AN APPRAISAL OF THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00826A001300010010-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 10, 2004
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: October 1, 1966
• Content Type: REPORT

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SECRET
AN APPRAISAL
OF THE
BOMBING
OF
NORTH VIETNAM
(THROUGH 11 OCT08ER 1966)
OCTOBER 1966
Prepared Jointly by
The Central Intelligence Agency
and
The Defense Intelligence Agency
DIA .review(s) completed.
E
R
C
XG LUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
EG RADING~ DOD DIR 5200,10
DOES NOT APPLY
SECRET
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`iris dcacuent captains in1'orznation a~feetin the national
ri.el'ense caf the United States within the meaning o~ tixe
~~a3cana~;e haws, Title 18, U.S;C. Sections `79;~ and `794.
"`he trar~sa.sion car re-ve3.ation oi' its contents in any
rrzanner to an unauthorised person is prcahibited by law,
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AN APPRAISAL OF TKE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM
THROUGII 11 OCTOBER 1966
Air strikes against North Vietnam in September
and early October continued at a high level with particular emphasis
on lines of communication (I,OC's), dispersed POL storage sites, and
transportation equipment. The campaign against North Vietnamese
POL continues to chip away at the country's bulk and dispersed
storage capacity, making it more difficult to import and distribute
POL. The North Vietnamese, however, }rave expended great efforts in
dispersing and concealing the remaining POL stocks thus making these
sites more difficult and costly targets for US forces. `T'here is
no evidence yet of a shortage of POL in North Vietnam.
Although air strikes against transport facilities
and equipment continued at a high level during September, the over-
all capability of the transport system to move supplies to axed
within North Vietnam apparently improved. Expansion of the rail
and road networks is continuing, and use of watercraft on -both the
inland and coastal waterways has been at a high level. Extensive
damage and de~?truction to watercraft and trucks in Military Region IV,
however, has undoubtedly hindered the movement of supplies in this
area. Nevertheless, there has been a major logistical buildup in
the area of the DM7 and there is no evidence of a serious shortage
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of supplies in Mili~tax?y Region IV. Communist truck movements over
-the Mu Gia Pass into Laos are reported to have begun earlier than
normal this year and traffic is also moving into Laos via the route
farther south (Route 137). Increased watercraft activity was noted
on the feeder routes in the vicinity of Nape and Mu Gia Passes
during September. In addition, significant coastal traffic in the
Dong Hoi area was apparent during September, probably in support of
the buildup in the DMZ area. It appears that more emphasis is being
placed on the movement of supplies by water instead of movement by
tree heavily interdicted roads, particularly in -the southern portions
of the country.
Three of the five major rail lines in the country
axe currently open for through service, including the two lines
important for the movement of foreign trade. Shuttle service
continues where necessary on the other lines. Sui'ficient time has
elapsed to complete the standard gauge line from Kep to TYiai Nguyen
as well as the conversion to dual gauge of the Dong Dang line from
Kep to the Chinese border.
There is still no evidence that the air strikes
have significantly weakened popular morale, and there is no known
serious or widespread opposition to the .regime.
The economy continues to show signs of strain
in the form of localized food shortages, lagging industrial growth,
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decreased agricult~zral production, reduced exports, and delays in
the implementation of plans for industrial development as a result
of the air strikes. The damage sustained by North Vietnam, however,
is in large measure compensated by aid received from other Communist
countries. 'i'he 1966 spring rice cY'op is estimated to be at least
200,000 metz'ic tons below tkie average spz'ing crop of the last five
years, because of poor weather and the disruptive effects of the
bombing on agricultural labor. The measurable damage to the
economy caused by the air strikes now stands at more tY~an
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Effects on Military Targets
The ROLLING THUNDER program during September
and early October was marked by continued high sortie rates and
generally favorable weather. Emphasis continues to be placed on
attacking lines of communication (LOC's), dispersed POL storage
sites, and transportation equipment. The campaign against North
Vietnamese POL continues ~to chip away at the country's bulk and
dispersed storage capacity. This effort has been effective in
making it more difficult to import and distribute POL. The North
Vietnamese have expended great effort, however, in dispersing and
concealing remaining POL stocks thus making tYiese sites more
difficult and costly targets for US forces. Strikes were made
during September against five major and over 160 dispersed POL
storage sites. As of 11 October 1866, about 80 per cent of the
JCS targeted POL storage capacity had. been destroyed. Because of
the dispersal program, it is not anticipated that serious recon-
struction of major bulk POL facilities will be attempted in the
near future.
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imports of POL into North Vietnam from China are estimated to be
continuing, and imports of POL by other means have probably occurred.
There is still no evidence of any advez?se military or economic effects
that can be attributed to attacks on POL facilities. It must there-
fore be assumed that POL stocks on hand and recent imports have been
adequate to sustain operations. This condition will undoubtedly con-
tinue until the major flow of POL into the country is curtailed. In
any event, high priority activities such as military transport, SAM
support, and aircraft operations will be sustained at the expense,
if necessary, of other POL consuming functions.
Although air strikes against transport .facilities
and equipment continued at a high level during September, the over-
all capability of the transport system to move supplies to and
within North Vietnam apparently has improved. Expansion of the
rail and road networks is continuing, and use of watercraft on both
the inland and coastal waterways has been at a high level. The
continuing high rate of destruction and damage to watercraft and
trucks in Military Region IV, however, has undoubtedly hindered
the movement of supplies in this area. Three of the five major
rail lines in the country are currently open .f'or through rail
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service, including the two lines important for the movement of
foreign trade -- the Hanoi-Dong Dang and the Hanoi-Haiphong lines.
Shuttle service continues on the other lines between and around
interdicted points. The rail line from Hanoi to Haiphong was
probably open during September to through traffic, and the Dong
Dang line was open for at least half of the month. The Hanoi-
Vinh and Hanoi-Lao Cai lines remain closed to through rail service,
but the Lao Cai line may be open for a small amount of through
traffic between Hanoi and the industrial cities of Lain Thao and
Viet Tri. Sufficient time has elapsed to complete the remaining
work on the standard gauge line from Kep to Thai Nguyen as well as
the conversion to dual gauge of the Dong Dang line from Kep to the
Chinese border. The completion of this work will provide an
alternate rail route for the Hanoi-Dong Dang rail line in case of
interdiction between Kep and the Hanoi area, and will permit the
use of the standard gauge rolling stock between China and the iron
and steel complex at Thai Nguyen. South of Hanoi, many bridges and
some rail yards and sidings were attacked on the Hanoi to Vinh
line with especially heavy damage reported to the rail facilities
in the Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa, and Phu Ly areas. Tlie destruction at
Phu Ly has disrupted rail service between Hanoi and the important
industrial city of Nam Dinli.
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 in the North Vietnamese Panhandle during September and early
October, with damage to the highway system above the 20th parallel
at a low level. The main coastal route soutYi of Thanh Hoa was
heavily cratered from Ninh Binh to the DMZ forcing traffic to use
the less direct bypass and secondary routes. Many destroyed
bridges now have lower caliber alternate facilities ranging from
seasonal fords to multiple ferries. It is entirely possible that
air actions in the North Vietnamese Panhandle have slowed the
intensive logistical buildup in the DMZ area. Nevertheless, the
buildup i.n the DMZ apparently continues, and there is no evidence
of any serious shortages of supplies in Military Region IV.
Communist truck movements into Laos over the Mu Gia Pass began
earlier than normal this year, according to roadwatch team reports.
Clearing weather and improved roads in Laos have probably facilitated
this early movement in the Mu Gia area. Traffic is also moving
into Laos via the route further south (Route 137).
Despite the large numbers of vehicles struck
during September, North Vietnam has been ablo to offset vehicle
losses by the continuing import of sizeable numbers of trucks from
other Communist countries. Nevertheless, the continued destruction
of trucks, coupled with heavy interdiction of the lines of com-
munication, undoubtedly is resulting in at least local shortages
of supplies and material. Th,e chart at Tab A contains the results
of strikes on North Vietnamese targets through 10 October 1966.
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Aerial operations during the period extended over
22 waterway routes with heavy emphasis placed on attacking craft on
inland routes as opposed to those transiting coastal waters.
Significant coastal watercraft activity was noted in the Dong Hoi
area during September, probably in support of the DMZ buildup.
Increased watercraft activity was also noted in the vicinity of the
feeder routes in the Nape and Mu Gia Pass areas. The recent use
of a Soviet ocean-going vessel to move coal from Cam Pha to Haiphong
may indicatethat power failures have seriously disrupted barge
J_oadings at tIon Gay, that there is now a shortage of barges in
northern watex?s, or that an effort is berg made to reduce the
exposure of North Vietnamese barges to air attack. In sum, it
appears that mox?e emphasis is being placed on the movement of
supplies by water. instead of movement by the heavily interdicted
roads, particularly in the southern portions of the country.
Despite tree intensity of US air strikes, Hanoi retains
the capability to continue support of activities in South Vietnam
and 1~aos everx at increased combat levels and force structures.
Moreover, tree armed forces of North Vietnam continue to expand and
the infil~trat:i.on o:I' men and material into South Vietnam and Laos
continues at a high rate. Nevertheless, it is estimated that the
North Vietnamese capability for overt aggression has been limited
by US air actions .
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Zeadership and Public Reactions
The North Vietnamese leadership in the past several
weeks has reasserted its determination to press on with the war in
spite of the US bombing raids on the DRV. Official DRV propaganda
statements during the same period have been equally rigid in
condemning recent proposals for negotiations offered by the US,
British and foreign statesmen at the UN. North Vietnam continues
to insist that the basis for any settlement of the war must rest
upon its terms.
From the point of view of general popular morale,
there continues 'to be no hard evidence that the willingness of the
population to bear the burdens of increasing air strikes has been
adversely affected to the extent that i~t might influence the
regime's war policy. The best evidence suggests that, despite the
hardships and shortages encountered by the general population,
there is still no serious or widespread opposition to the govern-
ment.
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Effects on the Economy
The economy of North Vietnam continues to show
signs of strain in the form of localized food shoY?tages, lagging
industrial growth, decreased agricultural production, reduced exports,
and delays in the implementation of plans for industrial development.
However, the transportation and petroleum distribution systems, the
two major military economic targets of the air strikes, apparently
continue to function at levels adequate to meet the essential
economic and current military requirements of the country.
11. ~ Communist aid to North Vietnam continues to be
the vital element in maintaining essential production and services
and in enabling Hanoi to defend 'the North and support the war in
the South. On 3 October, the USSR announced the conclusion of a
broad new aid agreement with North Vietnam which almost certainly
includes military supplies as well as economic assistance. The
agreement followed repeated Soviet assurances that economic and
military aid would continue on an "ever increasing" scale. Both
outright grants and additional credits are included in the Soviet
pact. Just prior to this agreement, North Vietnam signed new
agreements with China, North Korea, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, and Rumania. These agreements also are believed to have
provided for outright aid grants. The bulk of imports of civilian
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goods as well as of military supplies must now be paid for by
Communist aid since Hanoi's ability to export has deteriorated in
the last 18 months as a consequence of the air strikes. Exports
of coal, the principal earner of foreign exchange, were lower than
those recorded in any of the 18 previous months; and no seaborne
exports of cement and apatite were noted.
The 1866 spring rice crop -- which normally
accounts for about one-third of the annual harvest -- is estimated
to be at least 200,000 metric tons below the average spring crop of
the last five years (1.7 million metric tons . This shortfall, which
would be valued at about $17 million, is ?the x?esult of poor wea~thex?
and the disruptive effects of the bombing on the use of agricultural
labor. Imports, however, apparently have enabled the rice ration
to remain basically the same as in the past year. Although there
are no signs that the food situation is critical, reports of short-
ages of milk, flour, vegetables, and other foods in urban ax?eas
persist. These shortages are largely a result of delays in dis-
tribution caused by the bombing of the transportation system.
disruptions to daily life caused by evacuation, dispersal of
business and industry, changes in working schedules, and other
civil defense measures. The continued emphasis in the Hanoi press
on improved management of evacuation procedux?es suggests that the
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program in the large urban areas is moving slowly. There are
indications, moreover, that many urban inhabitants leave during
daylight hours but return a~t night to find housing and services.
from long-term development to maintenance of economic stability is
indicated by 'the apparent suspension, or' at least drastic curtail-
went, of construction of the Thac Ba hydroelectric power plant, the
largest under construction in North Vietnam.
is some two years away from completion. The most likely explanation
for the abandonment or delay of this project is a more immediate
need elsewhere for labor and construction materials. The demands of
the war had earlier caused the leadership to scrap a five-year plan
for economic development in 1966-70 in favor of a less ambitious
two-year plan.
There is as yet no evidence that the loss of
petroleum or petroleum facilities as a result of the bombing has
had a measurable effect on the economy of North Vietnam. Despite
the lack of any single oil storage facility with sufficient capacity
to accept the cargo of afully-loaded ocean tanker, the North
Vietnamese were able to discharge two Soviet tankers, each carrying
a=lsn.ost 11,000 tons of petroleum products, in about 20 and 15 days,
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respectively. If North Vietnam can continue this rate of acceptance,
it can satisfy its requirements for POL without z~esorting to
alternative means of supply. Inasmuch as no bulk POL cargoes for
North Vietnam have been diverted to China since August, this
particular expedient may now be unnecessary. Moreover, there are
indications that the USSR plans to supply POL to North Vietnam from
the Soviet Far East using small tankers.
Reports of continuing discovery of dispersed
storage tanks sites -- particularly on navigable waterways -- suggest
that North Vietnam probably is well prepared to store and distribute
its POL supply.
reveals that several damaged storage tanks which were still standing
after the bombings were being dismantled. This is probably part of
a salvage operation, and the dismantled tanks may be reconstructed
at another site.
Direct losses caused by air strikes against
economic and military facilities and equipment measured in terms of
estimated reconstruction or replacement cast are now estimated at
some 126 million as shown in the tabulation below.
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Economic Facilities and Equipment
Targets
Million
Dollars
Railroad/Highway Bridges
1/
Reconstruction
_
16.2
Temporary Repairs
3.6
Transportation Equipment
30.5
Railroad Yards and Ports
1.0
Electric Power Plants
11.5
Petroleum Storage
Facilities
2.3
Manufacturing Facilities
2.1
Telecommunications
Facilities
0.2
Airfields
Naval Craft
Miscellaneous Targets of
Armed Reconnaissance
Total 67.x+ Total 58.1E
1/ The estimate in this category is incomplete because of inadequate
post-strike photography.
2/ Includes ~2.1I- million expended to date on temporary repairs and
$1.2 million required to provide temporary repairs for structures
damaged but not yet restored to operable condition.
3/ Excludes destruction and damage to trucks in Laos. The estimated
value of damage and destruction to transportation equipment in
North Vietnam is based on pilot reports and may be somewhat overstated.
~+/ Excludes destruction and damage to support facilities and contents
of petroleum tanks.
5/ Includes five MIG-17's destroyed in 1965 but previously omitted
from this report.
2/
3/
Target s
Military Facilities and Equipment
Barracks
Million
Dollars
16.5
Ammunition Storage 1+.5
Naval Bases
Supply Depots
SAM Sites
~+/
Aircraft
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Measurable indirect losses include losses of foreign exchange earnings
1~+.1 million, losses in the 1865 fall rice crop of $3.5 million,
and an unknown part of the losses of at least $l7 million in the
1866 spring crop. In addition, there are many other losses and
costs to the economy and the military establishment which cannot be
assigned values. These include the loss of production and lower
productivity of labor resulting from the dispersal of industry, time
lost from work as a consequence of civil defense measures, and loss
of production caused by shortages of electric power.
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App - 10010-0
RESULTS OF STRIKES ON NVN TARG TS a
otal Tar ets
Targets
c
?~o of National Capacity
Fixed Targets
c
o.
d
Targeted
No ~ o
No ~
d
o
o.
ttacks
b~
Strike
Sorties
~~
Destro ell Inactive
Barracks
3 Man
2
39?
5
33
217
23
22.70
5?
Ammo Depots
12. MT
1
9 .7
13
-75.7
52
1155
73?
37.51
POL Storage
Suppl Depots
31. NPI'
0550 SQFT
13
2
NA
37.
11
17
19.0
57
51
9
Ol
NA
13. 0
NA
2.0
Power Plants
7 KW
20
9 .3
7
2
2 0
0.7
Maritime Ports
ST DY
95
2
17
21
13.0
2. 3
RR Yards
3.7 ST DY
7
2
19
1
13
?3
Explosive Plant
MT
1
100
1
100
3
2
71.
Airfields
23
~
12
35
Naval Bases
15
17
215
Brill es
3
217
2505
Comoro Install
5
2
2
15
Radar Sites
50
5
5
13
SAM Sites
130
7
2
33
Locks & Dams
1
2
2
10
Ferries
3
11
l
7
ti
3
1
Results
es: 9,
5
or
Tota
Armed ,Recce .Sorties D~estr_oYell Damaged
7 ,975 Vessels 335 5590
Vehicles 2261 2131
RR Stock 1~+8~- 1767
Assessments are based on best information recea.ved, will be refined as more accurate
information becomes available.
b~ Strike plus flak suppression sorties. Some applied to multiple targets; in this
summax'y assigned to principal target.
c~ National capacity in 1,000's where measurement shown except POL. Dispersed storage
capacity is not included.
d~ Percentages of national capacity where appropriate.
e~ Also numerous attacks during armed recce and other missions.
f~ Also numerous installations, AA sites, bridges, etc, attacked and road and rail cuts made.
~~ Per cent inactive due to dismantling or abandonment of facilities as a result of air
strikes.
(~) These columns are not additive, since the number of installations, both targeted and
struck in some cases, apply to more than one category of targets. (i.e., barracks,
supply and ammo depots).
NOTE: For comparative purposes.
US world-wide ammo storage capacity is 6,936,000 metric tons (CONUS 5,719,000 MT).
US world-wide military POL storage capacity is 15,x+52,000 MT; national US commercial
capacity is 151,325,000 MT; approximate average ~ value of 1 MT of POL products is $28.
US world-wide military supply depot covered storage space is 137,100,000 sq. ft.
(CONUS 121,300,000 sq. ft.).
Total kilowatt capacity of power plants serving metropolitan areas: New York - 7.6
trillion; Chicago - 6 million; Washington (DC and Md~suburbs only) - 2.>+ million.
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TAB A
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DISTRIBUTION LIST FOR DIA-CIA INTELLIGENCE REPORT
AN APPRAISAL OF THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM
THE WHITE HOUSE:
Vice President
Gen Maxwell Taylor
Mr. Bromley Smith
1 Cy
1 Cy
5 Cys
DEFENSE:
SECDEF 2 Cys
ASST SECDEF (ISA) 2 Cys
ASST SECDEF (Systems Analysis) 2 Cys
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET 1 Cy
TREASURY (Secretary) 1 Cy
USIA 1 Cy
AID 1 Cy
NASA 1 Cy
NSA 5 Cys
STATE 15 Cys
AEC 1 Cy
FBI 1 Cy
NIC 1 Cy
ACDA 1 Cy
CHAIRMAnT, JCS 1 Cy
DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF 1 Cy
J-1 1 Cy
J-3 2 Cys
J-~+ 1 Cy
J-5 1 Cy
J-6 1 Cy
SALSA 1 Cy
NMCC 3 Cys
ARMY:
CHIEF OF STAFF 2 Cys
DCSOPS 1 Cy
ACSFOR 1 Cy
ACSI 1 Cy
ACSI-CI 1 Cy
ACSI-Eastern 1 Cy
STAG 1 Cy
NAVY:
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
DNI
OP- 921E
OP-922Y1
OP-922Y2
OP-92B1
2 Cys
1 Cy
1 Cy
1 Cy
1 Cy
1 Cy
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 Apps
AIR FORCE:
CHIEF OF STAFF
ACS,I~USAF
AFNINDE
AFNIEBB
AFISI (Spec Investigation)
AUL (Air Univ Library)
MARINE CORPS:
COMMANDANT
G-2
CINCPAC
CTNCPACAF
CINCUSARPAC
CINCPACFLT
COMUSMACV
7AF'
CO.NISEVENTHFLT
COMA.TKCARSTRIKEFORSEVENTHFLT (CTF
CINCLANT
CINCSTRII{F
CINCSAC
SAC 5~-4
CINCTAC
AFSTRIKF
CONTIC
CINCALCOM
CTNCEUR
CINCUSAREUR
CINCUSAFE
CINCNAVEUR
CINCCONAD
cIA
D IADR
D IADD
DIAIIP
SC-1
XX
AP-2
AP- 2A 3
AP- 2F
AP-1
AF-1C3
AP-1H2
CO-2C
JT
CI
77)
2 Cys
1 Cy
6 Cys
]. Cy
1 Cy
1 Cy
1 Cy
1 Cy
Cys
Cy
Cy
Cy
Cys
Cys
Cy
Cy
Cy
Cy
Cy
Cy
Cy
Cy
Cy
Cy
Cy
Cy
Cy
Cy
r,T
1 Cy
1 Cy
1 Cy
1 Cy
1 Cy
1 Cy
2 Cys
~+ Cys
1 Cy
1 Cy
1 Cy
1 Cy
1 Cy
1 Cy
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.A1'-1R2
AP-1R3
.AP-1T
JS
1 Cy
1 Cy
2 Cys
1 Cy
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