INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM LIBYAN-SOVIET RELATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000300070001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 22, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 25, 1975
• Content Type: IM

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Top Secret
Intelligence Memorandum
Libyan-Soviet Relations
Top Secret
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June 25, 1975
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Libyan-Soviet Relations
June 25, 1975
The relationship that has developed between Libya and the Soviet Union
during the last year adds a new and potentially dangerous element to the Middle
East equation. Soviet military assistance and diplomatic attention has enhanced
President Qadhafi's ability to promote radical causes in the Arab world. It may also
encourage him to expand his activities in such diverse places as Ethiopia and the
Philippines. Of immediate concern is the unsettling effect Libyan-Soviet cooperation
is having on Egypt, and the possibility that this may ultimately hinder progress in
peace negotiations.
Soviet-Libyan relations have broader implications for the Mediterranean area
and for the US. The magnitude of the most recent arms agreements-although
greatly exaggerated in most accounts-raises the possibility that Moscow will gain a
new strategic foothold in Libya. Whether Moscow is We to parlay these initial
successes into g-^ater assets will depend on the Libyans and on Soviet ability to treat
with them. While both sides are still uneasy with one another, each ems inter-
ested--if not anxious-to maintain the momentum of the recent movement toward
better relations.
This memorandum assesses the current status of the Soviet-Libyan relationship,
the motives behind it, and the direction it may take.
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Evolving Relations
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The Soviets enthusiastically greeted the 1969 Libyan coup that brought
Qadhafi to power, but they soon discovered that the Libyan leader was
bitterly anti-communist and suspicious of "super power" influence in the
Middle East. Soviet overtures for closer tics were rebuffed by Qadhafi, and
the Soviets soon joined those who f0; And him erratic, unpredictable and
irresponsible. Political ties were openly sc, ained and characterized by frequent
ideological invective. The Libyans did buy from Moscow prior to 1974 some
$125 million in military equipment, mainly armor and other ground forces
equipment. Tripoli also sold Moscow once oil, but these deals ended when
oil prices skyrocketed in 1974.
During the last year, Libya and Moscow have begun to move in a new
direction. On the Libyan side, the ki.,y has been a desire to coordinate their
military inventory with those of thy Arab front line states. The Soviets have
wanted influence in a new corner of the Middle East and Libyan hard
currency. A commonly held antagonism to Egypt has motivated both parties
to seek better relations with each other. The Soviets also saw a chance to
gain some advantage over the US in the Arab world, particularly since the US
has been unwilling to meet Libya's minimal arms requests.
A turning point in Soviet-Libyan relations was Prime Minister Jallud's
visit to the USSR in May 1974, which led to two substantial military sales
agreements. Soviet Premier Kosygin's visit to Libya last month, the first by a
top Soviet leader, was a follow-up to the Jallud visit. Kosygin sought to
expand military and economic dealings and establish a closer political rela-
tionship.
Kosygin's visit was only one sign of the change in a relationship that
not long ago was fraught with misunderstanding and recrimination. Polemics
have been muted, Libya has upgraded its repiesentatio,i in Moscow by
replacing its charge with an ambassador, and the Soviets have established one
of their many "friendship 1;ocieties" to further the idea of better Soviet-
Libyan relations.
Nothing that happened in Tripoli, however, significantly narrowed the
substantive differences between the two countries regarding the nature of
communism, the right of Israel to exist, or the outlines of a Middle East
settlement.
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sygin s visit to Libya and news of an expansion of a 1974 military
agreement between the two sides have given ris o 25X1
exaggerated reports about massive arms purchases and Soviet base rich Es in
it represents a
major expansion ot the military relationship between Tripoli and Moscow.
According to our preliminary estimates, the arms accords since 1974 repre-
sent nearly a one-billion-dollar commitment that may be open-ended. Mos-
cow's commitments now do not necessarily guarantee that Tripoli will
receive all of the weapons it has reg uested
the ea is fully
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can possib;y absorb, thus providing the Soviets an opening for increasing
their physical presence in the area.
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The two sides have also reached a number of agreements in the
economic and scientific fields that will draw them closer together. The most
noteworthy is a preliminary accord tinder which the Soviets have agreed to
build a nuclear research center in Libya. This agreement-which will not be
finally concluded until the end of the year-has provisions for a small
10-megawatt research reactor-similar to those the Soviets have given Egypt
and Iraq-a training program, and advisory and coordinati(,:n assistance,
Libya has ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty-presumably a con-
dition for receiving the reactor-therefore, it should come under interna-
tional safeguards.
If the agreement materializes, it will not significantly advance Libya's
quest for nuclear weapons, but it will enable Tripoli to take the first halting
step toward acquiring the necessary expertise.
Soviet Military Use of Libya
One major breakthr -)ugh for the Soviets is the commitment they appear
to have won on naval access to at least some Libyan ports. Until now, the
Libyans have restricted even routine port calls; no Soviet naval combatant
has visited Libya since 1969.
Our estimate is that at this stage the Libyans. in response to Soviet
urgings, have do ided to grant Moscow occasional port calls for bunkering
and replenishment and will initially attempt to keep a tight leash on the
Soviet navy. The Libyans may be dangling the prospect of greater conces-
sions in return for Soviet help in building Libyan naval facilities. So far,
however, we have detected no Soviet naval vessels in Libyan waters.
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LIBYA
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At present, Libya does not have much to orfer Moscow in the way of
significant naval facilities-particularly in comparison to the dockyard Mos-
cow uses in Alexandria. Tripoli and Benghazi are crowded commercial ports
currently under extensive renovation with limited berthing space and only
minor repair facilities. Tobruk at present has only limited berthing space and
no significant repair facilities. It does have a la ye natural harbor and
potential for develo inent.
If Moscow could gain unrestricted use, currently available anchorages
and bunkering in Libya would provide a suitable alternative for all Egyptian
ports other than Alexandriai. Moscow would have to make extensive use of
its repair ships and even these would be no substitute for 'Alexandria.
Moscow, however, would find it difficult to maintain its current level of
deployments-particularly submarines. If the ex-US air base at at Uqba bin
Nafi (Wheelus Field) were made available, it would provide first class
facilities for Soviet naval reconnaissance and attack aircraft-which the
Soviets have not had in this area since 1972.
In responding to Libyan arms requests, the Soviets appear to have had
on. eye on making a fast buck. Soviet officials have commented on the
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financial windfall open.-., up by Moscow's arms transactions, and certain
aspects of the saies bear the earmarks of sharp trading. The Soviets, for
example, apparently are charging Libya full price for the weaponry, in
contrast to the concessionary prices they have offered other clients. Moscow
may also be trying to trade the Libyans up to more advanced and higher
priced weapons.
Political objectives, however, were almost certainly controlling. It is
hardly coincidence that the Soviets began to make progress with Tripoli at
the same time that its relations with Egypt were becoming more difficult.
The Soviets want to put Sadat on notice that they have other options open
to them and want to contrast their military generosity in Tripoli with their
stinginess ir. Cairo.
While Moscow wants to send Sadat a message, there is no evidence that
the Soviets have directly encouraged Tripoli's campaign against him, and it is
doubtful that they have taken the risky step of directly colluding with
Qadhafi against the Egyptian president. Indeed, the comments of some
Soviet officials suggest that Moscow does not want Libyan-Egyptian friction
to become so bitter as to complicate its ability to maneuver between both.
Soviet efforts in Libya are also part of Moscow's more general efforts to
win a place of influence in the Middle East, and the Soviets would have
responded to overtures from Tripoli even if their relations with Cairo were
better. Closer relations with Libya enable Moscow to keep one foot in the
camp of Arab "rejectionists." This could prove useful to the USSR if it
wants to switch tracks and try to obstruct a Middle East settlement. In the
meantime, this threat forces the US and Egypt to give Soviet interests in a
settlement serious consideration, particularly when a new round of step-by-
step diplomacy is in prospect.
The Soviets seem to recognize, however, that they have few ideological
allies in the Libyan body politic. Furthermore, they do not overrate Libya's
political significance and certainly do not see it as an influence in the Arab
world comparable to Egypt-or even Syria or Iraq.
Libya's strategic location on the southern rim of the Mediterranean
could be of considerable advantage to the Soviet fleet if it is shut out of
Egypt. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the Soviets have any expectation of
making significant use of Libya any time soon. The fact that the Libyans
inserted their usual rhetoric opposing foreign bases in the Mediterranean into
the communique ending Kosygin's visit will help keep Soviet hopes in
perspective.
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If the Soviets have gotten Libya to drop its opposition to Soviet naval
visits, however, they will be encouraged to press for more. They will
certainly seek to put their access to Libyan ports on a regular basis, similar
to what they now have in Syria.
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The substantial inflow of Soviet arms into Tripoli is not without
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It a so opens OR
potential Western accus,aiions that Soviet actions destabilize the Middle
Eastern situation and violate the spirit of detente. We do not think, however,
that these considerations have given Moscow much pause.
Nor has concern over the use Qadhafi might make of Soviet weapons,
such as bombers and submarines, inhibited Moscow from promising them.
The Soviets probably are uncertain about Qadhafi's intentions. Grechko
once described him as a "madman on top of a pile of gold," and Moscow was
irritated when Tripoli gave the SA-7 to fedayee.:n. But Moscow is certain that
Libya cannot master all of its weapons without Soviet assistance. In any
event, the Soviets do not hold themselves responsible for the use to which
their weapons are put.
The Soviets probably recognize that the Libyans will seek to use their
arms stockpiles to influence Arab politics. It may be that Moscow thinks the
impact of arms deals on the Arabs will be positive from their point of
view-once again underscoring that only Moscow can provide the where-
withal to challenge Israel.
The Soviets do not appear concerned over the possibility that Libya
will transfer arms to other countries. Although the Soviets will retain a
handle through control of spare parts, ammunition, and training, the Soviet
equipment already in Libya gives Tripoli an impressive inventory. In the
event war breaks out, the Libyans would have to depend on Soviet or other
Arab air and sea transport to move rapidly substantial amounts of equip-
ment-particularly SAMs and armor-to the Arab belligerents. Furthermore,
Moscow has probably incorporated in its agreements standard clauses pro-
hibiting arms transfers without Soviet consent. Moscow may think this will
give i* some influence over Libyan attempts to send arms to other Arabs.
Qadhafi's Motives
President Qadhafi, who once offered Egypt generous inducements to
expel the Soviets, is now expanding his own ties with Moscow for political
purposes that apparently transcen i his anti-communist convictions. We do
not believe Qadhafi has softened his ideological opposition or lost his basic
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distrust of the Soviets; on the contrary, his contempt for them may ulti-
mately disrupt the liaison. His motives are more opportunistic, stemming
mainly from his desire to challenge Israel, its supporters, and those Arab
leaders willing to accept a negotiated settlement.
Qadhafi believes negotiating with Israel is dangerous and doomed to
eventual failure. He, therefore, wants a well-equipped arsenal, which must be
Soviet-made to augment those of Arab nations that will fight a war he
believes is inevitable. In the meantime, he plans to use his newly acquired
weapons to unnerve Israel and to try to block peace negotiations. In this
campaign, President Sad at and Egyptian policy are his primary targets.
Qadhafi hopes that a large flow of Soviet weapons into Libya will
create unrest in the Egyptian military-based on envy and fear-and thus put
pressure on Sadat to alter his negotiating stance. The Libyans are aware that
some of Sadat's advisers are worried about deficiencies in Egypt's military
inventory and troubled by Sadat's turn away from the Soviets. Qadhafi
intends to play on these fears and appeal to the young:, pro-Nasir audience in
Egypt that he has usually been able to influence. The change in emphasis of
the Egyptian media over the last week from personalized attacks on Qadhafi
to serious consideration of his actions and their implications suggests anxiety
that his strategy will succeed.
Qadhafi also yearns to recapture the influence he had during the years
when Libya was setting the pace of Arab oil policy and planning a union
with Egypt, the most powerful country in the Arab world. In the two years
since then, Qadhafi has come to realize that his prospects are now almost
exclusively dependent on his ability to re-establish an alliance with Cairo. He
may, in fact, be hoping eventually to use Soviet arms to buy his way into
another unity project with Egypt. Qadhafi's fixation on unity with Egypt
often matches his desire to defeat Israel, and in his mind, the former may be
a necessary first step in achieving the latter.
While waiting for the right opportunity, Qadhafi might try to use his
arms to bargain for Egyptian concessions on lesser issues-a meeting with
Sadat, for example, or a firm declaration of Egyptian support for the
Palestinians.
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hatever the state of his relations with Sadat, Qadhafi would
feel duty- ound to support the Egyptian military fully in the ev.-nt of
renewed hostilities with Israel. He had no trouble doing so during the 1973
war, despite his fury over Sadat's rejection a month earlier of union plans,
and he is likely to give generously again.
Like most ideologues, Qadhafi can rationalize the bending of one
principle, for example, nonalignment, to serve a higher purpose-in his case,
the restoration of Arab Palestine and greater Arab unity. His swing toward
Moscow is made easier by what he sees as Washington's unresponsiveness to
Tripoli's recent diplomatic overtures, its foot-dragging on the release of
US-manufactured and licensed arms, and its threatening posture toward Arab
oil fields.
Whether Qadhafi fully appreciate5 the ri-,kq in becoming closely
involved with Moscow is problematical.
Despite this caution, the parallel between Qadhafi and his mentor,
Nasir, is striking as well as paradoxical, given Qadhafi's outspoken opposition
to Nasir's relationship with Moscow. Over the years, Qadhafi has fervently
adhered to Nasir's teachings, mimicked his tactics and style, and-perhaps
finally-lost sight of his mistakes. Unlike Nasir, Qadhafi does not need Soviet
arms for Libya's defense; moreover, he has a bargainer's financial independ-
ence. Nevertheless, the Libyan leader's brash confidence, impatience, and
near blindness to some political realities may leave him vulnerable both to
his own actions and to his new patron.
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Soviet Prospects
The course of Soviet relations with Egypt will have significant influence
on Soviet policy in ..ibya. The Soviets recognize that Egypt is still the
country of paramount interest and influence in the Middle East. Even if
Moscow were confident it could establish a firm footing in Libya, which it is
not, Moscow would think it a poor second to a similar relationship with
Egypt. Despite their deep problems with Sadat, the Soviets have not wanted
to force an open break and foreclose the possibility of a restoration of their
position in Egypt. The Soviets will be given pause by Sadat's restrictions on
Soviet naval access to Egyptian ports in response to Kosygin's visit to Libya.
While it seems unlikely that they will knuckle under to this pressure, they
may want to avoid a further intensification of friction with Sadat. This
suggests that they will go slow in developing their Libyan ties, unless
relations with Sadat go further downhill.
The recently concluded arms deal already gives Moscow more influence
than it has ever had in Libya. If Qadlhafi is to make effective use of Soviet
supplied equipment, he will need more Soviet support. The reported
doubling of the number of Soviet military technicians permitted in Libya
indicates the pressures that will be on him to increase his dependence on
Moscow. Furthermore, control of resupply, spare parts and training will give
Moscow important leverage.
But Moscow also faces powerful obstacles in Libya. Suspicion of the
Soviets is strong, and Qadhafi remains xenophobic, nationalistic, and anti-
communist. The heavy-handed Soviets have not been able to establish a good
working relationship with more moderate Arabs-much less any with
Qadhafi's volatile characteristics. The relationship is based on opportunism
rather than shared interests, and friction over their conflicting approaches to
a Middle East settlement can erupt at any time. Moscow must remember that
if the Libyans become dissatisfied with the Soviet performance, they have
the financial resources to send the Soviets packing and to seek alternate
sources for their essential military needs.
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Lih;,ur Trouble-Making
Soviet cooperation with Libya -nay also encourage 'i'ripoHb adl cn-
turistn elsewhere in the Middle Fast and in the Muslim world, The feda-
ycen--already beneficiaries of Libyan financial and military aid are regarded
by Qadhafi as an Important ,nti-Israeli instrument. Some of the Soviet arms
going into Libya are, therefore, likely to end up In terrorist hands, A less
Immediate but more ominous possibility is that Qadhafi will revive :n now
moribund program for recruiting and training ,in Arab "liberation" army
with terrorist components. At its peak in nnid-1972, this program involved
several thousand trainees from all parts of the Arab world.
Libya has already complicated Lebanon's current government .?risis by
encouraging with money and weapons Lebanese leftists and radical Pales-
tinians in their feud with conservative fhalangists. in addition, Qadhafi has
tried to promote concerted Arab pressure on Beirut to accept military
assistance in order to protect itself from Israeli Incursions. Fortified with
more equipment than he can possibly use at honer. Qadhafi may now try to
channel more arms to Lebanon.
'i u e Soviet-Libyan liaison may bear less directly on Qadhafi's interests
beyond the derailment of Middle East peavc negotiations. Libya's advocacy
of it specifically Islamic Arab revoluti in has involved political meddling,
financial aid, and in some cases low-level military support all of which
Qadhafi is fully capable of undertaking on his own. So, ;et aid may, however.
encourage Qadhafi to greater activism and enhance the allure of his ability to
provide benef;zz . to his clients. For example, Prime Minister Jallud's threat
last week of military intervention in support of Omani rebels suggests that
Tripoli was, indeed, emboldened by Moscow's endorsement a few weeks
earlier. We do not take these threats seriously at this stage. But, we do
expect a step-up in Libyan aid to the Dhofar rebels and their supporters in
South Yemen and an intensification of Tripoli's propaganda campaign
against Iran's military presence in the area.
Tripoli has provided assistance to assorted other clients who may now
seek renewed or increased support.
? Libya has in the past supported Moroccan dissidents and is now
probably giving aid to one or more liberation groups in the Spanish
Sahara.
? Muslim dissidents in Ethiopian Eritrea have received Libyan sr',,--
port, which apparently has been increased since the outbreak of serious
fighting in January.
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? Libya has aided southern Afriran Iihcration groups through regional
organizations, such as the Organii tIon of African Unity,
? 'I'rIpoll has boasted abotaI atippnrt to the Irish Republican Army,
? Muslim hnsurgenti in the 1'hili i lines have received some mono and
small arms from the Libyans
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I:GYP'11AN ANt) LIBYAN PORT FACILITII FOR
SOVIFT NAVY USE IN 'TIIF MI;l)ITI:RRANE;AN SEA
Alexandria is the only port providing major repair support to Soviet
naval ships In 1?gypt. Mersa Matruh and Port Said have limited facilities
which have provided some supplies but no repair support to the Soviet ships.
The Gulf' of Sollum near the Libyan border has been used by the Soviets
solely is an anchorage.
Alexandria has ,in improved natural harbor of some I .400 acres and has
extensive commercial and naval facilities. Fuel, provisions, and water
bunkerir., are available, and considerable berthing and anchorage space also
are present. In addition to large conunL.rcial facilities, Alexandria is the site
of the headquarters of the iigyplian navy which has its own support and
operational facilities in the port.
Soviet navy ships use the Al Qabbari shipyard which was built by the
Soviets in the mid-sixties. It can accommodate surface ships and srbrnarines.
Among the more important facilities are two large drydocks (850' and 550'),
marine railways which are used to move ships to one of four open building/
repair ways, a covered repair way, and extensive machine ships. Floating and
railway cranes also are available.
Port Said has extensive, unprotected anchorage space, but only limited
naval berthing. Limited amounts of fuel and water and some provisions
probably are available. Repair of the extensive damage caused by Israeli
air strikes during the 1973 war has been the major task of the Egyptian
government in this area. Few, if any, Soviet ships have been supported by
the port since the war. Port Said has no major repair facilities available for
the Soviet navy. A small Ejyptian naval base is located at Port Said.
Mersa Matruh had provided limited quantities of water and perhaps
provisions for Soviet ships anchored in the Gulf of Sollum, but the port has
little else to offer. The !iarbor is shallow except for a small man-made
channel, and very limited berthing space, and only shallow-draft anchorages.
Little storage an'i no significant repair facilities are available.
Libya has three ports that might be used by Soviet warships, but none
has facilities approaching those at Al Qabbari in Alexandria. Indeed, except
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for anchorages and bunkering, Tripoli, Tobruk, and Benghazi could provide
little in the way of support and virtually no significant repairs.
Tripoli has an excellent natural harbor, but only limited berthing space
and protected anchorage space. Minor repairs to small craft and it variety of
floating and wharf cranes are the only repair support available. Although
Tripoli is the headquarters of the Libyan navy, it lacks any significant naval
facilities of a size comparable to those at Alexandria. Anchorage is available
outside the harbor anti considerable amounts of fuel, as well as provisions
and water bunkering facilities, are also available.
Benghazi harbor encompasses about 3GG acres, but has very limited
berthing space and no significant repair capability. Unlimited, unprotected
anchorage is available as tare limited amounts of fuel, water, and provisions.
Benghazi probably could furnish more of these supplies than the Egyptian
port of Mersa Matruh, but Soviet ships would still have to rc;y on auxiliaries
for maintenance.
Tobruk has a large natural harbor of some 1,200 acres which has riot
been developed extensively. Only limited berthing and protected anchorage
spaces are available, and virtually no significant repair facilities. Some water
and fuel are available. Extensive, unprotected anchorage space is available
which could be safely used for most of the year because of the relative Calm
of the sea. The size of the harbor and the location of Tobruk make it a
better candidate for Soviet development than Tripoli. Tobruk has potential
for development, but currently has little in the way of naval facilities.
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