KEY ITALIAN COMMUNIST LEADERS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000200010025-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 2, 2000
• Sequence Number: 25
• Publication Date: June 1, 1975
• Content Type: BR

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C/NFD
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Confidential
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 013787
Exempt from General Declassification Schedule
of E.O. 11652, exemption catodory+
?5B(1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified on:
data Impossible to determine
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CONFIDENTIAL
No Foreign Dissem
PREFACE
Enrico Berlinguer, a young, hard-working and skillful party craftsman,
became secretary general of the Italian Communist Party (PC1) in 1972.
Under his leadership, the PCI has made substantial progress toward
establishing its image as a serious and responsible party concerned with the
country's social and economic problems. The PCI claims 1,657,000 members;
it is the largest nonruling Communist party in the world and, after the
Christian Democrats (DC), the second largest party in Italy. In the Italian
legislature, as a result of elections held in 1972, the PCI controls 28.4 percent
of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 27.2 percent of those in the
Senate. The DC controls 38.8 and 38.1 percent, respectively, in the two bodies.
The atmosphere of recurrent economic and political crisis-marked by
labor unrest, disunity and factionalism among the government coalition
parties and a center-left regime that has failed to implement long-promised
reforms-prompted Berlinguer to announce at the 13th PCI National
Congress in 1972 that the time had come "to assume our responsibilities" and
to "give a new direction to the country."
Berlinguer claims that the PCI's present campaign for an active role in
tackling Italy's manifold problems is based on the political legacy of the late
Palmiro Togliatti. It was Togliatti who set the PCI on a course of
opportunistic adaptation to national realities and who abandoned
revolutionary violence in favor of elective politics within the framework of
constitutional pluralism. Togliatti often expressed the wistful hope that the
PCI would someday "enter the field of government." Luigi Longo, Togliatti's
successor who moved up to the party's presidency when Berlinguer became
secretary general in 1972, has often referred to the PCI as "un partito di
governo" (a party of government). Berlinguer believes that a leftist majority
can never govern Italy because of strong opposition from the center and the
right. In his own words only a coalition of the center and the Communists
would have the "force and authority" to deal with Italy's problems.
In the fall of 1973, in a highly publicized article in Rinascita (Rebirth),
the PCI theoretical journal, Berlinguer proposed that the DC join the PCI in a
"historic compromise" to solve the political and social problems that beset the
country. During its 14th National Congress, held in Rome during 18-23
March 1975, the PCI endorsed the objectives of the historic compromise in
general. Differences of opinion emerged during the congress, however,
particularly with respect to the timing and the terms of the proposed alliance.
The resolution approved by the congress reaffirmed that such an alliance
remains the long-term "strategic" objective of the Communists.
This report was prepared by the Central Reference Service and was
coordinated within CIA as appropriate and with the Department of Stale.
Comments and questions may be directed to
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No Foreign Dissent
Berlinguer emerged from the 14th Party Congress as the undisputed
leader of the party, as evidenced by the important party structural changes lie
was able to effect: He reduced the membership of the Central Committee, the
Cultural Commission and the Directorate but increased the Secretariat to
accommodate his supporters. Most important of all, he abolished the
Politburo, which had served as a source of political power for such former
"party notables" as Giorgio Amendola and Pietro Ingrao and others of their
generation. In addition, with an obvious lack of concern for Soviet
sensibilities, Berlinguer removed Armando Cossutta, the PCI leader most
esteemed by the Soviets, from the Secretariat.
The PCI effort to gain a
share in the national govern-
ment through an alliance
with the dominant DC and
the left-oriented Italian So-
cialist Party (PSI) may be
hindered by recent events in
Portugal: The Portuguese
Government has banned
Portugal's Christian Demo-
cratic Party from participating
in the national elections, and
anti-Commnmunist forces in
Italy are seeking to exploit
this issue to its fullest extent.
Amintore Fanfani, political
secretary of the DC, who
remains adamantly opposed
to the historic compromise,
ordered the DC delegation
that attended the PCI Con-
gress as observers to walk
out in protest against
Berlinguer's failure to con-
demmn the Portuguese Com-
munists' action against the
Christian Democrats. Reac-
tion from other Italian polit-
ical leaders to the PCI historic
compromise proposal has
Enrico Berlinguer Addresses 14th PCI Congress,
Rome, March 1975
been primarily negative. Oddo Biasini, leader of the small but influential
left-oriented Republican Party, ca fled it "an idea not for the moment real-
istically feasible." Giovanni Maiagodi, head of the conservative Liberal
Party, commented that the PCI aspired to enter the government "in order to
institute the characteristic totalitarian regime" that exists in Russia and
Iv
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No Foreign Dissent
Portugal. The Social Democratic Party issued a document in which it labeled
the proposal "a strategem of the Leninist brand."
The official Christian Democratic response, led by Fanfani, continues to
be negative, but some prominent members of the DC, in the center as well as
on the left, are privately persuaded that, eventually, they will have to come to
terms with the Communists. At a DC national meeting in July 1974, Ciriaco
De Mita, now Minister of Foreign Trade, went as far as to call for an
undefined "accord" with the Communists. Others labeled the PCI
"democratic" and argued that national sovereignty would not be "wounded"
if the Communists entered the government. Other influential DC
leaders-including Foreign Minister Mariano Rumor-apparently are in
general agreement that there is no way for any Italian Government to function
effectively without some form of input by the Communists.
Returns from the Italian regional elections of 15 Jun:. 1975 ha : e revealed
a decisive shift to the left, marked by unprecedented gaina for the Communist
Party, The PCI received 33.4 percent of the vote, compared to 35.3 percent for
the Christian Democrats. The parties of the left-the Communists, the
Socialists and a small party to the left of the Communists-obtained 46
percent of the vote. The election results represent the largest shift in Italian
voting patterns since 1948; the left will interpret the vote as a call for a change.
That was the common thread in the Socialists' and Communists' campaigns.
The outcome does not constitutionally affect the comparative strength of the
parties in the national legislature, but the election results will bring additional
pressures for implementing Berlinguer's historic compromise proposal.* Both
the Communists and the Socialists have until now opposed holding a national
;icction before the scheduled 1977 date. Pressures for an early election will
probably increase in both parties, however, in hopes of translating the regional
gains to the national legislature.
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*For an evaluation of the impact of Communist participation in the
national government, see N!E 24-1-74 Prospects for and Consequences of
Increased Communist Influence in Italian Politics, 18 July 1974.
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