EASTERN EUROPE
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110012-6
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RIPPUB
Original Classification:
C
Document Page Count:
65
Document Creation Date:
November 11, 2016
Document Release Date:
March 22, 1999
Sequence Number:
12
Case Number:
Publication Date:
April 24, 1975
Content Type:
REPORT
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1999/09126 C1141~'?~ V IR1~.~2~~12_~~~ U RAJ R ~ ~~ . 7 ~ A N ~, a.A~Y ~.ON
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confidential
FPD: 0013/75
~, 24 April 1975
No Foratgn Dlssem
D
Ei#STER~1 EUROPE
FBIS
Tranrlationr From 11 ~I~LI TAER ~VES~N ~ ~ ~ ~
STATSPEC
FOREIGN BQOADCAS~T I~IFORh1ATION SERVICE
Confidential
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CONFIDENTIAL
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FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
Fo~cign P:?ess Digest -- 001375 -- 24 April ].975
Translations from Militaerwesen (40)
Understanding of Economics Necessary for Officers
1
NATO Strategic Con,:epts Scored as Aggressive
10
concepts of Automated Command Systems Described
20
Lenin Seen as E}:ample for. i~TVA Officers
28
Officer Physical Training Programs Evaluated
35
Progress aL Geneva Talks Considered Poesible~ Necessary
43
Problems Cited in Preparation of Training Group Leaders
46
Soviet D-902 Snow Plow Assessed
57
CONFIDENTIAL
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East Berlin MtLITAERWESEN in German Nov 74 pp 15-21
[Article written by authors' collective of the Frio_drich Engels
Military Academy)
/Text/ Through the main task as resolved by the Eighth Party Congress,
the economic and sociopolitical developme;it of our society--as a].1 other:
areas as well--is being continued on a higher level and with qualitatively
more demanding objectives. In an interview given to the DK;` newspaper
UNSERE ZEIT, Comrade Erich Honecker said that we are about ;.o realize t:he
greatest sociopolitical program in GDR history.l There is a close con-
nection between the main task as, resolved by the Eighth Party Congress
and the main military task as ae-signed to the National People's Army
and the GDR border troops. This requires that the party and government
problems of economic policy be constantly included in the political-
ideological work with the members of the army. This makes a thorough
understanding of the economic and sociopolitical orientation derived from
the Eighth Party Congress particularly important.
The Main Task of the Eighth Party Congress Reflects the Obiectively
Determined Objective of Social Production in Socialism
The political power of the working glass and its allies in the GDR resks
on tree social property in the means of production. From 1950 to 1970,
the proportion of the socialist i_~dustrial and con;~traction enterprises
in the GNP ruse by 12 percent. ~t was 89 percent in 1970. When the pri-
vate and semi-state enterprises were converted into public property in
1972, all means for developing *he material foundations of life came into
the hands cf the people. Almost 100 percent of all industrial enterprises
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are socialist property. In agriculture, 8.2 percent of arable land is
public property and 86.3 percent, cooperative property.
Socialist conditions of productioi: determine fundamentally the social
position of the working clans, of the cooperative farmers and all working
people. At the same time they also determine the social function of our
armed forces. The exploitation of man by man has been eliminated, and
labor assumes an increasingly creative character. Economic and social
facts are no longer subject to profiteering and to the mechanisms of
competition. Every worlcinR person has an influence on the level of the
standard of living by means of his own performans~e in producing social
wealth.
In the last 25 years, the national -ncome produced in our republic has
increased sixfold, f~Cum M 22 billion to 127 billion. It includes the
industrially produced income, which went up from M 12 billion to 81
billion. The scientific and realistic policy of the Eighth Party Con-
gress led to a new upswing. While the annual rate of growth in the
national income increased by apprrximately 4.4 percent annually from
1961 to 1970, the rate attained from 1971 to 1973 was 5.2 percent. The
growth rate expected for 1974 is 5.4 percent.
As its strategic economic and soclupolitical main tas!c, the Eighth Party
Congress decided--in complete agreement with the tasks sst by the CPSU
and the other fraternal parties of the CEMA countries--on the "further
elevation of the people's material and cultural standard of living,
based on high speed in the development of socialist production, the raising
of efficiency, of scientific-technical progress, anti on the growth of.
labor productivity."2 Thereby the party drew its conclusions from the
basic er.~~?.,omic law of socialism,3 particulari;? with regard to tts con-
crete effects under the conditions of the f'r-rmation of the developed
socialist aw iety.
"As all economic laws, the basic law is effective under definite concrete
historical conditions which influence the intensity of its effectiveness.
Among this complex of conditions are such important factors as the state
of development and the structure of the production conditions, the state
of development of the material-technical base of industry and agriculture,
the leve] of skill of manpower, the state and efficiency of economic man-
agement and planning, tine state of the working people's consciousness,
the degree of cooperation among the socialist countries, and the c:ountry's
foreign policy and military-strategic situation."4
The complex of this and still other factors decisively affects the scope
with which and the level on which the socialist society can make use of
the basic economic law; it determines how close the connection can be made
between production and requirements. Comrade Erich iionecker said about
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this at the Eighth Party Congress: "Even in tY.e past, cf course, our
party let itself be guided by it (the basic economic law). But with the
further development of the socialist society and ?lts economic potentials,
this inevitable connection between production and the needs of the people
can and must be rendered ever more immediate. This is what we intend to
live up to through the main task."5 Proceeding from the main task the
~tghty Party Congress conceived an entire sociopolitical grogram. With
its r,~rposeft?l realiza~ion, tl1e population's standard of .living has been
raises. systematically and is so being raises.', including that of the mem-
bers of the armed forces.6
The vitality and superiority of our social order, expressed in the results
of the fulfillment of the sociopolitical program, become all the more mani-
fest at a t{me when the economic upswing under socialism is contrasted by
the s~agnation, insecurity and inflation in the developed capitalist coun-
tries. Th.e whole imperialist economic system is stuck in a deep crisis,
tries to load all its burdens onto the working people an:; has none but
gloomy prognoses to offer for the future. In clear contrast tc that the
policy of the Eighi.h Party Congress i.s directed at the stability, con-
tinuity and systematic planning of economic growth and of improving the
people's well-being. Z'he facts and exper?`~nces of recent years are mak-
ing that evident and v:!sible. They prove that for our socialist society,
the economy is a means to an end, a means for satisfying the growing mater i-
al and cultural needs of the working class and the other working people.
And here we must always t.~~e into account th-~t, first of all, the satis-
faction of these needs is not restricted t'o are improvement in the material
standard of living but cerc?ainly slso includes the spiritual-cultural needs.
Secondly, the improvement of the standard of living applies not or-~y Co the
sphere of le:!3ure time--housing, clothing, food, recreation, enjoyment of
art and so forth--but equally must to the domain of labor itself.
Our party assigns an extraordinarily high rank to working conditions; it
has declared their improvement t~~ be an inseparable component of socialist
rationalization.
The total complex of the material and cultural needs, the ever better sat-
isfaction of which the main task is directed, as resolved by the Eighth
Party Congress, centers actually around one of the most important con-
cerns of the struggle by the working class: The formation of the univer-
sally developed socialist personality as the supreme goal of economic
activities as well.
The point, simply, is to create conditions which will make possible and
further the all round development of the abilities and creative activity
of the working people. This amounts, as Marx wrote, to "the full develon-
ment of the individual which in turn, being th~a greatest productivity,
has its effects on the productivity of labor."~
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Especially under that as~,ect is the objective of the Eighth Party Congress
inseparably and dialectically connected with the means for its realiza-
tion: Growth end i:^;,rovement of proc',uction, raising the people's pros-
perity, and developing socialist personalities form a unity and, under
socialist conditions, condition each other.
Intensification--Main Road to Higher Efficiency in Social Production
The Central Committee report to the Eighth SED Congress states: "The
socialist intensification of production is a precept of economic reason.
And by calling it the main road we mean to indicate it is not merely
something but the main issue. It is not a matter for some but a matter
fo7 all."$ In it lies the decisive guaranty that the satbility and con-
tint+ity of production and supply can be raised and the systematic pro-
portional development of the economy increasingly better realized. Only
through this main road--the decisive field of application to successful
creative work by all working people--can the great increase in national
income be ensured that is needed for strengthening the material-technical
base of our economy and for further improving our working and living con-
ditions.
The party, in focusing on intensification, is aiming at a fundamental and
permanent t2sk in terms of the present as well as the future. It is
directly connected with the economic tasks for the formation of the de-
veloped socialist society and requires a new approach to the problem of
economic efficiency.q
The substance of intensification lies in increasing the efficiency of
social labor. Expanded production, according to Marx, is, "extensive
when the field of production is expanded, and intensive when the means of
production are made more efficient."10 At present we in the GDR are in
a process of transition from a predominantly extensively to a predominantly
intensively expanded production. In the past it was mainly a matter of
increasing the scope of production. Today and in the future it will
mainly be a matter of producing more commodities with a higher use value
and a lower expenditure per unit. That means primarily that we must ratse
the expended efficiency in reified, existing labor. It does not mean re-
fraining from the construction of new enterprises. Yet that must become
subordinated to the mai,~ line of increasing our efficiency. For the need
for intensification, th~~ee factors should be~stressed:
(1) "The economic, scientific-tec~.~ical and intellectual-cultural poten-
tial has grown. It is understandable that the further successful develop-
ment of the socialist economy ~~ill all Ltie more depenc+ on the qualitative
improvement and efficient use of resources available of living and reified
work, the greater will be the economic, scientific-technical and intellec-
tual-c~~.'?.tural potential that we have available."11 The sco;,e of the
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production funding of our economy, which in 19S'1 amounted to a value of
M 121 billion, will in the current five-year plan exceed the M 500 billion
limit. This enormous potential must be better utilized by means of the
latest scientific-technical knowledge so as to raise the eff.ieiency of
our whole economy.
(2) "The acceleration of scientific-technical progress and the develop-
ment of the sciet-tif ic-technical revolution are the decisive sources for
raising efficiencyy and, th~ls, for the intensif ication of the social repro-
duction process."12 For that reason i.t is a matter of letting the results
of science and technology enter into the investment projects we already
have and not only into the construction of new enterprises.
(3) The extensive way of expanding production constantly creates new
jobs. To combine production increases constantly with demands for more
manpower, however, is not feasibly. Besides, employment is very high in
the GDR, and one can hardly expect for. the years to come Hach of an in-
crease in the total of the employment-seeking population. Even so, in-
tensification cannot primarily be explained from the limitations in the
number of manpower. Above and beyond all else, one hss to raise efficiency
through intensification by carrying the scientific-technical progress into
the economy in its whole breadth, as concrete conditions require it in
any given case.
The task of increasing labor efficiency applies to all public spheres.
Even where one does not produce, one must reach high results through
minimum expenditure of efforts. That also applies to the NVA. The Eighth
SED Congress task pertaining to the intensif ir_ation and rationalization
for tt?.e purpose of making social labor highly efficient thus also supplies
the guideline to military activity. The point in ideological ?aork is that
one deepens th understanding for the party's economic policy and, at the
same time, draws conclusions with respect to one's own activity.
Fulfillment of the Main Task Means Cootmunity With the Fraternal Socialist
Countries
The 25 ye?srs of socialist construction in the GDR are indissolubly embedded
in the development of the socialist c^;^,::u-~'.ty of states. It i4 connected
with the formation of new socialist ?international relations among the peo-
ples, a close rallying around the Soviet Union, the development of a co-
ordinated foreign policy by the socialist states, the important growth of
our economic and research potential, and the creation of an effective
military coalition. Being part of the a111ance cf free and equal states
working together on the basis of the principles of socialist internation-
alism, the GDR has always been able to support itself on the important
political, ideological, economic and military potential of the community.
"F,ach step we take today, each thought about our future," Erich Honecker
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_xplained, "is determined by our unshakable certainty that the pledge of
our successes lies in the community with the Soviet Union. The decisive
guaranty for the co.itinual growth of the economy of the GDR lies in its
working together with the Soviet Union and the other fraternal countries--
which is shown ?articularly clearly today when the imperialist world is
more and more strongly upset by inflation and crisis. The key to the de-
cisive advanc?s of our economy toward fulfilling our main task liar, in our
community with the fraternal socialist states, and mainly with. the U~SR.'?13
Economic cooperation with the sa~ialist community of states is taking
place today on the basis of the (;EMA Comprehensive Program, The communist
and workers parties and the governments of the member coin Gies are con-
sciously and systematically forming the new stage of their international
economic and scientific-technical division of labor and collaboration--
the r~ocialist economic integration. As part of the process of socialist
integrati.~n, the socialist economic integration forms the material base
for the comprehensive cooperation and all round assimilation by the CEMA
states in all domains of public life. This is an inevitable process
caused by the increasing socialization and internationalization of the
productive forces, the development of socialist production conditions and
the class conflict between socialism and imperialism. Socialist economic
integration significantly contributes to the further consolidation of the
Qconomic strength and the defense capability of the Warsaw Pact states.
It constitutes, within the t~?.al process of social development, a key
proble~a for the solution cf all the other tasks and a decisive part of
the revolutionary world process today, and it is one of the basic con-
ditions for making full use of the advantages that are characteristic of
socialism within the framework of the socialist community of states.
The fraternally alined socialist countries are combining their scientific-
technical and production capacities more and more strongly in order to
reach maximum achievements with a r,~axlmum saving of time. The communist
and workers parties, through the state organs in research and production,
are systematically organizing the highest form of the international divi-
sion of labor--specialization and cooperation--between production associ-
ations and enterprises. It creates better prerequisites for the material
satisfaction of t~~e needs of the working people and also for economically
safeguarding the national defense within the framework of the socialist
military coalition. Between the GDR and the USSR alone, 60 govermnent
accords have been concluded on research and production cooperation in de-
cisive areas. The CEMA countries have coordinated their long-range eco-
nomic plans, especially with the Soviet Union. :`.:e GDR and the USSR have
agreed on joint planning between their ministries for machine building up
to 1980. The biggest, trade agreement of the world, amounting to M 100
billion, between the Soviet Union and our republic, is systematically being
realized in the course of the current five-year plan.
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For decades the close fraternal cooperation between the GDR and the Soviet
Union has guaranteed stable supplies of raw materials and fuels for our
economy (for example, petroleum and iron ore, 90 percent; zinc, 70 percent;
lumber, 40 percent; cotton, 80 percent). The "Friendship" oil pipeline
and the "Northern Light" gas pipeline are playing a special role in this.
One must also emphasize the fact that at an exchange value of M 50 billion,
the Soviet Union is supplying approximately 50 percent of commodity ship-
ments in machinery and equipment for the GDR economy from 1971 to 1975.
All that is also important to economically safeguardizig our national de-
fense. There is going on at the same time, in connection with various
economic processes on large building sites, as for example at Thierbach,
Boxberg and the Nord Nuclear Power Plant in the GDR, an international ex-
change of experiences among the workers and specialists of a17. CEMA coun-
tries, a genuine process of internationalizing the best experiences and
production methods. It shows that the consolidation of the international
alliance of the working class in production is a process of historical
importance, which does not merely amount to saving time and money. "?'his
is a historical process in which socialism is proving its superiority
in every country and, as a firm community of states, in the life of the
people and the peoples.'?14
From these objective conditions of the development of the socialist ~om-
munity of states, the Ninth Delegates Conference drew conclusions with
respect to ideological work. It focused on the need for further deepening
the friendship with the Soviet Union and all other fraternal peo~,les, on
improving economic knowledge, and on rejecting all attackF against *_he
cooperation by our socialist family of peoples.
During the 25 years of GDR development, the SED and our government have
always been mindful of the fact that the strength and developmental tempo
of all socialist states can only be improved to the extent that every
single socialist country places its own potentials, based on the prin-
ciples of socialist internationalism, in the service of the socialist
alliance. As a capable industrial state .with a developed socialist agri-
culture, the GDR has incessantly, as best it could, contributed to the
growth of those political, economic and military potentials and to the
unity and cohesiveness of the socialist community of states. With 5 per-
cent of the population, the GDR produces approximately 10 percent i.f the
industrial production of the countries united under CEMA and, in 1973,
had a 16.5 percent share in the foreign trade turnover of the CEMA market.l5
At present the GDR meets approximately 25 percent of the USSR import needs
in machinery, equipment and installations. For tracked vehicles this
share even amounts to from 35 to 40 percent. These few examples clearly
indicate that our republic is doing its share in the economic development
of the socialist community of states.
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All countries united under CEMA have convincingly proven the vit~.lity and
superiority o# the socialist social order. In 1950 the?~ only produced
18 percent, but at present, approximately 33 percent of the world indus-
trial production. In 1990, its share will probably be 50 percent. From
1948 to 1973, industrial production in the CEMA urea rose mores than twelve-
fold and the national income, more than eightfold.l6
From 1961 to 1973 alone, more than 35 million housing units were built in
the CEMA countries. Approximately 130 million people could move into these
new dwellings, ;which amounts to as much as the entire population in the
F&3, France, Netherlands and Denmark. Especially since the Comprehensive
Program was adopted it became possible to accelerate the speed of develop-
ment in all CEMA countries ar.d to make further progress in improving the
+aorking and living conditions of the working pQopl^..
In contrast, other develc;pmental trends appeared in the capitalist states.
The share of the EEC states in world industrial production, from 1950 to
1974, went down from 22 to 18 percent, and that of tiie United States,
from 44 to 27 percent.17 The working people's everyday life in the cap i-
talist countries is beset more and more by increased crisis phenomena,
inflation, rising prices, unemployment and social insecurity. The con-
trast confirms this: The states united in CEMA have in the last 25 years
become the greatest and most dynamic industrial area in the world. So-
cialism is on a worldwide offensive; its ?~dvance cannot be stopped. 'i~his
fundamental insight is of importance to the ideological work with army
personnel. Here one must underscore that the worldwide and comprehensive
safeguarding of the superiority of socialism, in teens of the int9rnational
power t.atio, calls for thorough efforts in the political, economic and
military fields and that every memb-~ of the army, as every working person,
in our republic has his own share, t~~rcugh his performance, in the world
revolutionary process.
1. Cf. E. Honecker: "Stability and Security are the Cric.eria of Real
Socialism." In: NEUES DEUTSCHLAND (A edition), 30 May 74.
2. "Eighth SED Congress Documents," Berlin, 1971, p 49.
3. Cf. E. Honecker: "Das Volk der DDR kann mit Zuversicht die Schwell~
zum Jahre 1973 ueberschreiten" (The GDR People May Cross the Threshold
to 1973 With Confidence), Berlin, 1972, p 12 f.
4. G. Tittel: "The Basic Economic Law of Socialism and the Main Task."
In: WIRTS~HAFTSWISSENSCHAFT (Berlin), No 12, 1913, p 1846.
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5. E. Honec~.ar: Bericht des Zentralkomitees an den VIII. Parteitag
der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands" (Report of the
Central Committee to the Eighth SED Congress), Berlin, 1971, p 39.
6. Cf. "The 19 May Communal Elections--Expression of the Socialist Exer-
cise of Power." In: ARGUMENTATION DER POLITISCHEN HAUPTVERWALTUNG
DER NATIONALEN VOLKSARMEE, No 6, 1974.
7. K. Marx: "Preface to the Critique of Political Economy," Berlin,
.1953, p 599.
8. E. Honecker: "Bericht des Zentralkomitees.:.," op. cit., p 46.
9. Cf. H. Nick: "Intensivierung and wissenschaftlich-technischer
Fortschritt" (Intensification and Scientific-Technical Progress),
Berlin, 1974, p 11.
10. K. Marx: "Das Kapital," Vol 2, in Marx./Engels, "Werke" (Works),
Vol 2~~, Berlin, 1969, p 172.
11. H. Nick, op. cit., p 22 f.
12. Ibid., p 23.
13. E. Honecker: "From Generation to Generation We Carry on the Noble
Cause of Our Friendship." In: NEUES DEUTSCHLAND (A edition),
13 May 74.
14. E. Honecker: "With New Successes to the 25th Anniversary of the GDR."
In: "12. Tagung des Zentralkomitees der SED. Bericht. Schlusswort"
(Concluding Remarks to the 12th SED Central Committee Session),
Berlin, 1974, p 100.
15. Cf. DDR AUSSENWIRTSCHAFT (Berlin), No 5, 1974, p 1.
16. Cf. E. Honecker: "With New Successes...," op. cit., p 99.
17. Cf. K.-H. Stiemerling: "The Socialist Economic Integration of the
CEMA Member Countries--A Material Base for the All Round Collaboration,
Assimilation and Union of Socialist States." In: WIRTSCHAFTSw'ISSENSCHAF7
(Berlin), No 5, 1974, p 748.
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NATO STRATEGJ% CONCEPTS SCORED AS i.~GRESSIVE
East Berlin MILITAERWESEN in German Nov 74 pp 22-29
[B'/ Lt Col R.. Buhlmann, instructor at the Friedrich Engels
Miii~ary Academy]
/Text/ In the foreign policy part of his significant speech in Alma Ata
on 1S March 1974, the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee,
Comrade Leonid Brezhnev, pointed to the stubborn resistance by the most
reactionary and aggressive imperialist circles and to the active attempts
by the enemies of peace at preventing a new political climate, and he
emphasized: "The present period is complicated and contradictory. P.e-
action is trying everywhere, wherever it is possible, to start a counter-
offensi~e, at least in some sectors, to obstruct detente and to compli-
cate the solution of problems under discussion. Many bourgeois press
organs, radio and television programs are widely being used for this pur-
pose which deliberately distort the content of our policy, place its
re:suits in a false light and use the outdated cliches of anti-Sovietism."1
The imperialists, as one tinows, have for a long time camouflaged their tri~e
foreign and military policy aims and objectives. They are posing as
friends of peace and are crying to blame the socialist countries for the
still Existing danger of war. Out of the great numbea? of imperalist
theses, two especially have been made much of in recent years during
their ideological attacks. They are the claim of an allegedly existing
"balance of fo+:ces as a peace preserving factor" and that of the "double
strategy," developed to justify the increasing combination between foreign
and military policy activities by imperialism. It means that NATO pre-
sumably advocated "defense and detente." In close connection with that
also is the legend of the "threat to the free world."
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(3-f)-N-F-I-D-E-N?-T-I? ?A-L
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This is amply borne out by the program points in the basic document by
the SPD/FDP government on the current military policy ~f imperialism in
tha FRG, the "Weissbuch 1973/74" /!Ihite Paper 1973/74/.
What then is the class character of these conceptions? Which aims do
they pursue and what functions do they fulfill? What is their internal
connection and which place do they occupy within the overall strategic
conception of imperialism?
The decisive cause that forces the imperialists to recognize the results
of postwar developments and to accept r~latiot-s with the socialist coun-
tries on the basis of peaceful coexistence lies in the increasing change
of the international power ratio in favor of socialism. It is this which
forces the imperialists to accommodate to the new situation and to abandon
~~ositions that have become untenable. A?so contributing to decisively~~-
s~~bering up the aggressive adventurers are, to a high degree, the military
t.;:'ne speeds which
are either too high or too low. The fact that the mc;>~: is running is
indicated only by the ignition control light's going our or by the pres-
sure shown on the oil pressure gauge of the traction motor.
When shifted into traction gear, the D~902 operates within a speed range
of 0.45 to 3.75 kilometers per hour after having been shifted from the
1st *'~rou~h the 5th forward gears.
From ?his it is obvious that the driving speed can be changed only mini-
mally with the use of t!~e gas pedals.
Installation in 1975 of commercial-type electroni.: revolution indicators
is planned for all D-902 show plows.
It is advantageous for the working life of the power transmission parts
not to use the traction gear for plowing operations. Experience has
shown that it has been possible to handle s.~ow accumulations which in
some cases were as high as 1.20 meters wit's the 2nd or 1st driving gear
without overtaxing them in the slightest.
The traction gear is intended for meteorological conditions Which occur
on the airfields of the LSK/LV only on the rare::t of occasions.
If it should nevertheless become necessary to shift to the traction gear,
then utmost care must be taken that shifting of the change-spe,~d gear
(1st to 5th gear) is categorically done anly when the basic vehicle is
standing still. As a rule, the vehicle which has been shifted to trac-
tion gear comes to an immediate standstill when the clutch is disengaged
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NO FOREIGN DISSEM
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NO FOREIGN DISSEM
because of the masses of snow in front of the plow box. However, things
are different when driving if no plowing is being done.? Through the
thrust effect of the moving vehicle which weighs 15." tons by itself,
acceleration before disengaging the clutch results in an overburdening
of a shaft of the power-drive transmission and, under unfavorable con-
ditions, in its being broken. This was determined as the result of an
investigation of two incidentz of breakage of this shaft on a D-902.
The use of the D-902 is moat effective if one begins plowing snow accumu-
lations when they are no higher than about 30 centimeters, i.e. when it
is possible to carry out the plowing with a speed of 13 to 20 kilometers
per hour. This reduces the stress placed on the propelling vehicles
equipped with frontal snow plows, because there is no need for the power
required for moving big snow accumulations away. At the same time this
improves their working range and thus also the speed of their snow clear-
ing operations and their power-area ratio.
Plowing at speeds of 15 to 20 kilometers per hour represents a high strain
on the skids of the plow box of the D-902. Depending on the condition of
the surface involved (concrete or blacktop), they are subjected to a rela-
tively high rate of wear and tear. From this it follows that the proper
height setting of the skids must be checked regularly. If this is neg-
lected, a complete wearing down of the skids and, in addition, damage to
the underside of the plow box may result.
At that time when preparations for winter are being made, one should al-
ready have a sufficient supply of skids made and skids should be replaces'.
in good time.
When plowing, one must see to it that the lever which activates the pilot
valve for the lifting and lowering of the plow box is in the lowest posi-
tion (floating position). Through the floating position, a balancing
effect is achieved in the hydraulic system and the plow box is prevented
from jumping to a considerable extent.
If, when plowing, the 3rd position is erroneously engaged from above, the
plow box will be pushed down by the hydraulic lifter and by its own weight,
and extremely high wear and tear of the skids will result. The speed of
the helical plow blades and that of the snow expeller are coordinated so
favorably that any kind of snow (ranging from powder snow to slush) can
be easily plowed without the slightest stopping up of the snow to be
expelled even when the plow motor runs at medium speeds. The shortcoming
of the SF-1 snow plow, the work capacity of which was exceeded anti the
snow ejection ducts .of which were clogged when plowing wet, heavy snow,
. is entirely nonexistent in the D-902.
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
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NO FOREIGN DISSEM
It was possible to routinely handle even ~,~et snow accumulations which,
due to a rapid sinking of temperatures, had already been covered with
an ice-crust, thanks to the cutting edges on the plow box and thanks to
the ducts on the plow's helical blades.
The throwing distance and throwing velocity increase as the snow masses
get thicker. There is danger of persons getting hurt or technical materiel
or buildings (windows, roofs) being damaged particularly when plowing wet or
frozen snow accur~u~.ations on the main runway or in the areas where tech-
nical installations or equipment are located. This is to be pointed out
particularly to the D-902 specialists in the course of their thorough
training and instruction before they are assigned to this service.
Experience has shown that the work of plowing snow accumulations can
be done neatly only if
--the speed of the D-902 is adap~ed to the size of the snow accumulation,
--the sno~r mass pushed through the side reamers is smaller than the width
of the plow box, and
--the skids have the proper height setting (about 10 mm).
It is useful to equip all plow boxes of the D-902 with snow deflector
fins. By doing this, the snow is prevented from falling out of the sides
of the plow box. Operation of the D-902 has shown that the traction and
the service motor work under all meteorological conditions within the
range of the parameters listed in the pertinent operating instructions.
It should be noted that the coolant temperature of the service motor is
subject to fluctuations which can, however, be held to permissible norms
by means of the radiator louvers and the service cabin hatches. ~A high
sense of responsibility for continuous operational readiness of the D-902
snow plow is required by the specialists. They must be able to master the
URAL 375 E basic vehicle and the special mounting.
Development of Specialists
The need to conduct strict technical maintenance, inspections, ar,d con-
trols as well as the need for detection and elimination of minor c.~ubles
by individuals on their own initiative make particularly high de,~+ands on
maintenance personnel.
Experience gathered in the course of the centralized instruction courses
for the development of D-902 specialists has shown that not all troop
units have paid the necessary attention to the selection of participants
in the training courses.
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NO FOREIGN DISSEM
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NO FOREIGN DIS5EM
The participants in thc~ training courses must be prepared on a long-range
basis for their enrol..lment in the central training course. At the time
of hts beinK detailed to take the central instruction course the part ici-
pant in the tr:pining ce~urse must already pusseRS the following documents:
t. A Cl:ass V driver's permit,
2. A military motor vehicle driver's permit, and
3. Proof tli:~t lie ]iay been instructed in the use of llW1L 375-type motor
vehicles.
in add itic~n, the training course participant must he lnetructcd in t hose
tasks which await him as a D-90'~ specialist, so that all participan t s
have the ner.estiary degree of readiness for this instruction when the
instruction course begins.
In summary, we can make the assessment that the D-902 has fully met a 11
expectations wit}i respect to its performance and dependability. It is
particularly under conditions when sweeper-blower equipmentl is used that
its importance fur a speedy restoration of the usability of the air opera-
tions areas increases. because of its relatively high plowinK speed. Its
dependability and its effective use depend to a considerable degree on
a Digit level of knowledgeability, ability, and action on the part of the
specialists and of the comrades who are responsible for supervising winter-
time service. Necessary attention must therefore be paid to Cheir train-
ing and qualification as well as to developing in them a high sense of
responsibility vis-a-vis technical materiel and for a continuous sta to
of operational readiness of the airfield areas during the winter period.
1. See also MILITAERWESEN, B-Edition, Issue No 10, 1974, p 113.
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
NO FOREir,N DiSSEM
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