CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A001000110001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 42
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 1, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 6, 1956
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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LDS
CO1iE1t.ENT
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY NO. 18
OCI NO. 7753/56
6 December 1956
DAtE4Jt'j6MREVIE ?ER
DOCUMENT NO. / I,._ ..___~. ,,...
NO CHANGE IN CLA$$. 13
1 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS, CHANGED TO;
NEXT REVIEW OATS:
AI PL. LJii psi. w
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
111 OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
DIA and DOS
review(s) completed.
CONFIDENTIAL
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 13, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
The British and French forces in Egypt are now
scheduled to be completely withdrawn by 18 December.
Tel Aviv has announced that its troops have pulled
back, but hopes to secure guarantees regarding Sinai
and navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba before completely
evacuating Egyptian territory. Cairo has hailed the
announcement of the British and French withdrawals as
an unconditional surrender.
Renewed demonstrations of worker defiance after
six weeks of revolutionary chaos point up the inability
of the Kadar regime to restore order with its two-
pronged policy of threat and compromise. Although the
USSR's policy appears to be to consolidate its control
mechanisms within the country on a basis of firm
military supremacy, it continues to be reluctant to
push an all-out campaign to crush the workers, hoping
instead that hunger and need will finally force the
recalcitrant strikers to engage in productive effort.
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6 December 1956
NOTES AND COMMENTS
POLISH SITUATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... Page 1
Polish party first secretary Gomulka continues to be
faced with the delicate problem of not offending the USSR
by adopting too liberal policies and, at the same time,
of not inciting the population to open anti-Soviet
demonstrations by resorting to too harsh restraining
measures. In his efforts to stabilize control of a tense
and uneasy Poland, he appears to be adopting a somewhat
stiffer attitude toward all popular sentiments which could
jeopardize his arrangement with Moscow. Poland has made
overtures to the West for economic aid. Increased con-
tacts with the West would probably give the regime a
greater respectability in the eyes of the Polish people.
UNREST IN THE SATELLITES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Unrest in the Satellites, stimulated by events in
Hungary and Poland and by economic privation, continues
at a high pitch, particularly in Bulgaria, East Germany
and Rumania. The governments are endeavoring to meet
this situation through a combination of coercive
measures designed to ensure essential controls and con-
cessionary economic policies calculated to reduce popular
hostility.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Page 2
SOVIET FORCES TIGHTEN BORDER SECURITY IN EAST GERMANY Page 4
The Soviet Union has apparently resumed full re-
sponsibility.for controlling all East German borders.
As a part of its general effort to tighten bloc-wide
security, Soviet troops have moved into positions which
assure them more direct control over East German border
areas and stricter supervision over Allied travel to
Berlin. Soviet authorities on 5 December turned back
an American army convoy.
SOVIET CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 5
The plenary session of the Soviet Communist Party's
central committee which Khrushchev has stated will be
held this month may clarify Khrushchev's position in
the Soviet leadership. According to recent rumors and
speculation, he has been slipping as a result of Soviet
reverses in Poland and Hungary. At the present time,
forces in opposition or potential opposition to
Khrushchev do not seem to be in a position to effect his
removal. Khrushchev remains extremely active and
continues to speak authoritatively for the regime, which
continues to adhere to the principle of collective
leadership. I SECRET
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
6 December 1956
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NORTH AFRICA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 5
The Moroccan government has indicated its desire to
open bilateral discussions on the status of the American
air bases; it considers recent French military activity
at the Port Lyautey base an "unacceptable affront to
Moroccan sovereignty." The recent "harmonious" re-
lations between France and Tunisia abruptly ended when
a French air force unit attem ted to install a radar
link on Cape Bon Peninsula.
NATO MEETING FACES UNITY TEST . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page
The concern of NATO members for bringing new unity
to the alliance overshadows preparations for the regular
agenda items of the foreign ministers' meeting .from
11 to 14 December. The meeting will give special at-
tention to the report of the three ministers appointed
to study nonmilitary aspects of the alliance. Their
report urges greater use of NATO's present facilities
for this purpose, but little formal change in its
structure. r- I
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AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND RALLY TO BRITAIN IN CRISIS . . Page 8
The unwavering support of Australia and New Zealand
for British military intervention in the Suez Canal zone,
despite London's failure to consult with either the
Commonwealth or the United States, reflects the strength
of the bonds which link the countries with Britain. The
press in both countries has expressed increasing alarm
about the future of the Western alliance.
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 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
A widening cleavage among Indonesian political
parties is in prospect which would split the country
approximately evenly, with the National and Communist
Parties supporting President Sukarno and the major
Moslem parties--the Masjumi and the Nahdlatul Ulama--
rallying to former vice president Hatta. Hatta, who
resigned on 1 December, has indicated an intention to
remain active in politics and even a willingness to
challenge Sukarno's leadership.
Page 9
POPULAR DISCONTENT IN NORTH VIETNAM . . . . . . . . . . Page 10
New outbreaks may occur
during the next few months, but the Viet Minh leadership
seems confident of its ability to control the situation.
The Diem government is trying to make the most of the
unrest in an effort to discredit the Viet Minh as well
as to enhance Saigon's prestige at home and abroad.
Hanoi has reacted vigorously to what it terms South
Vietnam's "distortions" of recent events.
KUBITSCHEK'S RECENT MOVES IN BRAZIL . . . , . . . . . Page 11
President Kubitschek's attempt in late November to
crack down on military intervention in politics appears
to have gained general approval. His authority remains
in question, however, as long as his war minister,
General Lott, continues to create political controversy,
hampering Kubitschek's attempts to establish viable
domestic policies and maintain good relations with the
THE CUBAN REVOLT . .
The rebel outbreak in eastern Cuba, probably intended
to trigger a full-scale revolution against the Batista
regime, met with determined action from the armed forces.
The situation appears to be stabilizing, although a
small rebel invading force has not yet been brought under
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CONSTRUCTION PROGRESS ON TRANS-SINKIANG RAILROAD .
Work is now under way on the Soviet as well as the
Chinese end of the Trans-Sinkiang Railroad, which will
cut the rail distance between Peiping and Moscow by 625
miles and will facilitate development of petroleum and
other important mineral deposits in Sinkiang. The line
will probably be completed by July 1958, well in ad-
vance of the 1960 target date.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
6 December 1956
SOVIET REAPPRAISAL OF RELATIONS WITH YUGOSLAVIA . . . . Page 1
The Soviet leaders today are facing a situation
similar in many respects to that which confronted Stalin
in 1948--an independent Yugoslav Communist regime setting
itself up as an authority independent of Moscow and
capable of exerting influence in the Eastern European
Satellites. The crises in Poland and Hungary have in-
creased the risk to Moscow of growing Yugoslav influence
in the area and have forced the Soviet leaders for the
present to stop trying to draw Tito closer into the bloc
and begin to try to isolate Yugoslavia from the
Satellites.
INDIA'S ECONOMIC PROBLEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 5
India's economy is experiencing a foreign exchange
crisis caused by the large-scale imports of industrial
products needed for the industrialization program under
the Second Five-Year Plan. Estimates of foreign aid
needed to fulfill the plan have been revised from
nearly $1.7 billion to over $2.1 billion. India has
secured less than $400,000,000 of this sum, of which
about $240,000,000 has come from the USSR. Indian
leaders are reluctant to become too closely tied to the
USSR economically, but are determined to meet the plan's
goals.
ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN EGYPT . .
The effects of the Middle East crisis on the
Egyptian economy, although severe, have not yet resulted
in the development of organized opposition to the Nasr
regime. While that small part of the population which
derives its livelihood from industry, commerce and the
operation of the Suez Canal is undergoing considerable
hardship, most Egyptians exist on a simple agricultural
economy and remain relatively unaffected.
Page 8
POLISH ARMED FORCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 10
The Polish armed forces, the largest in the
Satellites, have been developed with Soviet direction
and support into a reasonably efficient, well-organized
and well-trained force. A shortage of qualified
company- and field-grade officers and technicians,
dependence on the USSR for logistical support, and lack
of experience and skill among the recently appointed
Polish top command, however, limit their combat
effectiveness. The military forces can be expected to
support a nationalist regime.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
6 December 1956
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OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
British and French forces,
will be completely removed from
Egypt by 18 December, accord-
ing to a statement by Foreign
Secretary Lloyd to the American
embassy in London. About
4,000 British troops but of a
total Anglo-French force of
nearly 20,2500 began the with`:
drawal on 5 and 6 December.
A general British and
French pullback from the east-
ern Mediterranean, under way
for over a week, has recently
included the return to Toulon
of one of the two French air-
craft carriers, and the dis-
solution of the British car-
rier task force and the general
movement westward of naval
units leave no major British
combat vessels in the area.
In their public announce-
ments, Lloyd and French foreign
minister Pineau gave no date,
stating only that the forces
would be withdrawn "without
delay."
Political Problems
The announcement of the
withdrawal followed a week
end of intense efforts, espe-
cially in London, to marshal
parliamentary support. The
Conservative Party's deep
divisions over the Middle East
policy have brought expres-
sions of doubt from government
leaders that the government
can survive the decision to
withdraw from Egypt. Some
ministers in the government
have joined the back-benchers'
sharp attacks on the United
States for "forcing" the re-
treat. Speculation that Eden
will never resume active leader-
ship of the government has in-
creased.
In Paris, dissatisfaction
with the decision to withdraw
appears common to almost all
parties supporting Mollet,
and dissension within his own
Socialist Party is reported to
have gr
need to
major f
to acce
pears t
in the
good re
States.
In agreeing to uncondi?
tional withdrawal, London and
Paris publicly renewed their
support of the six broad prin-
ciples on control and opera-
tion of the canal they agreed
own. Apart from the
follow the British, a
actor in the decision
pt the withdrawal ap-
p have been a belief 25X1
need to re-establish
lations with the United
Economic Consequences
to with Cairo on 12 October. As a result of the Suez
They also indicated that their situation, Britain evidently
salvage equipment would be faces an indefinite period of
left in care of the UN forces, financial crisis. Britain's
in the evident hope that it gold and dollar reserves dropped
might be used to speed clearance by $279,000,000 during November,
of the canal. Chancellor of the Exchequer
25
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
6 December 1956
Macmillaq ? .'announced: , on: 4
December, and now stand at
1,965 billion dollars, the
lowest since 1952. The emer-
gency measures announced--
particularly the request for a
waiver of interest on the Amer-
ican and Canadian debt pay-
ments due on 31 December--would
help relieve the Chort-term
pressure on hard-currency re-
serves, but also may be inter-
preted as a sign of weakness,
and thus add to the long-term
pressure on the reserves.
The French economy is en-
countering similar pressures,
although no such emergency steps
have yet been announced. In-
flation is growing and the
government faces increasing
budgetary difficulties as well
as the drain on the country's
dollar reserves.
The Israelis have not
finally committed themselves
to withdraw their troops. On
2 December,Tel Aviv announced
that its troops in Sinai had
been drawn back about 30 miles,
but a further Israeli with-
drawal seems unlikely in the
immediate future, since the
Israelis have announced they
will bargain for some kind of
UN or Western guarantees re-
garding the future of Sinai
and the freedom of navigation
in the Gulf of Aqaba and the
Suez Canal before they pull
out of Egyptian territory
entirely.
The Israeli government's
posture remains militant; on
3 December, Ben-Gurion called
for a larger and better air
force than that which Israel
had before the hostilities,
and the Israeli army appears
to be leveling off at about
100,000 men including para-
military forces--a figure
some 15-20,000 higher than
normal peacetime strength.
Egypt
The Egyptian press re-
ceived Lloyd's announcement
as an unconditional sur-
render; the Nasr regime
greeted it with a mixture of
relief and exultation. Ambas-
sador Hare reported that Nasr,
even before the official an-
nouncement, appeared to be
resuming his chosen role as
the military savior of his
country in contrast to the
worried petitioner of the
past several weeks.
Nasr's "victory" may have
come none too soon to head off
incipient unrest. On 30 No-
vember the regime reportedly
arrested some 150 persons
including a number of leaders
of the old Wafd party. Al-
though these arrests appear to
have been only a warning to
dissidents, Egypt's economic
position continues to deteri-
orate (See Part III, p.8);and
the first reports of crowds
gathering to demand govern-
ment action to alleviate the
situation came last week from
Alexandria, a "soft" area
economically and politically,
as far as enthusiasm for Nasr
is concerned.
There have been more
reports of dissatisfaction in 25X1
the armed forces. Rumors of
executions are probably false_
popular revulsion against the
army also has been reported--
many urban Egyptians now feel
that they are protecting the
army as a result of the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
dispersal of military units in
the cities, rather than the army
protecting them on the battle-
:field.
UN Activity
When Egypt permits the UN
to begin canal clearance opera-
tions, Secretary General Hammar-
skjold will implement the next
stage of his schedule--the
announcement of the UN's plans
:for clearing the canal. He
has already sent a survey group
to the area. By the end of
December, Hammarskjold hopes to
have begun talks on canal opera-
tions between Britain, France
and Egypt on the basis of the
six principles which all three
accepted on 12 October.
UN consideration of the two
American draft resolutions on
settling the Suez dispute and
the general Arab-Israeli problem
will be deferred until the troop
withdrawal and clearance o era-
tions are well under way.
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HUNGARIAN WORKERS CONTINUE TO DEFY x',ADAR REGIME
Renewed demonstrations of
worker defiance after six weeks
of revolutionary chaos point
up the inability of the Kadar
regime to restore order with
its two-pronged policy of threat
and compromise. Although the
USSR's policy appears to be to
consolidate its control mecha:-
tisms within the country on a
basis of firm military supremacy,
it continues to be reluctant
to push an all-out campaign to
crush the workers, hoping in-
stead that hunger and need will
finally force the recalcitrant
strikers to engage in produc-
tive effort. Soviet deputy
premier Malenkov reportedly was
still in Budapest on 29 Novem-
ber, a week after his arrival,
presumably to formulate and
implement policies designed to
overcome the stalemate.
Worker Defiance
The regime's rebuff of
worker demands, levied in a num-
ber of meetings with Kadar,
has spurred workers to demon-
strate their open defiance of
the puppet Communist regime.
The regime's continued disincli
ination:to permit UN secretary
general Hammarskjold to visit
Budapest may further irritate
the workers. The workers,
apparently not intimidated by
a threat of force, have not
accepted the proposition that
further concessions cannot be
wrung from the government.
Some workers, however,
continue to feel that the strik-
ers are striking against them-
selves and that they will be
in a better position after re-
turning to work; others feel
that Hungary's only course is
to continue anti-Soviet demon-
strations. Several large pub-
lic demonstrations which were
staged from 2 to 5 December in
Budapest provided additional
evidence of the continued de-
termination and strength of
the working population. On 5
December leaflets were circulated
in Budapest calling for a gen-
eral strike and armed resistance.
The following day, numbers of
workers in major Budapest fac-
tories went back on strike, re-
portedly largely in those plants
where members of the factory
workers' councils had been ar-
rested on 5 December.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
6 December 1956
The workers have striven
toward their goals by trying
to overcome differences among
themselves and to establish
a "unified" labor position
with which'to confront Kadar.
The workers' councils report
that they have "good" relations
with writers' and students'
groups. Worker representatives
have engaged in a lively free-
for-all with the Kadar regime
to gain control of the workers'
councils. Kadar's efforts to
limit the function of the work-
ers' councils to harnessing
economic productive effort and
to delimit their political
function has been ignored and
his effort to infiltrate the
councils' leadership has met
with only slight success.
Kadar has announced the
abolition of revolutionary
councils established during
the past few days in various
ministries in youth groups
and among intellectuals. These
councils--apart from the work-
ers'councils--have served as
focal points of opposition to
Kadar.
Non-Communist worker
groups appear to have gained
a victory over the regime-
dominated national trade union
council when Sandor Gaspar re-
signed as trade union president.
Several officials Who reportedly
have a Social Democratic back-
ground and others who are Com-
munists--but who have long been
out of public light---were named
to leading trade union posts.
This suggests that leftists
not "controlled" by Kadar have
assumed authority over the trade
union movement.
Economic... Situation
Although the regime claimed
on 3 December that 60 to 65
percent of the workers in
Budapest reported to their
factories, the breakdown of
transportation and communica-
tion facilities, shortages
of fuel and raw materials, and
the sullen defiance of the
people make normal production
a far distant hope. The threat
of a renewed general strike
still remains very great. Food
and fuel shortages will become
more acute in the latter part
of the winter, even if the
strike is settled, due to the
time necessary after full work
effort is resumed to attain a
reasonable production level.
For the moment, the food supply
in Budapest appears adequate
and state market prices have
not risen.
Kadar Policies
Kadar, in attempting to
restore public order and con-
trol, has found it increasing-
ly difficult to keep the rem-
nants of his own Communist
Party in line. Large numbers
of Communists, who must apply
for admission in the recon-
stituted party--the Hungarian
Socialist Workers Party--are
not doing so. Party activists'
meetings, when held, are re-
portedly scantily attended and
certain local Communists are
apparently aligning themselves
with the workers' councils in
defiance of Kadar.
Attempts to reorganize
the armed control mechanisms
in Hungary have not been very
effective. The police force
is inept,, shattered by fear of
public reprisals or trials for
past errors. The army and
air fore
no longer ex s as
organizations. They have been
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disarmed and will not be re-
organized for some time to come.
All officers belong to a con-
glomerate "Armed Forces Of-
ficers Corps" with the only
duty being to restore peace
and disarm "counterrevolution-
aries."
'Soviet Measures
The USSR is apparently
reluctant for the moment to
crush the workers in an all-
out drive and hopes to exer-
cise its control in as unob-
trusive a manner as possible.
Continued resistance, however,
has forced Soviet control into
the open and demonstrated the
necessity for the retention of
such control for the maintenance
of Communism.
The Soviets do not appear
concerned about immediate
political and economic develop-
ments. They are quietly moving
to consolidate their control
mechanism throughout the country.
Soviet officers reportedly are
now appearing at workers' coun-
cil meetings. A Soviet citizen
has reportedly been appointed
as managing director of the
Hungarian State Railways, in A
move which may-presage similar
appointments to key posts
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throughout the country
to oversee the recovery
in
of
order
the
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Hungarian economy.
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CONFIDENTIAL
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
NOTES AND COMMENTS
POLISH SITUATION
Polish party first secre-
tary Gomulka, in his efforts to
stabilize control of a tense
and uneasy Poland, appears to
be adopting a somewhat stiffer
attitude toward all populat
sentiments which could jeopard-
ize his arrangement with Mos-
cow. He continues to be faced
with the delicate problem of
not offending the USSR by adopt-
ing too liberal policies but,
at the same time, of not incit-
ing the population to open
anti-Soviet demonstrations by
resorting to too harsh restrain-
ing measures.
In a speech on 29 November,
apparently in response to a
recent series of Polish press
and radio commentaries critical
of the USSR, he warned against
"reactionaries trying to ride
the wave of democratization"
and said that anyone who opposed
the Communist program of
socialism is on the "other side
of the barricades." The Krem-
lin followed up the speech by
broadcasting in Polish a.bitter
East German newspaper attack
on a Warsaw writer for holding
up Poland's "revolution of
1956" as a model for all Commu-
nist parties.
In respect to the recent
popular demonstrations against
the militia and the mob attack
on a jamming station in Byd-
goszcz, he said "we shall ruth-
lessly combat provocateurs,
scum and all those who dis-
turb public order....` A warn-
ing to the press was made on
1 December by Jerzy Morawski,
member of the Polish party
politburo, who called for "good
articles based on competent
knowledge," in a mild admoni-
tion to journalists to "under-
take a broader exchange of
views... as to which is to
be the Polish road to social-
ism...."
The country's leading in-
tellectuals have nevertheless
reaffirmed their determination
to work for complete freedom
of expression. The Polish
Writers' Union, concluding its
extraordinary congress on 2
December, resolved that a num-
ber of-changes should be made
in legislation in relation
to the control of information,
including the abolition of
censorship and of "prohibited"
books. In addition, it
called for increased contacts
abroad.
While Gomulka attempts
to stem popular criticism, he
is continuing to take steps
designed to meet popular de-
mands for political and
religious freedoms and economic
improvement.
Gomulka has gone far in
settling long-time issues with
the Catholic Church, moves
which have undoubtedly won
the regime increased support
from the predominantly Catholic
Polish people. Gomulka, after
restoring Cardinal Wyszynski
to his office as Polish primate,
agreed to permit the church
freedom of publication and
education that had heretofore
been denied it.
In return, the Vatican
appointed bishops in the west-
ern territories of Poland and
that portion of East Prussia
now occupied by Poland, thus
giving the Holy See's implicit
recognition of Poland's
sovereignty over these areas.
Wyszynski has also lent his
support to the Gomulka regime
.~.
CO TIA_
I~FID~.N_
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6 December 1956
and urged the populace to sup-
port the government in its ef-
forts to improve conditions in
Poland.
Economic Moves
In the economic field,
Poland's recent approach to
the United States for economic
aid suggests that the recent
Soviet grants are, insufficient
to effect a substantial im-
provement in the Polish standard
of living in the near future.
The Kremlin reportedly sanc-
tioned Poland's move during
the recent Moscow negotiations.
The Polish regime is wary
of the possibility of controls
attendant on American aid and
fearful lest the Kremlin get
the impression that Poland is
becoming too economically
bound to the West. The Poles
are also approaching the United
Kingdom and France to seek
trade agreement extensions and
loans, and
UNREST IN THE
Unrest in the Satellites,
stimulated by events in Hun-
gary and Poland and by economic
privation, continues at a high
pitch, particularly in Bulgaria,
East Germany and Rumania. The
governments are endeavoring to
meet this situation through a
combination of coercive measures
designed to ensure essential
.security controls and economic
concessions calculated to re-
duce popular hostility.
The failure of the majority
of the Satellites to undertake
any significant political lib-
eralization measures and the
lack of opposition leadership
for the restive populations
lessen the likelihood of any-
thing more than local demon-
strations occurring in Albania.,
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East
Germany and Rumania.
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appear to be playing one country,
against the other in an effort
to obtain the best possible
credits. Poland has also in-
dicated a desire to rejoin the
International Bank and the
International Monetary Fund.
Poland has also made an
overture to the United States
for a resumption of cultural
contacts, the Polish UNESCO
delegate in New Delhi on 26
November having suggested an
exchange of professors to
participate in projects "com-
pletely free of politics."
Increased relations with
the West will probably give
the Gomulka regime a greater
respectability in the eyes of
the Polish people.. While in-
creasing contacts with the West,
however, the regime will try
to prevent any deterioration
of Polish-Soviet relations.
Popular IT-o----,t
Hatred of tit. USSR by the
East Germans is reported to be
even greater than in the
period immediately following
the riots in June 1953, al-
though it is no longer expressed
openly as in the days immedi-
ately following the Soviet
intervention in Hungary. Unrest
remains most prevalent among
university students, who have,
however, confined themselves
largely to demanding changes
in university curricula and
openly questioning the Commu-
nist version of events in Hun-
gary and Poland.
The previously reported
tense atmosphere in Rumania
has not abated. Although a
popular uprising does not
appear imminent, further local
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6 December 1956
demonstrations against the
regime are possible.
Considerable instability
in Bulgaria is reported and
appears to be due to both fac-
tionalism in the party leader-
ship and dissidence and discon-
tent among the people. The
dissident party elements are not
believed to be sufficiently
united, however, to bring about
any significant changes in the
Bulgarian leadership or to lead
a popular movement against the
regime.
The numerous press reports
of unrest in Albania remain un-
confirmed and may be largely
Yugoslav-inspired in order to
abet Belgrade's propaganda bat-
tle against the Albanian leader-
ship.
Communist Control Measures
Satellite leaders in East-
ern Europe are fearful of the
example provided their people
by revolutionary Hungary, na-
tional Communist Poland and
independent Yugoslavia. Appar-
ently in an effort to lessen
similar pressures in other
Satellites, Moscow'is permitting,
if not encouraging, them--par-:
ticularly Albania and Bulgaria--
to pursue a vigorous campaign of
denigrating Yugoslav ideology.
The USSR may be hoping by these
means to goad Yugoslavia into
severing relations with its
sensitively exposed Satellite
neighbors.
Hard repressive measures
have been resorted to in Bul-
garia and Rumania, where numer-
ous arrests have taken place.
The East German regime, in addi-
tion to having instituted an un-
usual security alert, is plac-
ing more and more emphasis on
internal party orthodoxy, and
paying only lip service to the
de-stalinization policies of
the 20th congress. German lead-
ers appear determined to make
no real concessions and pre-
pared to take drastic measures
to put down quickly any signs
of overt resistance.
The Czechoslovak regime
is taking no chances and has
adopted a policy of utmost
vigilance. To emphasize its
position,'party leaders in
late November ostentatiously
celebrated the anniversary
of the birth of the late Stalin-
ist leader Gottwald.
In addition to convention-
al security precautions, the
Czechoslovak and Rumanian re-
gimes have mounted a vigorous
propaganda campaign against
the United States and have in-
creased their harassment of
Western diplomatic personnel.
Albania has been making life
difficult for the few Western
diplomats in Tirana.
All the Satellites have
in the past week or two announced
economic concessions such as
price reductions, family al-
lowance increases, or some form
of wage increase in an effort
to reduce the crushing economic
privations suffered by their
peoples. Czechoslovakia has
made unusual and successful
efforts to keep food stores
well stocked and ensure a good
supply of consumer goods for
the Christmas season.
While these minor conces-
sions have undoubtedly been
made with the hope of reducing
popular dissatisfaction, they
may also be an indication that
the basic long-range Soviet
policy of permitting very care-
fully controlled liberalization
and de-Stalinization in the
Satellites will continue. As
indicated by the Soviet-Rumanian
communique of 3 December, how-
ever, Moscow is now placing
great emphasis on the need to
strengthen the "unity" of the
Sino-Soviet Inc--that s ties
to the USSR.
pared jointly with ORR)
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6 December 1956
SOVIET FORCES TIGHTEN BORDER SECURITY IN EAST GERMANY
The Soviet Union has ap--
,parently resumed full respon-
sibility for controlling all
East German borders, probably
as a part of its general ef-
fort to tighten. bloc-wide se-
curity and prevent Western ex-
ploitation of the tense situa-
tion in Eastern Europe. So-
viet troops have moved into
positions which assure them of
more direct control over East
German border areas and strict-
er supervision over Allied
travel to Berlin.
West German officials
have reported that during the
past several days controls on
West German travel on East
Germany's highways have been
tightened considerably. The
controls appear to be aimed
principally at the important
truck traffic between West
Germany and West Berlin. Truck
drivers report that cargo in-
spections are more rigid and
more frequent now at practical-
ly every check point. At some
points, additional control
booths have been erected in
the last few days to check pas-
senger traffic on the highways,
and all road approaches to
Berlin are being checked more
thoroughly.
On 14 November, Soviet
authorities re-established con-
trol points on the highway to
Schoenefeld Airport just out-
side East Berlin, requiring
Soviet travel passes for all
persons, including official Al-
lied personnel. Similar re-
strictions had been lifted on
5 October. Since the latter
part of October, Soviet authori-
ties have refused visas to
personnel of the American mis-
sion in Berlin for travel in
East Germany, probably in con-
nection with, the general
tightening of security re-
strictions in East Germany.
In an apparent effort to
justify the overt Soviet re-
sumption of responsibility for
maintaining security, the East
German party newspaper Neues
Deutschland observed on 25
November that "sovereignty" is
not incompatible with prin-
ciples of "fraternal co-opera-
?tion and assistance." The
newspaper also said "independ-
ence does not mean that each
country had to cope with its
problems alone," and noted
"there is no contradiction be-
tween sovereignty and socialist
internationalism because one:
needs the other to become
firmly established."
The~Soviet authorities
who have been checking Allied
trains to Berlin for more than
a week have been accepting
identity documents ,and Russian
translations of;Allied'travel
orders as adequate documenta-
tion.
American army authorities
in Berlin announced on 5 Decem-
ber that the regular weekly
convoy was turned-back to Ber-
lin "rather than submit to in-
vestigations beyond those which
have been in effect for many
years." This is a continuation
of the Russian harassment of
Allied highway traffic which
began on 29 November when they
attempted to search an American
army truck convoy en route to
'Berlin. At that time, the con-
voy was permitted to pass, after
a considerable delay with the
warning that in the future the
interior of all vehicles would
be searched before being per-
mitted'to continue the journey.
O
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Changes in the composition
of the Soviet Communist Party"s
presidium and secretariat may
be announced following the
plenary session of the party's
central committee which Khru
sh:chev has stated wvill': be'- held
early this month, since such
changes are normally formalized
at plenums. The proceedings
may clarify Khrushchev's posi-
tion in the Soviet leadership.
According to recent rumors and
speculation, he has been slip-
ping as a result of Soviet
reverses in Poland and Hungary.
On 29 November, for example,
Yugoslav de ut premier Kardel
predicted
that Khru- --
s c iev would alL from. powei in
the not-too-distant future.
At the present time,
forces in opposition. or poten-
tial opposition to Khrushchev
do not seem to be in a position
to effect his removal.. Khru