THE SOVIET MILITARY POSTURE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82R00025R000400220017-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 6, 2005
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: January 5, 1965
• Content Type: BRIEF

A W FSJ CR2UD5[03
5 J-an ar-y 1965
re`l x"O R y
DRAFT DCI BRIEFING FOR
HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE
THE SOVIET MILITARY POSTURE
I. The Intelligence Community has recently com-
pleted the annual series of important estimates
on the principal components of Soviet military
power.
A. These estimates conclude that there have
been significant changes in the direction
of certain Soviet military programs, in-
cluding a marked movement toward achiev-
ing quality improvements.
II. Let me preface these conclusions by saying that
we have a high degree of confidence in these
estimates because--for the last two or three
years and particularly this year--they rest on
A. ~3 rs. g
1e';bf evidence which is broader and far more
solid than any we have had before.
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B. Because we consider it vital that this com-
mittee be able to judge the validity of our
conclusions, I wish to brief you today on
the product of our program of satellite
photography. The sensitivity of this
source of intelligence requires both a
word of caution and some explanation of
how the system works.
III. We consider the satellite reconnaissance program
so worthwhile--and so sensitive--that even with-
in the Intelligence Community only a small and
essential proportion of our personnel have ac-
cess to the resultant intelligence. Not only
the product, but the actual existence of this
program is guarded by a special classification
which is higher than Top Secret.
IV. The program has been under active development
for several years. It has cost a great deal
of money, but the information it gives us is
unique and so valuable that we believe it more
than justifies the cost.
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CONCLUSIONS
I. To summarize our major conclusions, it is appar-
ent that the Soviets are pursuing a dynamic,
progressive military program, with advances under
way in almost all important sectors of their
military power. It is a sophisticated program
directed more toward quality than toward quantity.
In my personal opinion,
there is always the possibility that the program
we have observed might achieve a breakthrough
of some sort which could redress the present
balance of power. Specifically, we find that:
1. New and improved ICBMs are being developed,
and hardened launchers are being-deployed
in a dispersed pattern.
2. Tactical strike forces, ground and air,
are being equipped with increasingly ad-
vanced and more powerful weapons, both
nuclear and conventional.
3. The Soviets are producing new and improved
submarines with increased capabilities,
equipped with both cruise and ballistic
missiles. They are increasingly capable
of long-range operations.
4. Antiaircraft defenses are being strengthened.
5. The Soviets are energetically pursuing re-
search and development on antiballistic
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missile systems. Some ABM deployment may
already be under way.
6. There is a strong possibility that the So-
viets are directing their efforts toward
an anti-satellite capability.
7. Facilities for the production of special
nuclear materials for weapons are being ex-
panded.
II. Few if any of these appear to be crash programs,
but they do reflect a dynamic effort--an insistent
determination to achieve qualitative advances in
military power which will assure the national se-
curity and international strategic power of the
USSR.
SOVIET GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES
I, Despite the rapid and costly development of So-
viet strategic attack and defense forces, the
ground, tactical air, naval, and military trans-
port forces, often referred to as general pur-
pose forces, are still the largest and most ex-
pensive component of the Soviet military estab-
lishment.
II. The Soviets continue to retain a large number
of line divisions--we estimate between 120 and
140. Sixty to 75 are at full strength. The
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rest are at reduced or cadre strength.
(MAP, Deployment of Soviet army divisions)
A. Deployment is concentrated mainly in the
European area, confronting NATO. East
Germany alone has 20 Soviet divisions.
B. The size of divisions has been reduced in
recent years, and most of them have been
reorganized into tank and motorized rifle
divisions. All of them are small by West-
ern standards, and their support is very
light.
(PHOTOS, FROG, Scud, Shaddock)
1. Conventional artillery has been cut
back sharply in favor of tactical mis-
siles and Honest-John type rockets with
nuclear and chemical warheads, some
of which you see here.
2. These changes give eraphasis to mobility
and shock at the expense of staying
power.
(CHART, Soviet armed forces manpower by purpose)
III. We estimate the strength of Soviet general pur-
pose forces at 1.8 to 1.9 million men, out of
a total force of 2.8 to 2.9 million. These
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figures are a bit lower than our estimates in
previous years, but this reflects more a re-
appraisal. of intelligence than any major reduc-
tion by demobilization. There has been some
slight demobilization since 1961.
IV. Tactical air power continues to play an impor-
tant role, mainly for air defense of Soviet
ground forces.
(CHART, Soviet aircraft by mission)
A. Tactical air forces currently have about
3,250 aircraft in operational use. Most
are interceptor types, but some could de-
liver nuclear weapons.
B. We have noted a steady addition of new
supersonic aircraft to tactical air units,
with first priority going to Soviet regi-
ments in East Germany.
V. Modernization of the general-purpose forces will
continue in the future. Recent trends point to
Soviet efforts to improve the non-nuclear capa-
bilities of their ground forces. By 1970, the
USSR will probably reduce the number of divisions
slightly, but may keep a greater proportion in
combat-ready status.
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A. In addition, we may have seen the first
steps toward Soviet acquisition of a real
capability for the rapid mounting of
limited long-distance military actions:
air and sea lift is being improved, there
is a greater emphasis on airborne opera-
tions, and a marine corps has been re-
established. This is an entirely new
development, because until now Soviet
military forces have been landlocked, with-
out combat sea lift and with no air lift of
any significance.
VI. We have detected significant changes in the mili-
tary forces of the East European satellites in the
past several years.
A. The European satellites can contribute about
a million men and more than 30 full-strength
divisions to Warsaw Pact- needs.
B. Increasingly over the past two years, the
Soviets have been giving these satellite
forces very modern weapons, such as tactical
missiles and rockets, and new models of
fighter aircraft.
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SOVIET STRATEGIC STRIKE FORCES
I. The first element of Soviet strategic strike
forces is Long Range Aviation, a Soviet version
of SAC, with 66,000 personnel, 200 heavy bombers,
and nearly 900 medium bombers.
A. Heavy bombers are still a significant part
of Soviet capabilities for intercontinental
attack. The USSR could put about 100 heavy
bombers over the US on two-way missions.
In addition, up to 150 medium bombers could
arrive over North American targets on two-
way missions, but such attacks would be
limited in range to targets in Greenland,
Canada, Alaska, and the extreme northwestern
US.
1. The Air Force estimate of the two-way
bomber threat is somewhat higher; the
Air Force also estimates a considerably
greater threat to the US based on the ex-
tensive use of one-way missions. We do
not exclude the latter possibility, but
consider it increasingly unlikely as
Soviet ICBM and missile submarine forces
grow.
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B. The Soviets have the Blinder, a medium
bomber with supersonic dash, in production.
There are now between 50 and 75 of these
in Long Range Aviation, and we believe the
number will increase over the years ahead.
(PHOTO, Close-up of Gomel bomber airfield)
1. This photograph of a Soviet military
airfield shows 12 of these Blinders,
as well as one Badger medium at the
extreme right, and one old B--29 type,
a TU-4, parked in a field at the upper
right.
C. We have no evidence that the USSR is developing
a new heavy bomber, but the Air Force believes'
the Soviets will introduce a new heavy bomber
by 1968, and a new medium bomber by 1970.
Ii. The Soviet Union's principal strategic threat,
the Strategic Rocket Force, has 100,000 picked
men manning intercontinental, intermediate, and
medium-range ballistic missile units.
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(MAP, Soviet ICBM deployment)
A. We estimate that the present Soviet ICBM
capability is about 220 operational launchers.
The Air Force makes a larger allowance for
undetected launchers and estimates a some-
what larger number of operational launchers.
The red and black stars on this map are
the 18 large established missile complexes
we have been watching since early 1962. The
circles are new complexes, under construction
for the past year or so.
(MAP, Location of Soviet missile test ranges)
B. The Soviets have long maintained an exten-
sive missile testing program. This map
locates some of the important missile
test areas--the ICBM and space launch
center at Tyuratam, the MRBM and IRBM
testing area at Kapustin Yar, and the SAM
and ABM test center at Sary Shagan.
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(CHART, Soviet ICBM tests, 1957-1964)
III. This chart shows Soviet ICBM tests from 1957
through 1964. Altogether, counting the record
for 1965 to date, there have been 213 test firings
of all five types of missiles. The record
shows 171 successes, 39 failures, and three
unresolved.
A. ICBM testing began with the SS-6 in 1957.
Only four launchers were deployed for
this system.
B. The SS-7 has had only 14 failures in 89
firings, and is the most widely deployed
of the Soviet operational ICBMs.
(PHOTO, SS-8 in parade)
C. The missile in this picture is the SS-8,
appearing in the latest November Parade
in Moscow. It is the first ICBM ever
displayed by the Soviets. The SS-8 was
developed just after the SS-7, and has
been deployed to only a small number of
launchers. It may soon be phased out of
the operational inventory.
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IV. The SoviPtS are pursuing a dynamic ICBM
program designed to improve their relative
strategic position. They do not appear to
be trying to match us in numbers. I believe
they may be hoping for a breakthrough in
strategic offensive or defensive systems
which would offset our existing quantitative
advantage.
A. During the past year there have been
two significant developments in the
Soviet ICBM field. One of these is
the advent of a third generation of
missiles.
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Over the past year, the Soviets have begun
to test yet a third generation of ICBMs--
the SS-9 and SS-10. The SS-9 has had,a
fair test record--three failures in 17
firings--and we think it will become op-
erational soon.
The SS-10 has also done well in tests--one
failure out of eight shots--and probably
will be deployed later in 1965.
We believe that Soviet design teams are
also working on a very large ICBM capable
of delivering a 100-megaton warhead, and
they may be developing a small ICBM with
improved propellants--possibly solid.
V. In addition to the 220 or so launchers which
are operational, more are under construction,
some of them for the SS-9 and SS-10. We
estimate that:
A. By the middle of this year, there will be
about 260 operational launchers.
B. Looking farther into the future, we believe
that there will be between 400 and 700
launchers by mid-1970. The Air Force, on
the other hand, estimates 600 to 900 ICBM
launchers by then.
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VI. The second major development--in addition to
these new missiles--is a new deployment pattern.
(MAP, Soviet ICBM Deployment)
(PHOTO, single-silo complex)
A. We have found isolated single silos under
construction in contrast to the former
clustered launch sites where, in effect,
several launchers constituted a single
aiming point for a US missile strike.
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B. As of today, we have detected about 90
single silos, like the ones shown in this
photograph. They are being built at the seven
new complexes indicated by circles on the map,
and at the three older complexes shown as
black stars. These new silos are still grouped
in complexes, but in the new deployment pattern
they are from three to six miles apart.
1. We believe that many of these silos
will be finished some time this year.
vii. The Soviets also have approximately 750 launchers
for medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic
missiles.
(MAP, ItRBM/IRBM deployment)
A. About 90 percent of these launchers are in
the western USSR, where their missiles
could deliver a devastating attack--as much
as 2,000 megatons--against targets in Europe
and the Middle East.
B. The remaining launchers are targeted against
South Asia, Japan, and Alaska.
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VIII. The Soviet submarine strategic strike force
consists of about 80 missile-carrying submarines.
None is as effective as our Polaris subs.
(CHART, submarine types)
A. Ballistic missile submarines include types
which fire 350-mile missiles from the sur-
face, and possibly a few which can fire
700-mile missiles from beneath the surface.
B. Cruise missile subs include types equipped
to fire 300-mile and 450-mile cruise mis-
siles from the surface. One class is nu-
clear powered and carries six to eight
such missiles.
C. We believe that a new class of nuclear sub-
marine firing the 700-mile submerged-launch
ballistic missile will shortly be brought
into service.
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IX. Soviet submarines now are conducting longer range
clandestine patrols with greater frequency. These
patrols observe stringent communications security
measures and show a greater realization of the
needs of wartime operations, We expect them to
be conducting regular patrols throughout the
North Atlantic, Pacific, and Mediterranean by
the end of this decade. A Soviet nuclear submarine
may have been 40 to 50 miles off the mouth of the
Columbia River last week. That would be the closest
a Soviet nuclear submarine has been to our waters.
SOVIET AIR DEFENSES
I. The Soviets have given defense against strategic
attack a high priority in their military planning,
They allocate about 20 percent of the total
military budget to this purpose.
II. This investment has bought the Soviets a good
defense against manned bombers penetrating the
Soviet Union at medium and high altitudes--which
was the main threat of the 1950s.
A. Soviet antiaircraft defenses have not, however,
proved dependable against the sophisticated
attack techniques which have developed in
recent years, and the Soviets are trying
to improve these defenses.
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III. The current Soviet air defense system is equipped
with an impressive quantity and variety of weapons'
deployed in.depth, including 1,200 surface-to-
air missile sites and several thousand jet fighters
supported by an extensive ground radar and control
network.
type of
A. The SA-2, the/surface-to-air missile system
deployed to Cuba, is the mainstay of Soviet
surface-to-air missile defenses, backed up
by the low-altitude SA-3.
(PHOTO, SA-2 site)
1. This is a photograph of an SA-2 site in
.Cuba, taken from an aircraft flying at
about 500 feet.
B. The fighter interceptor force is very large,
but only about one-third of the force is
equipped. for all-weather operations, and
less than one-fourth have air-to-air mis-
siles.
SOVIET ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILE AND SPACE DEFENSES
I. For eight years now we have been watching inten-
sive Soviet efforts directed toward the develop-
ment of an antiballistic missile capability.
A. The magnitude of this development effort,
together with early moves to deploy at least
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one ABM system, indicates a stong intent
to obtain ABM defenses rapidly.
B. There 'are a number of developments in widely
separated parts of the Soviet Union which
all appear to have some relationship to the
development of an advanced air defense sys-
tem. In many cases, construction is not
yet far enough along for us to determine
exactly what function the installation
will have, or how it will fit in with other
facilities.
(MAP, ABM and associated facilities)
II. After aperiod of testing at the Sary Shagan
range, the Soviets apparently committed them-
selves to the deployment of an ABM system at
Leningrad starting in 1960. This system prob-
ably was intended for defense against both mis-
siles and aircraft, but it appeared to have
little capability against sophisticated missile
attack.
(PHOTO, Leningrad NW Complex)
A. This complex, 37 miles northwest of Lenin-
grad, was first seen under construction
in June 1961. It has five launch sites,
each with six curved buildings. There is
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(PHOTO,
also a launch control center under construc-
tion, and a probable electronics facility.
Leningrad launch site)
III. The Leningrad deployment was interrupted in
1.962 or early 1963, at a time when testing on new
or modified systems began at Sary Shagan.
(PHOTO and MAP, Tallinn air defense complex)
iv. The Soviets now appear to be deploying a new
system at Leningrad and two other places in the
northwestern USSR. About a year ago they began
to build'two large sites, of 30 launch positions
each, at Tallinn, shown here, and at Cherepovets,
north of Moscow. The installations at Leningrad
also appear to be for the same weapons system.
A. We are not yet certain, however, whether it
is an ABM facility or a long-range system
against attacks by aircraft or stand-off
missiles.
V. We have also spotted a possible ABM system being
built at Moscow. Construction began early in 1963.
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A. We have found one large radar under
construction southeast of Moscow, as
well as electronic facilities, similar
to some at Sary Shagan, being installed
at four other sites around Moscow.
B. We cannot yet confirm that all these new
facilities are part of an ABM system--
some of them may represent improvements
in Moscow's defense against aircraft
launching standoff air-to-surface missiles.
(PHOTO, ABM shown in November parade)
C. This is one of the new missiles displayed in
the November 7 parade. The Soviets described
it as an antiballistic missile. From our
analysis, we estimate that it could have an
intercept mission against ballistic missiles,
with a high altitude capability of a few
hundred miles, and a slant range of several
hundred miles.
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(PHOTO, Large tracking radars at Angarsk)
VI. In addition to their ABM programs, the Soviets
are constructing an extensive space surveillance
radar system at Angarsk and Sary Shagan.
A. The size, power and placement of these new
radar complexes suggest that they are com-
ponents of an anti-satellite weapons system.
They are very expensive, and provide a
space tracking capability which exceeds
Soviet requirements for tracking either
US or Soviet space vehicles. They are not
properly located for early warning.
B. We must, therefore, be alert to the possi-10 bility that they may be directed toward an
anti-satellite role which could be intended,
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in effect., to "blind" us in our gathering of
photographic intelligence.
I., The State Department agrees that these
radars could be used in an anti-satellite
system, but considers deployment of such
a system within. the next two years un-
likely because of cost; moreover, the
State Department notes the political
and. other disadvantages which the So-
viets would probably see in attacking
US satellites.
(PHOTO, BMEWS at Olenegorsk)
(MAP, BMEWS field from Olenegorsk)
C. There is a similar installation going in at
Olenegorsk, well north of Moscow. From the
ioc.at:i.on, and direction of these radars, we
bel:ie'i~ve that they will have a ballistic
missile early warning function, but they
could ha.'~.e a space surveillance role as
well.
VII. Frankly, these air defense developments I have
just summarized are an enigma as long as our
evidence remains as incomplete as it is at present.
A. The status of construction at some of these
fac:i.l:i.ti.es does not yet permit an accurate
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analysis of the Soviet state of the art of
air defense
B. For the time being, we can only conclude
that the Soviets are embarked on some un-
explained approach to a defense system against
either ballistic missiles or aircraft, with
a strong possibility that they either have,
or are at least approaching, a new technique.
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THE SOVIET ECONOMY
I. The development of this large and diversified
military establishment has been expensive
and has imposed considerable strain on the
economy.
A. The mass deployment of many advanced weapons
systems was responsible for part of,the
slowdown in Soviet economic growth which
has occurred over the past five years.
II. Our new estimate on the Soviet economy, however, is that the
economy can continue to support a vigorous
military and space program.
A. Expenditures on these programs may level
off between now and 1970: On the other
hand, they might continue to rise by as
much as 20 percent. In either event, the
economy will continue to grow.
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B. In short, we do not estimate that economic
pressures will inexorably drive the Soviet
Union to cut arms spending drastically or
accept new arms control measures.
III, In closing this review of the Soviet military
posture, I would like to stress two points.
A. The first is the nactre of the substantial
research and development efforts which are
going on in the USSR. I believe that the
Soviet leaders have made a basic decision
to pursue--with energy and imagination--
the qualitative improvement of their mili-
tary forces. The emphasis is on upgrading
the effectiveness of existing forces and
pushing deeper into the frontiers of
military science.
1. The Soviets have probably concluded
that they cannot out-spend us and match
us in quantity. However, they can and
are willing to devote substantial funds
and resources to research for improved
weapons. In short, I look for them,
over the next few years at least, to
concentrate on quality, not quantity.
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B. Secondly, I want to impress on you the
sensitive nature of the information con-
tained in this discussion of the Soviet
military forces.
1. The Soviets go to great efforts to
deny us even-'.the most general informa-
tion on their troops, their equipment,
and particularly their plans for new
weapons systems. It costs the United
States and our allies a great deal of
money and manpower to pierce the
Soviet screen of secrecy. I want to
keep the Soviets guessing as to the
degree of our success in doing this.
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