MILITARY SHOWDOWN IN THE FALKLANDS: ALTERNATIVE OUTCOMES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83B01027R000100040027-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 20, 2005
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: May 20, 1982
• Content Type: MF

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DDI #4242-81
20 May 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, National Intelligence Council
SUBJECT : Military Showdown in the Falklands: Alternative Outcomes
1. With the failure of Secretary General"Perez de Cuellar's mediation efforts
and with both Britain and Argentina placing the blame for the impasse on each other,
the Falklands crisis will be settled by a test of military strength, skill and
resourcefulness and by a potentially more decisive trial of political stamina in
London and Buenos Aires. There are so many variables in the balance of assets and
liabilities-ranging from unexpected changes in weather and sea conditions to the
indeterminate location of two Argentine attack submarines that the outcome could
be determined as much by the random play of Murphy's Law as by the measureable
military capabilities and political competence of the two sides.
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2. Another possibly decisive but unpredictable determinant may be the
rceptions and psychological predispositions of the Thatcher government and the
Argentine junta.
3. Both governments have locked themselves into positions that cannot be
compromised without fatal domestic consequences. Thatcher's original calculation
that "diplomatic efforts are more likely to succeed if backed by military strength"
has been refuted by the junta's performance during the past eight weeks. The
junta's gamble that the U.S. or the United Nations would somehow broker a compromise
that would preserve at least a reasonable prospect of vindicating Argentina's claim
to sovereignty over the islands has backfired. Now that their mutual bluffs have
been called, London and Buenos Aires are left with an immensely risky roll of the
iron dice.
Alternative Outcomes
A. An unambiguous British military victory. The British are counting on a
prompt collapse of Argentine resistance following initial engagements with the
invasion force and on a surrender of the Argentine garrison without substantial
casualties. The failure of Argentine forces on South Georgia and Pebble Islands to
offer more than token resistance will have encouraged the British to expect little
effective or prolonged opposition. At the outset, the British may elect to avoid
engaging the main body of Argentine forces in the Port Stanley area by staging their
2 5lnitial landings in outlying areas such as Port Darwin and Fox Bay. The British
bbelieve that the rapid defeat or surrender of these outposts will demoralize the
Port Stanley garrison and soften it up for either quick defeat or surrender.
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a c er s confidence in a quick and relatively painless: victory
was reflected in her remark on 17 May that if Galtieri does not make major con-
cessions, "We make him go." S.
B. An inconclusive initial round of combat leading to a war of attrition
with heavy casualties on both sides. Successful British landings will be countered
by all-out retaliatory strikes by the Argentine Air Force and Navy that will avert
an early demoralization and collapse of Argentine resistance on the ground. The
junta is determined to maintain resistance regardless of the costs in lives and
equipment, and it is gambling that a British failure to force a prompt surrender
and the shock of heavy losses of British personnel, aircraft and ships will bring
down the Thatcher government. The junta has persuaded itself that Argentina can
outlast the British in a costly and inconclusive war of attrition, and that support
for Thatcher's policy will evaporate quickly in these conditions, politically
disarming Britain from continuing the war.
C. British landing operations will be defeated by a combination of stiff
resistance by the Argentine garrison and damaging air and naval attacks on the
British invasion force and fleet. Thatcher will be forced to resign and her
successor will have no choice but to order the evacuation of the invasion force.
Argentine Political Initiatives
The Argentines will respond immediately to a British invasion by announcing
acceptance of Perez de Cuellarts final proposal for a compromise agreement.
Following Britain's expected rejection of this proposal, Argentina will request a
UN Security Council meeting at wiiich it will propose, through Panama's delegate,
an immediate and unconditional ceasefire in place without provisions for a mutual
withdrawal of forces. This move will be aimed at forcing a British veto, supported
by the U.S. The Argentines believe these initiatives will place the onus squarely
on Britain for a continuation of hostilities and greatly strengthen Argentina's
position in negotiations under the Secretary General's aegis that will be renewed.
The junta also will calculate that British rejection of these two "peace moves" will
stimulate a backlash in British public opinion and parliament that will bring
Thatcher down, even if she is not forced out by heavy British combat losses.
Weighing the Odds
The variables mentioned in paragraphs 1 and 2 preclude a confident forecast,
but a plausible case could be made that the most likely outcome will be something
that could be called a British military success tempered by important Argentine
political gains that may eventually prove to be more significant than the military
test of strength. Even the military outcome may be considerably short of an
unambiguous British victory, and it may fall between the first and second scenarios.
The Argentines may well demonstrate an ability to deny the British a prompt victory.
If they can impose substantial losses on the British invasion force, aircraft and
warships, Thatcher's domestic political vulnerability may prove to be greater than
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that of the Junta. If the encounter settles into a costly war of attrition, the
Junta may surprise the world by showing greater staying power than the Thatcher
government.
25X1 The third scenario-a British defeat and forced withdrawal-cannot :be completely
ruled out. The greatest threat to British prospects would seem to be overecmfidence.
Special Assistant for Warning
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