SOVIET UNION- EASTERN EUROPE STAFF NOTES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000400110034-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 26, 2000
• Sequence Number: 34
• Publication Date: December 22, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

/ p e a ele se 2001109104 :ILIA-RDP86T0067 0004001106340
 Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP86T00608R000400110034-0
Secret
NO ORN
Soviet Union-Eastern Europe
F
I
State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file
Secret
1,71
December 22, 1975
No. 0782/75
Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP86T00608R000400110034-0
 Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP86T00608R000400110034-0
Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)
NA) TONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disc;kLure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS
NOFORN- Not fteleasable to Foreign Nationals
NO:'ONTRACT- Not Releas9ble to Contractors or
Contractor/Consultants
PROPIN- Caution-Proprietsry Information Involved
USIBONLY- USIB Departments Only
ORLON- Dissemination and Extraction of Information
Controlled by Originator
REL... - This Information has been Authorized for
Release to ...
Classified by 010725
Exempt from 3eneral Doclassllicatlon S;hedulo
of E.O. 11652, exemption category:
?56(1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassifieC on:
date Impossible to determine
Approved For Release 2001/09/04: CIA-RDP86T00608R000400110034-0
 Approved For Release 200
ATE,
rIL6 80608R000400110034-0
SOVIET UNION - EASTERN EUROPE
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the USSR - Eastern Europe Division, Office of Current Intel-
ligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the
Directorate,-)f intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should
be directed to the authors of the individual articles.
CONTENTS
December 22, 1975
Soviet Vi-Aws on Bangladesh. . . . . . . . . . . . 1
USSR - French Communist Party . . . . . . . . . . 3
USSR-Turkey: Kosygin's Coming. . . . . . . . . . 4
Yugoslavs Arrest a Soviet Spy . . . . . . . . . . 6
ANNEX: Supreme Soviet Speakers
Protest 1976 Plan Cutbacks. . . . . . . . . . . 7
Approved For Release 2001/09/ :Lc ffP86T00608R000400110034-0
 Approved For Release 2001 /09/04. Cli- 6T00608R000400110034-0
Soviet Views on Bangladesh.
Moscow has once again expressed its co,icern over
the unsettled situation in Banglades2-.. In a conversa-
tion on Bangladesh with the US ambasiiador on December
19, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Firyubin repeated-
ly stressed the paramount importance: Moscow attaches
to the preservation of stability in Scuth Asia. Fir-
yubin seemed to be saying that Mosc;,.aw's special in-
terest in the region entitled it tr: have a role in
events there.
The Soviets believe the turmoil in Bangladesh is
a direct result of outside interfr?,.rence. Although
there is no hard evidence to suggest that machina-
tions by Peking are involved, Mot :ow persists in see-
ing China's hand in the allegedl,;Y anti-Soviet activi-
ties of Bengalee extremist groupi;. The planned es-
tablishment of a Chinese diplomatic mission in Dacca
has heightened Moscow's concern.
In an effort to reduce Soviet suspicions, Ben-
galee special envoy Tabarak Husain met with Soviet
officials in Moscow on December 16-18 to discuss re-
lations between the two countries. Husain probably
sought to assure the Soviets that Dacca would con-
tinue its policy of nonalignm':.rit and would do its
best to put down the disturbeLw:es in the countryside.
Firyubin indicated, however, -,.izat Moscow remains ex-
tremely doubtful that the ne'ai leadership will be
able tc cope with its enormo;.r. problems.
Firyubin acknowledged i ,'aat the question of In-
dian military intervention had come up during the
talks, but he doubted the effectiveness of such a
move. 25X1X
the Soviets thus far have stopped
short of re'ommending Indian military action, de-
spite Moscow's dissatisfaction with the re,:ent, po-
litical changes in Bangladesh. Should the situi-
tion there deteriorate further, however, it seems
December 22, 1975
-1-
Approved For Release 2001/09/0 E, P, . 86T00608R000400110034-0
 Approved For Release 2001/09/04""ETA-R ' 86T00608R000400110034-0
unlikely that Moscow would actively work to prevent
India from intervening, (SECRET NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/
ORCON)
25X1A
Phone: [phone]
December 22, 1975
Approved For Release 2001/09/0+:1 6T00608R000400110034-0
 Approved For Release 2001 /09?. Cd P86T00608R000400110034-0
USSR - French Communist Party
A public exchange of recriminations between the
French and Soviet Communist parties suggests that re-
lations between them have reached a new low. The ex-
change was triggered by a film shown on French tele-
vision on December 11 depicting Soviet persecution of
political prisoners. On December 19, Pravda labeled
the film a "crude falsification," which clashed with
the generally improving climate of Soviet-French re-
lations.
Pravda also expressed surprise that "some per-
sons who have always given a due rebuff to anti-So-
vietism and anti-Communism were taken in by the prov-
ocation of anti-Sovietists and anti-Comminiists and
thus, wittingly or unwittingly, promoted further
spread of this anti-Soviet provocation." This was
clearly aimed at the French Communist Party, which,
instead of criticizing the film itself, had issued
a formal statement calling on the Soviets to rebut
the charges contained in the film.
The highly unusual public airing of differences
reflects the gradual cooling of relations between
the two parties, especially since the Soviets fa-
vored Giscard over the leftist coalition in the May
1974 elections. The recent joint statement of the
French and Italian parties and Spanish Communist
Party leader Santiago Carrillo's remarks about form-
ing a Latin Socialist blot: undoubtedly added to So-
viet concern about the increasing independence of
the major Western parties.
One result of the growing dispute is to reduce
the chances for a European Communist Party confer-
ence in the near future. There has been other evi-
dence, however, that the Soviets have decided not
to make the compromises necessary to convene the
conference. (CONFIDENTIAL)
December 22, 1975
-3-
Approved For Release 2001/09 P86T00608R000400110034-0
 Approved For Release 2001 /09/0 E 14 .86T00608R000400110034-0
USSR-Turkey: Kciygin's Coming
Soviet Premier Kosygin will arrive in Turkey on
Friday for a five-day visit. Although the inaugu.-a-
tion of the Soviet-aided Iskenderum steel plant will
provide the ceremonial centerpiece of his visit, Kosy-
gin will also continue Moscow's low-key efforts to ex-
ploit US-Turkish friction and to improve its own rela-
tions with Ankara.
In his conversations with Turkish Prime Minister
Demirel, Kosygin will probably urge continued economic
cooperation and suggest that Moscow poses no threat to
Turkish interests. He may indicate that Moscow is will-
ing to sell Turkey military equipment. 25X1C
Kosygin may also bring up the subject of extra-
dition of two Soviet aerial hijackers who fled to Tur-
key in 1970.
The incident,
which has been a continuing irritant to Moscow, has
led the Soviets to propose to Ankara that an agree-
ment on air piracy be worked out.
In his discussions on Cyprus, Kosygin will re-
state the formal Soviet position favoring a unit--rv
Cyprus, but he will not press the issue. He may sug-
gest that Moscow--in fact--has followed a policy of
benign neutralit;- toward the Turkish occupation.
The Turks will continue their efforts, which
have accelerated since their embargo' difficulties
with the US, to take some of the chill and antagon-
ism out of relations with their Communist neighbors.
They no doubt view the visit as a useful signal to
the West that Turkey cannot be mistreated or taken
for granted.
December 22, 1975
Approved For Release 2001/09/08E., ET86T00608R000400110034-0
 Approved For Release 2001/09/04~lEC]k6T00608R000400110034-0
The Iskenderum project that Kosygin will dedi-
cate is one of Moscow's largest aid projects, in-
volving $420 million in Soviet credits. Construc-
tion on the project got under way in 1970; the first
stage, now being opened, will be able to produce 1.1
million tons of steel ann,ially.
Last July, Moscow and Ankara signed a-. economic
and technical cooperation agreement that may provide
as much as $600-700 million in credits for sei--- L.i.
projects. Expansion of Iskenderum to a capao_.-y, of
4 million tons is envisioned in this accord. (SECRET
NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON)
N
P one: 143-7285
December 22, 1975
Approved For Release 2001 /091 E( WP86T00608R000400110034-0
 Approved For Release 2001/09/0tJ 86T00608R000400110034-0
Yugoslavs Arrest A Soviet Spy
The recent arrest of a Soviet citizen for es-
pionage could become a cause ceZebre should the Tito
regime wish to accelerate its vigilance campaign
against foreign, and particularly Soviet, meddling
in Yugoslavia.
a 35-year-old
woman--who resides in Yugoslavia but is a Soviet
citizen--was arrested on November 30 for economic
and political espionage. The arrest took place just
three days after Pravda had asserted that Moscow had
no hand in the activities of pro-Soviet subversives
in Yugoslavia? The woman is reportedly the first
Soviet citizen to be arrested in the current cam-
paign against Cominformists and other subversives.
there was a
link between the arrested woman and the Soviet con-
sulate in Zagreb. The recent, premature departure
of the Soviet consul general from Zagreb had already
loosed rumors of his involvement with Cominformists.
The Soviet diplomat had been expelled from Great
Britain in 1971, when London ousted a host of sus-
pected Soviet intelligence officers.
The Tito regime could use the incident to ques-
tion--either by innuendo or outright accusat~.on--
the sincerity of Soviet promises to stay out of Yugo-
slav affairs. (CONFIDENTIAL)
December 22, 1975
Approved For Release 2001/09/ ,,(9JP86T00608R000400110034-0
 Approved For Release 2001/09/04~]Plk:6 86T00608R000400110034-0
The following in extracted from FBIS Trendy,
December 17, 1975.
Supreme Soviet Speakers Protest
1976 Plan Cutbacks
The tight 1976 annual plan and budget presented
at the December 2-4 USSR Supreme Soviet session were
greeted with a barrage o- complaints by republic rep-
resentatives, according to regional press versions
of their speeches at the session. Although all for-
mally endorsed the plan and budget--as they are ex-
pected to--spokesmen from virtually every republic
protested parts of the plan and budget and appealed
for more money or equipment for their local areas.
Supreme Soviet sessions on the plan and budget often
hear appeals for local projects, but the present cho-
rus of demands appears to set a new standard in this
regard.
While it is not surprising that the extremely
low growth rates envisaged in the plan should provoke
complaints from those affected, it is surprising that
local representatives would dare to speak out so
openly and bitterly. Moreover, virtually all these
appeals for changes in the plan or for more money or
equipment were deleted from the versions of the
speeches published in the central press, even in the
relatively long versions printed in Izvestia. Only
a few of the lesser appeals for more funds were men-
tioned in Gosplan Chairman Baybakov's concluding
speech, and he replied in each instance that the
funds provided were sufficient or that the questions
raised were still under discussion.
The speeches do not appear intended to reflect
on Brezhnev or his leadership, since the compl.ai:its
were more than counterbalanced by praise for Brezhnev.
December 22, 1975
Approved For Release 2001/09/CE;.E,G'IRB11P86T00608R000400110034-0
 Approved For Release 2001/09/04 -FC (=RR T86T00608R000400110034-0
Moreover, many of the complainers were from republics
controlled by close Brezhnev proteges (the Ukraine,
Kazakhstan, Azerbaydzhan, etc.). On the other hand,
virtually all the complaints mentioned Gosplan or the
central ministries, suggesting that Kosygin may have
been the ultimate political target. Coincidentally,
Kosygin, for the first time since becoming premier in
1964, failed to attend the opening day's meeting of
the Supreme Soviet session. Kosygin also failed to
attend on December 3, although he was reported meet-
ing briefly with the Kuwaiti foreign minister on that
day. He did attend the short December 4 final ineet-
ing which heard the brief closing speeches of
Baybakov and Finance Minister Garbuzov.
The most far-reaching and serious criticism was
made by Ukrainian Deputy Premier and Gosplan Chair-
man P. A. Rozenko, half of whose speech, as published
in the December 4 Radyanska Ukraina, was devoted to
complaints and appeals for more money. His main
appeal was on behalf of the Ukrainian coal and metal-
lurgy industries, whose growth, he contended, was
being stymied by limits on investments. Stressing
the national importance of Ukrainian coal and metal,
he pleaded with the USSR Gosplan and central minis-
tries to provide new equipment for Donetsk mines,
to opef new mines, and to provide for accelerated
construction of metallurgical projects in the new
five year plan. He also appealed to Gosplan and the
USSR Power and Electrification Ministry to aid the
lagging construction of the Dnepr-Don Canal and'urged
diversion of some production funds to build more
kindergartens and nurseries.
Estonian Premier V. I. Klauson declared flatly,
according to the December 5 Sovetskaya F'stonia, that
the 1976 plan's growth rates for Estonian industry
"do not satisfy us." He complained that Gosplan and
the USSR Finance Ministry had already placed limits
on t:_c rights of local plants to use their own funds
December 22, 1975
Approved For Release 2001/09/(SIE(3R.'86T00608R000400110034-0
 Approved For Release 2001/09AV.% P86T00608R000400110034-0
for their own development and that these limits were
being continued in the 1976 plan. He also asked
Gosplan to "raise the limits on building materials"
provided for Estonian kolkhozes.
A Georgian representative accused Moscow, in
effect, of reneging on recent promises of aid. Accord-
ing to the December 4 Zarya Vostoka, M. T. Tsiskar-
ishvili, head of a Georgian hydroelectric station
construction administration, complained that while
a 1974 CPSU Central Committee - Council of Ministers
decree on Georgia had promised aid to Georgia's
railroads and metallurgical, machine building, chem-
ical, food, and light industries ministries under the
1976-80 plan, "preliminary discussion of the measures
in union ministries and the USSR Gosplan" shows that
these measures are in serious jeopardy, and he ap-
pealed to Gosplan and various ministries to imple-
ment the promised aid.
Azerbaydzhani and Belorussian speakers protested
cutbacks in housing and schools. Azerbaydzhani fac-
tory worker 0. A. Bagirov, according to the Decem-
ber 5 Bakinsky Rabochy, stated that the 1976 plan
had cut local housing construction to 330,000 square
meters, as against 1975's 355,000, and provided for
construction of only 27,300 rural school seats a
year. He appealed to Gosplan to allot additional
investments to build housing and ruralsschools in
Azerbaydzhan, which he said suffered a severe short-
age of both.
Belorussian Deputy Premier and Gosplan Chairman
F.LL. Kokhonov complained, according to Sovetskaya
Belorussia on December 4, that central ministries
had "sharply" cut investments for housing construc-
tion in Belorussia in the 1976 plan; he also attacked
the USSR Agricultural Machine Building Ministry for
eliminating funds to build vocational schools in
the new plan. A Kazakh speaker, Karaganda miner
Ya. Musagaliyev, according to the December 5
December 22, 1975
Approved For Release 2001/09/045 M'fB6T00608R000400110034-0
 Approved For Release 2001/09/04 : rA-F S;F86T00608R000400110034-0
Kazakhotanrtkaya Pravda, urgently appealed for Gosplan
and the USSR Coal Ministry to reverse cutbacks in
housing construction in Karaganda and also to deliver
more equipment to the area.
More speakers, including even those whose repub-
ics seem favored in the new investment plans, ex-
pressed fear that their republics would not develop
fast enough under the 1976 and 1976-80 plans. Accord-
ing to the December 5 Pravda Voctoka, Uzbek Premier
N. D. Khudayberdyev urged Gosplan and central minis-
tries to increase the planned growth of Uzbekistan's
economy--especially its industry--to raise the produc-
tion of Uzbek coal fields, and to increase delivery
of agricultural equipment and pesticides to Uzbekistan.
Kazakh Premier B. A. Ashimov, according to the De-
cember 5 Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, asked Gosplan and
central ministries to provide for a "significant
increase" in produc',ion of equipment for the Kazakh
consumer goods industry and to provide more drilling
equipment and pipe for the Kazakh oil and gas in-
dustry and more equipment for irrigation. Turkmen
First Secretary M. G. Gapurov, in the December 5
TuAmenskaya Iskra version of his speech, appealed
for aid in construction of more plants, in building
a canal, and in expanding electric power, and com-
plained that the 1976 plan's reduced investments in
the Chardzhou oil refinery--which was supposed to be
completed in 1975--will mean that the project will
not be finished even by 1980. Armenian First Deputy
Premier G. A. Martirosyan, according to the December
5 Kommunist, urged Gosplan and central ministries to
accept local proposals to further develop Armenia's
natural resources and to aid construction projects in
the republic.
Even speakers from the RSFSR joined the chorus
of appeals and complaints. Although long local ver-
sions of most of their speeches are not available,
Baybakov's concluding comments indicated that RSFSR
First Deputy Premier V. I. Vorotnikov had asked for
December 22, 1975
Approved For Release 2001/0" RIDP86T00608R000400110034-0
 ?~'((~~cpRrr~~ y
Approved For Release 2001/09814: CTA-Z P86T00608R000400110034-0
more funds to build roads in the RSFSR. Baybakov
likewise indicated that Moscow, Leningrad, and Kuyby-
shev speakers had -tppealed for more money for subway
construction in their cities. (CONFIDENTIAL)
December 22, 1975
Approved For Release 2001/09SE CAMbP86T00608R000400110034-0