WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT NIGERIA'S NEW FEDERAL STRUCTURE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A006500060002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 20, 2004
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: July 12, 1968
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Nigeria's New Federal Structure
Secret
N! 44
12 fully1968
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F
NIGERIA'S NEW FEDERAL STRUCTURE
The Federation of Nigeria, beset by civil war
with the secessionist Ibos from Eastern Nigeria, is
nevertheless taking steps to strengthen national
unity in the postwar period. Federal leader Gowon
split the former four regions into 12 states on 1
April 1968 in a move to solve the critical problem
of intertribal strife among Nigeria's three major
tribes--Hausa/Fulani, Yoruba, and Ibo--and their
domination of some 250 minority tribes.
The Federal Military Government is made up
largely of relatively young and politically inex-
perienced men from the northern minority areas who
are acting in concert with tribal leaders from most
parts of the country. Gowon and his fellow minority
tribesmen in the federal government believe that the
12-state structure will dilute the power of the major
tribes and broaden popular participation in government.
This, they expect, will take a long time and will
require the firm hand of the military to prevent the
civilian politicians from disrupting their plan.
The new states, especially the six in the north,
have many problems. Strong intertribal frictions
that have come to the surface may result in further
territorial splits or realignments. The state gov-
ernments also have immense staffing problems, as
well as inadequate finances. Nevertheless, most of
the states are beginning to function in the basic
areas of government, and the relatively well-qualified
federal civil service is keeping the country as a
whole running despite the civil war.
Background
When soldiers replaced Ni-
geria's civilian leaders in Jan-
uary 1966, the country's federal
structure was based on four re-
gional units, each of which pos-
sessed a great deal of political
and economic autonomy. A single
tribe dominated each of three
of the four regions: Hausa/Fulani
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in the North, Yoruba in the West,
and Ibo in the East. (The Mid-
Western Region, split off from
the West in 1963, contained sev-
eral tribes, none of which con-
stituted a majority.)
Federal power, which had
grown in the years since inde-
pendence, has become an object
of increasing contention among
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States and Tribal Groups of Nigeria
State boundary
o State capital
IJA W Selected tribe
5.0 100 1 O
STATUTE MILES
4
91261 7-68 /~:~ena
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the three major tribes. The
military coup in January 1966,
the countercoup in July 1966, and
the Ibo secession in May 1967 were
all primarily reactions by one
tribal group against the attempts
of another to dominate the coun-
try as a whole. The coup of July
1966 was also a reaction against
the attempts of the Ibo-dominated
first military regime to strengthen
federal power at the expense of
the regions.
The present Federal Military
Government (FMG), which took
power in August 1966, has basically
continued to work within the frame-
work of the Nigerian Constitution,
altering it as necessary by decree
in the absence of the civilian
political institutions suspended
following the first coup. In
late 1966 and early 1967, repre-
sentatives of the four regions
met several times in an attempt
to devise a new formula for the
relationships between the regions
and the federal government. Dur-
ing these discussions, considerable
support was evidenced, especially
from the newly powerful spokesmen
for the minority tribes, for di-
viding the four regions into a
larger number of states.
The unwillingness of the Ibo
leaders of the former Eastern Re-
gion to permit the east to be
split kept these meetings from
reaching any workable conclusions.
When federal leader Gowon took
matters into his own hands on 27
May 1967 and created by decree
12 states in place of the four
regions, the east seceded as the
"Republic of Biafra," thereby
capping a series of moves it had
already made toward greater auton-
omy.
Gowon's action was influenced
by his own origins as a minority
tribesman from the north, and by
strong pressures from the minority
tribal elements which predominate
in the army. Along with other
important leaders in the FMG who
are from minority tribes in both
the north and south, Gowon be-
lieved that Nigeria's political
problems would be alleviated by
reducing the power of the three
largest tribes, which under the
new system theoretically could
no longer dominate one large and
powerful region but would have
to work through several weaker
states.
The Present Central Authority
At the center of Nigeria's
federal structure is the Supreme
Military Council (SMC), composed
of the top military and police
officers and the military gov-
ernors of each of the states, ex-
cept for the East-Central State--
i.e., the Ibo heartland--whose
governor has not yet been ap-
pointed. This group is headed
by Major General Yakubu Gowon,
who is officially styled as "Com-
mander in Chief of the Armed
Forces and Head of the Federal
Military Government". As-
sisting the SMC in running the
country is the Federal Executive
Council (FEC), on which sit some
of the top military leaders, in-
cluding Gowon as chairman, about
a dozen civilian commissioners,
the two top police officials, and
the attorney general.
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The commissioners function
as heads of the government minis-
tries and were brought into the
FMG primarily to broaden popular
support for the regime and give
it a civilian flavor. All major
policy decisions, however, have
to be referred for approval to
the SMC, which thereby maintains
a checkrein on executive council
actions. Few of the civilian
commissioners are providing any
real leadership to their minis-
tries, which are largely function-
ing under the direction of a group
of fairly experienced and compe-
tent civil servants. Many of the
commissioners are actively seek-
ing to further their political
careers for the time when the
country is returned to civilian
rule.
The military regime also is
too preoccupied with the war to
give much positive guidance or
attention to the myriad other
problems that have arisen during
the past year. Although govern-
ment administration is frequently
slow-moving and many problems
seem to be ignored, basic govern-
ment services have continued.
Administering the New States
The 12-state federal struc-
ture officially took effect on 1
April 1968, by which time 10 of
the 12 states had set up function-
ing administrations. Of the three
eastern states, only the South-
Eastern State is fully under
federal control. The federal
army still retains basic control
there, although the governor now
is operating from Calabar, the
capital. Rivers State also has
a governor, and its capital has
been occupied by the federal army,
which is slowly proceeding to oc-
cupy the rest of the state. When
this process is completed, the
Rivers State governor will prob-
ably move to establish his admin-
istration in Port Harcourt. Even
though Enugu, the East-Central
State capital, is occupied by
the federal army, most of the
state is not. The future status
of the Ibo homeland and its re-
lationship to the rest of Nigeria
must await the end of the civil
war.
Two of the 12 states in the
south had functioning administra-
tions well before 1 April. The
Western State has simply converted
its former regional structure,
although it lost considerable
territory and some administrative
elements to Lagos State. In late
1967, the Mid-Western State re-
constituted its regional admin-
istrative structure, which had
been disrupted by the Biafran
conquest of the state and the
federal reoccupation the preced-
ing summer and fall.
Following Gowon's decree of
May 1967 creating the 12 states,
an interim administrative council
was set up in the Northern region
to oversee the apportionment of
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the region's administrative struc-
ture and assets among the six new
states. The Northern region gov-
ernor, Brigadier Hassan Katsina,
was appointed head of the council,
which proceeded slowly to accom-
plish its tasks during the next
year. On 1 April 1968, the coun-
cil was terminated and residual
matters of joint interest were
assigned to an Interim Common
Services Agency which will ad-
minister a number of organiza-
tions serving the six states.
These include the higher educa-
tional institutions, radio and
television, the Northern Nigeria
Marketing Board, and several less
important functions difficult to
split six ways. A significant
feature of the new agency is that
disputes between it and a state
government will be referred to
the Head of the FMG for compulsory
arbitration.
Many southerners have tended
to view the Common Services Agency
as a device for maintaining north-
ern solidarity. Other evidence,
however, indicates that it will
take a more powerful organization
than the limited Common Services
Agency to withstand the centrifu-
gal forces in the north. The
Benue-Plateau governor, for ex-
ample, has refused to accept the
agency's jurisdiction over the
minor matter of automobile li-
censing and reportedly intends
to set up his own marketing board.
The number of ministries in
each of the six northern states
has been reduced to seven, both
because the Common Services Agency
has assumed some of the ministe-
rial functions of the former re-
gion and because there are not
enough civil servants to go
around. In the other states,
either the existing regional
structure was carried over or a
new one created along similar
lines. In addition, in the north
generally more civilian ministers--
actually called commissioners--
have been appointed than there
are ministries. This undoubtedly
is an attempt by the military
governors to strengthen their
political positions by bringing
politically important personages
into their administrations.
Staffing the state adminis-
trations in the north has become
both a political and a tribal
problem. Some of the states have
already adopted states' rights
positions and are fostering state
"nationalism." In some instances,
there have been public demonstra-
tions, largely tribal in character,
against nonindigenous civil employ-
ees and businessmen. Although
most governors put their need
for qualified personnel ahead
of tribal considerations and
have discouraged this activity,
there undoubtedly will continue
to be local outbreaks of inter-
tribal friction, any one of which
could erupt into violence and
threaten the security of a wider
area. The Tiv tribe, in particular,
has a long history of periodic
outbreaks of violence stemming
from an ingrained resistance to
any external domination.
The relative youth and polit-
ical inexperience of the six north-
ern governors and the two so far
appointed for the three eastern
states is a weakness in the new
federal structure. The Benue-
Plateau governor seems to be taking
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hold firmly, but the Kano gov-
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probably strongly influenced by
civilian politicians in Kano, as
well as by the powerful Emir of
Kano. The two minority state gov-
ernors in the east face perhaps
the most difficult task of all.
The need for massive rehabilitation
and reconstruction is matched by
the intense tribal hatreds exacer-
bated by atrocities committed on
all sides during the civil war.
Animosity Among the Tribes
once dominated, and they con-
tinue to seek the return to na-
tional power of the conservative,
Muslim Hausa/Fulani tribe.
Should these conservative former
NPC leaders fail to regain polit-
ical power on the national level
or if they feel unable to live
with social and democratic re-
forms being made elsewhere in
the north they might well resort,
perhaps in alliance with some of
the emirs of the "Holy North,"
to extreme measures. These might
even include an attempt to take
the far north out of the federa-
tion.
Although the federation's
open warfare with the Ibos would
seem to be a warning to the rest
of Nigeria of the consequences of
tribal strife, frictions between
tribes and even within tribes con-
tinue to plague the state and fed-
eral governments. The Yoruba
tribesmen resident in the north,
in particular, have been the ob-
ject of open hostility on the
part of the conservative, far
northern Hausa/Fulani ever since
the Yorubas moved into jobs and
occupations abandoned by Ibos
driven out of the Northern re-
gion in 1966. There have been
numerous anti-Yoruba incidents,
and in recent months a number
of Yorubas have returned south.
More violent anti-Yoruba out-
breaks seem likely.
Behind these activities are
a number of influential former
political leaders of the abol-
ished Northern People's Congress
(NPC). Such men as Inuwa Wada,
former federal minister of de-
fense, resent the accession to
power of minority peoples they
The Yorubas, dwelling in
the Western, Kwara, and Lagos
states, are themselves badly
split, basically along tribal
clan lines, but also according
to their adherence to one of two
former political parties, the
Action Group (AG) or the Nige-
rian National Democratic Party
(NNDP). The AG adherents, led
by Chief Obafemi Awolowo, who is
vice chairman of the Federal Ex-
ecutive Council and the federal
minister of finance, prefer a
united Yorubaland. On the other
hand, the traditional foes of
the AG, including some important
clan leaders, desire their own
state. Under further impetus
from tribal leaders outside the
west who still fear Yoruba polit-
ical power, the creation of an
NNDP-dominated Yoruba state from
a part of the Western State is a
strong possibility.
The six northern states
present a vast complexity of in-
tertribal tensions. The Kanuri
tribe in the North-Eastern State
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has long wanted a state of its
own, and is unhappy at having to
share one with others. The Tivs
of Benue-Plateau do not get along
very well with the tribes in the
northern part of that state--or
with anyone else for that matter.
Several small tribes in the east-
ern part of Kwara resent domina-
tion by indigenous Yorubas and
have already petitioned Lagos
for their own state. These in-
stances of intertribal hostilities
are repeated throughout the
country and are as intense in the
south as in the north.
Problems and Prospects
The creation of the 12 states
and the civil war are, almost
paradoxically, contributing to a
measure of relative political
stability in important parts of
Nigeria. The process of estab-
lishing a number of new state
administrations and the govern-
ment's concentration on the war
effort have kept a number of
potentially disruptive situations
from arising. This period of
relative calm, however, may not
last long beyond the end of the
civil war.
The civil war appears to have
brought about an increased ad-
herence to the concept of Nige-
rian unity on the part of many
leaders at both federal and local
levels. Indeed, the motto adopted
by the FMG, "Keep Nigeria one,"
is constantly put before the
general populace over the radio
and in the newspapers. The
strength of this incipient na-
tionalism vis-a-vis the deeply
imbedded tribal consciousness of
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nearly every Nigerian is likely
to be the key to Nigeria's fu-
ture as a country. Much will
depend on the quality of lead-
ership emanating from Lagos and
the state capitals under the
present military regime, which is
determined to maintain Nigerian
unity.
On the other hand, Nigeria's
political and economic complexity,
now increased with the 12-state
structure, makes it difficult
for any one group to break up the
federation. Even the secession
of the Ibos, a major tribal group,
has not brought on the end of the
Nigerian federation, and the se-
cession seems destined for fail-
ure, at least in this round. In
addition, the factor of inertia--
the average Nigerian's inability
to take actions that disrupt
traditional patterns--helps to
maintain the status quo.
Inter- and intratribal anti-
pathies verging on open hostility
will plague the new state admin-
istrations for a long time. One
or more states, particularly the
North-Eastern and Western, may
split further to accommodate
tribal pressures, and the bound-
aries of several states could be
realigned to calm tribal animos-
ities. Gowon himself has indi-
cated that additional states
might well be created. Few if
any changes, however, are likely
to take place as long as the
civil war is being actively prose-
cuted. The army leaders have
already made it clear they will
tolerate no interference with the
war effort. On the other hand,
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after the war is over, the
thousands of soldiers who are
sent home may well provide a dis-
ruptive leadership to those tribes
which feel oppressed or wronged
by the present 12-state structure.
A major question still to be
resolved is the issue of the fu-
ture balance of power between the
central government and the states.
Most of the new states are con-
siderably weaker than the old
regions, and the central govern-
ment should be in a better posi-
tion to strengthen its author-
ity at the expense of regional and
tribal interests. Many minor-
ity tribal leaders support a
stronger central regime as a bul-
wark against domination by one
of the three major tribes.
which played a large role in the
Eastern region's move toward
secession. This question will
inevitably figure prominently in
the constitutional discussions
expected to take place after the
war. At present, federally col-
lected revenues are allocated in
part according to population,
which does not satisfy states
such as Kano which provide a far
greater proportion of revenues
than they get back under this
formula. This will also be true
of the oil-rich states, such as
Mid-Western, South-Eastern and
Rivers.
In April 1967 Gowon had an-
nounced a timetable for return-
ing the country to civilian rule
by early 1969, but this has been
Lagos' preoccupation with
the war, however, is giving the
states the opportunity to estab-
lish fairly autonomous governing
structures. If this trend is
permitted to continue, Lagos could
find it difficult to reimpose
its authority. The central govern-
ment, on the other hand, controls
the purse strings, and most of the
new states, although they collect
taxes themselves, must get money
from Lagos to pay for economic
and social programs being de-
manded by the public.
A key concern of the new
states is their relative share
of federal revenues, an issue
derailed by the civil war.
lieve the new state structure
which they have imposed should
have an initial period of con-
solidation under their tutelage
before being subjected to the
added political strains and
stresses accompanying a return
to civilian rule. It remains
problematical, however, whether
this breathing space will be suf-
ficient to ensure the success of
this new arrangement for accom-
modating Nigeria's complex
tribal pressures.
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