COMMUNISM IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82R00025R000500260029-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 6, 2005
• Sequence Number: 29
• Publication Date: July 19, 1965
• Content Type: PAPER

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The account of events in the section of this paper
entitled "the rebellion" is a reconstruction of
developments based on reports which in some cases
were received some time after the fact due to delays
necessitated by security of communications and the
chaotic situation prevailing.
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19 July 1965
Communism in the Dominican Republic
I. The Pre-Rebellion Period
History -- The Communist Party of the Dominican Re-
public originated in the late 1930's and early 1940's with a
group of Spanish Communist exiles who came to the country
after the end of the Spanish Civil War. In the Dominican
Republic, these Spanish Communists established a network of
front organizations and publications and began to proselytize.
They appealed mainly to anti-Trujillo intellectuals, particu-
larly among the university students. Although Trujillo
courted the Soviet Union during World War II, Dominican Comu-
nists were jailed or kept under surveillance, and operated
underground from 1942 until 1945. In 1945 the Dominican Com-
munist Party was formed under the leadership of such men as
Pericles Franco Ornes, Francisco Henriquez, and the Ducoudray
brothers -- Juan Bautista and Felix Servio Ducoudray Mansfield.
In mid-1945 the police prohibited Communist propaganda activi-
ties and leading Dominican Communists sought diplomatic asylum
and exile. Most sought refuge in Cuba.
Late in 1946, exiled Communist leaders returned to
the Dominican Republic at the invitation of General Trujillo,
who was preparing an "election" which would permit him once
again to become chief executive. The Communists supposedly
were to be allowed freedom of operation while the Trujillo
government could take credit for furthering democracy by
allowing opposition groups to take part in the life of the
nation. The Dominican Popular Socialist Party (Partido
Socialista Popular Dominicano - PSPD)--currently a~ c e in the
re e ion ?was'?Iega y es a ished as the official Communist
Party in the country and began holding public campaign meet-
ings. This recognition scheme, which was to become a favorite
Trujillo maneuver, was short-lived. The PSPD was suppressed
shortly before the 1947 elections and its principal leaders
were put in jail and then exiled.
The Dominican Communist exiles established their head-
quarters in Guatemala and began publishing Orientation, which
was smuggled back into the Dominican Republic. Ater the fall
of the Arbenz government in Guatemala in 1954 the Dominicans
moved their headquarters first to Mexico and then to Cuba,
where it remained until after the death of Trujillo.
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Prior to the assassination of Trujillo in May 1961,
the Cuban-based PSPD members were negotiating with him in an
effort to re-establish a Communist organization in the Domini-
can Republic. During the months of negotiations, there were
no Cuban propaganda attacks on the Dominican dictator. Imme-
diately after his assassination the Cubans reacted with accu-
sations of US government complicity in the deed.
With the relaxation of controls that followed the
death of Trujillo, exiled Communists began joining the re-
turning Dominican exiles. By early 1962, extremist propagan-
da leaflets signed by the Central Committee of the PSPD be-
gan appearing in the Republic. The PSPD also beamed a daily
radio program to the Dominican Republic from Cuba. Communists
became increasingly active in the labor field and suspected
Communists headed both the United Workers' Front for Autono-
mous Trade Unions (FOUPSA) and the now defunct National Federa-
tion of Public Employees and Autonomous Institutions (FENEPIA).
Although the Central Committee of the PSPD in October
1962 declared itself opposed to the Council of State govern-
ment and the forthcoming December 1962 elections, it cautioned
leftist forces in the Dominican Republic against being drawn
into armed insurrection in which they would probably be de-
feated. This stand against violence reflected the PSPD's
quarrel over tactics with the more extremist elements of the
far left, a disagreement which impeded the unification of
leftist forces into a "popular front" movement.
The election of Juan Bosch raised expectations within
the party that the new government would be initially left-of-
center, followed by a definite swing to the left that would
create a political situation favorable to Communist activities.
By the time Bosch had been inaugurated as President in Febru-
ary 1963, most Communist party leaders had returned to the
Dominican Republic loudly praising Communist Cuba and express-
ing conditional support for Bosch. Although still illegal,
the PSPD operated without much restraint during the short Bosch
administration. Bosch :refused to take repressive action
against the extreme leftist groups so long as they pursued
their ends by peaceful means. He apparently wanted to avoid
forcing the extreme left completely underground and into a
position where they would probably resort to violence--as had
happened in Venezuela under President Betancourt. The PSPD,
for its part, followed a double-faced policy toward the Bosch
government. On one side they concentrated most of their propa-
ganda resources on advancing the line that the government was
in imminent danger from an ultra-reactionary plot, involving
elements of the military and the "imperialists." Although the
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Communists emphasized the desirability of protecting
the "democratic forces," they made almost no mention of
the Bosch administration. The Communists, along with
other extreme leftist groups, hoped to lead the anti-
coup forces without committing themselves too much to
the regime. The other side of their position involved
exerting pressure on the government for more "revolu-
tionary" measures, with the intent to exploit for
their own benefit Bosch's failure to deliver on his
promises.
Shortly after the military coup which ousted
the Bosch regime on 25 September 1963, the Triumvirate
government declared all Communist organizations and
activities illegal, and forced the PSPD underground once
again. PSPD members probably joined other political
parties and the country's leading labor organizations,
but had little success in subverting any major group.
The Communists have influence in only one trade union,
the Dominican Workers' Union (Union Dominicana de
Trabajadores Sindicalizados), known a _s "La Union,"
and even here the extent of their influence is difficult
to determine
Communist indoctrinators and recruiters have
concentrated their efforts in the schools with marked
success. Communist and Cuban propaganda is distributed
more or less freely in the schools. The average worker
or peasant in the Dominican Republic is semi--illiterate
and incapable of absorbing Communist doctrines quickly,
while the students are usually avid readers and, as in
other Latin American countries, become involved in
politics at an early age. Fragua (Forge), the pro-
communist student organization, has, since its founding
in February 1962, largely dominated campus politics at
the Autonomous University of Santo Domingo. General
student apathy toward campus elections and the militancy
of the pro-Communists help Fragua control the Dominican
Students' Federation (Federaci n de Estudiantes Domini-
canos - FED), the official organization o the student
body.
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The MPD (Movimiento Popular Dominicano) was organized
in 1956 by Dominican exiles in Cuba, where MPD members actively
supported Fidel Castro. In June 1960 Trujillo, in hopes of
favorably influencing opinion in the Western Hemisphere, allowed
MPD leaders to return to the Dominican Republic to form a token
opposition. Within two months the Dominican government arrested
MPD leaders Maximo Lopez Molina and Andros Marcelino Ramos
Peguero and had the party headquarters looted by mobs. Lopez
Molina had been expelled from the PSPD in 1956. He was accused
of following the "Chinese heresy," Although the MPD operated
for only a short time and at Trujillo's pleasure, it gained
considerable popularity and established itself as a bona fide
anti-Trujillo organization.
Lopez and Ramos were released in March 1961 and the
MPD was given new guarantees by Trujillo who was again making
overtures to the OAS. Following Trujillo's assassination
at the end of May 1961, Lopez and other party leaders reactivated
the MPD amid extremist speeches filled with anti-US and pro-
Castro propaganda. Party leaders denied favoring violence
or Communism, but the MPD created disorders in Santo Domingo
and their public declarations contained an unmistakable note
of class warfare. The MPD political banner--a red and black
flag with an upraised fist--supported the extremist impres-
sion. Although mobs organized by the government repeatedly
sacked MPD headquarters during the summer of 1961, by Septem-
ber the party had an estimated 7,000 members and was pene-
trating other opposition groups in the Dominican Republic.
During the period the MPD, in cooperation with the PSPD,
unsuccessfully attempted to unite all leftist parties into a
common political front. In October 1961, as a result of mob
violence instigated by the MPD, the government of Joaquin
Balaguer declared the MPD illegal. The internal security
agency obtained official membership lists and deported the
party leaders.
Until the inauguration of Juan Bosch in February
1963, the MPD was subjected to sporadic harassment by the
government and went underground. It lost most of its popular
following and increasingly resorted to provoking riots and
mob violence led by disgruntled youth drawn largely from the
lowest urban classes. When MPD leaders returned from exile
in the spring of 1963 the party tried once again to set up
a united front of leftist parties. Although the party was
still outlawed, Lopez was allowed to travel throughout the
country publicizing the ideas of "national liberation" and
the popular front, which were echoed in the clandestine
party news organ, Libertad. At this time MPD leaders
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were receiving guerrilla warfare training in Cuba and the
MPD began cooperating with the APCJ in instruction and indoc-
trination in military operations.
Shortly after the September 1963 military coup the
MPD, along with the PSPD, was declared illegal by the govern-
ing Triumvirate. Arrests of MPD leaders more or less
eliminated the MPD from the guerrilla campaign of late 1963.
Maximo L6pez Molina and nine of his followers with a supply
of weapons were arrested near Cotui in October 1963. In
early December government forces captured several high-ranking
MPD members during an attempted landing from a ship called
the Scarlet Woman and discovered an arms cache nearby.
MPD strength is found among members of the poor
urban classes, and many of the leaders come from this group.
The rest of the leaders are lower-middle class university
students or professionals, most of whom have laboring-class
family backgrounds. Without close family ties, often without
employment, they and their largely unlettered followers form
a highly combative group of the dispossessed.
The Cuban government has presumably.supported exiled
MPD members while they were in Cuba and facilitated their
travel to and from Cuba. Many MPD members have received
guerrilla warfare training in Cuba, and in July 1963 it was
reported that a member of the MPD central committee returned
to the Dominican Republic with money from Cuba for MPD ac-
tivities. It is probable that some of these Cuban-trained.
Dominicans are illegal agents of the Cuban Government, un-
known to their MPD colleagues. The only evidence of Cuban
attempts to supply weapons was found in December 1963,
when Dominican officials captured Cayetano Rodriguez del
Prado and Islander Selig Delmonte, two high-ranking MPD mem-
bers attempting to land, and discovered an arms cache nearby.
The Fourteenth of June Political Group
The extreme leftist 14th of June Political Group
(Agrupaci6n Politica Catorce de Junio --APCJ) is a pro-
as r o - p o u t -ca - o r ganiza i.on which came into existence in
the late 1950's as a clandestine movement aimed at unseating
Trujillo. As an anti-Trujillo organization, the APCJ
originally attracted members from a broad political spectrum,
many from wealthy and socially prominent families. The name,
14th of June, commemorates an abortive invasion attempt
mounted from Cuba on 14 June 1959. In January 1960 the
APCJ was implicated in a plot to kill Trujillo, with the re-
sult that many of its members were imprisoned and tortured.
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The APCJ was not involved in Trujillo's assassination on 30
May 1961. Shortly after Trujillo's death and apparently at
the insistence of the extreme leftist faction of the move-
ment, the APCJ assumed the role of a functioning political
party,. In late 1961 the APCJ refused to enter the Council
of State government proposed by President Joaquin Balaguer.
The increasingly pro-Communist orientation of the APCJ caused
moderate leaders to resign from the party in January 1962,
leaving the APCJ in the hands of extremists. By April 1962
the APCJ was organizing armed groups, and stocking arms
caches for future guerrilla activities. The party's public
pronouncements became increasingly anti-US and pro-Castro,
reflecting the dominant position of pro-Communist forces.
The APCJ did not participate as a party in the
December 1962 elections, basing their abstention on the
accusation that the Council of State was maintaining the
repressive machinery--the police and the army--of the Trujillo
dictatorship. After the inauguration of the popularly-elected
Juan Bosch i-n--*pt-i-?963 j the APCJ applied for recognition as
a legal political party, which was granted in May 1963 by the
superior electoral tribunal. The party continued, however,
to organize clandestine cells, and party leaders appeared
to be in full agreement with Marxist-Leninist solutions to
the economic and social problems of the country.
During 1963 extreme leftist groups, especially the
MPD, attempted to unite all Dominican leftists into a popular
front. Personal rivalries, however, doomed the proposed
front.
After the 25 September 1963 coup the APCJ attempted
to rally non-Communist opponents--the PRD and the PRSD--into
a national front to "struggle for the restoration of consti-
tutionality..." By late October 1963, however, when it be-
came apparent that anti-coup forces would not join forces
with the pro-Castro APCJ, party leaders decided to commence
the much discussed but poorly planned armed insurrection.
The APCJ temporarily joined forces with the extreme
leftist MPD under the banner of the Revolutionary Movement
14th of June (Movimiento Revolucionario 14 de Junio --
MR-1J4), and iY_N_o_v_eFFe_r_ 1963 a force esUmaTe -about 130
men took to the mountains. Leaders of the MR-1J4 apparently
hoped that the uprising would point out the instability of
the triumvirate government and make the MR-1J4 the leader for
the presumed growing discontent with the government in the
Dominican Republic. They failed in both hopes. The MPD
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guerrilla contingent was quickly captured, and the uprising
attracted little sympathy. PSPD leaders, who continued to
counsel against violence, withheld their support. On 2 Decem-
ber 1963 the government, using an October 1963 anti-subversion
decree, declared the APCJ illegal. Campesinos in the zones
of operation refused to aid the guerillas in spite of efforts
to win them over. Dominican army leaders crushed the uprising
within a month.
The death of several leaders and the imprisonment
or deportation of others such as Jaime Duran, Fidelio Des-
pradel, Juan Roman Diaz and Pablo Johnson Ortiz, left the
APCJ disorganized and divided. During 1964 some wanted to
rehabilitate the APCJ as a legal political party, others
wanted to continue as a subversive group aiming at the violent
overthrow of the de facto government. By October 1964, how-
ever, Cuban-trained APCJ leaders began returning clandestinely
to the Dominican Republic and the prospects for a more active
APCJ became manifest.
Although little information is available on the
sources of APCJ funds, the party probably supports itself by
contributions from members, sympathizers, and businessmen
hoping to buy protection, and by the sale of the party news-
paper, El lJ4.
The most important group in the APCJ is the political
bureau, and the organization includes a central executive com-
mission or committee, provincial committees, and cells.
Leaders of the APCJ before the recent rebellion appeared to be:
Rafael Baez Perez Luis Genao
Norge Botello Fernandez Juan B. Mejia
Fidelio Arturo Despradel Roque
Jaime Duran. Hernando Daniel Ozuna Hernandez
Roberto Duverge Juan Miguel Roman
Rafael Francisco Taveras Rosario
Since .1961 the aim of the APCJ has been a revolution
for national liberation from what they term the domination
of the landowners, the oligarchy, the upper bourgeoisie, and
US imperialism. The Castro revolution in Cuba is its model:..
The APCJ is openly pro-Castro and maintains a repre-
sentative in Havana. The Cuban Government is known to have
trained APCJ members in guerrilla warfare, sheltered APCJ
exiles and assisted them to infiltrate back into the Dominican
Republic. Radio Habana has furnished propaganda support to
the AP'CJ as we as boo other extreme leftist groups in the
Dominican Republic.
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Beginning last autumn, the Communists and allied
extremists who had been deported following the abortive
guerrilla effort began filtering back into the Dominican Re-
public. They.-came back by a variety of circuitous routes
and used various clandestine means of entering. Some were
caught by the Dominican authorities. Most were not. Even
some of those arrested were not sentenced because Communist
lawyers were able to intimidate and influence the judges.
A few were released on bail and never appeared for trial.
By early April of this year, on the eve of the insurrection,
there were nearly 50 Communists or allied extremists back
in the country after varying periods in exile.
The returnees who came back during the six months
that preceded the outbreak of the insurrection included
many who were to take very prominent parts in the fighting.
Among the more prominent were Juan Miguel Roman Diaz, top
APCJ militant who was killed on 19 May leading an attack on
the loyalist-held national palace; Jaime Duran Hernando,
another prominent APCJ leader who is now reliably reported
to be hiding out in the interior; Daniel Ozuna Hernandez, an
APCJ militant active during the insurrection; Cayetano
Rodriguez del Prado, top MPD leader also active during
the fighting; Baldemiro Castro Garcia, an MPD leader who
took part in the rebel raid on San Francisco de Macoris on
25 Juno; Tomas Erickson Alvarez, an MPD activist who was
captured by loyalist forces during the early stages of the
fighting; Felix Servio Ducoudray Mansfield, top PSPD leader
who is playing an active political role in the rebel camp;
Franklin Franco Pichardo, another ranking PSPD "politician"
who has been particularly close to rebel foreign minister
Cury; and the PSPD militant fighter Antonio Isa Conde. Many
of the returnees had been active in the abortive guerrilla
effort of late 1963.
effort, however, the Dominican security organization did not
develop into a competent service. Capable and educated men
could not be induced to serve in it and Reid insisted on
25X1
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diverting its few trained men away from their primary task
of controlling Communist subversion and instead continually
assigned them to investigate smuggling and to collect in-
formation on his non-Communist political opponents. Reid
never seemed to take the subversive threat as seriously the facts would seem to have justified
One factor that made the situation particularly
vulnerable in the case of the Reid government was the fact
that the Communist parties had found an exploitable issue--
one which placed them on the same side as the non-Communist
political parties which had the greatest popular support.
That issue was the one of "constitutionalism" and anti-
militarism, reflecting the public's opposition to the mili-
tary coup of September 1963 and the unpopular governments
that had followed.
The Rebellion
In its earliest moments, the rebellion appeared to
be a coup by anti-Reid officers, some of whom'had old scores
to settle.with their superiors, and some of whom were intent
on returning Bosch from exile in Puerto Rico. Many PRD mem-
bers who had not been involved in the plotting quickly threw
in with the rebels; a provisional government headed by PRD
member Rafael Molina Urena was proclaimed and Bosch was
asked to return.
It now appears, however, that extremist and Commu-
nist groups had advance word of the revolt, not surprising
in Santo Domingo where plotting had been endemic and the
subject of frequent gossip. Some lower-level PRD members
are reported, moreover, to have been in contact with some
extremist leaders and seeking support for a coup effort.
In any event, once news of the revolt became public
on the afternoon of 24 April, these extremist groups moved
quickly to participate. Leaders of the three Communist
parties began collecting arms, organizing their forces, and
establishing strongpoints in Santo Domingo. The PSPD estab-
lished its principal strongpoint, or garrison, at the house
of party leader Buenaventura Johnson Pimentel at #56 Calle
Espaillat. Crudely fortified machine-gun emplacements were
set up on the roof of the house. PSPD activists, including
Johnson, Nicolas Pichardo Vicioso, Manuel Ortiz, Ignacio
Perez, and others were observed on 25 April making Molotov
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cocktails and crude grenades at the house, which continued
to serve as an arsenal and as headquarters for the main
PSPD paramilitary forces until 27 April. The PSPD moved
its headquarters to the house of Rafael Esteves Weber on
the night of 27 April, probably for security reasons, but
the Johnson house has remained an important stronghold and
arsenal.
A building on the corner of Arzobispo Portes
Avenue and Sanchez Street also served as a PSPD stronghold
during this period. Diomedes Mercedes Garcia, Jose Rodriguez
Acosta, and other PSPD leaders were observed there and were
seen leading a paramilitary force armed with submachine guns
and rifles, Molotov cocktails and hand grenades.
The APCJ is known to have established a strongpoint
during this same period on Jose Gabriel street near the
Malecon in the Ciudad Nueva section of the city. A heavily
armed paramilitary force was seen using this building as a
base. A headquarters and strongpoint of MPD guerrillas was
established on Benigue Street in the Ciudad Nueva area.
On the first day of the rebellion the military
rebels, fearful that the high command would move rapidly
against them, opened the arsenals of Santo Domingo and be-
gan passing out weapons to civilians. One such arsenal
was at the "27 February" camp on the outskirts of the city.
This and similar actions elsewhere on subsequent days pro-
vided the leaders of the various Communist and extremist
groups with the materiel they needed to supplement their
own collection of arms and become a significant factor in
the rebellion.
Buenaventura Johnson Pimentel, Juan Ducoudray Mans-
field, Jaime Duran Hernando and Fidelio Despradel Roques
were particularly active in acquiring weapons and equipping
their followers in both the PSPD and APCJ. The last of
these Des radel had been trained in Cuba, and according
to had been given $20,000 by the Chinese
Communist m assy in Paris for use by the Dominican Commu-
nists. All these men appeared to be responsive to direction
from Manuel Gonzalez Gonzalez, a Spanish Communist veteran
of the Spanish civil war.
By the afternoon of Sunday, April 25, the situation
in Santo Domingo had become chaotic and confused. Violence
had begun but there was more feinting and jabbing than sig-
nificant action. Some of the rebels, particularly among the
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military, were tempted by offers from the loyalists for the
establishment of a new junta which would seek a solution,
presumably along traditional compromise lines. The Wessin
forces, apparently taken by surprise, were reacting slowly
and not effectively. In this situation the Communists were
intent on strengthening popular participation in the revolt.
Public address cars manned by identifiable PSPD members
prowled the city directing the crowds to tactical positions.
At this point the PRD leaders appeared to share
the initiative with rebel officers; the Communists were
busying themselves with organizing the distribution of
weapons to "reliable" groups and rounding up manpower for
civilian militia units. It was in this period that the
various Communist parties established their weapons depots
and set up disbursing controls.
As they established their organizations to assure
the military effectiveness of the civilian rebels, the
Communists apparently also began to turn their attention
to the political ends of the revolt. On the night of
April 25th and the early morning hours of April 26 rebel
leaders consulted in the captured Presidential Palace on
strategy and on the composition of a provisional govern-
ment. To these meetings came PSPD leaders Milvio Perez
and S:ilvano Lora, as well as a Cuban-trained guerrilla
fighter of the APCJ, Facundo Gomez.
These conversations in the palace showed for the
first time not only that the Communists were intent on win-
ning influence in the rebellion, but that they already had
a degree of bargaining power. The government formed by
Molina after these consultations included as Attorney General,
Alfredo Conde Pausas, who had two sons in the PSPD. The
Director of the National Department of Investigations--the
security service--was to be Luis Homera Lajara Burges, re-
ported to be an underground member or associate of the PSPD;
the sub-director was to be Lajara's son, an APCJ militant
with a. long record of arson.
PSPD leaders, and particularly Diomedes Mercedes
Garcia, commented on several occasions during the early days
of the insurrection that they were very pleased with the
attitude of Captain Mario Pena Taveras, one of the army rebel
leaders, whom they described as a "friend of the party."
Another rebel leader, the lawyer and retired army officer
Rafael E. Saldana Jimenez, was acting as legal adviser to
the rebel military officers occupying the National Palace
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between 24 and 27 April. Saldana is closely connected to the
APCJ and is reported to have used his military connections dur-
ing 1.963 to obtain weapons for the APCJ. APCJ and MPD lead-
ers are known to have been in communication with Saldana on
27 April and at other times.
Thus by the night of April _2i the rebellion was
undergoing a rapid evolution. The Communist militants among
the rebel forces had established their credentials as effec-
tive and ruthless leaders. They were recruiting supporters
with sound trucks and manufacturing Molotov cocktails for
use against Wessin's tanks. This latter task was a specialty
of PSPD members. APCJ activists organized in patrols were
arresting "political prisoners" and often meting out rough
justice on the spot.
Monday, April,21, was the last full day of the short-
lived Molina rebel government. The day began with sporadic
bombardments of the downtown area of Santo Domingo by loyalist
planes and naval guns. While casualties were being sustained
in the rebel sectors, ten members of the PSPD were meeting
at the home of Nicolas Pichardo Viciosio to plan the destruc-
tion of the city by fire if Wessin's troops entered. This was
apparently characteristic of the Communists' doggedness dur-
ing this bleakest hour for the rebels. Before the night was
over it had become the dominant mood of the workers' quarters
embittered by the bombing raids. Some of the military rebels
apparently had had enough, but they were relieved of their
weapons by rebels before being allowed to defect to the loyal-
ists.
The principal defections at this stage of the rebel-
lion besides that of Molina were those of Jose Pena Gomez,
Colonel Hernando Ramirez, and Antonio Martinez Francisco,
the secretary general of the PRD. After he had withdrawn
from the rebel camp and taken refuge, Jose Pena Gomez, a
prominent PRD loader, informed a US Embassy officer that he
considered his movement to have been defeated. He admitted
that the Communists who joined the rebel force had infiltrated
into positions of importance and that it was very difficult
to stop them. Molina, who took asylum in the Colombian Em-
bassy, is reported to have said on 5 May that he wanted to
get the truth of Communist infiltration across to the world,
but that he could not face further jeopardizing his and his
family's safety. He reportedly said that he was already under
:intense attack by the Communists for opposing them. Also,
he was reluctant to make any statement that would force him
to give up asylum.
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Martinez made his way out of the rebel lines and
on April 28th addressed the nation over San Isidro radio,
controlled by the forces of General Wessin y Wessin. In
that broadcast, Martinez said: "I beg all to lay down their
arms; turn them in to the nearest military post, because
this is no longer a fight between political parties."
Communists did, in fact, clearly dominate the rebel
movement between 28 April and 2 or 3 May. They were in ob-
vious control after having filled the vacuum created when
moderate non-Communist political leaders who had been in con-
trol lost heart for the fight and abandoned it. The moderate-
led rebel government of Rafael Molina Urena collapsed on
27 April and most members of Juan Bosch's Dominican Revolu-
tionary Party (PRD) went into hiding or took asylum in Latin
American embassies. Most of the rebel military officers who
had initially sparked the revolt also went into hiding. Even
Colonel Caamano was briefly in asylum. The collapse was
brought on largely by the movement of loyalist army troops
toward the rebel strongholds and recognition on the part of
the non-Communist rebel leaders that their forces could not
have prevailed over the superior military power then moving
toward them under General Wessin y Wessin and other loyalist
commanders.
The Communists and their extremist allies had no
place to hide and they prepared on 27 and 28 April to de-
fend the rebel stronghold to the last ditch. The Commu-
nists, in short, upheld rebel resistance when it otherwise
would have completely collapsed. This is what they are un-
likely to permit the non-Communist rebel leaders to forget.
This is an important source of their present strength and
their influence in the Caamano government.
Actually, the Communists were not brought to the
ultimate test. The expected loyalist onslaught on the city
did not come during the crucial days of 27 and 28 April.
The "gutless generals" on the loyalist side were unable or
unwilling to bring their well-equipped forces into action
against the rebel stronghold. The much-vaunted Dominican
military establishment was, in fact, on the point of utter
disintegration by the evening of 28 April when the first
US Marines landed. It was not until 13 May that loyalist
forces became sufficiently stiffened to take the military
offensive. By that time, US troops were interposed between
them and the main rebel stronghold.
Between 28 April and the first two days of May
the Communists and their extremist allies were the only
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effective rebel holdouts--together with the naive youths man-
ning the barricades under Communist leadership. By 3 May, how-
ever, various of the moderate PRD leaders had come out of
hiding and asylum, returned to rebel headquarters, and began
resuming at least nominal control. The presence of US troops
and the continuing impotence of the loyalist military gave
them at least some confidence that there would be no all-
out loyalist onslaught on the city. On 4 May, the non-Commu-
nists of the rebel movement formed a government under Colonel
Caamano and composed of non-Communists, including some highly
respected moderate leftists. Thus, the rebels were able to
re-establish the picture of a moderate leftist regime dedicated
to the fulfillment of a popular revolution. Communists were
not obvious in the rebel camp by the time the bulk of US and
other foreign newsmen arrived on the scene. The Caamano gov-
ernment proceeded to try to establish a respectable front
and to try to enhance its bargaining position for the political
discussions and the negotiations with the UN and the OAS that
were to follow. This is, in general, the situation as it has
prevailed since that date.
There is voluminous testimony as to the Communists'
continuing important role in the rebel movement. This was
acknowledged even by Antonio Guzman, who was under considera-
tion as a new ;president of a PRD-weighted anti-Communist gov-
ernment. Guzman repeatedly stressed in his conversations
with high-level US officials that he could not afford to act
against the Communists in the rebel movement in a precipitous
manner. He seemed to be honestly convinced that he would be
unable to lead the kind of government that would have the
support of a significant portion of the non-Communist rebel
movement if he were required first to deport or take other
strong action against Communists and other extremists who
were with the rebels. Such action, he said, would only have
the effect of creating more Communists.
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