CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A006100470001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 26, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 18, 1962
• Content Type: REPORT

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18 January 1962
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18 January 1962
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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CONTENTS
4. USSR: No valid evidence supports, press speculation that
Khrushchev's leadership may be in jeopardy. (Page iii) 25X1
6. Cuba: Castro may be planning increased harassment of
Guantanamo. (Page t v)
8. Japan: Pro-Communists and moderates expect showdown
fight for party control at Japanese Socialist convention
20 January. (Page v)
9. Watch Committee Conclusions. (Page vi)
10. LATE ITEM: - Dominican Republic. (Page vii)
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. *USSR: Despite widespread press speculation that Khru-
shchevs authority may be injeopardy, his public activities
since the 22nd party congress appear to have been at the same
high level as during the pre-congress period, with the excep-
tion of the first week in January when he apparently suffered
an attack of influenza. He has made numerous speeches, toured
the Soviet provinces, chaired high-level meetings, conferred
with foreign and bloc officials; in short, has been involved in
what is for him a normal. round of activities.
The treatment of Khrushchev's activities in the Soviet press
and references to him by other Soviet officials continue to re-
flect acknowledgment and praise for his leading role, though
this praise, in line with Khrushchev's attack on the cult of per-
sonality, is somewhat more restrained than before the congress.
Khrushchev continues to be the only top Soviet leader cited by
Soviet officials and the public media as the authority on inter-
nal and external matters.
Pravda's attack on 17 January against Molotov's "dogmatic
obstinacy" in opposing Khrushchev's peaceful coexistence policy
would seem.to invalidate speculation that Molotov's return to
Vienna would indicate rehabilitation and a political defeat for
Khrushchev.
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DAILY BRIE F
 Cuba: Increasing Cuban harassment oI employees of Lne
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US ava Base at Guantanamo Bay and stepped-up Cuban.mil-
itary activity in the base environs may presage a propaganda
campaign to force US withdrawal from the base, but a Cuban
military attack on the base is unlikely. Castro has scheduled
a new "assembly of the Cuban people" for 28 January in Havana,
postponed from 22 January, apparently to deal with the OAS
foreign ministers' meeting. At the last such mass rally, in
September 1960, Castro, among other. things, warned that if
"aggression" against Cuba continues, a new "assembly of the
people will be convened" to demand US withdrawal from the
base. The Castro regime claims that the purpose of the meet-
ing of American foreign ministers opening in Uruguay on 22 Jan-
uary is to formulate "new aggressions" against. Cuba.
Castro could curtail base activity by cutting off most of
the labor supply--about two thirds of the 3,500 workers live
outside the base--but this would deny his government approx-
imately $6,000,000 in badly needed foreign exchange it receives
is now provided by Cuban sources.
each year from the base payroll. Alternate sources of water
are available if the Cubans cut off the base water supply which
On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee, the United
States Intelligence Board? on 17 January reached the following
conclusion concerning Cub
he ossibilit of a Cuban air attack on Guantanamo Naval
Base sl
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VNIMMEM
MON: Mum
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considered unlikely, but the Castro regime may engage in
spectacular demonstrations to coincide with the OAS confer-
ence 22 Janu r
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Japan. Pro-Communist and moderate leftists will fight
for control of the Japanese Socialist party at a three-day na-
tional convention beginning 20 January during which .the party
will attempt to formulate plans for the mid- 1962 upper house
elections. The struggle centers on the attempt by extremist
elements to replace Secretary General Saburo Eda, whose more
moderate position aided the Socialists in the 1960 election. A
party mission to Peiping on 13 January sought to undermine the
moderates by once again joining the Chinese Communist public
in a statement designating "US imperialism as the common enemy
of the Japanese and Chinese peoples" Uniform Tokyo press de-
nunciation of the Communist line and of Socialist "subservience
to a foreign power" may strengthen the moderates. Socialist
strength and influence have been weakened by the internal strug-
gle, but if the extremists gain control of the party apparatus, it
is almost certain .to result in a reversion to more militant mass
action,
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All
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CUBA: //(Carried on Page iv of Daily Brief
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WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS
7~n the basis of findings by its Watc Committee, the United
States Intelligence Board concludes thato
UNo Sino-Soviet bloc country intends deliberately to initiate
direct military action in the. immediate futures
BERLIN: Communist military activity, as in recent weeks,
does not suggest that the Communists expect to risk serious mil-
itary confrontation over Berlin. in the immediate future. Harass-
ments over access and over East-West contacts, however, can be
expected to continues
LAOSg7Although it is unlikely that there will be any large
increase inrilitary activity in Laos while. the three factions are
meetings Geneva, localized military engagements will probably
continue 77
SOUTH VIETNAM 4/ Viet Cong subversive and small-scale
military activity continues at a high rate, despite counteractions
in various regions by government forces. The Viet Cong has the
capability of conducting large-scale attacks on preselected tar-
gets. in some areas. of the country at any tim,
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j *Dominican. Republic: (Infor?mation as of 0330 EST) The
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civilian-military junta imposed by General Rodriguez Eche-
varria on 16 January can be maintained only by strongly re-
pressive measures. At its inception, it faces widespread
public repudiation, the active opposition of all organized po-
litical groups, and disunity within the armed forces them-
selves.
The two holdovers from the ousted Council of State,
Antonio Imbert and Luis Amiama Tio, were apparently sur-
prised by their retention in the new junta. They told an Amer-
ican Embassy officer on 17 January that they intend to repudi-
ate Rodriguez' action and call for the restoration of the former
Council as the only legitimate government. Other junta mem-
bers have little if any public following and the new regime. will
.have to depend to a large extent on individuals discredited dur-
ing the Trujillo era. The nominal president of the junta,
Huberto Bogaert is a little known lawyer and former Trujillo
cabinet minister from General Rodriguez' home area. One of
the military members, army Lt, Colonel Nival Seijas, devel-
oped a widely accepted reputation for brutality under Trujillo.
Bogaert's address of 17 January, in which he echoed Gen-
eral Rodriguez' claims that the "Communist threat" necessi-
tated the change in government, will remind many Dominicans
of the similar rationalizations for repressive action employed
by the late dictator..
Mean-
while, the genuine Communist threat may grow as more Do-
minicans feel impelled toward violent actin
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Status of Foreign Assistance to Ghana's Armed Forces
fNkrumah's regime has been holding intermittent consul-
tations with the USSR on possible Soviet military assistance
at least since late. 1960. At that time Moscow offered to fur-
nish all needed equipment- -including a wide range of aircraft--
for a large-scale, long-term military development program
.
While Nkrumah was visiting the bloc last summer, he accepted
? a Soviet offer to train up to 400 cadets for Ghana's three mil-
itary services; the first contingent of 75 trainees arrived in
the USSR in October. Of these, nine are reportedly receiving
pilot training. Bloc arms deliveries to date have apparently
been limited to the approximately 7,000 cases of small arms
which arrived in Ghana last April. These were reportedly in-
tended fo Gizenga's Stanleyville regime, but they were never
deliveredd
eanwhile, Nkrumah in recent months has sharply reduced
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the 'evious dependence of his armed forces on UK support--a
move inspired by his desire to play a leading role in the scheme
for a "joint high command" being developed by the Casablanca
group of radical African states. In September he dismissed
his British chief of staff and ordered the removal of British of-
ficers--there were then over 200 attached to the Ghanaian armed
forces- -from command and executive positions. He agreed to
accept a British military advisory mission but has procrastinated
on its formal establishment. It now appears that this mission,
when finally established, will be small, including an army con-
tingent of no more than 50 officers. At present there are still
about 130 UK officers in Ghana. On the other hand, Nkrumah's
government has indicated .its interest in retaining and even .
strengthening a small Canadian training team. Accra has also
I expressed gratification over Washington's recent agreement to
accept a number of Ghanaian junior officers and enlisted special-
ists in US service schools. The special interest which was dis-
played by Ghanaian defense officials in publicizing this arrange-
ment may have reflected a desire to offset in advance the effec
in th
e West of new Ghanaian military arrangements with the USSR,I
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18 Jan 62 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1
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Bitter Controversy Expected at Japanese Socialist Convention
Basic to the dispute between the pro-Communist and mod-
erate leftist elements are two factors: the power aspirations
of individual faction leaders, and the Japanese Socialist party's
(JSP) inability to choose between seeking its goals by parlia-
mentary means or relying on extraparliamentary mass action
and violence.
Public criticism of JSP extremism in the struggle against
the US-Japanese security treaty in 1960 caused the party to
adopt the "structural reform program" aimed at achieving a
socialist state by constitutional means. This new program
helped the JSP recover its prestige in time to gain 23 seats
in the lower house elections of November 1960 at the expense
of the more moderate Democratic Socialist party.
In recent months, however, extreme leftists in the party
have become increasingly restive over Secretary General Saburo
Eda's de-emphasis of political struggles, of the class party con-
cept, and of ties with the Communists. Intent on ousting Eda,
the extremists are supporting Kozo Sasaki for the secretary gen-
eralship. An open convention fight appears almost certain.
The JSP mission to Peiping, headed by former party chair-
man Mosaburo Suzuki, had indicated a desire to avoid political
entanglements with the Chinese Communists. Suzuki's acquies-
cence in the "common enemy" statement, probably under pressure
from, extremists in his delegation, was a reaffirmation of a state-
ment by the late JSP chairman, Inejiro Asanuma, when he led a
party delegation to Peiping in 1959. Asanuma's adherence to the
"Communist line" precipitated a split in the JSP and led to the
formation of the moderate Democratic Socialist party in January
1960.
Strong adverse reaction to the "common enemy" statement
almost certainly has damaged the party's election prospects,
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although there is still time for it to regain a moderate posture
before the upper house elections in July. The intraparty effect
is more difficult to assess. Most informed observers believed
before Suzuki Is statement that Eda was losing ground in his ef-
forts to retain office against the extremists' challenge, despite
his having drafted for convention approval a program that meets
the left-wing demands for a more militant course, There now
is a considerable chance, however, that Suzuki's action may
have backfired and actually damn ed the extremists in their ef-
fort to gain control of the party.
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
Military Representative of the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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