CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A006000410001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 24, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 15, 1961
• Content Type: REPORT

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State Dept. review completed
15 November 1961
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15 November 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
2. Finland: Soviet demand for continued Finnish neutrality
appears designed to guarantee President Kekkonen's re-
election. (Page i)
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4. Yugoslavia: Tito reiterates support for Soviet position on
Germany. (Page i i)
5. France-Algeria: Rebels apparently reject formal negotia-
tions until hunger strike of Algerian prisoners in France
'ends. (Page iii)
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8. Iran: Shah apparently abandons for time being plan to take
personal control of the government. (Page iv)
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
15 November 1961
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*Finland-USSR: The Soviet demand for assurances of
continued Finnish neutrality, together with the implied
threat that otherwise Moscow would call for military nego-
tiations, seems designed primarily to guarantee President
Kekkonen's re-election and to strengthen pro-Kekkonen sup-
porters in parliament. Kekkonen has dissolved parliament
and called for new elections next February in the hope of
demonstrating widespread public endorsement for his pol-
icies and thereby satisfying the USSR. Kekkonen appar-
ently feels that parliamentary elections in the near future,
with the Finnish public in a state of apprehension, will en-
dorse his policy of friendship with the USSR. The recent
Soviet moves will also greatly strengthen Kekkonen's own
re-election prospects in the presidential election already
scheduled for January 1962.
In discussions with Finnish Foreign Minister Karjalainen
in Moscow over the week end, Gromyko criticized the political
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policy--an obvious reference to Kekkonen's chief opponent
in the presidential election. According to Finnish parlia-
mentary
sources, Gromyko also characterized the incum-
bent
minority Agrarian government as too weak to guarantee
current Finnish policy, although he did not demand the in-
situation in Finland as "unstable" and accused "a certain
political grouping" of desiring a change in Finnish foreign
Yugoslavia:
In a speech on 13 November, Tito reiterated
his support for the Soviet stand on Germany and complained of
Western pressure on Belgrade intended to change his foreign
policies. He indicated that both Yugoslavia's and Moscow's
policies are intended to prevent creation of a strong, independ-
ent Germany which might again threaten their security.
Tito endorsed Moscow's stand on the Soviet-Albanian dis-
pute, but implied that Belgrade does not wish to become
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directly involved in this issue. He denied that his country
has any expansionist designs on Albania but warned that
Yugoslavia must be alert to the possibility of an Albanian
provocation which would "trouble peace in the Balkans and
cause conflicts to break out." 25X1
Page 4)
France-Algeria: There is further evidence that pros-
pects for a negotiated Algerian settlement between Paris
and the provisional Algerian government (PAG) are being
IMM, adversely affected by the rebels' propaganda build-up of
vice premier Ben Bella's hunger strike. The PAG cabinet
apparently decided on 12 November that formal negotiations
\ could not be scheduled until the hunger strike of Algerian
\ prisoners in F ante ends.
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Iran: The Shah apparently has, for the time being, aban-
doned his an to take personal control of the government and
will permit Prime Minister Amini to continue. Amini has re-
fused the Shah's request that he replace certain cabinet minis-
ters and urged the Shah to permit his government time to carry
out its reform program. The Shah agreed and on 11 November
made one of his infrequent appearances at a cabinet meeting.
Amini outlined his program at this meeting, and the Shah con-
tented himself with a request for more rapid progress in car-
rying out economic and social reforms.
LThe Shah is likely, however, to intervene in governmen-
tal affairs whenever pressure builds up from the interests
which oppose reforms but which constitute the Shah's main
source of support
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Yugoslav Foreign Policy
In his speech, Tito blamed "certain capitalist circles and
other reactionary-minded people" in the US for economic pres-
sures on Yugoslavia "at a time when our country has been se-
verely hit by a drought and when it is in a highly unpleasant
situation." He insisted that Yugoslavia would not alter its for-
eign policies, no matter what the economic consequences, but
he gave a rare expression of appreciation for past American
aid and asked for its continuation on a credit, rather than grant,
basis.
Tito took a fatalistic view of Yugoslavia's relations with
the bloc, suggesting that Belgrade expects no change. Ambas-
sador Kennan believes, however, that the Yugoslavs are dis-
turbed because the bloc has not given greater support to Bel-
grade's current propaganda campaign against West Germany.
Tito expressed at length his preference for East over West
Germany, primarily because the Ulbricht regime "shows no
revenge-seeking tendencies" Belgrade has been committed to
support of the East German regime since extending diplomatic
recognition to Ulbricht in 1957 and as a result losing its diplo-
matic ties with Bonn.
recently claimed that Yugoslavia would be
willing to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany, but
only after extracting unspecified concessions from the Ulbricht
regime.
Tito's speech indicated that closer cooperation among the
non-aligned states remains the primary goal of Yugoslav for-
eign policy. The Yugoslav President called upon the uncom-
mitted states to extend their collaboration into the economic
sphere and to broaden the membership of the "non-aligned world:'
Belgrade claims, moreover, that it is having troubles with the
Western powers because they are waging a general campaign
against the states which participated in. the Belgrade conference
last September. F7 I
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
Military Representative of the President
the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronatuics and Space Administration
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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