NOTE FOR GENERAL WILSON/(Sanitized)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83M00171R000300270019-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 31, 2005
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: March 20, 1975
• Content Type: NOTES

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INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF
NOTE FOR: General Wilson/
25X1
As you will recall, earlier this week we
received a letter fro of 25X1:
DIA/DE defending the DIE "PRC Strategic
" Nuclear Forces: How Much Is Enough?"
which. had been. criticized in the RONI for
giving the impression of a much broader
evidential base than actually exists. You
advised us to respond directly and we have.
On Thursday, 20 March,
25X1
invited to lunch and discussed the
25X1
matter with him. The main issue was that
some of the wording used and the manner
in which the material was presented did not
allow a clear distinction to be made between
judgments based on evidence and those based
on assumptions. quickly saw the 25X1
problem and agreed that the lines should be
sharply drawn.
I lemphasized the desirability of
such dialogues and asked II to relay
our sentiments to all elements of DIA/DE.
25X1
25X1
Z
25XI
INFORMATION
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COQ FIUE UT1A1
passed along to me your note of 18 March concerning
the
I think that you are largely right when you say that the Post Mortem
overlooked the inexperience of many analysts working on Il and the
consequences thereof. We were at least in part aware of this problem.
We did not address it, however, partly because we were wary of under-
taking the kind of extensive research required to document a conclusion
along the lines you suggest. We would have had to acquire an array of
statistics concerning the experience of analysts not only in OCI but also
in INR and DIA. It may also have been because we were reluctant to
deal "in public" with the management problems of specific organizations
(e. , OCI).. There may be one additional point: I am not sure that
is a desirable illustration of your point since there are so few
analysts with real expertise concerning
19 March 1975
25X1
25X1
But I am moved by your thoughtful comments to pursue your notion
that "if we wish to develop our analysts as interchangeable cogs in the
mechanism we should not worry too much about 'intelligence failures'
because this is part of the trade-off. " We will certainly keep it in mind
during our next post mortem, and I am pondering ways to look into the
matter sooner than that.
In any event, thanks for your comments. I would like very much
to have your permission to reproduce them in the next issue of our
Review of National Intelligence, which, as you may know, excerpted
portions of the conclusions or the I Please let 25X1
me know. (The RONI, by the way, could provide us with an appropriate
medium for further exploration of this problem. )
With regards,
Chief, Product Review Division
25X1
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I
This ote to call attention to one aspect of the
I I which I think has been overlooked..
The covering memo on that report notes that the analysts' "inability
to foresee critical. events -- in the face of mcu'lting evidence -- seems
to rest in part on the familiar analytical bias that ultimately reason
and rationality will prevail." I have no quarrel with that as far as
it goes.
I submit that a key element, however, has been overlooked. So
far as I know, the analysts were relatively new and inexperienced in
the area and their supervisors were no better equipped. The branches
concerned had been reorganized and personnel transferred elsewhere. I
speak from some experience and with a touch of special pleading. For
many years I was Chief of Gil Branch in OCI and the analysts handling
were equally superannuated. I cannot myself
imagine assuming at any time that "ultimately reason and rationality
will prevail," nor would. any of analysts. We had lived through too
many similar crises involving to take any
except
25X1
The critical nature area familiarity is tacitly recognized on page
15 of the Post Mortem where it is noted: "Those who were directly
concerned with the Dissue, particularily foreign service officers
with solid backgrounds in the area, had apparently long since made up
their minds that a showdown between was inevitable 25X1
and did not look to finished intelligence for primary guidance." If
finished intelligence does not provide primary guidance, what does? In
this case, the FSO's knowledge and experience. If our analysts cannot
match that we may as well go cit of business.
But enough of that. I hope I have made my point: If for reasons
of personnel flexibility we wish to develop our analysts as inter-
changeable cogs in the mechanism we should not worry too much about
C-O--N-F--I -D-E-N-T-I-A-I_.
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"intelligence failures" because this is part of the trade-off. If,
however, such a failure is important enough to warrant a. post mortem
then the analytical and substantive experience of the analysts ought
to be factored in.
25X1
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