CONSEQUENCES OF THE FUTURE REVELATION OF THE CONTENTS OF CERTAIN GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80R01720R000900100009-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 24, 2004
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: May 8, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

TOE !IM
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SIG A.TUR R CO AND COVER SHEET
D)CL'iVENT DESCRIPTICI
REGISTRY
r
SOURCE
029304
CIA CONTROL NO.
~~y
DOC. NO.
8 n'ay 1952 8 v "y .1,"f;2
n 'ay
DATE DOCUMENT RECEIVED
DOC. DAic
~
r! ~ jip
COPY NO. - ^~
NUMBER OF PAGES
Cy 7T a 87
C ~9g t,c 'r
LOGGED BY
NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS
L Ls
; L ^~v
SAT T'ENTIChi: This form will be attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency or classified Top Secret
within the CIA and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or transmitted outside of
CIA. Access to Top Secret material is limited to those individuals whose official duties relate to the material. Each alternate or assist-
ant Top Secret Control Officer who receives and/or releases the attached Top Secret material will sign this form and indicate period of
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TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
SPECIAL ESTIMATE
02930
,8
CONSEQUENCES OF THE FUTURE REVELATION
OF THE CONTENTS OF CERTAIN
GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
8 May 1952
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION
U. S. Officials Only
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
SPECIAL ESTIMATE
CONSEQUENCES OF THE FUTURE REVELATION
OF THE CONTENTS OF CERTAIN
GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State,
the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff
participated with the Central Intelligence Agency in the
preparation of this estimate. All members of the Intelli-
gence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimate on 6
May 1952.
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TOP SECRET
CONSEQUENCES OF THE FUTURE REVELATION OF THE
CONTENTS OF CERTAIN GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the consequences for US foreign relations and for US strategic in-
terests of the revelation of the contents of the two-volume study entitled "Report of
the Federal Trade Commission on the International Petroleum Cartel."
. SCOPE
This estimate considers the consequences of the revelation of the contents of the
subject report, whether by official publication or otherwise. The estimate does not
consider to what extent the statements in the Report are accurate or already known,
but solely the effect of their revelation, individually or collectively, as allegations made
under the sponsorship of an arm of the US Government.
ESTIMATE
1. We estimate that official, publication of this 3. Assistance to Soviet propaganda and to the
Report would greatly assist Soviet propa- achievement of Soviet objectives throughout
Banda, would further the achievement of the world. Publication of the report would:
Soviet objectives throughout the world and a. Assist the USSR in pursuing its objec-
hinder the achievement of US foreign policy tive of dividing the West and specifically of
objectives, particularly in the Near and Mid- driving a wedge between the US and UK, and
dle East, and would otherwise tend to injure between the US and other European nations.
US foreign relations and strategic interests, b. Greatly assist Soviet propaganda de-
as more fully set forth below. signed to discredit the US and other Western
2. We believe that the manner of the revela- Powers in the Near and Middle East, and
lion of the Report's contents, otherwise than further the Soviet objective of fostering and
by official publication in full in its present perverting to Communist ends the spirit of l
form, would cause the consequences to differ nationalism in that area.
only in degree from the consequences of off.- c. Assist the current Soviet campaign to
vial publication estimated herein. The ad- induce a relaxation of East-West trade con-
v,erse effects herein estimated might be trols, through distortion of certain allegations
mitigated to some extent by withholding from in the Report to support the propaganda argu-
creneral' release certain paragraphs which meat that US and Western foreign trade prac-
v,; ould particularly provide propaganda and tices are deliberately restrictive.
political ammunition to Soviet and other d. Assist the world-wide Soviet campaign to
forces in the Middle East opposed to the represent the US and other Western Powers
interests serialist" and "colonial" powers. This
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effect would be felt not only in the Near and e. As a consequence of c. and d. above, re-
rospects for achieving a Middle East
e the
d
p
uc
Middle East but also in the countries of South
anization
e or
f
d
.
g
ens
e
and Southeast Asia and to some extent in tl.
Latin America.. f. Seriously embarrass certain governments
h
4. Specific Adverse Effects on the US Position in the area, both in their relations wih t te
r Western Powers and in their
th
f
d
e
o
US an
in the Near and Middle East. Publication o
thus increasing
ituations
l
ti
,
s
ca
the Report would: internal poli
of r1;cnrr1ar and deterioration
a. Further prejudice prospects for a Settle- -- - -
ment of the Iranian oil controversy, in par- favorable to extreme nationalist and anti-
including Communists.
Western elements
,
ticular by damaging, perhaps irreparably, the
status of the US as mediator between the UK J;-
IT, 5. Other Adverse Effects on US Interests. In
and Iran. Publication would thus contribute
addition to the consequences listed above, pub-
to the present economic deterioration an
political instability in Iran, and increase, I
opportunities for Communist subversion.
Assist forces in other oil-producing coun-
b
.
tries in the area which desire to alter present
contractual arrangements with the interna-
tional oil companies, and thus jeopardize the
flow of oil, which is of great strategic im-
portance to the US and its allies.
Harm the general position and prestige
c
.
of the US and other Western Powers in the
area, by providing propaganda ammunition
not only to Communist elements but also to
extreme nationalist and other anti-Western
elements.
d. Raise doubts in the UK and France con-
cerning US objectives in the Near and Middle
East and possibly jeopardize coordination of
over-all policies for the area. ,
lication of the Report would:
a. Tend to impair basic relations between 11
the US and UK and to a lesser extent between `s
the US and the Netherlands and between the
US and France, to the detriment of US in-
terests in all areas in which close cooperation
with these powers is essential to the achieve-
ment of US security objectives. In addition
to the proposed Middle East defense organiza-
tion, this would apply to NATO and to efforts
to achieve agreed policies in the Far East
including Southeast Asia.
b. Tend to jeopardize US oil concessions in
areas other than the Middle East and to
jeopardize other US commercial and indus-
trial interests abroad, including private min-
ing arrangements in South America and
elsewhere.
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 SIGNATURE RECORD AND COVER, SHEET
DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION
REGISTRY
SOURCE
01ID' 030360
SE-28/1 5 Jan 1953,
CIA CONTROL NO.
DOC. NO.
h Jai 19513 12LS
DATE DOCUMENT RECEIVED
DOC.DATE
~* r
COPY NO.
total
LOGGED BY
NUMBER OF PAGES
-''
NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS
ATTENTION: This form will be attached to each Top Secret document; received by the Central Intelligence Agency or classified Top Secret
within the CIA and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or transmitted outside of
CIA. Access to Top Secret material is limited to those individuals whose official duties relate to the material. Each alternate or assist.
ant Top Secret Control Officer who receives and/or releases the attached Top Secret material will sign this form and indicate period of
custody in the left-hand columns provided. The name of each individual who has seen the Top Secret document and the date of han-
dling should be indicated in the right-hand columns.
REFERRED TO
RECEIVED
RELEASED
SEEN RY
OFFICE
SIGNATURE DATE
TIME
DATE
TIME
NAME AND OFFICE SYMBOL
DATE
(
r~r
IN i/
25
F
THE
SaI t1L t TTaT 1
TI4E
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NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detached from Top Secret material it shall be completed in the appropriate spaces below and
transmitted to Central Top Secret Control for record.
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 TOPp, ~S~ECR ~ C` r
SECURITY' TC~lF 2 ~C~N Relpse 2004/10/20: CIA-RDP80RO1720RQQ9906100009-9
SPECIAL ESTIMATE
PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF
THE PROSECUTION OF THE ANTI-TRUST
SUIT AGAINST CERTAIN US OIL COMPANIES
FOR THE PERSO AL RTTuITIC'"'
OF TPE A)RESSEE ONLY.
SE-28/1
Published 2 January 1953
The following member organizations of the Intelligence
Advisory Committee participated with the Central Intelli-
gence Agency in the preparation of this estimate: The
intelligence organizations of the Departments of State,
the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff.
All members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee con-
curred in this estimate on 29 December 1952, except the
Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion, who abstained from comment, neither concurring
nor dissenting.
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
TOP SECRET
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PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE PROSECUTION OF THE
ANTI-TRUST SUIT AGAINST CERTAIN US OIL COMPANIES
NOTE
This paper deals only with the consequences of the publication of the FTC
report and of the possible indictment and trial of US oil companies. It
does not consider the consequences of a judgment for or against the oil
companies.
ESTIMATE
1. In S,E-28,1 we estimated that publication
of the "Report. of the Federal Trade Com-
mission on the International Petroleum
Cartel" would :
a. be exploited in Soviet-Communist and
other anti-US propaganda;
b. tend to impair basic US relations with
the UK and other Western countries;
c. adversely affect the position of the US,
and of US oil companies, in,. the Middle East;
and
d. strengthen attacks against US business
interests in other areas.
2. The FTC report was published on 22
August 1952. The fact that deletions were
made is a matter of public report, but the
text of the deleted portions has not been
publicly revealed.
3. The effects noted in SE-28 have not yet
materialized in any significant degree as a
result of publication of the FTC report or of
the initial legal proceedings stemming there-
from.
4. However, publication of the report has
already provided Communists and nationalist
extremists with material which they can use
in an aggressive propaganda campaign to the
detriment of US interests at any time they
so decide. We are unable to estimate when
or in what manner they will do so.
5. Indictment and trial of the oil companies
would probably bring out additional material
which could be exploited by Communists and
nationalist extremists to discredit US oil com-
panies and other US foreign business enter-
prises. On the other hand, abandonment of
the case would lay the US Government open
to charges of attempting to suppress dam-
aging evidence and of condoning the practices
alleged in the original complaint.
6. Past and possible future revelations will
probably provide an additional stimulus to
demands in Middle Eastern countries and in
Venezuela for a larger, share of oil revenues.
They will also provide nationalist extremists
with additional ammunition for use in their
campaign in behalf of nationalization of oil.
These revelations are not, however, in our
judgment, likely to be a decisive element
affecting the policy of these countries with
regard to nationalization of oil resources.
7. In the UK and other Western European
countries there has been criticism of the
soundness of US judgment in publishing the
FTC report. The prosecution of the case
would place a further strain on US relations
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with these countries. These countries are
generally more tolerant of cartel arrange-
ments than is the US. They have questioned,
and will probably continue to question, the
soundness of a policy which, in order to sup-
port a principle that they regard as of minor
importance, risks reactions in oil producing
countries which might result in the loss of how major strategic resources. There are,
n-
ever, no indications that
basic relations
the FTC report has impaired with the UK and other Western countries, or
that the indictment and trial of the oil com-
o
.
panies would be likely to do s
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A 12 Fr duy, Feb. 222,194 '111E V ASHIiNGTON POST
ational Security' Saved 011 C
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