COMMUNIST INSURGENCY IN THAILAND: STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001200010024-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 8, 2004
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: August 11, 1966
• Content Type: IM

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INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
COMMUNIST INSURGENCY IN THAILAND:
STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
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This Document contains information affecting the Na-
tional Defense of the United States, within the mean-
ing of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, as
amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents
to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited
by law. The reproduction of this form is prohibited.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
11 August 1966
Communist Insurgency in Thailand:
reng s an ea nesses
Summary
The growth of the Communist movement in Thai-
land over the past two years has raised the specter
of another protracted insurgent struggle in South-
east Asia. At the present time, however, the
balance sheet in Thailand does not appear to favor
the insurgents. An essentially stable socioeconomic
situation anal a long history of independent nation-
hood are key factors militating against Communist
efforts to win. popular support in the countryside.
In addition, the military oligarchy in Bangkok,
after a slow start, is now coming to grips with the
insurgent problem anal its counteroperations are
gathering momentum.
Nonetheless there are soft spots in. the Thai
internal situation which have favored the Communists
and which could prove to be increasingly troublesome
over the long haul. Despite the important progress
which has been. made, there are still substantial
underdeveloped and isolated areas which provide
favorable ground for the Communists. The govern-
ment?s political machinery throughout the country
remains extremely weak, anal the military oligarchy
does not appear to appreciate the contribution that
govern.men.t-backed political movements could make in
fighting the insurgents.
In. Bangkok, the Thanom-Praphat government is
enjoying its third year of stable rule, but serious
factional infighting, during which the counterinsurgency
repare by the Directorate of Intelligence anal co-
ordinated with the Office of National Estimates.
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effort would almost certainly suffer, could flare
up with little ~rarning. The present government's
greatest weakness in meeting the insurgent challenge,
however, is simply that it does not command substan-
tial popular support.
The Communist movement in. Thailand is still in
the embryonic stage, despite the increasing number
of insurgent incidents. It does not, for example,
yet exhibit the tight discipli.n.e and effective struc-
ture that is characteristic of Communist organiza-
tions in the neighboring countries. The Communists
also suffer from a severe shortage of experienced
and dedicated cadres, which has limited their ability
to expand into new areas. Despite these weaknesses,
the insurgents are likely to step up recruiting,
propaganda, and terrorism in the coming months.
In. the final analysis, the insurgency will be
limited less by the action of the Bangkok govern-
ment than by the fundamental strength of the Thai
nation .
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