INDONESIAN COMMUNISTS ACTIVE IN EAST AND CENTRAL JAVA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A006600020003-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 4, 2005
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: August 9, 1968
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A0066000200ret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
Special Report
Indonesian Communists Active in East and Central Java
Secret
N2 44
9 August 1968
No. 0032/68A
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The Indonesian Communist Party, resurgent in
East and Central Java early this year, was hit hard
by government operations in June and July. Heavy
losses among the small group of party leaders who
survived the postcoup debacle in 1965 will proba-
bly intensify factionalism and create new obstacles
to reorganization efforts.
Despite this, Communist political activity
and terrorism are likely to continue in East and
Central Java. These provinces have long been areas
of party strength and the situation there still of-
fers a good potential for Communist rebuilding ef-
forts.
The Indonesian Government is aware of the
acute need for economic improvement if the Com-
munists' appeal among the people is to be undercut,
but it is hard pressed to find funds for more than
token projects. For some years to come, therefore,
the government will probably have to rely on mili-
tary and intelligence efforts to suppress the party.
Background
East and Central Java were
the major areas of support for
both the Communist Party and
former president Sukarno prior to
the attempted Communist coup in
1965. Following the coup, the
army purged the civil provincial
administrations of Suk arnoist and
Communist elements and screened,
to the best of its ability, the
various armed services. It im-
prisoned and often executed Com-
munist cadremen and members of
Communist front organizations.
Particularly in East Java, where
devout Muslims have significant
strength, civilians either as-
sisted the army or independently
undertook mass executions of Com-25X1
munists.
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East Java
an isolated area along the south-
ern coast of the province. This
region has a long history of pro-
Communist sentiment which was in-
tensified by the postcoup execu-
tions of Communists. Until early
this year the area had been in-
adequately policed because of its
relative inaccessibility and sparse
population.
The guerrillas at first sup-
pressed local opposition through
terrorist activities aimed pri-
marily at local anti-Communist
Muslim elements. Later, raids
were carried out against military
patrols and installations. These
operations were supported by an
extensive propaganda campaign de-
signed to exploit local antigov-
ernment sentiment.
Central Java
Although the militant activ-
ii.y in East Java has received more
notice, the rebuilding of the
party apparatus in Central Java
has also gone forward, taking a
more pragmatic line. The party's
provincial leadership, which has
supported central committee pol-
icy, apparently has been able to
capitalize on a sizable reservoir
of experienced former cadres. I
The capture earlier this year
of Sutarto, an important Central
Java provincial leader, coupled
with the arrests of several couriers
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from East Java, led to the expo- as a preliminary to more widespread
sure in early June of an extensive terrorism. Other incidents have
25X1 party apparatus being consolidated been attributed to a militant splin-
around the city of Solo in Cen- ter group concentrated in Solo and
Semarang, or to the spill-over of
some East Java elements hard pressed
by army operations.
Loss of Party Leaders
The party has recently sus-
25X1I ity have been the cities of Jog-
jakarta and Semarang.
25X1
Although guerrilla activity
in Central Java appears to be
in an early phase, some incidents
have occurred, probably in the
nature of probing actions. In
late June, several assassina-
tions of anti-Communists took
place in north coast areas, pos-
sibly--as had occurred earlier in
East Java's Malang-Blitar, area--
tained significant leadership losses.
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Government successes in Cen- 5X1
tral Java appear to have been
fairly extensive.
The intensive sweep in the
Malang-Blitar area of East Java,
involving over five battalions,
has been largely successful in
depriving the party of experienced
leaders.
Nevertheless, the govern-
ment's campaign appears to have
had little positive effect on the
political orientation of the gen-
eral population in East Java's
Malang-Blitar area; if anything,
army operations have aggravated
antigovernment feeling.
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Economic projects, hampered
by a lack of funds, have been
restricted to a partially com-
pleted dam project in East Java,
where floods are a serious prob-
lem, and limited experimental
planting of "miracle rice" in
both provinces, which is often
held up for lack of qualified
personnel and necessary chemicals
and equipment. Facilities for
health, education, and recreation
are seriously lacking. In par-
Outlook
25X1
ticular, the government has no
effective channel of communica-
tion to the populace which could
take over when military opera-
tions are scaled down.
The economic base that the
government had hoped to build be-
fore the Communists could begin a
reconsolidation has not been re-
alized, and the government's
anti-Communist effort is thereby
rendered increasingly difficult.
A greater emphasis than had orig-
inally been intended probably
will have to be placed on con-
tinued military and intelligence
operations, and present indica-
tions are that the total cam ai n
will be a prolonged one. \
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