STATE DEPARTMENT SECURITY THE NEW PASSPORT REGULATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP66B00403R000500120001-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 602
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 15, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 19, 1962
• Content Type: REGULATION

Ap TATEeIeDEPARTMENT 6 o 4Q3~2~,(1Q 1W001-1
S
HEARINGS
SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY
ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE
EIGHTY-SEVENTH CONGRESS
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
L.S.
WASHINGTON : 1962
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THE NEW PASSPORT REGULATIONS
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COMMITTEE ON THE
ESTES KEFAUVER, Tennessee
OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina
JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas
SAM J. ERVIN, JR.,, North Carolina
JOHN A., CARROLL, Colorado
THOMAS J. DODD, Connecticut
PHILIP A. HART, Michigan
EDWARD V. LONG, Missouri
ALEXANDER WILEY, Wisconsin
EVERETT MCKINLEY DIRKSEN, Illinois
ROMAN L. HRUSKA, Nebraska
KENNETH B. KEATING, New York
HIRAM L. FONG; Hawaii
HUGH SCOTT, Pennsylvania
SUBCOMMITTEE To INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY
ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS
JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, Chairman
THOMAS J. DODD, Connecticut, Vice Chairman
OLIN D. JOHNSTON, South Carolina ROMAN L. HRUSKA, Nebraska
JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas EVERETT McKINLEY DIRKSEN, Illinois
SAM J. ERVIN, JR., North Carolina KENNETH SCOTTB. KEATI vane York Pennsya
J. G. SOQRWINE, Counaei
BENJAMIN MANDEL, Director of. Research
RESOLUTION
Resolved by the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, That the following testimony taken in
executive session be released from the injunction of secrecy, declassi-
fied where necessary, and with such expurgation as may be required
for security or objectionable for other good cause be authorized to, be
printed and made public :
William A. Wieland, January 9, 1961; William A. Wieland, Febru-
ary 8,1961; Samuel Shaffer, February 15,1961; Col. Benoid E. Glawe,.
March 15, 1961; Andres Perez-Chaumont, March 29, 1961; Scott
McLeod, April 4, 1961; Col. Oscar Doerflinger April 26, 1961; Ray-
mond Leddy, June 1, 1961; Jorge Garcia-Tunon, June 1, 1961;
Ricardo Artigas-Ravelo, June 1, 1961; Whiting Willauer, July 27,
1961; Elmer R. Hipsley,, November 16, 1961; Otto F. Otepka, Novem-
ber 16, 1961; Harris Huston, November 16, 1961; Salvatore A. Bon-
tempo, January 9, 1962; William A. Wieland, February 2, 1962;
Roger Jones, March 8, 1962; Abram Chayes, January 15, 1962; Wil-
liam O. Boswell, March 8, 1962; Frank Becerra, Jr., March 12, 1962;
Elmer R. Hipsley, March 15, 1962; Capt. Charles R. Clark, Jr., April
12, 1962; Otto Otepka, April 12, 1962; Frances Knight, May 16,1962;
Robert D. Johnson, May 16, 1962; Abram Chayes, June 7, 1962;
Roger W. Jones, June 7, 1962; John Leahy, June 12, 1962; Andreas
Lowenfeld, June 7,1962; Andreas F. Lowenfeld, June 12,1962; Abram
Chayes, June 19, 1962.
JAMES O. EASTLAND,
Chairman.
THOMAS J. DODD,
Vice Chairman.
OLIN D. JOHNSTON.
JOHN L. MCCLELLAN.
SAM J. ERVIN, Jr.
ROMAN HRUSKA.
EVERETT M. DIRKSEN.
K. B. KEATING.
HUGH ScoTT.
Dated October 4, 1962.
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CONTENTS
Testimony of-
Chayes, Abram------------------------------------------------
Johnson, Robert D--------- -- ----- ------------- ---------
Jones, Roger W---------------- ---- -------------- ---------
Knight, Frances G---------------------------------------------
Leahy,Jack--------------------------------------------------
Lowenfeld, Andreas F------------
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----------------------------
Appendix I. Chronology No. 3_____________
-------------------------
-
Appendix II. Proceeding in Elizabeth Gurley Flynn passport case -__-__- y
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229
297
229
334
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STATE DEPARTMENT SECURITY
The New Passport Regulations
WEDNESDAY, MAY 16, 1962
U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE To INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION
OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL
SECURITY LAWS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met= pursuant to call, at 11:05 a.m., in room 2300,
New Senate Office Building, Senator Thomas J. Dodd, presiding.
Present : Senators Dodd and John L. McClellan.
Also present: J. G. Sourwine, chief counsel; Benjamin Mandel,
director of r. esearch ; and Frank Schroeder chief investigator.
Senator DODD. The hearing will come to or ?der.
We are pleased that you could come here, Miss Knight.
Mr. SonRwINE. May I respectfully suggest, Mr. Chairman, that
both Miss Knight and Mr. Johnson be sworn and identified on the.
record.
Senator DODD. Raise your right hands, please. Do you each solemn-
ly swear that the testimony you will give here will be the truth,,
the whole truth, and nothing but. the truth, so help you God?
TESTIMONY OF FRANCES G. KNIGHT, DIRECTOR, PASSPORT OFFICE,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE; AND ROBERT D. JOHNSON, CHIEF
COUNSEL, PASSPORT OFFICE
Miss KNIGHT. I do.
Mr. JOHNSON. I do.
I am Robert D. Johnson, chief counsel for the Passport Office.
Mr. SOURWINE. And you are Frances Knight?
Miss KNIGHT. Yes, sir. My name is Frances G. Knight. I am
Director of the Passport Office of the Department of State. I have
been Director of that Office since May 1, 1955.
Mr. SOURWINE. Miss Knight, we are interested in the operations
and problems of the Passport Office, with special reference to in-
ternal security.
You have, I believe hrough the proper channels, been notified of
the general area of le- committee's interest. The members of the
committee know you and have for years, and the committee wants
your personal opinion and experience. If you care to make a general
statement respecting these matters here at the beginning of the hear-
ing, I think, with the permission of the Chair, it would be appro-
priate.
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STATE DEPARTMENT SECURITY
Senator DODD. Oh, yes, glad to hear anything you want to tell us,
Miss Knight.
Miss KNIGHT. Thank you: Mr. Chairman. I know generally what
the committee is interested in, but I do not know exactly what you
wish to discuss. So I have prepared some notes dealing with the
issuance of the passport. And~I have arranged these notes in a chron-
ological order. I believe that the sequence of these actions will pro-
vide a very useful background on the policies, the regulations, and
other pertinent actions affecting the entire question of issuing pass-
ports. May I proceed I
Senator DODD. Yes; of course.
Mr. SouxwINE. Off the record.
Discussion off the record.)
Senator DODD. Back on the record.
Miss KNIGHT (continuing). I have worked for the Federal Govern-
ment for 22 years in various positions involving administrative work
and public relations. I am not a lawyer and I am not on the policy-
making level in the Department, therefore, I can answer questions and
speak only from actual experience gained in operating and administer-
in g the Passport Office.
Mr. Johnson, the Chief Counsel of the Passport Office, who is here
with me, is more familiar than I am with technical legal details. Be-
tween the two of us, I hope we can give you the information you
seek.
The act of July 3, 1926 (see. 211a, title 22, United States Code),
places authority to issue passports in the Secretary of State under
such rules as the President may prescribe. The Executive Order No.
7856, under which we are operating, was issued by President Roosevelt
on March 31, 1938. Virtually the entire order, consisting of 127
paragraphs, is taken up with detailed, technical provisions relating
to passport applications and supporting data such as the size and
number of passport photographs to be submitted, how a married
woman should sign her name and other minutiae, some of which are
impractical and obsolete under present-day conditions.
Following a special statutory court decision in the District of
Columbia in July 1952, which held that apassport could not be re-
voked without notice and a hearing, the Secretary of State issued
partially revised regulations in August 1952, under which passports
were denied to Communist Party members and supporters of the world
Communist movement. A hearing procedure in the Passport Office
with subsequent right to appeal to & 'Board of Passport Apppeals was
also provided. In June 1958, the Supreme Court, in the BriehI-Kent
decision, held that there was no statutory base for these regulations.
It is my opinion that the inconsistencies and arbitrariness of Pass-
port Office procedures in denying passports in the past have had a con-
siderable bearing on the confusion and dissension which clouded this
issue in the last few years.
The travel pattern, volume, and mode of transportation in the
United States, as well as in the entire world, have changed consider-
ably since 1926. The Passport Office has been shunted around in vari-
ous areas of the Department of State. It was first called a bureau;
then a division; then a permits office; then back to a division and since
1952, it has been known as the Passport Office.
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STATE DEPARTMENT SECURITY .231
Over the years the Passport Office has grown in importance as a pub-
lic service to American citizens, as a revenue-producing operation and
a public relations asset, not only to the Department of State, but to the
entire Federal Government. When I became Director in May 1955,
the Passport Office was in dire need of help. With the sympathetic
support of Congress, the Office was completely reorganized, modern-
ized, and streamlined to cope with the tremendous workload thrust
upon it by the jet age.
In March and April of 1956, and again in June 1960, the Senate Gov-
ernment Operations Committee published reports and hearings on the
Passport Office, giving in considerable detail its past history, its func-
tions, its administration, and operation. Some specific and, in my esti-
mation, highly desirable recommendations for legislation were made.
Unfortunately, no action was taken and the Passport Office continued
with a bureau framework which was not geared to cope with or support
a fast moving direct line operation.
We have, however, fared reasonably well, because we have a very
measurable product-applications received and passports issued.
There is little argument with an office that issues 850,000 passports a
year and processes applications within 3 days after receipt. Our
busiest day this year was Monday, May 7, when we received 8,023 appli-
cations in the 1 day, and 2 days later the passports were in the mail.
We bring into the U.S. Treasury a little over $61/2 million per year, at
a cost to the Government of less than $21/2 million. There is little fault
to find with an office that, in the past 7 years, has increased its employee
productivity by 56.7 percent. Nevertheless, I believe additional im-
provements can be made, but these are now more or less dependent on
the administrative climate within the Department.
The more important and serious problem facing us today is the lack
of passport legislation, the lack of a revised Executive order, and the
lack of rules and regulations under which we can operate honestly,
efficiently, and expeditiously. In the 7 years that I have been Director
of the Passport Office, I have reported to a series of six administrators.
This has not been easy and the lack of continuity has taken its toll out
of good management and progress.
In the past 5 years I have tried to push through, by every means I
know2 a revised Executive order and updated rules and regulations
pertaining to passport issuance. Only once did this package reach the
desk of an Under Secretary, but no action was taken until early this
year. Before I discuss this action, I want to illustrate some of the more
glaring omissions which put the Director of the Passport Office in the
position of operating in violation, or pretty close to it, of the existing
but obsolete regulations.
For instance, there has never been a statutory deleation of author-
ity to the Director of the Passport Office. 'While- the Director is
charged with the issuance of passports, the operation of the national
office, its field offices, the direction of passport and citizenship work
overseas, the regulations state that the Secretary of State appoints
passport agents. This has never been the case, but there is, in fact, no
delegation of authority to the Director to perform any of these duties.
R ere is no statutory definition of the U.S. passport. This omis-
sion is serious when it is necessary for the Passport Office to pick up
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232 STATE DEPARTMENT SECURITY
a passport from the bearer for a valid reason. The question has been
posed as to whether the passport is an official Government document,
or does it belong to the bearer once it is issued?
Another discre ancy, in my opinion, is the fact that, by law, State
courts charge a $2 fee for the execution of a passport application.
Federal courts and the Passport Office and its agencies charge a $1
execution fee. This has caused considerable public confusion. The;
fee charged for the execution of a passport application should be uni-
form, regardless of where the service is rendered.
These and other matters could be cleared up by proper legislation.
From practical experience, I would strongly recommend that criteria
for pass ort refusal and limitation be spelled out by statute to pro
vide the department. of State with a general frame of reference.
Now I would like to document the Passport Office procedures on
denials prior to 1952; between 1952 and 1956; subsequent to 1956, in-
cluding the latest regulations which went into effect January 12, 1962.
regulations without refer-
It would be difficult to discuss the present
ence to our practical experiences with the previous ones:
DENIAL PROCEDURES PRIOR TO 1952
Prior to 1952, with reliance on the absolute discretionary authority
of the Secretary, the Passport Office, in denying a passport, merely
informed the applicant that "it was not in the best interests of the
United States" that he should have a passport. The applicant was
not informed of the nature of the information upon which the action
was based. There was no provision for appeal from the refusal.
The free exercise of this discretion was first tested in the Bauer v.
Acheson case (106 F. Supp. 445 (1951) ). Miss Bauer, a naturalized
U.S. citizen, was employed as a journalist. in Europe from 1944 to
June 1951. On June 4, 1951, her passport was revoked without notice
or hearing. No reason for the action was given other than in the opin-
ion of the Secretary "her activities are contrary to the best interests.
of the United States."
A three-judge statutory court sitting in the District of Columbia
held that the right to travel abroad was protected by the fifth amend-
ment to the Constitution and the cancellation of an outstanding pass-
port., without a hearing, deprived the bearer of liberty without due
process of law.
The court also made this pertinent comment:
This court is not willing to subscribe to the vtew that the Executive power
Includes any absolute discretion which may encroach on the Individual's con-
stitutional rights, or that the Congress has power to confer such absolute dis-
cretion. We hold that, like other curtailments of personal liberty for the public
good, the regulation of passports must be administered, not arbitrarily or capri-
ciously, but fairly, applying the law equally to all citizens without discrimina-
tion, and with due process adapted to the exigencies of the situation.
As a result of the Bauer decision, the Secretary of State on August
28, 1952, prorhulgated regulations (sees. 51.135-51.143, title 22, CFR),
which placed limitations upon the issuance of passports to persons.
supporting the. world Communist movement. The regulations pro-
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STATE DEPARTMENT SECURITY
vided that the individual should be informed of the nature of the
information upon which the action was based; for an informal hear-
ing in the Passport Office and the right of subsequent appeal to a
Board of Passport Appeals. The regulations also provided that at
.any stage of the passport proceedings, an applicant could be required
to furnish an affidavit with respect to present and past membership
in the Communist Party.
In practice, however, the records show that an applicant was
merely informed of the tentative denial of his application in the
language of the regulations-"in your case it is alleged you are a
Communist."
The affidavit with respect to present and past Communist Party
membership was used indiscriminately and on the basis of the flim-
siest. information.
The informal hearing merely consisted of an across-the-desk inter-
view of the applicant by a Passport Office attorney. A memorandum
outlining the gist of the conversation was prepared, often a number
of days after the interview had taken place. The entire procedure
was very casual.
The final refusal action by the Passport Office likewise was couched
in the language of the regulations with the one change, a notice of
right of appeal to the Board of Passport Appeals. A circular con-
taining the Board's rules was enclosed with the letter.
In 1956, the Passport Office, taking advantage of its reorganization,
and improved staffing, made some changes in the procedures affecting
denials. An applicant was informed in detail of the nature of the
.derogatory information consonant, of course, with security considera-
tions. For example, he was informed- of the period of Communist
Party membership, the particular branch (as distinguished from
unit) of the party, his official capacity, the nature of his activities
financial contributions, and the like. The applicant was also advised
of his entitlement to an informal hearing and of representation by
counsel.
The informal hearing procedure was established along the follow-
"ini lines :
the Chief of the Passport Office Legal Division acted as a hearing
officer. The attorney in charge of the security branch presented the
case. The passport application, tentative refusal letter, correspond-
ence between the applicant and the Passport Office, public source data,
rand a resume of the classified information were all entered into the
record.
The applicant was afforded the opportunity to answer any of the
allegations made against him, to present any relevant information
and to testify in his own behalf.
A verbatim transcript was prepared and a copy given to the appli-
cant or his attorney.
In the case of a final refusal, the applicant was informed in detail
,of the basis for the refusal. He was informed of his right to appeal
to the Board of Passport Appeals. A circular setting forth the
Board's rules was enclosed with the letter.
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234 STATE DEPARTMENT SECURITY
On January 10, 1956, the Secretary amended the 1952 regulations
with section 51.136 (title 22 CFR) which placed limitations on the
issuance of passports to persons going abroad whose activities would
violate the laws of the United States; be p judicial to the orderly
conduct of foreign relations; or otherwise be prejudicial to the in
terests of the United States.
An applicant who came within the provisions of this regulation
was also afforded the right to an informal hearing and appeal to the
Board of Passport Appeals.
Subsequent to the promulgation of the so-called Communist regu-
lations in August 1952, passports were withdrawn and the individual
was informed along the lines of the tentative refusal of a passport
application.
The withdrawal was affected either by the Immigration and Nat-
uralization Service lifting the passport at the port of entry or by
agents of the Departments Office of Security. The individual con-
cerned was orally informed that the passport was withdrawn at the
request of the Passport Office, but no basis for the action was given.
No hearing or review procedure was provided for contesting the
withdrawal action, unless specifically requested by the person in in-
terest or his attorney.
WITHDRAWAL OF A PASSPORT SUBSEQUENT TO JANUARY 1956
By the 'middle of 1955, the Director of the Passport Office realized
that radical changes would have to be made in the procedures relat
ing to the denial or withdrawal of a passport. There was no ques-
tion but that the old procedures were arbitrary and were leading up
to legal difficulties. The time was late, but nevertheless, in January
1956, we instituted procedures which closely conformed to our tradi-
tional concepts of due process.
Therefore, subsequent to January 1956, the Office of Security was
utilized to withdraw passports when necessary. A letter was ad-
dressed and hand delivered to the bearer of the passport, advising
him of the tentative withrawal and requesting him to give his pass-
port to the Department's representative. The basis for this action
was outlined in the letter and at the same time he was advised of his
right to an informal hearing before the action became final.
Only in a few cases was the Immigration and Naturalization Serv-
ice requested to pick up the passport at the port of entry. In these
instances, the same procedure of advice and notice was followed.
It is interesting to note that after the institution of these procedures,
not once were our actions seriously challenged in the courts on pro-
cedural grounds.
At the time of the Brieh,l-gent decision (July 16, 1958) we had ap-
proximately 65 passport applications on hand which would have been
processed under the so-called Communist regulations. These involved
alleged Communist Party membership as well as various other acti-
vities in support of the Communist movement. This does not mean,
however, that all 65 applications would have been denied. In some
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cases, we were in the process of assembling additional data, and in
others we would have asked the applicants for clarification of their
activities.. No doubt some of these applicants would have given us
satisfactory proof that they were no longer active in the promotion
of communism. On the other hand, some would have reached the ten-
tative refusal stage. The Supreme Court decision resulted in granting
passports to all such applicants.
I am very reluctant to give out figures, because it is so easy to slip
into a numbers game. A qualifying word can change any figure, de-
pending pretty much on what a witness is trying to prove. However,
our records would indicate that from June 16, 1958, through Decem-
ber 31, 1958, 158 applications would have been processed under the
Communist regulations had they been in force. In 1959, 175 would
have been so processed and in 1960, the estimated figure was 117. In
1961, 96 applications came within this category.
This brings us to the Supreme Court decision of June 5, 1961, up-
holding the constitutionality of the order by the Subversive Activities
Control Board requiring the Communist Party of the United States
to register under the provisions of the Internal Security Act of 1950.
In the Passport Act, section 6 of the act is relevant. Subsection (a)
of this section provides that when a Communist organization is regis-
tered under the act or is the subject of a final order of the Subversive
Activities Control Board requiring registration, it is unlawful for a
member of such organization to apply for a passport or the renewal
of a passport. It also makes it unlawful for such a person to use or
attempt to use a passport already issued.
Subsection (b) provides that when an organization is registered
or required to register as a Communist-action organization under the
act, it is unlawful for an officer of the Government to issue a passport
to,any person when he knows or has reason to believe that such per-
son is a member of such an organization.
I would like to call your attention specifically to the language "has
reason to believe" in subsection (b). I believe this to be the crux of
the entire section insofar as the Passport Office is concerned.
I have with me a detailed chronology of Passport Office actions start-
ing June 5, 1961, and carrying us through to January 12, 1962, when
the Department's new regulations appeared in the Federal Register.
Without dwelling on these individual actions, I believe it is worth
noting that the Passport Office, once again had an opportunity on
December 15, 1961, to submit to the Legal Adviser's Office, its pro-
posed revisions of the Executive order and the Department's rules
and regulations governing the issuance of passports. Once again we
stressed the urgent need for revisions and in our accompanying memo-
randum of that date we pointed out that we were submitting regula-
tions which were not only clear, and concise but regulations which
could be administered uniformly in all the important areas of pass-
port and citizenship.
On December 28, 1961, the Passport Office received from the Legal
Adviser a draft revision of the Communist section of the regulations.
We were told that a study of the comprehensive package we had sub-
mitted would take too long and only the regulations relating to the
Communist issue were of immediate importance. The Legal Adviser's
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Office had rewritten the Communist part of the regulations, though
many paragraphs were identical to those issued in 1952.
The most important and significant changes, however, established
'confrontation and the right to cross-examine witnesses, and barred
the use of classified information to deny a passport. We pointed out
that these changes nullified any practical and workable control of
travel by American Communists. We were assured that the Legal
Advisers Office was working closely with the Department of Justice on
the wording of the proposed regulations.
On January 4, 1962, a final draft of the regulations was submitted
to the Passport Office for concurrence, which we refused. The same
-day I sent a memorandum to Mr. Michel Cieplinski Acting Adminis-
trator of the Bureau of Security and Consular A$tairs, of which we
.are a component office. In this paper, I set forth my reasons for not
concurring with the proposed regulations. Dir. Cieplinski supported
the Passport Office position. On January 6, 1962, the Passport Office
was informed that the Department of State position in favor of con-
frontation and cross-examination of witnesses in the Communist cases,
was supported by the Department of Justice. At the same time we
were advised that the Department of Justice interpretation of the law
was binding and that we were to deny a passport only on the basis of
information that could be disclosed to the applicant.
In view of the criminal sanctions involved, the deputy Under Sec-
retary of State, has given sympathetic understanding to my position
and has assumed the responsibility of ordering me to issue the pass-
port when under the regulations the Department finds no other alter-
native.
I made it abundantly clear at that time that most, if not all of our
information regarding Communist Party activities is furnished by
the FBI. In transmitting this information, the FBI specifically en-
joins its distribution outside the Department of State.
Any regulation which states that we cannot consider confidential
information makes it virtually impossible to deny pas71
ort facilities
to members of the Communist Party, U.S.A., as provided y law. The
only exceptions would be a handfuf of Communist Party functionaries
on the national level who, because of their recognized positions and
operations, are more or less impotent insofar as their subversive effect
is concerned These individuals are symbols or figureheads of the
Communist Party and the glare of publicity over the years has dulled
their influence to a great extent.
The real danger, however, lies in the issuance of passports to the
relatively unknown, undercover Communists engaged in espionage,
sabotage, and sedition. These are the people who can and do inesti-
mable damage to our country at home and abroad.
On January 7, 1962, the Attorney General was quoted as saying-
Communist espionage in this country is much more active now than it ever
has been.
Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the FBI, was quoted in the Con-
gressional Record on March 19,1962, as warning that-
The communist threat from without must not blind us to the communist
threat from within. The latter is reaching into the very heart of America
through its espionage agents and a cunning, defiant, and lawless communist
Party which is fanatically dedicated to the Marxist cause of world enslavement
and destruction of the foundations of our Republic.
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These statements are alarming and frustrating when, in the prac-
tical application of the law, a regulation is developed which in effect,
forbids us to protect ourselves. We have been instructed that when
we consider the application of a person whose file indicates Commu-
nist membership, we must separate, in our minds, the confidential in-
formation which cannot be used, from the public information which
can be used, before recommending a denial.
I, as the issuing officer, am supposed to tailor my "reason to believe
that the applicant is a member of a Communist organization" to data
which can be made public regardless of how much classified informa-
tion is produced by the FBI or other agencies of Government to the
effect that the individual is a dangerous Communist. If the proof
cannot be used in open hearings, with the right to cross-examine wit-
nesses, I have been instructed to disregard it. In other words, I am
expected to read the file, dismiss the classified information and base
my decision on what can be best described as generalized public infor-
mation. I maintain that no one can do this in good conscience and
this places me in a difficult position between the law and the Govern-
ment's expert legal advisers who interpret the law. It is a fact that
under the present regulations, the more treacherous and vicious and
destructive the individual may be, the less likely it is that he will be
denied a passport.
It is not difficult to understand why information regarding the
activities of the most dangerous Communist operators in the United
States is classified and cannot be made public. It certainly is not
difficult to understand why the FBI will not produce its informant
agents and counteragents to be questioned by alleged Communists.
What is hard to understand is why we are not permitted by law to
protect ourselves from these people..
Some editorials, newspaper stories, and comments lauding the new
passport regulations have been very discouraging because they reveal
such abysmal ignorance of the true character of.the situation with
which we are faced. The public has been led to believe that, at long
last, there are regulations in effect which will prevent the.use of the
U.S. passport for the benefit or promotion of world communism.
There appears to be no realization that the few functionaries who may
get caught in this very ineffective net are relatively unimportant
They are, in effect, window dressing.
I think there is a very clear choice and one which should not be too
hard to make. Either we make no attempt at protecting the national
interest by means of the passport, reducing it to an identification
document and consequently issuing passports to" anyone who can prove
he is a citizen, or we develop effective legislation which, even though
it may be challenged in the courts, will once and for all time resolve
the question as to whether or not there actually exists the will and
the right to employ every possible means to protect the United States
of America from the inroads of communism. Only the Congress can
make this decision.
Mr. SOUlnvINE. Miss Knight, counsel has purposely avoided break-
ing into your statement while you were making it. I think this state-
ment raises a number of questions. I believe that when the members
of the committee have had an opportunity to read the record that is
made here the morning, there will be additional questions which they
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will wish to ask, I therefore respectful ly suggest to the Chair that at
the conclusion of the hearing today, Miss Knight be asked to stand
by to appear before the committee again at an early date.
Senator DODD. Yes, that is my plan.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Now to make this record as complete as possible,
Mr. Chairman, I want to offer a number of items for insertion.
First, I think we should have in the record the text of the so-called
new passport regulations of the Department of State-that is depart-
ment regulation 108.475, approved January 11, 1962, and filed with
and printed by the Federal Register.
Senator Dona. So ordered.
(The material referred to reads as follows:)
[Reprinted from the Federal Register, Washington. Friday. Jan. 12, 1982)
TITLE 22-FOREIGN RELATIONS
CHAPTER I-DEPARTMENT OF STATE
[Dept. Reg. 198,475]
PART 51-PASSPORTS
Pursuant to the authority vested In me by Paragraph 126 of Executive Order
No. 7850 dated March 31, 1938, Issued ender the authority of section 1 of the
Act of Congress approved July 3, 1926, 44 Stat. 887 (22 U.S.C. 211a) and section
4 of the Act of May 26, 1949, 63 Stat. 111 (5 U.S.C. 151c) I hereby revise
f ; 51.135 to 51.170 Inclusive of Part 51 of Title 22 of the Code of Federal
Regulations to read as follows :
?51.135 Denial of passports to members of Communist organizations.
A passport shall not be Issued to, or renewed for, any individual who the
issuing officer knows or has reason to believe is a member of a Communist
organization registered or required to be registered under section 7 of the Sub-
versive Activities Control Act of 1950 as amended. (50 U.S.C., sec. 786.)
?51.136 Limitations on issuance of passports to certain other persons.
In order to promote and safeguard the interests of the United States, passport
facilities, except for direct and immediate return to the United States, shall be
refused to a person when it appears to the satisfaction of the Secretary of
State that the person's activities abroad would: (a) Violate the laws of the
United States; (b) be prejudicial to the orderly conduct of foreign relations;
or (c) otherwise be prejudicial to the interests of the. United States.
? 51.137 Tentative denial of passports and available administrative procedures.
Any person whose application for a passport or renewal of a passport has
been tentatively denied under 151.135 or f 51.136 shall be entitled to a notifica-
tion In writing of the tentative denial. The notification shall set forth clearly
and concisely the specific reasons for the denial and the procedures for review
available to the applicant.
? 51.138 Procedure for review of tentative denial.
(a) A person whose application for a passport or renewal of a passport has
been tentatively denied in accordance with f 51.135 or f 51.136 shall be entitled,
upon request, and before the denial becomes final, to present to the Passport Office
any information he deems relevant to support his application. He shall be en-
titled to appear in person before a Hearing Officer in the Passport Office; to be
represented by counsel; to present evidence ; to be informed of the evidence
upon which the Passport Office relied as a basis for the tentative denial; to be
informed of the source of such evidence; and to confront and cross-examine ad-
verse witnesses.
(b) The applicant shall, upon request, by the Hearing Officer, confirm his oral
statements in an affidavit for the record. After the applicant has presented his
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case, the Passport Office shall review the record and advise the applicant of its
decision. In making its decision, the Passport Office shall not take into con-
sideration confidential security information that is not made available to the
applicant in accordance with paragraph (a) of this section. If the decision is
adverse to the applicant, he shall be notified in writing, and the notification shall
state the reasons for the decision. Such notification shall also inform the appli-
cant of his right to appeal to the Board of Passport Appeals under ? 51.139.
? 51.139 Appeal by passport applicant.
In the event of a decision adverse to the applicant, he shall be entitled within
thirty days after receipt of notice of such decision to appeal his case to the Board
of Passport Appeals provided for in ? 51.150.
? 51.150 Creation and functions of Board of Passport Appeals.
There is hereby established within the Department of State a Board of Pass-
port Appeals, hereinafter referred to as the Board, composed of not less than
three officers of the Department to be designated by the Secretary of State.
The Board shall act on all appeals under ? 51.139. The Board shall adopt and
make public rules of procedure to be approved by the Secretary.
? 51.151 Organization of Board.
The Board of Passport Appeals shall consist of three or more members desig-
nated by the Secretary of State, one of whom shall be designated by the Secre-
tary as Chairman. The Chairman shall assure that there is assigned to hear the
appeal of any applicant a panel of not less than three members including him-
self or his designee as presiding officer, which number shall constitute a quorum.
51.152 Chairman.
The Chairman, or his designee, shall preside at all hearings of the Board, and
shall be empowered in all respects to regulate the course of the hearings and to
pass upon all issues relating thereto. The Chairman, or his designee, shall be em-
powered to administer oaths and affirmations.
? 51.153 Counsel to the Board.
A Counsel, to be designated by the Secretary of State, shall be responsible
to the Board for the schedule and presentation of cases; for assistance in legal
and procedural matters; for providing information to the applicant as to his
procedural rights before the Board; for maintenance of records; and for such
other duties as the Board, or the Chairman on its behalf, may determine.
? 51.154 Examiner.
The Board may, in its discretion, appoint an examiner in any case, who may,
with respect to such case be vested with any or all authority vested in the Board
or the Chairman, subject to review and final decision by the Board, but an ap-
plicant shall not be denied an opportunity for a hearing before the Board unless
he expressly waives it.
51.155 Duty of Board to advise Secretary of State on action for disposition
of appealed cases.
It shall be the duty of the Board, on the basis of the evidence on the record,
to advise the Secretary of the action it finds necessary and proper to the dis-
position of the cases appealed to it, and to this end the Board may first call for
clarification of the record ; make further investigation ; or take other action con-
sistent with its duties.
? 51.156 Basis for findings of fact by the Board.
In making or reviewing findings of fact, the Board, and all others with re-
sponsibility for so doing under ?? 51.135 to 51.154 shall be convinced by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, as would a trial court in a civil case. In determin-
ing whether there is a preponderance of evidence supporting the denial of a
passport, the Board shall consider the entire record before it. The Board shall
not take into consideration any confidential security information which is not
part of the record.
? 51.157 Decisions of the Board.
Decisions shall be by majority vote. Voting may be either in open or closed
session on any question except recommendations under ? 51.155 which shall be
in closed session. Decisions under ? 51.155 shall be in writing and shall be signed
by all participating members of the Board.
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240 STATE DEPARTMENT SECURITY
? 51.158 Delivery of papers.
Appeals or other papers for the attention of the Board may be delivered per-
sonally, by registered mail, or by leaving a copy at the office of the Board at
the address to be stated in the notification of adverse decision furnished to the
applicant by the Passport Office.
?5L159 Notice of hearing.
An applicant shall receive not less than five business days notice in writing
of the scheduled date and place of hearing, which shall be set for a time as soon
as possible after receipt by the Board of the applicant's appeal.
? 51.160 Appearance.
Any party to any proceeding before the Board may appear in person, or by
or with his attorney, who must possess the requisite qualifications, as herein-
after set forth, to practice before the Board.
? 51.161 Applicant's attorney.
(a) Attorneys at law in good standing who are admitted to practice before
the Federal courts or before the courts of any State or Territory of the United
States may practice before the Board.
(b) No officer or employee of the Department of State whose official duties
have. In fact, Included participation in the investigation, preparation, presenta-
tion, decision or review of cases of the class within the competence of the Board
of Passport Appeals shall, within two (2) years after the termination of such
duties, appear as attorney in behalf of an applicant In any case of such nature,
nor shall any one appear as such attorney in a case of such class if in the course
of prior government service he has dealt with any aspects of the applicant's
activities relevant to a determination of the case.
? 51.162 Hearings.
The record of proceedings held under (t u1.188 shall be made available to the
applicant in connection with his appeal to the Board. The applicant may appear
and testify In his own behalf, be represented by counsel, present witnesses and
offer other evidence in his own behalf. The Passport Office may also present wit-
nesses and offer other evidence. The applicant and witnesses may be examined
by any member of the Board or by counsel. If any witness whom the applicant
wishes to call is unable to appear personally, the Board may, in its discretion,
accept an affidavit by him or order evidence to be taken by deposition. Such
deposition may be taken before any person designated by the Board and such
designee is hereby authorized to administer oaths and affirmations for purposes
of the depositions. The applicant shall be entitled to be informed of all the
evidence before the Board and of the source of such evidence, and shall be en-
titled to confront and cross-examine any adverse witness.
? 51.163 Admissability.
The Passport Office and the applicant may introduce -sucks evidence as the
Board deems proper. Formal rules of evidence shall not apply, but reasonable
restrictions shall be Imposed as to the relevancy, competency and materiality
of evidence presented.
? 51.164 Privacy of hearings.
Hearings shall be private. There shall be present at the bearing only the
applicant, his counsel, the members of the Board, Board's Counsel, official stenog-
raphers, Departmental employees and the witnesses. Witnesses shall be present
at the hearing only while actually giving testimony, or when otherwise directed
by the Board.
? 51.165 Misbehavior before Board.
If, in the course of a hearing before the Board, an applicant or attorney is
guilty of misbehavior, he may be excluded from further participation in the
hearing. In addition, an attorney guilty of misbehavior may be excluded from
participation in any other case before the Board.
? 51.166 Transcript of hearings.
A complete verbatim stenographic transcript shall be made of the bearing by
qualified reporters, and the transcript shall constitute a permanent part of the
record. Upon `request, the applicant or his counsel shall have the right to inspect
the complete transcript, and to purchase a copy thereof.
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STATE DEPARTMENT SECURITY 241.
? 51.167 Notice of decision.
The Board shall communicate to the Secretary of State the action that it
recommends under ? 51.155. In taking action upon such recommendation of the
Board, the Secretary shall not take into consideration any confidential security
information which is not part of the record. The decision of the Secretary shall
be promptly communicated in writing to the applicant.
GENERAL APPLICABILITY OF REVIEW AND APPEAL PROCEDURES
? 51.170 Applicability of ?? 51.138-51.167.
Except for action taken by reason of noncitizenship or geographical limita-
tions of general applicability necessitated by foreign policy considerations, the
.provisions of ? ? 51.135 to 51.167 shall apply in any case where the person affected
takes issue with the action of the Secretary in refusing, restricting, withdraw-
ing, canceling, revoking, or in any other fashion or degree affecting the ability
of such person to receive or use a passport.
The regulations contained in this order shall become effective upon publication
in the Federal Register. The provisions of section 4 of the Administrative
Procedure Act (60 Stat. 238; 5 U.S.C. 1003) relative to notice of proposed rule
making and delayed effective date are inapplicable to this order because the
provisions thereof involve foreign affairs functions of the United States.
For the Secretary of State.
ROGER W. JONES,
Deputy Under Secretary for Administration.
JANUARY 11, 1962.
[P.R. Doc. 62-459; Filed, Jan. 11, 1961; 12:80 a.m.]
Mr. SOURWINE. I want to pay my compliments to Mr. Johnson
who, on January 18, supplied the committee with reprint copies of
this regulation.
Now I want to ask Miss Knight-I show you a paper of two pages,
.the caption being "Passports and Communism." I will ask you, are'
you familiar with this?
Miss KNIGHT: Yes, sir. I prepared this "Passports and Commu-
nism" paper for a documentation of what we did on a day-to-day
basis after the Supreme Court's decision of June 5, 1961.
Mr. SouRwINE. Is it accurate, Miss Knight?
Miss KNIGHT. Yes, sir, it is accurate.
Mr. SOIIRWINE. I might say for the record Mr. Chairman, we did
not get this from Miss Knight. I noted her look of surprise when I
handed it to her.
I offer this for the record at this time.
Senator DODD. It may be admitted.
(The material referred to reads as follows:)
PASSPORTS AND COMMUNISTS
The following is a chronology of actions taken by the Passport Office follow-
ing the Supreme Court decision of October 9, 1961, to dismiss the petition of
the Communist Party for a rehearing of the Court's decision of June 5, 1961, up-
holding the constitutionality of the order of the Subversive Activities Control
Board requiring the Communist Party, U.S.A., to register under the provisions
of the Internal Security Act of 1950.
October 9, 1961: Supreme Court dismisses Communist Party petition for a
rehearing on its June 5, 11961, decision.
October 10, 1961: Passport Office issued a memorandum alerting personnel
that all passport and renewal applications of persons within the purview of
statute must be intercepted prior to any issuance and/or renewal as the case
may be. All cases to be referred to the Legal Division of the Passport Office
for handling.
November 30, 1961: Passport Office sent memorandum to Mr. Abram Chayes
transmitting two lists of persons who appear to be within the purview of 50
U.S.C. 785. The lists were compiled from the records of the Passport Office.
21-092 0-63-pt. 3-2
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December 1, 1961: Passport Office sent a memorandum to Mr. Abram Chayes
recommending the withdrawal of passports issued to individuals on the national
levels of the communist Party leadership; recommending the issuing of appro-
priate letters to such individuals concerned, notifying them of the tentative
withdrawal of their passports and affording them a hearing and right to appeal.
December 7, 1961: Passport Office sent a memorandum to Mr. Abram Chayes
recommending that the following statement be placed in all passport application
forms, registration forms, agency notices, etc.:
Section 6 of the internal Security Act of 1950 (50 U.B.C. 785) provides a
severe penalty (fine and/or imprisonment) for a member of the Communist
Party of the United States who applies for a passport or for the renewal of a
passport or who uses or attempts to use a passport."
December 7, 1961: Meeting in legal adviser's office. Mr. Abram Chayes
reviewed his conversations with the Department of Justice attorneys. Mr.
Chayes advised Miss Knight of the Secretary's interest in not withdrawing
passports but in having the statute enforced by means of criminal prosecutions
in due course.
It. was agreed that the Passport Office prepare a letter for Mr. Chayes' sig-
nature transmitting to Assistant Attorney General Yeagiey for use to enforce-
ment of the act, a list of persons holding valid passports who, on the basis of
Information supplied the Department by the FBI, appear to he within the purview
of section 6 of the act.
Mr. Chayes also advised that he would soon assign someone to check the
passport regulations and was informed by Miss Knight that a complete revision
of the Executive order and the Secretary's regulations on the issuance of pass-
ports had been made by the Passport Office and had been held in abeyance
for over a year pending some action either by the Department or legislative
branch. It was agreed that the revisions be checked and brought up to date
by the Passport Office. Mr. Chayes agreed to review the Passport Office presenta-
tion as a matter of urgency.
December 15, 1961: Mr. Chayes cleared the proposed warnings to be inserted
In Passport Office forma and a printing order was processed immediately by
the Passport OMce. New placards, cards, signs, ? and forms were among the
documents to have the warning inserted.
December 15, 1961: Passport Office sent a memorandum to Mr. Abram Chayes
transmitting an original and one copy of the draft of a new Executive order
and rules and regulations by the Secretary which are to supersede Executive
Order No. 7858 issued on April 2, 1938, and regulations Issuedpursuant thereto
at intervals since April 2,1938.
December 28, 1061: Meeting in the legal adviser's office with Mr. Meeker and
Mr. Lowenfeld regarding the immediate issuance of revised regulations dealing
with the denial of passports to Communists.
It was decided that sections 51.135 through 51.170 of the regulations on issu-
ance of passports be reviewed and revised prior to the completion of a compre-
hensive study of passport regulations and the Executive order of 1938.
Mr. SouRwINE. I want to ask one question about this.
Senator DODD. You have identified it as a paper you prepared-a
copy.
Miss KwmnT. It is a copy of a paper I prepared, yes.
Mr. Sounwnrn. I note that there were a number of conferences
with regard to these new regulations, and I want to ask you just one
foundation question now. We can go into more detail when you
come back.
Did you, at any of these conferences, agree to or sign the proposed
new regulations?
Miss KNIGHT. No, sir; I did not.
Mr. SouRwiwn. Did you at all times make your disagreement with
thr proposed new regulations quite clear?
Miss KNIGHT. I made my disagreement with the regulations quite
clear.
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STATE DEPARTMENT SECURITY 243
Mr. SOURWINE. I want to show you another document, possession
of which by the committee may surprise you, Miss Knight. This is a
two-page paper. Have you seen that? I will characterize this, Mr.
,Chairman. This is a draft of a proposed regulation with respect to
-pass orts.
Miss KNIGHT. I don't recognize this immediately, sir. It looks as
though it might be a part of a memorandum.
Mr. SouawINE. Do you know who drafted it?
Miss KNIGHT. No, sir.
Mr. SOURwINE. And you do not recall its having been presented
at any meetings ?
Miss KNIGHT. I don't recall it; no, sir.
Mr. SOURWINE. It might have been presented and you might not
.recall it.
Miss KNIGHT. That is right.
Mr. SounwINE. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman. I had hoped that Miss
-Knight might be able to identify this document.
Let me try Mr. Johnson.
Mr. Johnson, can you identify this document-the document of
which this is a copyy ?
Mr. JOHNSON. It appears to be--I have seen something similar to
-this, very similar to this, to it. But I just can't say whether I have
seen this particular document or not.
Mr. SOURWINE. All right. You don't know what it is, then.
Mr. JOHNSON. No, sir.
Senator DODD. Do you think you have seen the original?
Miss KNIGHT. If it had a cover sheet on it-it seems to be a part
of a document. And I can't recognize it as such.
Mr. SouRwnNE. All right. Maybe Mr. Chayes, when he appears,
can identify it.
Now, Miss Knight, I show you what purports to be a copy of a
memorandum to Mr. Cieplinski from you, under date of January 4,
1962. I will ask you, is that a copy of such a memo-is it what it
purports to be? Did you write that memo?
Miss KNIGHT. Yes, sir; this is my memo of January 4 to Mr. Michel
Cieplinski.
Mr. SoURWINE. This was your protest against the new passport
regulations.
Miss KNIGHT. Yes. And I make reference to this
Mr. SOURWINE. I know you make reference to this in the statement
.you have made already.
What did Mr. Cieplinski do with this memorandum, if you know.
Miss KNIGHT. I don't know what he did with the memorandum, but
I did know that as a result of this memo, he supported the passport
office position.
Mr. SouiiwlNE. He supported your position.
Miss KNIGHT. Yes, sir.
Mr. SOURWINE. In opposition to the new regulations.
Miss KNIGHT. Yes, sir.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Did Mr. Roger Jones see this memorandum?
Miss KNIGHT. I don't know, sir.
Mr. SouRwiNE. Do you know what position he took with regard
-to it ?
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Miss KNIGHT. No, I don't.
Mr. S, orRwiNE. Was Mr. Roger Jones advised of your position that
if it was determined that a passport should be issued, or renewed for
an individual whom you knew or had reason to believe was a member
of the Communist Party, then in each and every case you wanted to
get specific instructions directly from the Secretary of State.
Miss KNIO1iT. Yes, sir. Mr. Roger Jones was advised of that,
because I told him at a meeting.
Mr. SounwiiE. And what did he say. What was his position with
egard to your position?
my position, and he agreed that he would take the responsibility of
ordering me to issue a passport in cases where the Department felt
that it had to do so under the regulations.
Mr. SouRwirE. Now, if you should be ordered in that manner to
issue a passport in a case where the law makes it a crime to issue it,
you would be kind of in trouble, wouldn't you?
Miss KNIGHT. Yes, sir : I would be in trouble.
Mr. SoURwI:4E. Have you made. up your mind what you would
do in such a case?
Miss KNIGHT. It has already been done, sir, in two cases.
Mr. SOURWINE. What do you mean?
Miss KNIGHT. Well, in my position on two passport cases, I have
indicated that I had reason to believe that the individuals involved
were members of the Communist Party.
Mr. SouRwiNE. And you have thereafter been directly ordered to
issue passports, notwithstanding?
Miss KNIGHT. Yes, sir.
Mr. SouRwlNE. And you have done so?
MISS KNIGHT. Yes, sir.
Mr. SouRwi.,rE. From whom did you get the orders?
Miss KNIGHT. From Mr. Roger Jones.
Mr. SOURWINE. By direction of the Secretary of State?
Miss KNIGBT. Yes, yes, it was worded "by direction of the Secre-
tary of State."
Mr. Souliwi-nm. So you felt that satisfied your requirement that
you have orders directed from the Secretary.
'.Hiss KNIGHT. Yes.
Nfr. SouawiNE. Now, in what two cases was that done?
Miss KNIGHT. This was done in the case of Mr. and Mrs. Duimo-
vich.
Mr. SouRwi.N . May this go in the record, Mr. Chairman?
Senator Donn. Yes.
Mr. SouRwiNE. This is the identified memorandum.
(The material referred to follows-)
JANUART 4. 1962.
SCA-Mr. Michel Cteplinski.
PPT-Frances G. Knight.
Passport Denial to CommunistR.
During and since the holidays, I have had time to read through all the papery
which have passed back and forth between the Passport Office and the legal
adviser's office, relating to the procedures on handling passport applications?
from persons known or believed to be members of a Communist organization.
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You will recall that during my absence from the office in November 1961, you
with Mr. Hickey and Mr. Johnson of my staff discussed various facets of this
matter with Mr. Chayes and other members of the legal adviser's office.
. About 2 years ago, I started working with members of my legal staff on a
comprehensive revision of the Executive Order No. 7856, dated March 31, 1938,
as well as a revision of the Secretary's rules and regulations on the issuance
of passports. When this was completed toward the end of 1959, I tried to get
it through the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, but was unsuccessful.
In November of 1960, I brought the revision of the Executive order and the
Department's rules and regulations governing the issuance of passports up to
date. In my opinion, these versions were practical, workable, and protected
the security of the United States.
When Mr. Roger Jones came to the Department, I advised him of this revision
and he suggested that it be held in abeyance until such time as the Department
could get into a study of the entire passport question. The revisions have been
in my office ever since.
On December 7, 1961, during a conference I was having with Mr. Abram
Chayes, he mentioned that he would get a member of his staff working on a
revision of the passport rules and regulations. I told him that the job had
been done and was fully documented in my office. As a result, the papers
prepared by the Passport Office consisting of a new Executive order and revised
regulations were turned over to Mr. Chayes on December 15, 1961.
Since that time, it was suggested by the legal adviser and his staff that
section 51.135 through section 51.170 of the regulations be issued separately and
in advance of a larger and complete package consisting of the Executive order
and the rest of the rules and regulations. The reason being- that the larger
package is more time consuming and there was an element of urgency in
spelling out procedures for denial of passports to Communists.
I have been advised that the proposed amended regulations received today
(January 4, 1962) comprising section 51.135 through section 51.170 have been
prepared in accordance with the interpretation of law by the Department of
Justice.
In view of these impending passport regulations and Department of Justice
interpretations, I think I should make my position clear. According to my
understanding of the law and with special reference to section 785(b) of the
Internal Security Act, It is unlawful for me or any other employee of the United
States to issue a passport to or renew the passport of any 'individual if we
know or have reason to believe he is a member of the Communist Party.
The new regulations received today state in part that "the Passport Office
shall not make use of confidential security information that is not made avail-
able to the applicant" and that the applicant "be informed of the evidence upon
which the Passport Office relied as a basis for the tentative denial ; to be in-
formed of the source of such evidence; and to confront and cross-examine ad-
verse witnesses."
Most, if not all (99.9 percent), of our information regarding Communist Party
activities is furnished by the FBI. In transmitting the information, the FBI
specifically enjoins its distribution outside of the Department of State.
In effect, then, since we cannot rely on confidential information, these regu-
lations, in my opinion, will make it virtually impossible to deny passport facili-
ties to members of the Communist Party, U.S.A., as provided by law. The only
exceptions would be a handful of Communist Party functionaries on the na-
tional level who, because of their recognized positions and operations, are more
or less impotent insofar as their subversive influence is concerned. These char-
acters are symbols or figureheads of the Communist Party and the glare of
publicity has dulled their influence to some extent.
The real danger, however, lies in the issuance of passports to the relatively
unknown, undercover Communists engaged in espionage, sabotage, and sedition.
These are the people who can and do inestimable damage to our country at home
and abroad.
This statement is borne out by the testimony of Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, the
findings of the Congress set out in the Subversive Activities Control Act, and by
numerous hearings into Communist Party activities held by various congressional
committees.
I have been informed that the legal adviser's office is expecting a letter from
the Department of Justice today defending their position and allegedly advis-
ing that the Passport Office would not be held in violation of the law if a passport
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SCURrry
Is issued or renewed for applicants coming within the purview of section 51.135
of the Department's regulations, but against whom not sufficiently publicly
known (unclassified) evidence could be used.
I do notagree with this interpretation or procedure. Therefore, I have in-
structed my staff to document every step taken regarding these individuals when
and as they become applicants. We will proceed according to the law. If it is
determined by the Department of State and/or Justice that a passport shall be-
issued to or renewed for an individual whom we know or have reason to believe
is a member of the Communist Party then, in each and every such ease, I should
properly receive specific instructions directly from the Secretary of State to do
so, since my authority in the passport area is delegated to me by him. .
Mr. SounwiNE. Miss Knight., after the Supreme Court decisions
in the passport eases, do you recall that President Eisenhower called
for congressional legislation to strengthen the hand of the Secretary-
of State with regard to his passport authority ?
Miss KNIGHT. Yes, sir.
Mr. SounwINE. What was the Department's position at that time?
Was it in favor of passport legislation authorizing denial of passports
to Communists?
Miss KNIGHT. Well, that is very hard to say, sir, because in the past
5 years there has been a great deal of shifting of setion, and
Mr. SouRwiNE. You are aware that Mr. John Hanes came u and
testified on two different occasions, and testified that the Ie islation
was urgently needed-he supported the President's position, didn't he?'
Miss KNIGHT. That is correct.
Mr. SouRWINE. Now, when did the Department's position change?
Miss KNIGHT. I don't think I can pinpoint the date ofchange.
Mr. SGUIIWINE. Were you aware that by early November of 1961, at
least, the Department, or as a minimum, the office of legal counsel of'
the Department had arrived at the conclusion that no action on pass-
port legislation was needed or desirable?
Miss KNIGHT. I have heard that.
Mr. SouRwINE. You don't know.
Miss KNIGHT. I have not been told that definitely.
Mr. SounwiNE. Can you help the committee any further with regard'
to this change in position, when it took place?
Miss KNIGHT. Well, I believe the Department's position may have-
developed from the Department of Justice interpretation of the Su-
preme Court decisions and the law. I believe that there have been,
knowledgeable persons in the Department who believed that under
the present legislation they have the authority to deny passports to-
Communists.
Mr. SouRwINE. It wouldn't surprise you, I am sure, when I tell you
I am confident that a majority at least of the Congress feels that you-
not only have authority to deny them, but that you have a mandate to
deny them.
Miss Knight, according to the committee's information, passports
outstanding January 1,1962, included 547 held by known members of
the Communist Party, of which 30 were Communist Party function-
aries. Of this total of 547 passports, 868 were valid as of the end of
November 1961, and the remainder required renewal as of that date.
Can you tell me if these figures as I have quoted them are correct
accordin to your records?
Miss KNIGHT. According to my records, those figures are correct-
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STATE DEPARTMENT SECURITY
Senator DODD. Would it be helpful if we knew when these passports
were issued originally, or initially?
Miss KNIGHT. Yes, I believe I have that information prepared, per-
haps not in exactly the form that you would wish to have it, but I have
the figures, and they could be made available to the committee.
Senator DODD. That would be satisfactory-if you could make them
available.
Miss KNIGHT. Yes, sir.
Senator DODD. What I would like to know is when these passports
were initially issued.
Miss KNIGHT. Yes, sir.
Senator DODD. As I understand counsel, he asked if they were re-
newed.
Mr. JoHNSoN. May I clarify that for the Chair. These would be
passports issued subsequent to June 16, 1958, which was the date of
the Briehl-Kent Supreme Court decision, holding that we had no.
legislative authority for the Communist regulation.
senator DODD. I see. Even so, I would like to get the figures.
Miss KNIGHT. Yes, we have that.
Mr. SounwiNE. Who categorized these 547 passport holders as.
known members of the Communist Party? Was that on the basis of'
the best information available to you ?
Miss KNIGHT. That is on the basis of the information available to
the Passport Office; yes, sir.
Mr. SOURWINE. If the committee asks you for a list of these pass-
port holders, and the dates on which they got their passports, do,
you think the State Department would let you give it to us?
Miss KNIGHT. I don't know, sir. You know, I am in trouble right
now with having violated a regulation of the State Department by
making available a document to this committee.
Mr. SouRwlxE. To this committee? What document?
Miss KNIGHT. Well, the transcript of the hearing on the Flynn case..
Mr. SOURWINE. We subpenaed that document.
Miss KNIGHT. Yes, sir. But unfortunately I didn't go through,
channels. I understand that the Department's regulations are that
the subpena has to be handled through the Legal Adviser's office. I
have the regulation right here. May I read it-because I am in viola-
tion of it, and I think I am in trouble.
Mr. SotRwlNE. Go ahead.
Miss KNIGHT. So I have some qualms about what the Department
would make available to the committee.
THE HANDLING OF SUBPENAS FOR DEPARTMENT RECORDS
No office or employee is authorized to produce departmental or overseas post
records or give testimony regarding information contained therein before a com
mitee of Congress, a court of law, or a quasi-judicial tribunal, without the specif-
ic authorization of the Secretary, the Deputy Under Secretary for Administra-
tion, the Assistant Secretary for Administration, or the Assistant Secretary for'
Congressional Relations. In the event the records contain classified informa-
tion, the security regulations contained in section 1964 shall also apply.
Mr. SoURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I would only comment with regard:
to that, that that purported regulation attempts to prohibit appear-
ances before congressional committees and testimony before congres-
sional committees by members of an executive department properly
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FPARTMENT SECURITY
subpenaed. And I think it is absolutely void. There is no power by
an administrative regulation to prohibit an employee from testifying
before a congressional commitee.
Senator Donn. Well, I quite agree. It seems so to me. But that
is a matter
Mr. SouitwINE. Who told you you were in trouble about furnish-
ing that material?
Miss KNmir, r. The legal Adviser's office advised me today.
Mr. SounwiNE. Well, Mr. Chayes is out of the city we are told.
Who advised you?
Miss KNIGHT. It was Mr. Lowenfeld, one of his assistants.
Mr. SovmwINE. In person or by telephone?
Miss KNIGHT. In person.
Mr. SOURWINE. Could you tell us about this conversation? Did he
come toyour office, or call you to his office?
Miss KNIGHT. Tell, he came to my office and part of the conversa-
tion dealt with the fact that we had made available to the committee
the testimony of the Flynn hearing. And I was told that I was in
violation of this departmental regulation, and I should have known
about it. But I just didn't.
Mr. SouitwINE. When was the regulation issued?
Miss KNIGHT. It was issued September 25, 1961.
Mr. SouawINE. Didn't you explain to Mr. Lowenfold that this has
been subpenaed as I might say, the committee has many times sub-
penaed your office for information which we wanted.
Miss KNrmIIT. Yes. But lie pointed out that the Department might
have a reason for not honoring the subpena.
Mr. SouswiNi.:. In other words, the legal counsel's office is going
to decide what the committee can get under subpena?
Miss KNIGHT. I don't know, sir.
Mr. SoultwiNE. Well, this is what you understood to be his position?
Miss KNIGHT. Yes.
Mr. SouRWINE. Mr. Lowenfeld has been asked to come before the
committee, Mr. Chairman. Perhaps we can ask him about this when
he comes.
Senator Donn. Yes, I think so.
Mr. SouRwnNE. Miss Knight, you have supplied the committee with
information which the committee requested in a formal way. I can't
speak for the committee, but I will tell you, I will be very much sur-
prised if the committee didn't support you very fully.
Miss KNIGHT. Thank you sir.
Senator Dona. By the way, who is Mr. Lowenfeld-what is his full
name and his title?
Mr. JOHNSON. I think his name is Andrea.
Mr. SOURwINE. A-n-d-r-e-a-s F. L-o-w-e-n-f-a-l-d.
Miss KNIGHT. I believe lie is Special Assistant to the Legal Adviser.
Senator Dorio. How long has he been such, if you know ?
Miss KNIGHT. I should think for about a year now. I don't know
when he came on duty, but I think lie has been there about a year.
Senator Donor. Do you know anything about his background?
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STATE DEPARTMENT SECURITY
Miss KNIGHT. No sir.
Mr. SOURWINE. Miss Knight, I want to push on, because. the time
is a little short.
Will you look at the new regulations-section 51.137 speaks of tenta-
tive denial of passports. Is this a new term?
Miss KNIGHT. No, this is not a new section.
Mr. SounwINE. It is not a new term?
Miss KNIGHT. It is not a new term.
Mr. SOURWINE. You knew about tentative denials before these reg-
ulations were issued?
Miss KNIGHT. Yes, sir.
Mr. SoURwINE. Does the law say anything about tentative denials?
Miss KNIGHT. I don't believe so.
Mr. SotlwINE. But the regulations which preceded these new reg-
ulations did so.
Miss KNIGHT. Yes, sir:
Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I want to offer for the record at this
time a copy of a one-page paper entitled "Summary of Proposed Reg-
ulations for Issuance of Passports in Communist Cases," which was
furnished to me for distribution to the members of the committee, to-
gether with a note, a copy of a note which I placed on copies of this
summary and distributed to the members of the committee. The item
itself is dated January 10. My note is dated January 11.
Senator Donn. Yes. It may be admitted.
(The material referred to reads as follows:)
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, January 10, 1962.
SUMMARY OF PROPOSED REGULATIONS FOR ISSUANCE OF PASSPORTS IN
COMMUNIST CASES (22 CFR 51.135-170)
1. Passports shall not be issued to or renewed for any individual who the is-
suing officer knows or has reason to believe is a member of a Communist organi-
zation registered or required to be registered under the Subversive Activities
Control Act.
2. A person whose passport application has been tentatively denied shall be
notified in writing of the denial and the reasons therefor.
3. A person whose application for a passport has been tentatively denied shall
be entitled to appear in person before a hearing officer in the Passport Office.
At such hearing he shall be entitled to present evidence, and to examine any
adverse witnesses or evidence. The decisions of the Passport Office shall be
based only on evidence made available at the hearing.
4. The applicant shall be entitled to appeal from an adverse decision to the
Board of Passport Appeals, appointed by the Secretary of State. The Board of
Passport Appeals shall conduct a hearing at which the applicant and the Pass-
port Office shall each have the right to present and examine evidence and wit-
nesses. Decisions of the Board of Passport Appeals shall be based only on the
record made at the hearing.
5. The Board of Passport Appeals shall recommend to the Secretary of State
the action to be taken on the passport application. In acting upon such recom-
mendation, the Secretary shall not take into consideration any confidential se-
curity information not part of the record.
6. The procedures for review shall apply also to persons affected by with-
drawals, cancellations or revocations of existing passports.
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250 STATE DEPARTMENT SECURITY
U.S. SENATE MEMORANDUM,
January 11, 1962.
DEAR SENATOR : This summary of proposed new passport regulations was sup-
plied just before noon today by Mr. Jack Leahy of the State Department, for
the information of the subcommittee. Mr. Leahy advises the regulations have
been approved by the Secretary and that it is proposed to publish them in the
Federal Register next Monday with the emergency clause which will make them
immediately effective upon publication.
JAY SODRWINE.
Mr. SOURWINL Now, Mr. Chairman, I ask that there be placed in
the record a memorandum to me from Mr. William Lowell, of the
committee's staff, under date of February 1, 1962, in response to my
oral request to him for information regarding the publication of exec-
utive documents.
Senator DODD. Very well. It may be admitted.
(The material referred to gads as follows:)
FEasuAaY 1,1962.
JAY: You asked certain information regarding the publication of executive
documents.
Presidential papers have precedence. If they are received before 12:30 p.m.,
they will normally be published in the Federal Register of the following day.
If they are received after 12:30, they will not appear until the second day
unless the White House asks immediate treatment and the Presidential docu-
ment can be squeezed into the time and space limitations of the printing job.
Regarding departmental papers, there is a lag of 4 days. Thus a document
received on Monday would be published on Thursday. Again there are excep-
tions. If earlier publication is requested, the Register will try to meet it. On
the other hand, if thereare charts, tables, or other illustrations, more time may
be required-perhaps another 3 days. Such a situation can lead to negotiations
which could result in a condensation of the document or to an overtime speedup
schedule on the part of the printer. The longer time, in comparison with
Presidential papers, is caused by the fact that departmental documents often
are much longer than those which originate in the White House.
The Register is printed by the Government Printing Office and published
(since its resumption) on a 5-day basis-Tuesday through Saturday.
W.E.L.
Mr. SotRWINE. I also ask that there be placed in the record a
memorandum to me from Mr. Sam Scott, assistant counsel of the sub-
committee, on the subject of the new regulation of the Department of
State relative to the issuance of passports.
Senator DODD. It may be admitted.
(The material referred to reads as follows:)
Memorandum to: Jay Sourwine.
From : Sam Scott.
.Subject: New regulation of Department of State relative to issuance of pass-
ports (27 F .R. 344).
On February 5, 1962, Mr. Warren R. Reid, Director of the Publication Services
Division, Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Service,
General Services Administration, Washington, DC.; made available to me his
file containing the "originals" of six State Department regulations recently
published in the Federal Register. Five of the six "originals" had transmittal
letters attached. The "original" marked No. 3 was the above-captioned regula-
tion which did not have a letter of transmittal attached. When this was called
to the attention of Mr. Reid, he remarked, "Strangely, this one has no trans-
mittal letter attached, apparently it must have been hand delivered by special
messenger." Then Mr. Reid advised that until 2 years ago his office required
transmittal letters; however, since they didn't seem to serve any useful pur-
pose, the requirement had been discontinued. But most departments and agen-
cles still continued the practice.
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STATE DEPARTMENT
An examination of the "original" No. 62 450, photostat copy attached hereto,
xevealed it was signed by Roger W. Jones, Deputy Under Secretary for Admin-
istration, and dated January 11, 1962. It was noted the signature of Mr. Jones
was in blue ink and the date "Jan. 11, 1962" was in red ink in handwriting
.appearing to be different from that of the signature.
The time-date block stamp of the office of the Federal Register stamped at
the bottom of the last page recorded the "original" as having been filed at
12: 30 p.m., January 11, 1962. An examination of the Federal Register reflected
the instant regulations were published and issued January 12, 1962, 27 F.R.
.344. It was noted the Federal Register set forth the time of filing of the regu-
lation' as January 11, 1962, at 12: 30 a.m. (obviously a typographical error).
Mr. Reid said it usually takes 2 or 3 days from date of signing in the agencies
to clear the paper-flow route before the Office of the Federal Register receives a
document of this nature, and then if it follows the normal course, about 72 hours
elapsed from the time of receipt until publication. Noting the short interim be-
tween receipt and publication in this particular case, Mr. Reid remarked, "I seem
to recall that we received an advance copy of this 'Passport Regulation' so we
could have the type set up in advance in order to publish it immediately in the
Federal Register as soon as we received the signed 'original'." At this point Mr.
Reid said he would like to call Mr. Lawshe, the Assistant Director, who was more
familiar with the details and circumstances surrounding this particular transac-
tion.
Upon being called, Mr. Lawshe came to the office of Mr. Reid and confirmed that
be had handled and was familiar with the details in this instance. Mr. Lawshe
said he had received a call from the State Department, describing it as not a high-
level call but by some clerk, saying this was not the normal procedure but an ad-
vance copy was being sent over so that the type could be set up in advance in
Corder to expedite the publication, that they would call and tell them when the
"original" was signed, and that the "original" would be sent later. Mr. Lawshe
said, however, no call was received, but the signed "original" was hand delivered
by special messenger and received at the time and date as stamped in the docu-
ment. Mr. Lawshe advised that inasmuch as the type had been set from the ad-
vance copy it was ready and was published the following day, January 12 in the
Federal Register (27 F.R. 344).
Mr. SOURWINE. I ask that there may be inserted in the record a letter
under date of January 5, addressed to Mr. Roger Jones, by Mr. J.
Walter Yeagley, Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Divi-
sion, and I will state for the record this is a photostat of the letter, or a
signed copy thereof, and this came to me in proper manner, being
handed to me by an Assistant Attorney General, in Senator Eastland's
office.
Senator DoDD. Very well. It may be admitted.
(The material referred to reads as follows:)
Mr. ROGER JONES,
Deputy Under Secretary for Administration,
Department of State, Washington, D.C.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Washington, January 5,1962.
DEAR MR. JONES : Discussions between representatives of this Department and
the Department of State with respect to implementing passport provisions of
the Subversive Activities Control Act have raised the question as to whether
or not officers and employees of the Department of State are obligated by the
=act to deny a passport where the basis for their reason to believe that an appli-
cant is a member of the Communist Party is, and must remain, confidential for
security reasons.
For the reasons expressed hereafter, the Department of Justice is of the
opinion that the State Department in denying a passport should conduct a hear-
ing based upon an open record, and that the statute does not contemplate the
denial of passports on the basis of information which cannot, for security rea-
sons, be disclosed.
Section 6(b) of the act makes it unlawful for an officer or employee of the
United States to issue or renew a passport if such officer or employee "has rea=
.son to believe" that an applicant is a member of the Communist Party. It is
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our position that section 6(b) must be read to require the officer to deny a pass-
port only where be acts on Information that Is capable of disclosure. If the ap-
plicant sought to contest the dental, he would, In our view, be entitled under the
statute to be confronted with the precise Information against him and to be
apprised of the source of such information. A proceeding that may result in
curtailment of the right to travel, and that does not afford an opportunity for
such confrontation would raise serious questions as to whether the requirements
of the due process clause were satisfied (See Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474,
486-97 (1959) ). In such circumstances we believe the Supreme Court would
hold that the statute should not, without more explicit language, be read to
authorize curtailment of travel upon the basis of secret information. Compare
id. at 506--08.
This construction of section 6(b) Is supported by an examination of other
provisions of the act. Where an organization has registered pursuant to the
act and has filed a membership list, the act affords to those on the list an op-
portunity for a full hearing to determine whether In fact they are members (50
U.S.C., see. 792 (c) and (d)). The hearing procedures Include the right "to
conduct such cross-examination as may be required for a full and true disclosure
of the facts," (50 U.S.C., sec. 792(d) ). Where the organization required to
register has not done so, and where Individual members have not been ordered
to register, the hearing procedures provided by section 792 are not available, ab-
sent the filing by the Attorney General with the Subversive Activities Control
Board of a petition seeking an order requiring an individual member to register.
Since in such cases the fact of membership will not have been determined at any
stage through a hearing, Congress must have intended that before the disabilities
of section 6 are Imposed on alleged members, membership be determined in a
hearing to be provided by the agency imposing the disability. To conclude other-
wise would be to give Congress' apparent Intention to afford adequate procedural
safeguards to those against whom the disabilities of the act were sought to be
imposed an irregularity of application not easily explained.
If we were to conclude that the Secretary of State is required to deny a pass-
port on the basis of secret Information, we would open the door to anomalous
intt?rpretation of the act. For example, a person who was found at an open hear-
Ing before the Subversive Activities Control Board not to be required to register
might, nonetheless, be denied a passport by the Secretary of State on the basis
of information not disclosed at that hearing.
Consequently, as we interpret It. the statute only requires the Department of
State to deny passports In cases In which It can, if subsequently called upon to
do so, produce the evidence upon which the denial is based at a hearing chal-
lenging the denial. It does not follow that your Deparment must divulge infor-
nmation where security interests require that It be kept secret. Such an inter-
pretation would require one to read the act as undermining the very security It
was designed to promote. Rather, where it is inconsistent with secdrity interests
to divulge information as to membership, the passport should be issued and the
information withheld. In such cases, the Secretary of State can properly con-
sider that he does not have the "knowledge or reason to believe", which the stat-
ute makes a condition for the requirement that he deny a passport.
With respect to the decision as to what evidence may properly be publicly dis-
closed we would, of course, expect to be consulted before any information derived
from this Department were made public, and would not expect such information
to be disclosed without our concurrence.
Sincerely,
J. WALTER YEAGLEY,
Assistant Attorney General,
Internal Security Division.
Mir. SounrviNE. We have another letter, signed by Mr. Yeagle, and
addressed to Mr. Roger Jones, under date of January 5, 1962.' This
is a somewhat longer letter. I ask that this also go in the record at
this point.
Senator Donn. Very well, it may be admitted.
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STATE DEPARTMENT SE
(The material referred.toxoAs as follows:)
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Washington, January 5, 1962.
Mr. ROGER JONES,
Deputy Under Secretary for Administration,
Department of State, Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. JONES : This is with reference to the letter of October 24, 1961, from
Mr. Edward J. Hickey of your Department, requesting the views of this Division
on procedures appropriate for the Department of State to initiate in consequence
of the recently activated passport provisions of the Subversive Activities Control
Act of 1950.
The responsibilities of the Departments of State and Justice in the implementa-
tion of section 6 of the act (50 U.S.C. 785), recently was the topic of discussion
at conferences attended by representatives of this Department (including the
-Solicitor General and the Assistant- Attorneys General in charge of the Office of
Legal Counsel and the Internal Security-;Division) and representatives of the
State Department (including the Legal Adviser to the Secretary). At those
meetings it was the view of the Department of Justice that since the provisions
of section 6 are now effective, the Departments of Justice and State have a re-
sponsibility to enforce the provisions.
As Mr. Hickey points .out in his letter, the Supreme Court's recent affi;rmaniee-
in the case of Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board (367
U.S. 1), has resulted in bringing into operation the criminal sanctions applicable
to section 6, which prohibit a member of a Communist organization (in this case,
the Communist Party), which is required to be registered with the Attorney
General, from applying for, seeking to renew, using, or attempting to use any
passport issued under the authority of the United States. It is also unlawful
under this section fors any officer or employee of the United States to issue to,
or renew the passport of, any individual knowing or having reason to believe
that he is a member of such an organization.
Under the terms of section 6, we think it clear that subsequent to October 20,
1961 (the date on which the order requiring the party to register became
"final"), any of the above activities, with one exception hereinafter discussed,
by a member of the Communist Party having knowledge of the finality of the
order, could afford the basis for a criminal prosecution for violation of section 6.
The exception referred to above arises out of the following circumstances:
Following the 1958 decision of the Supreme Court in Kent and Briehl v. Dulles
(357 U.S. 116), holding that the Secretary of State had no statutory basis to
deny passports to persons because of their alleged communistic beliefs and
associations and their refusal to file affidavits concerning their membership in
the Communist Party, the State Department, we are informed, issued passports
to about 500 individuals whom it had reason to believe were members of the
Communist Party. Undoubtedly, some of the holders of these passports were
lawfully traveling abroad as of October 20, 1961, when section 6 first became
operative. Since the obvious purpose of the statute is to prevent travel outside
the Western Hemisphere by members of Communist organizations subsequent to
the effective date of the statute, it is our opinion that the "use" of a validly
issued passport.by a member of the Communist Party to reenter the United
States after October 20 from a trip which was commenced prior to October 20
is not prescribed by section 6. To read the statute otherwise would be to require
such an individual to choose between violating the statute by reentry or to
forever exile himself from the country. Obviously, such interpretation could
not be reasonably placed on the statute. Any use of such passport subsequent
to October 20, 1961, by a member of the Communist Party for the purpose of
departing from the United States would violate the "use" provision of the
statute.
1. With respect to your request for our views as to what action should be
taken with regard to an application for a pa sport or for the renewal of a
passport submitted subsequent to October 20, 1961, the following are suggested
for your consideration :
(a) It is our tentative view that as a reasonable method of implementation
of the statute each passport applicant should be requested to state, in response
to questions placed on the passport application form required by the regulations
(22 CFR 51.14), whether he is presently a member of the Communist Party
or has been a member.
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(b) An affirmative answer to the question as to present party membership,
is a sufficient basis for dental of the passport.
It has been suggested that an affirmative answer would require the Depart-
ment of Justice to then prosecute the applicant for "making application" for-
a passport in violation of section 6(a) of the act, using as evidence of guilt
the honest response made to the question posed by the Department of State.
However, we cannot conclude that Congress intended to punish, under section'
6(a) of the act, individuals who perform the harmless act of simply furnishing
information which under section 6(b) of the act requires the Department of'
State to deny them a passport. The purpose of section 6 is to prevent the party
from carrying on its activities through travel of its members abroad. Penal-
izing honest responses to Inquiries designed to obtain Information enabling your
department to effectuate section 6 would to some extent frustrate rather than,
advance its purpose. Thus, despite the literal language of section 6(a), we,
can only interpret it to mean that it is unlawful for those Individuals who in:
some way conceal the fact of membership. to apply for a passport. This inter-
pretation makes section 6 more rational in Its, application and eliminates what
would otherwise be an inexplicable Inconsistency with the approach taken by
Congress in section 5 of the act, 50 U.S.C. 784, which only makes It unlawful-
for one seeking, holding, or accepting office or employment under the United
States, or employment in a defence facility to "conceal or fall to disclose the
fact that he Is a member of [a Communist] organization * ? *."' [Empbasis-
supplied.] Consequently, placing the question on the application will not In
our view lead to the potentially bizarre consequences suggested.
(c) The procedure of requiring responses to questions as to party member-
ship raises the question of what is to be done In the event an applicant refuses
to answer.
He might refuse to answer on the ground that Congress may not constitution-
ally require the Secretary of State to deny passports because of membership in,
the Communist Party, or be may claim his privilege against self-incrimination.
We suggest tentatively again that with respect to cases In the first category the-
Department of State may properly decline to process the passport application on
the ground that the applicant failed to furnish relevant Information. Compare-
In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 38, 44-45 (1961) ; Bcaan v. Board of Education, 357
U.S. 399 (1957) ; Cronan Y. FCC; 285 F. 2d 288 (D.C. Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
366 U.S. 904 (1961). Where, however, the Department of State is convinced
that applicant's refusal to answer purely is a matter of principle and that ap-
plicant Is not a member of the Communist Party we would appreciate It if the
Department of State would, before deciding not to process the application, refer
the case to the Department of Justice so that it may examine the case from a
litigation standpoint. With respect to the second category refusal based upon.
invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination, we believe a refusal to
process the application Is also justified on the ground that the applicant failed
to furnish relevant Information, despite any deterrent effect that such action-
may have upon applicant's exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination.
Compare Nelson v. County of Loa Angelca, 362 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1960).
As a basis for the above action in appropriate cases, it is advisable that the
Department of State Issue regulations to the effect that the failure to answer
pertinent questions on the passport application may be sufficient basis for a re-
fusal to process an application. This would enable you to refuse to process an
incomplete application in an appropriate situation, without requiring that you
do so in all cases.
We would appreciate having your views, as well as those of your Legal Adviser,
on these suggestions.
(d) If the answer to the question of present membership Is In the negative
but the answer to the question as to past membership Is In the affirmative, the
application form should require that additional details concerning the applicant's
cessation of membership be furnished. Here, too, refusal to furnish the re-
quested information may Justify a refusal to process the application.
(a) If the applicant denies membership In the Communist Party, and the State
Department has reliable Information to establish the contrary, an administrative
hearing on the question should be conducted. Since what is involved is the
question of curtailment of what the Supreme Court has held to be a constitu-
tional right to travel, the Information and the source thereof upon which the
Government Intends to rely in the proceeding should be made a part of the
open record. 'Compare Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496-997 (1959). The
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STATE DEPARTMENT C
questions raised by the situation in which the Department of State has "reason to
believe" that an applicant is a member of the communist Party but cannot, for
security reasons, disclose that information are dealt with in my supplementary
letter of this date.
With respect to unexpired passports presently held by member of the Com-
munist Party issued prior to October 20, 1961, we believe you should institute
withdrawal proceedings, having in mind the security considerations which are
involved, as well as the question of availability of evidence which could be
presented in an administrative proceeding. However, we, believe that it may
be desirable at this time to make requests for the return of passports now
held by key members of the party, concerning whom there wilL be no difficulty
in establishing membership in an open hearing. In the event your Department
decides to take action in this regard we will be glad to confer with you as to
the procedures for carrying out such action.
J. WALTER YEAGLEY,
Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division.
Mr. SOIIRWINE. Miss Knight, are you familiar with that letter?
Miss KNIGHT. Yes, yes, sir.
Mr. SOURWINE. Do you know about the letter from Mr. Hickey,
which the letter you now hold
Miss KNIGHT. Yes, sir.
Mr. SouRWINE. Answers?
Miss KNIGHT. Yes, sir.
Mr. SOURWINE. Now, we don't have that letter from Mr. Hickey.
Mr. JOHNSON. Sir, may I interrupt you. We have the letter here.
Mr. SouRwINE. We have asked the State Department to produce it.
Do you have a cop ?
Miss KNIGHT. es, sir.
Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, sir. Mr. Leahy called me last night, and he
gave me a list of five letters.
Mr. SouliwINE. Do you have them? You have three of them.
Mr. JOHNSON. Three of them; yes, sir.
Mr. SOURWINE. I understand two of them Mr. Leahy was not
going to be able to produce, because he said they originated at the
Department of Justice.
Mr. JOHNSON. That is right, sir. Then one letter-we have it as
December 14, 1961, and another December N, 1961-I believe the
No. 5 refers to actually the October 24 letter, which you have.
Mr. SouRWINE. All right.
Mr. JOHNSON. So we just have two letters.
Mr. SOURWINE. This letter, under date of October 24, addressed to
Mr. Yeagley, signed by Hickey, as Acting Director, Passport Office,
is the letter answered by Mr. Roger Jones' letter of January 5, the
'last letter put in the record.
Miss KNIGHT. That is correct.
Mr. SOURWINE. May this also go in the record, Mr. Chairman?
Senator DODD. Very well.
(The material referred to reads as follows:)
OCTOBER 24, 1961.
Mr. J. WALTER YEAOLEY,
Assistant Attorney General,
Internal Security Division, U.S. Department of Justice.
DEAR MR. YEAGLEY : The Federal Register of Saturday, October 21, 1,961, con-
tains a notice by the Subversive Activities Control Board to the effect that the
Board's order (docket No. 51-101) issued on April 20, 1953, requiring the Com-
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STATE DEPARTMENT SECURITY
munist Party of the United States to register as a Communist-action organiza-
tion under section 7 of the Internal Security Act of 1950 became final on Octo-
ber 20, 1961.
This action automatically triggers section 6 of the act which makes It unlaw-
ful for a member of the Communist Party with knowledge or notice of the final
order to apply for a passport, or the renewal of a passport, issued under the
authority of the United States, or to use or attempt to use a passport. Likewise,
section 8(b) makes it unlawful for any officer or employee of the United States
to Issue or renew a passport for any individual, knowing or having reason to
believe that he is a member of the party.
The Supreme Court decision of June 16, 1958, In Sent-Briehl-v. Dulles (357
U:B. 118 (1958)), held there was no legislative base for the regulations of the
Secretary of State placing limitations upon the issuance of passports to persons
supporting the world Communist movement (22 CFR 51.135). In its brief the
Government contended, In part, that the travel control statute (8 U.S.C. 1185)
was a delegation of authority to the Secretary to restrict the travel of citizens
through passport denials on grounds related to the national security In times of
war or national emergency. In its decision the Court noted, however, that sec-
tion 0 of the Subversive Activities Control Act had not yet become effective.
Since Briehl-Kent we estimate that we have issued passports to approximately
roO persons, who according to information furnished by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation are members of the Communist Party. Many of these persons
are known functionaries of the party. Many have already renewed their pass-
ports while others will have to renew theirs in order to preserve their validity.
Passports issued prior to September 14. 1W59, have an overall period of validity
of only 4 years-2 years of initial validity and an additional 2 years validity upon
renewal. Passports issued on and after September 14, 1959, are valid for an
initial period of 3 years and are subject to an additional 2-year period upon
renewal.
Recent press reports show that Elisabeth Curley Flynn, national chairman of
the party, and James E. Jackson, national committeeman and editor of the
Worker are the party's delegates to the 22d Congress of the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union presently in session In Moscow.
Under section (b) of 8 u.S.C. 1195 as implemented by E 0. 3001 of January
17, 1953 (18 F.R. 489) it is unlawful for a citizen to depart from or enter the
United States for points abroad (except generally, North, Central, and South
America) without a valid passport. Section (a) (2) makes it unlawful for any
person to transport or attempt to transport any person whose entry or depar-
ture is forbidden under this section.
The question arises as to what action we should take with respect to Flynn
and Jackson upon their return to the United States, especially in view of the
provisions of section 8(a) (2) which makes it unlawful to use or, attempt to use
a passport. ?
The Browder (Browder v. U.S., 312 U.B. 333) and Warszower (U.S. v. Wars-
zorrer, 312 U.S. 342) decisions relate to the "use" of a passport. In the
Browder case the court held that the "use" of a passport to prove the bearer's
citizenship on reentry into the United States was a "use" of the passport even
though at the time passports was not customarily used by citizens (or legally
required) for reentry. While in the Warazower case the court held that the
presentation of a passport to an immigrant Inspector on reentry Into the United
States was a "use" of the passport.
Should we authorize the immigration and Naturalization Service to withdraw
the passports of Flynn and Jackson upon arrival at a port of entry into the
United States? The passports themselves are of strong, evidentiary value.
Should similar action be taken upon return to the United States of other Com-
munist Party members who are now abroad?
We would also appreciate your views as to what action we should take with
respect to an application for a passport or for a renewal of a passport sub-
mitted on or after October 20, 1981, the date the order requiring the party to
register became final, by an Individual whom we have reason to believe, on the
basis of FBI information, is a member of the Communist Party of the United
States of America.
Sincerly,
EDWARD J. Uicaar,
Acting Director, Passport Office.
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Mr. SourwlNE. Now, this document you have handed ine is a letter
which Mr. Leahy gave you in response to our request, to be brought
up here?
Mr. JOHNSON. I got, the letter. Mr. Leahy has seen it.
Mr. SourwINE. It is in response to our request.
Mr. JoIINSON. Yes, sir.
Mr. SouuwINE. This is a letter addressed to Mr. Yeagl.ey from Mr.
Cieplinski, under date of October 26, 1961. May this go in the record?
Senator DODD. Yes.
(The material referred to reads as follows:)
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, October 26, 1961.
Mr. J. WALTER YEAGLEY, '
Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division,
U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. YEAGLEY : Your letter of October 20, 1961, to the Secretary concern-
ing the applicability of certain provisions of the Subversive Activities Control
Act of 1950 to members of the Communist Party has been forwarded to this
Bureau for reply.
The letter of October 24, 1961, from the Acting Director of the Passport Office
of this Bureau posed a number of questions relating to the issuance, renewal and
use of passports by Communist Party members. Your advice was also solicited
regarding the withdrawal of the passports of Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, national
chairman of the Communist Party and James Jackson, a member of the party's
national committee and editor of the Worker, as well as of other members of
the party who are now abroad.
Additional information which you requested by telephone yesterday has been
furnished to you. I want to thank you for your generous offer of assistance.
In turn, I want to assure you that we will cooperate fully with your office in
every possible way.
Sincerely yours,
Acting Administrator, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs.
Mr. SOURWINE. Now, you have one other document for us?
Mr. JOHNSON. That is all I have, sir.
Mr. SOURWINE. You have given us two.
Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, sir. We got this over the telephone. Ap-
parently there was confusion, because I have two dates-October
24, 1961, Acting Director, Passport Office, re withdrawal passports
from Flynn and Jackson. Then I have the same thing, December
24, 1961, E. J. Hickey to Yeagley. So I assumed they referred to
the same letters.
Mr. SouRwINE. I see. In other words, it is asked for two different
ways-identified two different ways, but is the same letter-and that
is the letter from Hickey, that is in the record now.
Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, sir.
Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I now offer for the record the text
of a letter addressed by the vice chairman of this committee to the
Attorney General, under date of January 9, 1962.
(Senator McClellan enters the hearing room.)
(The material referred to reads as follows:)
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5th STATE DEPARTMENT SECURITY
HOn. ROBERT F. KENNEDY,
Attorney General of the United States,
Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
DEAR Ma. ATTORNEY GENERAL: Information has reached me that the Depart-
ment of Justice, in a letter over the signature of Mr. Yeagley to Mr. Roger
Jones, Deputy Under Secretary of State, has, as reported to me, tentatively
taken a position which amounts In practical effect to abandonment of all efforts
to use the Internal Security Act as an effective weapon against the Communist
Party.
As I understand It, this letter takes the position that passports cannot be
withheld from applicants without full confrontation with the adverse evidence,
Including the source or sources of information. Although couched In words
ostensibly designed to protect the security of FBI files and sources, this neverthe-
less poses a threat to these very files and sources If the act should be construed
to require (as I believe it clearly does) that passports be withheld from any
person whom the issuing authority has knowledge or reason to believe is a
member of the Communist Party, U.S.A.
I am informed that the Yeagley letter does not take this position, but rather
holds that the act must be construed to require the withholding of a passport
only on the basis of evidence placed or which can be placed upon an open record,
and that the State Department has accordingly been advised that where rea-
son for believing that a passport applicant is a member of the Communist Party
is confidential or cannot, for security reasons, be disclosed, the passport must
be issued.
According to my Information, the Yeagley letter thus amounts to administra-
tive brainwashing, i.e., it purports to say that what a State Department official
knows only from confidential records or records which may not be disclosed, may
not enter Into his belief with respect to whether an Individual is a member of
the Communist Party, U.S.A.
The Yeagley letter goes further, I have been told, and Indicates that an in-
dividual member of the Communist Party, U.S.A., way not be prosecuted for
failing to register until be has been ordered to do so by the Subversive Activi-
ties Control Board after a petition by the Attorney General and a full hearing
before the Board. As a practical matter, this would of course render the act
of little value to proceeding against any substantial number of Communists,
clue to the very large cost of a multiplicity of hearings before the Board, and
the great amount of time-possibly 5 or 0 years-involved in prosecuting a case
before the Board.
In stating that the passport sanctions of the act under section G(b) cannot
be applied without granting the passport applicant a hearing, the Yeagley letter,
as reported to me, would appear to imply that no sanctions under the act can be
enforced against a member of the Communist Party, U.S.A., without a bearing
and confrontation. If such an interpretation should prevail, It Is easy to see
that the usefulness of the act would be almost completely destroyed as a weapon
against the Communist conspiracy.
These constructions of the act are substantially those advanced by Mr. John
Abt in behalf of the Communist Party, though In some respects they seem to go
even farther in the party's favor than even Mr. Abt has gone. It seems to me
that for the Attorney General, as a spokesman for the administration, to give
the act such a construction would be most dangerous from a political standpoint.
In the eyes of the public, I believe it might appear that the Attorney General
was backing away from stiff enforcement of the law. If the act is to be so con-
strued, I'd far rather see this construction placed upon it by the courts than by
a spokesman for the administration.
The practical procedure, it would seem to me, would be to proceed with a test
case in a U.S. district court, against a member of the Communist Party, U.S.A.,
who has failed to register, with a view to getting a court determination on that
point; and it policy of withholding passports from all those known or believed
to be party members, whatever the basis of the information leading to such
knowledge or belief, leaving the applicant in each case to his remedy in the courts,
where be may seek an order to require the issuance of the passport. This would
involve strong administration of the act by the executive branch, and If the con-
struction advanced by the Yeagley letter should ultimately prevail over the de-
termined efforts of the Department of Justice, it would nevertheless be clear
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that there is no softness toward communism on the part of the administration.
I am gravely concerned about this matter, which is why I have written to you,
and so bluntly. If the Yeagley letter does not represent the view of the Attorney
General or the administration, and this can be made clear speedily, I think it may
be that little harm will have been done. On the other hand, if the State Depart-
ment should issue and promulgate regulations in accordance with this letter,
even a subsequent change of policy at the direction of the Attorney General
might not be enough to avoid very serious effects, adverse to the interests of both
the United States and the Democratic Party.
All best personal regards.
Sincerely, THOMAS J. DODD,
Vice Chairman, Internal Security Subcommittee.
Mr. SouRwINE. I should like to offer for the record at this point,
for
the
new passport regu-
January 12,1962 s It deals w we ith the subject of Holmes
lations.
Senator Donn. Very well.
(The material referred to reads as follows:)
[From the McNaught Syndicate, Inc., New York, N.Y., for release Friday, Jan. 12, 19621
A LETTER TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT
(By Holmes Alexander)
WASHINGTON, D.C.
To: Hon. Roger Jones, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration.
Subject : The State Department's insecure security.
DEAR MR. SECRETARY JONES: The security system of the 'State Department
recently has been under public chastisement for security slackness, a down-
grading of security efficiency, and hence an inevitable softness-on-communism.
The American public will be even more disturbed, I believe, at the purloined
letter which I am about to reveal. It was sent on January 5, 1962, by J. Walter
Yeagley, Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division, Department of
Justice. The contents of the letter reveal :
1. An apparent unwillingness to carry out the will of Congress, which is, of
course, the will of the people.-Secretary Yeagley is a low echelon official who
can only be transmitting the administration line. He has worked out a serpentine
argument by which the State Department can wiggle out of its duty to apply the
passport provisions of the Internal Security Act.
2. Legal sanctuary for subversives.-"* * * the Department of Justice,"
writes Secretary Yeagley in a rough draft in my possession, "is of the opinion that
the State Department, in denying a passport, should conduct a hearing based upon
an open record * * *." This means, in effect, that only known and hence rela-
tively harmless subversives (but not unknown and relatively harmful ones) can
be denied their country's seal of safe conduct, known as a passport.
3. Must Congress be obeyed?-"* * * the (internal security) statute does not
contemplate the denial of passports on the basis of information which cannot,
for security reasons, be disclosed." This is the language of Secretary Yeagley
and the opinion of the Justice Department, which apparently is trying to thwart
the will of Congress--and is searching for a suitable subterfuge. In point of
fact, the statute requires a State Department official to deny a passport when
he "has reason to believe" that the applicant is a Communist.
4. Does the law mean what it says?-Section 6(b) of the Internal Security
Act plainly makes It "unlawful" to issue or ~enew the passport of a member of
the Communist party. How does the Jui9tice Department get around this?
"It is our position that section 6(b) must be read to require the officer capable
to disclose * * *" writes Justice to State. The officer of the State Department
may have top secret information that the passport applicant is as Red as
Khrushchev. But the officer cannot act upon secret information which is not
"capable of disclosure."
5. Is there a right to travel?-There is permission to travel and privilege to
travel. The United purpose, among kindred t purposes, of protecting its citizens r and their property
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anywhere in the world-but there is no right to travel, as such. Hence, there
is no "right" to demand a passport. Yet justice says to State that the passport
applicant who is denied a passport "would, in our view, be entitled under the
statute to be apprised of the source of such information." Unless the applicant
is allowed the "confrontation" by the FBI or other officials who hold top secret
information about Communist membership, the applicant Is being denied "due
process of law"-according to Justice. But since the public safety is paramount,
Justice advised State not to encourage such a confrontation. Keep the informa-
tion secret, but give the Red a passport.
6. Soft on subversives and slack on security.-"consequently, as we interpret
It," says Justice to State, "the statute only requires the Department of State
to deny passports in cases In which it can * * * produce the evidence * ^ *
It does not follow that your Department must divulge information where secu-
rity Interests require that It be kept secret ? * * Rather ? * * the passport
should be issued and the information withheld. In such cases, the Secretary
of State can properly consider that he does not have the 'knowledge or reason
to believe"' that a Communist applicant for a passport Is really a Communist.
Well, it all appears to be very legal and pious-but from where I sit, It sounds
as though the Kennedy administration was instructing Itself not to execute the
Nation's laws on Internal security. And unless our Nation develops a rage to
win the cold war, we could lose it by just such nonsense as this.
Mr. SouR.wINa. The date is interesting.
Miss Knight, have you seen that column by Holmes Alexander-
did you see it in print?
Miss K*Trcirp. No, sir, I have not read this column.
Mr. Som1wINE, You have not f
Miss KNICIIT. No.
Mr. SouRwINE. You do not know whether it came to the attention
of the Secretary of State before publication ?
Miss KNTc, IIT. No. I would not know.
Mr. Sor=RWINE. The point is, Mr. Chairman, this is for release
January 12, and was circulated at least 3 days earlier. So that this
column was available in mimeograph form around Washington at
least as early as the 9th.
Senator Dnon. That was a letter by Mr. Holmes Alexander.
Mr. SounwiNE. Sir, it is the copy for his regular syndicated column.
This is the form in which it is sent to several hundred newspapers.
Senator Down. I see.
Mr. SouRwiNF. I now offer a clipping from the New York Herald
Tribune of January 12, 1962. the title being "Pass 't Ban for Reds
Is Near Revival." I ask that- that go in the record at this time.
Senator Doon. Without objection.
(The material referred to reads as follows:)
[Frain IN, New York Herald Tribune, Jan. 12, I9O21
PA69I'onT PAN' FOR REDS Is NEAR REVIVAL
(By the Associated Press)
WARRINGTON. The State Department is about to issue new regulations denying
passports to Communist Party members for the first time in more than 3 years,
it was teamed yesterday.
It plans to Invoke the new rules first against a number of top party ofFleials and
known members after they are published In the Federal Register this week or
next.
Unlike earlier passport regulations which the Supreme Court invalidated in
1958, the new rules specifically require that the evidence against an individual
be fully disclosed to him.
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The Justice Department has ruled that if the only available evidence is classi-
fied, officials must choose between disclosing it to withhold the passport, or issu-
ing the passport to keep the information secret.
On June 16, 1958, the Supreme Court ruled 5 to 4 that the State Department lacked authorit to Briehl because withhoassports from Arst Rockwell
refused to file non-Communist eaffidavits. Psychia-
trist Walter
DUE PROCESS
Justice William O. Douglas, speaking for the majority, held that the right to-
travel is a "liberty" protected by due process of law and that Congress never spe-
cifically authorized the Secretary of State to withhold the right.
After this. decision, State Department passport officials said they had no further
power to withhold passports from Communists. It is estimated that 400 or more
party members now hold passports.
1950 ACT TESTED
When the Supreme Court decided the Kent-Briehl cases, another act of Con-
gress denying passports to party members had not yet been tested in the courts.
This was the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950 requiring Communist
organizations to register with the Federal Government.
A section of the registration law makes it a crime for members of an organiza-
tion under final registration orders to apply for, renew, or attempt to use a pass-
port. Last June 5 the Supreme Court upheld the registration law, thereby bring-
ing the passport provisions into effect for Communist Party members.
Unlike the earlier invalidated regulations, the new ones do not apply to Com-
munist sympathizers but only to members or organizations under a final registra-
tion order, which so far means only the Comm.-nist Party Itself.
(The following stories from the New York Times and the Washing-
ton Post later were ordered into the record:)
[Fro-m the New York Times, Jan. 12, 19621
RIGHT To QUESTION
To MAKE ANY PASSPORT
TRIPS R OUTSIDE UNITED D STATES ENT
COMMUNISTS ACCUSERS
To FO
(By Anthony Lewis)
WASHINGTON, January 11.-The State Department will announce tomorrow
new regulations that bar passports to Communist Party members but allow any-
one accused of party membership to confront and cross-examine his accusers.
This is believed to be the first time that the Government has provided such an
absolute right to confrontation in any internal security program. The use of
confidential information has been a characteristic of many security proceedings.
Under the new regulations, the Federal Bureau of Investigation or other secu-
rity agencies will still be able to insist on anonymity for a confidential informant.
But in such a case, the State Department will have to issue a passport to the
person accused by the informant.
ATTORNEY GENERAL APPROVES
The confrontation provision was worked out in extensive discussions among
State and. Justice Department lawyers. It has the approval of Attorney Gen-
eral Robert F. Kennedy.
Communist Party members have been free to obtain passports since 1958.
The Supreme Court then held that State Department regulations barring pass-
ports to persons affiliated with communism had not been authorized by Congress.
The new move against party members results from the Supreme Court's up-
holding last June of the Internal Security Act of 1950.
The Court said that the Communist Party must register under the law as a
"Communist-action" group. The party has refused to do so and is being prose-
cuted.
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T SF,CURITY
NONE MAY APPLY
The law of 19:10 provides that no member of a group directed to register,
whether actually registered or not, may apply for or even use a passport. The
maximum penalty for violation is a line of $10,000, 5 years In jail, or both.
To implement the Internal Security Act, the State Department will print a
warning about the passport provision at the top of every passport application.
It is also distributing signs to passport offices around the country warning that
it is a crime for Communists to apply.
Under the net, only present party membership is a reason for withholding a
passport. If any lrlssport official has reason to believe an applicant is a member,
he will Lviitatircly deny the application.
The applicant is then entitled to present any Information that he thinks shows
he is not a Communist. For example, he might produce a letter in which he pur-
portedly resigned from the party some years ago,
RPECTFIC GUARANTEES
The regulations then provide these spedlflc guarantees to the applicant:
Ile shalt be entitled to appear in person before a hearing officer in the Pass-
port Office, to be represented by counsel, to present evidence, to be Informed of
the evidence upon which the Passport Office relied as a basis for the tentative
denial, to be informed of the source of such evidence, and to confront and cross-
examine adverse witnesses. Then, the regulations say: In making its decision,
the Passport Office shallnot take Into consideration confidential security Infor-
ination that Is not made available to the applicant.
An appeal is provided to the Board of Passport Appeals, which the regula-
tions say must be convinced by a preponderance of the evidence as would a trial
court in a civil case. The Board is barred from considering any confidential
information not part of fhe record.
Finally, the Secretary of State will consider the case, and he, too, Is prohibited
from considering material not shows, to the applicant.
In contrast, the regulations upset by the Supreme Court in ID 58 specifically
provided for the department to consider "such confidential information as it
may have in Its possession."
One problem for the State and Justice Department lawyers was that the In-
ternal Security Act made It a crime for any Government official to issue a
passport "knowing or having reason to believe" that the applicant belonged to
a proscribed organisation.
This raised the possibility that a State Department official might be violating
the law by issuing a passport to an applicant against whom there was confidential
Informs lion that a security -agency refused to disclose.
The difficulty was resolved by a Justice Department ruling that a passport
official's "knowledge" about an applicant's party membership could only be
from material made available to the applicant. This position was made formal
in a letter by the Assistant Attorney General for Internal Security, J. Walter
Yeagley.
[From the Wnshington Post. Jan. 12, 1962]
NEw IIUI.ER To DENY Top RFDR PARRPORTS
United Press International
The State Department is about to issue new regulations denying passports to
Communist Party members for the first time in more than 3 years.
It plans to invoke them first against a number of top party officials and known
members after they are published In the Federal Register this week or next.
Unlike earlier passport regulations which the Supreme Court invalidated in
1955, the new rules specifically require that the evidence against an individual
he fully disclosed to him.
The Justice Department has ruled that If the only available evidence is classi-
fled or officials must choose between disclosing It to withhold the passport or issu-
ing the passport to keep the information secret.
On June 16, 11}.18, the Supreme Court ruled 5-4 that the State Department
lacked authority to withhold passports from Artist Rockwell Kent and Psychia-
trist Walter Briehl because they refused to file non-Communist affidavits.
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STATE DEPARTMENT SECURITY
Unlike the earlier invalidated regulations, the new ones do not apply to
Communist "sympathizers" but only to members of organizations under a final
registration order, which so far means only the Communist Party itself.
Mr. SounwiNE. I have asked the Department for any press release
which was issued about this matter. There was such a press release
you had on January 12. It had been supplied by the Department in
response to my request to Mr. Lincoln White. I also ask for a copy
of the transcript of the background radio 'and news briefing on Janu-
ary 12-it took place beginning at 11:10 in the morning in the State
Department-on this subject. I ask that this press release and the
text of the briefing may go in the record at this point.
Senator DoDD. Without objection.
(The material referred to reads as follows:)
[Department of State, press release No. 24, Jan. 12, 19.62]
The Department of State announced today the promulgation of revised pass-
port regulations dealing with denial of passports to members of Communist
-organizations registered or required to be registered under the Subversive Acti-
vities Control Act of 1950. These regulations are designed to implement the
act in light of the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of the Com-
munist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Board.
The regulations provide that a passport shall not be. issued to or renewed for
any individual who the issuing officer knows or has reason to believe is a mem-
ber of a Communist organization registered or required to be registered under
the Subversive Activities Control Act.
.These regulations provide further that any person to whom a passport or re-
newal of a passport has been denied or whose passport has been revoked shall
have the right to a hearing before the Passport Office, and shall have the right
to appeal from an adverse decision of the Passport Office to the Board of Pass-
port Appeals appointed by the Secretary of State. In such hearings, the appli-
cant shall be accorded the right to appear, to be represented by counsel, to pre-
sent evidence, to be informed of the evidence against him and the source of such
evidence, and to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. The decision
to deny a passport shall be based only on evidence which is made available to
the applicant for the passport.
The Department of State also announced today that It will move to revoke the
outstanding passports of certain leading officers and members of the Communist
Party of the United States. This action will be taken pursuant to the discretion-
ary authority of the Secretary in the issuance of U.S. passports, and in conformity
with the provisions in the Subversive Activities Control Act relating to passports
for persons who are members of Communist organizations registered or required
to be registered under the act. The Department is now conferring with the De-
partment of Justice as to the procedures for carrying out such action.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE TRANSCRIPT OF BACKGROUND PRESS. AND RADIO NEWS
BRIEFING, FRIDAY, JANUARY 12, 1962, 11:10 A.M., EASTERN STANDARD TIME
Mr. WHITE. Gentlemen, there has been distributed to you press release No.
24, which announces the promulgation of revised passport regulations.
I will give you an opportunity to read through this, and then Mr. Roger Jones,
the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration, and Mr. Abram Chayes, the
Legal Adviser, are here to answer questions. One or the other of these gentlemen
may want to add to the handout.
(Please refer to press release No. 24, dated January 12, 1962, which was dis-
tributed and read at this time.)
Mr. WHITE. Do you have something to add, Roger?
Mr. JoNEs. Just slightly, Link.
Mr. WHITE. Would you both [Messrs. Jones and Chayes] like to come and
sit up at the head of the table here, or stand?
Mr. JONES. I would like to come and stand for the moment.
Question. Are questions in order?
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Mr. WxurE. As soon as Mr. Jones gets the signal that you are all through
reading the handout, he wants to add a few points.
I think they are all through, Roger.
Mr. JONES. Gentlemen, and ladies, what I would like to do this morning is
to have this completely on the record for this reason: that It is quite probable that
several committees of Congress will interest themselves very much in these
regulations; they may want to have conferences with departmental officers and
officers of the Department of Justice ; they may want to talk with members
of the press, and It would be a great favor to me if, Indeed, we do get into This
position of having further discussions with the Congress, if whatever I say
here today or whatever responses I give to your questions could be a matter
of record In order that, if necessary, we can just produce it with the committees.
This is a very difficult kind of an issue, as I am sure you know. There are
two key sentences In this press release that I would like to call specifically to
your attention. The first Is at the beginning of the second paragraph:
"The regulations provide that a passport shall not be Issued to or renewed
for any Individual who the Issuing officer knows or has reason to believe is a
member of a Communist organization registered or required to be registered
under the Subversive Activities Control Act."
The next is the final sentence of the next paragraph :
"The decision to deny a passport shall be based only on evidence which is
made available to the applicant for the passport."
Consequently, the whole issue is on those, and I have reason to believe is
complicated by the nature bf the information available both to the department
and to the applicant.
Passport eases In the past, and certainly In the future, will sometimes depend
upon security information which cannot be compromised by its release either
to the applicant or to any other person. Under those circumstances, In con-
sultation with the Department of Justice, we have adopted this posture: that
we will take no action except on the basis of information which can be made
available to the applicant.
This means, of course, that if there is a case In which you have evidence of
a security nature which cannot be revealed that that evidence will not be used
In making the decision with respect to the Issuance of the passport.
This, I think, is going to attract a very considerable amount of public atten-
tion.
The Attorney General and the officers of the Department In consultation have
agreed that this is the only way that we can proceed In order to prevent the
compromise of security Information.
I think at the moment it would probably be most useful If I now kept quiet and
took your questions.
I may have to refer to counsel here [indicating Mr. Cbayes].
Question. I would like to have it explained where from comes the ruling that
the applicant has the right of confrontation?
Mr. JONES. Abe, do you want to take this one?
Mr. CuArse. Well, I Will. We examined the statute In the light of the cases
in this general area, and in the light of other provisions of the statute as well
as the Court's expressions on constitutional requirements for hearings in this
kind of case. And on the basis of a review of all these criteria, the Justice
Department and we independently construe the statute as requiring a full con-
frontation hearing.
As you know, In the Kent and Brieht cases, (Rockwell Kent and Walter
Rrichl) the Supreme Court held that the right to travel was a part of the
liberty of which a citizen cannot be deprived without due process of law.
If you look, for example, at the Greene case, there It was held that under
those circumstances, where the petitioner was an employee who had been refused
clearance in an industrial security and under the industrial security program,
it was held that he there had been deprived of liberty, and that due process
of law under the circumstances required-well, let me put it the other way
around : the Court could not uphold the nonclearance without a full confronta-
tion under those circumstances.
Sn you hnbe to look at those cases which provide constitutional background :
then you look at the act itself, and you we there that If a person-you recall
the structure of the net. The art proceeds by first requiring a finding that an
organization must register: If the organization has to register it has to file a
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STATE DEPARTMENT EC
list of members. If a person feels that he is wrongly on that list, or if the
Court feels that a person has been wrongfully omitted from that list, the person is
entitled to a full confrontation hearing before the Subversive Activities Control
Board to determine whether or not he goes on the list.
Now, then if you go over to section 6, the passport section, that relates to
people who are members of organizations required to register, and it has been
our judgment that comparing the registration provisions with the attendant
requirement of full confrontation hearings against the constitutional background
of the Kent and Briehl cases and the Greene case, and others, that the statute
must be read to require a full confrontation hearing here, and that the Supreme
Court-of course, It is always hard to predict what a court is going to do-but
in our best judgment that is the way the Court would read it.
Ned? I
Question. Well, Abe, on that point, in the decision last year on the 1959
act did the Court specifically direct their attention to the passport provisions or
did it only deal with the registration?
Mr. CHAYES. Well, let me say that that was a long and complicated decision.
There were several opinions.
One of the arguments made was that since the passport provisions came into
effect immediately upon registration the Court would have to deal with the
passport provisions as well as the registration provisions.
The Court specifically rejected that argument. It has dealt only with the
registration provisions and has specifically left open the question of the constitu-
tionality of the passport provision per se; regardless of the kind of hearing that
you get, yes.
Question. This may very well be challenged?
Mr. CHAYES. Oh, I have no doubt that the constitutionality of the section itself
will be challenged in court. And-
Question. Especially in view of the Court's 1958-
Mr. CHAYES. That's correct. That is correct. And I think these regulations,
if I may say so, will put us in a better posture to secure a favorable decision on
the constitutionality of the whole program.
Mr. JoNas. Incidentally, the regulations are in the Federal Register today,
gentlemen.
Question. In the administration of this-let's go to a passport office in New
York-and a case comes up, where is the burden of proof?
Mr. CFIAYES. Well, there are a series of stages at which this arises. Passport
application is made to a passport officer-this is all laid down in the regula-
tions-and if the passport officer believes that the section may be applicable
he notifies the applicant of a tentative denial and of his rights to a hearing.
The notification shall set forth clearly and precisely the specific reasons for the
denial, and the procedures for review available to the applicant. Then, the
applicant comes into the passport office itself and has a hearing on the denial.
That hearing is itself a full hearing. And after the applicant has presented
his case, the passport office shall review the record and advise the applicant
of the decision.
In making its decision, the passport office shall not take into consideration
confidential security information. So it then decides whether to confirm its
tentative denial or not to, on the basis of a full confrontation hearing.
At that point, if the applicant wishes he can appeal to the passport review
ooard, and the passport review board, it says, "shall be convinced by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence as would a trial court in a civil case."
So the answer to your question about who the burden is on is that at the stage
of the passport review board, where it is specifically stated, the burden to show
by a preponderance of evidence is on those opposing the application.
Question. But in the first stage it tends to be on the applicant?
Mr. CIIAYES. Well, I don't think you can say that really, because you wouldn't
make a denial unless you thought you could get it sustained.
I ought to go back-excuse me-and add one further point to the set of points
which we took into account in construing the statute to require a full confron-
tation hearing. You have to remember that this is basically a criminal statute.
While it makes it a crime for the Department to issue a passport, the basic
prohibition is a criminal prohibition. It makes it a crime to apply for or to
use the passport if you are a member of this kind of an organization. So it
is a crime.
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STATE DEPARTMENT SECURITY
Now it is perfectly clear that In order to convict the fellow of crime in open
court you are going to have to have a full confrontation bearing. I just add
that to the other points that I made in connection with the full confrontation.
Question. Abe, could you or Roger try to make this a little less technical?
In the past when Mr. Dulles was arguing his position on this thing he always
would give you 430-some people and a half who would getaway with passports
who shouldn't if they didn't have the regulations be wanted. Is there any way
of looking back at passports for the last year or two and say what percentage
you would have had to issue If the rules were dented?
Mr. CIIAYES. Since the Kent and Briehi cases, we have issued practically all
of them.
Question. I mean with respect to application of this particular type.
Mr. CIIAYES. We haven't made any investigation, because there has been since
the Kent and Brtchl cases-tbese old regulations have been invalidated and we
have been unable to deny any passports on this ground.
Question. Could you say how many either?
Mr. CIIAYES. I couldn't myself.
Question. But, Abe, isn't It-let's put the question the other way then. Flow
many passports out now are about to be called in?
Mr. CIIAYEa (to Mr. Jones). Do you want to speak to that? I don't think we
really know the number. We are going to start with high functionaries of the-
I shouldn't say "high functionaries"-the functionaries of the national party
organization, people who on the public record are-
Question. Have you got any names?
Mr. CIIAYES. No, I haven't got any names yet. We are conferring with the
Justice Department on the procedures for implementing that right now. The
Justice Department Is obviously very interested in this, because if any one of
these fellows comes back with a lawsuit they are going to have to defend us,
and they are going to have to defend the constitutionality of the act in it.
So we want to make very sure that the procedures are such as will support
the Government's ease In court if we have to go to court.
Question. This revocation doesn't get you Into a bill of attainder situation,
though.
Mr. CuAYEs. I would not think so. But I wouldn't want to express my views
on a constitutional question that will probably be Involved in the litigation on
the validity of the section.
Question. Well, Abe, Isn't the purpose of the set Itself substantively defeated
by the provision that you will not use security information?
Now suppose that In a particular case the only proof that you have is security
information. Then Ifthe purpose of the act is to deny passports to Communists
they are going to get them anyway.
Mr. JorF.M.. I think you have to kind of turn It around. The basic purpose
of the act is to enhance the security of the United States. And it can be argued
on whichever side of the coin you happen to be on, and I am quite sure will be,
but It wouldn't make a great deal of sense to defeat the security of the United
States by the compromise of security Information.
Question. Since the authorization In the act says that you shall withhold
the passport only from a person who is required to register under this act,
aren't you jumping the gun? Why don't you wait for the registration battle
to be settled?
Mr. CIIAYES. Well, It doesn't say a person who-It doesn't say a person
required to be registered ; it says-let me just read it here so I have got it.
It is 786, and it says: "unlawful for any member of such organization." So It
was argued by some-well, I take that back.
Question. Isn't the whole question on which organization should register?
Mr. CHAYES. The organization question has been settled as to the Communist
Party by the Court.
Question. The presumption, therefore, Is you will act only against members
of the Communist Party.
Mr. CHAYES. That's the only one we are authorized to act against under the
statute.
Mr. LowExsELD. So far.
Question. Can't we find out who the people are who have passports outstand-
ing? Certain leading officers and members of the Communist Party of the
United States.
Mr. CHAYES. I don't think we would be prepared to.
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Question. We can start with the two delegates, the American delegates to
the Soviet Communist Party Congress, representatives of the American Com-
munist Party on the record. Are you going to revoke their passports?
Mr. CHAYES. I have to say on these matters of the details of this program
we are still consulting with the Department of Justice and I really would not
want to go further into the problem.
Mr. WHITE. I don't think, Abe, you could possibly go into this until action
is taken.
Mr. CHAYES. That's right.
Question. Is there involved in this confrontation rights?
Mr. CHAYES. I have got counsel here, too. [Laughter.]
Question. Where did you get your law degree?
Mr. WHITE. That's all right.
Question. Why was it announced that certain leading officers who have pass-
ports outstanding are going to have them revoked? The only ones who have
got them are ones that have got them and might "fly the coop" and you fellows,
is that right? And we can't have it for the paper?
Mr. CHAYES. I would say, in the first place, that they can't "fly the coop"
because if they do they would be committing a crime, because it is a crime to
use those passports.
Question. Why don't you let them use the passports and then you can punish
them for it? This makes it a crime to apply for a passport; do you have an
opinion on the constitutionality of that?
Mr. CHAYES. I don't think I would express myself on the constitutionality
of that. The Government intends to enforce the law as written, and the court
will express itself on the constitutionality.
Question. Doesn't it follow then that for a man a member of the party to get
a test, he has to commit a crime? Is that right? How else would he get a test?
Mr. CHAYES. Well, the withdrawal program may provide a test. This with-
drawal program that we have been talking about ; If any member of the party
wishes to litigate the withdrawal.
Question. I am talking about a party member who doesn't have a passport
now.
Mr. CHAYES. If he doesn't have a passport now, he must, as you say-he must
take the risk of committing a crime in order to test the act. That is not a rare
thing in constitutional law, you know.
Question. This same Communist, I take it, can travel in Canada, Central
America, and South America where passports are not required, are they?
Mr. CHAYES. There is nothing in the law that prohibits him from doing that.
Question. And what happens if he gets "down" there and wants to go to
Europe, or "up" there?
Mr. CHAYES. There is nothing in the law-well, wait a minute.
Mr. LOWENFELD. He can only go south of the border if he does not intend to
go from there to Europe.
Mr. CHAYES. Well, if he goes, he violates the law.
Mr. LowINFELD. He violates the law and the penalty is it is a crime to travel
without a passport, except under the exceptions, which is to South America.
Question. Abe, is there anything in the present regulations which would make
it possible for the Department, if it chose, to deny a passport, say, to Mr. Rocke-
feller?
Mr. CHAYES. That would make it "possible" or "impossible."
Answer. No, "possible."
Mr. CHAYES. I don't think so ; no.
Question. What is the time element involved in this finding-is it current
membership?
Mr. CHAYES. The language of the statute in-let me read it again, because
that's the language. It is, yes, "shall be unlawful for any member of such organi-
zation with knowledge or notice that such organization is registered, or that the
order has become final, to make application for a passport."
So the time as of which membership, as of which the man has to be a member
in order to commit a crime is the time of application for use.
Question. Is it possible then for a person to resign from the party and to
apply ; and then get back into the party?
Mr. CHAYES. Well, if you present-
Mr. LOWENFELO. That would be a crime.
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Mr. CHAYES. You present a hypothetical state of facts. Let me put It this
way: If a person has bona fide and clearly quit the party, past membership
would not make this a crime or not make it wrongful to apply for a use of
passport.
Now you start asking, "Well, what is bona fide?"
Question. Yes.
Mr. CnayES. I say this: We are just going to look at this on the facts of the
cases as they come up.
Question. Well, it seems as if he intends to go through subterfuge ; then the
evidence you would have against him would be FBI evidence, which you couldn't
disclose at a hearing. So for practical purposes all the guy has to do is say,
"I left the party, try to prove that I didn't, and give me my passport."
Mr. CIIAYES, I don't think that is true, because the law really Is pretty clear on
the fact that past membership Is a basis for an inference that it continues. So the
fellow's unsupported statement that he resigned would not necessarily out-
-weigh the inference that was available from evidence of past membership.
Question. He could give you a letter of resignation pretty quickly, couldn't he?
Mr. CIIAYES. Well, all I have to say is that these are the kinds of issues that
the board will have to be dealing with in every case. It is up to the FBI or
appropriate security agency to determine whether in its judgment it is more
important to keep this-guy In the country or to keep the information confidential.
Question. What Is the composition of the Review Board?
Mr. CIIAYES. The Review Board is made up of officers of the Department ap-
pointed by or designated by the Secretary. It should not be less than three
officers of the Department, and one of them will be chairman, and there is a
counsel to the Board who presents the cases before it, and so on.
Question. Does the applicant bear the cost of all this litigation himself?
Mr. CnAyES. In our system of law anyone who wants to try a case has to
pay for it.
Question. Abe, are you taking a kind of precautionary step on this matter of
the revocation of passports when you any, "This action will be taken pursuant
to the discretionary authority of the Secretary * * *"?
That's in case the other thing doesn't stand up?
Mr. CHAYES. No. The discretionary authority of the Secretary is authority
to withdraw a passport in case he goes where he has authority not to issue it.
So that the two are coterminous, in effect. That's our position. I think it is
pretty clear that that is the case.
Question. A background question: Does possession of a passport incur a per-
son's right to return to the country?
Mr. CIIAYES. I think a person has to be a citizen to get back into the country.
If he is a citizen be can get back in. One way of proving he is a citizen is to
exhibit his passport. But I would suppose if he had other satisfactory proof
of citizenship he could get back in.
Question. Mr. Jones, has this yet been discussed with any of the committees
on the Hill?
Mr. JONES. The committees on the Hill have been notified of the regulations.
They are aware of the content of them, and of the problems which we see. It
has not been discussed in terms of what is going to happen next.
Question. Can you say bow long ahead of the fact they were notified-the
committees?
Mr. JONES. We started that process-when? Two days ago. This week.
I think It was on Wednesday.
Question. Well, I think a contention up there is the way this regulation works
out makes the law meaningless insofar as being able to bar a passport from a
Communist. I am wondering-
Mr. JonES. I have no doubt that this contention will be made.
Question. Do you feel that this is administratively effective?
Air. JONES. Do I think we can administer this act?
Question. That this will be effective in keeping passports. out of the hands
of Communists?
Mr. JonES. I don't know. Because I don't think we know yet, I don't think
anyone knows yet, the nature of the evidence that will be adducible in connection
with individual cases. You can only Infer.
Mr. CHAYES. I would state further that at a minimum it will permit us to
deny passports to more Communistsg than we have been able to do in the past
year and a half, because we have been able to deny none on that ground in the
past year and ahalf.
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Question. There is-this is not a legal question-a lot of fellows will wonder
why you don't let these people leave the country and then take up the problem
when they try to get back. There is a well-known case, as you know, of a char-
acter who was not disturbed until-apparently, he went to England, and then
we wouldn't allow him back. Why isn't that standard practice?
Mr. CIIAYES. Well, part of it is that we don't have any-I mean part of these
problems are legislative ; others are
Question. Philosophic?
Mr. CHAYES. No. Others have to do with really other agencies having security
responsibilities. We are only in this business because it happens that the Sec-
retary of State has to issue passports. And that is really the way we get into
the act.
THE PRESS. Thank you very much.
(Whereupon, at 11:38 a.m., the press briefing was concluded.)
Mr. SOURWINE. Now, the reason, Mr. Chairman, that I put this
material in is because it appears extremely likely, at least, that the
Associated Press story, which was carried in the morning papers of
the 12th in New York, was in fact taken from this press release of the
12th by the State Department. The press release wasn't given out to
the press generally until nearly noon on the 12th, long after the
Associated Press story had moved on the night wire and been printed
in the morning papers of that day, which would appear to indicate
that to certain correspondents at least this press release was given
out or leaked out the day before. And the question arises in view of
some of the statements at the press briefing whether the ]department
did not in fact have knowledge of Mr. Holmes Alexander's column,
and rush into print with this other version of the action. I think it
is a matter for the committee to consider.
I now offer, Mr. Chairman, the text of a news story appearing in
the Washington Evening Star of January 13, entitled "Senators Hit
Passport Rule as Too Soft." This refers to the reaction of certain
Senators to the new regulations. I think it probably should be stated,
since one member of the committee is mentioned here, Senator Keat-
ing, that in addition to the request of Senator Keating, which is
mentioned in this news story, other Senators also have asked the
committee to go into the matter of these regulations, including both
the vice chairman and present presiding officer, and the chairman.
Senator Donn. Very well.
(The material referred to reads as follows:)
[From the Washington Evening Star, Jan. 13, 1982]
SENATORS HIT PASSPORT RULE AS Too SOrr
(By the Associated Press)
The new passport regulation covering persons accused of being Communists
has drawn the fire of Congressmen who think the rule isn't tough enough.
It is "a step backward in the control and supervision of the Communist ele-
ments," said Senator Hickenlooper, Republican, of Iowa.
Senator Lausche, Democrat, of Ohio, declared "The order does not deal ade-
quately with the problem and legislative action is necessary."
The new regulation was announced yesterday by the State Department.
Under it, passports will be denied to known Communists but a person accused of
being a Red would be permitted to examine the evidence against him at an appeal
hearing. .
After a Supreme Court decision in 1958 Communist Party members were per-
mitted to receive passports.
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STATE DEPARTMENT SECURITY
CONTROL ACT UPHELD
But last year the Supreme Court upheld the 1950 Subversive Activities Con-
trol Act which bars issuance of passports to Communists.
The new passport procedure is based in part on that decision.
The principal criticism of the new procedure is aimed at the right given to
persons denied a passport to appeal at bearings where they can examine the
evidence and confront their accusers.
This, critics contend, will prevent use of confidential FBI material at the
hearings and thus will allow all but self-declared Communists to get passports.
The State Department's legal adviser, Abram Chayes, and Roger W. Jones,
Deputy Under Secretary for Administration, explained the new procedure to
newsmen yesterday.
BASED ON DOUBT RULINGS
Mr. Chayes said that on the basis of court decisions and on the Anti-Subversive
Act Itself. State and Justice Department legal advisers concluded that persons
accused of being Communists must be permitted to examine the evidence used in
the decision against them.
Mr. Jones acknowledged this would rule out use of confidential information
in turning down a Communist's application but said it was still better than the
situation prevailing after the 1958 decision permitting Communists to receive
passports.
However, Senator Mundt, Republican of South Dakota, said the new regula-
tion provides "nothing anywhere near the safeguards" intended by the Internal
Security Act. He said he was preparing a protest to the Justice and State
Departments.
Senator Keating, Republican, of New York, said the new procedure is an im-
provement "on blanket issuance of passports to any known Communist or traitor
who applies." But at best, he added, it is a stopgap measure. He said he
would call for bearings on the situation by the Senate Internal Security Sub-
committee.
Mr. SouRwINE. I now offer, Mr. Chairman, the letter under date
of January 16, addressed to the Secretary of State by the vice chair-
man of this committee with regard to the new passport regulations.
Senator DODD. Without objection.
(The material referred to reads as follows:)
Hon. Dssa Rues, JANVARY 16, 1962.
The Secretary of State, Department of State,
Washington, D.O.
DEAS Ms. SECRETARY: About noon on January 11 Mr. Leahy of the State De-
partment delivered to the chief counsel of the Internal Security Subcommittee,
for the information of the subcommittee, a one-page "Summary of Proposed
Regulations for Issuance of Passports in Communist Cases." A copy of this
summary was delivered to me within the hour.
Counsel was told the Department proposed to publish these new regulations In
the Federal Register on Monday, January 15, with the emergency clause which
would make them immediately effective upon publication. The regulations were
in fact published in the Federal Register of January 12, ]962.
For several reasons, which I shall set forth below, I plead with you to recon-
sider and to withdraw these regulations.
Here are my reasons for this plea :
(1) As the Department's summary points out, the new regulations set up a
procedure for "tentative denial" and grant an absolute right of hearing in case
of any such "tentative denial" and then provide unequivocally that the applicant,
at the hearing on the "tentative denial," shall be entitled "* * * to examine any
adverse witnesses or evidence." [Emphasis added.] The effect of this would
be to require a disclosure to any Communist who is a passport applicant of all
the evidence in the possession of the Department which is adverse to him. This
would Involve simply devastating compromise of FBI files and sources.
(2) The Internal Security Act makes it a criminal -offense to issue a passport
to an individual whom the issuing officer knows or has reason to believe is a
member of a Communist-action organization, required to be registered under the
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STATE DEPARTMENT SECURITY 2W-
Subversive Activities Control Act. The SACB order requiring the Communist
Party, U.S.A., to register under the act has become final. But the new regula-
tions require that decisions of the Passport Office on the issuance of passports
shall be based only on evidence made available at the hearing, and that decisions
of the Board of Passport Appeals shall be based only on the record made at the
hearing, and that in acting upon the recommendation of the Board of Passport
Appeals respecting action to be taken on a passport application, the Secretary of
State shall not take into consideration any confidential security information not
part of the record. This amounts to an attempt at administrative brainwashing.
The Passport Office, passport officials, and even the Secretary himself, are told
that they must forget what they know about an applicant if the knowledge Is
based on confidential information not placed on the public record.
(3) The proposed new regulations appear to place the Secretary of State in
an absolutely impossible position. On the one hand, he is forbidden by law to
issue a passport to an applicant whom he knows or has reason to believe is a
member of the Communist Party, U.S.A. The Secretary is the sole judge of his
own belief. But by these regulations the Secretary appears to be telling himself
that if he knows something adverse to an applicant but does not order it into the
public record, be may forget it ; or, to state it another way, that if his duty to
protect FBI files and sources requires him to keep information out of the public
record, he must issue a passport to the applicant notwithstanding the fact that
the confidential Information is sufficient .to convince him that the applicant is a
member of the Communist Party, U.S.A.
(4) At best, the new regulations appear to require that where evidence of
Communist Party membership is confidential or, in order to protect FBI files and
sources, cannot be put on the public record, passports must be issued to Com-
munist applicants. At worst, the new regulations appear to provide that pass-
port applicants shall be given access to FBI files and apprised of FBI sources
of information, but still cannot be denied passports unless all the adverse evi-
dence Is placed on the public record.
(5) By embracing fully the doctrine of the right of complete confrontation in
passport.cases, the new regulations adopt the view most favorable to the Com-
munist Party with respect to interpretation of the Subversive Activities Control
Act.
In testifying before the House Committee on Un-American Activities on June
5, 1959, Mr. John W. Hanes, Jr., at that time Administrator, Bureau of Security
and Consular Affairs, Department of State, declared :
"I can say bluntly that any legislation concerning denial of passports to com-
munist supporters would be meaningless and would not achieve any purpose if
it prohibited the Government from utilizing confidential information. Almost
without exception, dangerous cases in the Communist area involve confidential
information and investigative Sources.?. Indeed, the more recent and meaningful
our information is, the more likely it is that it has come from current confidential
investigative sources within the Communist movement."
Now the Department has done by regulation just what Mr. Hanes declared
would be meaningless and would not achieve any purpose if done by legislation.
The Subversive Activities Control Act was directed against Communist or-
ganizations. I would hope, Mr. Secretary, that in the administration of such
portions of this act as fall within your jurisdiction, you would consider it de-
sirable to enforce the act as strongly as possible against the Communist Party,
U.S.A., and members of that party. If there is to be an interpretation of the
act which gives passports to members of the Communist Party, I had far rather
see this Interpretation applied by the courts than imposed by administrative
order of the Secretary of State, speaking for a Democratic administration.
Most respectfully, I suggest that you consider simple compliance with the
law by refusing to Issue a passport to any applicant whom the issuing officer
knows or has reason to believe is a member of the Communist Party, U.S.A.,
leaving the applicant In each such-case to seek in the courts whatever remedy
he thinks is available to him.
The Secretary of State can never be criticized for obeying a court order; but
1. must say frankly that I believe that criticism will be severe and nationwide if
it becomes known the Department of State has promulgated an interpretation
of the statute under which passports will be issued to Communists.
Best personal regards and all good wishes.
THOMAS J. DODD,
Vice Chairman, Internal Security Subcommittee.
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DEPARTMENT SECURITY
Mr. SouRwiiig. I now offer the letter of Mr. Frederick G. Dutton
in reply to the letter from Senator Dodd under date of January 16.
Senator Donn. Without objection.
(The material referred to reads as follows:)
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, January 89,1962.
Hon. THOMAS J. DODD,
Vice Chairman, Internal Security Subcommittee,
Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate.
Dens SENATOR DODD: The Secretary has asked me to reply to your letter of
January 16,1962, concerning the new passport regulations.
First let me say that we regret any misunderstanding that may have been
occasioned by publication of the regulations on January 12. As I believe Mr.
Leahy of my office informed the chief counsel of the Internal Security Subcom-
mittee, the intention was to put the regulations into effect with as much dis-
patch as possible, since more than 8 weeks had passed since the entry into force
of the order requiring the Communist Party of the United States to register under
section 7 of the Subversive Activities Control Act. There was thus a period in
which persons possibly coming under the act were applying for passports with
no regulations in effect under which the Department could deny them passports.
As a matter of courtesy to the interested committees of the Congress, we gave
them advance notice and distributed a summary of the regulations. Because of
the urgency of the matter, and because of the fact that the text of the regu-
lations was not very long, it proved possible for the Federal Register to cut
the normal time between submission and publication, and to publish the regu-
lations on Friday, January 12, rather than on the following Monday.
Coming now to the substantive points which you make with respect to the
regulations, I shall take them up in order. I am also taking the liberty of
enclosing a copy of the letter of January 5, 1962, from Mr. J. Walter Yeagley
to Mr. Roger .Jones, which sets forth the views of the Department of Justice
with respect to some of the points you raise.
1. 22 CFR 31.138 states that a person whose application for a passport has
been tentatively denied shall be entitled "? * * to be informed of the evidence
upon which the Passport Office relied as a basis for the tentative denial." The
regulation does not say, nor is it contemplated, that the applicant is entitled
to examine any adverse evidence or witnesses. To give the applicant such a
right would, as Mr. Yeagley has stated in his letter of January 5, be to under-
mine the very security the act was designed to promote. If there is not suf-
ficient disciosable evidence to support denial of a passport, the consequence
would be that the applicant will receive a passport. In no case will he, or any
other unauthorized person, be granted access to FBI files or sources.
2. In stating the requirement that the decision on a passport application may
be made only on the open record, the regulations simply spell out the traditional
requirement in Anglo-American jurisprudence that a person to be seriously in-
jured by governmental action shall be entitled to face his accusers, and that the
investigator or prosecutor shall not be the judge. See Greene v. McElroy, 384
496, 497 (1959). The Board of Passport Appeals will consist of senior Depart-
ment officials outside the Passport Office who will have had no prior contact
with the case and will thus, generally. have no knowledge about the applicant
which they would have to forget. Hearing officers in the Passport Office will also
be chosen among persons who have had no previous acquaintance with the ap-
plicant's ease. There will thus be no "administrative brainwashing" at any level.
3. The inconsistency which you suggest is the result of the prohibition con-
tained in section 6(b) of the act and the requirement of the new regulations for
a decision only on evidence on the record is based upon a construction of the
words "knowing or having reason to believe." In construing these words, the
Department of Justice in the letter of January 5 previously referred to has stated
that in cases in which security considerations dictate withholding of confidential
security information from the record, "the Secretary of State can properly
consider that he does not have the `knowledge or reason to believe,' which the
statute makes a condition for the requirement that he deny a passport."
4. As stated under 1 above, passport applicants will never be given access to
FBI files and will be informed only of matters which the FBI or other originat-
ing agency agrees .may be placed on the public record. This is in accordance
with section 7(c) of Executive Order 10501 of November 9, 1963.
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It is true that there may be circumstances in which passports are issued to
Communist applicants. If they use the passports, they are, of course, liable to
criminal prosecution under section 6(a) of the act.
5. It is true that the Supreme Court has thus far reserved the question of
whether the right of full confrontation is a constitutional requirement in pass-
port cases. It is our judgment, however, and that of the Department of Justice,
that the restriction on the right to travel contained in section 6 of the Subversive
Activities Control Act is most likely to be sustained when accompanied by hear-
ing procedures which themselves are not subject to serious question on constitu-
tional grounds. We thus, believe that the regulations are not favorable to the
Communist Party, but on the contrary, will serve to strengthen the part of the
Subversive Activities Control Act within the jurisdiction of the Department of
State.
Moreover, as pointed out in the enclosed letter from Mr. Yeagley, a construc-
tion of section 6 of the Subversive Activities Control Act that did not call for
a confrontation hearing would require an interpretation whereby the sanction
of the passport sections were applied on a different basis from. that applied to
membership in an organization registered or required to be registered under
section 7, it does not seem that a sound interpretation of the act should result in
different kinds of hearings depending on whether the legal sanction to be im-
posed is registration or denial of a passport.
I do not believe that it is appropriate for us to comment on the remarks of
the Administrator, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, in the previous
administration. We do believe, however, that as officials of the executive
branch we are bound to construe and administer the law in accordance with
the advice of our law officers. This we have done in issuing the present regula-
tions.
The problems discussed above and in your letter of January 16 are, plainly,
not capable of easy solution. We trust that you will understand that we have
given them. serious consideration, and we appreciate your continuing interest
in them.
Respectfully,
PEEDEaaox G. DurroN, Assistant Secretary.
Enclosure from Mr. J. Walter Yeagley.
Mr. SOURWINE. Miss Knight, did you have anything to do with
preparing this letter?
Senator DoDD. This is the Dutton letter?
Mr. SOURwINE. That is right.
Miss KNIGHT. I have never seen this letter before.
Mr. SomRwINE. Mr. Johnson, did you have anything to do with
preparing this letter?
Mr. JOHNSON. No, sir. Absolutely not.
Mr. SouxwINE. Well, I can't examine you about the letter if you
had nothing to do with preparing it.
Senator DoDD. Have you ever seen it before?
Miss KNIGHT. No, sir, I have never seen the letter. I had no knowl-
edge of it.
Senator DoDD. Mr. Johnson.
Mr. JOHNSON. No, sir.
Mr. SOURWINE. I have analyzed this letter, Mr. Chairman. There
are a number of questions I want to ask about it. Since Miss Knight
is coming back, I think with the Chair's permission I will reserve
these, and I will segregate them into those questions which concern
the activity of the Passport Office generally, which she could answer,
and the questions about the letter, and we will ask the letter questions
of Mr. Chayes and Mr. Lowenfeld.
Senator DoDD. Very well. Has that been put in the record?
Mr. SOUnwINE. The letter itself has gone in the record. This is a
copy which I am retaining. The original has gone to the reporter
to go in the record.
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Miss KNIGHT. May I see the letter again, so we could identify it and
I could get a copy of it.
Thank you.
Mr. SounwuNE. I now offer, Mr. Chairman, a copy of a press release
issued by the office of Senate Mundt for morning papers of January
18.
Senator DODD. Very well.
(The material referred to reads as follows:)
[Press release from oftlee of Senator Karl E. Mundt, Republican, of South Dakota, Wash-
ington, D.C., for release Thursday morning, Jan. 18, 19621
Following is a copy of a letter Senator Karl E. Mundt, Republican, of South
Dakota, is sending Wednesday, January 17, to Secretary of State Dean Rusk,
concerning the new passport regulations Issued by the Department of State.
Senator Mundt's interest in these regulations stems from his work as a coauthor
of the Internal Security Act of 1950 (the first 17 sections were Initially presented
as the Mundt-Nixon bill) which Is to be implemented by these regulations. A
similar letter Is also being sent to Attorney General Robert Kennedy. The let-
ter follows :
Hon. DEAN Russ, JaxveaY 17,1962.
Secretary of State,
Department of State, Washington, D.O.
DEAR Ms. SecaETARY : This letter concerns the regulations recently promul-
gated by the Department of State, establishing the administrative procedures
for the denial of U.S. passports to members of the Communist Party.
I have carefully studied these regulations as they appeared in the Federal
Register for January 12, 1962, and I am obliged to state that I view their final
adoption with grave concern. My concern centers on that portion of section
51.138, which provides that an applicant, who contests a tentative denial of a
passport, shall be fully informed as to the sources of adverse evidence and
granted the right to confront and cross-examine all adverse witnesses.
While I am fully aware of the infinite Importance attaching to the coordinate
rights of confrontation and cross-examination in criminal proceedings, under our
Anglo-American legal system, I am, nevertheless, dubious as to the feasibility of
making a strict transference of these rights to administrative proceedings, espe-
cially when national security is at Issue. I am certain that many occasions will
arise when the FBI, the CIA, and other Intelligence agencies will understanda-
bly be strongly opposed to disclosing the Identity of sensitively placed confiden-
tial informants; and if the testimony of these Informants had determinative
weight In the consideration of a passport application, the newly promulgated
regulations will have the effect of compelling Issuance of a passport to an In-
dividual, whom the Passport Office knows or has reason to believe Is a mem-
ber of the Communist Party. In matters involving our national security it Is
my earnest conviction that the Federal Government should not be compelled
into the position of having to choose between two alternative courses of action,
when both are inimical to our Nation's best interests.
This matter is further complicated by the fact that under the Internal Security
Act of 1850 It is unlawful for any officer of the United States to Issue a passport
to an individual, whom that officer knows or hasreason to believe is a member
of an organization which is registered or under final orders to register in accord-
ance with the registration requirements of that act.
It would seem that the newly promulgated regulations will place in an Im-
possible legal circumstance those officers In the Department of State, who are
responsible for passport issuance. Recognizing that the intelligence and inves-
tigative agencies will be unwilling to Identify valuable confidential Informants,
will these State Department officers henceforth refuse to read confidential inves-
tigative reports for fear'of gaining knowledge which might at some future date
make it unlawful for them to approve the Issuance of a U.S. passport? If this
will be the result (and I do not see how such a result can be avoided under the
new regulation) should we not then turn the responsibilities for passport Issu-
ance over to a room full of clerk-typists thus stripping away any and all pretense
of a security system, which in fact will not exist?
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STATE DEPARTMENT SECURITY
Had this strange and irreconcilable conflict between statute and regulation
come about through inadvertence or honest mistake, my concern would be mini-
mal. But since the regulations in question were specifically drafted to imple-
ment the statutory commands of the internal Security Act of 1950, it must be
assumed that this conflict is not the byproduct of haste or inadvertence but
Instead is the calculated end product of forethought and premeditation. As the
coauthor of the first 17 sections of the Internal Security Act of 1950 (initially
presented as the Mundt-Nixon bill) I view with grave concern the final adoption
of these regulations, which render inoperable the passport security features of
the act ; and I, therefore, urgently request that you provide me with a detailed
explanation of the legal reasoning which prompted the Department of State to
issue these regulations in their present form.
Assuring you that your early attention in this matter will be deeply appre-
ciated, and with warmest personal regards, I am,
Cordially yours, KARL E. MUNDT, U.S. Senator.
Mr. SouRWINE. I now offer, Mr. Chairman, a copy of the bill, S. 2095,
of the 86th Congress, and I want to explain that this bill introduced
is referred to another committee than the Judiciary, but since the
Judiciary Committee itself is free at any time to make legislative
recommendations, eitherto the Senate or any of its sister committees
it seems to counsel proper that we might have in our record a text of
the bill which represented an effort nearly 3 years ago to solve the
problem of passport control from the security standpoint.
Senator DoDD. Very well. Without objection.
;(The material referred to reads as follows:)
[S. 2095, 88th Cong? 1st secs.] Pass A BILL To establish a United States for other rt within the Department of State,
and Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States
of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the "Passport
Reorganization Act of 1959".
TITLE I-ESTABLISHMENT OF THCUE STATES PASSPORT
SERVI
SEC. 101. There is hereby established in the Department of State an agency
to be known as the "United Service" wh1ch shall
accordance
co rdance
who shall be appointed by the Secretary of State In
Director with
the civil service laws, and whose position shall be allocated to grade 18 of the
General Schedule as prescribed in the Classification Act of 1949, as amended.
The Service shall be under the immediate jurisdiction of the Deputy Under
Secretary of State for Administration.
SEC. 102. All functions, powers, duties, and authority of the Passport Office
of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, Department of State, together
with those funds, liabilities, commitments, authorizations, allocations, personnel,
properties, and records of the Department of State which the Secretary shall
determine to be primarily related to and necessary for, the exercise of such
functions, powers, duties, and authority, are hereby transferred to the Service.
SEC. 103. The Director of the Service may appoint passport agents within the
United States and such appointments shall be under the civil service laws. Pass-
port agents and such other officers and employees of the Service as may be desig-
nated in writing by the Director for that purpose may, in connection with their
official duties, administer to or take from any person an oath, affirmation,
affidavit, or deposition.
SEC. 104. The Service shall be responsible for the administration m nistaand control and
regulations relating to the nationality, protection,
international travel of nationals of the United States. The Service shall direct
and coordinate the work of the Foreign Service in those fields.
Src. 105. The Secretary shall administer the provisions of this Act through
the Service ; except that the functions vested in the Secretary by sections 208,
302 (c), 304, and 402 shall not be delegated to any other person.
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TITLE II-PASSPORT ISSUANCE AND FEES
SEC. 201, The Secretary for and on behalf of the United States may grant,
issue, renew, or revoke passports in the United States and cause passports to be
issued, renewed, or revoked outside the United States by (1) diplomatic repre-
sentatives of the United States, (2) such consuls general, consuls, or vice-
consuls when In charge, as the Secretary may designate, and (3) the chief or
other executive officer of any Territory or possession of the United States.
Sec. 202. Before a passport Is issued to any person by or under authority
of the United States, such person shall subscribe to and submit a written ap-
pilcation, duly verified by his oath or affirmation before a person authorized
to take passport applications containing a true recital of each and every matter
of fact which may be required by law or by any rules authorized by law to be
stated as a prerequisite to the issuance of any such passport.
SEC. 203. There shall be collected and paid Into the Treasury of the United
States quarterly a fee of $2 for executing such application for a passport and
$9 for each passport Issued: Provided, That nothing contained herein shall be-
construed to limit the right of the Secretary by*regulation to authorize the reten-
tion by State officials of the fee of $2 for executing an application for a pass-
port. No fee shall be collected for passports issued to officers or employees of
the United States proceeding abroad in the discharge of their official duties, or
to members of their Immediate families, accompanying or residing with theca
abroad, or to seamen or to air crewmen or to widows, children, parents, brothers,
and sisters of American soldiers, sailors, or marines, buried abroad whose jour-
ney Is undertaken for the purpose and with the intent of visiting the graves of
such soldiers, sailors, or marines, which facts shall be made a part of the applica-
tion for the passport.
SEC. 204. Whenever a fee Is erroneously charged and paid for the Issuance
of a passport to a person who is exempted from the payment of such a fee by
section 203 of this Act, the Department of the Treasury is authorized to refund
to the person who paid such fee the amount thereof upon proper notice from the
Service.?
See. 205. Whenever the appropriate officer within the United States of any
foreign country refuses to visa a passport issued by the United States, and there
Is a request In writing accompanied by return of the unused passport within sir
months from the date of Issue, the Department of the Treasury is authorized
to refund to the person to whom the passport was issued the fee of $9 upon proper
notice from the Service.
SEC. 206. All persons who shall be authorized to grant, issue, renew, or verify
passports, shall make return of the same to the Secretary, in such manner and
as often as be shall require. Such returns shall specify the names and all other
particulars of the persons to whom the same shall be granted, issued, renewed,
or verified, as embraced In such passports.
SEC. 207. The validity of a passport shall be limited to an initial period of
three years. A passport may be renewed for an additional period of two years,
upon the payment of a fee of $5. The final date of expiration of a passport,
however, shall be not more than five years from the original date of Issue.
SEC. 208. Notwithstanding any other provisions of this title, the Secretary
may. under such regulations as he shall prescribe, provide for the issuance of
special passports for the use of persons going abroad on official business for the
Government of the United States.
SEC. 209, Except as otherwise provided by the Secretary and subject to such
limitations and exceptions as the Secretary may authorize and prescribe, no
national of the United States shall travel to or in a foreign country without a
passport.
TITLE III--ELIGIBILITY FOR PASSPORT; TRAVEL LIMITATIONS
SEC. 301. Passports shall be granted and issued to nationals of the United
States making proper application therefor who are not ineligible under the pro-
visions of this title.
See. 302. (a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), a passport shalt
not be granted and Issued to-
(1) any person under Indictment or Information for a felony ;
(2) any person owing money to the Government of the United States;
for previous transportation back to the United States;
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(3) any person under restraint pursuant to an order or decree entered
by a Federal or State court of record ; before any Federal or
(4) any person who is under subpena to appear State court, or before any congressional committee, or any committee of
the legislature of any State ;
(5) any person who is a member of the communist Party or a member
of any organization which has been finally ordered by the Subversive Activ-
ities Control Board to register, or has terminated such membership under
such circumstances as to reasonably support the conclusion that he con-
tinues to act in furtherance of the interests and under the discipline of the
Communist Party or such organization ; or
(6) any person, not included in any of the foregoing categories, if there
are reasonable grounds for believing that the travel abroad of such person
or his activities abroad will violate the of subsection the a)United this States. the
(b) For the purposes of paragraph (5) of
-term "Communist Party" shall have the meaning ascribed to such term in sec-
tion 4 (b) of the Communist Control Act of 1954. For the purpose of determin-
ing membership of any person in the Communist Party consideration shall be
given to the factors listed in section 5 of such Act.
(c) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Secretary may issue a
passport to any person otherwise ineligible under this section if he shall deter-
mine that peculiar circumstances exist in the case of such person making such
action consistent with the national interest. Such passport may be limited with
respect to duration and areas for which it is valid.
SEC. 303. A passport may be revoked in any case.where the holder thereof
falls within one or more of the categories enumerated in section 302(a).
SEC. 304. (a) Whenever the Secretary shall determine that-
(1) hostilities are threatened or are occurring in any country or area; or
(2) the Government of the United States is unable to provide adequate
protection to United States citizens traveling in any country or area ; or
(3) citizens of the United States are being wrongfully detained in any
country ; or
(4) a limitation on travel of United States citizens in any country or
area would serve as a deterrent to aggression ; he may, in accordance with
regulations prescribed him, liit the validity
to l which such passport
than any country or area with determination has
been made.
(b) The Secretary may by regulation except from any general limitation on
the travel of citizens in a particular country or area, prescribed under subsec-
tion (a), certain classes of persons whose vocations make such exception neces-
sary or desirable in the national interest.
(c) No person who holds a passport, or is included in the passport of another,
shall violate any regulation prescribed by the Secretary under this section.
TITLE IV-PROCEDURE FOR DENIAL OR REVOCATION OF PASSPORT
AND REVIEW THEREOF
SEC. 401. Before any application for a passport shall be tentatively denied,
the Director shall, within sixty days after receipt of the completed application,
give notice in writing to the affected person setting forth clearly and concisely
the reasons for the proposed denial. A hearing, upon request, shall be promptly
granted before a hearing officer of the Service. At the hearing, which shall be
informal, the person requesting the same shall be entitled to appear in person,
be represented by counsel, offer. oral or documentary evidence, examine all evi-
dence which is part of the open record, and receive a copy of the transcript of
the proceedings. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Director shall promptly
decide, on the basis of the hearing record, whether or not the passport should
be denied. The decision of the Director shall be forthwith communicated to
the affected person in writing, and, if adverse, shall set forth the reasons
therefor, and advise such person of his right to obtain a review of the decision
by the Passport Review Board. If the decision is based in whole or in part
on classified information a fair resume of such information shall be made a
part of the open record subject to the provision in Section 404 of this Act.
SEC. 402. (a) There is hereby established in the Department of. State a Pass-
port Review Board (hereinafter referred to as the "Board") which shall be
composed of five members to be appointed by the Secretary. No person
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(b STATE DEPARTMENT SECURITY
appointed to the Board shall be connected in any way with the Service. The
Secretary shall, at the time of appointment, designate one member to serve as
Chairman. The Board may, with the approval of the Secretary, appoint such
clerical and technical assistants as it may require.
(b) Any person who has been denied a passport, after a hearing under
section 401 may, within sixty days after notification of such denial, file with
the Board a petition to review the decision resulting in such denial. Any
petition duly filed hereunder shall he promptly granted by the Board and a
time for a bearing of the matter shall be set at the earliest practicable date.
Upon the granting of any such petition the Board shall notify all parties in
interest of the time set for bearing, and upon receipt of such notice the Director
shall cause the record upon which the order of denial was based to be filed with
the Board.
(c) Proceedings before the Board shall be In accordance with regulations
prescribed by the Board, with the approval of the Secretary, which regulations
shall Include the following requirements:
(1) The petitioner shall have the privilege of being represented by
counsel.
(2) The petitioner shall have a reasonable opportunity to present all
Information relevant and material to his case, Including testifying in his
own behalf, presenting witnesses, and offering other evidence. If any wit-
ness whom the petitioner wishes to call is unable to appear personally, the
Board may, in its discretion, accept an affidavit by him or order that his
testimony be taken by deposition. Such deposition may be taken by any
person designated by the Board and such designee shall be authorized to
administer oaths for the purpose of any such deposition.
(3) A complete transcript shall be made of proceedings before the Board,
and such transcript shall constitute a permanent part of the record of any
such proceedings. Upon request the petitioner or his counsel shall be
furnished a copy of the transcript and each witness shall have the right
to inspect the transcript of his own testimony.
(4) Attendance at hearings before the Board shall be restricted to such
persons as may be concerned with the case under consideration, including
the petitioner, his counsel, the witnesses, and the official stenographers.
Witnesses shall be present only while actually giving testimony.
(5) The petitioner may, at any time during the proceedings, address a
request In writing to the Board for such additional Information or explana-
tion as may be necessary for the preparation of his case. The Board shall
pass promptly anti finally upon any such request and advise the petitioner
of its decision.
(d) In proceedings under this section the Board may administer oaths, present
and receive evidence, and Interrogate, examine, and cross-examine the petitioner
or witnesses. It shall be the duty of the Board to assure the petitioner of a com-
plete and fair consideration of his case. In determining whether there is substan-
tial evidence supporting the denim or revocation of a passport, the Board shall
consider the entire record and such Information of the type described in section
404 of this title as it may have received. The Board shall take Into consideration
the Inability or the petitioner to challenge Information of which be has not been
advised in full or In detail, or to attack the credibility of information which has
not been disclosed to Jilin. Formal rules of evidence shall not apply in proceedings
under this section ; except that reasonable restrictions shall be Imposed by the
Board as to the relevancy, competency, and materiality of evidence Introduced
In the proceedings.
(e) Upon the conclusion of a proceeding under this section, the Board shall
transmit its findings and recommendations to the Secretary. Upon the basis of
such findings and recommendations, and after review of the entire record, the
Secretary shall affirm or reverse the action resulting In the denial or revocation
of passport. The decision of the Secretary shall be final and the petitioner shall
be promptly notified In writing.
(f) The United States District Court for the District of Columbia shall have
jurisdiction to review any final determination of the Secretary of State under this
title to determine whether there has been compliance with the provisions of this
Act and of any regulations Issued thereunder. In any such proceedings the court
shall have power to determine whether any findings which are stated to be based
upon the open record are supported by the evidence contained in that record, or,
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STATE DEPARTMENT SECURITY
in the case of a resume of evidence which was not made a part the the open of record
in conformity with section 401 of this title, are supported
evidence.
SEC. 403. Except for action taken by reason of ngn-citizenship or action taken
under the provisions of Section 304 of this Act, the provisions of section 401 and
402 shall apply in any case where the person affected takes issue with the action
of the Secretary in granting, issuing, limiting, extending, renewing, or revoking,
or in any other fashion or degree affecting the ability of such person to receive or
use a passport.
SEC. 404. Nothing'contained In his title shall require the disclosure of informa-
tion affecting the national security, or of investigative sources or methods.
TITLE V-AMENDMENTS TO TITLE 18, UNITED STATES CODE
SEC. 501. (a) Chapter 75 of title 18, United States Code, Is amended by adding
at the end thereof a new section as follows :
1547. Travel without passport or in countries In which passport is not valid;
failure to surrender passport
"Whoever, being required by law to have a passport issued under the authority
of the United States for the purpose of travel in or to a foreign country, shall
knowingly (1) travel In or to such country without a passport duly issued under
such authority, or (2) travel in or to a country with respect to which such pass-
port Is not valid ; or
"Whoever, holding a passport issued under the authority of the United States
which has been tentatively or finally revoked, shall refuse upon proper demand
to surrender the same-
"Shall be fined not more than $1,000 or Imprisoned not more than one year,
or both."
(b) The analysis to chapter 75 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by
adding at the end thereof a new item as follows :
"1547. Travel without passport or in countries in which passport is not valid; failure to
surrender passport."
TITLE VI-LAWS REPEALED : EFFECTIVE DATE
SEC. 601. (a) The following Acts or parts of Acts and all amendments thereto
are repealed:
(1) Sections 1, 2, and 3 of the Act of July 3, 1926 (22 U.S.C. 211a, 217a,
214a).
(2) Sections 1, 2, and 4 of the Act of June 4, 1920 (22 U.S.C. 214, 215,
216).
(3) Section 1 of title IX of the Act of June 15, 1917 (22 U.S.C. 21-3).
(4) Sections 4076 and 4077 of the Revised Statutes (22 U.S.C. 212, 218).
(b) All other laws, or parts of laws, in conflict or inconsistent with this
Act are, to the extent of such conflict or inconsistency, repealed.
SEC. 602. This Act shall take effect on the sixtieth day after the date of its
TITLE VII-DEFINITIONS
SEC. 701. As used in this Act, the term-
(1) "Director" means the Director of the United States Passport Service,
established pursuant to section 101 of this Act ;
(2) "Service" means the United States Passport Service ;
(3) "Secretary" means the Secretary of State;
(4) "Passport" means the document which is issued by the Government of
the United States to a national of the United States, for the purpose of (A)
identifying the bearer and his nationality, (B) indicating that the bearer Is
entitled to receive the protection and good offices of the American diplomatic
and consular officers in those countries abroad in which the bearer proposes to
travel or sojourn, and (C) requesting that the officials of such countries permit
the bearer to travel or sojourn in their territories and, in case of need, to give
him all lawful aid and protection; and
(5) "National of the United States" means (A) a citizen of the United States,
or (B) a person who, though not a citizen of the United States owes permanent
allegiance to the United States.
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STATE DEPARTMENT SECURITY
Mr. SOLTIAVINE. Similarly, an effort this year-I offer for the rec-
ord the bill II.R. 9754, introduced by Congressman Francis Walter,
,January 18, 19G2, and his press release issued in connection therewith.
Senator Donn. Very -vell. W ,'itltout objection.
(Tito material referred to reads as follows:)
STATEMENT BY CONGRESSMAN FRANCIS El. WALTER, CHAIRMAN, HOUSE COMMITTEE
oN UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES, JANUARY 18, 1962
I Introduced today a bill spelling out a review procedure under which the De-
partment of State may consider appeals from rulings under which passports are
denied to Communists and members of Communist organizations pursuant to
section 6 of the Internal Security Act of 19u4. Since the Supreme Court of the
United States rendered Its decision in the Communist Party case on June 5, 1961,
that law is In effect.
The urgent need for this legislation Is stressed by the fact that the Depart-
ment of State, without consultation with appropriate committees of the Con-
gress, has seen fit to issue, on January 12, 1962, regulations nullifying the law
and facing the Government of the United States with the problem of either per-
mitting the Communists and their attorneys to rifle freely the confidential files
of the FBI, the CIA, and other investigative agencies, or to obtain passports not-
withstanding the prohibition now in effect. The Committee on Un-American
Activities recommends In this instance that the Congress shall lay down a pro-
cedure, which the Department of State has neglected to do, Implementing the
statutes as written by Congress and now in force.
My bill specifically requires the applicant seeking a passport to submit a writ-
ten application under oath with respect to his membership In such Communist
organizations as specified in section 6, subsection (a) of the Internal Se-
curity Act. This in fact amount$ to nothing more than a restatement of existing
law in force under the act of June 15, 1917 (22, U.S.C. 213), but which the
Department of State has deliberately ignored, and In effect annulled, In Its reg-
ulations recently promulgated.
Under this bill, an applicant who is refused a passport for reasons other than
that he failed to submit the sworn statement above referred to, will be able to
file a motion for review and be heard by a special review officer, who Is pro-
hibited from having participated in investigative functions or in any proceed-
ings connected with the original refusal of a passport to the person requesting
review. The applicant will be entitled to submit evidence pertinent to the mat-
ter and appear at hearings, accompanied by counsel if he so desires, and receive
such additional information or explanation as may be necessary for the prepa-
ration of his case before the special review officer. Moreover, all review pro-
ceedings will he conducted in such manner as to protect from disclosure all in-
formation affecting the national security, safety, and public interest, or tending
to compromise investigative sources and methods.
A special review officer who conducts the bearing will not be entitled to make
the decision as to the issuance or refusal of a passport. Instead the bill imposes
upon him the duty promptly to submit his recommendation to the Secretary of
State, whose decision will be final.
[11.It. 97154, 87th Cong., 2d seas.]
A BLLL To amend section G. title I. of the Internal Security Act of 19150, as amended
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled, That section 6, title I, of the Internal
Security Act of 1950, as amended, Is hereby amended by adding the following:
"(c) As used in this subsection-
"(1) The term 'applicant' means a person who has made application for a
passport in accordance with section 1 of title IX of the Act of June 15, 1917
(22 U.S.C. 218).
"(2) The term 'special review officer' means any officer of the Department
of State whom the Secretary of State deems specifically qualified to conduct
proceedings, prescribed by this subsection and who is selected and designated
by the Secretary of State, individually or by regulation, to conduct such proceed-
ings. Such special review officer shall he subject to such supervision and shall
perform such duties, not ineonsistent with this section, as the Secretary of State
shall prescribe.
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STATE DEPARTMENT SECURITY G28
"(3) Before any passport is issued or renewed to any person, the Secretary
of State shall, in the application therefor, require such person to subscribe,
under oath or affirmation, to a statement with respect to his membership in such
Communist organizations as specified in subsection (a). Should such person
fail or refuse to subscribe to such statement, the application for such passport
or renewal thereof shall, by reason thereof, be denied forthwith without further
proceedings or review. It shall be unlawful for any officer or employee of the
United States to issue or renew a passport in the absence of such statement.
"(4) Any applicant who, for reasons other than that he has failed or refused
to subscribe to the statement required in paragraph (3) preceding, has been
refused a passport or the renewal or extension thereof, or has a passport with-
drawn, canceled, or revoked, or has a passport restricted or limited, except
in a manner applicable to all applicants, may within six months after notifica-
tion of such action by the Secretary of State submit to the Secretary of State
a motion in writing for a review before a special review officer, and any such
applicant shall be advised of his right to make such motion.
"(5) It shall be the duty of the Secretary of State to refer any motion for a
review made under paragraph (4) of this subsection to a special review officer.
In any case in which the Secretary of State believes that such procedure would
be of aid in making a determination, he may direct, specifically or by regulation,
that an additional officer of the Department of State shall be assigned to present
the evidence on behalf of the Government, and In such case such additional officer
shall have authority to present evidence, and to interrogate, examine, and cross-
examine the applicant or the witnesses. Nothing in the preceding sentence shall
be construed to diminish the authority conferred upon the special review officer
conducting proceedings under this subsection.
"(6) A special review officer shall conduct proceedings under this subsection
for the purpose of submitting to the Secretary of State a recommendation as to
what action should be taken upon the passport application under review. The
special review officer shall communicate his recommendation to the Secretary of
State with the least possible delay and the decision of the Secretary of State
shall be final. Such decision shall be notified to the applicant by the Secretary
of State in writing.
"(7) No special review officer shall conduct a proceeding in any case under
this section in which he shall have participated in investigative functions or in
which he shall have participated in the original refusal to issue, renew, or extend
a passport, or in the original action of withdrawal, cancellation, revocation,
limitation, or restriction of a passport. All testimony shall be given under oath
or affirmation. The special review officer may administer oaths, present and
receive evidence, interrogate, examine, and cross-examine the applicant or
witness.
"(8) Proceedings before a special review officer acting under the provisions
of this subsection shall be in accordance with such regulations, not inconsistent
with this section, as the Secretary of State shall prescribe, which regulations
shall include requirements that-
"(A) the applicant shall be given notice, reasonable under all the cir-
cumstances, of the reasons for the original action taken on his application
and of the time at which the proceedings will be held ;
"(B) the applicant shall have the privilege of being advised, assisted, or
represented (at no expense to the Government) by counsel;
"(C) the applicant shall have a reasonable opportunity to present all
Information relevant and material to the formulation of the special review
officer's recommendation in his case. The applicant may address a request
in writing to the special review officer fon such additional information or ex-
planation as may be necessary for the preparation of the hearing before the
special review officer. The special review officer shall pass promptly and
finally upon such request and advise the applicant of his decision ;
"(D) the applicant may testify in his own behalf, present witnesses, and
offer other evidence. If any witness whom the applicant wishes to call is
unable to appear personally, the special review officer may, in his discretion,
accept an affidavit by him or order that his testimony be taken by deposition.
Such deposition may be taken by any person designated by the special review
officer and such designee shall be authorized to administer oaths for the
purpose of the depositions ;
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282 STATE DEPARTMENT SECURITY
"(E) a complete verbatim stenographic transcript shall be made of pro-
ceedings conducted under this section by qualified reporters, and such tran-
script shall constitute a permanent part of the record. Upon request the
applicant or his counsel shall have the right to Inspect the transcript of his
own testimony; and
(F) attendance at hearings under this section shall be restricted to such
officers of the Department of State as may be concerned with the case under
consideration, the applicant, his counsel, the witnesses, and the official ste-
nographers. Witnesses shall be present at the hearing only while actually
giving testimony.
"(9 Proceedings under this subsection shall be conducted in such a manner
as to protect from disclosure all information affecting the national security, safe-
ty, and public interest, or tending to compromise investigative sources or In-
vestigative methods.
"(10) The files maintained by the Department of State and any other perti-
nent Government files submitted to the special review officer shall he considered
as part of the evidence in each case without testimony or a ruling as to admissi-
bility. Such files may not be examined by the applicant.
"(11) It shall be the duty of the special review officer to insure the applicant
of complete and fair consideration of his case. In making his recommendation
the special review officer shall consider the entire record, including the transcript
of the proceedings and such confidential information as be may have received.
The special review officer shall take Into consideration the inability of the appli-
cant to challenge information of which he has not been advised in full or in
detail, or to attack the creditability of Information which has not been disclosed
to him. Formal rules of evidence shall not apply In proceedings under this
section except that reasonable restrictions shall be imposed by the special re-
view officer as to the relevancy, competency, and materiality of evidence Intro-
duced in the proceedings.
"(12) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, the procedure pre-
scribed in this subsection shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for the review
of the refusal to issue, renew, or extend a passport, or of the withdrawal, cancel-
lation, restriction, limitation, or revocation of a passport, under this section.
"(13) An Indictment for any violation of any of the provisions of this section
and sections 1001 and 1542 of title 18, United States Code may be found at any
time within ten years next after such violation shall have been committed."
Mr. SounwINF. This will give the committee a full picture of efforts
to solve this problem.
Now, this is a column from the Daily News of Washington, D.C.
of January 23, 1962, the column being entitled "The World Today. It contains a single paragraph referring to the revocation of passports
bYS the State Department. I offer this for the record, Mr. Chairman.
enator DoDD. Very well. -
(The material referred to reads as follows:)
[From the Washington Daily News, Jan. 23, 19621
The State Department revoked passports of several top members of the U.S.
Communist Party, Including Elizabeth Curley Flynn, the national chairman, and
James E. Jackson, editor of The Worker.
Mr. SoTrnwixn. 'Miss Knight, you note the statement in that column
that the Department had revoked the passports of several top Com-
munists. Is that statement true
Miss KNICZIT. Ices, sir.
Mr. Sotrnwr lE. Whose passports were revoked?
Miss K-arcrrr. Elizabeth-we tried to revoke the passport of Eliza-
beth Gurley Flynn.
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Mr. SOURWINE. When did you try to revoke that passport?
Miss KNIGHT. On November 1, the Passport Office requested the
INS to withdraw the passport of Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, since in-
formation given us reflected her return from Moscow on November 4
or November 5 of 1961.
Mr. SOURWINE. What is that paper from which you are reading?
Miss KNIGIIT. This . is the chronological documentation of actions
which you put into the record. I have all my copies right there. I
was surprised when you showed me a copy.
Mr. SouRwINE. Well, Miss Knight, if you will look back at the
document I showed you, you will find, I believe, that it is neither
as long nor as comprehensive as this one. Do you have any objection
to having this document put in our record?
Miss KNIGHT. No, sir. This one, I just brought up to date in the
last few days.
Mr. SouRWINE. May this op in our record at this point?
Miss KNIGHT. I have no ojection.
Mr. SOURWINE. If you have no objection, Mr. Chairman, I offer
this for the record.
Senator Donn. Very well.
(The material referred to reads as follows:)
PASSPORTS AND COMMUNISTS
The following is the chronology of actions taken by the Passport Office follow-
ing the Supreme Court decision of June 5, 1961, upholding the constitutionality
of section 7 of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. 781 et
seq.) :
June 5, 1961: Passport Office issued internal memorandum to withhold action
on applications submitted by individuals where there is information reflecting
present or recent past (5 years) Communist Party membership.
June 12, 1961: Passport Office sent memo to Acting Legal Adviser Mr. Meeker,
through S.C.A., outlining pertinent portions of the Internal Security Act (section
S in particular) requesting views as to what action should be taken with respect
to (1) pending applications from Communist Party members, (2) those Com-
munist Party members who have passports, and (3) what actions and what
procedures should be followed when law (section 6) becomes operative.
June 14, 1961: Airgram (CG-1032) to all American diplomatic and consular
posts, advising of Supreme Court decision, provisions of the law and directing
all applications from individuals within purview of the law to be sent to Depart-
ment.
June 22, 1961: Memo from L. to PPT advising that when law becomes effective
PPT will be prohibited by penal sanctions to issue passports to Communist
Party members ; advising there was no statutory basis for withdrawing out-
standing passports and to process application just like the application from any
other applicant.
June 27, 1961: PPT advised (by Legal Adviser's Office) by telephone that
Justice Frankfurter had granted stay on Communist Party petition for rehearing.
June 27, 1961: Internal instructions issued advising of Supreme Court stay and
to continue recording procedures placed in effect on June 5, 1961.
July 18, 1961: Airgram to all diplomatic and consular posts to process applica-
tions same manner as prior to June 5, 1961.
October 9, 1961: Supreme Court dismisses Communist Party petition for a re-
hearing on its June 5, 1961, decision.
October 10, 1961: Passport Office issued a memorandum alerting personnel that
all passport and renewal applications of persons within the purview of statute
must be intercepted prior to any issuance and/or renewal as the case may be.
All cases to be referred to the Legal Division of the Passport Office for handling.
October 10, 1961: Passport Office sent airgram to all American diplomatic and
consular posts advising of Supreme Court's dismissal of petition for rehearing
and directing that applications from all persons within purview of law be for-
warded to Department (Passport Office).
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October 10, 1961: PPT advised SC1 (confirming oral information of October
9, 1961) of Internal procedures for handling appileations-advising our views
that criminal act attaches as soon as individual applies for or uses passport.
October 11, 1961: ITT advises chief executive officers, Puerto Rico, Guam,
Virgin Islands, and American Samoa of Supreme Court action, provisions of law,
etc.
October 24, 1901: PPT sent letter to Mr. J. Walter Yeagley, Assistant Attor-
ney General, Internal Security Division, Department of Justice (through legal
adviser) requesting views as to what action should be taken re withdrawal of
passport from Communist Party members (mentioning Flynn and Jackson-dele-
gates to CPUSSR Congress).
October 25, 1961; PPT answered in detail Mr. Yeagley's telephone request
concerning I'PT hearing procedures. He was also furnished statistics regard-
Ing number of passports Issued to persons subsequent to June 16, 198 (-Kent-
Bricfti decision), who, on the basis of FBI information, are Communist Party
members or Communist Party members within recent past (5 years prior to pass-
port application).
November 1, 19G1: PPT requested I. & N.S. to withdraw passport of Eliza-
beth Gurley Flynn-FBI information reflected her return from Moscow on No-
vember 4 or 5, 1961. Mr. Maroney, Internal Security Division, Department of
Justice, advised.
November 3, 1961: PPT advised by Mr. Chayes and Mr. Yingling (during
conference re passport legislation) that PPT had no authority to withdraw
Flynn passport-matter solely for Department of Justice.
Novemeer 3, 1961: PPT countermanded requested to I. & N.S. in Flynn
matter. FBI and Justice advised.
November 16, 1961: P. P. T. drafted for SCA-Boutempo signature-reply to
letter dated November 9, 1961, from Oongressman Walter to Secretary regarding
HCt1A interest in section 6, Internal Security Act. Reply stated internal pro-
cedures and close liaison being maintained with Department of Justice.
November 10, 1961: P. P. T. (Mr. Seeley) advised by Mr. Yingling (L) re
meeting held November 15, 1961, at Department of Justice, which lasted for
several hours. No decision reached but withdrawal of passports held by Com-
munist Party members might provoke court test of constitutionality of section (:.
Mr. Yingling requested list be prepared.
November 29, 1961: P. P. T. representative (Mr. Johnson) attended meeting
with Mir. Yingling, legal adviser's office, re passport renewal application of
Abraham Magil (Communist Party member) fled on October 20. 11101, date
SACB order became final. No definite decision other than write fir. Magi],
advising him of law, and asking if he wished to pursue application.
November 30, 1961: Passport Office sent memorandum to Mr. Abram Chaves.
transmitting two lists of persons who appear to he within the purview of 50
U.S.C. 785. The lists were compiled from the records of the Passport Otflce.
December 1. 1961: Passport Office sent a memorandum to Mr. Abram Chayes.
recommending the withdrawal of passports Issued to individuals on the national
levels of the Communist Party leadership. recommending the Issuing of appro-
priate letters to such individuals concerned, notifying them of the tentative with-
drawal of their passports and affording them a hearing and right to appeal.
December 4. 1901: Passport Office sends letter to Mr. Magil re passport applica-
tion (see November 2R, 1961, above).
December 7, 1961: Passport Office sent a memorandum to Mr. Abram Chayes'
recommending that the following statement be placed in all passport applica-
tion forms, registration forms, agency notices, etc. :
"Section 6 of the Internal Security Act of 1950 (50 C.S.C. 786) provides a
severe penalty (fine and/or imprisonment) for a member of the Communist
Party of the United States who applies for a passport or for the renewal of a
passport or who uses or attempts to use a passport."
December 7, 1901: Meeting in legal adviser's office. Mr. Abram Chayes re-
viewed his conversations with the Department of Justice attorneys. Mr. Chaves
advised Miss Knight of the Secretary's interest in not withdrawing passports but
in having the statute enforced by means of criminal nrnseentions in due course.
It was agreed that the Passport Office prepare a letter for 3Ir. Chayes' signature
transmitting to Assistant Attorney General Yeagley for use In enforcement of
the act, a list of persons holding valid passports who, on the basis of Information
supplied the Department by the FBI. appear to be within the purview of section
6 of the act.
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STATE DEPARTMENT SECURITY
Mr. Chayes also advised that he would soon assign someone to check the pass-
port regulations and was informed by Miss Knight that a complete revision of
the Executive order and the Secretary's regulations on the issuance of passports
had been made by the Passport Office and had been held in abeyance for over
a year pending some action either by the Department or legislative branch. It
was agreed that the revisions be checked and brought up to date by the Passport
Office. Mr. Chayes agreed to review the Passport Office presentation as a matter
of urgency.
December 11, 1961: P. P. T. sent two copies lists A and B (persons within sec.
785) to Mr. Yeagley under Mr. Chayes.' signature.
December 12, 1961: P. P. T. advised Mr. Yeagley that Mr. Magil asked that
renewal application be withdrawn. Mr. Yeagley requested to advise P. P. T.
what criminal action, if any, would be taken. Refund of $5 renewal fee would
be held awaiting reply.
December 15, 1961: Mr. Chayes cleared the proposed warnings to be inserted
in Passport Office forms and a printing order was processed immediately by the
Passport Office. New placards, cards, signs, and forms were among the docu-
ments to have the warning inserted.
December 15, 1961: Passport Office sent a memorandum to Mr. Abram Chayes
transmitting an original and one copy of the draft of a new Executive order
and rules and regulations by the Secretary which are to supersede Executive
Order No. 7856 issued on April 2, 1938, and regulations issued pursuant thereto
at intervals since April 2,1938.
December 28, 1961: Meeting in the legal adviser's office with Mr. Meeker and
Mr. Lowenfeld regarding the Immediate issuance of revised regulations dealing
with the denial of passports to Communists.
It was decided that sections 51.135 through 51.170 of the regulations on issu-
ance of passports be reviewed and revised prior to the completion of a compre-
hensive study of pasbport regulations and the Executive order of 1938.
Mr. SouRwINE. On what page is the item
Miss KNIGHT. Page 2. The third from the bottom.
Mr. SOURWINE. Well, that doesn't-
Miss KNIGHT. You will notice that on November 1, 1961, the Pass-
port Office requested INS to withdraw the passport of Elizabeth
Gurley Flynn.
Mr. Sou-RwiNE. But it never was withdrativii, was it?
Miss KNIGHT. No, sir.
Mr. SOURWINE. Well, then
Miss KNIGHT. Because we were advised by the legal adviser's office
that the Passport Office had no authority to withdraw the Flynn pass-
port.
Mr. SOuRwINE. Well, then, the story-do.you have that little clip-
ping I just showed?
Miss KNIGHT. Yes, sir.
Mr. SOURWINE. The story in the Washington Daily News which
says:
State Department revokes passports of several top members of the Communist
Party, including Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, the national chairman, and James E.
Jackson-
that is wrong, isn't it? The passports had not, in fact, been revoked.
Miss KNIGHT. In fact, they had not ben revoked.
Mr. SOURWINE. Either at this time orn November when you tried
to do it.
Miss KNIGHT. We tried to.
Mr. SOURWINE. Did you ever try to revoke the passport of James E.
Jackson?
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STATE DEPARTMENT SECURITY
Mr..Tol1NsoN. May I answer that? We sent letters to Elizabeth
Gurley Flynn and to James Jackson, Arnold Johnson, and two others--
A theker, and I can't think of the other name-five of them.
1r. SounwiNE. When?
Mr. JoiiN,sox. I believe it was around January 22, sir.
Mr. Souitwu u. Is this listed in your chronology, Miss Knight?
Miss IiNicur. I don't believe this is listed.
Mr. SOURWINE. This chronology ends with 1961. Do you have a
chronology of actions in 1962?
Miss KNEGirr. Yes, I think; Mr. Johnson has that.
tir. SouitwrNE. While you are looking to see, I have two other items
I want to offer for the record. May l clo that now, Mr. Chairman?
Senator DODD. Yes.
Mt?. SouR:WINE. This is first a story from the St. Louis, Mo., Globe-
Democrat, of April 30 1962, entitled "Pass ort for Reds." And then
it clipping from the Washington Post of d April 24, 1962, entitled
"Showdown of Flynn Passport Bid Balked." May those go in the
record?
Senator DODD. Yes, without objection.
(Tice material referred to reads asfollows:)
(From the St. Louis (Mo.) Globe-Democrat, Apr. 30, 19021
PA88PORT FOR REDS?
Believe it or not, but Elizabeth Gurley Flynh, who was long an open and
avowed member of the Communist Party, may get a U.S. passport, after all.
Last year, the Supreme Court ruled these vital safe-conduct passes could be
denied to Iced party members. This decision was bailed by many concerned with
the Nation's security.
The decree meant, for example, that Washington could stop known Communist
couriers from going abroad to transmit information-or pick up funds to finance
espionage In this country.
It also meant Communist Party bigwigs could no longer smear their country
overseas, by taking part In anti-American propaganda circuses staged here by
the Soviet Union.
But where the Supreme Court giveth, the State Department taketh away.
Last January, the Department unveiled a new set of rules that must be fol-
lowed before it will deny an American Communist a passport.
First, the burden of proof of party membership is on Washington. The FBI
or other agencies involved must produce witnesses who can Identify the passport
applicant as a party member. He and his lawyer must also have the right to
cross-examine these witnesses. Washington must produce any evidence that
shows party membership for his examination.
This is mandatory, no matter how confidential the material or its source. If
It is classified information which cannot be disclosed to unauthorized persons,
the evidence can't be used.
Worst still, even airtight proof of past Communist Party membership isn't
enough. The applicant can say he has resigned from the party. It is up to
Washington to prove otherwise.
When these rules were made public, the American Civil Liberties Union
shouted with joy. This is the first time in history, the ACLU pointed out, that
the right "to confront and cross-examine" has been made a part of the "Gov-
ernment's loyalty-security programs."
It said It would urge other Government agencies to follow the State Depart-
ment's example.
Mrs. Flynn has applied for a passport to go abroad. Last week, a bearing
was held to show cause for denying It. But the redtape which the State Depart-
ment has wound about such passport cases immediately brought the proceedings
to a halt.
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STATE DEPARTMENT -SECURITY
A major witness failed to appear. Why? Perhaps out of fear of the abuse
the Communist Party and its friends might heap on him. Perhaps out of fear
of bodily harm from one of the many plug-uglies and hired assassins on the
party's payroll. +
Mrs. Flynn's hearing was postponed until May 3. Unless the missing witness
can be rounded up, it will be bon voyage for "Lizzy," another great victory for
civil liberties, and one more black day for the United States.
[From the Washington Post, Apr. 24, 1962]
SHOWDOWN or FLYNN PASSPORT Bm BALKED
(Associated Press)
The State Department's attempts to deny a U.S. passport to Elizabeth Gurley
Flynn ran into trouble yesterday when a major witness failed to show up.
As a result, the Department got a continuance until May 3 in the first-of-its-
kind hearing on Mrs. Flynn, listed by the Department of Justice as chairman of
the Communist Party of the U.S.A.
Officials said the State Department had been severely hampered by lack of
legal power to subpena and pay expenses of witnesses in the newly created
passport-revocation procedures.
The Flynn hearing, which started yesterday, is the first under a new and
controversial regulation issued by the State Department after the Supreme
Court upheld the passport provisions of the Subversive Activities Control Act.
The act makes it unlawful for a Communist Party member to apply for a pass-
port, or for renewal of a passport, or to use a passport.
Mr. SOURWINE. I also offer a copy of the Department of State press
release, No. 264, of April 23, 1962, regarding hearings in the passport
revocation case of Elizabeth Gurley Flynn.
Senator DODD. Very well.
(The material referred to reads as follows:)
[Department of State press release No. 264, Apr. 23, 1962]
The Department of State will begin hearings tomorrow in the passport revo-
cation case of Mrs. Elizabeth Gurley Flynn. Mrs. Flynn's passport was revoked
by authority of the Secretary of State on January 22, 1962, on the ground that
there was reason to believe she was a member of the Communist Party of the
United States, an organization required to register with the Attorney General
under the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950.
The case is the first one to arise since the passport provisions of the Subversive
Activities Control Act went into effect. The provisions became effective follow-
ing the entry of judgment by the Supreme Court in the case of Subversive Activi-
ties Control Board v. Communist Party of the United States.
Under the provisions of section 6 of the Subversive Activities Control Act, it
Is now unlawful for a member of the Communist Party of the United States to
apply for a passport or for the renewal of a passport or to use a passport.
The hearing will take place before a hearing officer, and will be held in the
hearing room of the Passport Office. The hearing officer will be Mr. Max Kane,
a hearing examiner for the Federal Power Commission, who has been assigned
to this case by arrangement with the Civil Service Commission.
For the protection of persons suspected of Communist Party membership, the
regulations require that hearings be private. The Passport Office and the ap-
plicant will be represented by counsel, and a transcript will be made of the
proceedings.
The recommended decision of the hearing officer will be based only on evi-
dence presented at the hearing, and will not be based on any confidential infor-
mation.
The hearing officer will prepare findings of fact and will make a recommended
decision to the Director of the Passport Office. In the event of an adverse de-
cision, the applicant will have the right to appeal to the Board of Passport Ap-
peals, which has been appointed by the Secretary of State.
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STATE DEPARTMENT SECURITY
Me. SOUttivINE. 1)o you have that chronology, Miss Knight?
Miss K it:irr. I t is not prepared in exactly the same manner as the
other, but it gives t lie information you are requesting.
Mr. SouRRWviNr. Whatever form it is, may we have it for the coni-
mitie,' rv. omit
l[iss KNicit.r. Yes, sir.
Mr. SOURZVINE. This is prepared by you, dir. Johnson?
Mr..loirNsoN. Yes, sir.
Tr. 5ovi:iviNi;. All right.
('Elie n-aterial referred to reads as follows:)
BACKGROUND of AcrtoN TAKEN' UNDER INTERNAL SECURITY ACT of 1950
11) Supreaue Court's decision of June 5, 1961, in the case of the Subversive
detivilics Control Board v. The Communist Party, U.S.A., requiring the Com-
munist Party, U.S.A., to register as a Communist action organization under
section 7 of the Internal Security Act of 1930.
(2) The Supreme Court granted a stay of judgment pending their decision
on a petition for a rehearing flied by the Communist Party. The petition was
dismissed on October 9, 1961, making the Subversive Activities Control Board's
order final within the statutory period.
(3) Notice of fact that Subversive Activities Control Board's order requiring
Communist Party to register had become final which appeared in the October
21, 1961, issue of the Federal Register.
(4) The finality of the Subversive Activities Control Board's order on October
20, 1961, automatically triggered the provisions of section 6 of the Internal Se-
curity Act of 1950 (50 L.S.C. 785) concerning the issuance of passports to
Communists.
(5) Letter to Mr. J. Walter Ycagley, Assistant Attorney General from Mr.
Hickey dated October 24, 1961, requesting the Department of Justice's views
with respect to what passport action we should take in the cases of Elizabeth
Gurley Flynn and James Edward Jackson who were returning to the United
States after attending the 2d Congress of the Communist Party of Soviet Union
and further requesting their views with respect to action to be taken on applica-
tions for passport submitted on or after October 20, 1961.
(6) Memo to L. Air. Cbayes from Miss Knight dated December 1, 1961,
recommending withdrawal of the passports of Communist Party functionaries at
national level.
(7) Memo of conversation between Mr. Chayes and Miss Knight dated
December 7, 1961 (prepared In L) setting forth Secretary's Interest In not
withdrawing passports but in having statute enforced by means of criminal
prosecutions,
(8) Letter from J. Walter Ycagley. Assistant Attorney General, to Mr. Roger
Jones, Deputy Under Secretary, dated January 5, 1962, expressing Justice's view
that the Department does not have "reason to believe" under section 6 of the
Internal Security Act of 1930 when such "reason to believe" Is based on classi-
fled information. Also expre..ses view that Department must conduct hearings In
passport denims affordin:t full confrontation to the applicant.
(9) Letter front Ycagley to AIr. Jones, dated January 5. 1902 (second letter of
that date), setting forth generally the Department of Justice's views as to the
procedures for the Department to follow in handling cases under section 6.
(10) A decision was reached to withdraw passports of national functionaries
of the Communist Party. C.S.A. (after consultation with L and Department of
Justice).
(11) Aietno from L. Air. Chayes to Miss Knight. dated January 19, 1962, direc-
ting revocation of the passports of William Albertson, Herbert Aptheker, Eliza-
beth Gurley Flynn, James Edward Jackson, and Arnold Samuel Johnson (draft
of letter prepared by L). This action was in accordance with L's recommenda-
tion in memorandum for the Secretary dated January 8, 1962, as modified by
direction of the Secretary. (Names selected and summary of information avail-
able were reviewed by Department of Justice.)
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(12) Revocation letters were mailed to the five Communist Party functionaries
enumerated in item 11, on January 22,1962.
(13) Memo from Edward J. Hickey, Acting Director, Passport Office, to L,
Mr. Chayes dated January 29, 1962, forwarding, for L's clearatlce, revocation
letters addressed to Dorothy H. Connelly, Albert J. Lima, George A. Meyers,
Thomas Nabried, and Louis Weinstock.
(14) Memo from L, Mr. Chayes to Mr. Hickey, dated February 6, 1962, ad-
vising that Department of Justice had recommended withholding revocation of
passports of the Communist Party functionaries enumerated in item 13 pending
indication of the reaction of the first group of Communist Party functionaries
whose passports had been revoked. L concurred in Department of Justice's
recommendations.
(15) A hearing in the case of Elizabeth Gurley Flynn was held on April 24,
1962, and concluded on May 3, 1962. It is presently in the hands of the hearing
examiner for recommended decision.
(The subcommittee subsequently received the following letter:)
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, May 18,1962.
Mr. JUIiEN G. SOURWINE,
Chief Counsel, Senate Internal Security Subcommittee,
New Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. SOURWINE : I am enclosing herewith a paper presenting a chronologi-
cal listing of the actions taken by the Passport Office following the Supreme
Court decision of June 5, 1961, upholding the constitutionality of section 7 of
the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950.
I had an incomplete list of these actions with me at the hearings held on
Wednesday and you will remember that you requested it, and I believe it was
made part of the record. Then you noticed that this earlier list only covered
the actions taken to the end of December 1961, and Mr. Johnson provided a
paper which was more or less informal, listing subsequent actions. When I
returned to the office I compared these papers with my files, and I feel that there
are a few references to conversations and opinions expressed in some intra-
office conferences within the Department which could be omitted without destroy-
ing the value of the chronological listing. Also, I believe the paper Mr. Johnson
referred to and which was made part of the record is more valuable when trans-
lated into the chronological listing and added to it in the same style.
This is only a suggestion, but I do believe the enclosed document is better
prepared and can be better understood than the two incomplete documents
which are now in the record. For the sake of posterity, is there any chance
of substituting this better and more complete documentation for the other two?
With best wishes.
Sincerely, FRANCES G. KNIGHT,
Director, Passport Office.
CHRONOLOGY JUNE 5, 1961 TO JANUARY 12, 1962
The following is the chronology of. actions taken by the Passport Office fol-
lowing the Supreme Court decision of June 5, 1961 upholding the constitution-
ality of section 7 of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C.
781 et seq.) :
June 5, 1961: Passport Office issued internal memorandum to withhold action
on applications submitted by individuals where there is information reflecting
present or recent past (5 years) Communist Party membership.
June 12,1961: Passport Office sent memo to Acting Legal Adviser, Mr. Meeker,
through SCA outlining pertinent portions of the Internal Security Act. (sec. 6 in
particular) requesting views as to what action should be taken with respect to
(1) pending applications from Communist Party members, (2) those Com-
munist Party members who have passports, and (3) what actions and what
procedures should be followed when law (sec. 6) becomes operative.
June 14, 1961: Airgram (CG-1032) to all Ameriacn diplomatic and consular
posts, advising of Supreme Court decision, provisions of the law and directing
all applications from individuals within purview of the law to be sent to Depart-
ment.
21.092 0-63-pt. 3-5
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June 22, 1961: Memo from L to PPT advising that when law becomes effective
PPT will be prohibited by penal sanctions to issue passports to Communist
Party members; advising there was no statutory basis for withdrawing outstand-
ing passports and to process application just like the application from any
other applicant.
June 27, 1961: PPT advised by Legal Adviser's Office by telephone that Justice
Frankfurter had granted stay on Communist Party petition for rehearing.
June 27, 1961: Internal instructions issued advising of Supreme Court stay
and to continue recording procedures placed in effect on June 5, 1961.
July 18, 1961 Airgram to all diplomatic and consular posts to process appli-
cations same manner as prior to June 5, 1961.
October 9, 1961: Supreme Court dismisses Communist Party petition for a
rehearing on its June 5, 1961 decision.
October 10, 1961: Passport Office issued a memorandum alerting personnel
that all passport and renewal applications of persons within the purview of
statute must be intercepted prior to any issuance and/or renewal as the case
may be. All cases to be referred to the Legal Division of the Passport Office
for handling.
October 10, 1961: Passport Office sent airgram to all American diplomatic
and consular posts advising of Supreme Court's dismissal of petition for re-
hearing and directing that applications from all persons within purview of law
be forwarded to Department (Passport Office).
October 10, 1961: PPT advised SCA (confirming oral Info of October 9, 1961)
of internal procedures for handling applications-advising our views that crimi-
nal act attaches as soon as individual applies for or uses passport.
October 11, 1961: PPT advises chief executive officers, Puerto Rico, Guam,
Virgin Islands, and American Samoa of Supreme Court action, provisions of
law, etc.
October 24, 1961: PPT sent letter to Mr. J. Walter Yeagley, Assistant Attor-
ney General, Internal Security Division, Department of Justice (through Legal
Adviser) requesting views as to what action should be taken re withdrawal of
passport from Communist Party members (mentioning Flynn and Jackson,
delegates to CPUSSR Congress).
October 25, 1961: PPT answered in detail Mr. Yeagley's telephone request
concerning PPT hearing procedures. He was also furnished statistics regard-
ing number of passports Issued to persons subsequent to June 16, 1958 (Sent-
Briehl decision) who on the basis of FBI information are Communist Party
members or Communist Party members within recent past (5 years prior to
passport application).
November 1, 1961: PPT requested Immigration and Naturalization Service
to withdraw passport of Elizabeth Gurley Flynn-FBI info reflected her return
from Moscow on November 4 or November 5, 1961. Mr. Maroney, Internal
Security Division, Department of Justice, advised.
November 3, 1961: PPT advised by Mr. Chayes and Mr. Yingling (during
conference re passport legislation) that PPT had no authority to withdraw
Flynn passport-matter solely for Department of Justice.
November 3, 1961: PPT countermanded request to Immigration and Natu-
ralization Servicein Flynn matter. FBI and Justice advised.
November 16, 1961: PPT drafted for BOA-Bontempo signature-reply to let-
ter dated November 9, 1981, from Congressman Walter to Secretary regarding
House Committee on Un-American Activities Interest in section 8, Internal fleeu-
rity Act. Reply stated internal procedures and close liaison being maintained
with Department of Justice.
November 30, 1901: Passport Office sent memorandum to Mr. Abram Chayes
transmitting two lists of persons who appear to be within the purview of 50
U.S.C. 785. The lists were compiled from the records of the Passport Office.
December 1, 1961: Passport Office sent a memorandum to Mr. Abram Cbayea
recommending the withdrawal of passports issued to individuals on the national
levels of the Communist Party leadership; recommending the Issuing of appro-
priate lettersto such individuals concerned, notifying them to the tentative with-
drawal of their passports and affording them a hearing and right to appeal.
December 7, 1961: Passport Office sent a memorandum to Mr. Abram Chayes
recommending that the following statement be placed in all passport application
forms, registration forms, agency notices, etc.: "Section 6 of the Internal Se-
curity Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. 785) provides a severe penalty (fine and/or Em-
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prisonment) for a member of the Communist party of the united States who
applies for a passport or for the renewal of a passport or who uses or attempts to
use a passport."
December 7, 1961: Meeting in Legal Adviser's Office. Mr. Abram Chayes re-
viewed his conversations with the Department of Justice attorneys. Mr. Chayes
advised Miss Knight of the Secretary's interest in not withdrawing passports
but in having the statute enforced by means of criminal prosecutions in due
course.
It was agreed that the Passport Office prepare a letter for Mr. Chayes'
signature transmitting to Assistant Attorney General Yeagley for use in enforce-
ment of the act, a list of persons holding valid passports who, on the basis of
information supplied the Department by the FBI, appear to be within the pur-
view of section 6 of the act.
Mr. Chayes also advised that he would soon assign someone to check the
passport regulations and was informed by Miss Knight that a complete revision
of the Executive order and the Secretary's regulations on the issuance of pass-
ports had been made by the Passport Office and had been held in abeyance for
over a year pending some action either by the Department or legislative branch.
It was agreed that the revisions be checked and brought up to date by the Pass-
port Office presentation as a matter of urgency.
December 11, 1961: PPT sent two copies lists A and B (persons within see.
785) to Mr. Yeagley under Mr. Chayes' signature.
December 15, 1961: Mr.' Chayes cleared the proposed warnings to be inserted
in Passport Office forms and a printing order was processed immediately by
the Passport Office. New placards, cards, signs, and forms were among the
documents to have the warning inserted.
December 15, 1961: Passport Office sent a memorandum to Mr. Abram Chayes
transmitting an original and one copy of the draft of a new Executive order and
rules and regulations by the Secretary which are to supersede Executive Order
No. 7856 issued on April 2, 1938, and regulations issued pursuant thereto at
intervals since April 2, 1938.
December 28, 1961: Mr. Lowenfeld of L called Miss Knight concerning L's
redraft of proposed regulations stating he wished to set up a meeting concern-
ing this draft between Miss Knight, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Meekeri and himself.
December 29, 1961: Meeting in the Legal Adviser's office with Mr. Meeker
and Mr. Lowenfeld regarding the immediate issuance of revised regulations
dealing with the denial of passports to Communists.
It was decided that sections 51.135 through 51.170 of the regulations on
issuance of passports be reviewed and revised prior to the completion of a com-
prehensive study of passport regulations and the Executive order of 1938.
January 4, 1962: L's proposed regulations were transmitted to SCA as a final
draft to be submitted to the Secretary for approval January 5, 1962, and referred
for immediate publication in the Code of Federal Regulations. (See Mr. Cie-
plinski's memo to Mr. Jones of January 5, 1962.)
January. 4, 1962: Memo from Miss Knight to Mr. Cieplinski, SCA (copy to
Mr. Lowenfeld January 5, 1962), reiterating. her view that she could not con-
vince herself that she did not have reason to believe an individual was a Com-
munist after reading classified information indicating he was one.
January 5, 1962: Memo from Mr. Michel Cieplinski, Acting Administrator,
SCA, to Mr. Roger Jones, Deputy Under Secretary, proposing revision of L's
draft of section 51.135-51.170 of passport regulations and requesting that ap-
proval thereof be withheld pending reconciliation of differences of opinions
concerning them.
January 5, 1962: Memo from Miss Knight to Mr. Chayes transmitting L's
draft of sections 51.135-51.170 in required format and inserting citation of
statutory authority and statement relating to effective date of the regulations.
January 5, 1962: Letter from J. Walter Yeagley, Assistant Attorney General,
to Mr. Roger Jones, Deputy Under Secretary, stating that the Department of
Justice was of the opinion that the Department of State in denying a passport
should conduct a hearing based upon an open record and that the statute
(50 U.S.C. 785) does not contemplate the denial of passports on the basis of
information which cannot, for security reasons, be disclosed.
The Department of Justice also indicated that if the applicant sought to
contest the denial he would, in their view, be entitled under the statute to be
confronted with the precise information against him and to be apprised of the
source of such information. Mr. Yeagley further indicated in such cases where
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it is inconsistent with security interest to divulge information as to member-
ship, the Secretary of State can properly consider that he does not have the
"knowledge or reason to believe" which the statute makes a condition for the
requirement that he deny a passport.
January 5, 1962: Letter from J. Walter Yeagley, Assistant Attorney General,
to Mr. Jones expressing the views of the Department of Justice with respect
to procedures to be followed by the Department of State in administering
section G of the Internal Security Act of 1950.
January 6, 1902 (Saturday) : Meeting at the request of Mr. Meeker, Deputy
Legal Adviser, concerning the proposed passport regulations. Present were
Mr. Meeker and Mr. Lowenfeld of L, Mr. Bryan of SCA, and Miss Knight and
Mr. Johnson of PPT. Present during part of the meeting was Mr. Roger W.
Jones, Deputy Under Secretary. Meeting was held to reconcile "difference"
of views between L, PPT, and SCA over the regulations, In particular, with
respect to the denial of passports and the use of classified Information.
January 9, 1902: Memo to PPT from Mr. Lowenteld of L transmitting the
letter drafted by L to be sent to passport holders whose passports are to be
revoked. Memo Indicates Secretary had approved letter.
January 10, 1962; Mr. Lowenfeld advised by phone that revocation letter
(referred to above) bad been cleared with Department of Justice.
January 12, 1962: Press Release No. 24 of January 12, 1962, announcing the
promulgation of the revised section 1.61.135 -51.170 of the passport regulations.
The press release also announced Department's plan to move to revoke out-
standing passports of certain leading members of the Communist Party, U.S.A.
January 12, 1962: Revised sections 51.135-51.170 of the passport regulations
were published In the Federal Register of January 12,1962 (vol. 27, No. 8).
Mr. Souitw1NE. Now, the two newspaper stories I have just put in
the record, from the St. Louis Globe-Democrat, and the Washington
Post, indicate that a major witness failed to appear at the Elizabeth
Gurley Flynn hearing. That is true, is it not ?
Miss KNIGHT. I understand it is true; yes, sir. I have not seen
the transcript, nor have I read it.
Mr. Sou wiNE. Mr. Johnson, is it true that a major witness failed
to appear at the Elizabeth Gurley Flynn hearing?
Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, sir.
Mr. SOURwINE. Who was the witness who failed to appear?
Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. ThomasTraecy.
Mr. SOURw1NE. Where does he live?
Mr. JOHNSON. He lives up in Long Island, N.F.
Mr. SomiwINE. What does he do 9
Mr. JoliNsoN, He works for the Pennsylvania Railroad -I believe
in the pullman shop.
Mr. SoURWINE. And why didn't he appear?
Mr. JOHNSON. Before we go into-I have been under strict instruc-
tions not to discuss the Flynn hearing. However, this seems to be
actually not involved in the Flynn hearing itself. I mean it is part
of the hearing, I suppose. I am just debating within myself whether
I should go ahead and tell you about the Flynn case-since the deci-
sion has not been made by the Passport Office-we have not received
the recommendations by the hearing examiner. And we are ordered
to file briefs, And we still have 20 days to do that. I am wondering
if I go into the Flynn case, whether I may prejudice the Government s
case. We have gone to considerable expense and time and effort,
and I certainly would not like to prejudice the case in any way,
especially at this time. I would certainly be glad to go into it
all the facets of the case later.
Senator Donn. When you say prejudices the Government's case, I
don't know quite what you mean.
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Mr. JOHNSON. Well, the case is still in a pending status, as it were.
Senator DODD. I understand. But who told you not to discuss it?
Miss KNIGHT. Well, this was a result
Mr. SOURWINE. Pardon me, Miss Knight. Let Mr. Johnson say
who told him not to discuss it.
Mr. JOHNSON. Let me say, as it was put to me by Mr. Roger Jones,
it would be very inappropriate for me to discuss the case.
Senator DODD. Is this
Mr. SOURWINE: When was this done?
Mr. JOHNSON. This morning, sir.
Mr. SOURWINE. By telephone?
Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, sir.
Senator DODD. Is this a sort of claim of executive privilege?
What is it?
Mr. JOHNSON. I don't believe so. I think Mr. Jones' view was that
I shouldn't discuss the case while the case was still in a pending status
in the Passport Office.
Senator MCCLELLAN. Mr. Chairman-you speak of a case. What
do you mean by case?
Mr. JOHNSON. Senator, we had the hearing revoking the passpoh
of Elizabeth Gurley Flynn. We had witnesses appear to testify. The
hearings have been concluded.
Senator MCCLELLAN. Before the Passport Office ?
Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, sir.
Senator MCCLELLAN. You had hearings on revocation of her pass-
port.
Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, sir.
Senator MCCLELLAN. And that hearing has not been decided-I
mean you still
Mr. JOHNSON. The hearings are concluded, but no decision has been
made. The hearing examiner has not yet made his report. So ac-
tually no decision has been made in the Flynn case.
Mr. SOURWINE. Let me, ask a question, with the Chair's permission.
You mentioned a hearing examiner. Does the State Department
have any hearing examiners?
Mr. JOHNSON. No, sir.
Senator MCCLELLAN. I didn't understand that.
Mr. SOURWINE. I asked if the State Department had any hearing
examiners.
Senator MCCLELLAN. What hearing examiners-from what source?
Mr. JOHNSON. I understand this hearing examiner was obtained
through the Legal Adviser's office, from the Civil Service Commission.
Mr. SouRwINE. Why doesn't -
Senator MCCLELLAN. I am trying to follow this. You had a hear-
ing examiner from where?
Mr. JOHNSON. He was. obtained by the Legal Adviser's Office,
through the Civil Service Commission.
Senator MCCLELLAN. They assigned him?
Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, sir.
Senator MCCLELLAN. The Civil Service Commission.
Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, sir.
Senator MCCLELLAN. To hold the hearing on this revocation of
the passport.
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 294Approved Ford W2,3tg FRDP66B00403R000500120001-1
Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, sir.
Mr. SOURWINE. Isn't it true, Mr. Johnson that the reason' the
State Department has no hearing examiners is because there is no law
authorizing the State Department to have any or to hold any hearings?
Mr. JOHNSON. Well, we do have the regulations
Mr. SOURWINE. Talking about law.
Mr. JOHNSON. That is right.
Mr. SOURWINE. Now, would you give this committee your profes-
sional opinion as to whether the issuance by the Secretary of State of a
regulation providing for a hearing automatically authorizes his De-
partment to hold hearings, where Congress has not given any such
authorization?
Mr. JOHNSON. Well, we certainly should have legislation.
Mr. SOURWINE. Of course, you should.
Senator MCCLELLAN. Is Roger Jones your superior?
Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, sir; he is the Deputy Under Secretary for
Administration.
Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, the reason I am inquiring about
the failure of this witness to show up-the fact is, as I understand
it, three witnesses failed to show up.
This man Traecy, and two newspaper reporters; isn't that right?
Mr. JOHNSON. That is right.
Mr. SOURWINE. One newspaper reporter from the New York Times
and one from the Associated Press. The State Department has by
regulation set up this hearing procedure, which is not authorized by
law, and has by regulation purported to grant passport applicants
a right to be confronted at this hearing procedure with all the wit-
nesses against them. The State Department then set up its first
hearing, with Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, and they asked two newspaper
reporters, who had been present when Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, in
public, performed as a functionary of the Communist Party, to come
down and testify to what they had seen. And it is counsel's infor-
mation
Senator MCCLELLAN. They didn't appear?
Mr. SOURWINE. They did not appear. It is counsel's information
that the New York Times decided it did not want its reporter to
appear, and that the Associated Press decided they were not going
to embarrass the Times by having their man there. So that both
reporters were instructed by their respective employers not to come.
The State Department has no subpena powers and couldn't make
them come. And this simply points up the fact that the State De-
partment has by regulation granted to passport applicants a right
which the State Department is not in a position to give them. And
the net result is that under the regulations, since they cannot be
given the right by regulation that is made a prerequisite to, with-
drawal or refusal of the passport, automatically every applicant is
going to get his passport. The next step will be, dust as sure as shoot-
ing; the State Department will be up here asking the Congress to
give it authority to hold hearings, and to give it subpena powers, so
that it can go ahead with this.
Senator MCCLELLAN. Let me ask this.
You, Miss Knight, and Mr. Johnson-you are just carrying out
your superior's orders in this regard.
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 Approved For Release 2005/08/22 PQP
Mr. JoHNSoN. Yes, sir.
Senator MCCLELLAN. You didn't initiate the hearing.
Mr. JOHNSON. No, sir.
Senator MCCLELLAN. You didn't request the hearing.
Mr. JOHNSON. No, sir.
Senator MCCLELLAN. You requested that the passport be canceled.
Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, sir.
Senator MCCLELLAN. Your office requested that.
Miss KNIGHT. Yes, Sir.
Senator MCCLELLAN. And as a result.of your requesting that in the
State Department, your superiors took the action that counsel has
referred to here.
Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, sir.
Senator MCCLELLAN. Is that correct?
Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, sir.
Senator MCCLELLAN. Now, then, Mr. Jones tells you you ought not
to discuss the case here before the committee.
Is that the instruction he gave you?
Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, sir; since no decision has been reached.
Senator MCCLELLAN. I understand. Since it is still pending, you
are under instructions from him that it wouldn't be proper for you
to discuss it here, is that correct?
Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, sir.
Senator MCCLELLAN. And that instruction came to you this
morning.
Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, sir.
Senator MCCLELLAN. Is there anything else, Mr. Counsel?
Mr. SOURWINE. I have one more thing.
Senator MCCLELLAN. I was just trying to get it in its proper per-
spective.
Mr. SOURWINE. I think the story is clear on the record now, except
for one thing. I have here the transcript of the proceedings in the
Elizabeth Gurley Flynn case. They were furnished by Miss Knight
in response to the committee's subpena, a procedure in every way the
same as in many former instances when we have sought information
by subpena from her office. I believe that this should be made a part
of this record. This hearing record, if read by Senators; will be
extremely instructive. It is a small sample of exactly what they are
going to go up against every time they try to deny a Communist a
passport. It is a minuscule portrayal of the kind of obfuscation that
a Communist attorney will throw in the way. Every Senator ought
to read it. I offer it for the record.
Senator MCCLELLAN. I don't know what it contains. Is there any
reason why it shouldn't be received?.
Senator DODD. I don't know of any.
Mr. SOURWINE. This is the official transcript of the hearing in the
Elizabeth Gurley Flynn passport revocation case.
Senator MCCLELLAN. I will tell you what I would do. For the
moment, I would let it be introduced for reference, so we can read it,
and then we can determine what else to do with it.
Senator DODD. So ordered.
Mr. SoURWINE. Very good, sir.
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Senator McCL=Ax. It might. be for reference, for the Senators
only for the present, and let them determine it, and you can either
direct it be made a part of the record
Senator DODD. Very well.
Senator McCizLLAx. I don't know what is in it. I don't know if
there is anything in there that shouldn't be public. I suppose the
proceedings up to now errs private.
Mr. Sovawaxa. Well? the point is, Senator, this is an executive
record. Putting them in this record does not make it public.
Senator M?CLELLLN. I understand.
There may be some startling disclosures in it with respect to the
kind of procedures being followed down there. Off the record.
Discussion off the record. )
Senator Donn. We will recess at this time.
(Whereupon at 12:10 p.m. the committee recessed subject to the
call of the Chair.)
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STATE DEPARTMENT SECURITY
THURSDAY, JUNE 7, 1962
U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE To INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT
AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS,
OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:65 a.m., in room 300,
New Senate Office Building, Senator Roman L. Hruska presiding.
Also present: J. G. Sourwine, chief counsel of the subcommittee;
Benjamin Mandel, research director; and Frank Schroeder, chief in-
vestigator.
Senator HRUSKA. Counsel may proceed.
STATEMENT OF ROGER W. JONES, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY
FOR ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF STATE; ACCOMPANIED
BY ABRAM CHAYES, LEGAL ADVISER; AND ANDREAS LOWEN-
FELD, OFFICE OF LEGAL ADVISER, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. SoURWINE. Mr. Chairman, at the start I -should like to offer
for the record a letter by Senator Dodd addressed to Mr. Jones, and
a copy of Mr. Jones' reply, this letter having to do with the possibility
of any reprisals against Frances G. Knight, who was a witness here,
and Mr. Jones' assurance that there would be nothing like that. I
think that should be in the record.
Senator HRUSKA. Very well, it may be accepted and will be part
of the record at this point.
(The documents referred to follow:)
Hon. ROGER W. JONES,
Deputy Under Secretary for Administration,
Department of State, Washington, D.C.
DEAR MR. JONES : It has come to my attention as vice chairman of the Internal
Security Subcommittee that Miss Frances Knight, Director of the Passport
Office, may be in trouble because of her compliance with a subpena duces tecum
issued by this committee.
I do not wish to inject myself into the internal affairs of the State Depart-
ment, but this situation appears to involve the rights and powers of the com-
mittee, as well as the question of reprisals against a witness before the com-
mittee. It does not seem to me 'improper to ask, therefore, and I dd ask, that
the committee be advised of any charges brought or any disciplinary action
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 29 \pproved For KWMs Ab3M9M ? DP66B00403R000500120001-1
taken against Miss Knight or any other official or employee of the Department
as a result of compliance with a subpena of this committee or appearance and
testimony before this committee. `
Best personal regards.
Sincerely,
THOMAS J. DODD,
Vice Chairman, Internal Security Subcommittee.
Hon. THOMAS J. DODD, -
Vice Chairman, Internal Security Subcommittee,
U.S. Senate.
DEAR SENATOR DODD : Thank you for your frank letter of May 16 concerning
a response of the Director and Counsel of the Passport Office to a subpena issued
by the subcommittee on May 11 "for production of a transcript of the proposed
hearing in the Elizabeth Gurley Flynn case." I assure you of the Department's
desire at all times to cooperate with the subcommittees of the Congress, both
willingly and voluntarily. I believe that the testimony by Miss Knight and Mr.
Johnson demonstrated that desire. I regret, however, the Impression left with
the subcommittee by Miss Knight that she may be in trouble because of her
compliance with the subpena.
As the officer of the Department with general supervisory responsibilities for
the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs I was concerned about this par-
ticular incident for three reasons.
First, neither Miss Knight nor Mr. Johnson, upon accepting service of the
subpena, complied with provisions in the Department's regulations which have
been in force for many years and which were made a matter of record at the
time of Miss Knight's appearance before the subcommittee. I am sure you will
agree that it is essential for the Secretary of State or one of his principal depu-
ties to be promptly advised when subordinate departmental personnel accept
service of a subpena and to give authorization for compliance. I do not con-
sider that my action in calling attention to the failure to comply with regula-
tions was a disciplinary action. I do not contemplate bringing charges against
either Miss Knight or Mr. Johnson.
Second, the Department has taken more than ordinary care to conduct itself
with complete legal propriety and proper procedure in the administration of
passport regulations. In this case (revocation of the passport of Elizabeth
Gurley Flynn) the issue of proper procedure and the avoidance of any action
which might he considered prejudicial seem to us of the utmost importance
because of the relationship of the laws and the proceeding to the security of
the United States.
Third, the record demanded under the subpena was a part of a proceeding
which has not been concluded. In my judgment an incomplete proceeding, and
transcripts relating thereto, should not be introduced into the records of a con-
gressional committee prior to the completion of the proceeding unless the need
is so great as to permit no other course of action. I was gratified, therefore, to
learn that the subcommittee had ruled that the materials supplied in response
to the subpena would be held and not Introduced into the record at this time.
I believe that the subcommittee'R action will provide some very essential safe-
guards against any claim of prejudice which might otherwise be made by the
attorneys for Elizabeth Gurley Flynn.
With best personal wishes,
Sincerely yours,
Room W. Jonas.
Mr. SoURwIxE. Will you tell us, Mr. Jones, with whom was your
letter to Senator Dodd cleared before it was sent?
Mr. JoxES. The Office of the Legal Adviser.
Mr. Sovitwn . Do you mean Mr. Chayes or Mr. Lowenfeld?
Mr. JONES. To tell you the truth, I am not sure. I sent it down-
stairs and asked it be cleared. Mr. Chayes was actually out of town
then, or he was not, in at the time-I think that is correct.
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Mr. LOWENFELD. Yes.
Mr. JONES. But it was cleared by that office.
Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, in view of the fact these gentlemen
are both here together, is there any objection to asking questions of
first one and then the other?
Senator HRUSKA. On this point?
Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.
Mr. HRUSKA. None at all. I think it should be cleared up so that
we get the full intent of the correspondence.
Mr. SOURWINE. Does clearance of the letter, Mr. Lowenfeld, indi-
cate that you concurred?
Mr. LOWENFELD. I saw the letter and had it formally cleared. Yes,
I concurred in that, sure.
Mr. SouRWINE. Mr. Jones, do you agree with the testimony of Miss
Knight, that any regulation which states that we could not consider
confidential information makes it virtually impossible to deny pass-
port facilities to members of the Communist Party U.S.A.?
Mr. JONES. Would you repeat that? I have not seen the testimony.
Mr. SouRWINE. This is testimony from page 17 of her testimony,
that any regulation, and she was referring, of course, to passports,
any regulation that states we cannot consider confidential information
makes it virtually impossible to deny passport facilities to members
of the Communist Party U.S.A.
Mr. JONES. I don't think I could agree with that entirely, sir, no.
Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Lowenfeld, do you agree with that testimony
by Miss Knight?
Mr. LOWENFELD. No sir, I don't.
Mr. SouxwINE. I would like to offer for the record, Mr. Chairman,
a latter which has been received from Miss Knight. The substance
of the letter is to offer a substitute chronology for the chronology which
we more or less received from her since she was up here as a witness.
I don't know what the ruling of this committee will be regarding the
substitution of the one for the other, but I suggest that this letter and
the accompanying chronology be put in the executive records, and if
the committee decides to substitute they can do that later.
Senator HRUSKA. It will be received on that understanding and
on that basis.
(The document referred to is printed as an appendix to this testi-
mony, beginning at p. v.)
Mr. SOURWINE. This chronology, Mr. Chairman, refers under date
of January 5 to a memorandum of that date from Mr. Cieplinski,
Acting Administrator, to Mr. Roger Jones, proposing a revision of
the draft passport regulations, and .1 wonder if we might request that
a, copy of that memorandum be furnished for our records.
Mr. JONES. From Cieplinski to me, January 5?
Mr. SouxwINE. Yes, sir, proposing a revision of the Legal Division's
draft of the new passport regulations and requesting that approval
be withheld pending a reconciliation of differences of opinion.
Mr. JONES. I would be glad to examine that, sir, and to notify you
promptly.
(The Information referred to reads as follows:)
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 %proved For R@'eD2f9: WMP66B,00403ROO0500120001-1
DzpaZTMINT Or STSTJ;
ADMIHIBTaaTOB, Bu au or SSCUYITr ?ND Coaaur..sa. AYYAnBa,
January 5
1962
,
.
To : 0-Mr. Boger W. Jones.
From : 8CA-Michel Cleplinski, Acting Administrator.
Subject : Proposed regulations on the Issuance of passports
Attached are the Legal Adviser's proposed amendments on regulations cover-
ing the Issuance of passports (22 CFR Sec. 51.135-169) (Tab A). This draft
was transmitted to SCA by the Legal Adviser's Office on January 4, as a final
draft to be submitted for approval by the Secretary today and referred for im-
mediate publication In the Code of Federal Regulations. We have reviewed this
draft In careful detail and feel that as drafted it would be virtually Impossible
to administer and misleading in that it would not result in the denial of pass-
ports to any Communists except the most notorious. In other words, the
Legal Adviser's draft Is unacceptable to SCA and the Passport Office. For in-
stance, under section 51.138 (a) Procedure for Review of Tentative Denial, there
is provided (as underlined In red) that the applicant will be informed of the
evidence, etc. In part (b) of this section, It Is stipulated that the Passport
Office shall not make use of confidential security information. Further, In
section 15.142, the Board is precluded from using confidential information in
making its determinations. Again, in section 51,10 under Hearings, the appli-
cant must be informed of all evidence before the Board. Simply stated, the
Board will not consider or receive any confidential information which consti-
tutes the major portion of Information in Communist cases.
The Passport Ofl9ce, on December 15, 1981, had sent to the Legal Adviser's
Office Its ,version with comments on proposed rules and regulations governing
the issuance of passports. It is believed that the regulations as proposed by
PPT, particularly subpart (e), copy attached, Tab B, (the numbering system
does not coincide with that prepared in the Legal Adviser's Office) Is more
meaningful and realistic so far as concerns the proper administration of pass-
port control in the Communist area.
I strongly urge that the rules and regulations as proposed by the Legal Ad-
viser's Office be revised In certain Important aspects and cover those important
aspect provided in the version submitted by the Passport Office.
It would be appreciated If your office would withhold approval of the Legal
Adviser's proposal until these positions can be reconciled.
Attachments :
Tab A-Proposed amendments by the Legal Advi er's Office.
Tab B-Proposed regulations by the Passport Office.
Mr. SounwINE. All right. I have another item which perhaps
ought to be in our record, Mr. Chairman. These are the new passport
application forms. The fact that there were to be new forms was
mentioned earlier in this record. and we asked for a copy.
(The document referred to reads as follows:)
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 Approved For Releas@AQQ5&W22nvf eRlDP68M403R000500$f001-1
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CT_ ? antler .
0;E. Is Mr. AVltitt? authorized to speak to the. U.S. press
on behalf of the I)enart-nent of State
Ali-. I)tl.i.tty. )-tits. 114, is.
Senator Gain:. Are you now saying that lie was making statements
about this, i)ut that he was not informed on the subject f
All., 1)ILI,~Jti. I am st-ltlug that ht: was not informed as to the facts
of this intelligence operation any more. than the people. who made
the press statements for NAS.1 were informed of (Iii' facts of it.
Senator (xolcE. I)o you call that. responsible anti coordinated per-
formancc ?
Mr. We are. getting at. this stage, :senator, into another
question, the key question of intelligence. When You have something
as import a lit and secret a this, it. is important 14) limit the knowledge
to the minimum number of people and this was strictly limited
throughout the Government and we did limit it in tin State Depart-
uient.
tWFe (lid not think it was proper to inform our press people. There
was a special procedure for people who were informed of this, and
the prey people were not. so informed.
Senator (Moat'.. Mr. Secretary, I ;till not cluest.ioning you about the
initial cover statement issue you had in Turkey. I ?un asking you
about an official falsehood on May G, after you say the Departuient
knew of the. flight pattern, assumed the Kahane wasc[own, a whole. day
after you received information that tlie. pilot was probably alive and
in the afternoon of .litt day after even I had been informed. I ask
you again if you think this is an example of the coordination which
von earlier t4-1d its the I)cttartinent had.
11r. I iI.IAIy. Senator. I will answer that. I think it. took a major
effort which was re.tcbecl the following day that we were going to
abaandou our cover story and tell the trot II. 'T'hat decision could not
be readied rapidly and quickly. It, was reached after long sessions
with the Secretary on Saturday and until that was reached, we saw
no reason to inform our press officer of anything but the cover story
which is what we were standing by up until that time.
IIASI, FUT. Mit. M-ltl'I'E S STATEMENT
The Cii. ncm.v.%. Senator, may I interrupt-? I didn't understand
why fir. ..Mi(o wasn't required to clear his statement at this time
with yon.
Mr. I)n.r,o :. I am glad to answer that. Ali. W' bite sees the press
every day, and ho does not know in advance necessarily the detailed
quest ions that. It(, may be. asked.
If a question comes that he thinks lie does not know the answer to,
he does clear it wit It us.
Now, the. clay befou r, when eve put out our statement, it was given to
him and lie followed exactly what lie had been told. I Ie, did not make
any statement, that was quite as categoric as this statement lie made
the following day.
vin Why didn't ho stand on the one that had been
cleared?
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Mr. DILLON. This was just an answer to a question. Why he did it,.
lie thought he was telling the truth. I think he acted perfectly all
right. He did not think that this was a new question. He thought
he was following the cover story, which he was. So he made this
statement. It wasn't a statement; it was in answer to a question. I
want to emphasize that.
The CHAIRMAN. It was a very categorical statement that went far
beyond the other statement. That is what begins to complicate your
situation, doesn't it?
Mr. DILLON. Possibly to some extent, yes.
The CiIIAIRMAN. The Senator from Ohio.
IMPORTANCE OF INTELLIGENCE GATHERING ACTIVITIES
Senator LAu5CIIE. First of all, I want to pursue this question.
Shall we abandon or modify our efforts of gathering intelligence,
covering the military activities of potential aggressors?
First, I ask Mr. Herter this question. At any time during the ap-
pearance of Mr. Dulles, the Central Intelligence Agency Director,.
before this committee, do you know of him at any time being chal-
lenged or asked about how he acquired intelligence?
Secretary IIERTER. That I cannot answer at firsthand. My impres-
sion is that there was it very small group in the Senate with whom he
conferred. He has got this responsibility under the law, which was.
written by the Congress.
Senator LAUSCIIE. You have answered my question. Have you ever
heard of any member of this committee or any member of the Con-
gress asking the Central Intelligence Agency to discontinue acquiring
intelligence or to modify its methods?
Secretary IIr:RTER. No, I do not.
May I qualify that to this extent? I think that Senator Mansfield.
had introduced a measure which would provide for a different method
of coordinating with the Congress. That is the only thing I do
know of.
Senator LAUSCIIE. Would it be right to assume that at this very
moment there is great probability that there are Soviet intelligence
agents operating in our country?
Secretary IIERTER. I would assume so.
Senator LIUSCIIE. Do you know of any member of our Defense De-
partment in a responsible position, or any person in any government
who is responsible for security, taking the position that intelligence
of a potential enemy's conduct is not essential for the proper develop-
ment of a nation's own defense?
Secretary IIERTER. I do not.
Senator LAUSCIIE. Do I understand that you subscribe to the state-
ment made by the President that for the protection of the security
of our country it is essential that intelligence of potential enemies'
conduct be acquired?
Secretary IIERTER. I do.
Senator LAUSCIIE. Now than, this question : Do you feel that it
would be wise for our Government in the face of the discussions about
peace and disarmament and banning of nuclear tests to discontinue
our intelligence activities?
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
Secretai FIERIER. I do not.
Senator L.tuscnu. Would it be a danger to our country if at this
moment while we are discussing disarmament and banning of nuclear
tests we scuttle the Central Intelligence Agency
Secretary HERTER. I certainly would not advocate anything of the
kind.
Senator LAUSCIIE. What is it historically concerning men in a re-
sponsible position for the protection of a country, beginning from the
earliest days of recorded battles about the use of scouts and intelli-
gence agents, so as to properly guide a country in what it ought to do?
Secretary FIERIER. It is a custom, sir, that has grown up, I imagine,
ever since warfare began.
KIIRIISIICIIEI''S DECISION NOT TO rARTICIr.tTE IN SUMMIT CONFERENCE
Senator LAIISCIIE. Now then, the second question: Is it your con-
sidered opinion that when Iihrushchev came to Paris lie had already
decided not to participate in the summit conference?
Secretary HERTr:R. That is our best judgment.
Senator LACSCIIE. And that Judgment is formulated not upon
what he has said but what lie has done; is that correct?
Secretary HERTER. It is a combination of both. But it is mostly
in what he has said, and the assumption is that lie had received his
orders before he went to Paris.
Senator LAUSCIIE. Is it a fact that beginning in December 1959
and going down into April, he has made statements indicating that
the probability was that there would never be a conference?
Secretary IYERTER. Not the probability that there would never be
a conference but. that if a conference were held it would not turn out
to his satisfaction.
IKIIRIISIICIIEC'S MEETINGS WITII DE G ULLE AND MACMILLAN
Senator LAuSCIIE. Ile was scheduled to arrive in Paris on Sunday,
May 15; is that correct.?
Secretary IIERTER. That is correct.
Senator LAuscIIE. But instead of coming there on Sunday, May
15, he came there on Saturday, May 14.
Secretary IIERTER. That is right.
Senator LAUscuE.And on ,unday morning he, with Malinovsky,
at the early hour of 11 o'clock already had made an appointment to
see de Gaulle..
Secretary FIERIER. That is correct.
Senator LAusc1. And at that meeting, this vigorous statement
about what they expected of Eisenhower if Khrushchev were to at-
tend the conference was read.
Secretary IIFRTER. Yes; that was not only read but a copy of it was
given to General de Gaulle.
Senator LAIISCUE. Why do you think that he came there before his
scheduled visit of Sunday and made it Saturday?
Secretary FIERIER. Whey he came to Paris at all is the real question.
That is a question that general de Gaulle asked him at the time of
the one meeting when the four were present and to which the answer
was completely unsatisfactory.
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT ONF
Senator LAUSCHE. So that at 11 o'clock in the morning he met with
de Gaulle and laid down these four demands upon Eisenhower.
Secretary HERTER. That is right.
Senator LAUSCHE. Then at the hour of 1:30 in the afternoon he went
to Macmillan and to Macmillan repeated those demands, that unless
they were met he would not attend the conference.
Secretary HERTER. That is right.
Senator LAUSCIIE. Did anything happen between his arrival on
Saturday, his action at 11 o'clock in the morning on Sunday, and 4:30
on Sunday, that would have caused him to change his mind from
what he was thinking when he left Moscow?
Secretary IIERTER. Not a thing.
PREMIER KHRUSHCH.EV'S DEMANDS
Senator LAUSCHE. Now then, Mr. Secretary, getting down to these
demands that he made; that is, he demanded that Eisenhower de-
nounce the overflights; is that correct; and two, that he apologize to
the Soviet Union.
Secretary HER=,R. Yes.
Senator LAUSCHE. And three, that he punish those directly respon-
sible.
Secretary HERTER. Yes.
Senator LAUSCHE. And four, that Eisenhower promise not to repeat
these flights.
Secretary HERTER. Yes, may I add there, sir, that the demand for
the apology was added; it was not in the original document. It was
one that was added by him while he was in Paris as a fourth condition.
Senator LAuscUE. Can we assume that Khrushchev honestly ex-
pected that these demands that he made upon Eisenhower would be
complied with?
Secretary HERTER. He could not have possibly.
Senator LAUSCHE. That is additional proof confirming the assump-
tion that when he left Moscow he never intended to participate in the
conference.
Secretary HERTER. You are quite right, sir.
Senator LAuscHE. Why couldn't he have issued this statement while
he was in Moscow, and why did he go to Paris instead of making the
statement in Moscow?
Secretary HERTER. There it is a matter of speculation but I think
that the desire to dramatize himself, the fact that there would be 3,000
correspondents in Paris, that he would have a larger audience in that
place, led him to take this particular route.
Senator LAUSCHE. Was anything said anywhere about his train of
misdeeds, of the Communist Reds', beginning from the very day that
they were established as a country, in breaking treaties, in mass mur-
dering of people, including our American boys
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4 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE StMM1T CONFERENCE
Secretary ILr:ierlac, That was not in the brief meeting of the four.
The, only stateiuents that were made lay the President were the state-
meilts which were publicized. plus :not-her statement ]villa regard to
the U- ~_' not being a'ratn user] for (iii, pitrlro,c,. 't'hat commitment
of the President could] last, of course, only so long as he was President.
Senator L.rrsr-tir. I-oil have seen certain questions about which
I said I would like to get information. To the extent that it can be
done, I would like answer, to those questions prepared aura put into the
record. One, broken treaties. Twyo, lxla-tieipat ion-not. of Red Russia
but Red communism-in the Red Chinese-Soviet. provocation of
trouble throughout the world, their activities in the Iiatyn Forest, in
Quemoy and Nfatsit, in South Korea where thousands of our knieri-
can boys Were. killed, in Red Ilungai East Germany, and in Poland
when tlhe liberty fighters rose to pro cure liberty for themselves.
Secretary IIExaf:ta. Senator, I saw those questions as they are iii-
corporate(f in lire Congressional Record and we will be prepared to
answer them.
(The questions and answers referred to above appear in appendix 2.)
Senator Lati~sc-iir:, T want. to say I ant. not prejeared to put a halo
of honesty and holiness on Khrushchey and one of scorn and disgrace
upon my country, not in this hearing or any other place. That. is all
I have to say.
T9te Cti.~ttali.~\. Mr. Secretary, the time is a quarter to 1. 1 think
it would be a proper t line to adjourn until 2:30.
Senator WILL:r. May I ask one questions Mr. Chairntan
The, Cli.ant~r.ati. All right, (lie. Senator from 'Wisconsin is recog-
nized for a quest ion.
Senator ICti.Ev. We say that the first law of human nature is the
law of self-preservation. You have heard that said, have you not
Secretary IIEnri r;u. Yes, sir.
Senator'Wii,a:r. That applies to nations its well as individuals:
does it not ?
Secretary IIIiRTER. It does.
Senator WILEY. .end in watt tine we speak of what we have called
spying here; it is called spying, but in peacetime it is espionage:
is it not?
Secretary M.-Irma. Yes, sir,
Senator WILr:v. But there are difheretll rules that apply. too. are
there not? In wartime then it. generally means the penalty is death.
In peaceful times like we have now, the penalty dellenals entirely
more or less union (lie court arhninisteringit: is that right'?
Secretary Tlr:r,?ri:tc. Yes.
Senator''\Vii.i v. Is it generally conceded that the Kreualin has been
engaging in espionage not only in our own country but in virtually
all the countries oil earl ii and is still doing it? That is correct, is
it not?
Secretary IF:u Rea. That is correct.
Senator Wn,i:v. As demonstrated by Ambassador Lodge in the
United 'Nations the other day. they even tried to pull a stunt on our
Embassy in Russia : did you see that ?
Secretary IlEarrE:R. Yes, sir. [Deleted].
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Senator WILEY. Just this one thing. Now, then, if the first law of
human nature is the law of self-preservation, then the best means
that we can use to preserve the freedom of America, the CIA has
been using when it has been using the overflight, the U-2 means; is
that right?
Secretary HERTER. Yes, sir.
Senator Wn EY. Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. We will
return here at 2 :30.
Secretary IIrirTrit. 2:30.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir. I may say to the committee that the
Secretary has very kindly agreed to go on today and, if the ques-
tioning is not completed, to come back in the morning. We will
determine that at the end of today's session.
I hope we can make progress.
(Whereupon., at 12:45 p.m. the hearing was recessed, to reconvene
at 2 :30 p.m. of the same day.)
Present : Senators Fulbright, Ilumphrey, Mansfield, Gore, Lausche,
Wiley, Hickenlooper, Aiken., Carlson and Williams.
The CIIAII ALAN. The committee will come to order.
Mr. Secretary, there are one or two statements in your own state-
ment I would like to have developed a bit for clarification.
On page 12, at the bottom of the page of the mimeographed state-
ment you say as follows :
Proponents within the Communist bloc of an aggressive course must not be
encouraged by signs of weakness on our part. Proponents of a peaceful course
should be encouraged by our readiness to get on with outstanding international
business in a sober and rational manner.
In which of these groups do you include Mr. Khrushchev?
STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTIAN A. HERTER, SECRETARY OF
STATE-Resumed
Secretary IIElrnui. That I think would be very difficult to answer
categorically.
There have been a good many estimates inade as to whether or not
he really means some of the things that he has said with regard to
peaceful coexistence, with regard to disarmament and other matters.
There is another group that feels that this is a front for the same
power line that Stalin used to take.
I don't think it is possible yet to answer that categoricall y.
I think that events are likely to show which of those groups he
belongs to.
The CHAIRMAN. Who did you have in mind when you wrote that?
Maybe you can't categorically for all time designate him, but what
has been your view and the view of the Department as to which group
he belongs in? I think that is rather important as to how we treat
him. Is it in our interest to discourage him? If he were a member
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of the aggressive course group, I suppose it. would be. If he. is a
member of the group who are proponents of the peaceful course, then
it would be to our advantage to encourage or be cooperative within
limits. I wondered why you put that in there if von didn't have
some idea of who does belong to these groups or how they are
constituted.
Secretary IlERTER. iat I was trying to describe here was in effect
a middle course. Insofar as Mr. Ishrushchev is concerned. I think
those who have dealt with him directly were convinced that he was
genuinely in favor of a dis:u?niament program. that he genuinely
wanted, for the sake of developing the economy of Russia, a reduction
both in expense from a monetary point of view and from a human
point of view, of the great burden of armaments.
Certainly there I would ut him in the second category. His more
recent behavior, however, has shaken my belief that this is entirely
genuine, and, as I say, I think that only the events of the next few
months and possibly even of the next few years can give a final
answer to what you have asked.
The CrrararAN. Can you identify any other members or any people
you had in mind in citing these groups?'
Secretary HERTER. 16. I would rather have those who are real
Russian experts do that. kind of identification, those. who are familiar
with the individuals, more familiar than I am.
There is no question but what there are still
The CHAIRMAN. Would you care to have Mr. Bohlen comment on
this question?
Secretary IIEnmR. I would be very glad to have him, if you wish
to.
The CHAnmrAN. It would be very good to have him comment. He
is recognized, is he not, as one of our best Russian experts?
Would you care to comment on this, :dir. Bohlen?
Mr. BOIILEN. Mr. Chairman, my experience has been that it is not
always possible to identify a trend in the Soviet Union with individ-
uals. As the Secretary said earlier we literally know nothing of what
goes on in the hierarchy. My impression of the statement the Secre-
tary made is that it is possible to detect trends. You cannot identify
people with them. My experience with the Soviet officials is that they
follow whatever the agreed line is, whether it is hard or whether it is
soft., with great consistency, and they just do not reveal sufficiently to
any foreigner whattheir inner thoughts are to identify one individual
with one trend or another. But I think the indications are that both
trends exist.
The CHAIRMAN. Well , don't you think we know more about Mr.
Khrushchev than any other Soviet leader? More of us have seen him.
He has been around more than any other. Don't, you have any view
as to which of these groups Mr. Khrushchev would'be identified with?
Mr. Boii x. Well, any acquaintanceship with Mr. K hrushchev was
when I was in there as Ambassador when he was not quite as promi-
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nent as he is now. I would merely say that he, along with all of them
are excellent actors [deleted] and are able to maintain whatever the
common line is in their dealings with foreigners. I think also there
is a question of time. I think, as the events of Paris showed, that
there have been certain shifts of emphasis inside the Soviet Union
which were manifested in part by what they did in Paris.
Therefore, it is conceivable that Mr. Khrushchev could have been
entirely serious in the line he was pursuing prior to Paris, and be
equally serious in pursuing one diametrically opposite to it.
The CHAIRMAN. If I may interpolate, do you mean that prior to
the U-2 incident Mr. Khrushchev may have been identified with the
second group; that is, proponents of a peaceful course?
Mr. BOIILEN. I would not segregate out the U-2 incident alone,
Mr. Chairman. I think, as outlined in the Secretary's statement,
there seemed to us to be three elements involved in this matter, and
I think it is difficult to assess the value of each. But, certainly, I
would say his doubt as to the success from his point of view of the
summit conference, that some of the views voiced by the Chinese
Communists had probably supporters within the Soviet hierarchy,
and the U-2 incident together brought about this change.
I have no difficulty
IDENTIFICATION WITH TRENDS IN TIIE SOVIET UNION
The CHAIRMAN. I didn't wish to make you review all that was
said there. I was merely trying to find the inner meaning of this
particular statement. I thought that I could elicit some clarifica-
tion since many of us don't know about these proponents of these
courses or about any of these groups of people.
Mr. BoIILEN. The answer, Mr. Chairman, is that I think we don't
know. That you cannot tell whether X, Y, or Z in the Soviet hierar-
chy, what particular line he advocates, because he never reveals any
difference, even a shade of difference publicly, with what is the
agreed line. It is quite impossible, I believe, for anybody to tell who
within the leading group stands for one trend or the other. You
can only detect from external evidence that there appear to be cer-
tain divergent trends and the individuals may not remain the same.
WAS THERE A DECISION NOT TO SUSPEND FLIGHTS AS SUMMIT MEETING
APPROACHED?
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. One other statement, Mr.
Secretary, on page 5, point 2:
The decision not to suspend this program of flights, as the summit meeting
approached, was a sound decision.
Can you tell us who made that decision, and when, and of the
circumstances?
Secretary HERTER. That is a decision that I think has been carried
over the whole 4-year period. Here, sir, we get into certain technical
aspects of when these flights would properly be conducted and could
not be conducted, but I think the technical reasons had better be kept
in executive session.
The finding of a good time for a flight of this kind in relation to
current events is almost impossible if you had known in advance that
it is going to fail.
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The real issue was how urgent. was the information and is there
anv one time (drat, is more favorable than another? Front a technical
point, of view the (line was more favorable at that (late than another.
From it diplomatic point of view, it scented to me that with the
President scheduled to go to ixussia later, (hero would have been the
same difficult%,; when Iiltrushchev was here there was the same difli-
cu1tY, in efi't ct one would run into one time after another where
dipl~nnat ically it would have been a bad brie.
The Cu.ne..r.tx. I don't think I iuake myself clear. I understood
front your Inrrious statement and others that the program was agreed
upon, and it. was running along without being suspended. But this
statement seems to leave the implication that a specific decision was
taken not. to suspend ihetu in view of the conference approaching.
Was such a decision taken?
Secretary Ilta,rrat. That I can't. tell you. I was not it party to that.
The Cip:tnttr:i.x. Well, this says:
The decision not to suspend this program of flights, its the summit meeting
approached, was it sound decision.
Was t here any decision taker not to suspend it ?
Secretary IIr~rriF.tt. I know that when the (natter came before inc.
which vas some time (previous from the point of view of the continua-
tionof the ptograin, when ccoinlitions tit ere appropriate, I (1]( 11101 inter-
pase any objection to it. Because of any diplomatic event. that. was cont-
ing
The CIm. iiutt. x. Is it fair to say (lien that no specific decision not
to suspend them was taken? It. was allowed to go along without any
decision being taken to suspend them.
Sec,retar,y IIi:rrrr:rt. I think that is correct.
The Crt.urnMAx. Therefore, the other way around is that rto posit ire
decision was taken not to suspend theni is that. correct ?
Secretary Ili,.icri it. That is right.
The CllAT Ut1. :. That st-a(c'ment, I think) needs clarification. I
think, to me, it (limits that at some point prior to 'May 1 a specific
decision was taken not to suspend their in view of tite simtmit, Isn't
that a legitimate interpretation of that sentence?
Secretary IlFatrr:a. I think (hat is correct. May I read What the
President said on that subject.? IIe: said :
As to the tinning, the question was really whether t.) halt the program and thus
forego the gathering of important information that was essential and that was
likely to be unavailable ni a later date.
The program went forward.
The Cii.invu.tx. Then that decision was made by the President.
Secretary- Iliacimit. Oil, lie was certainly consulted with regard to
the continuation of the program.
The Cimritm.kx, Do you know when that decision was made ?
Secretary IliiTEit. #o.
The CiEAutM.vx. Was it priortoMay 1?
Secretary IIERTEIt. I couldn't tell you.
The Crr.UuiM:%x. Mr. Secretary, do you know whether there was a
moratorium on these flights during the meeting at Camp David?
Secretary IIi?:trrEit. No. As far as I know, that question never arose.
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE 59
The CHAIRMAN. So that there was not as far as you know?
Secretary HERTER. As far as I know, there was not.
PRESS SECRETARY IIAGERTY'S KNOWLEDGE
The CHAIRMAN. I refer to this matter that Mr. Lincoln White did
not know that Powers might be alive, the last question before we
recessed. Did Mr. Hagerty know whether or not he was at that
point ?
Secretary IIERTER. That I will have to ask Mr. Dillon to answer.
I have no direct information.
Mr. DILLON. I have no way of knowing whether Mr. Hagerty knew
or not. In the ordinary course of business, a telegram such as the one
which informed us of this rumor-it's only a rumor that we had
received through other diplomats in Moscow-such a telegram would
have been transmitted for information to the White House staff.
Whether Mr. Hagerty knew about it or not, I don't know.
QUESTION OP SOUNDING OUT PREMIER KIIRUSIICIIEV'S F EELINGS
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, was any effort made on the part of
our Ambassadors or anyone from the Department, after the incident,
to pursue Mr. Khrushchev's feelings?
Was anyone instructed to approach him and express any regret or
in any way to reconcile him to forgive or overlook this incident?
'Secretary IIERTER. No, I don't know of any such thing.
The CHAIRMAN. No approach was made?
Secretary IIERTER. No.
IMPLICATION THAT FLIGHTS WOULD CONTINUE
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, what were the considerations which
led to the decision, not only to assume responsibility for the flight, but
to imply that the flights would continue in the future?
Secretary HERTER. I have to take responsibility for the statement
that was interpreted and if I may, I would like to read you exactly
what was said on that score.
This is a statement that was interpreted that we were going to con-
tinue the flights :
The Government of the United States would be derelict to its responsibility
not only to the American people but to free peoples everywhere if it did not, in
the absence of Soviet cooperation, take such measures as are possible unilaterally
to lessen and to overcome this danger of surprise attack. In fact the United
States has not and does not shirk this responsibility.
That is the statement that was interpreted that we were going to
continue the flights, and it seems to me it was a pretty far-fetched
interpretation.
The CHAIRMAN. Then do you mean in that statement you did not
intend to convey the view or the possibility that the flights would be
continued; is that correct?
Secretary IIERTER. No; what I was saying there was just what I
have testified to today ; that from the point of view of our own in-
terests and that of the whole free world, it is essential for us to do
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whatever we properly can in order to acquire information to avoid
surprise attack or to be prepared for it.
The C:' IIAm rA.N. But in view of that statement, do you think that
Mr. Khrushchev could accept it and continue the conference?
Secretary IiERTER. Yes; I certainly do, if he had wanted to.
The CuAIRx?:irrER. I do.
Senator WIL.EY. I didn't get the import of the questions when I
came in that apparently referred to some different. groups. What is
the name of tie young man who defected the other day? I guess
that is what you call it. He testified on
Senator L:~lsciiE. Meet the Press,
Senator Wn.EY. Meet the Press. It. is a long, Russian name. I put
what lie said into the record today. But one of the important things
he brought out, and I would like to get the former Ambassador's at-
tention on this, was that there is a group of young people growing up
in Russia who have different ideas, and he was about to go into detail
on it when time ran out. But anion other things, he is the one who
said-and this is important-he said some months ago that Khru-
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EVENTS INCIDENT TOE THE' SUMMIT CONFERENCE 6I-
shchev and the powers in being would not permit the President to
come to Russia, that they would find some excuse.
Now, that is all in what he said over the radio here a couple of
weeks ago. That confirms, I presume your own idea that when
Khrushchev came to Paris, he had already decided that he was
going to throw the bombshell, and he would refuse to invite the
President, and so forth; is that right?
Secretary HERTER. That is right."
Senator WILEY. So this is something that didn't result from the
downing of the plane.
I want to ask you a question. Have you any definite information
as to whether or not this young Powers is alive?
Secretary HERTER. No, sir. We have no information other than
that which the Russians have furnished to us.
Senator WILEY. If that plane had been shot down, do you think the
instruments that he had with him would have remained intact?
Secretary HERTER. There, sir, I am not skilled enough in the tech-
nique of shooting down planes. But I should think it is very doubtful
if he was hit by a rocket whether either he or the plane would have.
come down intact.
Senator WILEY. Is there any thought that perhaps they have the
plane? They claim they have the instruments and they have shown
something which wasn't the plane. Do you think they have that,
intact?
Secretary IIERTER. They have shown a later photograph of a plane
which those who built the plane feel is the plane itself. They have
also shown pieces of the plane in Gorky Park in Moscow when they
invited all the diplomats to come and look at it, and I think our people
feel that that is a genuine part of the plane.
INTERNAL CONDITIONS IN RUSSIA
Senator WILEY. I want to ask the former Ambassador if it is true
that the youth in Russia, the now class of youth, is growing up like'
this fellow said. Someone said if he had been privileged to carry on
his answer he would have said they are not satisfied with their standard
of living, that they are not satisfied with the little opportunity they
have to express themselves in the political life of Russia. Do you
know whether that would be true or not?
Mr. BOIILEN. I think it is a fair assumption, Senator. Of course,
as you know, the possibilities for contacts in there during the period.
I was there were considerably less than they are now. The country
is still totally controlled by the mechanism of the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union. They control all modes of expression by press,
meetings, or anything else, so it is very difficult to get any overt signs
of the feelings of the youth or any other section of the population.
But there are certain indications that the youth are looking forward'
a.t some time in the future to considerably different circumstances.
They hope for better material conditions and also undoubtedly hope
for a period when they will have more freedom of expression and
more ability to participate in the political life of their country.
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6? EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
But this is very hard to document because people do not talk openly
and freely in the Soviet Union.
Senator WILEY. Well, you know that ferment. generally is all over
this world. You know that the President of Turkey has been kicked
out.. You saw that today, and you know what is happening elsewhere..
Is there any reason why that yeast or ferment. should not. be operating
in Russia among the youngsters?
Mr. Butii,EN. There is no reason why it should not be and it. is a
logical assumption it, is. But. I should also say that the controls in a
-society like ti c Soviet Union are ver tight. Indeed and I have seen
no sign that those controls are breaking down or weakening to the
point. where the party is not in com fete control of the situation.
They are able to stifle'? if you will, or hold in check this ferment due
to the nature of their system.
Senator W ILEY. Out of the 200 million Russians, how many of them
do you think belong to the Communist Party?
Mr. I think the latest figure is sonie?where in the neighbor-
hood of 8l,, million.
Senator WYLEI-. Thank you. That is all.
The CII UR3L N. The Seirator from Montana?
QUESTION: OF IN`DICiTIO\ 3 THAT KIIRT'S1T TH C WOULD SCtTFLE SU- MTF
CONFERENCE
Se.naicx' 1f. NSFlrt.n.:tlr. Secretary, it hit,; been reported that- at. the
house liearings, you said there were indications that. even before
11Ia.s t> t?he. Russians planned to scuttle the confe rence.
Now, it seems to me if we are gointo estimate the. importance of
the U-2 incident. in the collapse of the-summit, we need to fix the date
when these indications in any significant fashion began to appear. I
would appreciate, then, in the interest of saving time, yes or no answers
to certain questions which I am about to ask unless there is a need of
an elaboration.
The first question: Are You aware whether any member of the
Cabinet. or the. President had any reason to believe before. May 15
when I irushchev made his demands for an apology and so forth,
that lie would come to Paris and leave as he did .
Secretary IIE:RTF.R. No.
Senator MIANSFrE .n. Were there any indic rtions that Khrushchev
planned to scuttle the conference before the U--2 plane was shot down
on May 1 ?
Secretary IhirrsR. No.
r NDF.R .SECRETARY nrr.LON'S SrEF.CII
Senator NfAxsvim.n. Did Iehruslichev's Baku speech precede or fol-
low JIr. Dillon's speech to the AFIr-CIO convent ion ?
Secretary IIERTER. Tt followed it..
Senator AN-sFiEi.n. Would you classify :1Ir. Dillon's speech as very
much in the spirit of Camp David or would you say it. was an excel-
lent, forthright and ant i-Communist. statement. somewhat oblivious
to the. spirit 'of Camp David. the kind of speech which any official of
the State Department might have, made before that historic meeting?
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT
Secretary HERTER. That I can't qualify with a yes or no answer,
Senator.
Senator MANSFIELD. You can go into detail there.
Secretary IIERTER. I would say this, that Mr. Dillon's speech was
almost a requirement as an answer to the allegations that had been
made by Mr. Khrushchev against Adenauer and the Germans and
his continued repetition which I have given the chronology of, of the
fact that they were going to take this unilateral position sooner or
later without its being an absolute ultimatum on the subject of Berlin,
Germany.
Senator MANSFIELD. In other words, Mr. Secretary, speeches which
you and Mr. Dillon made were a counteraction to the gradual harden-
ing of Mr. Khrushchev's speeches in the period preceding that?
Secretary IIE,RT ,R. Entirely.
QUESTION OF STATE DEPARTMENT KNOWLEDGE OF U-2 FLIGHT
Senator MANSFIELD. Did Secretary Dillon propose that a U-2
flight be undertaken prior to the summit conference?
Mr. DILLLON. No.
Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Dillon, as acting Secretary, were you
aware beforehand of the scheduling of the U-2 flight over the Soviet
Union an May 1 ?
Mr. DILLON. No, I was not aware of it.
I was aware that there was a program of flights that might take
place at some time when the weather was right but I think I was
informed of that maybe a month or two before this actual time, and
I had nothing to do with it afterward because I didn't in the ordinary
course of my duties.
Senator MANSFIELD. Your knowledge was, in effect, general
knowledge?
Mr. DILLON. Yes.
Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. IIerter happening to be out of the country
at the time was, I assume, unaware of any specific flight but pe+r
haps had general knowledge that these flights were being undertaken:
and had been over a period of years.
Secretary IIFsRTER. I didn't know there was a flight underway. The
first knowledge I received was when I was in Ankara. All I heard
was this same report that a plane was down.
PRESIDENT'S ASSUMPTION OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR FLIGHT
Senator MANSFIELD. Now, both of you have had general knowledge
of this : Would it be a fair assumption to say, despite the fact that
the President undertook, in a certain sense, personal responsibility for
this particular flight, that he, too, likewise, had only general knowl-
edge but that because of his position as the Chief of State, he would
be held responsible under any circumstances because of his position
of responsibility?
Secretary IIERTER. That is correct.
Might I just qualify one thin; ? When you say he was familiar
with this particular flight and his timing, so far as I kn w all of us
were familiar with alternate possibilities of flights but not this par-
ticular flight as such.
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Senator MANSFIELD. That would apply to the Department of State
and the President.
Secretary IIEinnu. That is correct.
STATUTORY AUTHORITY FOR FLIGHTS
Senator MANSFIELD. From what legislation or Executive orders, or
both, was the authority for these flights of deep penetration derived?
Secretary IIERZ-En. Well, presuma fly from the fact that I have here
before me-I am told that this applied to two specific acts. The one
that I am particularly familiar with, that I had a moment ago, is the
one creating the Central Intelligence Agency. The other is the Na-
tional Security Act..
Senator MANsmEr.D. Would it be possible to have copies for the
record at this point?
Secretar MIEirirEn. Yes.
Senator ANSFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I ask that they be included in
the record at this point.
The CIIAni tAN. Without objection it is so ordered.
(The provisions in the National Security Act relating to the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency follow:)
EXCERPT FROM NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947
(Public Law 253, 80th Coug., July 26,1947; 61 Stat. 405)
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY'
SEC. 102. (a) There is hereby established under the National Security Council
a Central Intelligence Agency with a Director of Central Intelligence who shall
be the head thereof, and with a Deputy Director of Central Intelligence who
shall act for, and exercise the pourers of, the Director during his absence or
disability. The Director and the Deputy Director shall be appointed by the
President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, from among the
commissioned officers of the armed services, whether In an active or retired
status, or from among individuals in civilian life: Provided, however, That at
no time shall the two positions of the Director and Deputy Director be occupied
simultaneously by commissioned officers of the armed services, whether in an
active or retired status.
(b) (1) If a commissioned officer of the armed services is appointed as Di-
rector, or Deputy Director, then-
(A) in the performance of his duties as Director, or Deputy Director, he
shall be subject to no supervision, control, restriction, or prohibition (mili-
tary or otherwise) other than would be operative with respect to him if he
were a civilian In no way connected with the Department of the Army, the
Department of the Navy, the Department of the Air Force, or the armed
services or any component thereof ; and
(B) he shall not possess or exercise any supervision, control, powers, or
functions (other than such as he possesses, or is authorized or directed to
exercise, as Director, or Deputy Director) with respect to the armed services
or any component thereof, the Department of the Army, the Department of
the Navy, or the Department of the Air Force, or any branch. bureau, unit,
or division thereof, or with respect to any of the personnel (military or
civilian) of any of the foregoing.
(2) Except as provided In paragraph (1), the appointment to the office of
Director, or Deputy Director, of a commissioned officer of the armed services,
and his acceptance of and service in such office, shall In no way affect any status,
office, rank, or grade he may occupy or bold in the armed services, or any emolu-
ment, perquisite, right, privilege, or benefit Incident to or arising out of any such
status, office, rank, or grade. Any such commissioned officer shall, while serving
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
in the office of Director, or Deputy Director, continue to hold rank and grade not
lpwer than that in which serving at the time of his appointment and to receive
the military pay and allowances (active or retired, as the case may be, including
personal money allowance) payable to a commissioned officer of his grade and
length of service for which the appropriate department shall be reimbursed from
any funds available 'to" defray the expenses of the Central Intelligence Agency.
He also shall be paid by the Central Intelligence Agency from such funds an
annual compensation at a rate equal to the amount by which the compensation
established for such position exceeds the amount of his annual military pay and
(3) The rank or grade of any such commissioned officer shall, during the
period in which such commissioned officer occupies the office of Director of
Central Intelligence, or Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, be in addition
1-o the numbers and percentages otherwise authorized and appropriated for the
armed service of which he is a member.3
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 6 of the Act of August 24, 1912
(37 Stat. 555), or the provisions of any other law, the Director of Central Intelli-
gence may, in his discretion, terminate the employment of any officer or employee
of the Agency whenever he shall deem such termination necessary or advisable in
the interests of the United States, but such termination shall not affect the
right -of such officer or employee to seek or accept employment of any other
department or agency of the Government if declared eligible for such employment
by the United States Civil Service Commission.
(d) For the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several
Government departments and agencies in the interest of national security, it
shall be the duty of the Agency, under the direction of the National Security
Council-
(1) to advise the National Security Council in matters concerning such
intelligence activities of the Government departments and agencies as relate
to national security ;
(2) to make recommendations to the National Security Council for the
coordination of such intelligence activities of the departments and agencies
of the Government as relate to the national security ;
(3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security,
and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within
the Government using where appropriate, existing agencies and facilities:
Provided, That the Agency shall have no police, subpena, law-enforcement
powers, or internal-security functions : Provided further, That the depart-
ments and other agencies of the Government shall continue to collect,
evaluate, correlate, and disseminate departmental intelligence : And provided
further, That the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for
protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure;
(4) to perform, for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies, such
additional services of common concern as the National Security Council
determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally ;
(5) to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence
affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from
time to time -direct.
(e) To the extent recommended by the National Security Council and approved
by the President, such intelligence of the departments and agencies of the Gov-
ernment, except as hereinafter provided, relating to the national security shall
be open to the inspection of the Director of Central Intelligence, and such intel-
ligence as relates to the national security and is possessed by such departments
and other agencies of the Government, except as hereinafter provided, shall be
made available to the Director of Central Intelligence for correlation, evaluation,
and dissemination : Provided, however, That upon the written request of the
Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation shall make available to the Director of Central Intelligence such infor-
mation for correlation, evaluation, and dissemination as may be essential to the
national security.
2 Civilian Compensation-Subsections (a) and (b) supplemented by section 4, Public
Law 359 `81st Congress, October 15, 1949 (63 Stat. 880), increased annual compensation
to $16,060 and $14,000, for the Director and Deputy Director, respectively per annum ;
subsections (c); (d), (e), and (f) from section 102, Public Law 253, 80th dongress, July
26, 1947 (61 Stat. 495). Sections 104(a)(2) and 105(26), Public Law 854 84th Con-
gress, July 31, 1956, increased the annual compensation to $21,000 and $20,600, respec-
tively, for the Director and Deputy Director.
a As amended by Public Law 15, 83d Congress (67 Stat. 20).
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(f) Effective when the Director first appointed under subsection (a) has taken
office-
(1) the National Intelligence Authority (11 Fed. Reg. 1337, 1339, February
5, 1946) shall cease to exist ; and
(2) The personnel, property, and records of the Central Intelligence Group
are transferred to the Central Intelligence Agency, and such group shall
cease to exist. Any unexpended balances of appropriations, allocations, or
other funds available or authorized to be made available for such Group
shall be available and shall be authorized to be made available in like manner
for expenditure by the Agency.
? S a s s ?
Senator MANSrrrr.D. Mr. Secretary, by what authority have these
flights now been suspended ?
Secretary IIEi iTR. Senator, I have now got before me the National
Security Act of 1047, and if you wish we to read the pertinent para-
graph Twill lie gl ad to do so.
Senator MANSFrrr.D. No, I would just like to have the pertinent
parts incorporated in t lie executive record.
Secretary-111,MT :n. Right.
Senator MANSFIELD. Nov the question, to repeat, is by what au-
thority have these flights now been suspended
.
Secretary IIFitTER. By direction of the. President.
Senator MANSFIELD. 'By a Presidential directive. Could we have a
copy of that for the record ?
Secretary Hrr-.TER. Yes; I assume so. I don't know whether it was
given in writing or whether it was done by word of mouth.
Senator 4hixsFrEi.n. Well, will you look into it and see what you
can do to comply with the. rerluest?
Secretary IIERTER. Yes.
(It was later reported by the Department of State that the directive
was oral.)
Senator MANSFIELD. Will this order suspending the flights auto-
matically remain in force after President Eisenhower leaves office
and until it is superseded by another order of some future President?
Secretary IlEirri:it. It- could be. The. President's responsibility as
Commander in Chief which gives him the right to give an order of
this kind would, of course, expire. with him. It. would only be
through some treaty obligation that there would be a binding commit-
ment on the part of the United States to carry beyond his term.
Senator if tslllr,n. Do I understand you correctly, then, to state
that this order would automatically die wvitlt the leaving of office by
President. Eisenhower, and to become effective again would have to be
once again initiated by the. next President?
Secretary HERER. ~I believe another President would be free to do
as he sees fit.
EFFECT OF I'-2 INCIDENT ON KIIRUSIICTIEV'S POSITION IN arss "
Senator AIANSFIF.I.n. Have Russian experts in the executive branch
suggested the possibility that Khrushchev's position at home may have
become seriously undermined?
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Secretary IIEIrTEII. Yes.
Senator MANSFIELD. Do you believe that the U-2 may have been a
contributing factor to this undermining?
Secretary IIE UEE.. It may have been. May I elaborate on that?
It may have been in the sense that it must have been a great shock
to both the military and to the civilian leaders in Russia to find that
they had been as open as they were for such a long period of time.
Senator MANSFIELD. And to him as well.
Secretary IIEItr1u. To him as well.
Senator MANSFIELD. If Khrushchev should be forced out of power,
is it the thinking of the Russian experts in the Department that his
successor is likely to be .a man more amenable to friendly and peaceful
dealings with the West?
Secretary HERTEIR. That, sir, I cannot answer categorically. I
think that that. is a pure matter of guesswork.
Senator MANSFIELD. All right.
What, in the view of our Russian experts, is the most probable
coalition of influential forces in the Soviet Union and in world com-
munism that could bring about Khrushchev's downfall?
Secretary HERTER. There, sir, I am afraid of my own knowledge I
could not answer that. If you would like Mr. Bohlen to answer that,
he is as good an authority as we have on the subject.
Senator MANSFIELD. If you will, Mr. Bohlen. But before you do,
I would like to throw out indications that perhaps the military, the
Chinese Communists and forces of that kind, might be considered.
Mr. BOIILEN. Senator, I honestly in all sincerity think it is not
possible to answer that question. I think in dealing with the Soviet
Union in view of the general secrecy prevailing in the Communist
bloc it is only after the event that you can hope to trace them back
and see what particular influences have seemed to have brought about
given decisions. There is literally no way in which a foreigner can
ascertain what the varying degrees of influence of all factors which
go into the making of any particular event. If I might I will give
you one illustration of secrecy. I was not there but in June 1957 for
10 days the Presidium of the Central Committee and the Central
Committee itself met in a violent inner row which resulted in the
-expulsion from both of those bodies of Molotov, Kaganovich, Malen-
kov, and several others.
This went on for 10 days in Moscow and no foreigner in the capital
and mighty few Russians knew anything about it.
We had trained observers there. There was an extremely alert
U.S. press corps and not one of them got any inkling of this major
development. This I merely cite to show the degree of secrecy and
if you are trying to get 'these things you are in truth looking into a
crystal ball and a very cloudy one at that.
Senator MANSFIELD. What you have said, Mr. Bohlen, is a reinforce-
ment of thoughts you have previously stated in response to questions
propounded to you by the Senator from Wisconsin.
Mr. BOHLEN. That's right, sir.
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Senator MANSFIELD. And, once again that secrecy is so great there
that it is impossible for a westerner to find out what goes on in many
instances until after the fact is accomplished.
Senator MANSFIELD. Is it the view of the experts in the Department,
the Russian experts, that Khruslicllev, even if he remains in power,
will now take a harder line, a reversion to cold war type tactics in
dealing with the Western nations?
Mr. BoiiLE.-4. The indications at present are, and I ani speaking at
present, that this will not necessarily be so.
I think we can expect a propaganda campaign. The indication
from his own statements and from such information as we have re-
ceived from Moscow, is that there seems to be no determined policy to
return to the depths of the cold war at this time.
Senator !NfANsFIEW. Would you say that if that reversion does takb
place, taking the opposite tack from what you have just said, and is
pushed by the Kremlin or Khrushchev or his successor, that it will
make more difficult the maintenance of peace?
Mr. BOIILE\. It would if it returns to a line. that we would call
the lowest phase of the cold war, it most certainly would, Senator.
However, there are degrees in this thing of return to the cold war sit-
uation which are impossible to assess and which might not materially
increase the danger of war. But if it went all out., sealed off the
Soviet Union and the Communist bloc from contact. with the outside
world, attempted to exert pressures wherever they thought they could
do so I think undoubtedly a much more dangerous world situation
would be created.
Senator M.x sFIEI.n. Mr. Chairman, I have other questions but I
don't want to take too much time.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hickenlooper?
Senator ITICKE\ LnnrER. I don't have any questions at this time.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Humphrey, did I overlook you?
Senator ITrNn'nREr. I came in late., Senator. If any other Senator
wants to go ahead, it is all rigght.
The CIIAniMM.%N. Senator liforse,are you ready?
Senator. 1ioasn. I will yield to Senator Humphrey.
SECRETARY IIERTI:R'S KNOWLEDGE OF FLIGIM
Senator HuuruIREY. If the, question I ask, Mr. Secretary, has al-
ready been asked, just brush it aside. I don't want to take any of
your time on that..
Did anyone ask as to whether or not you had any personal knowledge
of the U-2 flight.?
Secretary IIERTFit. Of the program ?
Senator IIu?Mrlisi-. No, of the particular flight.
Secretary ITF.RTFR. It was included, I said it was included-I am
sure it was included in a group of flights that I had been asked
whether I had any objections to them.
Senator ITi'irrirnFV. If you wanted to, could you have effectively
vetoed such a Policy?
Secretary IIERTER. No; I could only have given my advice to the
President.
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Senator Hua~PIIREY. Would the Vice President be aware of these
decisions?
Secretary HERTER. I think that as a member of the National Secu
city Council, he was aware of the program in the larger sense. I doubt
if he was familiar with any of the individual flights as such, but he
may have been.
Senator HuMPnREY. The reason I asked that question was that the
Vice President intimated on a television program, I believe the day
before -the President's announcement in Paris, that the flights should
continue. The next day the President announced that he had already
canceled them.
The Vice President said they would continue, and the next day the
President announced that they had been suspended.
What I am asking is, would the Vice President, as a member of the
Security Council, have any opportunity of knowing the decision that
had been made by the President?
Secretary IIERTER. There, the days followed so quickly one on an-
other that I just couldn't answer that, whether that opportunity would
have been offered or not.
Senator HuMPIIREY. What I am trying to get at is the policy-
making machinery.
We have a subcommittee, as you know, that is studying the policy-
making machinery of the Government, the Jackson subcommittee.
I am a member of that subcommittee. We had recently before the
subcommittee Mr. Kennan. We have had many of the prominent
officials of Government and former officials of Government.
The program of the reconnaisance flights was an established pro-
gram, and apparently was agreed upon by the 'Security Council; is
that correct?
Secretary HERTER. The Security 'Council was aware of it, yes.
Senator HuMPIREY. The Vice President is a member of the Secur-
ity Council?
Secretary IIERTER. Yes.
Senator HuMPHiREY. If the Vice President states on P. television
program that he understood that the flights would continue, yet the
President announced the next day in Paris that as of the previous
Thursday they had already been suspended, do you think there was
any lack of communication between the responsibile officials of this
Government?
Secretary HERTER. There, sir, I am trying to think of the dates.
The Thursday on which the President gave that order was the day
that I went to Paris. I went to Paris that night.
The President followed 2 nights later and whether or not in that
2-day interval anything had been distributed with regard to that,
order, I just don't know.
IMPACT ON SUMMIT DIPLOMACY OF RECENT EVENTS
Senator HuMPHREY. Do you have' any changed views, Mr. Sec
retary, as to the value of the so-called summitry diplomacy as a.
result of this recent meeting?
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Secretary IIERrru. I think as a method of carrying out negotiations
it leas taken a hard knock.
Senator IIuMPiiREr. Have you any idea as to how we are going to
proceed in the months ahead? I heard the President's address. It
was a mood address. He gave a good accounting. He talked about the
necessity of maintaining-I believe the word wasbusinesslike relation-
ships-or at least normal relationships insofar as we can with the
Soviet Union,
Is there any projected plan as to how we will proceed with our
contacts with the Soviet Union V
For example, we have the Geneva Conference still in session on
the nuclear testing. I suppose the Disarmament Conference is still
a reality.
Is there to be any adjustment. in these conferences, any changes?
Are they to proceed according to the past?
Secretors ITERTER. Yes, the President, I think, made that very clear
in his statement.
Senator IT rriinrv. Are there any plans for any type of a high
level Foreign Ministers' conference or conference of sub-Cabinet
officers?,
Secretary IIERn'rR. As of now, there is not. I may add this with
regard to the summit, that the four nations that were involved in the
summit were the four nations who, as a result of the decisions and
agreements reached after the war, were the four nations that have
the responsibility for Berlin and for the final settlement of the whole
German question, and that is the reason for those four, essentially,
getting together.
It is possible that again they will have to get together. Whether
normal diplomatic changes would make progress or Foreign 'Ministers'
meetings in advance would make a program so that it would Ile worth-
while for them to come together, I just can't tell you. That is always a
possibility. But almost any other subject, there are many other nations
that are involved beside those four, and it is a great question in my
mind whether or not that method of coming together for the resolution
of problems world he fruitful in the future..
Senator TTi-nirirmv. To other words, what you are indicating is that
a summit conference merely ought to be the ratification, essentially the
ratification, of decisions that have been tentatively arrived at, at the
normal diplomatic levels.
Secretary TTirzri:n. In my opinion, that is the most desirable thing.
Senator TTr-T+rrTTRrr. T agree. ITo;v do von explain. or is there any
explanation for what appears to be a contradictory hit of evidence of
Gromyko's blustering up at the United Nations on the Soviet resolu-
tion and, yet, of the apparent conciliatory behavior of the Soviets
in recent days with respect to the quick release of our plane and flyers
who strayed into East Germany and the recent broadening of Soviet-
American exchange projects?
Secretary TTE:RTr.R. There again, you have got one of those contradic-
tions. As I was saying earlier, the fact that the attitude of the people
in Moscow and even the officials with whom our Embassy officials have
to deal, have been entirely normal since this incident.
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE 71
It is very hard to reconcile with the very harsh words that both
Khrushchev and Gromyko have uttered.
SOVIET OBJECTIVES
Senator HUMPIIREY. Do you lay any credence to the doctrine, or
at least an observation that has been made, that while the Soviet
tactics may change for awhile, that insofar as their general overall
strategy is concerned, it will remain pretty much the same as it has?
Secretary IIERTIm. Certainly as far as their objectives are con-
cerned. I think it was quite clear from some of this documentation
that will be put into the record, that is the speeches that were made
by Mr. Khrushchev, that he had laid greater and greater emphasise
on the eventual triumph of communism over the world, and that he
put particular emphasis on that in recent months before the summit..
PREDICTIONS OF SOVIET ACTIONS
Senator HUMrHIREY. I have a letter from a gentleman who is a pro-
fessor emeritus of a university, up at Bennington College, who has
had an uncanny record in my years of acquaintanceship with him in
understanding what goes on in the Soviet Union. His name is Dr,
Bernard Tauer. He is a former Social Democrat of some 35 years
ago from Austria, a professor of political economy, now retired. He
monitors Soviet broadcasts, studies Soviet literature, particularly
photographs and what-have-you. Just to give you a little back-
ground, he predicted to me some 3 weeks, I guess it was, before it
happened, the removal of Beria. I have a letter here from him right
before me, and it is a letter telling how Mr. Khrushchev was going
to scuttle the summit conference, written on April 25, this letter is.
And I also have a letter from him here in which he says :
The Soviet leader will now do everything possible to prove that Eisenhower
is a warmonger and an imperalis.t aggressor and not a man of peace, in action
not merely in words. We must, therefore, prepare ourselves for all kinds of
provocations all around the world.
His thesis is that Khrushchev had been selling the Soviet people
upon the idea that President Eisenhower was a man of peace and
a man with whom he could deal. I don't mean deal, in the sense of
the crudeness of that word, but one with whom. he could conduct
reasonably good negotiations, and that when the President accepted
the responsibility for the flights and didn't accept the opportunity,
at least what some people say was an opportunity of removing himself
from that responsibility, that Mr. Khrushchev took this as a very
personal matter, since he had staked his reputation in the Kremlin
and in the councils of the Communist Party upon the fact that he
could work with Eisenhower. Then Mr. Khrushchev felt that Eisen-
hower had not only upset the diplomatic applecart, but, more im.por-
tantl.y, from a subjective point of view-Khrushchev's-put Khru-
shchev in a very difficult position with the Communist Chinese, with
the rightwing Stalinists in the Soviet Union, so that Khrushchev is
now making a personal crusade out of attacking the President.
What is your view of this? I am going to give you. this letter. I
have a whole series of these, and this is a very remarkable man., may
I say.
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72 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMI'IIT CONFERENCE
For exam ple, I have a letter from him 2 weeks before the recent
shakeup in the Soviet.T'ilion which Was not t(X fundamental, but indi-
cating some of the ch;inges that were going t o be made, by a very care-
ful analysis of broadcasts and meetings~ and literature. I had this
man down to see the late Senator Walter George, some of you may
recall, and he was very helpful at one time. What is our view of Mr.
Khruslichev's reactions lately to the President, the' personal venom
that lie seems to exhibit ?
Secretary Hvicr a. I am particularly interested in two things, Sen-
ator, in the letter that, you have just read; one, the fact that it was
written before the TT-2 incident.
Senator HU]rPiIRr:v. Yes.
Secretary 14,wrmt. In which this authority cites the fact. that Mr.
Khrushchev was going to scuttle the conference.
Senator Iir rriiar:v. I think that substantiates essentially what you
were saying this morning, your own observations on this.
Secretary Iirirrr:a. Yes. The second has to do with the fact that
the President didn't accept the way out which Khrushchev ap-
peared to offer him. My own feeling with regard to that second mat-
ter is that it. was very much of a trap. That what Air. I hruslichev
thought might happen is that the President would disclaim personal
responsibility and that then qtr. Klirushc.hev would say. "The situa-
tion is even more dangerous than I thought, because this means that
that same little frantic group in the Pentagon"-and that is the phrase
that he used in his press conference- "is running the Government of
the United States without the President knowing about it, and that
makes our situation even worse" and he would have inveighed in
exactly the same terms and asked the President for exactly the same
apologies and punishments which he asked for later.
I think that, the. element of personal pique certainly played a part in
the whole show.
The CITAnr r.\N. The Senator's time is up.
The Senator from Kansas.
Senator CARLSON. Senator Aiken
OTHER COYT\TRTFS' REACTIONS TO SUM MIT CONFERENCE. COLLAPSE
The CiiAiR-Nr.\N. I am sorry, the Senator from Vermont.
Senator Ann:N. I won't take long.
Speaking of the reaction of the rest of the world. have you made
any analysis of the reaction of the other countries of the world rela-
tive. to the collapse of the summit meeting?
Secretary HE-Fn. Yes, I think we have. It isn't, of course, com-
plete. This will mean a study from K. great many nations and bring
this altogether in one place.
I think that, perhaps, the best indication has been the attitude
among the representatives at the United Nations where you have got
a cross section from the rest of the world. From the very outset of
get li any there, votes it their calling th they anea gresssion
o be . able -Russian to complaint
t ,
l
except Soviet bloc votes.
Some of the smaller countries, two of them, abstained in the final
vote for reasons that were of a rather different nature.
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE 73
But, by and large, we have heard no sympathy from the point of
view of what you might call the uncommitted nations or the free
nations of the world for the attitude that Mr. Khrushchev took.
Senator AIKCEN. Are you satisfied we have not lost prestige
throughout the world as a result, or lost more than Russia has?
Secretary IIERTER. May I say, sir, that in my opinion our alli-
ances are firmer than they have ever been.
Senator AIIKEN. What was the significance of the shakeup in the
Russian Government prior to the U-2 incident, I believe last April,
was it not, when Mr. Kozlov was promoted; and coupled with that
question, why don't we hear anything about Mr. Mikoyan any more?
Has he been isolated or just gotten out of the news, or what has hap-
pened with him?
Secretary HERTER. Mr. Bohlen, who is our expert, is also the cen-
sor of the document, so I am afraid he has gone out of the room at
the moment.
With regard to the disappearance of Mr. Mikoyan, we have been
told this is just a normal vacation he has taken down to the Black
Sea. It is true in years gone by he had taken rather extended vaca-
tions there,. and whether this is true or, not we can't say.
'With respect to the shakeup, I think the only significance that it
had were that two of the strongest members of the central committee
were sent to other responsibilities and this may have been a personal
strengthening of Mr. Khrushchev's power within the committee
itself. But rt was not considered very highly significant.
Senator Arri.EN. That is, Mr. Kozlov's promotion is not significant?
Secretary IIMiTEZ;. I don't think so. I didn't know that he as,such
had been promoted.
[Deleted.] .
A long time ago, I think when Mr. Averill Harriman was visiting
in Russia he reported that Mr. Kozlov had been pointed out to him by
Mr. Khrushchev as his successor, saying that he and Mikoyan were
too old to carry on and that Kozlov was the No. 2 man. But there
was no telling whether he was saying that seriously or whether he was
being flattering about it because Mr. Kozlov was there at the time.
Senator ArnEN. I thought he made the best impression of any of
our Russian visitors last summer. At least when he came before this
committee, I thought he did.
I have no further questions.
The CIIAMMAN. The Senator from Oregon.
Senator Mortsi. Mr. Secretary, I think it would be helpful for this
record if you made a statement in regard to the functions of NASA,
and the part that NASA played in connection with the U-2 flight.
I don't think the record is very clear as to what are the functions of
NASA, and what jurisdiction, if any, the State Department has over
NASA and what the relationship between NASA and the National
Security Council is, and the State Department.
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74 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SITIkfMIT CONFERENCE
Secretary Ilnitrrtt. NASA, as you know, is an agency devoted en-
tirely to the peaceful development, of satellites and outer space ve-
hicles of one kind or another.
Its operations have now been separated out from what were called
purely military operations, although it. is always inevitable in the
development of boosters that. there should be in interrelationship
between the two, because the utilittery vehicle and the peaceful vehicle
have got the same problems of propulsion to get- up into the air. The
witnesses of NASA, of routse, will be before the committee.
[Deleted.] Most of the F-`_''s are used by NASA in connection
with purer' scientific work, meteorological work. Actually, the
Japanese 6overriment. found them tremendously valuable in tracing
the course of tornadoes last year, and I think that. NASA put out at
least three publications on their findings from the TT-2 weather
observations.
[Deleted.]
With respect to the actual development of events in relation to
NASA, I am sorry to say that I rant give you firsthand information.
Perhaps .Mr. Dillon can supplement, that as it occurred while I
was overseas and when !sir. Dillon was in charic~TP.
Mr. Drr.r.ox. All I can say is as far as I Know the State Depait-
ment didn't have any climct relationships with NASA on this matter,
and the relationships that there were, were handled by the Central
I)ttelligence Agency [deleted], so either Mr, Dulles or the NASA
witnesses themselves will be able to inform you on that.
Senator Motmst:. Why would NASA make a statement in regard to
this plane if it was under file jurisdiction of CIA?
Mr. DiLIoN. Du the cover story it was in the open, the plane, was
under the jurisdiction of NASA. Actually for this operation it was
under the jurisdiction of CIA. [Deleted.]'
Senator %["itst_ Therefore, NASA, in your opinion was acting
within the proprieties when it. issued the statement that it issued.
Mr. Drr,r.ow. I think so: yes.
Senator Must;. You think it had cleared that statement with CIA
or had authority from CIA to issue it.
Secretary Ilsirrt:t.. I think so.
Mr. Dtr.r.nx. They should have: as I understood the matter, these
guidelines to answer questions were prepared by CIA. They were
gone over with State Department people a clay or two before. 'We
bad thought that x'_15,1 ~~ as going to ]Handle this in time way of an-
swering questions, which we. knew they would get, because this was a
NASA plane, and they apparently '(,]lose instead to forestall the
questions just, by puffing it all out in the form of a statement..
[Deleted.]
Senator Annrtsr. I raise the question because I want to do what I
can in order to clarify time record in regard to tyre allegation made
that there is not the best of coordination lief "een the State Depart-
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ment, CIA, Pentagon Building, and now NASA, and that there may
be a need for a centralization in the State Department of the authority
to authorize any statement by any of these agencies in regard to a
situation such as this, because of some possible reason to believe that
if this had. been centralized more, we would not have been having
different statements coming from different agencies.
Mr. DILLON. We were not aware, actually, of the fact that NASA
was going to make as formal a statement as this, and it was somewhat
of a surprise.
The CIiAIRIIAN. I could not hear that answer.
Mr. DILLON..I say we were not aware of the fact that NASA was
going to make such a, formal statement as this, and I am not sure
that the Central Intelligence Agency was either.
All the relationships-as I said in my original statement, there, was
coordination, there was a decision that the statements were going to
be made by the State Department.
That decision was taken and made known to the other agencies
concerned, which were the Department of Defense, and the Central
Intelligence Agency then on the morning of May 5.
The Central Intelligence Agency had the relationships with NASA
and undertook to pass that on. We' had no relationships with NASA.
They didn't know we were in this thing, and somehow this statement
was put out by NASA somewhat more complete than we expected
but it was along the lines of the material that they had been furnished.
VICE PRESIDENT'S KNOWLEDGE OF FLIGHTS
Senator Mousu Turning to a question that Senator Humphrey
asked-and may I assure you that I am quite nonpolitical in raising
that-I am only seeking to find out who had knowledge of what in
regard to the matter. I refer to the May 27 issue of the Washington
Post, in an article by Mr. Chalmers Roberts in the course of which
he said :
Nowhere in the 37/2-hour television program did Nixon refer to any Presidential
direction in the U-2 crisis, other than his approval of the flights some years
earlier. Nor was there any reference to his own part in the affair. Nixon, of.
course, sits in the National Security Council. Nixon did say that he was
"privy" to the U-2 reconnaissance policy "and. I do endorse it," He also said
that "I knew about this flight."
Now, my interpretation, Mr. Secretary, of your testimony is that
neither you nor the President knew this specific flight was going to be
taken at the time that it was. taken, but, that you. did know that. there
was a general program for such flights and that this flight could be,
considered as a part of that program.
Now I ask you, do you have any reason to believe that Nixon knew
anything that you and the President did. not know and that maybe it
is just an unfortunate use of language when lie says "I knew about this
flight," and that he probably means that he knew about the general
program of reconnaissance?
Secretary IIERT.ER. I would assume i t was about the general pro-
gram rather than about the particular flight.
ri 6412-60-- 6
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76 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S KNOWLEDGE OF FLIGHTS
Senator Morse. But as far as Tou know, the National Security
Council did not, brief its members in regard to any particular flights
without also notifying the President in regard to specific flights.
Secretary IIEirrmt. No, I think the National Security Council was
only aware of the general program.
Senator Molise. Are you a member of the -National Security
Council?
Secretary IILRrrn;R. Yes, I am.
Senator Molise.. One final question at this round, Mr. Secretary : As
you know I, along with everyone else, I think, who has the interest of
peace at lae rt, am very much concerned about long continuation of
this nuclear armament race.
Do you think that. the United States and the Western Powers on the
one hand and Russia on the other can continue this nuclear armament
race with its constant increase and acceleration for another 10 years
and not create the great probability of wear?
Secretary IIERTER. I don't know about the great probability of war,
Senator, but I would say certainly increase the chances of war.
Senator :IMoRsti;. I know we are of one mind but I want the record to
show this particular one mind: Do you agree with me that our genera-
tion simply has the responsibility in history to find some honorable
wa to end this nuclear armament race?
Secretary IIER?rFR. I agree with you completely on that.
Senator MoRSF. Do you think that we ought to do everything that
we can to try to gret the United Nations to exercise greater jurisdic-
tional authority in connection with this whole matter of armament
race than we have been able to get it to do so far?
Secretary II:RTF.R. Senator, some time ago I made a speech in con-
nection with disarmament- in which I stated my views as to the great,
necessity in the following years to finding some answer to this, and
at the same time finding an answer within the framework of the
United Nations of an authority which could maintain the peace with
law, and I still feel that just as strongly as I did at the time I made
that. speech.
Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, my time is up and I want to make
a request for data if I may.
The CIIAIRMIAN. Certainly.
Senator MoRSE. This morning we talked about the cases that we had
offered to take to the World Court.
Senator WILFY. A little louder, Senator.
Senator MoRSE. This morning you talked about the cases that we
were willing to take to the World Court.. I wonder if the State De-
partment can compile for the, committee the record in regard to the
World Court's operation, both on the cases it has handled and the
cases that we have offered to have it handle that have been rejected
by Russia or any other power.
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE `"`
Secretary IIERTER. Yes; we will be very glad to do that.
(The following information was subsequently furnished for the
record:)
STATEMENT BY TIIE DEPARTMENT OF STATE: INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE--
CONTENTIOUS CASES PROPOSED BY TIIE UNITED STATES AGAINST SOVIET-BLOO
COUNTRIES
1. The United States has proposed to the Soviet Union the adjudication of four
separate cases concerning aerial incidents. In each of these cases, the United
States has filed with the Registry of the International Court of Justice an
application instituting proceedings. These were the following cases : (a) Treat-
ment in Hungary of aircraft and crew of United States of America (United
States v. U.S.S.R.) ; (b) aerial incident of October 7, 1952 (United States v.
U.S.S.R.) ; (c) aerial incident of September 4, 1954 (United States v. U.S.S.R.) ;
and (d) aerial incident of November 7, 1954 (United States v. U.S.S.R.). Each
of these four cases has been dismissed by the Court for lack of jurisdiction.
The Court lacked jurisdiction because the Soviet Union has never accepted the
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court under article 36(2) of its statute nor
agreed to jurisdiction specially in any case.
2. The United States also instituted proceedings before the International Court
of Justice in eases against Hungary and Czechoslovakia. These were : (e)
Treatment in Hungary of aircraft and crew of United States of America (United
States v. Hungarian People's Republic); and (f) aerial incident of March 10,
1953 (United States v. Czechoslovakia). Each of these cases was also dis-
missed by the Court for lack of jurisdiction. Again, the reason was that neither
Hungary nor Czechoslovakia has ever accepted the jurisdiction of the Court in
any way.
3. The United States also instituted proceedings before the International Court
of Justice in a case against Bulgaria, the aerial incident of July 27, 1955 (United
States v. Bulgaria). This case differed from those above in that Bulgaria had
accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the former Permanent Court of Inter-
national Justice in 1921, and it was the contention of the United States that
Bu'garia was subject to the compulsory jurisdiction of the present International
Court of Justice by virtue of article 30(5) of this Court's statute. Bulgaria
challenged the jurisdiction of the Court on several grounds, including a decision
of the Court in another ease arising out of the same aerial incident that Bulgaria
is not subject tothe jurisdiction of the Court, and a reciprocal invocation of the
United States domestic jurisdiction reservation. The United States has moved
to discontinue the case.
The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Kansas.
DEVALUATION OF SOVIET CURRENCY
Senator CARLSON. Mr. Secretary, recently one of our Nation's finan-
cial writers, writing on the conditions in Russia, wrote that Mr.
Khrushchev was proposing a devaluation of the currency as of Janu-
ary 1, and he stated that no nation tampers with its currency unless
it is in financial difficulty.
What do we know about the financial and economic condition of
Russia that would lead us to believe or know that he is planning on
devaluating the currency?
Secretary IIERTER. This I hadn't heard at all. I hadn't seen that
particular statement and I have seen nowhere in any report any indi-
cations that they were planning to devalue their currency.
There is no question but that their foreign exchange rate, their
official rate, doesn't correspond with reality. They have two rates,
one an official rate and one a tourist rate. They are very far apart.
One is 4 rubles to the dollar and one is 10 rubles to the dollar. But
from the point of view of their internal financial situation, I have
heard no reports they were planning to devalue the ruble.
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78 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SU,%"fIT CONFERENCE
Senator CARLSos. We have had evidence that there is social unrest
among the people,, that, they are thinking that they are entitled to.
better living condtt ions, better homes and housing.
Do we have any evidence of that ?
Secretary IIFJI-I-ER. Yes; I think (here is. But this is a matter that
Mr. Bohlen test i tied t.o a few moments ago.
Senator C.1Itr so t. Tlhat there is?
Secretary IIr_Inrrit. There is evidence of that. As Mr. Bohlen said,.
it is impossible to get. documentary evidence, as such, because of the
secrecy and the discipline in their society, but I think that every
visitor to Russia who has had a chance to talk with the workmen or
the students at the university and so on, has come back with that
feeling.
After all, Mr. Khrushcliev lies made a good many statements about
the necessity of increasing the standard of living of their people.
In their incentives that they offer from the point of view of their
workers, better living conditions in these housing projects is one of
the principal inicentives tlhat they have been offering in the past,
giving people priority if their particular sections of a plant do par-
ticularly well from the point of view of production, they will be
advanced to better living quarters.
I think that the urge for better living quarters and at better stand-
ard of living, more consumer goods, is it very real one.
Senator CAI(Lsox. Does the State Department have any evidence of
a labor shortage in Russia based on a statement that was recently
made that Mr, Mhrushclhev reduced his military strength because it
was necessary to get sonic of the people back into the labor market?
Secretary lIm:Irrr:R. Yes. Very recently there has been a study that
I think will be made available to you, made on the whole question of
the labor problem in Russia.
(The study referred to appears on p. 283 in appendix 2.)
It is an extremely interesting one from the point, of view of the
present situation and the relationship of women at work compared
with men and the very large excess number of women over men that
exists in Russia. today.
ertainly every reason to believe that. If r. Khruslichev`s
There is certainly'
announced reduction of the armed forces was an effort to increase the
male labor force I,y taking the extra Ines nut of the armed services
when lie said lie was Irlannni,r to reduce from some 3,600,000 down to
2,400,000: that [lie principal purpose of that was to get a larger
working force.
EFFECT ON S[MMMrr CONFERENCE OF Turnr"STTCiiEvS T-,i-rR-.\-AT. PROBLEMS
Senator C.irn.sn\, Ts it not, reasonable to assume, then. that Mr.
Khrttslachev does have solve problems, internal problems, and tlint.
that may have some effect on his actions and his decision at Paris?
Secretary ITr-rrrr:a. That undoubtedly is true. He has had some
other internal difficulty that you undoubtedly know about, Senator, in
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connection with the new land that was planted, an area that has not
been too successful and this was something on which he had banked
very heavily to increase the food supply of Russia and I think he had
been rather heavily criticized because it hadn't worked out as planned.
Senator CARLSON. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gore?
ISSUANCE OP PRESIDENT'S ORDER SUSPENDING U-2 FLIGHTS
Senator GoRE. Returning, Mr. Secretary, to the examination of
-whether there was a breakdown in coordination and administrative
procedure, I would like to inquire when you personally first learned of
the President's order that the U-2 flights would be discontinued?
Secretary IIERTER.At the time that he gave it.
Senator GoRE. When did he give it?
'Secretary IIERTER. My recollection is that it was immediately after
meeting at the White House on Thursday morning at about noon.
Senator GORE. Did he give the order to you?
Secretary IIERTER. No, he did not give the order to me. I think it.
was through General Goodpaster, but I am not quite certain.
;Senator GORE. How did you know that it was?given ?
Secretary IIERTER. I heard him.
Senator Gone. You heard him give the order?
,Secretary HnnTER. Yes.
Senator Gone. And this was on Thursday?
Secretary HERTER. This was on Thursday.
Senator Gone. Then you do not know whether this information
was communicated to the Vice President?
Secretary IIERTER. I have no idea.
Senator GoRE. He was not present?
Secretary HenTen:. Ile was not present.
Senator GORE. Was this at a meeting of the Security Council?
Secretary HERTER. No, I don't think it was the Security Council.
I think it was at the meeting immediately after the Security Council
at which there were three of us present. Allen Dulles was not present
and I have forgotten-I think Gates was present-after a Cabinet
meeting it was.
Senator GonE. I don't understand.
Secretary HERTER. After the Cabinet meeting.
Senator Gone; After the Cabinet meeting?
Secretary IIERTER. Right.
Senator GoRE. That settles that. You heard the order issued and
I will have no further question as to where it was issued and to whom.
If you heard it issued to Secretary Gates, that settles one question
definitely and finally.
But you do not know whether the Vice President was informed
about it?
Secretary IIERTER. Excuse me-
Senator Gonn. Did you wish to add something?
Secretary HERTER. No, no.
Senator GoRE. You do not know then whether the Vice President
was informed about it?
Secretary HERTER. No, I do not.
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QUESTION OF PRESS SECRETARY HAGERTY'S KNOWLEDGE OF SUSPENSION OF
FLIGHTS
Senator GORE. On this question of coordination or lack thereof, in
addition to NASA and the State Department, to which Senator Morse
referred, there is the State Department, CIA, NASA, Mr. Hagerty,
and officials within the Department and perhaps others.
Did Air. Hagerty operate in this field strictly as press secretary or
did he undertake some Executive function ?
Secretary IlERTEil. I know of no Executive function that he
assumed,
ISSUANCE OF STATE DEPARTMENT AND NASA STATEMENTS OF MAY 6
Senator GORE. Mr. Dillon, on May 5 Mr. Hagerty, I understand,
told a press conference that the State. Department and NASA would
issue statements. Were you aware of this
Air. DILLON. I have very recently learned that he indicated that
NASA would issue a statement as such.
It was decided that the State Department would issue a statement.
I hadn't been aware that he had said we were. But it had been de-
cided and lie knew it had been decided that we were going to do it.
Senator GORE. You say you very recently learned this, How
recently?
Mr. }1ILLOx. I think a day ago or 2 days ago that someone from the
press said that he had told the press when they were there that
NASA would issue a statement, so that they could get their infor-
mation from NASA.
Senator GORE. Did Mr. Hagerty suggest to you that the State De-
partment issue a statement.?
Mr. DILI,ON. No, it was decided when we first heard of this, this
news, as I said earlier this morning, at this National Security Council
meeting or right after it flint. was held outside of Washington, that
the State Department would handle the publicity on this, and that
we would mace any statement that would publicity
made, and it was known
at that dine that we would make a statement.
Now Air. Ilagerty was not at the Security Council meeting, but
he was at that area out there where this exercise was taking place
and so he was aware of the fact that the State Department would
be making a statement at noon that day at our regular press con-
ference time.
Actually, the statement. was delayed 45 minutes. It was made at
12:45 when our regular daily press conference took place.
Senator GORE, Was it decided there that NASA would make a
statement also?
Mr. DiLLON. It was not to my knowledge, no. It was not decided
there that NASA would make a statement.
Senator GORE. Who made that decision?
Mr. Duu'N. I think that you have to ask NASA. I don't know
who made any such decision,
The fact. is, as I have said earlier, I thought that NASA would
answer questions.
I didn't know they were going to make a statement until I saw it.
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 Approved ForJJ OD5t8/2@ 1A 86'0012ld01-1
Senator GORE. You don't know whether -NASA or whether Mr.
Hagerty made that decision?
Mr. DILLON. I have no idea, no. I would assume NASA made it
because we did know that NASA would have to answer questions
because this was a NASA plane that was lost and the reporters were
going to find out how high the plane flew, what kind of a plane it
was, anything they knew about it, and we had given them-the Intel-
ligence Agency had given them good answers on how to answer such
questions.
Senator GoRE. You say you assume this. You did not know it?
Mr. DILLON. I knew they had given them that material. I knew
that as a fact, but we did not know that they were going to use that
and put in into the form of a statement as it actually came out.
Senator Goiu . But Mr. Hagerty did know that a statement by
.NASA would be made?
Mr. DILLON. I don't know that what he said meant that he knew
they were going to make a formal statement or whether he was just
using that as a phrase, indicating that they would answer questions.
He may have thought they were going to make a statement. I just
don't know that. He may have called them up and asked them. I
don't know.
Senator GORE. Did, in fact, both the State Department and NASA
make statements subject to Mr. Hagerty's notice to the press that they
would do so?
Mr. DILLON. The State Department made its statement and NASA
made one about three quarters of an hour later, yes.
[Deleted].
Senator GORE. My time is up, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Williams?
Senator WILLIAMS. No questions.
The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Ohio.
PREMIER KHRUSHCIIEV'S KNiOWLEDGE OF OVERFLIGHTS
Senator LAUSCHE. When did the Camp David meeting take place
with Khrushchev ?
Secretary HERTER. I am terribly sorry
Senator LAuSOIIE. When did the Camp David meeting take place
with Khrushchev ?
Secretary HERTER. That was in September as I recall it.
Senator LAUSCHE. Did Khrushchev, before May 1, make any state-
ments indicating that the Soviet had knowledge of American recon-
naissance planes over their territory?
Secretary HERTER. None.
Senator LAUSCHE. Based upon his statements and upon the knowl-
edge which he claims the Soviet possess, what day was it that he
understood the first American plane flew over the Soviet?
Secretary HERTER. I can't identify that. My recollection is that
when he was in Paris he made the statement that he knew about these
overflights at the time that he was at Camp David and that he thought
there was something fishy about President Eisenhower at that time.
Senator LAUSCiIE. Well, then at Camp David he did state that at
that time he knew that our planes were flying over the Soviet.
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Secretary Iltati-mi. 'Fliat is what lie said later when he got to Paris.
Senator LArusCitE. When he got to Paris?
Secretor}' Ilucn s. When he got to Paris. He never mentioned it
at Camp David or at any time between Camp David and Paris.
Senator LAuSCinE. Well, if lie knew at Camp David that our recon-
naissance planes were flying over the Soviet, and he said nothing about
it, can you give any reason for his remaining silent on the subject?
Secretary IItarrEit. Ile was asked that question in a press confer-
ence in Paris.
I Haven't got here the exact words of response but I think we could
dig them out for you, and tell you just what he said in answer to that
himself, but as I recollect, lie said lie felt that this was an inappro-
priate moment to bring it up but that he did think there was some-
thing fishy about the President at that time.
Senator L.~vsciu-. Then at Camp David, when he knew that our
planes were flying over his land, he was discussing what was to be
the summit conference; is that correct?
Secretory IiExrEn. What he hoped would be the summit conference.
Senator AUsciiE. And if we take him at his word, at that time he
hoped to have a summit conference although he knew then that we
were supposedly committing a flagrant transgression against his
rights.
Secretary IIER-rui. That is correct, from his own later testimony.
Senator LerscuE. Can you reconcile those two positions as both
being true, one. that he honestly intended to attend a summit confer-
ence and, two, that ho knew our planes were flying over his land?
Secretary IIawrEtt. N o5 it would be very difficult to reconcile the two.
It is very difficult particularly to reconcile the tremendous issue that
he made of it later when he knew about it all the time, according to
his own statement.
Senator AXE . Will the Senator yield? You will find on page 16
of the Background Documents Khrushchev's statement that Twining,
the then Chief of Staff, sent a plane over Russia which gent over
Kiev the day after he left Russia. It is the third paragraph on page
16. (See appendix 1, V. 1191.)
Senator 1.:-rsci[E. 1 es. Your recollection is that the meeting took
place last September.
Secretary IERTER. Yes, sir.
Senator LAUscIIE. Now then, from September to flay 14, was that
the day he came to Paris, he said nothing, about this knowledge that
he had, was supposed to have had while lie was at Camp David.
Secretary IIFaTEit. That is my recollection. I would want to check
on that. I. is possible that he may have said something at the Presi-
dium meeting before he left 'Moscow. MIy expert here tells me he did
not., and that was my recollection that he had never mentioned it until
'he got to Paris.
Senator LArscmm. Can one rationalize the furor of his resentment
in I1May of low compared to his admitted silence at Canip David about
similar flights?
Secretary IliE.irmiz. No: one eaiinot.
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INFORMATION GATIILRING OPPORTUNITIES IN THE UNITED STATES AND IN
THE U.S.S.R.
Senator LAUSCIIE. Now then, last January 18, Allen Dulles ap-
peared before our committee, and at that time he merely scratched on
the surface what I thought was a very vital question : the compara-
tive ease with which the Soviet gets information in the United States
and the impregnable wall that bars us from getting news in the Soviet.
I ask you the question, Mr. Herter, to give your understanding of
the facility with which we get information out of the Soviet, and that.
which they get out of the United States.
Secretary HERTER. Senator, as you know, we have what we call an,
open society. We are very proud of it in which we have complete
freedom of the press, in which, except for matters of highest security,.
very freely talked about, and a great deal is published.
Our technical magazines publish a great deal from the point of view
of vital military information. Our installations in this country, while
no direct overflights are permitted, can be photographed with com-
parative ease from an angle of one side.
Generally speaking we have had no restrictions at all on travel
in the United States except for a few very small circumscribed areas,
like the Atomic Energy Agency plants, and we have had restrictions
on Soviet citizens traveling in this country which have been taken
entirely as a retaliatory measure because of the limitations put on the
travel of Americans in Russia.
Senator LAUSCIIE. Right.
Secretary HERTER. The Soviet society, as you know, is a closed
society, where one moves and goes only where they tell you you can
go or when they tell you you can go.
Senator LAUSCIIE. This morning in answer to a question, assuming
that a Soviet plane was over the United States and what we would
do about it, you said that there is no need of them sending planes for
reconnaissance purposes because they can get the information without
going through that effort.
Secretary IIEETER. That is quite so.
Senator LAUSCIIE. That is, they can go to Cape Canaveral and
pretty simply see what is going on there.
Secretary HERTER. Well, sir, there are newspaper men down at Cape
Canaveral all the time and a good many visitors..
Senator LAUSCIIE. Now the fact is that :
The Soviets still consider that secrecy and the security of everything relating
to their military operations is one of their great assets, and they have no
intention whatever of changing that. Moreover they have no intention of letting:
us into areas of m,iltary importance.
Those are the words of Dulles.
That is, there is a difference between the Soviet getting information
here and our getting it in the Soviet.
Secretary, IIERTER. Oh, a very great difference,. It is the whole,
difference between an open and a closed society.
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Senator L:1rscnE. You have been asking for this Congress to pass
a bill that would give the State Department some limited control
over Communists going to the Soviet Union. Is that correct?
Secretary IIEIrrEa. That is correct..
Senator t uscnz. And why have you asked that?
Secretary IIEBTEri. Because we :elt that we ought to have some
control-these are American citizens traveling abroad-that we ought
to have some control over those who may be going to various parts of
the world in interest inimical to those of the United States.
Senator LirscuE. And you asked that because you have in mind
the grave dangers that lie in the ability of a Communist to distribute
information in the Soviet Union when he makes the visit, if he so
desires.
Secretary HEWIMR. Yes, sir.
Senator Lnrscim. That bill has not been acted upon; is that correct?
Secretary IIEnTsR. That. is correct.
Senator LArsclrE. Is there any type of legislation that you feel that
we ought to pass with respect to the curtailment of the duties and the
owers of the Central Intelligence Agency or the expansion of them.
If you have given that subject. no thought, you can state it,
Secretary i:RTER. I have given it no thought, I hope there would
be no change so far as the activities are concerned. [Deleted.]
Senator LAusci E. That is all I have.
The CIIAU LIN. Mr. Secretary, there was one statement that I was
told when I was in Paris that an account of overflights of the Russian
territory had been carried in a French newspaper some 30 to 60 days
prior to that.
Have you ever heard of such account?
Secretary III:RTER. I think I heard the same reports in Paris but I
never saw any documentary proof of it.
The CHAIRMAN. have any of your people tried to confirm it?
Secretary HERTER. Yes, but I have not heard it mentioned by any-
one except when I was over in Paris, too. I had not heard a word
before that.
KIIRUSITCITEV'S MAY 5 REFERENCE TO OVERFLIGHTS
The CHAIRMAN. [Deleted.]
In his speech of '.flay 5, Afr. ITlirushchev referred to the U.S. over-
flight- of July 2, 1956, April 9, 1960, and May 1, 1960. He said that
the April 9 flight caused concern within the Soviet Government and
resulted in admonishments to the Soviet military not to let it happen
again.
[Deleted.]
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KHRUSHCIIEV'S INTERPRETATION REGARDING CONTINUANCE
OF OVERFLIGHTS
The CHAIRMAN. This, again, raises this point that puzzles me very
much. The evidence is quite clear that Mr. Khrushchev, if he didn't
know positively, certainly suspected that it was our planes that were
.going across his territory, didn't he?
Secretary HERTER. That is what I assume.
The CHAIRMAN. And it comes back to this point that he hadn't
raised such a terrible fuss about it until this one, that is, the May 1
flight, which was shot down. And, you said you couldn't reconcile
the difference in his attitude toward the prior flights to the attitude
toward the May 1 flight. But doesn't the reconciliation, if it is ex-
plainable at all-I am just asking you if there is one-does it not lie in
the fact that our Government did take the position regarding the May
1 flight and this program, that this is a deliberate program which we,
the President, takes responsibility for, and which we intend to
continue?
Secretary IIERTER. Not which we intend to continue. That has
never been said.
The CHAIRMAN. He interpreted it as such. Mr. Khrushchev in his
statement, which I have a copy of here-this is his language. He
says-this is a quote from part of our Background Documents (see
p. 204, appendix 1) which says:
At his press conference, Herter made an outrageous statement. Far from
feeling guilty and ashamed of aggressive actions, he justifies them and says
that this will continue in the future. Only countries which are in a state of
war can act in this way. * * * Ilerter's statement has made us doubt the cor-
rectness of our earlier conclusions that the President, the American Government,
did not know about the flights. Herter's statement says that this intelligence
plan was endorsed by the Government.
At least that is the way he interpreted it, and, as we said before
Senator LAUSCIIE. Who is "he"? Who interpreted it?
The CHAIRMAN. This is a quote from Mr. Khrushchev's statement.
He is interpreting what Mr. Herter said as speaking for the Govern-
ment. But is this not at least a possible reconciliation of the differ-
ence in attitude between the prior flights and the May 1 flight?
Secretary IIERTER. It might be if one wanted to interpret the words
that I spoke that way. There was no need of his interpreting those
words that way. Certainly from what I said, that is a very far=
fetched interpretation. I think he was interpreting it for his own
purposes that way. I think that the one reconcilable feature between
those two things is that in one case he had specific evidence and in the
other case he did not.
The CHAIRMAN. Then it is your position that neither your state-
ment nor the President's press conference can legitimately be inter-
preted as an endorsement and justification of the flights and a policy
of pursuing them in the future?
Secretary HERTER. Certainly not the policies oaf pursuing them in
the future. The President's statement that was made in Paris said
it was perfectly clear from what I had said and from what he had said
that there was nothing that allowed that inference.
The CHAIRMAN. Did you in your. background news conference in
Paris on Sunday, May 15, repeat the same statement that you had
made prior thereto in Washington?
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 Secretary IIEItrnr.. I Was asked at that background press conference
whether or not I had made a statement that we would continue doing
this. I repeated the very words that I had used in my statement. I
said I stood on those. 'Chat did not imply that we would continue.
The CIi.llit_lt:1x. Prior to that second statement. Mr. Khi-iislichev
had so interpreted it. Were you aware that he had so interpreted it
in his statement to the Presidium?
Secretary IlEirrEn. I think I may have been, but if one took cog-
nizance of every interpretation of Ili,; of everything that Happens in
this country one would be spending all one's time trying to correct
his statements.
The CIi.uit_it.tx. You believe that it is an unreasonable and far-
fetched interpretation of your statement or the President's in his press
conference that these would be continued; is that correct?
Secretary IIERTER. Yes, I do.
The Cu:uinar. x. Is it or is it not a fact that the press in this country
interpreted it in that same fashion ?
Secretary IIEIcrER. I am told that sonic did and some did not..
The CILLiRbt:lx. It might have been wise for us to clarify at. that
time so that we interpreted it properly; don't you think?
Secretary IIERTER. That, as I think I have indicated earlier, re-
ferred to the cessation of the flights and not resuming the. flights.
The President had reserved to state in Paris in coif'unction Willi the
fact that lie was goinI to offer at. the United 'Nations his plan for
aerial supervision of all nations that would be willing to submit to it.
The CHAIRMAN. I)o you believe that any Bead of state, of any
iinportant nation at least, could proceed Willi negotiations at a con-
ference under the situation, at least as lie interpreted it, that is, that
we intended to continue such flights?
Secretary IL=.RTEIR.After all, Mr. fihrushcliev arrived in Paris and
made an arrival statement there the Saturday before the conference
saying that he expected to proceed and have fruitful results.
The CHAIRIt1,tx. For the record, in order flint it is clear what is
involved here, I would like to read one sentence, the one that is
referred to by Mr. Khrushchev, which I think you clarified. I quote
from the statement- that was made by the Department of State on
May 7 (see p.197, appendix 1) :
The necessity for such activities as measures for legitimate national defense
is enhanced by the excessive secrecy praettceel by the Soviet Union in contrast
to the free world.
I think that is the statement that led to the interpretation, don't
you?
Secretary IIEa,?rER. I .1111 sorry, sir, I have got before me now the
statement of May 7. 1171iicli were those wvords?
The Cn unM.~x. It appears on page 13 of the background docu-
ments prepared by the staff, the first. Iiaragraph at the top of page 12.
Secretary IIERrEit. That does not in any way intimate that they
would go on.
The Ct MMAN. You do not believe that that could reasonably be
interpreted as meaning that they will continue?
Secretary HERTER. RO.
The CHAIRMAN. My time is up.
Senator Wiley ?
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EVENTS INCID o
KIIRUSHCIIEV'S SPEECH AT BAKU
Senator WILE, Y. Mr. Secretary, I have listened to this examination,
and as you brought out, Mr. Chairman, I think that what we had
better do is get down to what I think is the basic issue, not what
was said or particularly done, but let's see what Khrushchev did.
On April 28, in what has been called the speech at Baku, an exam-
ination of that speech shows clearly that the Soviet Government had
come to the conclusion that it would get nowhere at the summit
conference. Now, listen to this :
Overnight all the Government-controlled radio stations-
and get the date, May 25-
all the controlled radio stations and newspapers in the Soviet Union began
to prepare the people for a summit failure, and flatly blamed the West. The
:same bitter tones which Khrushchev used in Paris is to be noted in what he
.said at Baku.
And Baku was days before.
In a violent attack in Baku on Secretary Herter and Under Secretary Dillon,
on. that same day, the Soviet Premier intimated that he planned to use military
.power to enforce the prospective seizure in the West.
I quote Khrushchev:
If, therefore, the Western Powers should not wish to sign a peace treaty
with the German Democratic Republic, that would not preserve for them the
rights on whose preservation they insist. They would then obviously lose the
-right of access to West Berlin by land, water, or air.
In another portion of his speech, the Soviet Premier practically
admitted that he had no hope of reaching any agreement at the sum-
mit conference.
He said :
The nearer May 16, the day of the meeting of the heads of Government, ap-
proaches, the more one-sided becomes the approach of certain statesmen of
the Western Powers to the problems the participants of the conference will
have to face.
Then he goes ahead and gives examples attacking Herter and
Dillon.
KIIRUSIICHEV'S DECISION TO SCUTTLE CONFERENCE
Now. I want to quote this. This morning I called your attention to
this young Russian that stepped out from the intelligence department
,of the Russian Government, who was heard on the radio. He said,
and I quote :
The Soviet Communist regime is in no way interested in allowing so popular
.a man as the American President to, come to the Soviet Union. They are
.definitely afraid of the impact such a visit can make on the people.
Now if the issue is what caused Khrushchev to shoot his wad, so
to speak, I think it is very clear that when he found out, one, that he
couldn't make an impression upon his associates who were to be at
the conference; two, that Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese were un-
happy and Mao Tse-tung laced him up and down about this confer-
-ence, as the record shows, when he found out that they didn't want it,
three, that he was having trouble with his own gang in Russia; and,
four, that the youth of Russia were simply getting all fed up-he
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8 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
decided before he went to Paris that he was going to let the balloon
go u
It wasn't the question of U That may have given him the os-
tensible opportunity to blow his top, but, as a matter of fact, he was
all ready to go days before.
Now if that is the fact, and I think it is sustained by the people
who weigh the evidence then there is no need of our inquiring into
what some folks feel. ~hey may be a little remiss hither and yon in
our own public service. hey were laboring under deep pressure.
When you put yourself in the President's boots and go over there
and see what he took, you have to say, "God bless him. He held his
temper and ho handled himself so that he made all America and all
the world proud," and the result was as suggested, as the record now
shows. Look at the U.N., look at Britain, what they say about it.
And the answer, I think is that we should just about stop our in-
vestigation and not try to ball up further the issue.
The CII AIRMAN. For the record I will say that the President, yes-
terday morning, heartily endorsed this inquiry.
Senator WILEY. That What?
The CIIAIIi LAN. The President himself said in my presence that
he heartily endorsed this inquiry, and if the Senator wishes to take
issue with the President, why I su ggest lie talk to him about it.
Senator Wu.EY. Oh, no. 1 hearldhini say that. Tani not disputing
his saying it. I am just simply slaying that where do we go from here
~
now?
Are we going further, are we going to try to ball up the agency
that gets the information, that has done sucri a tremendous job, that
for 31/2 years has given us information.
[Deleted.]
The CHAIRMAN. I think the Senator misunderstands the purpose of
this meeting. It is not. to ball up anything. It. is to try to clarify a
situation for the benefit. of the committee-
ommittee and the Senate and the
country. And I know of no one who has the slightest purpose of ball-
ing up anything.
Has the Senator completed his questions?
SenatorWILEY. Yes I am sorry that I used that expression. What
I meant was "confuse,l' and if there is going to be further evidence,
would you mind telling me who the next witness is?
The CHAIRMAN. There will be no other witnesses this afternoon.
Senator WILEY. Well, do you expect to call some later on?
The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Mr. Dulles is coming on Tuesday.
Senator Mansfield-is the Senator through?
Senator WILEY. No, that is the point I am making. I want to state
in all sincerity, gentlemen, it is your responsibility if you want to call
this man who has created this agency under the mandate of the Con-
gress, that we have appropriated money for, and have not tied his
hands and he is the one who brought about this; let us be frank.
(Discussion off the record.)
The CHAIR fAN. The. Senator is misinformed if he thinks that type
of testimony is going to go in the public record. There was no inten-
tion at any time of putting this in the public record.
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Senator WILEY. Did you hear yesterday when the 'distinguished
Senator from Ohio very plainly and bluntly talked about the leaks.
I belong to a committee where I have seen them go right from the
committee room right out in front of the fellows who have the mech-
anisms for giving the news. This is the first time I have blown my
top, but I am simply telling you in the interests of my country, I think
you should not call in this other agency. I think that these gentlemen
have told what the public knows now, but to bring in this other
agency, I think would be a mistake.
The CHAIRMAN. Does the Senator say that he knows Senators who
have gone out of executive sessions before the microphone and re-
peated what has been said here?
Senator WILEY. I am not putting my finger on any Senators. If
you want to know what is going on what have they got the television
out there for and you are quoted every day as appearing before it.
Let's be frank. This is not the only committee where they spill the
beans. But I am talking about the Central Intelligence Agency,
gentlemen. I happen to know something about it, and I know what
it means, and people over in the I-louse know what it means, and I
sincerely hope that you will not bring Dulles before you. That is all
I have to say.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mansfield.
JURISDICTION OVER THE AIRSPACE AND THE IIIGGII SEAS
Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Secretary, in an attempt to clarify some
of the confusion which exists in some of our minds I would like, to ask
some questions :
What is your present official interpretation of international law as.
regards the extension of national sovereignty skyward?
Secretary HERTER. I don't think we have any.
Senator MANSFIELD. We have no international law in that field as
yet?
Secretary IIERTER. That I know of. There is no definition as to
what is considered the atmosphere above the air. There is no ac-
cepted interpretation or verbiage when they are talking about the
atmosphere.
Senator MANSFIELD. Would you think it advisable to have an inter-
national conference or conferences to decide the question of sover-
eignty in the air over a country and also the possibility of regulating
the seas in a more orderly fashion?
Secretary HERTER. Well, as you know, we have tried for over a
year to get the United Nations to get the outer space committee
organized and underway.
enator MANSFIELD. At our suggestion?
Secretary HERTER. At our urging. We have been urging that this
be done. We have been pressing it. We have not been able to make
any headway because the Russians refused to go along. There have
been further discussions of this proposal but we have been unable to
agree on who should carry it out. I think we are making progress
but it is still one of those things where there is a constant dispute as
to what should be done.
Not only that but we had hoped to get it adjusted in time so that
this year there could be a great international scientific congress be-
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cause you're dealing with new matters that the scientists are expert
in that the layman is not, and the Soviets were unable even to allow
the calling of that congress.
Senator MANSFIELD. No. In other words, as yet there is no clari-
fication of this particular matter.
Getting back to my statement concerning regulation of the seas,
we, of course, operate under the doctrine of freedom of the seas.
But what I have in mind is the fact that it is my understanding that
the. Soviet Trnion Can launch missiles anywhere A. wants to up within,
say, three miles of our coastline if it, is in our vicinity, and we have
the sn'?' rirrht under international law to fire missiles up to 3 miles,
say of Vladivostok. Is that correct1
Secretary I lFirrr:ta. Yes, and it depends again on what one takes as
the territorial waters. Three miles have been the generally accepted
territorial limit. The Soviet Government has claimed 12 miles and,
ac von know, the recent Geneva Conference failed in reaching agree-
ment among the nations as to what should constitute the territorial
NN? .?r of c1i,1erent nations.
Some nations have gone much farther than that, particularly
with regard to fishing rigghts.
Senator M,txsrn.I.n. 'flat's right, but what I have in mind is that
times have changed considerably, even in our generation.
Mr. Chairman, may we have order in the committee'
The CIt:viHMAN. Ti is diflicult to have order.
Senatori~-:Rrrr;I,D. The fact is that we have these satellites going
skyward hundreds of miles and we have these missiles going thousands
of miles into the ocean. It was because of these new factors that I
offered the suggestion that it might be well to have international con-
ferences to take heed of changed conditions in this modern day.
? Te. have also advocated, as you are aware, peaceful uses of outer
space, and we have made no headway.
[Deleted.]
The Cli.tinM:aN. Senator Gore?
Senator Cont. Mr. Chairman, the first question I wish to pursue
leads to a question of Mr. Bohlen. Since others have asked him ques-
tions, I wonder if T might ask that lie return.
STATE DEPARTMENT'S RNOWLEDGF. OF U-2 FLIM TS
Mr. Secretary'. Secretary Dillon testified this morning that he
did not know of thi4 particular flight, and to the best of my memory
you said you were away at the time and (lid not know of this particular
flight.
Secretary Tlrmri'ru. T lcuew of the program. I made that. clear in
which the flight was included but not that particular flight.
Senator GORE. I was specifying this particular flight. Did T cor-
rectly understand both of you?
lfr. Dut.t.ox. Yes. Senator. I had heard about G weeks earlier that.
a series of flights would be undertaken and I had not heard anything
since that lime but it was not in my regular order of business.
Senator GORE. Would you repeat what you said? I did not under-
stand it.
Mr. Dim.t.o . I said I was informed about d'i weeks before the date
of this flirlit, I Ray. that there was a program of particular flights
of which this one could have been a part, and I did
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE S17MMIT CONFERENCE 91
Senator GORE. It could have been but you did not know of this
particular one.
Mr. DILLON. No; I did not know any more than that of this par-
ticular flight.
QUESTION OF DECISION NOT TO HALT PROGRAM OF U-2 FLIGIITS
Senator GORE. The President, in his statement to the American
people, the other night, said this :
As to the timing, the question was really whether to halt the program and
thus forego the gathering of important information that was essential and
that was likely to be unavailable at a later date. The decision was that the
program should not be halted.
Now, as I understand your reply to the chairman of the committee,
you did not participate in the making of a decision to halt or not to
halt this particular flight.
Secretary IIERTER. I had approved of it.
Senator. GoRE. On this particular program.
Secretary HERTER. And approved of it as a part of the program.
The question of the halting of it was not in issue at that time although
I knew that the summit conference was coming.
Senator GORE,. Well, my specific question is this: Did you partici-
pate in a conference or were you aware of a decision; did you make
a decision? What is the full extent of your knowledge of a decision
that the flight would not be discontinued?
Secretary HERTER. I know of no conference at which that matter
was discussed.
Senator GORE. Then would it have properly been
Secretary HERTER. The only matter that came before me was the
approval of this program.
Senator GORE. How long ago did you approve the program?
Secretary IIERTER. I can't tell you exactly, but it was some time
prior to the time I went abroad.
Senator GORE. Is it a matter of weeks?
Secretary IIERTER. A matter of weeks.
Senator GORE. Would such a decision have been properly within the
province of the State Department?
Secretary HERTER. No. The State Department would not have a
final decision in the matter. The State Department would have an
advisory position in the matter, and the CIA did consult with us
about it.
[Deleted,]
Senator GORE. I understood the purpose of this hearing was to de-
velop the facts insofar as we were capable of doing so, and to the extent
that security would permit, to make available the facts to the Ameri-
can people.
Do I correctly understand the purpose of the hearing?
The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Tennessee understands it as I
understand it in spite of the opinion of the Senator from Wisconsin?
Senator LAUSCHE. May I ask, is it-
Senator WILEY. You might as well just now.
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92 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
Senator LAUSCIIE. Is it confined to what our Government has done
or are we concerned about what the Soviet has done?
The CuAIRm-AN. I certainly am concerned about what the Soviet has
done.
Senator LAUSCIIF. It hasn't been manifested here today.
(Procedural discussion.)
The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Tennessee has the floor.
Senator '"'u.EV. May I just say one thing?
The CHAIRMAN. Does the Senator yield to the Senator from Wis-
consin ?
Senator Wu.Er. I realize when I lut the ceiling before that I was
probably not as coherent as I should be. I want to say to you with the
conviction of a man who has lived long, that. the business of a com-
mittee like ours is to develop facts for legislation, facts that are
necessary to bring out curative legislation, or if you please, if you
want to investigate an individual, that is another thing. We had the
McCarthy hearings. We know what that did, but here is another
angle.
It is not the business of this committee to expose to the people of
this country a mechanism that is so important to r l ife
preserve the and
integrity of this country, and I mean the CIA, I know what it means.
I happen to know something about what it has done [deleted] and to
me, at least, and as I say, as a young man of past 710 summers, please
remember that when you go into this thing, as you are going into it,
you are going to expose a mechanism that is as vital to the if of this
country its anything you can think of.
It is that mechanism that made possible this series of three and a
half years of exploratory missions over the Soviet Union [deleted].
If that is what you are going into, just count your words.
Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman?
The CIIAIR.IM.t_\'. The Senator from Tennessee.
Senator Goiu.. Dealing with the CIA is not a new experience for me.
I happen to have handled in the House of Representatives the ap-
propriation hill for the Atomic Energy Commission for 5 years before
I was elected to the U.S. Senate.
I was party to the appropriation for the, atomic energy program
when the atomic bomb was being built in my State. No one ever heard
those secrets from my lips. Every year for the past. 14 1 have listened
to the testimony of the CIA from one to two or three or more times.
I don't think that it is necessary that we violate the. security of this
country in order to hear Mr. Allen Dulles' testimony.
The CIIATRM. N. Will the Senator yield? Mr. Dulles said to this
committee when he was asked if he would appear, that lie would be
very pleased to appear. He thought it. would serve a useful purpose.
He had no objection.
Senator Goiw. I am aware that I am pursuing very important
questions that reflect upon the effectiveness of our country and the
prestige. of our country. That is all the more reason why they should
be pursued.
I thought, this was the purpose of the hearing, to develop (lie facts,
and insofar as they could be revealed to the public, to do so.
The CuAnn AN. The Senator is quite right.
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE 93
QUESTION OP DECISION NOT TO HALT PROGRAM OF U-2. FLIGHTS
Senator Gorm. To return to the question, insofar as either of you
know, or any official of the Department, no actual decision to proceed
with the flight or not to proceed with the flight was made.
If such a decision was made, it was beyond your knowledge. Is
that a correct statement?
Secretary IIERTER. Yes; I think that I ought to say this. When the
matter came before me, I had an opportunity of disapproving it and
did not do so. Not it, but the program.
Senator GORE. But this particular flight did not come before you?
Secretary HERTER. It came as one of a group.
[Deleted.]
Senator GORE. When did you first learn of the plane's misfortune?
Secretary IIERTER. I received word in Ankara, Turkey, that a plane
was down. That is all.
Senator GORE. From whom did you receive it?
Secretary IIERTER. It was handed to me from a slip of paper that
Mr. Livingston Merchant had. Ile was sitting behind me at a NATO
meeting and he handed me a slip of paper, "word has come that
[deleted] a plane is missing."
I don't think he said in Russia. I didn't know which one of the
flights it was.
Senator GORE. It is your presumption that this was a communica-
tion within the Department?
Secretary IIERTER. Oh, yes. I assume it was either in the Depart-
ment or from CIA sources with whom we are constantly in touch
overseas.
Senator GoRr. I believe my time is up. I will return to this.
[Deleted.]
The CHAIRMAN. You had one question of Mr. Bohlen. Ile was
called back at your request.
Senator GoiiE. Yes. If I may digress a moment, I have been told
several times, Mr. Bohlen, that in your press briefing at Paris, I
believe on this 16th, you expressed the view that except' for the U-2
plane, there would have been a, summit conference.
Will you relate to us what you said at this briefing in this regard?
Mr. BOHLEN. I don't recall, Senator, honestly that I made that
statement-
Senator WILEY. A little louder, please.
Mr. BOHLEN. I don't recall that I made that statement. The press
briefing that I held on the 16th was an open press conference on the
record, and I do not recall any statement of that kind because my
view then as now is that the U-2 was one of the factors that may have
led to the particular Soviet behavior at Paris.
I really do not recall any such statement of that kind. It's all on
the record. This was an open press conference.
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94 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUM MIT CONFERENCE
Senator Gctni;. YOU (lid not hot+i all off-die-record background
briefin a?
Mr. I3nflr,.N. I held a background later in which I outlined at. that
conference the three factors that I believed and still do entered into
the formulation of the Soviet position.
Senator Goin.. Was a trainsc ipt. made of that background briefing?
Mr. BoilLEN. I would have to check on that, sir. I think there
probably was.
Senator Goon. Would you supply it to the committee if there was?
Mr. Botli.F:N. If t here: i one, I would have no views on it.
Secretary IIEIrri:R. I would have no objection.
(The transcript referred to was subsequently furnished for the con-
fidential use of the committ.ee.)
Mr. Bor-a.r:ti. If them' is a transcript of it, but I recall the cireuni-
stance5 very well in this, in that. three factors that I mentioned earlier,
the Soviet pessimism as regards the outcome of the summit from their
point of view; the pcr.;.ible opposition or questioning of its conduct
and the V-2 matters were the three factors that appeared to ore to
have entered into Soviet decision to torpedo thec uliferenco.
I miF,ht add, Senator, for clarification on this, we have used the
words ' scuttle the conference" quite often.
There are various ways of scuttling it conference. You can scuttle
a conference before it 'begins or you can sabotage it from within
[deleted].
[Subsequently, Mr. Bohlen made available to the Committee the
following statement of views he held in Paris at the time the Sum-
mit Conference came to an end :]
I would like to just briefly note-this is a personal opinion-that there
were three elements in this situation :
One, I think, was the situation in Moscow, whereby there were some people
who were a little bit concerned about the manner in whichKhrushchev was
conducting the foreign relations of the Soviet Union, for reasons already
touched oil.
The second was that I believe that he came to think-or the Soviet Gov-
ernment came to think-that the prospects for any agreement at the sum-
mit, on Berlin particularly, which is one that he had committed himself so
deeply to. were very dim indeed. Before the plane incident:, they were visibly
preparing the usual tactic of placing the onus in advance upon the Western
Powers for any expected failure. But had there twen no plane incident, I
believe the conference would have run its full course. There would have
been discussions. There would have been the normal, if you want to call it
that, the normal type conference with the Russians, of which we have had
many in the last 15 years, but without results. -
The plane incident, the whole development connecting with that, moved
things into a totally new dimension. And I think that the evidence is con-
clusive, that he came here to Paris with the idea of either torpedoing the
conference or conceivably-because you cannot read their full minds-the
hope that somehow or other that the pressure from our Allies would force the
United States to capitulate. I think he makes this very plain. And this is
where he made his major miscalculation. Our Allies stood with us solidly--
wonderfully well.
Of course, it. is easier to say that now than it was before.
Mr. Ditvni:X. I was told that these statements had been cleared by
Mr. Din-DE". The CIA people with whom we were dealing, sir.
Senator GonE. Off the record.
(Discussion off the record.)
The Cii.vnM.ax. Does the Senator from Ohio have any further
questions?
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DUTIES OF `11B. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Senator LAUSCIIE. Mr. Herter, I have in my hand the National
Security Act of 1947, and I have read from page 5 that part of the
material which deals with the duties of the Central Intelligence
Agency.
Are the duties enumerated in this section complete?
Secretary IIERTER. Yes; I think those are enumerated in that
section.
Senator LAUSCIIE. This section didn't place any directions on how
intelligence is to be obtained.
Secretary IIERTER. No.
[Deleted.]
PRESIDENT'S ASSUMPTION OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR U-2 FLIGHT
Senator LAUSCIIE. Based upon the questions that have been asked
here today, one set implied that the President should not have told
the truth. The next set implied that one of the inen lied. And the
third set implied that there was an inability to coordinate the views.
Now, my question is-off the record.
The CHAIRMAN. Take it off the record.
We will make a special dispensatioii, whatever the Senator wishes.
Does he wish it on or off ?
Senator LAUSCIIE. Let it be on. Has anyone given any thought
about the peculiar position that the President of the United States
is placed in in connection with the paradoxical situation that he is
supposed to be a man of truth, and moral character, and yet requested
to lie about these matters, if they are within his knowledge?
Secretary HERTER. I am not sure whether that is a rhetorical ques-
tion or whether you are asking me that question.
Senator LAUSCIIE. Well, take it both ways. [Laughter.]
Senator GoRE. Rhetorical or oratorical. [Laughter.]
Senator LAUSCIIE. Well, let's assume that you were the President,
Mr. Herter, and you were faced with the dilemma of telling a lie
about what happened or telling the truth. In either event you are
hooked. What course would you follow?
Secretary IIERTER, I can answer that one so far as I myself am
concerned.
The CHAIRMAN. He followed both.
Senator LAUSCIIE. I don't know. I am beginning to wonder if what
the Central Intelligence Agency is doing ought not to be a matter
left with them and without the knowledge of the President.
I have no other questions.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, I just want to make a coinment.
The Senator from Ohio has put his finger on the very point that
perhaps I didn't make clear to him earlier in my inquiry. This is, in
my opinion, a central important question about this whole matter,
the wisdom of the policy of involving the President in this kind of
business, that is, espionage, which traditionally involves lying and
cheating and, murdering and violating the sovereignty of countries
with which a country is not at war and all of this. And what the Sen-
ator has said is-perhaps I didn't make it clear-is exactly the point
that I was seeking to raise an.d. to elucidate in the first line of questions
that I asked. And I agree with him this presents a very difficult
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96 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
dilemma and the question is the wisdom of departing from the tra-
ditional ihistorical practice of not involving the head of the state in
any espionage responsibilities that he is above and apart from. We
follow that in the Congress, as you have just stated. [Deleted.] We
treat it differently, and I was suggesting and raising the question of
whether it is wise to depart from the traditional practice that all
important states throughout history, without exception in accordance
with the Secretary's testimony, have followed. That is the very point.
I don't think the Senator understood what my point was.
Senator LAIISCIIE. I knew if I were President
Senator WILET. You would tellthe truth.
Senator LAUSCUE. I would tell the truth.
Senator WILEY. So did he.
The CHAIRMAN. Ile did and this is the answer.
Senator LAUSCIIE. And could you expect him to do anything else?
Senator WILEY. That is right.
Senator LAUSCUE. And the only way you could enable him to per-
form his duty to his country was not by having him know what was
done and if he didn't know the question would be pursued why
didn't he know.
Senator WILEY. Ile taught the world a lesson in 1960, new diplo-
macy, by telling the truth, and I think that it will echo down through
the years.
Senator LAUSCHE. So I don't know which group to follow.
The CHATTI-MAN. It is echoing down the years already. This is the
principal echo that has arisen from this whole matter.
Senator LAIISCIIE. The tragedy is that this is made the principal
echo but all of the misdeeds of the Soviet are looked upon as incon-
sequential.
The CIIArR3r;AN. Well, the Senator is entirely incorrect in that
statement. He draws conclusions that are not justified by the record
or any statement that I have heard before the committee.
Senator LAIISCIIE. Well, I can
Senator MANSFIELD. Can I ask a question?
[Deleted.]
USIA'S DIRECTOR'S RADIO PROGRA31 APPEARANCE
The CIIAiRt3r,tN. Do I understand Mr, Allen's statement. on the tele-
vision program was not approved by you or by the Acting Secretary .
Secretary IIEIiTEP,. No. As I understand it, this was in answer to
a question on a TV program.
Senator MANsrwLn. `t as. I think we have the program here. But
could somebody on the 4t.air fiiici it right away so that. I could read it
just as it is? (See p. 212, app. 1.)
The CHAIRMAN. Well, Air. Secretary while they are looking for it,
is it or is it not the policy of the 1epartnlent of State that its
employees clear public; statements with regard to delicate interna-
tional relations before they make them ?
Secretary llswrEnt. Yes, sir.
The CHATTIMAN. It is the policy?
Secretary ITFIrrER. It. is. Any statement dealing with foreign af-
fairs should be cleared with the tate Department.
The CIIAIRMAN. Then when they are made in this fashion without
clearance, it is not in accord with your policy; is that correct?
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE
Secretary HERTER. Well, as I say, this had not been cleared with us.
The CHAIRMAN: He is an employee -
Secretary HERTER. I think it is very possible that a prepared state-
ment had been cleared, but not an answer to a question. There is no
way of clearing that, until one knows what question is asked.
The CHAIRMAN. What I asked this for is because later on it seems
to me one of the important things that might come out of this commit-
tee hearing is a tightening of the policy which gives the Department
of State and the Secretary of State a much closer control over public
statements by other agencies. It strikes me that we would get in
much less trouble if all these people would clear with you or with
whoever is Secretary of State of the Department, we will say. Don't
you think that would minimize the chances of inconsistent state-
ments being made by members of the Government?
Secretary HERTER.. Yes, that is so. But I think that anything that
he may have said in a prepared statement on that TV program at that
time had been cleared. Insofar as answers to questions are con-
cerned, there is no way of clearing them without knowing the ques-
tions and in that way he was on his own.
The CHAIRMAN. It is his responsibility, then, when he goes beyond
anything that had been cleared?
Secretary HERTER. Yes.
Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Chairman, on page 35 of the Background
Documents on the summit conference, about 7 or 8 lines up from the
bottom of the page, Mr. Allen, in response to a question from Miss
Dodd, states the following :
There are a lot of different definitions of "spying" and I don't want to try to
quibble, but I do think I ought to point this out and that more people ought to
recall it : When he went down he told exactly what his mission was and exactly
what he was expected to do, and he was under instruction to do that.
Now, the answer to the question, I just thought ought to be in the
record, because there was some confusion about this statement in view
of information which had been given to a group previously in the
Capitol. Again, I want to say, Mr. Chairman, that I am through
with my questions of Mr. Herter, but I want to express my thanks
to Secretary Herter, to Secretary Dillon and to Ambassador Bohlen
for their candor and frankness today and to assure them that I, for
one, appreciate what they had to say,_ and I think they have made a
real contribution to clearing up a confused situation which confronted
the committee as a whole.
Secretary IIERTER. We are very grateful for that, Senator.
Senator Wir EY. Of course, on this side of the aisle, I have praised
your statement in the beginning and I will praise your conduct in
the conclusion. You all did very well.
Senator GoRE. Mr. Chairman?
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gore.
Senator GoRE. I do not wish to unduly tire the Secretary, but I am
perfectly willing to come back after dinner or to come back tomorrow.
I do have many more questions.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, it is my understanding the Secretary-he
looks very well to me-would prefer to go on tonight. He does not
wish to run over to next week.
Secretary HERTER. I prefer to go on, Mr. Chairman.
Senator GoRE. I don't think it will take very long tonight.
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~7 E41. I~tiCI i~ TO THE SUMMIT CON-FERENCE
RESPONSIiiILI'II FOR DECISION TO n1SCUNTJNIE FLIGHTS
The C11.1iini-1:s. The Senator may proceed.
Senator GURE. Fine.
I wish to resume Iny- inquiry with respect to this particular flight.
I alts perturbed that you say it would not be within the province of
t11e Depilrtilient of State to Make the decision to discontinue these
flights, that this would be it decision for Mr. Dulles to make.
Secretary Iir:RTui. No, I never said that at all.
Senator GORE. I beg your pardon?
Secretary I1i:Rrr?:ir. I never said that at all. I said he was the opera-
tional man who had to plan things, and then submit them for approval.
Senator Gone:. WW'ell, what would be the proper agency to consider
whether these flights should or should not be discont inuecl ?
Secretary IHERTER. If the question of discontinuance had come up,
if that was a decision to be made, we would have been asked advice on
it. We were not asked for advice on it. I e gave approval to carry
on with the routine planning that had been done from the point of
view of flight.
Senator Gone. Some weeks jPrior?
Secretary IIERTEi;. Yes, and had given that approval.
Senator GoitE. Did that approval
Secretary IIERTrai. That approval, as I say, is advice.
Senator Gor.E. Was advice?
Secretary IIEi1TEIr. Is advice. The President himself took the re-
sponsihilit v for any final decision.
Senator GORE. Did your approval involve continuation of the flight
through and during the period of the summit conference?
Secretary IIERTER. -Not, specifically as such, The approval con-
stituted going ahead when conditions were appropriate for carrying
them out.
Senator Goi:E. Did you give no consideration to discontinuance at a
time prior to the summit meeting or during the summit conference?
Secretary IIEin'Eii. Senator, I answered that quest ion before when I
said that there is no good time for a failure, that if the summit con-
ference had debarred carrying out these flights the President's visit to
Russia may have been the next thing that might have debarred them.
It ma f lave been debarred when Khrusllchev was at Camp David;
it may have been debarred when Mr. Khrushchev was visiting in
France.
There may have been any number of diplomatic reasons why they
shouldn't be conducted at a given period of time.
In my opinion, the value of the information and the necessity of
carrying out these flights under given conditions warranted t)ieir
going ahead,
Senator GORE. I am trying to be specific in my questions, and I am
tryin to elicit from you whether at the time you gave your approval
for the general program some weeks prior to this particular flight,
you gave specific consideration to the question of continuance or dis-
continuance during or near the time of the summit conference.
Secretary IIERTER. Certainly. The summit. conference. was very
much on my mind as it was on everybody's mind, at that time.
Senator GoaE. And you gave your approval then ?
Secretary IIFCTER. I did.
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE 99
Senator GoRE. To their continuation throughout the summit
conference?
Secretary HERTER. That was never specified as such.
Senator Gorz .. In other words, you are saying, then, that there was
no decision to discontinue?
Secretary HERTER. That is right.
Senator GoRE. Then if any decision to discontinue or if any deci-
sion was made not to continue, to use the words, you are not aware
of it?
Secretary IIERTER. No. The only decision that I know of at any
stage of the game was to go ahead.
[Deleted.
Senator GoRE. Another statement which the President made, I
would like to read :
Of course we had no indication or thought that basic Soviet policies had
turned about. But when there is even the slightest chance of strengthening
peace, there could be no higher obligation than to pursue it.
Now, on page 4 of your statement here today I would like to read.
This is on page 4, beginning "Summit prospects dimmed."
Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the second, third,
fourth, and fifth paragraphs on page 4 be reprinted at this point in
the record.
The CHAIRMAN. Without objection it is so ordered.
(The paragraphs referred to follow:)
In the first weeks after the Khrushehev American visit there was a general
improvement of atmosphere and people began talking, partly in hope, partly in
some confusion, about "detente," There were comparatively conciliatory
speeches on each side ; there was progress in the test-ban talks at Geneva ; a
new Soviet-United States cultural agreement was signed November 21, and
on December 1 the United States, the U.S.S.R., and other powers signed the
Antarctic treaty.
But clouds began to gather even then. One of the earliest signs was the
strong Soviet protest on November 11 against West German plans to build a
broadcasting station in West Berlin. Another was the Khrushchev speech on
November 14 which was harder in tone, boasted again of Soviet missile prowess,
and began a concentrated attack on Adenauer and the German Federal Republic
which later increased and seemed to be a central feature of Soviet presummit
tactics. The reason for this attack is still a matter for speculation. Perhaps
they thought it would undermine the Western position on Berlin by helping to
divide the Western Allies. It had no such effect of course, but naturally
rallied us to speak out in defense of our German ally.
Khrushchev as early as December 1 also began repeating his threats to sign
a separate peace treaty with East Germany. He repeated these threats in his
speech to the Supreme Soviet on January 14 and in his remarks during his visit
to Indonesia and other countries in January. On February 4, the Warsaw
Pact powers issued the first formal blocwide commitment to sign a separate GDR
peace treaty. Thus Khrushchev's threatening Baku speech of April 25, though
it was the most sweeping since February 19951), was only a harsher version of
what he had been saying for months before. I shall make full documentation
on his speeches available to the committee.
Not until April did we reply at length to this mounting crescendo of Soviet
statements. We did so in order to keep the record straight-notably in the
speeches of April 4 and 20, which Khrushchev attacked for starting arguments
that he in fact had begun.
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1L% EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
Senator GoaE. You will sec from this statement., Mr. Secretary,
that you contradict the President's statement, do you not?
The President says :
We had no indication or thought that basic Soviet policies had turned about.
From what I have just read, you list one, two, three, four occasions
where the Soviet policy had, in fact., changed.
Do you wish to comment.?
Secretary IIEJITER. Yes, I would be very glad to comment.
I don't think that there is any essential disagreement in the two
points of view.
I am talking primarily in my statement in regard to Berlin and
Germany.
The President was talking about a series of things in which lie spoke
of disarmament, mutual inspection, atomic control, and then lie added
Germany and Berlin.
As I testified earlier in the day, I think we all had hopes that there
might be a cissibility of making some progress, even though not in
the German-Berlin situation but in the disarmament field, and as a
corollary possibly in the nuclear testing field where it was not a sum-
mit problem, but it would have been a three-power problem that could
have been discussed in Paris.
For instance, so long as there was any hope of making any progress,
the President was willing to go.
Senator GoRE. I didn't question the President being willing to go
so long as there was any hope of progress.
What I was asking you to comment on was what appears to me to
be a contrast between the President's statement that there is no indi-
cation that basic Soviet policies had turned about., and where you give
almost a full page indicating that they had turned about. but you
have finished your comment on that.
Secretary IIERTsR. Yes, there was some talk here about basic policy
and tactics in connection with the summit. I don't think the President
felt events such as I cited necessarily mean that Soviet basic policy
had changed.
I think as he said after Camp David, he hoped that there was a
mutuality of interest, particularly in the disarmament field, which
would allow the great powers getting together in order to make prog-
ress in disarmament.
That had always been the area in which he hoped, because of the
mutuality of interest, that we might make progress.
I don't think that there is anything fundamentally opposed in these
two statements.
EXTENT OF FRE3rlFR HIr SiICHF.v-S POWER
Senator GORE. Now, I want to ask a few questions which relate to
the first of the three questions on which I wish to examine your opin-
ion; that is, whether the diplomatic failure in Paris represented a
failure in policy.
You recall that I submitted certain questions to you here on March
22. At that time I asked you :
Do you think it would have been more prudent to have had an understanding
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO TH
about the subjects to be considered at a summit conference before agreeing to
have one, or do you think this is the proper way to keep the store?
Secretary HERTER. It is a gamble. I don't know.
Senator GoRE. You are gambling with high stakes, and it seems to me in a
reckless manner. I am disturbed to have the Secretary of State make the
statements that you have made today about the summit conference ; that there
is no plan, no purpose, no understanding as to what will be discussed and what
we hope to attain there.
Secretary HERTER. Mr. Senator, I view this as essentially a matter of ex-
ploration. We have the situation where an individual, Mr. Krushchev, is the
man who makes the decisions so far as we know, for the Russians.
Later on, I asked you :
Is there any reason why the Russian dictator could not delegate the same
power to his Foreign Minister as President Eisenhower should or does delegate
to you?
Senator HERTER. None.
Senator GonE. Then isn't that a fallacious argument?
Secretary HERTER. Not necessarily, because you are dealing with an indi-
vidual personality who many believe wants to be the negotiator.
Now, I read those things because one of the principal, if not the
principal, justifications for going to the summit and for the exchange
of visits was that Mr. Khrushchev and he alone spoke for the Russian
people, but today you tell us on page 7:
I might digress here to observe that it had been our experience at previous
conferences with the Soviets, at least since the death of Stalin, that the Soviet
representative, no matter how highly placed he might be, was bound by the
collective decisions on basic policy matters made prior to his departure from
Moscow. Any substantive changes in those positions apparently required refer-
ence back to Moscow before they could be undertaken.
And then on page 8, you say :
This meeting completely confirmed our conclusion of the night before that
Mr. Khrushchev was operating within the fixed limits of a policy set before his
departure from Moscow.
Secretary HER=R. There appears to be an inconsistency in those
two statements.
When I was testifying here before, the visits of Mr. Khrushchev in
which sometimes ho had an important person with him and sometimes
he did not-
Senator GORE. In which what, sir?
Secretary IIERTER. Sometimes in which he had an important person
with him and sometimes he did not, indicated that his situation at
home was such that he had a great deal more leeway than had pre-
viously been the case.
When he went to Paris, and I think this has been brought out, he
had with him Gromyko and Malinovsky, General Malinovsky,
Marshal Malinovsky, who never left him for one moment at any time.
This was a departure from previous occasions. This is why we said
they had gone back to their standard policy of taking directions from
home.
Prior to that time I had believed he had greater leeway than was
clearly indicated here in Paris.
Senator Goin. So the assumption proved to be erroneous.
Secretary HEETER. It is.
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
USUAL DIPLOMATIC Piax'E.DC"Ri;s i'F:Itst s .sumlirr CO)NFERF:NCF:S
Senator GoRF:. I believe you testified before the House, according
to press reports yesterday, tint summitry as it diplomatic metliod
had had some hard kncxcks.
Secretary IL,ati it. Yes, 1 did.
In answer to a question from Senator Iitunplirey, I repeated the
same thing today.
Senator GoRF:. And in recommending, which 1 certainly endorse,
continuing businesslike negotiat ion with the Soviets, you have in mind
the more usual processes and pi'tx-edures of diplomacy.
Secretary IImi'rmc. That is correct.
Senator Goitn. Negotiations.
Secretary- Ilcim;R. The one ill ing that I did point out, luiwever,
is that with regard to the Berlin situation, Great. Britain, France,
the United States and the. Soviet. Union have responsibility. This is
the carryover f i'om t lie war.
Senator GORE. Yes.
Secretary IiF:iru'r t. And that there, there must be agreement. This
is a thing we have been lighting all the time, that unitiiteral action byy
the Russians cannot take away those rights and obligations which
the,~y, as well as ourselves had acquired as it result. of the war.
That it artist he done by the consent of the four.
So that whet bier or not in the future the discussions to reach agree-
ment among the four should take place thtrougli diplomatic channels,
through ambassadorial level, throe h foreign minister or not, I would
not say which would be the level, but, I think that it is much better
to see If we cannot, as we did in the foreign ministers' conference, and
failed, try to reach at large measure of agreement prior to the meeting
of a suimnit conferenc' so that there iniglit, ix' one or two small un-
resolved issues that could be resolved there rather than trying to
nego,t.iato when you know that you are very far apart at. a summit
conference.
Senator GORE. Well, I hope that you will persist, and that the
President will persist in the businesslike undertakings. I will not
ask you to say that summitry apart. from diplomacy failed. I am
content with your statement, in that regard. fain sorry that I think
it did fail.
Secretary Hmm.:n. I would differ with you, sir, on the question of
personal dipomac}? as against sumniitry. I think that visits are, on
the whole, useful th ings.
I wouldn't say that that was something that should be discarded
completely. I think it. is particularly true that visits of ministers
of foreign affairs, and visits of Beads of state from time to time can
accomplish a great deal of good. But I believe very strongly that
insofar as Beads of state are concerned that is not the place to begin
negotiations. It is the place perhaps where there should be the
culmination of negotiations.
Senator Gozu. I will agree with you in that, statement. The ex-
change of visits offers opl)ortuniticvs. But the formalization of it head
of state conference. where severe international tensions are involved,
without. precise plamting, without assurance that at least. limited
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EVENTS INCIDEN O
agreements can be reached, is, in my view, a dangerous process, and
a policy upon which we should never have embarked.
Of course, it is easier to say that now than it was before.
Hindsight, of course, we learned a long time ago, is better than
foresight.
The CHAIRMAN. Would the Senator yield for a moment? I have
one. or two questions and then he may come back to it.
Senator Goim. Good.
The CHAIRMAN. These I think have been covered but for clarifica-
tion, I might ask them again. Was there ever a, time when the Presi-
dent authorized each flight in this program; that's never been the
practice..
Secretary IIERTEit. It has never come up to, the President.
The CHAIRMAN. Nor of the National Security Council.
Secretary IIERTER. No.
The CHAIRMAN. It has always been under a. blanket authority
understood?,
Secretary IInnTEit. That is my impression.
The CHAIRMAN. Is this blanket authorization under review, either
constant or periodic review?
Secretary HERTER. In my experience the CIA has planned a num-
berof alternate flights at a time. [Deleted.]
The CHAIRMAN. When the Department brought Mr. Bohlen back
from Manila, and he was well-known as an expert on Soviet behavior,
and this was, I thought, in anticipation of these summit meetings
which had been discussed a long time, did he or any other of our
Russian experts advise you or the President to wait and see what Mr.
Khrushchev knew about the U-2 flight before making the NASA
statement ?
Mr. DILLON. The people in the Department who were familiar with
Soviet policy took part in discussions with the CIA which led to the
coordination and the agreement on the guidelines which were given
to NASA, and those included the people who were familiar with all
aspects of our policy.
However, as we said before, we did not know that there was going
to be a full statement by NASA.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bohlen was not consulted about the NASA
statement.
Mr. DILLON. Nobody in the State Department was consulted about
the statement as a statement.
The CHAIRMAN. Nobody.
What puzzles me about this is why was there such compulsion, if
there was, to make such an immediate reaction? I have wondered
why there was any necessity for immediately reacting to the first
Khrushchev statement.
It would seem to me much more normal to wait a while and see
what developed.
Was there anything that was compelling you to answer almost
immediately?
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104 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
Mr. DILI.oN. Yes, I would say so. It was such an unusual and re-
markable statement when Mr. Khrushchev said that American plane
had been shot down over the Soviet Union, that we were not in the
position to not make any comment whatsoever.
As a result we had to make some comment, and we made the very
bland statement which was put out on the 5th.
The CIIAIR3rAN. I didn't mean that. You misunderstood me. I
accept the necessity for the cover story, the statement.
Mr. DILLON. Yes.
The CiL IR34AN. It is the second one that went into such detail, It
would seem to me that it would be commonsense not to follow up too
quickly in the matter of timing. What was the reason for that?
Mr. DILU)-;. The State Department's second statement was innocu-
ous too. It didn't o into any detail, any more detail than the original
cover story did. There. was great-if any detail, that was the state-
ment that was put out by NASA.
The CHAIRMAN. Is it not true that the NASA statement itself is
what put you in a position of having to make a further statement?
Is that true?
Mr. DIL.T.oN.. The further statement, I think, was the next state-
ment in this series, was the one that was put. out on Saturday which
was made only at the time when we knew that the Soviets probably
had the pilot., which was new information, and then the Soviets had
already said they had hint, and had said where he was shot down,
and the probability was that they had certain parts of the airplane
because the picture which they had first put out turned out to be a
fraudulent picture.
BACKGROUND OF DErART]IENT OF STATE'S STATEMENT OF MAY 7
The CIiATRlr:1N. Perhaps I don't understand the timing of it.
It seems to me, if I do understand it, that you could have stood
upon the cover story for some time before the necessity of any further
statement, await ing developments.
Mr. Dlm.oN. You mean, your question is why we made the state-
ment on Saturday, May i, which was the first time we departed from
the cover story.
The CHATRSiAN. Yes, sir.
Secretary IlFimi. That, as I think I have testified before, was a
decision that was made in the light of the very full revelation of
Mr. Iihr~ushchev in giving out, both as to the pilot's testimony, and
as to the )arts and equipment, that had been recovered. That was
when we had to make the decision were we going to keep on lying
about tli is or were we going to tell the truth?
The CIIAIw1 N. II by there wasn't a third alternative is what I
am tryingg to get at?
Why (lidn t you just. he quiet and say nothing? You don't have
just the alternatives of either continuing to lie or to tell the truth?
You could have said nothing. I was just curious. Was it ever
considered that you didn't have to react ? being
Secretary I Congress, a . goof many statements were already being de
made in congress, a Y made
or required of us almost.
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EVENTS INCID N MljW,
The press was hounding everybody, "What do you say now after
what Mr. Khrushchev had said," it was a very difficult time in our
.society, our form of society to have said nothing.
The CHAIRMAN. I believe that was the statement in which you
said "it has been established that insofar as the authorities are con-
cerned, there was no authorization for any such flights." Is that
correct?
Secretary HERTER. That is right.
The CHAIRMAN. Which was not a truthful statement at that point,
was it?
Secretary HURTER. No, this was still partly cover.
The CHAIRMAN. Still partly cover?
Secretary HERTER. Still partly cover. It was not until Monday,
after the briefing had taken place before the congressional leadership
here on the hill that the full statement was made.
The CHAIRMAN. It was after that statement that the full statement
was made?
Secretary HERTER. That is correct.
BACKGROUND OF DEPARTMENT OF STATE STATEMENT OF MAY 9
The CHAIRMAN. That full statement, if I understood it-I think
you have testified-was only after complete and thorough consulta-
tion with everyone concerned, and had the unanimous support of
.State and the President; is that correct?
Secretary HERTER. It is, yes.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gore, go ahead.
Senator GORE. Well, when you made the final statement that the
President did approve, he was responsible-I am not undertaking to
quote you exactly-you also made it plain that he did not approve
specific flights?
Secretary HERTER. Yes.
[Deleted.]
BLOW TO UNITED STATES MORAL POSITION
Senator GORE. I will wait until Mr. Dulles' testimony.
Now, I wish to make my own feelings explicit. I have not intended
to suggest, nor do I believe the chairman or anyone else has intended
to suggest, that the President or any other official of the U.S. Govern-
ment tells a falsehood. I don't know of any requirement in Anglo-
Saxon jurisprudence or any other jurisprudence stemming from
Roman law that a citizen is required to incriminate himself. I know
of no requirement that a nation is required to incriminate or denigrate
or defame itself. I do not claim any sense of morals or sensitivity to
moral standards greater than the average American, but I want the
record to show that I was humiliated with official falsification, and I
think millions of Americans were humiliated. I can agree with you
that our alliance stood firm. I am happy that it did, but I think we
would be deluding ourselves if we did not realize that this unfortunate
incident has dealt a severe blow to the moral position of the United
States. I think we should begin to mend it. The way to mend it is
to ferret out our errors and our mistakes, correct them, and thereby
demonstrate to the world our will and our capacity to survive this
kind of blow-and I hope be stronger thereafter.
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WAS PRESrMMIT SUGGESTED
The CIi,IIRMM.lx. Mr. Secretary, there was one point that I over-
looked. 1 had heard that Chairman Khrusllchev had directly or in-
directly made some inquiry about the possibility of sleeting Mr.
Eisenhower before the summit meeting. Do you know whether or
not. that is so?
Secretary' IIEI{TEu. No. I know of no such effort.
The C11. uiMAN. No effort ?
Secretary IIER'rER. Actually. Mr. Kltrushchev, when he cause to
Paris, or just before lie came to Paris, sent a note to the British and to
the French, I think, largely on a procedural platter: no such note to
us. When the President arrived in Paris, there was just as much Op-
port unit4? for Nil-. liht?ushchev to seek a meeting with liiui as with the
others; and no such effort was made from any l ussiari source.
31TIATAIIv I'ItI:e.1REDx}SS OF TIIE SOVIET UNION
'T'hin Cii. IRMIAx. Mr. tiecretary, have you drawn any inferences
from this whole event relative to the military preparedness of the
Soviet Union?
Secretary IIERTEiI. Of course, my judgment would not be as good
as that of experts. And here, again, I wouldn't want to give my
judgment as a considered judgment from the point of view of the
record. Thep is no quest ion but what. the Russians are very active iii
certain directions, and that the intelligence that has been gained with
regard to that activity has been of very great value to us. And I
think that is as far as f should go.
Tlie Culutr:~N. Any further questions?
Senator Wn.EY. Is the cold war still on or is it over?
Secretary, IIla:rim. It reinains to be seen.
Senator AVILEY, 'then, %V0 had better give primary attention to the
main issue, instead of quarreling about. who is who and what is what
in relation to handling situations. It was your judgment; it isn't niy
judgment. It isn't the business of every little one. in the Senate to tell
you what you should do. It is your business, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mansfield, do you have any questions?
Senator MANSrn.rn. No.
Senator Goiu. Off the record, Mr. Chairman.
(Discussion off the record.)
[Deleted.]
The CIIAIR_M.%N. Mr. Secretary, one last thing. Do you think we
have learned-not just we, but all of us, including you and the admin-
istration-anvfhing from the U-2 incident?
Secretary IIr.R?rnn. Not to have accidents.
The CIIAIIMAN. Is that all we have learned?
Senator GontE. Not what ?
Mr.11LicoMBER. N it to have accidents.
The CI1AiRMA?r. Do you think that is the only lesson we can draw
from these event.??
Secretary II1 RTER MI'. Chairman, I think that anyone would be
foolish to say that with hindsight one couldn't have done better than
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EVENT
when one is faced with certain events at a given time. I think obvi-
ously we should be giving serious consideration to the very best
method of the handling of anything of this kind that might happen in
the future; and I think from that point of view, as the President said,
we welcome this inquiry. We welcome a full disclosure as far as we
could from. the point of view of responsibilities and coordination. I
thank you for your patience here today.
The CHAIRMAN. I want to thank you for your patience and your
frankness and candor. I think you and your associates-Secretary
Dillon and Mr. Bohlen-have been most cooperative in this whole
hearing. I like to think that out of this one-as you know, rather pest
project of mine-is that the State Department itself be given greater
prestige and authority in controlling and coordinating all matters
relating to our foreign relations-as I have tried in the case, for ex-
ample, with the recent instance of control of the black market in
Turkey. I think your Department, the Department of State, ought
to have more authority than we have in the past accorded it. I am
sure that some of our troubles do not relate to any fault on your part,
but to the sort of institutional practices that have grown up-and
people assuming authority to make statements without consulting you
and the Department.. I feel at this stage of the proceedings that this
may be one of the good things that will come out of these hearings ;
that the prestige and authority of the State Department will be
enhanced.
Secretary IILRa-Eit. Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.
Senator GoRr. Could I join you in commending the Secretary and
his assistants for their candor and their patience and their diligence
here today.
Secretary 13ERTER. Thank you.
Senator WILrY. May I also join you the third time by saying, in
my humble opinion the evidence and the statement you made and
the statement that Dillon made and the President's speech show con-
clusively that the breakup of the summit conference was due to K.hru-
shchev and no other cause.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
The committee is adjourned until next Tuesday.
(Whereupon, at 5:55 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene
at 10 a.m., Tuesday, May 31, 1960.)
[As noted in the foreword, Allen W. Dulles, Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, appeared before the committee on Tuesday, May
31, at 10 a.m., and testified in executive session. For security reasons,
his testimony was not released to the public. The committee recessed
on. May 31 at 5:10 p.m., to reconvene at 10 a.m., Wednesday, June 1,
1960.]
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WEDNESDAY, JUNE 1, 1960
U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ]FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.
The committee met at 10 :10 a.m., pursuant to recess, Senator J. W.
Fulbright (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Fulbright (presiding), Mansfield, Gore,
Lausche, Wiley, Ilickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, and Capehart.
Also present : Hon. Charles E. Bohlen, Special Assistant to the
Secretary of State; Hon. William B. Macomber, Jr., Assistant Secre-
tary of State for Congressional Relations; Ricliard Helms, Central
Intelligence Agency ; and Capt. L. P. Gray III, USN, Military Assist-
ant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.
Our witness this morniTer is Dr. Hugh Dryden, the Deputy Admin-
istrator of the National onautics and Space Administration.
I remind members of our committee that today our transcript will
be censored and released to the press. Tomorrow morning at 10 a.m.
we will meet again in this room in executive session with Secretary
Gates.
Dr. Dryden, do you have a prepared statement?
Mr. DRYDEN. I have no prepared statement but if the committee
will, I would like to proceed for 10 minutes or so to give you the
background of NASA's research with the U-2 aircraft.
The CHAIRMAN. All right, you may proceed.
'STATEMENT OF DR. HUGH L. DRYDEN, DEPUTY ADMINISTRA-
T'OR, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
(NASA) ; ACCOMPANIED BY JAMES P. GLEASON, ASSI'STANT' AD-
MINISTRATOR FOR CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS, NASA
STUDY OF AIR TURBULENCE BY 17-2'S
Mr. DRYDEN. There is an extensive program on air turbulence
-which was begun by the National Advisory Committee for Aero-
.nautics (NACA). It is a part of-as far as NASA is concerned, it
it a part of the aeronautical activities transferred to NASA in ac-
cordance with the National Aeronautics and Space Act.
In this program, which began in 1956, there have been 200 weather
flights of U-2 aircraft with NASA and air weather service instru-
mentation covering flights extended over about 264,000 miles. Ninety
percent of this flight time was above an altitude of 40,000 feet, and 40
percent of it, or about 100,000 miles, was above 50,000 feet; and these
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THE SUMT COIN I CE
flights have been Conducted in the Western Ignited States, Western
Europe,'I'urkey, and Japan.
I may recall to your m inds that the function of XAC.1 was that,
of an aeronautical research agency to support the Government's pr?o-
grani in the development of civil aircraft and military aircraft.
RESE;ARCII INFO1hMATION PRODUCED
We produced only research information used in the design of air-
planes.
One important part of this research information which certainly
is brought. to your mind by some of the recent accidents to aircraft
is that of loads on the aircraft due to atinosplieric. disturbances or
gusts. There are two types of problems: one illustrated by the ex-
perience of the airplane which recently got caught in thunderstorm
activity is that of the. maximum load which the airplane may reach
which may tear the wings from the body.
The of her and more insidious type of loading is the repeated load
due to gustiness or rough air that many of you have often encoun-
tered in flying. Thew repeated loads produce a type of brittle failure
which we call fatigue failure. This has, as you may recall, been
encountered in one or two types of airplanes and remedied at con-
siderable cost.
Now, it has been the function of NACA to carry on a program to
furnish the designer information on the magnitude of atniosplieric
gusts encountered by airplanes, the frequency of occurrence of loads
of different niagiuitmules. We have been enraged in the general type,
of activity since 1933 and have data on all of the civil transports from
that date.
ARRANGEMENTS T o OBTAIN INFORMATIO-N ON AIR TURBULENCE
That, of course, gives you a record of experience with the perform-
ance capabilities of present airplanes, but it was our responsibility
to try to get this information for air Manes y?et to be built. This meant
that in practice we were always see ng the highest, and fastest air-
planes to get information of this kind from, so as to be in advance
of the development. of t lie commercial aircraft.
To do this we made arrangements to get information from military
ai lanes.
For example, at the close of World War II we installed our instru-
ments in the BAG airplane used then by SAC; and during their
training operations these instruments continued to record gusts and
the data were sent to us for analysis.
Now the pattern of operation with the commercial airlines and with
the military has been the same throughout.. We meet with the owners
and operators of the airplanes-whether an airline or the military
service--come to an agreement with them that our instruments can
be installed on their airplanes.
In the early stages we send our instrument technicians to visit and
supervise the installation of the instruments. We train employees of
the airlines or the GI's in military
The Cn~1n rAN. Dr. Dryden, does any of this have any relevance
to the inquiry which this committee is concerned with?
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Mr. DRYDEN. It does. We will come to this immediately. We train
our technicians to change the film and send the information to NASA
for analysis. We have no detailed knowledge of the flight plans until
after the fact; and, as a matter of record, we obtain information
needed to analyze the data. Observations extend throughout the
world. At the present time we have instruments on Pan American
and TWA jets which, of course, go around the world. We have co-
operated with foreign governments and airlines by lending instru-
mentation.
Now the U-2 operation is in the same general pattern of operation.
This project, was organized in 1956 when [deleted] the capabilities of
this new airplane were brought to our attention. It was able to fly at
altitudes very considerably higher than any existing airplane.
The program has been carried on entirely openly. There have been
three reports issued, unclassified; there have been press releases on
these operations from time to time.
The program was unclassified except that the data which revealed
the airplane could go higher than 55,000 feet were classified. They
will now be declassified since the potentialities of the airplane have
become known.
[Deleted.]
NEED FOR DATA AT IIIGIIER ALTITUDES
I inust take you back to the atmosphere at the time. These were
the days when the airlines had had DC-6's and DC-7's, and Constel-
lations. At that time we knew the 707, the DC-8, and the Electra
were under design. We were told that the first of these airplanes
would be developed early in 1959. All of our previous data with air-
planes had been at altitudes generally not too much above 20,000 feet
where these airplanes operated. The new airplanes would operate at
35,000 to 40,000 feet, and the military services were interested in
supersonic airplanes which traveled at much higher altitudes, so that
there was at this time a great pressure on us to find methods of obtain-
ing data, and the presence of the capabilities of the U-2 airplane
seemed to us to give the answer. Some of our advisory committees
at the time were bringing to our attention the great need for this
information. I will simply read one extract, if I can find it quickly
for you, and this committee called our attention to the fact that we
did not have suitable airplanes available.
There are three basic regions within which data are available, below 25,000
feet, up to 30,000 feet with military vehicles, up to 55,000 where meager data
are available from balloons and rockets and inference from meteor trails. Exist-
ing research vehicles are reaching to higher altitudes-
and so on..
It is recommended that emphasis be placed on obtaining quantitative infor-
mation on air turbulence at the highest altitudes reasonably obtainable with
existing research vehicles.
[Deleted.]
Now this program was carried on from 1956 through the present
time. NASA was established in October, October 1, 1958, and this was
one of the programs carried over into NASA.
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I might recall to you that NACA was not extensively involved in
aeronautical activities, that NASA, at present is engaged in inter-
national space activities. So far we have not Lad any adverse reac-
tions on the part of people with whom we are cooperating abroad in
space programs.
I think this gives the general background and I would be glad to
respond to questions or to continue with the NASA chronology of the
week of May 1, as you desire, Mr. Chairman.
The CIZAIRMAN. Perhaps we ought to proceed with questions-
[Deleted.]
LINE OF RESPONSIBILITY FROM NASA TO THE PRESIDENT
Do you report directly to the President? What is your relation-
ship to the rest of the Government?
Mr. DRYDEN. At that time the NAC A was managed by a committee
of 17 persons appointed by the President who did report directly to
him.
I was the chief executive officer reporting to the committee at the
time this project was started.
The CIHAIRMAN. In 1956?
Mr. DRYDEN. 1956.
The CHAIRMAN. At that time the agency was known as the NACA?
Mr. DRYDEN. That is correct.
The CHAIRMAN. When did it change its name to NASA?
Mr. DRYDEN. On October 1, 1958 it not only changed its name but
was collected with other parts of the Government into a completely
new agency, the NASA.
The CIHAIRMAN. Does it report to the President?
Mr. DRYDEN. It, reports directly to the President, sir.
The CILtIRxAN. There is a committee of 17 you say?
Mr. DRYDENi. There is not a committee in NASA. There is an Ad-
ministrator and Depute Administrator appointed by the President
with the advice and consent of the Senate.
The CHAIRMAN. Is there anyone on the staff of the White House
who is given the duty of receiving your reports?
Mr. DRYDEN. Doctor Glennan reports and talks very frequently
with the President himself. Ile does keep the Science Adviser fully
informed of our activities in space.
The CIHAIRMMAN. Who is the Science Adviser?
Mr. DRYDEN. I)r. Kistiakowsky.
The CHAIRMAN. So if anyone has the direct responsibility within
theI''hite House, the office of the Presidency, it is Dr.
Mr. DRYDs ;. Kistiakowsky. He is the President's adviser on
science and technology. He has no line responsibility. He is an ad-
viser to the President.
REPORT OF t'-2'S LOSS
The CHAIRMAN. The first that you knew of this was the loss of the
U-2plane on May 1 ?
Mr. DRYDEN. May 1 it. was reported to the Administrator and my-
self that a U-2 had been lost, without further detail.
[Deleted.]
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EVENTS INIDE
ANTICIPATION OF INQUIRIES ABOUT LOSS
The CHAIRMAN. Did CIA consult with you as to the precise lan-
guag'e of the release of May 5 ?
Mr. DRYDEN. What was
The CHAIRMAN. Who drew up that language?
Mr. DRYDEN. It was discussed in consultation. The questions the
press asked were : who is the pilot, where was the airplane going, what
information do you have about it?
So that between CIA and ourselves, a list of these questions which
we had received was recorded, and the general nature of the answers
to these questions decided upon. Now, let me tell you about the so-
called release of the statement. On the morning of Thursday, May
5 was Khrushchev's announcement that the plane was shot down.
~omewhere between 11 and 12 o'clock, I believe, the President directed
an inquiry and public report on the missing plane, and as reported
in the Herald Tribune-I do not have any other stenographic record-
in quotes, it says :
At the White House, Mr. Hagerty announced at the direction of the President
a complete inquiry is being made. The results of these inquiries, the facts as
developed will be made public by the National Aeronautics and Space Adminis-
tration and the Department of State.
BACKGROUND OF THE MAY 5 NASA RELEASE
The reporters who had listened to Mr. Hagerty, many of them,.
came immediately to our public information office to obtain further
information. We ourselves thought it was better to take the agreed-
upon answers to the questions, to write them into a statement, and
give it to them all at once, rather than engage in a general free= for-all
on this subject. I would like to emphasize that the text of that state-
ment as issued was not cleared with CIA or anyone else, although
the information in it, the answers to the questions that are contained
within it, were cleared with CIA, and I am told by them with State.
The CHAIRMAN. You discussed all of the substantive facts and state-
ments in that with representatives of the CIA?
Mr. DRYDEN. This is correct. It was not intended to give out a
statement. We were confronted with a large group of reporters who
wanted the facts. We could either engage in a general free-for-all
discussion-we thought it preferable to take these facts, put them in
a piece of paper and give it to all of them at once.
The CHAIRMAN. After consulting with CIA, you prepared this state
ment, and they knew what the statement was?
Mr. DRYDEN. I tried to say before that the statement itself or the-
facts that were collected in a statement was not cleared with anyone.
The CHAIRMAN. With anyone?
Mr. DRYDEN. With anyone but ourselves. The substance of it had
been cleared. The fact that it was written down in a statement on a
piece of paper was not cleared with anyone. .
The CHAIRMAN. Before you issued this to the press, did you have
anyone from the Department of State look at it and approve it?
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1 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUM IIT CONFERENCE
Mr. DRYDEN. We had no contact with the Department of State.
Our direct contacts were solely with the CIA.
The CIILIRMAN. Has no one ever advised you that the Department
of State should be consulted when statements affecting our foreign
policy are made?
Mr. DRYDEN. I was told that these statements had been cleared by
CIA with State. I did not independently check that fact.
The CIi,116.rAN. Who told you that?
Mr. DRYDEN. The CIA people with whom we were dealing, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. What was the reason for saying in your statement
that these planes were being used in Japaan and Turkey and California.
Why were you so specific about Japan and California?
Air. DRYDEN. We were asked by thv press, "flow many TJ-2 planes
does NASA have in its weather program? Where are they operat-
ing?" Now, much of this had been published in these documents to
which I referred which had been publicly released. To take a specific
one, one released just a few months ago in June 1959, this has
been released generally, you will find in this that these operations
The CHAIRMAN. I don't wish you to read that memorandum. I
only want to know your thinking. You issued this without checking
it with the State Department. Why did you state that they were
operating out of Turkey?
Mr. DRYDEN. This publ ished report
The CHAIRMAN. You had already published it?
Mr. DRYDEN (continuing). Had said, "These flights were made from
bases at Watertown Strip, Nevada."
The CHAIRMAN. I know, but those were weather flights.
[Deleted.]
dir. DItYDE.. We had mentioned Adana, Turkey, and Atsugi, Japan,
in this free and open publication.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mansfield!
Senator 'ANSFIELD. Dr. Dryden, have all our U -2's been recalled
since the President's order of Thursday, a week ago, that there would
be no further overflights of the Soviet Vnion ?
Mr. DRYDEN. Not to my knowledge, sir. I believe at the present
time the airplanes are grounded. But I think this is a question again
that the operating people will have to answer.
Senator 1iANSru ' u . Do you recall the incident which occurred in
Japan some months ago when a LT-2, I assume, landed at Atsugi and
GIs landed from a helicopter and ordered the Japanese civilians in
the area to leave?
Mr. Ducar:,. I renu'niber the newspaper accounts of it. I have no
personal knowledge of the incident.
[Deleted.]
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We made arrangements to put instruments in U-2 airplanes. There
comes back to us flight plans of weather flights, and our instrumenta-
tion and the data from those instruments, and I do not have in ad-
vance knowledge even of the weather flight operations
Senator MANSFIELD. I am referring to a story which appeared in
Time magazine 2 or 3 weeks ago. I was seeking collaboration of that
story. But you have no personal knowledge whether it was true or
false?
Mr. DRYDEN. I have no personal knowledge of it, sir.
Senator MANSFIELD. Your responsibility in these U-2 flights is
primarily observation and calculation concerning weather conditions?
Mr. DRYDEN. That is correct, and in those flights made with U-2's
with our instruments, for our purposes.
Senator MANSFIELD. What is Dr. Glennan's position? You are
the Administrator of NASA.
Mr. DRYDEN. I am the Deputy Administrator. I appear because
I was here in 1956 through this program, from the beginning.
Senator MANSFIELD. Dr. Glennan is the Administrator?
Mr. DRYDEN. He is the Administrator.
Senator MANSFIELD. And Dr. Glennan supposedly reports directly
to the President?
Mr. DRYDEN. To the President, yes, sir.
Senator MANSFIELD. Does he or does he not report directly to Dr.
Kistiakowsky ?
Mr. DRYDEN. The President on the average sees him two or three
times a month.
Senator MANSFIELD. Where does Dr. Kistiakowsky
Mr. DRYDEN. He is a member of the White House staff.
Senator MANSFIELD. I know that he is the President's scientific
adviser.
Mr. DRYDEN. He is not in the line of command.
Senator MANSFIELD. The chain of command is directly from Dr.
Glennan to the President?
Mr. DRYDEN. Yes, Sir.
Senator MANSFIELD. That is all.
The CIrAIRMAN. Senator Wiley?
Senator WILES. What was the date of that cover statement?
Mr. DRYDEN. The Turkish story was put out by the local commander
in Istanbul an Tuesday, May 3. The statement which we issued re-
cording the agreed-upon answers to questions was on Thursday, May
5. If I might just continue this, on Friday, May 6, a NASA U-2 air-
plane was flown at Edwards Air Force Base, exhibited to the press,
they saw the instruments that were used. They took movies of the
airplane. On Saturday, May 7, Mr.. Khrushchev reported that he,
had the pilot. At 6 p.m. State issued a statement admitting the recon-
naissance flight.
At 6:30 NASA directed all further inquiries to the State Depart-
ment.
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
Senator WII EY. Let's get back to my question. What was the date
of the cover statement that the chairman has been talking about?
Mr. DRYDEN. The 5th, as I understand it, sir.
[Deleted.]
Senator WILEY.N NASA is primarily engaged in seeking weather
information.
Mr. DRYDEN. We have no intelligence activities either in the de-
velopment of devices, methods, instruments or operations.
Senator WILEY. My understanding is that this cover statement was
the result of previous interrogation by the press.
Mr. DRYDEN. That is correct.
Senator YWILEY. M, hen you issued it., you did not consult with Cen-
tral Intelligence?
Mr. DRYDEx. Not on the statement itself but all of the questions
had been taken up with them. We had no source of information. We
asked how shall we reply to the name of the pilot, to the flight plan
of the airplane, and the answers as given us are incorporated in the
statement, although the exact text was not read back to CIA.
Senator WILEY. You referred to some publicity that was issued, I
think you said, in 1959.
Mr. DIRYDEN. Well, the first press release on our U-2 project was
released on May 7,1956.
Senator WILEY. You Held up a blue docket referring to 1959.
Mr. DRYDEN. Yes, this is some of the results.
Senator WILEY. Has that been made public?
Mr. DRYDEN. Yes.
Senator WILEY. Oil what pages is the part you referred to, because
I want it in the record. I want to try to get this story simple and
clear.
Mr. DRYDEN. On page 3 of this NASA memorandum which car-
ries a number, 4-17-59?, the flights were inade from bases at Water-
town Trip, Nev., Lakenheath, England, Wiesbaden, Germany, Adana,
Turkey and at Atsugi, Japan. Two additional flights were made
from a base in Alaska and these data have, been combined with those
from Japan in the statistical treatment.
Senator Wii.EY. Yes. You agree that that has been public in-
formation now for some time?
Mr. DRYDEN. Yes.
Senator WILEY. Since 1959?
Mr. DRYDEN. And even earlier, I think in 1957-57, one of them
-deals with the western part of the United States only, and I believe
that 1959 is the one which gives the list., yes, sir.
June of 1959.
[Deleted.]
Senator WILEY. That is all.
The CIi aIRli.\N. Senator Gore?
[Deleted.]
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFEREN
REASON FOR NASA STATEMENT
Senator. GORE. In response to a question by me, Secretary Dillon
testified as follows :
No, it was decided when we first heard of this, this news, as I said earlier this
morning, at this National Security Council meeting or right after it that was
held outside of Washington, that the State Department would handle the pub-
licity on this, and that we would make any statement that would be made, and
it was known at that time that we would make a statement.
That leads me to wonder why NASA was making a statement at
,all.
Mr. DRYDEN. This information, this decision of which you speak
was not transmitted to us. I would like to remind you that this is
all within a few hours. The information we had was a statement
made at the White House which I read to you that the reporters were
referred to NASA and the State Department for the facts and this was
the extent of my knowledge when the statement was issued.
NASA UNAWARE OF DECISION TO LET STATE DEPARTMENT
IIANDLE PUBLICITY
Senator GORE. Then you did not know that a high level decision
had been made that the State Department would make whatever
statement was made with respect to this.
Mr. DRYDEN. That is correct. Within the 3 hours or so of this inter-
val, this was not passed to us, and I would again say that so far as
we were concerned the cover story was in effect as the result of the
collaboration with CIA for the period -from May 1 to May 7, and we
did nothing, we said nothing contrary to the agreed on facts relating
to the cover story.
Senator GORE. When did you first learn of this high level decision
that the State Department would make whatever statement was made
and would handle the publicity on this matter?
Mr. DRYDEN. I think that after the statement was issued, there were
,some calls as to-I do not know how to place the time. The only
thing I have been able to find in our records is an instruction to our
people as of Saturday to refer all inquiries to the State Department.
I believe that before that time, there had been some discussions of
why the statement had been issued by us, and I have explained the
-reasons for that.
Senator GORE. I will get to that in a moment. When did you first
know that the decision had been made, to which Mr. Dillon referred,
that the State Department would make statements and would handle
the publicity on this matter? You say you were not informed that
the decision had been made at the time you made your statement.
Mr. DRYDEN. It was subsequent to the day of May 5, May 6, or
May 7. I have a record of May 7. After the State Department's
,statement at 6 p.m., that. NASA would refer all inquiries to the State
Department, I believe we were informed, probably on Friday the 6th,
but I have no specific record.
Senator GORE. Who informed you?
Mr. DRYDEN. I think it was a telephone call. I just do not have
:a specific recollection whether it came as a telephone call or a contact
with Dr. Glennan at lunch at the White House. I just do not recall,
sir.
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CO2KFERE;4CE
We can perhaps clear that up for the record after consultation, sir.
Senator GoEE. I think it would be well if you can do so.
(The following information was subsequently furnished:)
STATEMENT BY Da. DityrES ox Wiias :NASA WAS NOTIFIED OF DECISION TO HAVE
DsI'ARTMENT OF STATE HANDLE PUBLICITY ON U-2
The telephone logs of Dr. Glennan and myself show no calls to or from the
State Delhartwrnt on May & or 7, but It is my best recollection that we did learn
of the decision on May &.
You have referred several times to questions and answers, or the
answers to questions as the case may he, supplied to you by CIA. Do
you have a copy of that question and answer series?
Mr. DRYDEN. We may have some rough notation. What we did
was record the types of questions that the press was asking us. We
then took these types of questions to the CIA and discussed them with
them as to the answers.
[Deleted.]
Senator GORE. Was there not a typewritten copy ?
Mr. Dare Ex. To the best of my knowledge, no.
Senator Gom.E. But you do have some notes.
Mr. IlitrlJEx. The statement itself enables you to reconstruct the
questions. They are generally who was the picot, what was the flight
plan, where was the airplane supposed to go, what was the route, how
many airplanes does NASA operate on weather missions, from what
bases have these airplanes been ope rat ing ? I think you can reconstruct
the questions fror.i the statement itself. I am not sure whether we
can find the note, that someone may have written down to refresh his
memory in discussing it.
Senator Gem:. Who instructed your Agency to make a statement?
Mr. Dnyio:l. We were instructed to answer questions.
Senator GoinE. By whom?
Mr. DityDEN. By the CIA, who said that this had been coordinated
with the State Department,
Senator Goiir. And the CIA gave you instructions to respond to
question,;?
Mr. DRYDEx. We asked for information. The operation was not
ours. We had no knowledge of the operation itself. We said, "How
shall we reply to these questions? l ou realize the fact that we did
not know very iuuch about where this airplane was, whether the
Russians have lime airplane, whether they have the pilot. What do
you want us to say in this interim period? Can we find out more
about it ?"
Senator GORE. You felt the burden of saying something, did you?
Mr. Ihuynns. We felt the burden of answering questions because
for 4 wears the existence of this NASA weather flight program had
been known.
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WHEN WERE COUNTERMANDING INSTRUCTIONS RECEIVED?
Senator GORE. And, meanwhile, no one informed you that the
decision had been made at the highest levels. of Government that the
State Department would handle this?
Mr. DRYDEN. The discussions I referred to, the visits of the press,
were made within an hour or two of the making of that decision at a
place outside of Washington, and it was not communicated to us
within that 2-hour period.
Senator GORE. You have told us it wasn't communicated to you at
all.
Mr. DRYDEN. Until the following day.
Senator GORE. Until after you had made a statement?
Mr. DRYDEN. A statement. To get the chronology again, this meet-
ing to which you refer, at which the decision was made, was on the
morning of May 5, somewhere between 11 and 12 o'clock. A decision
was made and Mr. Hagerty informed the press at the direction of
the President that the facts would be obtained through NASA and
State. The reporters came immediately over to our public informa-
tion section wanting to know some of these facts.
Senator GORE. Do you know whether either Mr. Hagerty or Presi-
dent Eisenhower had been informed of this decision reached outside
Washington?
Mr. DRYDEN. I think the President was outside Washington at the
time.
Senator GORE. It seems to me that I recall the President participated
in this conference.
Mr. DRYDEN. I just do not know the details of that. I think it was
given in the testimony of the Secretary of State.
Senator GORE. Wasn't that a meeting of the National Security
Council?
Mr. DRYDEN. I do not know that, to my knowledge. The statement
was made that Mr. Eisenhower was at secret Civil Defense IIead-
quarters.
Senator GORE. Will you repeat that ?
Mr. DRYDEN. I say the statement says that President Eisenhower
was at his secret Civil Defense Headquarters.
REFERENCE TO MR. DILLON'S TESTIMONY REGARDING NASA 'S ROLE
Senator GORE. I will read from Mr. Dillon's statement :
Now, Mr. Hagerty was not at the Security Council meeting, but he was at
that area out there where this exercise was taking place and so he was aware
of the fact that the State Department would be making a statement at noon
that day at our regular press conference time. Actually, the statement was
delayed 45 minutes. It was made at 12:45 when our regular daily press con-
ference took place.
Senator Goan. Was it decided there that NASA would make a statement also?
Mr. DILLON. It was not, to my knowledge, no. It was not decided there
that NASA would make a statement.
Senator GonE. Who made that decision?
Mr. DILON. I think that you have to ask NASA. I don't know who made any
such decision.
So you say you decided upon instructions of CIA?
Mr. DRYDEN. No.
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Senator GoitE. Just how do you state it?
Mr. DitrDEx. I stated that we had received word of the White
House announcement that the facts will be made public by NASA
and the Department of State. Now, this means I suppose that within
this 2- or 3-hour period this information was not transmitted to us-
I do not know the reasons.
Senator Gorm. Do you know if air. Hagerty called you or 3Ir.
Bonney or anyone in the Department suggesting that a statement ba
made?
AIr. DaYDrN. Not to my knowledge, sir.
Senator Gorr. My time is up.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Senator IIickenlooper?
NASA ACTION BASED ON I7tEVIOL UNDERSTANDING WITh CIA.
Senator IIIcKExworrtt. Dr. Dryden, when the newsmen came to.
the Information Department of N .SA, did the Information Depart-
ment act on its own?
Mr. Din-DEN. No, they did not. They acted in consultation.
Senator I IICKENLOOPER. 11"ith you?
Air. DitYDEN. With me; yes, sir.
Senator IIICIiENLOOPE . Was it in connection with that consulta-
tion, based upon the information which you then had about Mr. IIag-
erty's statement, that you authorized the issuance of the statement by
the Information Service of NASA?
Mr. DRYDEN. It was called a memorandum to the press. I did not
attribute sufficient importance to the distinction between answering
questions of reporters and giving them the same information on a
piece of papPer.
Senator IIICKE::LOOFFdt. After you had made the statement., or your
Information Department issued this statement, was this statement
sent to the CIA or the State Department?
Mr. DitYDEN. it. was sent-I do not know exactly what time.
Senator Iiict ENLoorEn. And was the statement which was issued
by your Information Department-perhaps you have answered this-
question-cleared with CIA in its context or with the State Depart-
ment prior to the issuance by your Information Service?
Mr. DRYDEX. I have answered that. The statement, as written,.
was not cleared.
The information in the statement had been previously cleared by
CIA, with State.
Senator IIleitrxl.oorrn. So that the statement was based, then,.
upon the understandings which had previously been had?
Mr. Dnr23:N. This is correct.
Senator IIICI,;ENI.oornn. With CIA?
Mr. DltYDEN. This is correct.
Senator IIICKENLOOrEIt.And with the State Department?
Afr. Din-nEN. Nothing---no substantive information was added to it.
Senator ITIc .exLOorER. Just to get this cleared up a little bit, after
you learned of the statement of Mr. Ilaterty-w{hich I believe was
the source of your determination to make the 3fay 5 statement-after
you had learned of that statement of Mr. Hagerty that NASA and
the State Department could give information on this matter, did you
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get in touch with the White Mouse, Mr. Hagerty, or any authorita-
tive person there, or with the State Department?
-Mr. DRYDEN. I did not. I say I perhaps erroneously did not see
the difference between answering questions of a large number of
reporters and putting the same thing down on a piece of paper. It
is the same information.
Senator IIIcKENLOorrru.. I believe that is all., Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lausche?
Senator IIICKENLOOPER. I wanted to ask you for a copy of that
statement.
Mr. DRYDEN. The committee has it already.
Senator IIICKENLOOPER. I understand it is in the background docu-
ments. That is all right.
The CHAIRMAN. It is in the background documents.
(See appendix 1, p. 180.)
NO WRITTEN MEMORANDUM Or QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
Senator GORE. Also, I believe you were going to supply to the chair-
man the question and answer series.
Mr. DRYDEN. I was going to see if there is around, a penciled
memorandum of the questions. lam not sure that there is.
Senator GoRE. If there is?
Mr. DRYDEN. If there is, I will supply it to the chairman.
(The following information was subsequently furnished :)
No memorandum of questions and answers was made ; the discussion was
entirely oral.
NASA'S LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OF U-2 FLIGHT
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lausche, the NASA statement is found on
page 4 of the background documents.
[Deleted.]
Senator LAUSCHE. At the time you issued your statement you did
not have knowledge of what the Soviet knew about it and what actu-
ally happened?
Mr. DRYDEN. We did not.
Senator LAUSCHE. Did you have knowledge of the instructions that
were given to the pilot?
Mr. DRYDEN. No, sir. No knowledge about the operations.
Senator LAUSCHE. And that is-
Mr. DRYDEN. We heard Khrushchev's press announcement, of
course, that morning.
Senator LAUSCHE. I think that is all that I have with this witness.
The CHAIRMAN. You think that your position as an international
weather gatherer has been compromised by this U-2 incident?
Mr. DRYDEN. Not so far. [Deleted.]
(From this point on all further testimony on this date was classified
by order of the committee.)
(At 12:15 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 10 o'clock
a.m., June 2, 1960.)
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
THURSDAY, JUNE 2, 1960
U.S. SENATE,
COM74IImm ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.
The committee met at 10 :10 a.m., pursuant to recess, Senator J. W.
Fulbright (chairman) presiding.
Present : Senators Fulbright, Humphrey, Mansfield, Morse, Long,
Gore, Wiley, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Capehart, and Carlson.
Also present: Brig. Gen. George S. Brown, U.S. Air Force, and
Capt. Means Johnston, Jr., U.S. Navy, military assistants to the
Secretary of Defense; Capt. L. P. Gray III, U.S. Navy, military
assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff: Hon. Charles E.
Bohlen, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State; Hon. William B.
Macomber, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Rela-
tions; Richard Helms, Central Intelligence Agency.
The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.
We have this morning the Honorable Thomas S. Gates, Jr., the
Secretary of Defense.
Mr. Secretary, I think you. know about the regulations. Your
testimony will be taken down but nothing will be released except
that which has been passed by the censors representing the State
Department and the CIA, and I assume perhaps you may want to
consult with them.
I think you understand that.
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. I understand you have a statement.
Secretary GATES. A very brief statement.
The C'IIAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Secretary, you may proceed.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE THOMAS S. GATES, JR.,
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Secretary GATES. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate this opportunity to
appear before you.
I have a short statement, if I may read it. It relates to two sub-
jects. First, I am certain that you wish me to cover the role played
by the Department of Defense in the U-2 overflight program.
56412-60 9 123
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EVENTS L\`CIDENT TO THE StM!.!IT CONFERENCE
Elements of the Department of Defense gave technical advice to
the U-2 project.. No military aircraft were used for these flights
nor were the pilots military personnel.
From time to time, the irector of the CIS, after obtaining the
concurrence of the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of ?t.ate,
recommended a. series of programs to the- President.
More specifically, I reviewed program proposals embracing sev-
eral priority missions, one or more of which it was proposed to
execute in the near future. Re, onsihilit.y for the operational con-
duct. of the program rested with the CIA.
We obviously were interested in the results of these flights as we
are in all of our Nation's intelligence collection results.
For example, from these flights we hot information on airfields,
aircraft, missiles, missile testing and training, special weapons stor-
age, submarine production, atomic production and aircraft deploy-
ments, and things like these.
These were all types of vital information, These results were con-
sidered in formulating our military prograns. We obviously were
the prime customer, and ours is the major interest..
Secondly, on a separate subject :
One incident, and one over which I assume. frill responsibility, is
the calling of a test of the readiness of our military communications
from Paris. In vies of the fact that guy action in this mutter has
been subject to some speculation, I would like to give you the facts.
First of all, our military forces are always on some degree of alert..
So it is merely a matter of moving this degree or condition of alert
up or down the scale. On Sunday night, May 1:i, we were already
aware of the sense of the statetnent which Mr. Kit rusheliev was going
to make the following morning. The conditions which lie had set
for his participation in the conference made. it. apparent even at the
time that he deliberately intended to wreck the conference.
This communications alert was not an act. that was either offensive
or defensive in character. It was a sound precautionary measure.
It did not recall Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine personnel from
leave. There was no movement. of forces involved. However, I want
to emphasize that it did make certain that, if subsequent developments
made necessary a higher state of readiness, such action could be taken
promptly and 'convincingly.
Under the circumstances it seemed most prudent. to me to increase
the awareness of our unified commanders. M'foreover, since the com-
mand and individuals concerned in the decision process, including
the President, the Secretary of State, and myself, were overseas, it
was important to check out our military communications. At about
midnight, Paris time, Sunday night, I requested that a quiet increase
in command readiness, particularly with respect to communications,
be instituted without public notice, if possible.
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE 125
One phase of our testing is to call no-notice exercises of our com-
mand communications. While some commands went further in exe-
cuting the instructions issued by the JCS as a result of my message
than I had anticipated, I consider the order proper and absolutely
essential. In similar circumstances I would take exactly the same
action.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Mr. Secretary, did you or any of your aides participate in any con-
ference prior to May 1 regarding the U-2 flights?
Secretary GATES. Yes, Mr. d airman. I was some weeks before
May 1 briefed on the preliminary results of the April 9 flight. At
that time, I was informed of a program of possible flights, one of
which would be selected to be flown, and I gave my approval of that
program.
The CHAIRMAN. Was anything said at that time about a moratorium
in view of the summit conference ?
Secretary GATES. No, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Who participated in that conference?
Secretary GATES. That conference was in my aflice in the Pentagon,
and was between myself and a man from CIA.
The CHAIRMAN. Was anyone in the State Department present?
Secretary GATES. No, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you know whether the State Department was
advised specifically of the plans for the May 1 flight?
Secretary GATES. I don't know from my own knowledge, but I am
perfectly certain that the Secretary of State was advised of the pro-
gram as I was.
The CHAIRMAN. You didn't advise him nor was he represented at
that meeting?
Secretary GATES. No, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. And no one raised the question of whether or not
there should be a suspension?
Secretary GATES. No, sir. In this conversation, it was a private
conversation between the CIA representative and myself, and I was
asked for my advice or approval of the program and I gave it.
The CHAIRMAN. I understand that, but I merely meant that the
question of whether or not there should be a suspension in view of the
upcoming summit was not raised; is that correct?
Secretary GATES. Not raised between the two of us, no, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Was it raised at any time?
Secretary GATES. I didn't have any other discussions about the
flight with anyone, Senator Fulbright.
The CHAIRMAN. Then so far as you know, it was not raised?
Secretary GATES. Yes, Sir.
QUESTION OF ANY PRIOR SUSPENSION OF FLIGHTS
The CHAIRMAN. To your knowledge, were any flights prior thereto
ever suspended because of political meetings, that is, other than
weather or military considerations?
Secretary GATES. I have no knowledge of any suspension of any
flights for those purposes.
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126 EVENTS INCIDENT TO TUE St 14MT CONFERENCE
The Cu.AmarAN. There was no suspension to your knowledge when
the Camp David meeting took place?
Secretary GATES. No, sir.
The CIIAIR?rAN. Nor was there any suspension, so far as you know,
during the period in which Klurtishelev visited the United States?
Secretary GATES. I don't know of any suspension. I don't know
precisely whether during that. period we flew any flights, Mr. Chair-
man.
The CHAIRMAN. No, but I mean you didn't discuss the question?
Secretary GATF.s. I didn't discoed the question of suspension of
flights, no, sir.
rho CIIATI(JIAN. Since you never considered it, then you had no
position relative to the a;ont.innat.ion, did you?
Secretary GATES. I approved this program, so I took a position
affirmatively.
SIGNIFICANCE TO DEFENSE DEPARTMENT OF SUSPENSION- OF FLIGHTS
The CII_Ai1 r.x . Were the results of these flights important to the
Defelrse. Department?
Secretary GaTrs. The results were very important to the Defense
Department.
The CIIAIRNIAN. Very useful to you?
Secretary GATES. "1 es, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you regard it as an important loss that the
flights have now been suspended ?
Secretary GGATFS. I think that., through becoming compromised, we
have lost, an important. source of intelligence. It has been a very
successful program over the past.
The CIIAii1r. x. Then it is it, great loss from your point of view not
to have available any f urther flights: is that 'o erect
Secretary GATFR. I think if we had been able to continue them with-
out having heat caught. and therefore compromised the source, it
would have been most, useful.
RUSSIAN I .%OWLEDGE OF THE FI.T(III1S
The Cii.k .%t.,,N. Mr. Gates, did Khruslchev, or the Russians, know
of overflights prior to May 1 ?
Secretary EI.vrss. Tie stays he (lid.
The Cir. Iiw%MAx. Well, whaat do you think?
Secretary G-YrES. I believe that he did, -Tr. Clna'irinan, but I don't
believe anyone could specifically prove it. But I believe that he did.
I believe he told the truth.
The CIIAIRArAN. If he knew about it, why did the incidents of May
I compromiso the flights: why should they he discontinued 2
Secretary GATES. Well, I don't believe lie knew the exact type and
character of the flights. Ile probably--all he knew was that they
were [deleted] aircraft high in his sky.
KNOWLEDGE OF PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY OF STATE HE ORDER FOR ALERT
The CItmitat.xx. On your order on 'Tay 15, your alert, (lid you con-
stilt the Department of State before ordering it ?
Secretary GATES. No. I advised the Secretary of State, who was
with the President when it was issued.
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The CHAIRMAN. Did you advise. him before you issued it?
Secretary GATES. Ile was advised before it was released yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Was his opinion asked or was he merely advised
of it?
Secretary GATES. Well., I told him that I was about to issue a com-
munications alert, and the communication readiness exercise.
The CHAIRMAN. Ile approved of it.
Secretary GATES. Ile did not register any disapproval.
The CHAIRMAN. Well then he approved it.
Secretary GATES. I think so, yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Was that Mr. Herter?
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. In Paris.
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Did you advise the President?
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Before it was made?
Secretary GATES. Yes, Sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Was the NSC consulted about the alert ?
Secretary GATES. No, sir.
MEETING OF MAY 9
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gates, did you participate in any meeting on
May 7 to consider the statement which was later issued by the Secre-
tary of State?
`secretary GATES. No, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Or on May 9?
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.
On May 9, that is Monday, I believe, I participated in a meeting in
the office of the Secretary of State.
On the morning of the 9th.
The CHAIRMAN. Did you approve of the statement made in which
the full revelation was made?
Secretary GATES. I approved of the statement that was made on
May 9, yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Who was present at that meeting?
Secretary GATES. Well, I know that Mr. Douglas and myself were
present from the Department of Defenso. Mr. Herter and Mr. Doug-
las Dillon, and Mr. Kohler were present, I think Mr. Bohlen was pres-
ent from the State Department, there may have been one or two others.
The CHAIRMAN. Did that meeting go on for some time?
Secretary GATES. I would say about an hour.
The CHAIRMAN. About an hour.
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.
PRESIDENTIAL RESPONSIBILITY DISCUSSED
The CHAIRMAN. Was the question of whether or not it was wise for
the President to take responsibility discussed at that meeting?
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. What was your position?
Secretary GATES. My position was that he should take responsi-
bility.
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EM TS INCIDE.
The CIIAni3rAN. Was the meeting unanimous?
Secretary GATES. I believe it was.
The CHAIRMAN. They all agreed?
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.
The CILtIR1IAN. It. went. on about an hour.
Secretary GATES. Well, I would say at least an hour, Senator.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, did it go on more than an hour?
Secretary GATES. Well, I am talking about my recollection. I would
think it was at least 1 hour. Perhaps it was longer.
STATEMENT BY NASA
The CHAIRMAN. Was the statement issued by NASA on May 5
cleared with your office?
Secretary GATES. No, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. You didn't know anything about it.
Secretary GATES. No, Sir.
The CiII;1IIr r.\\', Have you had any relations with '."a SSA?
Secretary GATES. No, sir, not in this connection.
Tho CII:~rnM,N. I mein in connection with the U-2 flight.
Secretary GATES. No, sir.
The CIIArnirAN. Were these U-2 flights under your direct con-
trol in the field, that is, under the Air Force direct control in the field?
Secretary GATES. No, sir, they were under the control of the CIA,
[Deleted.]
INITIAL. STATEMENT BY AIR FORCE IN TUIMEY
The CIIAraMAN. How did it happen the Air Force made the initial
statement of the missing plane?
Secretary GATES. That was a part of the cover story that was de-
cided upon and they issued this statement from the base in Turkey
about a plane being missing.
The CIIAra MAN. Well does that indicate that you had arrived ahead
of time in concert with the CIA upon proper procedure to be followed
in case of a mishap?
Secretary GATES. I was not familiar with the details of how a cover
story would be executed. I was aware of the fact that a cover story
existed, and I imagine that when the details of it were put into
operation, the Central Intelligence Agency went to work.
The CIIAn MAN. It was not your responsibility to supervise the cover
story?
Secretary G_LTEs. No, sir.
The CIIAIRarA. My time is up. Senator Gore?
MEETING OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, MAY 5
Senator CORE. Mr. Secretary, you are a member of the National
Security Council.
Secretary GATES. That is right, Senator.
Senator GORE. Did you attend the meeting of the Council held on
May 5?
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.
Senator GORE. Did the President participate in that conference?
Secretary GATES. At the meeting of the NSC?
Senator GoRE. Yes.
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
Senator GORE. Was the cover story discussed there?
Secretary GATES. No [deleted], Senator.
There was a meeting of the small group after the NSC meeting
Senator GORE. Did you participate?
Secretary GATES. Where we discussed the Khrushchev statement. I
participated with the President. It was not at the NSC meeting.
Senator GORE. At this conference in which Mr. Khrushchev's speech
was discussed, was the cover story discussed?
STATE DEPARTMENT TO HANDLE RELEASES ON SUBJECT
Secretary GATES. Well, I think it was discussed in a general manner
but not in detail. It was decided at that meeting that the responsi-
bility for all releases pertaining to this matter would be handled by
the Department of State.
Senator GORE. Was there any discussion at this meeting of the
advisability of telling the truth?
Secretary GATES. I think I made a statement in that meeting, some-
thing to the effect that the prestige of the Presidency should not be
involved in an international lie particularly when it would not stand
up with respect to the facts. But that was the extent of the discussion.
There was no decision.
STATE DEPARTMENT'S COVER STORY
Senator GORE. After this observation on your part, the State
Department did issue a statement that was not true; is that the case?
Secretary GATES. I think
Senator GORE. Well, the record shows
Secretary GATES. I think they issued a statement, that is right. I
think they issued a part of the cover story statement after that meet-
ing; yes, sir.
Senator GORE. So there was no decision-although the question of
involvement of the Presidency in what you call an international lie
was discussed, and you expressed your view that it would be an unwise
thing to involve the President in the cover story or in an interna-
tional an official falsehood?
Secretary GATES. If it turned out that Mr. Khrushchev had all the
facts, which we subsequently found out that he had; yes.
Senator GORE. How did you think his involvement or his association
with this incident in its ramifications could be avoided by an assump-
tion of responsibility by the President for the program?
Secretary GATES. I believe the President did assume responsibility,
and I believe he should have assumed responsibility.
Senator GORE. Let me see if I understand you correctly. I cer-
tainly do not wish to make any implication at all. I do not wish to
impute to you any meaning which you did not intend. Did I correctly
understand you to say that this question was discussed at a small
meeting following the NSC meeting on the 5th at which you partici-
pated as did the President?
Secretary GATES. That is correct, sir.
Senator GonE. Who else participated?
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130 EVENTS P'+i`CIDENT TO THE SU fT CONFERENCE
Secretary GATES. Mr. Douglas Dillon, Mr. Allen Dulles, Mr. Gordon
Gray, and 0eneral Goodpaster.
Senator Goii>f. At. this meeting, you expressed the view that it would
be unwise for the. President to be involved in an international lie,
I believe you described it..
Secretary GAT.-s. That. is right. This depended on what Mr. Khru-
shchev knew, when he knew it and if he knew everything that he
claimed to kiuiw. It turned out hater lie did. I believe that the
President should take the responsibility for the, truth, for telling the
truth. That is nay opinion. T (lid not know specifically at that time
the extent of Mr. Ishruslwhev s knowledge.
Senator Goiu.. You lnave aniended your
Secretary GATES, I didn't mean to be evasive, Senator.
Senator Gumci:. I understand, but you have now amended, and I
would like to clarify, if I may. I know you are not trying to be
evasive and I assure you that. I anm only seeking to develop the facts
as they existed. The Government. has full leeway, so far as I am
concerned, to exercise censorship for security.
Now, when you expressed (lie view that the Presidency should not
be involved in an international lie, did you fat. that tinie, on the 5th,
suggest the. President should assume reslionsibilit y, or was this on the
7th or the, 9th that you expressed that- additional view?
Secretary GATES. It was on the----I had no more meetings on the
subject until the 9th, Senator. That meeting was with the Secretary
of State..
Senator GORE. Did you express the view on the 5th that the Presi-
dent. should assume responsibility or did you express that view on
the 9th?
Secretary GATES. I expressed the view on the 5th that if air. Nhru-
shchev had the complete information and the pilot, that the President
should assert the true story.
I expressed it again on the 9th when we knew that he had the plane
and tale pilot. [Deleted.]
Senator GoiRE. You were informed that Mr. Mirushchev had made
the public speech with respect to the plane, that it was shot down or
that it cane dowii in the vicinity of Sverdlovsk?
Secretary GATES. Yes. I ain not sure of my timing, Senator. Wo
knew some information on the 5th, but we knew a great deal more a
day later. He didn't report time full story until the 7th.
Senator GORE. I understand. I am only trying to develop the back-
ground of information
Secretary GATES."es, sir.
Senator Gonna:. And the derision that was made. Although you
expressed these views, and although this information was in the hands
of or was discussed in the eonferencr
Secretary GATES. Some information was in our ]lands.
Senator Gomu . The information which you have described?
Secretary GATES. Yes.
Senator GoiuE. I anm perfectly willing for you to describe it.
Secretary G:iTEs. Yes, sir.
Senator GORE. I have no description of it except as you give it to
me. The decision was not reached at this meeting?
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Secretary GATES. That is correct.
Senator GORE. A decision to tell the truth was not reached at this
meeting on the 5th?
STATE DEPARTMENT TO HANDLE ALL GOVERNMENT RELEASES ON
SUBJECT
Secretary GATES. That is right, Senator. The only decision that
was reached at that meeting was that all the statements pertaining to
the incident would be handled by the Department of State.
Senator GORE. What information was the State Department to give?
Was it specifically understood at the meeting that the cover story
would be continued?
Secretary GATES. Yes; I think it was assumed that the cover story
would be continued at that time.
Senator GORE. And the cover story was untrue?
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir. It turned out to be untrue. I mean,
yes, because it was untrue. We didn't have the full facts that we
had 2 days later.
The CHAIRMAN. The Senator's time has expired.
The Senator from Wisconsin.
Senator WILEY. Mr. Secretary, I have listened to this interroga-
tion. Now see if you can't tell us the story without .questioning,
starting in when you first became acquainted with the facts, who was
there, what was said, and then go on.
For instance, we have heard so many statements about something
not being true. Now this release on May 5 was the cover story,
wasn't it?
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.
Senator WILEY. When did you first get acquainted with the situa-
tion ? Start in the beginning and give it consecutively so that it
will be clear.
Secretary GATES. I first got involved in the situation when the
airplane did not return to base. I knew an airplane was down, pre-
sumably because it hadn't come back and it had taken off. That
was on May 1.
I had no other relationship with it until the morning of Thursday,
which was May 5 when we had a [deleted] meeting of the NSC at
a remote location under a civil defense exercise.
On that morning, there was the preliminary statements of Mr.
Khrushchev that we had been flying over his territory, and so forth.
After the NSC meeting, there was a small meeting at which I have
listed the members present, in which we discussed this matter.
Senator WILEY. Who was there?
Secretary GATES. Mr. Dillon of the State Department, Mr. Allen
Dulles, Mr. Gordon Gray, General Goodpaster, and myself and the
President. We discussed this whole matter. We made the decision
there that the matter would be handled by the Department of State,
and we adjourned.
I had no further participation or discussion concerning the incident
until the following Monday morning.
Senator WILEY. What date?
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Secretary GATES. Which was the 9th. I at that time participated
in a meeting in the office of the Secretary of State, and he issued his
complete statement.
Senator WYLEr. Have you got one of these pamphlets in front of
you?
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.
Senator WILEV. See if we can't get into the record that which is on
pane 4 for the press. That is the cover story up at the top?
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.
Senator Wir.sr.And that is the one that had been said was a lie?
Secretary G.%TES. This was a cover story; yes, sir.
Senator Wu.EY. This was issued when you had only part of the
facts; isn't that it?
Secretary GATES. That is right..
Senator 'WZLEY. On May 9, if you will turn to page 5, you have
the Department of State's release.
Senator WILEr. Was there one issued on May 9 ?
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.
Senator WILEY. At any of these meeting, was the President there?
Secretary GATES. The only meeting the President attended was the
meeting of Mary 5th after the NSC meeting
Senator '4 ILEr. f didn't understand. Was he there on the 5th ?
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir; after the NSC meeting. That is the only
meeting at which he was present.
Senator Wu.EY. When it was decided to have the alert, was that the
judgment of all that it was in the interest of the national defense?
Secretary GATES. It was my judgment and I was responsible.
Senator Wn.EY. You had in mind, did you, what the condition of
this country was at the time of Pearl Harbor, how we were asleep?
Secretary_ GATES. I certainly did.
Senator n.Ey. During negotiations.
Secretary GATES. I did, indeed.
Senator Wir_.r:v. Is it your judgment from the facts that when
Khrushchev went to Paris that he had already made up his mind to
call off the summit, meeting,?
Secretary GATES. Yes; it is my judgment, Senator.
MEETING ON NAY 5
Senator WILEY. Something was said by Yourself in the cross-exami-
nation to the effect that you claimed they should tell the truth. When
was that, on the 5th?
Secretary GATES. I said on the 5th, if it proved that Mr. Khrushchev
had the pilot, had the equipment, had the full and complete story, it
later turned out that he had, that I believed we should tell the truth
at that time.
Senator WmEY. That. is all, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mansfield.
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Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Secretary, since you have become Secre-
tary of Defense, you have made it a point to sit in on the meetings
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and if an agreement could not be reached
you make the final decision.
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.
Senator MANSFIELD. In that period you have also brought about re-
forms and increased the efficiency of the centralized purchasing
system.
Secretary GATES, Yes, sir.
Senator MANSFIELD. In that period you have also brought about a
centralization of the communications system.
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.
Senator MANSFIELD. For all those you are to be most highly com-
mended because I think they were reforms long overdue and it was
about time they were put into effect.
REASONS FOR ALERT
Now, at the time you issued your alert of the communications system
in Paris did you have any information that Soviet forces were massing
or mobilizing?
Secretary GATES. No, sir.
Senator MANSFIELD. Did any one person or any group ask you to
order the alert?
Secretary GATES. No, sir.
Senator MANSFIELD. You did that entirely on your own respon-
sibility?
Secretary GATES. That is correct, Senator.
Senator MANSFIELD. Did the alert order which you issued put the
forces of this country at a war readiness level?
Secretary GATES. No, sir.
Senator MANSFIELD. There was no call back of Reserves or cancel-
lation of leave to any extent.
Secretary GATES. No, Sir. There were in one or two instances some
people who interpreted the JCS order as meaning that they would
have a couple of more aircraft on alert, and in that case, they, on their
own, recalled, I believe some pilots who were home or off duty to have
approximately two more airplanes on an alert status. But this was
done on their own, testing their own alert procedures under the broad
order that was issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
It was not the intention of this order to move forces in any way.
Senator MANSFIELD. Now, that JCS order was in response to your
order?
Secretary GATES. That is right, Senator.
Senator MANSFIELD. Is there any connection between this communi-
cations alert and the recent centralization of the communications
system?
Secretary GATES. No, sir, because that will not be in effect in its
entirety for approximately 9 months.
RESPONSIBILITY OF TIIE PRESIDENT
Senator MANSFIELD. Now, during the course of your responses to
Senator Gore, you mentioned the following words, "The prestige of
the Presidency should not be involved."
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Isn't it true that in ahuost, any undertaking, in a general way the
prestige of the Presidency is always involved under our constitutional
system of government.?
Secretary GATES. Certainly.
Senator MANSFIELD. What I am getting at there is this: That
whether or not. he had any specific knowledge of this particular flight
or of this particular order, which you issued, that nevertheless under
our system ho is generally responsible for actions undertaken by the
head of the CIA and for actions and orders issued by the Secretary
of Defense: is that correct ?
Secretary GATFs. Ile, is the head of the executive branch and he is
Commander in Chief, Senator, so of course lie is responsible in that
sense.
Senator 1Llxsv1Ir n. l vs. he is generally responsible.
Secretary G.vrFS. Certainly.
Senator MAxsFIF.r.n. Ile is t ommander in Chief and Chief of State.
Secretary G.vn:s. That is right.
Senator 'MAxsrn:i,D. 'nacre. has been something said about a cover
story and the fact that it is not truthful. Well, isn't a cover story
by its very nature almost always a lie?
Secretary GATES. Yes. Senator.
Senator LtNsF111.o. 'That is the purpose; to seek protection in some
kind of a story under a riven circumstance so that for the time being
at least the situation c ould be taken care of.
Secretary G.t'rl:s. That is correct, Senator.
Senator MANSFIELD. That i all, Mr. Chairman.
The CIIAIRMA:ti. Senator Ilickenlooper?
Senator 1114' FxLOOVT:R. 'Ir. Serrei:ary. I believe that. we have had
repeated statements firma the Kremlin in the last Weeks, months, or
even years that contained threats of what. the Kremlin is ready to do
to the '\Vest =generally or to the United States under a variety of
conditions; isn't that correct.?
Secretary GATES. Yes, it is.
Senator IIIciiENLO01.1at. I believe Mr. Khrushchev has been quoted
as saying that lie would bury us-Whether he meant economically or
militarily might be argued-and I believe he stated that they hove
missiles on the launcliinur pads directed at various countries of Europe
as well as the United States?
Secretary GATES. That is right.
Senator ~TTIrKF:xt.oortat. Those statements have been reported, have
they not?
Secretary G.TFS. That is right..
SOVIET All'. SL\SEUVERS OVER FAST GERMANY
Senator IIIrTn xu'Ori:u. Are the Russians still ellaagtng in scramble
operations and massive airflight operations over past Germany; do
you know ?
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE 135
Secretary GATES. I don't know of any flights over East Germany
recently, but, of course, they have some 20 divisions in East Germany.
Senator IIICKENLOOPER. I don't know whether this comes within
your time or not, but I have heard in one way or another in times
past that they have repeatedly had large air forces in the air over
East Germany.
Secretary GATES. They have large air forces stationed in East Ger-
many.
Senator IIICKENLOOPER. I mean in the air.
Secretary GATES. They have had maneuvers, yes, sir.
Senator IIICRENLOOPFR. They have had maneuvers toward the West
German border which come very close to the West German border
on occasion ?
Secretary GATES. They have had them regularly; yes, sir.
Senator IIICKENL oorER. Sometimes these are rather massive maneu-
vers in the air?
Secretary GATES. I believe that is correct; yes, sir.
Senator IIICIKENLOOPER. Well, now, recently we have heard a great
deal of discussion and argument about keeping all of our strategic
Air Force planes or a great many of them in the air all the time.
There have been some that have advocated that and criticized us for
not keeping our airplanes in the air more than we have.
Secretary GATES. I am very familiar with this argument, with the
Armed Services Committee and the Appropriations Committee.
Senator HICKENLOOrER. I presume you do not see anything un-
warranted about this air alert which you ordered, but I will ask you
the question anyway. Do you see any reason for criticism because of
a demonstration by your Department of a worldwide air alert of our
forces?
Secretary GATES. I stated when I got off the airplfne and was
asked the question by the press on my return, I said it was incredible
to me that anybody would question it.
Senator HIclcENLOOPDR. Well, I agree with that statement, but
there seems to be some criticism nevertheless.
ADVISABILITY OF OVERFLIGHT BEFORE SUMMIT CONFERENCE A POLITICAL
QUESTION
Now, on the question of whether or not, that is from your view-
point, in your Department, the particular U-2 flight should have been
cancelled on the 30th of April, or the 1st of May, or whenever it
occurred, isn't that a political question and not a military question?
Secretary GATES. Yes.
Senator HICKENLOOrER. That is in view of the so-called summit
conference?
Secretary GATES. Yes.
Senator HIcKKENLoorIR. That becomes exclusively a political ques-
tion as to whether or not it was advisable at that time from the stand-
point of the summit conference?
Secretary GATES. That is correct.
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36 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CO TFERENCE
Senator IlrcKENLoorEit.. ~1nd I take it that from the standpoint
of primary responsibility you have nothing to say about whether it
would be cancelled or not as a political gesture in view of a political
conference?
Secretary GATES. Well, I, of course, knew of the date of the sum-
mit meeting, and if I had had a strong conviction about it I would
have said it even though I didn't have the responsibility for the
decision. I was in an advisory capacity, but I believed that there
was really no good time to stop the collection of important informa-
tion. There is always some international conference or something.
Senator IIrcJisNworEa. What I am trying to get at is whether you
have any primary responsibility for making political decisions, or is
your responsibility military decisions?
Secretary GATES. No, my responsibility is with the Department of
Defense.
Senator IIICrcE`I.oorEa. Now, these C-2 flights have been extreme-
ly valuable in the securing of intelligence, have they not?
Secretary GATES. They have indeed, Senator.
Senator IIICxENi ooiErn. They have also been very valuable in secur-
u weather information, have they not?
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir. [Deleted.]
Senator IIICREM oorEn. Do you believe that., in view of the general
tensions that exist and the rather jingoist. statemments, let's say, that
have been emanating from the Kremlin from time to time, it was a
beneficial thing to have this air alert as not only a show of strength
but as an assurance to our friends and allies over the world that we
had a readiness capability?
Secretary' GATES. 1 {10. It was not an air alert, Senator.
Senator IwKFIXI,00PER. Sir?
Secretary GATES. It was not an air alert. I think you miss-tech-
nically, you said air alert. It was a command readiness and com-
munications alert. I agree, however, with what you said that it was
a good thing to do.
Senator IIohsN1 nII'r:r.. I shall adopt your description for my
question, then, on that point.
But anyway, it was a show of ability on our part in connection
with our alertness, general alertness and our ability to put a defensive
force into the air in a short ti nme?
Secretary GATES. Yes, and we could go from there to further meas-
ures if we needed to. but this was primarily a measure of checking
command and checking rommunicatrons, particularly, as I said in
my statement, in view of the fact that the persons involved in im-
portant polio decisions were. out of the country.
Senator IlIOKENLOOPEIt. Would you agree that it either does have,
or should have, a certain degree of comforting effect upon not only
our own country but upon our allies that we do have these capabilities?
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE 137
Secretary GATES. I would hope it would, Senator. It seems to
me this is our responsibility, to be ready and alert under these
circumstances at all times, and we always are.
This was merely a matter of degree. It was a little increase in the
degree of alertness. We are in an alert condition at all times.
As of midnight last night we are having another communications
exercise, starting at 11 o'clock last night, and it is going for several
days.
Senator HICKENLOOPEiR. This fact that we may be always alert some-
times is not fully appreciated except on occasional demonstrations of
that.
Secretary GATES. That is right, and the Joint Chiefs, as a result of
this experience and critique of it have recommended to me that we
have these alerts on a no-notice basis more frequently.
Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thank you. My time is up.
The CHAIRMAN. The Senator's time is up.
[Deleted.]
QUESTION OF ADVANCE PLANNING FOR ACTION IN EVENT U-2 PLANE
DOWNED
Senator LONG. Did you advise or consult as to whether we were to
admit that we authorized these flights if and when the Soviets did
succeed in bringing one of our planes down?
Secretary GATES. If we should continue them or not?
Senator LONG. No, no. What I meant is this : As a matter' of fore-
handedness-I see a naval officer sitting behind you-they taught
me the definition of that word as a midshipman-I am sure that you
anticipated that sooner or later they were going to bring one of our
planes down.
Secretary GATES. We, knew it was a dangerous occupation; yes,
Senator.
Senator LONG. You could anticipate that sooner or later one of
these planes was going to fall into enemy hands?
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.
Senator LONG. There was a distinct possibility at any moment,
and had you advised and consulted as to how this matter should be
handled if and when such an event materialized?
Secretary GATES. No; I had not, Senator. I was only aware of
the fact that a cover story existed, but I had no part in it.
Senator LONG. And you had not been advised as to what the position
of this country was going to be in the event that that happened?
Secretary GATES. No, Sir, this was not my responsibility.
Senator LONG. Senator Young passed up two questions he would
like for me to ask. I will just ask them on my time since I have no
further questions.
He says if it were essential
The CHAIRMAN. I think the Senator ought to ask in his own name.
Senator LONG. May I yield the remainder of my time to Senator
Young then?
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138 EVENTS INCIDENT TO TIRE StJMIfIT CONFERENCE
The Cilmln,r. x. 'No, you may not. You may ask any question you,
yourself, but on your own responsibility.
Senator Loxc. If it were essential or important that the U-2 flights
be made for years, right up to and including May 1, is the defense of
the United States adversely effected by an asolute discontinuance on
May 13?
Secretary GATES. We have lost, through compromise, an important
source of information. [Deleted.]
Senator LONG. In other words, we do badly need the same informa-
tion that we were gathering with the U fights?
Secretary GATES. We need a continuity of this information, I think,
Senator.
Senator Lose. Then if that be the case, in your judgmlent was it
essential or advisable that the flight of May I should not have been
canceled?
Secretary GATES. III my judgment, it was proper to fly the flight
of May 1.
Senator LoNo. Thank you. I have no further questions.
The CIIAinltax, Is that all ?
The Senator from Verniont?
Senator Aiiu-; ;. Mr. Secretary, at the trine you ordered the com-
munications alert on May 15, did you have any apprehension at that
time the Communists might be considering or planningsurprise action
in any part of the world?
Secretary GATrs. No, sir, I felt that the situation was one that was
at best, not very constructive. We knew the sense of Mr. Khrushchev's
remarks, but f did not anticipate a surprise attack.
I didn't order that kind of an alert.
Senator Ail{E:J:. In other words, it -seemed like a good thing to do
at the time?
Secretary (L rns, I think it was, yes, Sir,
Senator AIKEN. Was the response to the order fully satisfactory?
Secretary G.rrEs. Yes.
Senator'AmF.x. Have you had any similar alerts since?
Secretary GATES. I testified a minute ago, I believe, that we started
one at 11 o'clock last night which will run for several days.
[Deleted.]
The Cr1,vlllr.as, Senator Morse.
Senator MauusE;. Mr. Seeret.iry, if this has been covered, please tell
me.
Secretary G.vits. Yes, Senator.
Ill PIACA'rI('NS OF SOVIEr THREAT AGAINST OVERSEAS BASES
Senator MU RSE. I am somewhat concerned about the implications,
proper a.ndawise and otherwise, of the alleged threat of the marshal
of the air forces of the Soviet Union that if they know that another
spy plane is leaving a. foreign baste the instructions are to shoot a
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
missile to that base. What is your judgment as to the seriousness of
that threat?
Do you think it is a bluff or do you think that he means it?
Secretary GATES. Well, Senator, this is awfully hard to know. IIe
must know that if he did such a thing that we have allied commit-
ments. If it was an allied country, for example, he would be starting
a very maj or problem for himself.
Senator MORSE. That is the point I want to raise.
Secretary GATES. And this would only be done with the assumption
that he would take the consequences of an act that would probably
start it general war. [Deleted.]
Senator MORSE. Doesn't it seem to imply, Mr. Secretary, that if he
is not bluffing, that they thereby mean to start a general war over
espionage activity on the part of the United States or any other for-
eign power that sends a spy plane over their territory?
Doesn't that seem to be--
Secretary GATES. If I understand your question, Senator, I think
he must take the responsibility for starting a general war or very
likely starting a general war if he hits one of our Allied bases for any
reason.
Senator MORSE. Could it possibly imply that the Russians are of the
opinion that our power of both defense and aggression is such that
they are willing to take it on? To put my question a different
it now. I think they absolutely know they will commit suicide the
moment they try it because I think they are fully informed in every
way possible about, practically, the exact defense posture of the
United States.
Senator MORSE. If that is true, and I think it is true, that they ought
to know that if they get involved in a nuclear war there can't be any
victory for them, and I doubt if there could for us, but apparently
this type of military mind in Russia possessed by their air marshal is
ready to start a nuclear war. Wouldn't that be a fair deduction from
this threat unless it is a, bluff ?
Secretary GATES. Senator Morse, I think it is a part of a stepped-
up, cold war aggressive, propaganda campaign. That is what I think
it really is, because I don't believe that Mr. Khrushchev wants to
start a war which he knows will be the end of his country.
Senator MORSE. I am inclined to think that is probably true of
Khrushchev. But the reason I am asking this line of questions is
to find out from you if the leaders in our country have reason to
believe that Khrushchev is being pushed in Russia by a preventive
war group that entertains the point of view that sooner or later they
are going to have to fight the United States, and that they think
probably now is a better time to do it than later.
Do we have any intelligence information that would justify our
believing that a military group in Russia is now taking over and
pushing Khru.shchev to the side?
Secretary GATES. We do not have. We can at this time only
speculate. It might be possible that the military group has come
into more power in Russia or that Mr. Khrushchev may have had
some of his power diluted. This is, however, just speculation, and
50412-60---10
eeretary GATES. I doubt very much that they are willing to take
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148 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SL'3. I T CONTERENCE
it is, I suppose, rather dangerous to speculate, but we do not have any
hard facts on the subject.
INFLUENCE OF, AND D.I GER IN, SOVIET MILITARY IIIERARCIIY
Senator MfoizsE. I understand they have some 250,000 military
officers army and naval and air. Could it be possible that within
the military in Russia. they see the possibility of reaching an agree-
ment on total disarmament which means that they would be moved
out of the very favored posit ion in Russian society they now occupy,
and that we need to be on the alert to the possibility that a great
inilitar change is taking place in Russia in the form of a military
hierarchy taking over control from the Communist leadership?
Secretary GATES. Well, 1 couldn't agree with you more, sir, that
we should certainly be on the alert to this possibility and continuously
so. I agree that, we must consider this as one of the possibilities.
Senator Moitss. What. concerns me is that as far as their leadership
is concerned and as far as I have any reason to believe, based upon
the briefings we have had from our own American leaders, we are
dealing with a group of very amoral leaders in Russia. And when
you get amoral leaders among the military establisluncnti, such as they
have, I think we have cause for concern as to whether or not even in
desperation they might not be willing to start a war. And if this is
more than propaganda, if this is more than bluff, if this is more than
what. you suggest might be the case of a new step-up in the cold war
to try to frighten our allies, then we have to take a long look, it seems
to ne, as to our responsibility to history in respect to following an
espionage course that might cause these amoral men in desperation
to start a war because there is always the hope on our part that we
may be able to contain them until we can negotiate through the
United Nations a workable and enforceable total disarmament
program.
I have raised this question because I don't think that in terms of
history we can completely ignore our responsibility in dealing with a
group of desperadoes such as I think the'
he Russian military people are,
and so it raises the question how far we can justify going morally, in
connection with an espionage system such as the U-t system, when we
know we are, dealing with a group of amoral military leaders in Russia
who might. start a nuclear war because of their complete. lack of appre-
ciation for the value of human life.
It puts us in a difficult position, it seems to me. We have our own
security to protect, we have our duty to gather information, but the
nature of the "beast" with whom we are dealing-in quotation marks
I put the word, of course. -nevertheless puts upon us some responsi-
bility, it seems to nie, to not go too far in our own espionage program
if by going a certain distance might indirectly put us in a position
where history might record that. we knew we were dealing with that
kind of a gang and knowing it we nevertheless followed an espionage
course of action that they considered so violated their sovereign rights
that they were willing glen Co take that last step into a nuclear war.
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE 141
Secretary GATES. Well, the Senator can speculate more intelligently,
I am sure, than I can on military people.
Senator MoRSE. Not at all.
Secretary GATES. But basically military people are conservative,
worldwide, and basically they are well informed on military matters,
and therefore, the military in the Soviet Union should know better
than the political leaders that they will be lost, and slaughtered and
devastated in a nuclear war.
On the other question, it seems tome again as a lay person that our
survival is at stake. If he threatens us, I have repeatedly testified in
Congress, that I didn't think he intended to make any significant
concessions at any meeting, that wehave not prepared our defense pro-
gram on that basis, that we had to keep it under continuous review, at
all times, and with a completely closed country, and our survival
threatened, if he builds up a capability for a surprise attack, it seems
to me absolutely vital that we obtain all the information we can from
every source.
Senator MORSE. Thank you very much.
The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Indiana.
Senator CAPEIIART. I have no questions except I will say I think
you did the right thing by ordering the alert.
I hope that you will continue to be on alert. I hope you will con-
tinue to get intelligence on Russia in every conceivable way we can.
The CHAIRMAN. Is that all?
The Senator from Ohio.
Senator LAusc-uE. Mr. Gates, how long have you been the Secretary
of Defense?
Secretary GATES. Only since last December, sir.
Senator LAUSCHE'. Were you in the Department prior to that time?
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir; I have been there since 1953, in the De-
partment.
Senator LAUSCIIE. In what capacity?
Secretary GATES. I was Under Secretary of the Navy, then Secre-
tary of the Navy, then Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Senator LAUSCHE. Based upon your knowledge, when did the Soviet
hierarchy first know of the fact that there were foreign planes flying
over the Soviet?
Secretary GATES. I don't think we can confirm, Senator. We just
have to take Mr. Khrushchev's statements at face value.
I think that it is debatable how much he knew. I assume be knew
that there were planes flying. He said he knew. He says lie had
known since he was here in the United States. But I don't think we
can definitely confirm this.
Senator LAUSCIIE. Testimony has been given by some witness
that, I think on July 2, 1956, he made a protest that there was a plane
overhead in the Soviet.
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142 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
Secretary GyTEs. Yes. I have the record of this. I believe this
was the tinge General Twining visited the Soviet Union. They made
a Public protest of overflights in July of 19:56.
Senator LAuscti:. And since that time U-?'s have been making mnis-
sions over the Soviet ?
Secretary G.vTEs. That is correct, Senator.
Senator I,;\useITE. And Ithrushchev, after May 1, made a state-
ment that lie knew at the tune that lie was at Camp David that planes
were flying overhead ?
Secretary G.vrrs. Yes, sir; he did.
Senator L.kusriiF:. Then the proof indicates that at the time lie was
invited to the United States, at the time lie went to Camp David, and
at the time that. ha arranged for the summit conference, he knew of
these planes bein~ overhead
Secretary GATES. Yes.
Senator LAuSciIE. And lie did nothing about it ? Can a staff inenm-
her tell ?
Secretary Gxrr:s. I can't say that we can confirm this, Senator.
Senator LA t_'SCIIE. I understand,
Secretary GATES. This ishisstatement.
Senator L.%uscur:. That is correct. When was Iihrusliches in the-
United States?
Mr.-Camel. September 1959.
Secretary Geri:S. Selitenilx r l:i through t1w 27th.
Senator L.ausciIF:. He made no statement to the President at that
time about planes being overhead
Secretary Ile did not.
Senator ,_arsei!E.And lie agreed to meet at the summit ?
Secretary G.ITF:s. That is right.
Senator LAusciiE. Then on May 1 this U-2 was brought down in
the Soviet and he then made these declarations that have been re-
ported. That is correct, isn't it?
Secretary GATF:s, Yes, sir.
Senator ,AuS(?IiE.'oat", Bien, what, in your opinion, motivated him
in agreeing to have a simlmit conference, accepting our invitation to
conic to the United States, meeting with the President, while lie knew
that this supposed grave transgression of his rights was taking place?
Secretary GATES. I can only hazard again a personal opinion, Sen-
ator. 'fy ojpinion is than lie believed that lie could not make any
progress at ttre sunurut iucet ing, and lie made a pre-positioned, he took
a pre-position-made a brief on it and came to Paris to wreck the
summit quite apart from (lie I -2 incident.
Senator L.iusciIE. Based upon your opinion or active knowledge,.
during this period was there espionage practiced by the Soviets in
our country ?
Yes: there was.
Secretary GATES.
Senator L.tusclTE. Is that answer based upon your knowledge?
Secretary GATES. Based upon reports that I have read..
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Senator LAUSCIIE. From the Central Intelligence Agency?
Secretary GATES. Or from the FBI.
Senator LAUSCIIE. In the Soviet, all things are hemmed in against
an individual getting into proximity of their bases. Am I correct in
that?
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.
:Senator LAusciIn. Does that situation prevail in our country ?
Secretary GATES. It certainly does not, Senator.
;Senator LAUSCIIL. Then there is a tremendous difficulty in the ability
of obtaining intelligence by our agents in the Soviet as compared to
their ability, through their agents in our country?
Secretary GATES. That is correct; and there is obviously no reason
for him to overfly the United States.
Senator LAUSCIIE. Based upon the knowledge that you acquired
through the U-2's, what would be your opinion about our intellectual
ability to pursue properly the development of our national defense?
Secretary GATES. I think we had a responsibility to take every
means we could.
Senator LAUSCUE. That is not my question. My question is, If you
slid not have the knowledge acquired through the U-2's, could you
have intelligently developed your national defense to cope with the
actual, potential military power of the Soviet?
Secretary GATES. Not as well, Senator; by no means.
Senator LAUSCIIE. By no means whatsoever?
Secretary GATES. We have other means.
Senator LAUSCIIE. Yes?
Secretary GATES. That gives us other information, but this was a
very importance piece of information.
Senator LAUSCIIE. If you didn't have that information, do you feel
that the security of our country in all probability would have been
affected because of our inability to develop properly our military
.strength?
Secretary GATES. I think this was-I want to be careful in my an-
swer because this is one source of several sources of intelligence,. It
is a very important one. I think it would have been affecting our
ability to properly defend the United States if we didn't have this
information.
DEDIANDS PRESENTED BY KIIRUSIICIIEV
Senator LAUSCHE.. Now, getting down. to the matter of the May 16
meeting, have you formulated any opinion as to whether Khrushchev,
when he left Moscow, already had prepared those four unacceptable
demands that he made upon the President with respect to the U-2
incident?
Secretary GATES. Everyone is entitled to a personal opinion, Sena
tor. I have an opinion, yes, sir, that he had very definitely, because
the moment he arrived in Paris he presented these conditions to Mr.
-de Gaulle along with a copy already in French.
Senator I.AUSCUE. That is-the fact is that he was supposed to go
to Paris on May 15 ; Sunday?
Secretary GATES. Yes; he came on Saturday night, I believe.
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Senator LArscIIE. And for some reason that has not been explained,
he decided to come there in advance?
Secretary GATES. That is right.
Senator t uscin . On Saturday I
Secretary GATES. That is right.
Senator Larrcxr;. And early in the morning at 11 o'clock on Sun-
day, he asked for a conference?
ecret,i.ry GATES. Attended by de Gaulle.
Senator tArscljr. Attended by Malinovsky,himself, and de Gaulle?
Secretary GATES. That is correct.
Senator'.AUScIIE. At that meeting, he set forth these unacceptable
demands?
Secretary G.vrEs. That is right, sir.
Senator LAUScIIE. Then in the afternoon at 4:30 he asked for a
conference with Macmillan ?
Secretary GATES. That incorrect.
Senator LArsCHE. And he again set forth those four demands?
Secretary GATES. That is correct.
Senator t2AUSCIIE. This is merely asking for your opinion.
Do you believe that in self-respect and maintenance of the Presi-
dent's position he could conform to the demands made in that ultima-
tum $
Secretary GATES. I certainly do not. I certainly believe he could
not, I guess, would be a better answer.
Senator LArscilE. I am of the opinion that when Khrushchev left
Moscow he knew there was not. to be a summit conference. He pre-
pared his paper. He had his mode of operation completely outlined.
Secretary GATES. I share that point of view, Senator.
SHOULD U-2 FLIGHTS HAVE BEEN SUSPENDED BEFORF. SUMMIT CONFERENCE?
Senator LAuSCInE. Now, you have stated that you did not feel that
we could, in the face of these discussions about a summit conference,
suspend our activities with respect to the security of the country;
is that right ?
Secretary GATES. That is right, sir.
Senator LArscIIE. If there was to be a temporary suspension of
these LT-1 flights, when should they have begun? This is speculation.
I am just trying to search it out. The discussions for a summit confer-
ence preceded by far the. September visit in the United States, and
then from September to May 16 practically 9 months elapsed. Should
we, last September, have discontinued our LT-2 flights?
Secretary G.%TEs. Not in my judgment. Senator. I think it would
have been most incorrect to have suspended them.
Senator L.%usciIE. Do you believe the Soviet, because of the ar-
ranged summit conference. discontinued its activities?
Secretary GATES. I am sure they didn't, although I don't know, but
I am perfectly sure they didn't.
Senator LAUSCUE. That is all.
The CUAIRarAi. Mr. Reporter, the staff overlooked a document
which should have been included in the background information. It
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is the Soviet note of May 10, which was sent to our Government, as
reprinted in the New York Times of May 11, and I ask that it be
inserted in the record so that this step in the development from a
documentary point of view may be complete.
(The note referred to appears on p. 195 of appendix 1.)
QUESTION OF ALTERNATIVES TO MAY 9 STATEMENT OF STATE DEPARTMENT
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, referring just a moment to a pre-
vious question, on the May the 9th meeting in which the issuance of
the statement by the Department was considered, were there any alter-
native statements proposed and considered to the one which was
issued?
Secretary GATES. Not in principle, Senator Fulbright.
The CHAIRMAN. Not in principle?
Secretary GATES. But there were, of course, various language ver-
sions considered.
The CHAIRMAN. Did anyone at that meeting raise the point that
for the President, the Chief of State, to assume personal responsi-
bility would be a departure from the historical practice of this
country?
Secretary GATES. I think this was understood, Senator, and I be-
lieve that we felt the circumstances were different from anything
that had prevailed heretofore.
The CHAIRMAN. But the point was raised and discussed?
Secretary GATES. I can't accurately say that it was raised and dis-
cussed but it was certainly in my mind and I believe it was obvious
to all of us that it was a departure from precedent.
The CHAIRMAN. It was a departure from precedent in this coun-
try. Do you know of any other country that has followed this
policy?
Secretary GATES. No ; I do not.
The CHAIRMAN. Was anyone concerned that this might have far-
reaching implications for the future of our intelligence operations?'
Secretary GATES. Well, we knew that it already had marked the
end of this particular method of collection of intelligence because of
its being compromised [deleted].
The CHAIRMAN. Did I understand you to say that to your knowledge
there was no time in the last few years, in which you are familiar
with our activity, that U-2 flights were suspended for political reasons.
Secretary GATES. Not to my knowledge, Senator; that is correct.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, were you ever consulted with regard
to the wisdom of holding a summit conference?
Secretary GATES. No; I was not, Senator.
POSSIBILITY OF AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIA ON DISARMAMENT AND NUCLEAR
TESTING
The CHAIRMAN. Do you personally believe there is any reasonable
hope for any agreement with the Russians with regard to disarma-
ment?
Secretary GATES. I think it is extremely doubtful., Mr. Chairman. I
think that the Soviets are playing off-and-on-again tactics; some-
times cool, sometimes cold, sometimes hot.
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I believe that their proposal for disarmament or total disarma-
inent is completely unrealistic. I find it rather difficult to believe they
will ever agree to the amt rols and inspections that we will of necessity
insist upon to make progress on disarmament.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you believe the same with regard to nuclear
test bans?
Secretary GATES. I am not so definite on that, Mr. Chairman, from
a personal point of view. We seem to have made more progress in the
negotiations on tests than we have in the other field. But I again
worry about. the possibility of having valid control and inspection
systems for either of these efforts.
The C ii, iinr, x. I understood you to say, I believe, in answer to a
question by Senator Morse that you did not believe any significant
concessions could be expected from the Soviets at the summit Ineeting.
Secretary G.Arr s. That. is right. This has been consistent with my
testimony before the conttnittevs of Congress all of this year.
The CHAIRMAN. Is it now probable that as a. result of the revelation
of the efficiency of the IT--2 photography, tote Russians will now change
the location of many of their strategic bases ?
Secretary (1vris. This is quite an undertaking. You don't do the
construction that is involved in strategic bases easily or quickly, and
they don't know precisely how much information we have about. them,
and I would think that they would perhaps take different, means of
building new bases or of dispersing bases or something of that
character. But. I don't believe that it is very practical to assume that
they would shift major installations because of the character required
to handle t11e. strategic \A-teapo-a,.
The Cimiwn.1N. What I meant is, do you feel that. the. information
you now have may become rapidly obsolete because of their knowing
you know about. them they will change them, so that you will have a
great deal of difficulty in keeping up with their location?
Secretary Gxrrs. We gill have to augment other methods toward
obtaining this information.
[ Deleted.]
The C'ii.tlalr.lti. Mr. Secretary, was your prepared statement re-
leased to the ~p,ress?
Secretary GATES. Was what, sir?
The Crr.tinau.~ x. Was the statement which you read initially released
to the press?
Secretary GATES. I didn't release it. unless the committee slid.
TheClr_6rtar.%N. Ao, tlit, committecdidn't,asfar aasIknow.
Captain .Ioultis'mx. It has lx'en released by Mr. St. Claire; I believe
that be had released it. We didn't release it.
The CuAioJCAx. Was it. your purpose io release it
Secretary GL?rt:s. It was up to you, Mr. Chairman.
The Cn:,nnr~x. Well, normally. the initial statement- made by wit.
nesses is the same as their own testimony. They either censor it or re-
lease it. I was just inquiring,
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Secretary GATES. It is all right with me if it is all right with you
that it be released, Mr. Chairman. I understand it has been released.
The CHAIRMAN. It has been released?
Secretary GATES. That is what I understand.
Captain JOHNSTON. Yes, sir, I was informed by someone from the
committee, I believe Mr. St. Claire, that it had been released.
The CHAIRMAN. By whom?
Captain JOHNSTON. By the committee, Senator.
The CIIAIRI4IAN. May I ask the staff, did you release it?
Mr. MARCY. No, Mr. Chairman, this will just be released in the
normal way. It is put on the tape here. It went through the censors
and, unless they took any portion of it out, it went to the public.
The CHAIRMAN. I just was, wondering.
Secretary GATES. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, I considered it your
prerogative. I have no objection one way or the other.
The CHAIRMAN. It usually follows the same procedure. You make
the statement and then it goes through the record if the censors wish it.
Was this statement cleared with the State Department before you
made it?
Secretary GATES. Yes, Sir.
Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Chairman, may I suggest that we find out
whether a copy got in the hands of the newspapermen other than
through normal sources here.
Mr. MARCY. No, sir, that did not happen, not through the commit-
tee. Everything goes through the regular process, through the cen-
sors, and so on.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, I asked the clerk a moment ago if you had
released it. Ile understood you had-I mean that you had given it
to the press before.
Secretary GATES. I didn't give it to the press, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. You or one of your aides, I don't know.
Secretary GATES. No, we did not release it.
TIMING OF KTIRUSIICIIEV'S DECISION TO WRECK SUMMIT
The CHAIRMAN. You stated very positively that you believed the
Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Mr. Khrushchev, before he
came to Paris, had already made up his mind to wreck the summit.
Can you tell us how and why you arrived at that opinion?
Secretary GATES. Well, I felt, and again speaking personally, I
felt that the fact that he arrived on Saturday night and asked for
these appointments with President de Gaulle and Prime Minister
Macmillan, and he arrived with a position paper translated in French
in the case of do Gaulle and given orally by translation in English
to Macmillan, a position paper that he used almost verbatim as the
first part of his text the following morning, was pretty good indica,
tion that he had a preconceived plan at the summit meeting and was
planning to, in my judgment again, and used the fact that there were
3,000 newspapermen in Paris and he had a platform to issue all of
these statements from. Then I believe there were indications in other
speeches that he made prior to the summit that he was going to adopt
later on.
The CHAIRMAN. What in your opinion caused him to arrive at this
conclusion to wreck the conference ?
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Secretary GATES. Why, I believe that he found that he had been
unsuccessful in creating any disunity among the allies. That he was
not going to get any substantive concessions himself, according to his
terms, on Berlin and other critical issues that he might consider im-
portant, and that. he wasn't ggoing to get a blanket disarmament check
without controls, and so forth. And I believe he felt that he was not
going to make any progress at the summit.
rPPECT Or TILE U-2 INCIDENT ON Klli.USuc.UEV'S SiThLt[IT ACTIONS
The CHAIRMAN. Do you believe the U-2 incident contributed to
that belief?
Secretary GATES. I, frankly in my judgment it did not, Senator
Fulbright. I believe it gave him, it contributed to his public case, but
I don't think it contributed to his position.
The CILLm LtN. You don't think that was a significant element in
causing him to arrive at this conclusion?
Secretary GATES. I really do not; no, Sir. I believe it was a factor
in his, an important factor in helping him make his case, but I don't
think it had anything to do with his policy decision.
The CHAIRMAN. Why do you think he would be better off and what
reasoning leads you to this conclusion? Why is he better off having
followed the course he did, than having gone to the conference and
having it result in no concessions?
Secretary GATES. Only lie can answer that, Senator.
The CHAIRMAN. Why do you think he left in his initial statement
what is called an "outs' for the President, by saying he thought the
President didn't know about this?
Secretary GATES. I don't know what his intentions were, whether
that was an out or whether that was just a statement that he believed.
I regally don't know.
The CHAIr%r. N. If it was an out, it would be inconsistent with his
determination to wreck the conference, would it not?
Secretary GATES. Sir?
The CHAIRMAN. If it was an out as it has been alleged, it would
be inconsistent with his determination to wreck the conference. He
wouldn't want to give the President an out, would be?
Secretary GATES. I never personally considered it was an out. I
just thought he was using this is part of his speech-I don't consider
it was an`c out.
The C1LuurAN. Well, he did say that he thought the President
didn't know about it, didn't lie, in his initial statement?
Secretary GATrs. Yes, he did.
The CILaiaMAN.My time is up.
Senator !Morse, do you have any further questions?
Senator MoisE. Senator Wiley is next.
The CiLUR d AN. Senator Wiley?
Senator 1\l 'asF:. I have some. more quest ions.
Senator \VIl.Er. Mr. Scere ary, we know very well that M. irushcliev
had canvassed the situation with Macmillan, de Gaulle, with Adenauer
and with our President, and they were all agreed and firm on the prop-
osition that Khrushchev wanted, to wit, to divide Germany, and so
forth and so on. Now, he was acquainted with that fact from his
conversations, was he not?
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Secretaryy GATES. I believe he was, sir.
Senator WILEY. And, in other words, he knew that if he went to the
,conference and couldn't get his way, which would be very apparent,
that wouldn't sit so well with the, people of Russia?
Secretary GATES. I think that is a good speculation.
Senator WILEY. So, it seems to be the consensus of those people who,
claim to know, including yourself, that the U-2 incident would give
him something to hang on his previous determination and that he
utilized. Do you agree to that ?
Secretary GATES. Yes, I think he used the U-2 as a tool rather than
as a matter of principle. I think he decided that there was no
progress for him at the summit.
SOVIET KNOWLEDGE OF OVERFLIGHTS
Senator WILEY. Well, there is just this one other question. I think
you have answered it, but see if I can't got it out into the open and get
it so there won't be any question : Is it your opinion that he had known
of the U-2 incidents for a long time-I mean the U-2 flights?
Secretary GATES. I think I believed -him when. he said that he knew
we were overflying the Soviet Union. I don't believe he knew their
capabilities. But I think he knew that unidentified aircraft were over
his territory.
Senator WILEY. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Morse?
RELATIONSHIP OF U-2 FLIGHTS TO SUMMIT CONFERENCE
Senator MORSE. Mr. Secretary, I want to pursue a bit further the
line of questioning that I was conducting when my time was up
because I think you have got to deal also, with the problem of where we
go from here, in view of Russian attitudes at the present time.
We have the air marshal's statement now which has not been coun-
termanded as far as we know by Khrushchev, that if an American U-2
plane flies from any base, goes over Russia, they will fire a missile
against that base.
Your testimony, I think, justifies my concluding that if they fire at
that base, that under our commitments under NATO, our obligations
to defend our allies, we will meet that force, and that that may very
well start general war.
As I understand also your testimony, you share my doubt as to
whether or not the air marshal is bluffing, whether or not this is
propaganda in the cold war or whether or not this is an announcement
of a definite decision as to what they are going to do.
So we have to discuss this hypothetically from this point on. Let's
:assume that he means exactly what he said, and because of my fear of
the type of military mind they have in Russia as contrasted with our
own, namely, the difference between amoral military leaders and moral
military leaders, I ain very fearful that the group in control of the
Russian military at the present time means exactly what it says.
They will fire a missile at any base from which an American U-2
plane flies. Doesn't that put squarely up to us then the question as
to whether or not we can justify being a party indirectly to the start-
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150 EVENTS INCIDENT TO TIIE SUNMIT CONFER ,
ing of general war by flying any I'-' planes from any foreign base,
in view of that announcement by the Russian air marshal?
Secretary GATES. We have announced t.lutt- the -2 flights will not
be resumed. The. President. has announced this. This is, of course,
known to them and that was announced prior to this Defense Min-
ister's statement. that you refer to.
Senator'4foatsE. That is what I want to clarify for this record be-
cause most resriertfully, I don't think it is clear in the. record that
this commit try has made to date.
The President, a nnou iced at- Paris that. they were suspending tlteni.
Secretary GaTES. lie made, the. statement, senator, that he couldn't
commit the next President, but. as far as he was concerned, during his
administration, the flights were stop )ed.
Senator Morsi-. Then do you wish to express the viewpoint that at
the present tinge the ITnited States does not intend to continue any
U-2 flights over Russia ?
Secretary G.1Tl:s. I think we. made a commitment not to.
Senator :dolts}:. There has been a considerable amount of discus-
sion in these hearings and outside of theme hearings that in view of
that situation that. confronts us, it is intended to continue LT-2 flights;
that the President's statement was a statement made in connection
with the summit conference situation.
In other words, tha summit. conference situation having blown up,
it does not follow that. that statement. of the. President now continues
in effect.
It is your testimony that. it. is your understanding it does continue
in effect?
ti 1TURE OF PRi;SinEXT'S COMMITMENT NOT TO CONTINUE FLTOIITS
Secretary GATES. I am not a lawyer, Senator, but I think you could
take the legal hint of view that the President, had no commitment
because. of the blowup of the summit. conference, but from a national
point, of view, prestige and the standpoint of the honorable point of
view, I think the United States has made a commitment. regardless
of the technicality of the timing of the decision, so in my judgment
we have made a. commitment, not to fly U-2 during the administration
of this President.
SenatorMoitsr.. I don't care to get. into any argument over seman-
tics, but. only judging from what I read about the interpretation of
the President.'s speech to the Nation, there are many news comments
interpreting the Pre,idrnt's speech to the Nation as a speech that does
not commit this Nation to a discontinuance of I'-?' flights, now that
the summit. conference, has blown up.
I think it. is very important that we make clear our position. I am
not. passing judgment now on what our position should be.
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.
IVIT.RPRF.TATTIaN OF PRi:SIDEN,r'5 C0313MT:NTS ABOUT NOT RR1;r,%rT%G
ovER FLIT T TTS
Senator. Monsr. But we have prohleins, may I say most respectfully,
with people in other parts of the world, even including the segments
of the population of our allies, raising the question as to whether or
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not the President's speech to the Nation the other night means that
we may continue U-2 flights.
In view of the statement of the air marshal of Russia as to what
they are going to do if they do continue, my question is this.: Should
not our Government restate its position in regard to the continuation
of U-2 flights and give the world assurance at the present time that
we do not intend to continue U-2 flights and thus risk the possibility
that the Russians may send a missile to the air base from which any
U-2 flight might leave?
Secretary GATES. Senator, I have in my hand the President's state-
ment in Paris in which he said :
In point of fact, these flights were suspended after the recent incident, and are
not to be resumed. Accordingly, this cannot be the issue.
That is a categorical statement that they are not to be resumed,
This is what I understand our position is.
Senator MORSE. The President didn't say that in his speech to the
Nation the other night. There isn't anything in the President's
speech to the Nation the other night that categorically and unequivo-
cally assures to the world that we are discontinuing, as a matter of
-espionage policy, the flying of any U-2 planes over any foreign
territory.
All I seek to do at this point in the record, and please let me assure
you of this, is to raise this point so that our Government can remove
any suspicion or fear in other parts of the world in view of the
Russian air marshal's statement, that the world doesn't have to be
concerned about a nuclear war being started by us by sending a U-2
plane from any foreign base over Russia.
I think the world is entitled to that assurance at this moment in
order to produce the relaxation that I think is necessary for the con-
tinuation, through the Unii:ed Nations I hope, of a good faith, this
.attempt to reach some understanding with Russia.
Secretary GATES. It may well need clarification, Senator. I didn't
think it did.. I thought it was perfectly clear to me that we had made
a commitment so long as the President is in office, not to fly the U-2
airplane, and everyone understood it. If they don't, perhaps it should
be reexamined. However, you are now faced with making another
statement in face of a threat, and I don't know whether this is a wise
move or not.
Senator MORSE. I think it is a wise move if we honestly believe
that this is more than a threat, that this is an announcement of mili-
tary policy that they intend to deliver on.
I don't intend to argue the point. I think the judgment of the
world will be against us if, in view of what you call this threat, we
should continue IT-2 flights, because I think we have to share joint
responsibility with Russia then for starting a nuclear war, because
I seriously question whether world opinion will ever be with us on
this kind of espionage conduct.
I think that world opinion is against our sending a U-2 flight over
any foreign territory, because I think most people, in other parts of
the world consider it. a form of constructive aggression.
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12 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUM IIT CONFERENCE
That is all, dir. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ilickenlooper, do you have any further
questions? I think you are next.
Senator IliCKr.NLoorr:R. Mr. Secretary, with reference to the dis-
cussion which you have just had with Senator :Morse-I think per-
haps I only have a comment because my comment will go to a mat-
ter of personal opinion-as I understand the line of questioning that
has been going on here, and as I think it probably will be interpreted,
the United States is required to take the burden for all the ills of the
world and take the responsibilities for all the. mistakes in the world;
that we must do everythnng, including complete, submission to the
demands and the threats of the Kremlin; and that the opinion of the
world is apt to be slanted against its unless we do this at this time.
I have heard front so many sources over the country that we have
to do this or that or the other thing as a gestnre that we are not
war-minded or that. we are not warmongers, or that we really have
some interest in our fellow man.
Now, if the record of the United States over the last. good many
years of humanitarian activities, of fantastic expenditures of billions
of dollars for peace, of fostering~, all kinds of conferences, of making
all kinds of offers to meet all kinds of reasonable propositions for
peace, based only upon reasonable agreements for their assurance of
being carried out-if that. isn`t an assurance to the world, I personally
think that to humble ourselves further by yielding to this threat of
this military mail in Russia would certainI not atld to our prestige
in the least, and it probably would be of little use in the eyes of the
world, at least to those that we would expect to stand by us in an
emergency.
I can't.'follow that line of reasoning, especially in view of the past
record of the United States.
We started out at the end of World War II with the sole and
exclusive possession of the atomic bomb, the ability to blow any na-
tion off the map and anybody else if we wanted to if we were war-
minded. Nobody else had it. We offered to give it up to an inter-
national agency to get out of the atomic business, to turn over all
fissionable materials to an international agency: all we asked was that
reasonable inspection, reasonable assurance, would be given that
the international agency would have control and that no nation would
cheat on this obligation.
Never in the history of the world, as far as I know, has a nation,
possessing the exclusive ability and the exclusive power to destroy
any other nation in the world, have they ever given that up or offered
to give it up voluntarily.
Wo go from that step by step with vast amounts of money. with all
kinds of humanitarian offers, with all kinds of peaceful offers, with
all kinds of peaceful efforts in the world and 1 just want to make
my position clear: we. have stated we are not going to overfly Russia,
at least- so far as President. Eisenhower's administration is concerned,
with U-2's--that: has been stopped. If we did continue it sometime.
in the future in the interests of the security of this country, I think
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EVENTS IN
the security of this country comes first in our responsibility, and we
must take whatever reasonable means we have and whatever calcu-
lated risks that may be involved in order to secure essential informa-
tion and in order to secure and maintain our proper defensive posture..
I feel that very deeply and I am not questioning you about it.
You don't have to agree or disagree. I merely wanted to make
that statement in view of the fact that I don't agree that we have
continually to humble ourselves in the eyes of the world, because I
think it can do nothing but destroy the confidence, in many cases, that
other Nations have in us if we continue to bow to the threats that
emanate periodically from the Kremlin, and we have had just as bad
threats in the past as this one. As I pointed out in my previous ques-
tions, where they said they have rockets pointed at our bases, they
have rockets on the pads pointed at other countries in Europe;
they know how many rockets they are going to put on Paris and
that they are going to bury us one way or another, and so on, and I
think there comes a time when even the world has to turn and stand
fast. That is all I have to say.
The CIAIRMAN. Is that all?
Senator HIcKENLOOFER. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gore?
[Deleted.]
The Senator's time is up.
The Senator from Ohio, any questions?
Senator LAusdun. No further questions.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, I don't want to labor this too long,
but I am interested in your reasoning. I didn't get to finish that ques-
tion. Let me go back. Do you think when Chairman Khrushchev
was in the United States last September that at that time he had an
intention to have a summit conference?
Secretary GATES. I would only be speculating, Mr. Chairman. I
think he did.
The CHAIRMAN. I want to know what happened between then and
May 15, in your opinion, that caused him to take the firm decision
which you stated a moment ago you believe he had.
Secretary GATES. I really don't know the value of my opinion, Mr.
Chairman, but my opinion is that he has tried for many years to
divide our allies from us. He has tried to divide the NATO member-
ship in particular. He has resented the bases that surround his coun-
try, and he has had, I think, as a No. 1 objective the division of our
security and collective alliances. I think he found during this inter-
vening period that he couldn't make a dent in the solidarity and
unity of these relationships, that he couldn't get anybody to change
their position on Berlin. He found the British and the French and
the United States stalwartly together on that subject, and that he
found the NATO alliance in good shape and strong, and that he was
going to run into a position where he would make no progress, and
as someone else has remarked, I believe, during this testimony, he
would probably lose some face at home if he couldn't make any
progress.
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1o4 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
The CI1:Iitt31AX. Do you think he would have refused to participate
if there had been no I`- incident.?
Secretary G.ITES. I think ho would have again, we must only
speculate, Senator-I think lee would have probably employed tactics
that would have ruined the summit from within.
The. L1Llitaf.ly. But you think he would have participated?
Secretary G:rrrs. I think he would have participated and found
some other neclianisnl of destroying it.
[Deleted.]
The CII.l1n I. . Mr. Dulles testified that the Air Force gave CIA
weather forecasts that were helpful to the U-2 operation: is that cor-
rect ?
Secretary GATES. That is correct.
[Deleted.]
The Ctf:lia.NfAx. What inference from Soviet military preparedness
can properly be drawn from the U-2 incident?
Secretary G.vms. This, pieced together and repeated and associated
with other sources of intelligence builds up, unfolds a story that defi-
nitely disclosed a military posture.
It builds up a story that gives you a judgment on a capability for
a surprise attack. It gives you a 1udgnnent.on important installations.
It gives you some judgment. on production. It gives you some judg-
ment on logistic backup and actual military sites, so that I would say
it gave you a, very definite look-see at their military posture.
The Ct1ATRM.lN. Is it possible for you to rive us a judgment.? Was
this preparation and strength very impressive? Was it greater than
you had expected ?
Secretary G.vn;s. Coming into two recent jobs I have had, which is
the first time I was ever involved in this, I would say that it impressed
me, Senator.
The CIIAHtii.l1. In other words, the result of your overflights and
the information you got. has given you a better appreciation of their
military stre.ii th and that, appreciation is that. they are, very well
armecd- is that. correct -better than you expected
Secretary GaIn sotnc case, yes. In some case, perhaps less well
than they advertised.
EFFECT OF Si-11"3ff'r F.lIL.URE ON U.S. PROdR,l1fS
The CTI.ITRli:l1. Does this failure of the summit and all that has re-
sulted from it give you any new ideas as to the level of expenditures
of progranTS relating, to defense?
Secretary G.ITEs. Not inumediately, no, sir. But. I believe I have
said when I started to testify in .Tanuaiy, I repeatedly stated we didn't
expect to have any significant or suhstantive concessions. We believed
there was a tactic on the part of the Soviet Union. We didn't know
how long it. would last and we are not basing our military programs on
this premise and I also said that we should keep then under continuous
review and as late as April we went back with a major revision in our
military programs to the appropriations Committees.
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE
I believe now we should continue this careful and continuous process,
and I have no desire right now to make any further recommendations
to the Congress. The Senate Appropriations Committee are about
to mark up the defense bill I believe next week or this week.
[Deleted.]
POSSIBLE INTERPRETATIONS OP THE ALERT
The CHAIRMAN. One inference I wish you would comment on that
might have been drawn from the ordering of the test on May 15 is, I
believe : Would it be fair to draw the inference that you had any
doubt about the readiness of our Armed Forces.
Secretary GATES. No, sir, but it is a very good move and we should
do it more frequently to have a no-notice alert communications and
command readiness test, and we hope to do this, I say we started one
again -last night which has been long planned, it is going to be about a
7- or 8-day exercise. -
The CHAIRMAN. It has been long planned.
Was the one on the 15th long planned?
Secretary GATES. No, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. When did you first think of doing that?
Secretary GATES. There was another one planned for about that
period of time, as a matter of fact, I made the decision to do this
myself. -
The CHAIRMAN. After you arrived in Paris?
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that that might have been construed
as a provocative act under the circumstances that then existed in
Paris?
Secretary GATES. No, sir, it was made after midnight on Sunday
night. It was not intended nor was it worded as a provocative mes-
sage. The first word in it was "Quiet," and the last words in it were
"minimum need to know."
It was not meant as provocative. It was not meant as either an
offensive or defensive alert.
In fact it was not issued as such. If we were going to go on that
kind of an alert we would have had a higher degree of readiness, than
the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued.
The CHAIRMAN. I didn't mean you intended it as such. Don't you
think reasonable people might have regarded it as a- provocative act?
Secretary GATES. I think reasonable people would have regarded
it as a prudent act.
The CHAIRMAN. But not as % provocative act?
-
Secretary GATES. That is right.
The CHAIRMAN. My time is up. Wo have a member here who has
just come in. Would you care to ask any questions, Senator
Humphrey?
Senator IIUMPIIREY. Can I follow up on two or three of yours?
The CHAIRMAN. You have 10 minutes to do as you please.
[Deleted.]
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Senator II a unEy. Do you think it was essential to have over-
flights in order to gain the kind of information that is supposed to
have been gained in recent months?
Secretary GATES. Yes; this was by all means our best information.
Secretary IIuairlIItEY. Well, it might he your best information.
Secretary GATES. Yes; I think it was essential; yes; I do.
[Deleted.]
Senator IIuMriniu:r. Have we ever shot down any Soviet aircraft
that. have ever been over American territory?
Secretary GATES. No, sir.
Senator IIL nriim:r. Have we shot down any Soviet aircraft that
have been over areas where we have some military responsibility?
Secretary GATES. Not. to my knowledge.
Senator 11 ~~1> Lnrv. -Not over Korea. Japan
Secretary GATES. You mean in peacetime?
Senator IIuMrIIRI:r. Well, in the armistice period.
Secretary GATES. No, sir; not to my knowledge.
Senator II atrltnEv. lVe have not?
Secretary GA7-t:s. Not to my knowledge, sir.
Senator IIU.MVInzra. I had been informed once that we had, and
that is why Iliad asked the question.
Secretary GATES. Maybe Ave ought to qualify this. There has been
ave flown aircraft that have been shot
speculation that "volunteers" have-
down. These, volunteers may have been Soviet, but, as far as I know,
any identified as a Soviet aircraft has not. been shot down,
senator IluarritiEr. Has the Soviet Union protested to the United
States because of an attack on our part on Soviet aircraft ?
Secretary GATES. I can't answer that question, Senator, because
my knowledge is that they have not. I don't think they have. No;
I don't think so, sir.
Senator IIU]trHREY. Do you have reason to believe that the so-called
volunteers might. very well have been a little less than volunteers, pos-
sibly engaged actively in Soviet espionage?
Secretary GATES. Well, there has been sort of a technique evolving
over a period of time in various places of the world where volunteers
have appeared and we have always been a Iittle apprehensive about
them.
Senator HUMPhtREr. Just a little?
Secretary GATES. 'No, sir. [Laughter.]
Senator IIUHuron:v. That. is all.
The CIIAm)1Ax. Senator W 'iley?
Senator WILES'. None.
The CIIAUIMA\. Senator l iorse?
Senator ` ORSE. I have a few more air. Secretary, pursuing the
same line of questioninm I was pursuingbefore.
The President, the otter night in his speech to the Nation indicated
very clearly that a nuclear war would produce devastation upon all
participants.
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Going back to my hypothetical, assuming that we should fly a spy
plane out of some foreign base and assuming that the Russian air mar-
shal makes good on his threat and strikes that airbase with Russian
missiles and starts a general war, do you think we could win it?
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.
Senator MoRSE. You think we could destroy Russia and have enough
of the United States left so that we could remain a power?
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir; because in this case he would, by initiat-
ing this attack, give considerable warning to our retaliatory forces
and with that warning, we would move in..
Senator MORSE. Your view then is that the United States could win
? a nuclear war?
Secretary GATES. If it is started under those circumstances.
[Deleted.]
Senator MORSE. Do you think that the Russian military are aware
of the fact that we could win a nuclear war if they started that war
by simply sending a missile to one air base from which a spy plane
might fly?
Secretary GATES. I think they are well aware of it.
Senator MORSE. Do you think then that if he kept his threat of
sending a missile to a foreign air base from which a spy plane might
be flown, he probably, would go much further than that and send mis-
siles elsewhere and if he knows it is going to lead to a general war,
start a complete general war?
Secretary GATES. I think he would have to.
Senator MORSE. In your opinion, could we win that war?
Secretary GATES. Well, we could do what we call in the military,
prevail in general war, but there would be great damage to the United
States.
Senator MoRsE. There would be terrific mutual destruction in a
general war?
Secretary GATES. Yes ; terrific damage.
Senator MoRSE. Therefore
Secretary GATES. But everything depends, Senator, on a lot of fac-
tors. If you vary any part of the equation you vary the answer. In
other words, time of warning, reliability of missiles ability to fire a
salvo of missiles worldwide against deployed and U.. forces at home
and abroad. These factors and the accuracies of these weapons-any
one piece of this equation varies the answer.
INTERPRETATION OF PRESIDENT'S COMMENTS ON SUSPENSION OF U-2
FLIGHTS
Senator MORSE. Therefore, referring most respectfully Senator
Ilickenlooper's observation, do you think that we would he showing a
sign of weakness, that we would be guilty of appeasement, that we
would be surrendering to threats if we removed any doubt in the
world at the present moment by notifying the world that we have no,
intention of usin o? military aircraft espionage tactics henceforth either
by CIA, by NA~A, by the Defense Establishment or by any other
agency of the American Government?. .
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I EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SU 1IT CONFERENCE
Secretary G.LTES. Well, I wouldn't know quite. how to answer your
question, Senator, because maybe some of us that live so close to these
things have. a ditTerent nmlerstanding than tile public. has. It is so
clear in my mind that the President has made a commitment not to
ily these airplanes during his administration that I believe that the
question becomes by(,othet ical, and I believe if it is clear to other
people as it is to Inc ttiai this is so, then it would be. I believe, stepping
up to a threat. But if it is not clear, and I am incorrect in this, then
I think we ought to take. a. look at it..
Senator Moi sr:. I ain so anxious to see to it that we make it crystal
,clear because I ant very much concerned about world reaction to our
present position. I think we are living in the nionieiit now where we
,can stop an adverse world reaction, and 1 (-]link we are living in a
moment where there is great danger that a substantial segment of
world opinion is going to go against its, tuiless. we are willing to crake
crystal clear that we are not going to, through any agency of our
Government, resort. to aircraft espionage, because we are dewing here
when we are dealing with espionage, as you so very well, I think.
described it yourself, with a form of activity that is a pretty ugly
business.
Secretary G.1Tns. Ye,-, sir.
Senator AIeorts}:. And we all know that it isn't based on principles
of truth. In espionage, you do what is necessary to protect your
country, including deception and engaging in iin.moral arts. [De-
leted.]
,\-ow, T don't think we humble ourselves. To the contrary, I think
we put their on the defensive. in world opinion if we say to (lie world:
Listen, Ave want the Russians to understand That they are going to have to
assume full responsibility for any starting of a war. We have said and we re-
peat to the world that we have no intention of using aircraft in espionage work
over foreign territory.
You think it is lierfe,-Hy clear. I have just colic from across the
country and I can give you assurance that it isn't, in tiny judgment
clear in American public opinion today, and you have really got a
segment. of public opinion in this country that wants that assurance
from the. President, because they take note of (lie, fact that in his
speech the other night he wasn't even as definite as he was at Paris
in regard to this matter.
Secretary G.tTr?.s. Senator, under the American tradition. I would
say that the President says lie isn't. going to overfly Russia during
his administration, any circumvention of that statement would not be
in character with either the President or our country. To me, it is
completely clear, but I respect your judgment.
Senator hfoltsr. I may be completely wrong. My only point is that
we can afford, it seems to me., as a Nation that. does seek peace, to re-
assure the world as many times as that when assurance might help the
cause of peace, and in doing so I don't think we humble ourselves.
To the contrary, I think we put Russia on the defensive. It will help
us in my judgment to win the so-called battle of propaganda. for
peace and strengthen its in getting these issues into the nited Nations.
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Of course I would say this. I think the President is to be commended
for making clear in Paris that he is suspending U-2 flights-that is
What lie said; U-2 flights.
I think he is to be commended for that, and I hope that, those who
seek to replace him will give the world assurance immediately that
when any one of them is elected President that will be their policy,
too, because if all this is a moratorium for a few months, it is not
going to strengthen America's position in world opinion. They want
to know whether or not this is going to be the policy of the United
States, because, in my judgment, if you continue espionage work by
way of aircraft, you are going to lose the world opinion in southeast
Asia, Latin America, and Africa, the opinion of which America has
got to win in the decades ahead to survive, because if that part of
the world goes against us, it is only a matter of a few decades before
we will cease, in my judgment, being a Nation.
You have got to win to the cause of freedom those hundreds of
millions of people, and you are not going to do it in my judgment if
you let Khrushchev get by with a propaganda drive now that we are
the ones that are committing a form of aggression by carrying out an
espionage program. We don't like to face up to it but in my judgment
that is going to be the verdict of those people.
The CTIAIRMAN. The Senator's time is up.
Senator Gore?
SECRETARY GATES' PARTICIPATION IN ISSUANCE OP STATEMENTS
Senator GORE. Mr. Secretary, I understood you to say that the
decision on the 9th that the President should assume full responsibility
was a unanimous decision. Did I correctly understand you?
-
Secretary GATES. The statement that was issued was a unanimous
paper. I think I am answering you yes.
Senator GoRE. I wanted to give you an opportunity to affirm that,
and you so do now.
You did not participate, I believe you told me, or you told the com-
mittee, in any conference between the 5th and the 9th.
Secretary GATES. That is correct.
Senator GORE. So you did not participate in a conference or in a
communication between the Department of State, the President at
Gettysburg, or otherwise, with anyone regarding the issuance of the
statement which was issued on the 7th by Mr. Herter?
Secretary GATES. No, I did not.
Senator GORE. Which partially acknowledged the mission of the
plane.
Secretary GATES. That is correct. I had no participation in that
in any way.
Senator Goin,.. I believe that concludes my questions, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lausche?
KHRL`SIICTIEV'S ATTITUDE FOLLOWING VISIT TO TIIE UNITED STATES
Senator LAUsonE. I want to explore a bit the course of conduct
taken by Khrushchev after his visit to the United States, concerning
his attitude especially on West Berlin and West Germany. Isn't it
a fact that following his visit to the United States, there was shown
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160 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SU !MJT CONFERENCE
by him a. conciliatory attitude fora period of about a month or two?
Are you able to answer that?
Secretary G:vrr.s. My impression is about the same as yours, Sen-
ator, that there was sort of a tone of conciliation in the air.
Senator LAUSCIIF. We have had before this committee the Ant-
arctic Treaty that has been recommended.
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.
Senator L:IrsCIiF. That was signed by the Soviet and by the United
States.
Secretar+y GATES. Yes, sir.
Senator L_IusCIiF. Agin that, I think, was last December 1. And
there was progress made fora period on the matter of banning nuclear
tests.
Secretary Gxrrs. Yes; t here was progress made.
Senator LAtSCIIE. In fact, their was more progress made during
that period than there had been at any other time on that subject.
Secretary G.vrn . T think that would be fair to say, that it looked
more hopeful.
Senator L.AUSCIIE. Oin November 1.1 in a.speechKhrushchev brutally
attacked Adenauer and the. German Republic.
Secretary G 1TFSS. I a?enaemiaer the speech.
Senator LArsciIE. You remember that speech?
Secretary GATES. Yes, sir.
Senator LAUSCnE. And there was some speculation in the minds of
the people in our Government as to what his purpose was in making
that attack when ostensibly there was to be a conference. to reach sonic
agreement on West Germany and Berlin.
Now then, on December 1, he began repeating his threats that he
would sign a. separate peace treaty with East Germany. Is it not a
fact that his attack upon Adenauer and upon the German Republic
and his purpose to sign a separate peace treaty, was confirmation of
the immovable position he took before he met at Camp David about
West Berlin and East Germany?
Secretary G.vTrs. Yes: I think it, was. T think his posit ion was well
advertised, and we felt- iii the Department of Defense that we were
living under a threat of a separate peace treaty at tlutt time.
Senator L.~rSCrrF. Then lie has the Baku speech of April ?5 in which
he gave a harsher version of what he, had been saying for months
about East Berlin, West Berlin, and the German Republic. That is
in April, pretty close to May 1B, and then we have those circumstances
in which you point- out tliat lie. had a translated paper originally
written in Russian into French translation so that he gave it to--
Secretary G.iTEs. De Gaulle.
Senator i~ sciiF. De Gaulle. How did he present his paper to
Macmillan?
Secretary G-vrvs. My understanding, Senator, was that lie didn't.
leave a paper with Macmillan. He talked from the same paper and
it was translated through an interpreter to Macmillan verbally. This
is my understanding.
Senator T,AURCHE Isn't it also n, fact that during all of this time and
especially in the several months preceding the conference, the sup-
posed conference, the four powers stated that. there would he no yield-
in r on West Berlin, and our rim*lits in West Berlin ?
.Secretary GATES. That is right.
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KIIRUSIICIIEV'S SUMMIT CONFERENCE AIMS
Senator LAUSCIIE. In your opinion, What was the primary thing that
he was aiming for in the conference? I am speaking of Khrushchev.
Secretary IxATES. You mean when he agreed to go to a summit
conference?
Senator LAUSCIJE.And down to the end.
Secretary GATES. I testified that I think he thought he would have
his way and make some peace treaty in Berlin with some kind of give
on the part of our allies and our allies refused to give.
REASONS FOR REVOKING INVITATION TO rRESIDENT EISENIIOWER
Senator LAUSCHE. All right. Now then, have you given any
thought to why he revoked the invitation to the President to come to
the Soviet land?
Secretary GATES. Well, again we speculate but in my opinion the
last thing he wanted was for the President to travel around his coun-
try and be acclaimed and received by the population of Russia.
Senator LAUscIiE. Do you think that he had flashes in his mind
about the acclaim that Nixon got in Poland, and in other places?
Secretary GATES. Ile probably did.
Senator LAUSCIIE. And do you think that he kind of thought that
there would be demonstrations for the President of the United States
by the Russian people unparalleled anywhere?
Secretary GATES. I believe there would have been.
Senator LAUSCIIE. That is my honest conviction, that he did not dare
have the President meet the Ukrainian people and the normal Russian
people, excluding the Communists, in that trip to the Soviet and that
is why the invitation was revoked.
Senator WILEY. Will the Senator yield?
Senator LAUSCIIE. I yield.
POSSIBLE INFLUENCE OF THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS ON KIIRUSIICIIEV'S
THINKING
Senator WILEY. I think there are some other facts there that fit
into the picture that you have very dramatically given us.
Do you remember after he came to America he went back and he
canvassed individually the various heads of the various states, and
then he made a trip out east and he met Mao Tse-tung?
. It was after that that he made that Baku speech. He made several
other speeches, and if you remember, the papers were pretty well filled
with the thoughts that the Chinese Communists were telling him, and
that at the time that he did go to Paris, that conditions were such that
the evidence indicated the Chinese were in Russia. Now all this
bolsters the conclusion that the Secretary has made, that it wasn't the
U-2 incident. That was just something that he got hold of as an
ostensible reason.
The other was that he couldn't get his way and that, I understand, is
your position.
Senator LAUSCIIE. I have nothing more to ask you. Thank you
very much, Mr. Gates.
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT ON`FE EN C,
SSenator Gone,. If the Senator would yield, I would like to observe
that I was in the Far East at the time President Eisenhower made his
visit to India and other countries, and there was a tremendous favor-
able reception. It served the cause of our country magnificently well.
I think it, is a great loss to us that the President has been denied
the opportunity to visit in the Soviet Union. It would have, in my
view, been a. great contribution. Ile is unquestionably a great exem
plary influence for America, and I agree with you, Senator Lausche
and Senator Wiley, that, the denial of the opportunity of this visit is
a great loss to us.
I do not. know whether _Mr. Mirushchev wanted it or did not want
it. Everyone can draw his own conclusions there.
I wish now that the exchange visit had been arranmed before the
summit conference. Perhaps we would have had a different result.
Senator LAF-SCIIE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask a question.
The CHAIRMAN. The witness would like to make a comment.
PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S DIGNITY AND CIIARACTy.r, AT PARIS MEETING
Secretary GATES. I want to make a comment. I sort of feel like mak-
ing, Mr. Chairman. T think you know about this because you were
there. I think everyone should be terribly proud of the dignity and
character of the President in this Paris meeting.
I happened to be sitting next to him and it was a most remarkable
performance of strength of character and dignity of any man I have
ever seen.
Senator GoRE. You might. be interested to know that I immediately
took the floor and expressed such views, and I do not believe you will
find any member of this committee has criticized the President's con-
duct while in Paris.
Secretary GATES. I am sure of that. The purpose of my remarks
was not intended to do anything but just. make a statement. I know
he has had remarkable support of not only the Congress and this coun-
try, but of all of our allies too, the NATO meeting that followed the
Paris meeting was a remarkable meeting.
The CHAIRMAN. Is that all, gentlemen?
Senator Wii,Er. I want. to express what you usually do, the appre-
ciation of the committee for the fine work- of the Secretary here this
morning.
Senator LArscIIE. I did want to go into this speech of Senator Dodd
where he points out how Communists took charge in the organizing
of the meeting in New York of the Committee for a Sane Nuclear
Policy. But- 7 am not going to go into it.
The CIIAIRZTA?. Mr. Secretary, I -,t ant to thank you for your very
frank and candid responses and for the patience that you have shown
in bearing with the, committee in asking these questions. I think you
have made a very useful record for the benefit of the committee, and
I think we understand what has gone on much better than we did be-
fore you came, tip here., and I hope, that the record, as censored by the
proper authorities, will not in any way embarrass you.
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EVENTS INCI d'' Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary GATES. I hope not, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman, before concluding the hearing I
would wish to express to you my personal appreciation for the dig-
nity, intelligence, and discretion and the courage you have displayed
and statesmanship during the course of this hearing.
The CIIAIRMAN. Thank you very much.
CHALMERS ROBERTS' CHRONOLOGY OP EVENTS
Senator GORE. Now I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the
record a chronology of events which I found exceedingly well done by
Mr. Chalmers Roberts.
The CHAIRMAN. Without objection it is so ordered.
(The chronology referred to follows:)
[From the Washington Post, May 27, 1960]
CIIBONOLOGY or TI-2 INCIDENT TRACED IN TANGLED WEB OF SUMMIT DISPUTE
WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE?
(By Chalmers M. Roberts)
Who was responsible for the incredible assortment of conflicting statements
and contradictory assertions when the Eisenhower administration was con-
fronted with the U-2 spy plane crisis?
This is the most immediate question in the tangled web of the U-2 affair
and the subsequent collapse of the Summit Conference in Paris. What follows
is a detailed examination of the facts about the Administration's handling of
the U-2 case.
It should be noted beforehand, however, that there are other important parts
to the whole story : The apparent public hardening of American policy toward
the Soviet Union prior to the TJ-2 affair; Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev's
reaction to that hardening; Khrushchev's reactions to the American accounts of
th U-2 case ; and the internal Soviet pressures an Khrushchev, before and
after the spy plane was downed, because of his year-old policy of trying to do
business with President Eisenhower.
Whether or not Khrushchev would have scuttled the Summit, had there been
no U-2 incident, is not now clear; there are divided opinions in the Adminis-
tration on that. A good many diplomats do tend to agree with what President
Eisenhower said to the congressional leaders yesterday-that Khrushchev
may have scuttled the conference because he was under "pressure by the
Stalinists," those in Moscow suspicious of any dealing with the West, "and the
Chinese" Communists who have openly disagreed with Khrushchev's policies.
But that question is only indirectly related to the handling of the U-2 affair
by the Eisenhower Administration.
The chief figures in the U-2 drama in Washington were president Eisenhower,
? Secretary of State Christian A. Herter, Under Secretary C. Douglas Dillon, Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency Chief Allen W. Dulles and White House Press Secretary
James C. Hagerty.
It is evident from the record that much of the confusion sprang from the
fact that no one acted in supreme authority in directing the Administration's
actions.
Here is the chronological record as far as it is known today :
May J.-The U-2 flight of pilot Francis G. Powers took place on this date
because of a clear weather forecast. That forecast also indicated that such
good weather probably would not be repeated for some weeks; that is, until
after the Summit Conference, then 2 weeks off. CIA officials say the equip-
ment carried by Powers, including the tiny poison needle, is standard equipment
carried by all Strategic Air Command crews. It is designed to help a crewman
escape if downed in enemy territory. Powers never was ordered to use the
needle to avoid capture ; it was for use to avoid torture, if captured, according
to CIA officials. The pistol was not for murdering Russians but for shooting
small game, it is contended.
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Second flight
The day of Powers' flight, there was a second U-2 flight from Turkey. This
was a meteorological flight outside the Soviet Union, the kind of flight the Na-
tional Aeronautics and Space Administration unwittingly thought all U-2's were
making. NASA was, of course, the "cover" for the clandestine flights over the
Soviet Union.
These penetrations of Soviet air space had been going on for four years with
results highly gratifying to American intelligence officials. There had been a
great many of these flights and the Powers mission was not the first designed to
cross the Soviet Union. Others had succeeded when he failed.
So detailed were the protographs brought buck by the U- 2s that at one time
the State Department's Policy Planning Stair considered a proposal to show them
to Khrushchev. The idea was to use them in an effort to break down his resist-
ance to inspection and control for various disarmament schemes.
The proposal was rejected, however, partially on the grounds that Khrushchev
already knew of the flights and that such a move might lead him to make such a
public row that they would have to be discontinued.
Cutoff planned
CIA officials contend that there was to he a cutoff of U-2 flights before the
Summit, that the question was how much time constituted a margin of safety.
Nevertheless, the Powers mission was permitted to take place two weeks before
the Summit. In his speech on Wednesday the President implied he fully ap-
proved of that.
Mr. Eisenhower said that, as to complaints over the timing of the flights so
close to the Summit, "there is notime when vigilance can be relaxed." By im-
plication, he meant there was no reason to cancel the flight because of the Im-
pending conference with the Russians.
However, this has not always been the President's policy. In September, 1916.
In the midst of the Suez crisps negotiations with the Russians as well as the
Egyptians--the President did order a halt to the U-2 flights. Then he apparently
wanted to avoid an incident which would make negotiation more difficult.
There is no evidence, however, that the President was aware beforehand of
this particular flight or that either the State Department or the CIA thought his
specillc approval necessary. Ile had delegated authority for the flights, once hav-
ing approved the entire U- 2 scheme following Soviet rejection of his "open skies"
plan at the 1955 Geneva Summit conference.
May 1--y: During this period the CIA and the State Department knew that
Powers was missing; they hoped he had crashed and that pilot and plane had
left no tell-tale evidence. The Initial confusion over the missing plane, as to
whether it was rowers or the legitimate meteorological flight in Turkey the same
day, was soon cleared up. There is no evidew'e that the Administration laid
out any plan of how to handle the possible disclosures later made by Khrushchev.
May have been misled
The Administration may have been misled into thinking Khrushchev would
remain silent because of Soviet action over the t' lx-t?tctii visit to the United States
of the boss of the Soviet. Air Force, Air Marshal K. A. Vershinin.
On May 2 t1w Soviets asked for a 45-hour LH,stpooensent. of the announcement
' the visit. But on May 4 they agreed to a joint United States-Soviet anuounce-
ment and it was made that tiny. The visit was canceled on May 13 after Khru-
sla'hev's l'-2 disclosure.
On May 3 it was announced from Istanbul, Turku that a single-engine Air
Force plane was missing near Lake Van, not far frosn [ht- Soviet border. It was
described as a high altitude research plane belonging to NASA.
The report said the plane was one of two which had taken off from the United
States base at Incrilik near Adana. Turkey, on a weather reconnaissance mission.
The other plane returned safely but the pilot of the missing craft was said to
have reported his oxygen equipment was out of order.
Standard story
This was the standard sort of "cover" story for the missing U-2, issued in the
hopes that it would suffice. It. was not known here whether rowers' U-2 went
down or why. To this date, in fact, there is only Khrushchev's word that it was
downed near Sverdlovsk, deep Inside the Soviet Union.
May S.-Khrushchev announced to the Supreme Soviet in Moscow the bare de-
tails of the U-2 flight, deliberately (he said later) withholding information
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
which would have let Washington know that Powers was alive and that much
of his equipment had been captured intact. Ile set a trap into which the Eisen-
hower Administration fell.
In his Wednesday speech, Mr. Eisenhower contended that the "covering state-
ment," as he called it, was imperative "to protect the pilot, his mission, and our
intelligence processes at a time when the true facts were still undetermined."
On May 5 Secretary Herter was in Athens, en route home from a NATO for-
eign ministers conference in Turkey. In charge of the State Department was
Under Secretary Dillon.
Dillon's responsibility
Under the President's delegation of authority, it was Dillon's responsibility
for what next occurred until Herter's return late on May 6. It was on May 5
and 6 that the administration allowed itself to be entangled in a series of lies
about the U-2.
When newsmen went to Press Secretary Hagerty for comment on Khrushchev's
speech, Hagerty was careful to say only that the President did not know of the
news story about the speech.
News of the speech arrived here just after the President had left by helicopter
for a National Security Council meeting at a secret hideout, part of a civil de-
fense exercise. There is no evidence on whether the President at that meeting
discussed what to do about the Khrushchev disclosure. The subsequent record
indicates that he left it to Dillon and the State Department.
State Department spokesman Lincoln White, who received his instructions
personally from Dillon, said that "it may be" that the plane Khrushchev referred
to was the missing so-called NASA aircraft. It was also announced that the
President had ordered an immediate inquiry into Khrushchev's accusation.
Trouble compounded
This semi-lie was aggravated by NASA's press chief, Walter T. Bonney. Un-
aware that NASA was being used as a "cover" for the spy flights, Bonney said
at a press conference that the plane was on a wholly peaceful mission. He gave
details of the plane's Adana take-off, its route within Turkey and the pilot's
alleged report of his oxygen trouble. The Administration's story thus was that
a peaceful flight outside Soviet borders might have by accident transgressed the
Soviet-Turkish border.
There is no evidence that the President or Dillon, or anyone else in authority
in the Administration, took charge of the whole affair and told NASA to say
nothing. There have been subsequent hints from the White House, however,
that some such order went out to NASA but was overlooked or disregarded. The
record here is not clear.
May 6.-In Moscow it was claimed the U-2 was shot down by a rocket on
Khrushchev's personal order, but other details still were withheld. However,
Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko termed the American explanation
"nonsense."
"Full facts" asked
The State Department said it was asking the "full facts" in Moscow. White,
still acting tinder Dillon's orders, declared that "there was absolutely no-n-o-
deliberate attempt to violate the Soviet airspace." The lie thus was: compounded.
Around dinner time Herter arrived home from Greece to take charge of the
State Department.
The strongest evidence that the handling of the U-2 affair was left by the
President to the State Department-first to Dillon, then to Herter-comes from
Vice President Richard M. Nixon. On a May 15 television show Nixon gave this
explanation, putting part of the blame for the fumbling on the insistent demand
of newsmen for the facts :
"Now, let's look at the problem with which our people in the State Department
were confronted when this information developed. They (lid not know at the
outset what the Soviet Union knew. They did not know that the pilot had been
recovered and that they had obtained information from him or otherwise which
made it imperative we acknowledge that these flights had taken place,
Alternative question
"Now, some would say then, `well, why then didn't we keep our mouths shut
and say nothing and wait until we found out what they knew?'
"And here again we have the problem of the open society. We have newsmen
in Washington. The newsmen descended upon the State Department and other
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166 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CON
'officials In great numbers. They bad it right to. And they asked for the in-
formation. What about this? And, so under the ciro?tunztances, It was felt that
the best, thing to do was to engage in pfTtet?t In what usually is engaged in where
so-exiled espionage activities are undertaken, evasive actions-evasive actions,
so as to protect the pilot in the event that he had been captured and also evasive
actions so as to give the Soviet Union, Mr. Khrushchev, for example, an oppor-
tunity to accept the consequences of this flight without admitting its he has had
to admit that It had been conducted for espionage purposes."
Later in the same iirogrant Nixon added that "they hall to nuke a snap de-
ci,;inn at (he moment and It, proved that---it fumed out that that decision was
wrong and in these kinds of activities, we, of course, want to try to avoid mis-
takes if we can."
Refurt'accs /nis,fiif/
Nowhere in tbelhree-and-at hatdf-hour television program did Nixon refer to any
presidential direction in the I'-2 crisis, other than his approval of the flights
sonic years earlier. Nor was their any reft?rence to his own part in tite affair.
Nixon, of course, sits In the National Security Council.
Nixon did say that lie was "privy.. to the d'-2 reconnaissance policy "and I do
endorse it." He also said that "I knew about ibis flight * * ..?
On Friday afteritxtlt,'lay fl, the Pri?sidcut went to his Gettysburg, I'll., farm
for a weekend of rest and golf. He did not. return to Wasitingitin until Sunday,
31ay S but he was in telephone routninndet!lina with Herter during the weekend.
Hagerty, who accompanied the President 1', Gettysburg, also talkeol by phone to
Herter.
.died 7.--Khrushchev, in a second 3Ioseow slx?c'ch on the U 2, disclosed the
pilot. was alive and talking and that much of his equipment had been captured
intaet. Khrushchev showed the Supreme Soviet photos taken from the I' of
Soviet military Installations ant( he detailed the plane's equiputent.
Genuine in-formation
American officials, who received the speech in the morning, Washington time,
knew Khr,ashehev was using; inroruoation that was genuine and that some of it
could have come only front rowers himself.
Khrushchev quoted Hagerty as saying That "the President. in his opinion,
knew nothing about the ine?hlent involving the American plane. I fully admit
(earn Khrushche?v) that thi? President did not know that it plane was sent be-
yond the Soviet frontier and did not return."
The Khrusbr'hev six'ech resulted in a series of all-day conferences, in which the
chief figures were Herter, Iiilimi. Allen Bolles and it number of lesser State
Departiiuyit officials, including Ilcrter's adviser on Soviet affairs, Charles E.
Bohlen.
nut of this came a unanimous decision to tell the truth -but not all the truth.
The dinner-hour State Department statentettt said that the flight referred to by
Khrushchev "was probably undertaken by an unarmed civilian 1'-?1 plane ? * "?
Flight justified
The flight was justified nn the grounds of the iiced "to obtain information now
concealed behind the Iron Curtain" to lessen the dangers of a surprise attack
on the' free world in general and the United States In particular.
On the critical issue of who was responsible for the flight, however, the state-
merit lied. It said that "as it result of the inquiry ordered by the President it
has lien established that insofar as the authorities in Washington are con-
cerned there was no authorization for any such slight as described by Mr.
Mr. Khrushchev."
lit iniking this stateutent. chiefly the decision of Secretary Herter. those in-
volved were guided by a number of considerations. They felt that Khrushchev
hail the evidence and therefore an admission was essential despite the earlier
lies. hut they were trapped In a dilemma on the issue of responsibility. They
rlea'tded It was best to avoid admitting any responsibility by President Eisen-
hower even at the cost of accepting the resultant impression that Washington's
control was so lax that American pilots around the world could go ofd'. on their
own on a mission that might provoke a war.
Dulles trilling
During the State Department deliberations Allen Dulles made it clear that he,
as head of CIA, was prepared to take full responsibility for the flight, that if the
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CON:N'ELtPENCE 101
Administration wanted to pin the blame on him to avoid blaming the President,
he would agree. But this idea was not accepted as being practical in view of
Khrushchev's disclosures.
Herter read the draft statement on the phone to the President in Gettysburg.
He approved it without changing a word.
In part, at least, Herter's decision to tell the lie that no one in Washington
authorized the flight also was based in the slim hope that somehow Khrushchev
would accept it. The Secretary and his aides had noted Khrushchev's acceptance
of what he had taken as Hagerty's disclaimer of any Eisenhower responsibility.
May 8-While the world assessed the seemingly incredible American admission
that the U-2 had indeed been on an espionage flight, President Eisenhower re-
turned to Washington and met with Herter at the White House.
Notes to Britain, France
The same day Khrushchev sent notes to Britain and France about the forth-
coming summit conference. In them he complained about the U-2 but gave no
indication it would be used to wreck the conference as was to be the case.
By now Hagerty was alarmed at the implications of the admission statement,
implications that the President did not know what was going on. He was
insistent to Herter that this should somehow be eliminated. It is not clear
whether the President said the same thing to Herter directly but if he did there
would seem to have been no, reason for Hagerty to do so.
May 9-After another State Department conference, Herter put out a state-
ment in his name saying that "penetration" by the U-2s of the Soviet Union had
been going on for four years, that this had been done by presidential orders
"since the beginning of his Administration" in order to. gather intelligence. But
Herter added that "specific missions of these unarmed civilian aircraft have not
been subject to presidential authorization." This, at last, appeared to be the
truth.
Unaware of implication
This was the statement which left the implication that such U-2 flights would
be continued over the Soviet Union. But there is reason to believe that none of
those involved at State Department was conscious of any such implication when
they drafted the statement. They took the view, shared by the CIA, that the
U-2 setup now was "a blown agent" to be discarded, that other intelligence
gathering methods would continue, however.
Nonetheless the implication was there and neither State nor the White House
did anything to correct it until the President himself told Khrushchev in Paris
a full week later that "these flights were suspended after the recent incident
and are not to be resumed."
The President said Wednesday he wanted no public announcement until he
met Khrushchev in Paris. American officials also claimed the flight suspension
was ordered the previous Thursday, May 12, which is at cross-purposes with the
claim that no implication of further flights was contained in Herter's, May 9
statement.
Nixon unaware
Indeed, Nixon in his May 15 television appearance seemed unaware that the
ffights.had been cancelled. He then said :
"The first responsibility of the President of the United States * * * is, to
protect the security of this country and of free peoples everywhere from the
devastation that would result. from a surprise attack. Now, that is why these
flights were made in the first place. That is why an indication has been made
that such activities may have to continue in the future * * *"
Herter and Dulles appeared on May 9 before a specially arranged closed-door
Congressional leadership meeting. To at least some of those present Herter
left the clear implication that the flights would continue.
May 10.-The Soviet news agency, Tass, described Ierter's statement as "a
frank attempt to legalize and justify violation of the state frontiers of other
nations for espionage purposes." A Soviet note to. the. United States avoided
blaming President Eisenhower personally but, in referring to the May 7 state-
ment by State, said it did "not correspond to reality." It charged that the U-2
flights "are carried on with the sanction of the Government of the United States
of America."
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Welcome doubted
May 11.-At an exhibition in Moscow of the U-2 wreckage and equipment,
Khrushchev said Herter's May 9 statement made hint doubt "Our earlier conclu-
sion" that the President himself did not know of the flights. He said he doubted
the President would be welcome in Russia during his scheduled dune visit there.
When asked whether the U-2 incident would conic up at the Summit Confer-
ence, Khrushchev replied: "It Is already the subject of worldwide discussion.
Therefore I believe there is no need to put it on the discussion schedule at the
Summit Conference."
The same day at his press conference here President Eisenhower took full
responsibility for the U-2 flights, said nothing to counter the implication that
they would continue, remarked that "no one wants another Pearl Harbor."
May 12-1.4.-During this period Khrushchev went to Paris a day early, arriv-
Ing on Saturday, May 14. Herter arrived on May 13 but there was no United
States-Soviet contact. On the 13th the Soviet Union sent protest notes to Nor-
way, Pakistan and Turkey warning against further use of their territory for
such missions as those of the U-2 which Khrushchev had claimed took off from
Pakistan with the expectation of landing in Norway.
On the 12th the United States sent a note to MMoseow which said the United
States had "fully stated its position" about the U-2 incident in the May 9 Herter
statement.
By now President Eisenhower's responsibility for the U-2 flights, if not for the
specific Powers mission, had been firmly established on the public record.
May 15.-The President arrived in Paris just before Khrushchev's call on
French President de Gaulle. The President considered two possible moves in
this final day before the Summit Conference was to open : To ask fora bilateral
meeting with Khrushchev and to announce publicly that no more flights would
be made.
But the President decided against either step. He did so chiefly on the basis
of de Gaulle's report of the hard stand taken by Khrushchev in their talk that
morning. Ills aides told him they deduced from Klsrnshchev's words with de
Gaulle that the Soviet leader had come to Paris bound by a prior Moscow deci-
sion by the ruling Presidimn, that he therefore could not be swayed by either
suggested Eisenhower move.
Allen statement
On this same day In Washington George V. Allen, chief of the U. S. Informa-
tion Agency, said on a television show that Herter "has not said that we are
going to continue to fly" IT-2 missions, that "he hasn't said one way or another."
This statement surprised State I)epartment officials who now say Allen was talk-
ing entirely on his own, that. he had consulted nobody In advance.
May 1G.-At the only Paris confrontation between President Eisenhower and
Khrushchev, the Soviet leader said the United States had "torpedoed" the con-
ference. He demanded that the President apologize for the flights, call off
further flights and punish those responsible for Powers' mission. These were
the same demands of which lie had informed de Gaulle the day before. He
charged the President with making "treachery" the basis of his policy toward
the Soviet Union.
To this the President responded by terming Khru?hchev's demands an "ulti-
matum" which "would never be acceptable to the United States."' He also told
Khrushchev that 11-2 flights had been suspended and would not be resumed.
The two men parted In anger. The Summit had collapsed before It had begun.
SI'EECII OF SENATOR DODD
Senator LAIISCIIE. I would like to put into the record a coy of
Senator Dodd's speech describing how this meeting in New York, on
the phase sponsored by the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy but
organized by Communists, was conducted.
The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, so ordered.
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(The speech referred to follows:)
[Prom the Congressional Record, May 25, 1960, pp. 10234-10237]
TILE COMMUNIST INFILTRATION IN THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN MOVEMENT
Mr. DODD. Mr. President, in his statement of January 22, J. Edgar Hoover
warned that Nikita Khrushchev's visit to this country had resulted in the
reinvigoration of the American Communist movement and that the FBI was
receiving increasing evidence of stepped-up Communist activities at many points.
Among other things, Mr. Hoover warned that non-Communist organizations
dedicated to causes that command popular support could expect Communist
efforts to infiltrate their ranks.
Evidence that has come into the hands of the Subcommittee on Internal
Security indicates that the Communist Party has made the nuclear test ban
movement the chief target of its infiltration operations. I think it important
that this evidence be placed before Congress and before the public so that we
may have a better understanding of the methods by which the Communists
operate and of the goals they seek to achieve. I should like to detail to you
some of the evidence of this infiltration,. and to suggest the outline of a self-
defense program for all organizations whose purposes make them particularly
vulnerable to Communist infiltration.
I do not accept the thesis that if one happens to hold a position that enjoys
the support of the Communist Party on any issue, one is, ipso facto, either a
pro-Communist or a fellow traveler. The Communists are opposed to the poll
tax : does that make all people who oppose the poll tax Communists? The
Communists support the Forand bill. Does that make the many millions of
Americans who have endorsed the bill Communist sympathizers? Obviously not.
But on a foreign policy issue of overriding importance like the test ban, if a
legitimate organization adheres to a policy which coincides with Communist
policy, then it must be prepared to expect a concerted effort at infiltration by the
Communist termites. The more urgent the issue, the more respectable the
organization, the more illustrious the names on its letterhead, the greater the
temptation from the Communist standpoint.
The Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy is headed by a group of nationally
prominent citizens about whose integrity and good faith there is no question.
Among them are people like Norman Cousins, of the Saturday Review, Mr.
Clarence Pickett of the American Friends Service Committee, Mr. Norman
Thomas, and so forth. They advocate a point of view which some of us consider
unrealistic or utopian, but it is, nevertheless, a significant point of view on an
issue of life and death importance. For the personal motivations of most of
those associated with the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy I have the most
sincere respect. The point of view they represent deserves a hearing-indeed,
it must be heard.
Last Thursday evening, May 19, the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy held
a rally at Madison Square Garden in New York City. Many eminent persons
attended this rally. The speakers included Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, Mr. Alfred
Landon, Mr. Walter Reuther, Gov. G. Mennen Williams, of Michigan, and Dr.
Harold Taylor, former President of Sarah Lawrence College. At this meeting,
the speakers urged that another summit meeting be convened for the purpose
of attempting to arrive at an agreement banning nuclear tests.
Because I esteem the sincerity of the original founders of the Committee for
a Sane Nuclear Policy and the sincerity of the speakers I have named, it was
for me an unpleasant duty to have to notify them that the unpublicized chief
organizer of the Madison Square Garden rally, Henry Ahroms, was a veteran
member of the Communist Party ; that there was also evidence of serious
Communist infiltration at chapter level throughout the Committee for a Sane
Nuclear Policy ; that the Communist Party and its front organizations had done
their utmost to promote the meeting ; that the Communists provided much of
the organizing machinery for the meeting because they planned to use it as
a pressure instrument in support of Soviet nuclear diplomacy.
This information was confirmed by the Subcommittee on Internal Security
only several days before the Madison Square Garden meeting was scheduled to
take place. Because I wished to be fair to all the decent and prominent people
who were associated with the meeting as sponsors or as speakers, I had some
doubt about the advisability of rushing into print with my information only
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48 hours in advance of the rally. Instead, I decided to comunicate the informa-
tion, or at least certain essential portions of it, to Mr. Norman Cousins, the
chairman of the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy. Mr. Cousins came to
Washington to see me and we had a long and frank discussion about the problem.
The directors of the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy, it turned out, had
some inkling of the existence of a Communist infiltration and were extremely
unhappy about it. When the Communist affiliation;; of the chief organizer of
the Madison Square Garden meeting were brought to Mr. Cousins' attention,
lie immediately suspended the organizer in question. This was 2 days before
the meeting. it is my understaudiiaa that the national committee of the organ-
ization intends to take some further measures against Communist infiltrators.
If I have any criticism to make. it is that the directors of the organization
have moved so slowly to confront the problem and that the measures they
have taken have been inadequate. I was, for example, surprised to discover
that one of the officers of the committee, Mr. Norman Thomas, had, as early as
last January, expressed serious suspicion about tide individual who later became
organizer of the Madison Square Garden meeting-but that no action had been
taken on Mr. Thomas' warning.
To me it is appalling that the Communists should be able to infiltrate and
manipulate a movement. founded on sincere humanitarian and pacifist niotiva-
tions, and headed by so many reputable citizens. Perhaps this is a situation in
whieli remedial legislation is indicated, a situation in which private citizens
must have the assistance of Government to cope effectively with a movement that
operates by stealth and by secrecy.
In accordance with the subconunittee's mandate from the Senate, it was
clear that our duty required that we do everything in our power to get at the
facts. In presenting the information Ave have gleaned to the Senate. it is my
hope that I will lie aisle to do so In a manner chit will avoid injury to the
innocent and will point the way to a constructive course of action by Govern-
ment and private organlzations.
The test ban has for several years now been the chief objective of the Com-
munist propaganda apparatus. Of this there is ample documentary evidence.
In his speech before the mmlaress of the Soviet Communist Party on January
27, Nikita Khrushchev, in his most militant rhetoric, called for a permanent
ban on nuclear tests.
The main political resolution adopted by the 17th congress of the Communist
Party of the U.S.A.. in February 1tlt'?t) said :
"The demand that the administration end nuclear testing and ban the II-bomb
has found a widening response in community meetings, peace talks, petitions,
and sermons from the pulpit."
On February 1c, 1960, seven Communists foreign language newspapers took
a full-page advertisement In the New York Times an-] called on the President-
"1. To proclaim the achievement of total, universal, and controlled disarma-
ment as the goal of National U.S. policy.
"2. To restore the moratorium on the, testing of unclear weapons and to do
everything In your power to insure early agreement on the banning of all nuclear
tests.
"3. To oppose the sharing of nuclear warheads w=th NATO allies."
The Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy has not solicited the praise of the
Communist movement, and most of its leaders, I am certain, would be much
happier if they received no plaudits from Communist Sources. The fact, never-
theless, remains that the committee In recent years has been the recipient of
consistent and generous praise from the Communist press. The Communist
organ, New World Review, for April of this year. for example, carried these
paragraphs under the caption "Peace Groups In the United States":
"No amount of conspiratorial silence can wipe out the forces for disarma-
ment and peace, but it can leave them Isolated from each other and ignorant
of the efforts their fellows are making.
"It is our purpose to bring to our readers' attention the main groups In our
country working toward these ends, beginning In this Issue * * * with a descrip-
tion of the main nonsectarian national organization.
"tiATIONAL COMMrrr E FOR A BARE NUCLEAR POLICY
"SAND offers a wide choice of channels for expression of the American peo-
ple's desire for a world without war. Under the co-chairmanship ofNorman
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Cousins, editor of the Saturday Review, and Clarence Pickett, executive secre-
tary emeritus of the American Friends Service Committee, and with the sponsor-
ship and support of many noted Americans, SANE provides an elastic organiza-
tion and comprehensive program through which. ordinary people can be effective.
"Local committees of SANE exist in many cities, towns, counties, and small
communities throughout the United States. Their membership policy is flexible
and they generally welcome additions to their forces, whether for one particular
campaign or on a long-term basis."
Mr. President, to anyone who is familiar with the language of communism,
the paragraphs I have just quoted constitute a clear directive to members of the
Communist Party to enter into the ranks of the Committee for a Sane Nuclear
Policy. These paragraphs, I might point out, were not the haphazard product of
a novice or intellectual dilettante. They were written by the editor of the
magazine, Jessica Smith, a hardened oldtime Communist.
As for the Madison Square Garden meeting, the Communist organ, the
Worker, in a series of its own advertisements, called upon all the Communists
faithful to turn out in strength. The masthead of the Worker for May 15
carried a banner headline "For Sanity in Foreign Policy-All Out to Madison
Square Garden, Thursday, 7:45 p.m."
Given this background, it was only natural to anticipate that the Communists
would attempt to find their way into the organizing mechanism of the meeting.
The name of the Communist Party member who served as chief organizer
of the Madison Square Garden meeting is Henry II. Abrams. As I have pointed
out, Mr. Norman Cousins suspended Mr. Abrams several days before the meeting,
when I brought the matter to his attention. Until the date of his suspension,
however, Mr. Abrams devoted virtually full time to the organization of the
meeting for many weeks. He did so, moreover, without remuneration.
On March 16, 1960, Mr. Abrams attended a meeting of the executive committee
of the Greater New York committee of the National Committee for a Sane
Nuclear Policy. Let me read just two sentences from the minutes of that meet-
ing, which clearly illustrates the central role this Communist agent has played :
"Dr. Lear reported that Gov. G. Mennen Williams has accepted our invitation
to speak at Madison Square Garden. Henry Abrams then gave the rest of the
Madison Square Garden report."
Henry Abrams' residence at 11 Riverside Drive, New York City, and his tele-
phone number of Trafalgar 4-7769, is the address and telephone number used
by the headquarters of the Upper Manhattan Sane Nuclear Policy Committee.
Abrams has served as an accountant for both the Upper Manhattan Committee
and the Greater New York Committee of the National Committee for a Sane
Nuclear Policy. From these facts it emerges that his association with the
Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy was a long and fairly prominent one.
Now let us look at Henry Abrams' Communist record.
In 1939, he resided at 972 East 14th Street, Brooklyn, N.Y. In that year he
signed a Communist Party nominating petition from that address which ap-
peared on page 4091 of the election records.
He was a member of the 11th Assembly District Club of the Communist Party
which met at 2744 Broadway, New York City. On Tuesday, February 1.5, 1944,
it was announced at a meeting of this Communist club that Henry Abrams
would give a class for Communists on the preparation of income tax forms.
Henry Abrams was a member of the Young Communist League and later of
the upper West Side section of the Communist Party of New York City. Ile has
been a consistent financial contributor to the Communist Party, U.S.A.
As recently as September 28, 1958, the official Communist Party newspaper, the
Worker, printed a letter from Henry Abrams endorsing the candidacy of Ben-
jamin Davis for State senator in the 21st senatorial district of New York City.
Benjamin Davis is national secretary of the Communist Party, and is, in fact, one
of the most notorious of native Communists, a fact which is well known to most
Americans. Ile was one of the leading members of the party convicted in the
famous Foley Square Smith Act trials of a dozen years ago. He spent several
years in jail for advocating the overthrow of the U.S. Government by force
and violence.
Mr. Abrams has served as an accountant for the American Communist Party,
for the Emergency Civil Liberties Committee, and for the late Congressman
Vito Marcantonio.
Abrams has carried out Communist policies in many ostensibly non-Commu-
nist organizations which have, in fact, served as fronts for the Communist
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Party. Among the organizations promoted by the Communists in which he
has played an active role are the Emergency Civil Liberties Committee, the
American Committee for the Protection of the Foreigui Born, the Ilfroshima Com-
memorative Committee, the National Committee of the American Forum for
Socialist Education, the American Labor Party, the United Independent Socialist
Conference Committet_.
I state all these things its facts, Mr. President. On Friday, May 13, Henry
Abrams was given the opportunity to deny them in a hearing of the Senate
Subcommittee on Internal Security. He invoked the :lfth amendment in reply to
all questions regarding his years` long record of service to the Communist con-
spiracy.
The obvious and declared purpose of the Madisi ti Square Garden meeting
was to Influence American policy on the nuclear test ban. It is one thing when
American citizens come together, in accordance with their rights, for the pur-
pose of urging a specific policy on their Government. It is an altogether differ-
cut thing when such a meeting is infiltrated by the Communists and when the
chief organizing role falls into the hands of a member of the Communist Party,
which, its we all know, is a quisling instrument of Soviet policy. Such a sit-
uation has an Important bearing on American security, because it Is axio-
matic that all actions of the Communist Party are planned to subserve the ends
of Soviet diplomacy.
Let me say here, parenthetically. that this is by no means the only occasion of
Communist machinations In the field of nuclear policy. At a previous hearing,
we established that Avrahm G. lfezerik, a man with a long Communist rec-
ord, actually managed a so-called American Nobel Anniversary Forum and ])in-
ner, held at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in New York City on January 11, 1953,
which concentrated on the theme of an American ban on nuclear testing. It was
brought. out in this hearing that this gathering whsle managed by a Commu-
nist, was financed by a prominent Amerlcan capitalist, who was unaware of
Mezerik's Communist record.
With all this interest In the subject, the Internal Security Subcommittee
summoned fir. Abrams to appear and testify. Through his attorney, Leonard
Bonilla, of New York, Mr. Abranis pleaded illness, and asked to be excused front
coming to Washington to testify. We then arranged to hear him in New York
City. He showed up with it doctor's certificate that he was suffering from heart
disease, and moved a further continuance on the ground that his condition
was so serious that being questioned might cause him serious harm. Since the
committee was aware that fir. Abrams had continued right up to that day to
carry a heavy load as the man In active charge of arrangements for the May 19
meeting at Madison Square Garden, we were not impressed by these claims.
We had a New York City Public Health Service doctor present, and asked
Mr. Abrams if lie would consent to be examined then and there. Ile refused,
so we denied the request for a continuance and went ahead with the hearing,
which was in executive session.
As I have indicated the hearing had been called in the hope that we could
learn from Mr. Abrams the full story of Communist infiltration of and partici-
pation In this movement for it nuclear test ban, as a basis for determining what,
if any, legislation may be indicated In this area.
The subcommittee has received evidence, much of it still of a classified na-
ture, that Henry Abrams is not a lone Infiltrator, that there exists in fact a
serious Communist Infiltration in the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy.
What, specifically, are the Communists attempting to achieve by their in-
filtration of the test ban movement, including their recent all-out support of
the Madison Square Garden meeting? The answer to this is, I believe, obvious.
The Communist purpose in supporting the test ban agitation and in going all
out to make the .Madison Square Garden meeting a success is to exert pressure on
the administration to make still further concessions to the Soviet viewpoint in
order to arrive at a test bail agreement; to create a climate of public opinion
which will make it Impossible for the administration to resume small under-
ground tests, even though there may be every reason to believe that the Kremlin
is conducting such tests; to enervate the free world s- that it becomes incapable
of responding with appropriate measures to challenges at Berlin and at other
points.
In the test ban negotiations that are now going on there are major differ-
ences between the Soviet position and our own. These differences hinge around
the question of inspection. In my own opinion, we have already conceded too
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much, especially by agreeing in principle to a further voluntary moratorium on
undetectable underground tests. But for those tests that are subject to detec-
tion, we still take the stand that here should be an inspection system based on
an adequate number of fixed stations, with at least 20 or 30 onsite inspections
per annum. The Kremlin wants a minimum of inspection. It wants as few
stations as possible, and its spokesmen have indicated that they would not be
willing to accept more than a few onsite inspections per annum.
The Kremlin apparently attached major importance to the Madison Square
Garden meeting as a pressure operation in support of its nuclear objectives.
This, I believe, is conclusively demonstrated by the generous and sympathetic
coverage of the meeting in the Soviet press. I think this is interesting. Ac-
cording to an AP dispatch of May 21st, Pravda headlined its account of the
meeting with the words "We Want To Live in Friendship With the Soviet
Union," while the Izvestia headline read "Rebuff to Advocates of War."
I believe that the heads of the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy have a
serious contribution to make to the great debate on national policy. But they
can only make this contribution effectively if they purge their ranks ruthlessly
of Communist infiltration and if they clearly demarcate their own position from
that of the Communists, first, by stressing the need for adequate inspection, sec-
ond, by reiterating at every opportunity their opposition to the tyranny of
communism
On the basis of the evidence that has come to me, I do not believe that the
Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy has taken the necessary measures to cre-
ate a climate that is inhospitable to Communist infiltration. At the Madison
Square Garden rally, for example, there was much direct and inferential criti-
cism of American policy, but, according to the press accounts and reports from
private sources-persons who were present at the meeting-there was almost no
criticism of Khrushchev or of his arrogant, insulting, gutter-level behavior in
Paris. On the contrary, the speakers called for an immediate effort to renew
the summit conference.
Let me digress briefly for a comment on this last proposal, which has, un-
fortunately, not been confined to the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy.
Perhaps I am old-fashioned, but to me it seems that after the President of the
United States has had to endure a barrage of the crudest insults ever leveled
at ia head of state, a petition to Khrushchev for another summit meeting would
constitute a total abandonment of national dignity. The only conceivable politi-
cal consequences of so craven an action would be to encourage Khrushchev to
further arrogance and further demands.
As I have said, I have found no serious evidence that the Madison Square
Garden meeting was organized and conducted in a. manner which would have
discouraged Communist participation. It was not surprising, therefore, that
the Communists and their sympathizers turned out in force. Although no
Gallup poll or breakdown was possible, I am convinced from reports that the
Communists were responsible for a very substantial percentage of the overflow
turnout. A number of well-known Communists, including Alexander Trachten-
berg, a top party member, were observed in the audience. Outside the meeting,
the Communists brazenly distributed literature in their own name.
If decent organizations like the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy wish to
protect themselves against the danger of Communist infiltration, I cannot em-
phasize too strongly the need for an organizational climate that is openly
inhospitable to Communists. This is a situation where a tepid declaration of
devotion to democracy simply will not suffice, while a neutral silence is an open
invitation to disaster.
I can think of other things that can and should be done by the directors of
the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy and of other non-Communist organi-
zations which must contend with the problem. of Communist infiltration. At
top level, control is relatively easy. One can more or less assume that the
people who are elected to a board of directors or to a national committee have
enjoyed public visibility over a period of years so that their records are known.
At the local level, not even the FBI with all of its resources could offer a 100
percent guarantee against infiltration. However, I think it is possible for
organizations to exercise a good deal of control by carefully examining the
personal records and bona fides, first, of all those who volunteer to help estab-
lish local organizations; second, of those who are elected to office in local
organizations; third, of all those assigned to organizing activities.
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If any effort had been made to do these things, the Madison Square Garden
situation might have been avoided. But for 2:; yearn, Henry Abrams has been
a Communist. Without looking up his record, the Committee for a Sane Nuclear
Policy allowed him to become the chief organizer of the rally in New York City.
That was not taking the necessary precautionary measures.
I think it is not too much t"i ask that all such eoainittees, which are headed
by good people and made tip of thousands of good people, ought to give considera-
tion to the question whether Communists like Abran.s are taking a part in the
running of their meetings. Many of these committees have been doing good
work. But it is little wonder that they become infiltrated by Communists if
they do not take Ibe pains and the time to ascertain who some of their people
are, before they allow them to become officers or chief organizers of mass rallies.
I believe it Is not too much to ask our fellow citizens who are organizing
committees for tile. purpose of exerting influence on Congress --as they have
every right to do--to make a preliminary, cursory clus?k of the persons who are
working in their organizations, especially before they hold such meetings.
This would not be an easy task. But there is much that can be clone. It will
not always be possible to obtain accurate personal Information, because many
Communists operate underground as secret party members. But in the case of
a man like Abrams, who has a public record of membership, the facts should
be available without too much effort.
Perhaps this is a situation in which private organizations can in some way be
assisted by Government. This is a problem that the Subcommittee on Internal
Security Is at present exploring.
Mr. President, in closing my remarks, I wish to pay my personal tribute to
Mr. Norman Cousins, the chairman of the Committee for it sane Nuclear Policy,
for the manner in which he has reacted to the revelations of the subcommittee.
fir. Cousins has been a neighbor and a friend of mina for ninny years. I have
the highest regard for him. That is why I called him up and told him what I
knew about Abrams. He was good enough to come to Washington to sec me.
I said, "I don't want to release this material 24 hours before your meeting.
You have your plans all made. But many innocent 14'ople will be present, and
a number of them will be prominent people. Why lu ven't you checked on peo-
ple like Abrams? Norman Thomas sold in January that he was doubtful about
the man's ba"kground. Here it is the middle of May. on the eve of your meet-
ing, and you have not yet done anything."
lir. Cousins was upset about the matter. Ile immediately suspended Abrams.
Not only did he do this. but he told me he was glad we had informed him about
Abrams. He offered to open the hooks of his orgnniz ition to the subcommittee
and to cooperate In every way to rid his organization of Communists.
I assure Mr. Cousins and other persons connected with his committee that the
Subcommittee on Internal Security is ready to cooperate with them to help to
prevent a repetition of the Madison Square Garden situation.
I think it is not too much to say that the subcommittee is desirous and willing
to help any other organiratlon to avoid infiltration by subterranean elements
who are not there for any good purpose, and who are certainly not interested,
as are the good people who make up the bulk of their membership, in the welfare
of the United States.
I yield the floor.
(Whereupon, tit 1:10 p.m., the committee adjourned.)
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APPENDIXES
APPENDIX I
BACKGROUND DOCUMENTS EVENTS
INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
1. PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV'S REMARKS ON U.S. PLANE
[From the New York Times, May 6, 19601
LONDON, May 5 (Reuters) -Following, in translation, are excerpts
from the section of Premier Khrushchev's address today referring to
the shooting down of a United States plane Sunday, as broadcast from
.Moscow:
On instructions of the Soviet Government, I am duty bound to
report to you on aggressive acts directed in the last few weeks by the
United States of America against the Soviet Union.
What form did these aggressive acts take? The United States
sent its planes, which violated our state frontier and intruded into
the airspace of the Soviet Union.
Its last but one aggressive act was perpetrated by the United States
of America on April 9,1960.
A United States plane intruded into the airspace of our country
from the Afghanistan side. Of course, no man. in his right senses
can think and assume that this violation was done by Afghanistan,
a country which is friendly with us.
We are convinced that this plane belonged to the United States of
America and obviously was based somewhere on the territory of
Turkey, Iran or Pakistan, which are linked with the U.S.A. by obli-
gations under the aggressive CENTO bloc.
[Mr. Khrushchev said the Soviet Government decided against mak-
ing aprotest but ordered military commanders to act if another plane
intruded.]
American military men apparently liked this impunity as it hap-
pened on April 9, and they decided to repeat the aggressive act.
INCIDENT ON MAY DAY
Selected for this was the most festive day for our people and the
workers of the world-the day of May the First-the international
holiday of fraternal solidarity of the working class.
That day, early in the morning, at 0536 hours, Moscow time, an
American plane flew over our frontier and continued its flight into the
interior of the Soviet land. A report on this aggressive act was im-
mediately given to the Government by the Minister of Defense.
175
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The Government had stated this: Since he realizes what he, comes
withgit ho wills attempt fre hinto
provocations. Tl etefor'e, if lie ets away
the plane mu t
be shot down.
This task was fulfilled and the plane was shot down.
According to first information, it has transpired that the plane
belongs to the United States of America although it bears no identifi-
cation signs.
Now an expert commission is studying data that fell in our hands.
It has been established that this plane that crossed the state frontier
of the Soviet Union was coming either from Turkey, Iran or Pakistan.
After the study of all materials that are now at our disposal, the
Soviet Government will lodge with the United States of America a
strong protest and will warn it that if similar aggressive acts against
our country continue, we reserve the right to respond to them with
measures we shall find necessary in order to insure the safety of our
country.
We shall also give the most serious warning to those countries that
put their territories at the disposal of the United States of America
for aggressive acts directed against our country.
The following conclusion comes to mind: Aggressive imperialist
forces in the United States in recent times have been taking the most
active measures to undermine the summit or at least to hinder any
agreement that might be reached.
4" Wire SENT THIS AIkCJL }"r?"
The question then arises: Who sent this aircraft across the Soviet
frontier? Was it the man who is Commander in Chief of the American
armed forces who, as everyone knows, is the President? Or was this
aggressive act carried out by Pentagon militarists? If such actions
-are taken by American military men on their own account, it must
be of especial concern to world opinion.
Perhaps it was a result of the friendship that is now forming be-
tween the United States and Franco that the American militarists
decided to act independently, as did the Spanish military junta, which
rose up against the legal Spanish Government.
Thus, in the so-called free world, military dictators not seldom set.
up their regimes using the methods of Frum'o. But the peoples are
beginning to understand where true freedom is and where there is
tyranny.
Take, for instance, the events in South Korea. The head of the
puppet Syagman Rhee regime, the best friend of the United States
and the father of his country as someone or other called him in Anier-
ice, has now been overthrown by the people and is now a political
corpse. And it was not the Communists who were behind these events;
even American pohiticial leaders have had to admit.
The sufferings of the Korean people led theca to rise up against the
bestial yoke, and the peoples understand Clint it was not only a question
of Syngmaan Rhee himself who was to blame but all those who sup-
ported him and hung hini round the necks of the South Koreans.
It is no coincidence that the free world sees so many popular demon-
strations demanding freedom.
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Comrade Deputies, the impression is being formed that the aggres-
sive actions newly undertaken by the United States against the Soviet
Union are a foretaste of the summit meeting.
Are they taken in order to exert pressure on us and to attempt to
frighten us with their military superiority in order to undermine our
determination to work for easing tension, to eliminate the cold war
and to put an end to the arms race
All these missions are sent in order to prevent any agreement on
vexing questions, for we cannot say that this aircraft was a harbinger
of peace, that it was on a goodwill mission. No, it was a real bandit
flight with aggressive intentions.
We can say to those gentlemen who sent the aircraft that if they
think they can bend our knees and our backs by means of such pres-
sure, this will have no effect on us. The Soviet Union has every means
to give a rebuff to those who want to exert pressure in order to achieve
a solution convenient to aggressors.
In the name of the Soviet Government let me express thanks to the
men of the military units who carried out with honor the task laid on
them in defending the frontiers of our motherland.
Comrades, the Soviet people and Government have always expressed
their peaceful intentions and friendly feelings toward the United
States, but in answer to this we have black ingratitude.
"PEELINGS OF INDIGNATION"
It is understood that this has aroused feelings of indignation against
the activities of the American military men. But we must control this
feeling and must be ruled not by our emotions, but by reason.
Government leaders interested in preserving peace must soberly con-
sider the consequences of such actions and think what they might
lead to.
Hitler's aircraft before the war used to intrude into our airspace.
The Soviet Government would protest, but Hitler refused to pay at-
tention and then attacked us. And where did that all end?
How do we assess the incursion of American aircraft-as a precursor
of war or a foreshadow of attack, of the repetition of what Hitler
did? The Soviet Government thinks that all the same there is no
reason to draw such conclusions.
There is another relationship of power in the world, and in this the
people's will to peace plays a great part and this is why we do not con-
clude that this is a prewar trial of strength or a reconnaissance made
to try our nerves, preserve the atmosphere of the cold war so that the
imperialists can continue to bind their people with taxation, to carry
on the arms race, and to keep their people in a state of fear of war and
to continue to impose their will.
The Soviet Union has no aggressive intentions, we do not want the
cold war, we want disarmament and our proposals made to the United
Nations on this subject remain in force still. Once a ain, we repeat
that disarmament is the right way to preserve peace and in such condi-
tions no country would be able unilaterally to arm and attack another.
The Soviet Government once again calls on the Government of the
United States to end the cold war. All states must act peaceably so
that calm, peace and happiness can prevail.
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4 IDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
2. DEFENSE DEPARTMENT NEWS RELEASE, MAY 5, 1960
For the Press:
[No. 509-G0]
The U.S. Air Force confirmed on May 3, 1960, that a NASA U-2
aircraft is missing in Turkey, It was on a weather mission originating
at Adana, Turke r. Purpose was a study of clear air turbulence. Dur-
ing the flight. in SE Turkey the pilot reported oxygen difficulty. Last
word heard at 9 a.m. 1st of May, Turkish time (3 a.m. 1 May e.d.t.)
over emergency frequency. U-2 aircraft did not land at Adana as
planned and could only be assumed down. A search effort is underway
m Lake Van area.
The missing U-2 is a National Aeronautics and Space Administra-
tion aircraft. The pilot. is an employee of Lockheed Aircraft Corp.,
under contract to NASA.
The U-2 program was initiated in 1955 to perform high altitude
weather research.
The flight was a joint NASA/AF Air Weather Service Mission.
3. EXCERPTS FROM TRANSCRIPT OF DEPARTMENT OF
STATE PRESS AND RADIO NEWS BRIEFING, MAY 5,
1960
dir. W11.UT#. Now, the l)ep:tmeut has been informed by 'NASA
that as announced llav 3 an unarmed lain', a V-2 weal leerresearch
plane based at. Adana '['urke~, nilotecipw a civilian has been missing
since May 1. During the flighlt of this plane, the pilot. reported
difficulty- with his oxygen equipment. .lfr. Khrushehev ha an-
nounced that a U.S. plaice has been shot dawn over the U.S.S.R.. on
that date. It may be that this was the missing plane. It is entirely
possible that having a failure in tlic' oxygen equipment, which could
result in the pilot. losing. consciousness, the. plane continued on auto-
matic pilot fora considerable distance and accidentally violated Soviet
airspace, The United States is taking this twitter u 1J with the. Soviet
Government, with jarticular reference to the fate of the pilot.
That is the end of the stdatenlent.
Q. What, was the plane, doing, weather reconnaissance?
A. NASA is briefing reporter on the full details of that.
Q. When you say you are taking this matter up with the Soviet
Government, do you mean you are. asking for information on the
pilot, or making a protest about the plane?
A. This matter is being taken up with the Soviet Government,
John (Hightower), through our Ambassador in Moscow.
Q. Yes, but it, is a protest nr an inquiry?
A. I can't say just what form it will take at this stare, I would
think, initially, an inquiry..
Q. Is this the report- which the White House announced would be
made?
A. That is correct.
Q. You Say it may he that this was the missing plane?
A. Yes.
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CON
Q. There are other planes missing or
A. Not that I am aware of.
Q. Unaccounted for?
A. No, not that I am aware of.
Q. You say this plane was from Adana, Turkey. Is that the U.S.
Air Force Base down there?
A. As I say, you better get this information from NASA. (See
NASA Press Release No. 60-i93.)
Q. Khrushchev also said an American plane violated the Soviet
frontier by flying over the Afghan border on April 9. Do. you have
anything on that?
A. We have absolutely no--N-0-information on that. at all.
Q. Wasn't this plane accompanied by another plane of the same
type when it started out on the reconnaissance flight?
A. I am not aware of that, if that is a fact, but I assume NASA
can give, you that information, Paul (Ward). I have nothing on it.
Q. Link, the area where this plane ,disappeared is the same as the
other plane--
A. This is the Lake Van area.
Q. Is that the same area where the earlier plane disappeared in
1958?
A. In the neighborhood of it.
Q. Link, how do you know the plane was having difficulty?
A. He, reported it.
Q. He reported it by radio?
A. That is right.
Q. At the time did he give his position?,
A. In the Lake Van area.
Q. Was his course such at that time that if continued it might have
taken him over the Soviet Union?
A. John (Hightower), I don't have those details.
Q. Was that the last communication from him, Link?
A. So far as I know.
Q. What was the question?
A. The question was, was that the last communication from the
pilot, and to my knowledge it was.
Q. Is the the name of this pilot being released by somebody?
A. Here I would like to go off the record. * * *
Q. Link, has any protest been received from the Soviet Govern-
ment?
A. No, sir, it has not.
Q. Link, do you have any comment on the rest of Khrushchev's
speech, his statement that the Summit looks gloomy now because of
his aggressive American action?
A. No.
Q. Is this the first indication we had in Khrushchev's speech that
the plane had been shot down? There was no previous communica-
tion from the Soviets?
A. Nothing prior to this.
Q. Thank you, very much.
A. Yes, sir.
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4. NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRA-
TION NEWS RELEASE, MAY 5, 1960
[NASA Release No. C0-193]
Memo to the Press :
One of NASA's U-2 research airplanes, in use since 1956 in a
continuing program to study gust-meteorological conditions found
at high altitude, has been missing since about 9 o'clock Sunday morn-
ing (local time), when its pilot reported he was having oxygen diffi-
culties over the Lake Van, Turkey, area.
The airplane had taken off from Incirlik Air Base, Turkey. The
flight plan called for the first check point to be at 37 degrees, 25
minutes, North : 41 degrees, 23 minutes, East, and for a left turn to be
made to the Lake Van beacon, thence to the Trabazon beacon, thence
to Antalya, and return to Adana. The flight scheduled was estimated
at 3 hours, 45 minutes, for a total of 1,400 nautical miles. Takeoff
was at 8 a.m local time.
(The above-given times are the equivalent of 3 a.m. Sunday, and
2 a.m., eastern daylight time.)
About 1 hour after takeoff, the pilot reported difficulties with his
oxygen equipment. Using emergency radio frequency, he reported he
was heading for the Lake Van %eacon to get his bearings, and that
he would return to Adana.
As indicated above, his flight plan called for him to make a left turn
at the Lake Van beacon. His last report indicated he was attempting
to receive that beacon. It is believed he probably was on a north-
easterly course, but there was no further word.
An aerial search was begun soon after receipt of the last communi-
cation. The Lake Van area is mountainous and very rugged. No
evidence has been sighted of the aircraft having crashed.
If the pilot continued to suffer lack of oxygen, the path of the air-
plane from the last reported position would he impossible to de-
termine. If the airplane was on automatic pilot, it is likely it would
have continued along its northeasterly course.
The pilot, as are all pilots used on NASA's program of upper at-
mosphere research with the U-2 airplane, is a civilian employed by
the Lockheed Aircraft Corp., builders of the airplane.
When the research program was begun in 1956 by the National
Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (predecessor to NASA), the
Federal agency did not have a sufficient number of pilots to operate
the program, and so a contract was made with Lockheed to provide
the pilots.
Overseas logistic support for NASA's continuin use of the U-2 is
provided by Air Weather Service units of the USAF.
NASA has procured a total of 10 U-2 airplanes. The airplane
was originally built as a private venture by I.ocklieed to serve as a
"flying test bed." It is powered by a single Pratt & Whitney J-57
turbojet. engine, and can maintain flight for as long as 4 hours at
altitudes of up to 55,000 feet..
Since inception of the research program in 1956, the U-2 flying
weather laboratories have operated from bases in California, New
York, Alaska, England, Germany, Turkey, Pakistan, Japan, Okinawa,
and the Philippines.
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFEREN
The U-2 airplanes are presently being used in California (Ed-
wards AFB, one), Japan (Atsugi, three) and Turkey (Adana, four).
The instrumentation carried by the U-2 permits obtaining more
precise information about clear air turbulence, convective clouds,
wind shear, the jet stream, and such widespread weather patterns as
typhoons. The airplane also has been used by NASA to obtain
information about cosmic rays, and the concentration of certain ele-
ments in the atmosphere, including ozone and water vapor.
Instrumentation carried includes : Angular velocity recorder, to
measure the airpla.ne's rate of pitch ; modified VGII recorder, to
measure and record head-on gust components in flight; flight recorder
Model BB, continuous recorder of indicated airspeed, pressure alti-
tude and normal acceleration ; airspeed and altitude transducer to
measure pressure altitude and indicated airspeed; temperature and
humidity measuring set AN/AMQ 7, to measure indicated free air
temperature and indicated relative humidity; and vortex thermometer
system, to measure true free-air temperature within one-half degree
centigrade at high speeds.
5. DEPARTMENT OF STATE PRESS RELEASE, MAY 6,1960
[No. 249]
The following is the text of a note delivered today by the American
Embassy at Moscow to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign A ff airs :
The Embassy of the United States of America by instruction of its
Government has the honor to state the following :
The United States Government has noted the statement of the Chair-
man of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics, N. S. Khrushchev, in his speech before the Supreme Soviet
on May 5 that a foreign aircraft crossed the border of the Soviet Union
on May 1 and that on orders of the Soviet Government, this aircraft
was shot down. In this same statement it was said that investigation
showed that it was a United States plane.
As already announced on May 3, a United States National Aeronau-
tical Space Agency unarmed weather research plane based at Adana,
Turkey, and piloted by a civilian American has been missing since May
1. The name of the American civilian pilot is Francis Gary Powers,
born on August 17, at Jenkins, Kentucky.
In the light of the above the United States Government requests the
Soviet Government to provide it with full facts of the Soviet investi-
gation of this incident and to inform it of the fate of the pilot.
6. EXCERPTS FROM PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV'S REMARKS
ON U.S. PLANE INCIDENT, MAY 7,1960
[From the New York Times, May 8, 19601
Following are excerpts from the concluding speech to the meeting
of the Supreme Soviet in Moscow yesterday by Premier Khrushchev,
as provided in English in New York by Tass, the o ffCcial Soviet press
agency:
The aggressive act committed by the American Air Force against
the Soviet Union has justifiably incensed the Deputies and all the
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E, T INCIDENT TO TILE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
Soviet people. Numerous inquiries and appeals are being received
by the session and the Soviet Government. In view of this permit me
to dwell on this question once again and to furnish certain new data.
After nl~ report. to the Supreme, Soviet, in which I dwelt on this
fact, the United States Department of State claimed in an official
press statement that the point in question was a violation of the Soviet
State Frontier by an American aircraft of (lie "Lockheed U-2" type,
which allegedly was studying weather conditions in the upper layers
of the atmosphere in thearea of the Turkish-Soviet frontier.
This piano had allegedly strayed off its course because the pilot had
oxygen trouble. The State Department asserts that the pilot lost
consciousness and, steered by its automatic pilot, the plane flew into
Soviet territory. According to the Department of State, the pilot
only had time to report back about the failure of his oxygen equip-
ment to the Turkish airdrome in Adana, whence it flew, an airdrome
which allegedly does not belong to the military but to the National
Aeronautics and Space Research Administration.
Soon after that, the National Aeronautics and Space Research
Administration issued a, statement with it view to confirming the State
Department's version.
"MANY SILLY TIHINGS'
Comrades. I must tell you a secret. Mien I was making my report
I deliberately did not say'
ay that. the pilot, was alive and in good health
and that we have got. parts of the plane. We did so deliberately be-
cause had we told everything at once, the Americans would have
invented another version.
And nowt just look how many silly things they have said-Van
Lake, scientific research and so on and so forth. Now that they know
that the pilot, is alive they will have to invert something else and they
will do it.
[Mr. Khrushchev read from the United States statement issued
after his first announcement ; it was printed in the New York Times
last Friday.]
These are the official versions put into circulation by American
officials to mislead the public opinion of their country and the world.
I must declare, comrade Deputies, that these versions are completely
untrue and calculated for gullible people.
The authors of these versions supposed that if the plane was shot
down, the pilot most probably perished too. So there will be nobody
to ask how everything actually happened, there will be no way to
check what sort of plane it was and what instruments it carried.
((ALIVE AND IN GOOD ]II:ALTII"
First of all, I wish to announce that the pilot of the shot-down
American plane is alive and in good health. Ile is now in Moscow.
Brought here also are the remains of this plane and its special instru-
mentation, discovered during the investigation.
The name of this pilot is Francis Gary Powers. Ile is 30 years old.
Ile says he is a first, lieutenant of the United States Air Force, where
he served till 1956, that is, to (lie day when he went over to file Central
Intelligence Agency.
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EVENTS INCIDENT To
Francis Powers reported, incidentally, that while serving with the
American Air Force he used to get $700 a month, but when he went
over to the intelligence service and started carrying out spying as-
signments to glean secret information, he began getting $2,500 a
month. That is how capital buys lives, buys people. The flier testi-
fied that he had no dizziness, nor had his oxygen apparatus failed.
He was flying along the assigned course, accurately executing his
chief's orders, switching on and off the equipment over the pre-
selected targets for gleaning intelligence on the Soviet Union's mili-
tary and industrial establishments, and flew on until the very mo-
ment his piratical flight into this country's interior was cut short.
I want to tell something about the results of the examination
of the plane that has been shot down and its equipment, as well as of
the questioning of the pilot. The inquiry still continues, but the pic-
ture is fairly clear already.
PLANE TYPE CONFIRMED
To start with, this was, indeed, a high-altitude, low-speed "Lock-
heed U-2." They banked on its high altitude and believed that this
piano cannot be brought down by any fighter or antiaircraft artil-
lery. That is why they thought it could fly over Soviet territory with
immunity. In fact, the plane flew at a great altitude and it was hit
by the rocket at an altitude of 20,000 meters [65,000 feet]. And if
they fly higher, we will also hit them ! The, plane was in no way
equipped for "upper atmosphere research" or for taking "air sam-
ples," as official. American. spokesmen assert.
Not at all. This was a real military reconnaissance aircraft fitted
with various instruments for collecting intelligence and, among other
things, for aerial photography.
The competent commission of experts, which examined the wrecked
plane, has established from the documentary evidence that this Amer-
ican plane is a specially prepared reconnaissance aircraft. The task
of the plane was to cross the entire territory of the Sovi Union from
coun-
try's Pamirs to the Kola Peninsula to got
try's military and industrial establishments by means of aerial photog-
raphy. Besides aerial cameras the plane carried other reconnaissance
equipment for spotting radar networks, identifying the location and
frequencies of operating radio stations and other special radio en-
gineering equipment.
} Not only do we have the equipment of that plane, but we also have
the developed film showing a number of areas of our territory. Here
are some of these photos. Here are photos of these airfields. Here
are two white lines. They are lines of our fighters. Here is another
airfield and also planes on it. All these films we developed ourselves.
CAMERA IS PRAISED
Here are photos of petrol stores. It must be said that the camera
is not a bad one and the photo is very accurate.
But I must say that our cameras take better pictures, are more
accurate, so that we gained little in this respect.
These photos here show industrial enterprises.
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There is also a tape recording of the signals of a number of our
ground radar stations. These are ileontestible evidence of the spying
done by the American plane shot. down in the vicinity of Sverdlovsk.
That is what "`air samples" American reconnaissance took, and it took
them not over Van Lake in Turkey but quite elsewhere.
The only thing that, is true is that this plane was stationed at the
American-Turkish air base at Incirlik east of Adana. As Powers, the
flier, testified, he was serving with the 10-10 unit, which, for the sake
of disguise, is under control of the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, but in reality, conducts high-altitude military recon-
naissance.
In his depositions, Powers mentioned the names of several officers
he had served with at the American military base in Turkey. Ac-
cording to Powers' testimony, the commander of the American 10-10
unit is Col. William Shelton and his deputy is Lieut. Col. Carol Funk.
Before his flight, Powers had long trained himself for flying into
the depth of this country and, as he said himself, he had flown along
the Soviet frontier many tines in order t study the radar system
of the Soviet Union.
``PO6vI:ns, TILE SCOUT"
On April 27, Powen,, the scout, flew over from the Turkish city
of Adana to the Peshawar airfield in Pakistan on orders from his
superiors. And it was, therefore, from Pakistan's territory, that is.
front the Peshawar airfield-and not from the Turkish airfield outside
Adana, as stated in the United States State. Department's version-
that Powers took off on May 1 with instruction to fly along the course
indicated on his ma over the Aral Sea, Sverdlovsk and other points
and reach Archangel and Murmansk, before landing at the Bude air-
field in Norway.
Now we can say where he was flying to. I must admit that we knew
it already when I was reporting this fact. We did not say anything
at that time in order to see what the Americans would invent. Now
that they have made their invention, we report how everything actually
happened.
This is what Powers said when questioned about the task of his flight
over Soviet territory.
"I was to take off from the Peshawar airfield in Pakistan, cross the
national frontier of the U.S.S.R. and fly across Soviet territory to
Norway. I was to fly over certain points of the U.S.S.R., of which I
remember Murmansk and Archangel. During my flight over Soviet
territory I was to switch on and off the equipment over certain points
indicated on the map. I believe my flight over Soviet territory was
meant for collecting information on Soviet guided missiles and radar
stations."
I want to ask the gentlemen from the State Department: Is it such
"air samples over Lake Van" that the spy flier Powers was to take?
IRAQI REVOLT RECALLED
I say nothing of the fact that by flying along this course, the Ameri-
can scout, plane grossly violated the national sovereignty of Afghan-
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i stan by having flown across that country's territory without permis-
sion. But there is, perhaps, nothing extraordinary in this for the
morals of American militarists. Such actions of theirs have long been
known.
Suffice it to recall the flight of American military aircraft over the
territory of Austria, when the aggression was being prepared against
Iraq, where a revolution had just taken place. The Austrian Govern-
ment protested against the treacherous violation of Austria's sover-
eignty by American military aircraft and against that blatant act of
disrespect for her neutrality sealed by the signatures of the United
States, among others.
If one believes the version that the pilot lost consciousness owing to
oxygen trouble and that the aircraft was subsequently controlled by
the automatic pilot, one must also believe that the aircraft controlled
by an automatic pilot flew from Turkey to Pakistan, touched down at
Peshewar Airport, stayed there three days, took off early in the
morning of May 1, flew over the territory of Afghanistan, crossed the
Soviet frontier, flew more than 2,000 kilometers over our territory for
a total of some four hours.
All the time of the flight over our territory the aircraft was under
observation and was brought down as soon as the order was received.
When our anti-aircraft rocket battery intercepted and brought down
the plane, the pilot, it must be believed, soon regained his conscious-
ness because he bailed out by parachute; you just note he was not
ejected by the automatic device but left through the upper canopy
designed for emplaning. The question arises why did he do this if
there are devices for rapid ejection?
He did this possibly because there was an explosive charge in the
aircraft which was to have blown up the plane as soon as the pilot was
ejected. The pilot knew this and possibly was afraid that he would be
killed in the explosion. Clever enough !
But the installation of the infernal machine was not the only pre-
caution taken. To cover up the tracks of the crime the pilot was told
that he must not fall alive in the hands of the Soviet authorities. For
this reason he was supplied with a special pin. He was to have pricked
himself with this poisoned pin, resulting in instantaneous death.
What a barbarism ! Here is this instrument-the latest achievement
of American technology for the killing of their own people (a photo-
graph is produced).
But everything alive wants to live and when the plane was brought
down the pilot bailed out by parachute. And when he landed he did
not follow the advice of those who sent him on his anti-Soviet preda-
tory assignment but remained alive.
It is alleged that the flight was made for scientific purposes to in-
vestigate the upper layers of the atmosphere. The question arises why
the pilot then had to be armed with a noiseless pistol. He was given
it for some emergency, not to take air samples but to blow people's
brains out. All this we shall present to the public as material evidence.
This is what, so to say, such Christians are like.
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Ile was given this pistol after making low bows as they do in
churches. end yet they call us godless atheists. Yet. we have never
committed such crimes against humanity and never will. If the pilot
was given a pistol to defend himself against wild beasts in case of a
forced landing, the question arises, why a pistol with a silencer? This
also shows what so-called scientific purposes were pursued by the
plane.
The pilot who was supposed to explore the atmosphere was given
7,500 rubles in Soviet currency. `Ilse question arises, when and
where was he to have spent them and for what purposes, for he did
not fly to exchange old rubles for new ?
GOLD FR.LNCS, (;OLD RINGS
The pilot was also given French gold francs. I have seen these gold
francs with my own eyes. And you can see theme here in the photo-
graph. They are covered with cello Shane on both sides of the coins.
one in a cultured, Anierican way. But what did the pilot need these
francs for? Ile also had %Vest Oernian, Italian, and other currency.
Besides his own watch he was also given for his trip another two gold
watches and seven gold rings for ladies. Why was all this necessary
in the upper layers of the atmosphere? Or, maybe, the pilot was to
have, flown still higher to Mars and was going to lead astray Martian
ladies?
You see how thoroughly Ai eric-an pilots are equipped before setting
oil' on a flight, to take samples of air in the upper layers of the atmos-
phere. Thus, no concocted version can save the reputation of those
who bear the responsibility for this perfidious act,
Thus, no concocted version can save the reputation of those who bear
the responsibility for this perfidious action. They were caught red-
handed as organizers of the incursion in the airspace of the Soviet
Union not long before the meeting of the heads of government in
Paris, not long before the visit to the Soviet Union of the President of
the United States. I believe that this is a bad preparation for.serious
talks on easing international tension.
I am now reading in the Western press comments on these events
and there are some people who accuse us, Khrushcliev, of wanting to
undermine the summit meeting because otherwise he would not have
presented this fact at the session of the Supreme Soviet but raised it
through some other channels but. what slid you expect., gentlemen?
You are accustomed to make mischief and some people regard this as
all but a good thing and keep silent.. No, we are not such kind of
people: if you made mischief bear the responsibility for this openly.
They live according to the law; if one is rich one will not be im ris-
oned. This is true for the capitalist because lie, always can buy him-
self off. But there is another country, the country of socialism, where
law protects the state, protects society, protects everyone living in Ibis
state,
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What could be the reason for such a reckless step? This was evi-
dently done because someone in the United States was obsessed by the
idea of intelligence. The United States proposal on the "open sky" is
well known. We rejected this proposal and the American military
then decided to "open" the Soviet sky by themselves.
But there are rules of international laws, there are national frontiers
and no one has the right to disregard these laws and to cross the
frontiers of other countries.
From the lofty rostrum of the Supreme Soviet we warn once, again
those countries that make their territory available for the take-off gentlemen!
planes with anti-Soviet, intentions-do not play with fire, e t
The governments of the three countries-Turkey, Pakistan and
Norway-must be clearly aware that they were accomplices of this
flight because they permitted the use of their airfields against the
Soviet Union.
7. STATEMENT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
MAY 7, 1960
[Prom The New York Times, May 8, 19601
WASHINGTON, May 7. Following is the statement on the U--
plane incident issued by the State Department today after clearance
by President Eisenhower:
The Department has received the text of Mr. Khrushchev's further
remarks about the unarmed plane which is reported to have been shot
down in the Soviet Union. As previously announced, it was known
that a U-2 plane was missing. As a result of the inquiry ordered by
the President, it has been established that insofar as the authorities
are concerned, there was no authorization for any such flights as de-
scribed by Mr. Khrushchev.
Nevertheless, it appears that in endeavoring to obtain information,
now concealed behind the Iron Curtain a flight over Soviet territory
was probably undertaken by an unarmed civilian U-2 plane.
It is certainly no secret that, given the state of the world today,
intelligence collection activities are practiced by all countries and
postwar history certainly reveals that the Soviet Union has not been
lagging behind in the field. The necessity for such activities as
measures for legitimate national defense is enhanced by the excessive
secrecy practiced by the Soviet Union in contrast to the free world.
One of the things creating tension in the world today is apprehen-
sion over surprise attack with weapons of mass destruction. To re-
duce mutual suspicion and to get a measure of protection against
surprise attack, the United States in 1955 offered its "open skies"
proposal-a proposal which was rejected out of hand by the Soviet
Union. It is in relation to the danger of surprise attack that planes
of the type of the unarmed civilian U-2 aircraft have made flights
along the frontiers of the free world for the past four years.
56412-60--?18
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO TILE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
8. TEXT OF PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV'S SPEECH WARN-
ING NATIONS WITH BASES USED BY U.S. PLANES
[From the New York Times, May 10, 1960]
Following is the text of remarks by Premier Khrushchev at a re-
ce, tion in the Czechoslovak L,'rnzba.3sy in Moscow yesterday, as pro-
vided in English in New York by Vass, the official press agency:
Dear Comrade Dvorak, Ambassador of friendly, fraternal Czecho-
Slovakia !
Dear friends, comrades, gentlemen !
11'e are very pleased to attend the reception held on the occasion of
the fifteenth anniversary of the liberation of the Czechoslovak Repub-
lic, the celebration of Victory Day, which indeed is a holiday for all the
peoples. The Soviet people, at. one with all other peoples, sincerely
want that there should be no more war, that this war should be the last,
that it should be reniembered by the peoples and should go down in
history as the last war.
We are doing our utmost to achieve this indeed. That is precisely
why the Soviet Union submitted at the United Nations its proposals
for general and complete disarmament.. We not only insist on the
necessity of reducing armed forces but already now, without waiting
for such decisions by the W 'estern countries, we unilaterally cut the
armed forces of the Soviet Union by one-third.
When we have reduced our armed forces to 2,400,000, some time will
pass, and we shall think it over and evidently we shall further reduce
our Arm'. Comrade Zhadov [Gen. Aleksandr A. Zhadov, deputy
commander of Soviet ground forces] over there scratched the back of
his head-another reduction.
No, this will not be done now, Comrade General, but later.
We shall do this if the situation favors such measures. Of course,
we shall not cut our armed forces to such a level which would prej-
udice the security of the Soviet Union. You should bear in mind that
we do not reduce our armed forces for fuaancial reasons. No, the
financial situation of our state is splendid and, if need be, could not
only forbear from reducing the army and navy, but increase them. I
repeat, if this were necessary we could do this without tense efforts.
But as good masters we say: Why have bigger armed forces than we
need?
CONTROLS NOT FESRED
If our partners agree we are willing to accept total disarmament
and we shall effect it honestly. We are not afraid of control. If you
please, gentlemen, then you could fly over our territory, check, take
pictures, do what you please.
Such an issue as now could not arise then. The Department of
State explains the incident with the downed reconnaissance plane
more or less as follows: One cannot, the' say, admit, nor can one
deny. It turns out, as in the well-known Joke, that here is a maiden
who is also not a maiden for she has a chid' The marriage was not
registered, therefore one can regard her as a maiden in a way. But
she gave birth, to a child. Can one regard her as a maiden or not?
This does not happen in real life. We tell file Americans: Your
plane flew over our country on an intelligence mission. We tracked its
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
flight and it flew to the Sverdlovsk area, where it was brought down.
That is how you got into a mess and you are in a mess. Pluck up
your courage and say : Yes, there was such a disgraceful fact. And
this is a big disgrace for America since everyone sees now how dis-
graced in the eyes of the world are those who committeed such a
shocking act of aggression. The whole world wants peace, a relaxa-
tion of international tension while certain quarters in the United
States stage such a provocation..
What were the purposes of this flight? A provocation! This is
bad, very bad indeed !
TIMING FOR SUMMIT SEEN
I have already said, comrades, and now I repeat, that this was done
deliberately and deliberately timed for the summit meeting in Paris.
It is said that it was the work of the military. Only the military?
What kind of state is this if the military do what the Government op-
poses? How can the Government tolerate this? If anyone of our
military allowed himself to do such a thing, we would pull him up im-
mediately. The Government and the country are strong when the en-
tire machinery functions smoothly, when everything is subordinated to
the Government. Therein lies real strength. Understand me rightly :
When everyone pulls in a different direction what kind of state is this
and what confidence can one have in the policy of such a state?
There can be no confidence in the policy of such a state ! The state-
ment that the aggressive flight was made without the will and instruc-
tions of the Government, that nothing was known of it in the State
Department, does not give credit to the Department of State of the
United States. And what about Allen Dulles?
For he knew about all this and he also is a member of the United
States Government ! For this is Allen Du] l.es' aviation ! It turns out
that the State Department's reply is, as the saying has it, too thin.
It is possible, I do not know this for certain, but I do not preclude
the possibility that the Government of the United States of America.
knew of this flight. But I, so to speak, confide it to you I
In diplomatic language it would be better to say ; It knew, but it
stopped its ears and closed its eyes and now depicts the matter as if the
devil led astray some official. However, let it be, with this Govern-
ment and with its way of issuing statements on all this.
One thing is alarming in this statement. It is vague. More, this
statement blames us for not allowing to fly over or travel across our
country those who want to study our defenses, to discover secrets,
And that is why they, that means the American Government, had been
impelled to send planes on intelligence missions. This is a very dan-
gerous explanation. It is dangerous because it does not denounce but
tries to justify such a flight and seems to say that such flights are pos-
sible in the future, too, because the Soviet Union does not think to
reveal its secrets to countries that pursue unfriendly policy toward us.
Using this as the only justification, some gentlemen intend to gain.
the right in the eyes of public opinion to fly over our territory in th
future, too, gleaning important military secrets.
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190 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
I repeat once again this is very dangerous, let alone that it is wrong
rinciplc and not in keeping with the spirit of international peace-
Wrelations. If someone intends to fly over our territory, recon-
noitering objectives and gleaning state secrets, we shall bring down
such planes, dust bring diem down !
Afore, if such flights are repeated, we shall take appropriate counter-
measures.
OTHER COUNTRIES WARNED
I should say thus : Those countries that have bases on their territories
should note most carefully the followin : If they allow others to fly
from their bases to our territory we shall hit at those bases. Because
we assess such actions as provocations against our country !
We tell the Governments of those countries, if you leased your ter-
ritory to others and are not the masters of your land, of your country,
hence, we shall have to understand it in our way. Those who lease
your territory, operate against us from your territory. Their lands
are far from us while your land is near. That is why as a warning
to remote targets, we shall find the range to the near ones. Let them
draw the appropriate conclusions.
I should not like to heat up passions because even in wartime people
long for peace, await an end to the war and dream of peace. There
is no war now. Our strength is being tested. Therefore, let us not
draw conclusions aggravating relations between countries, such con-
clusions as would Hamper us in the future, I should like to say, even
in building good relations with the United States of America. Today
I declare once again that we want to live not only in peace but also in
friendship with the American people. The American people want no
war. I am sure of this.
On the eve of the Paris meeting the a gressive circles wanted to
bring strong pressure to bear upon us. We say: Let us conclude a
peace treaty with Germany. Some of our former wartime allies are
against this.
WEST BERLIN STAND DECRIED
But why I Plainly speakin , why need the United States of Amer-
ica, France and the L nited Kingdom West Berlin 9 They need it
as a dog needs a fifth leg. West Berlin does not give them anything.
By the way, no one encroaches on West Berlin. It is said, freedom
is at stake, but who encroaches on freedom?
Let the West Berliners continue to live as they do now and let them
have the regime they like. The Soviet Government has long since
declared that to select a regime is a matter for each people and that
everyone should live as he prefers to. If the Western powers do not
want to sign a German peace treaty we shall have to sign a peace
treaty with the German Democratic Republic.
The point is that even after we conclude such a treaty with the
German Democratic Republic they would like to exercise those rights
which flow from Germany's surrender, to exercise them in defiance
of the peace treaty we would have signed. But if we sign a peace treaty
with the German Democratic Republic, the terms of war will be ended
and, hence, the terms of surrender will also be ended. They will
cease to operate. If after the signing of a peace treaty some one would
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like to force his way into West Berlin which we would like to see
a free city, our force will resist this force.
Aware of this, some leaders in the United States of America decided
to teach Khrushchev a lesson. Since it is said that force will resist
force, we shall teach a lesson to the Soviet Union, we shall fly over
your territory and we already flew over it and returned home.
EARLIER FLYOVER NOTED
This happened, for instance, on April 9. I have already spoken of
this. Even now this flight is denied in the United States. In this
case the ethics is : If the thief is not caught, he. is no thief. But this
time we caught the thief and now the whole world knows of it.
The reconnaissance plane should have been brought down on April
9, too. But our military, to put it mildly, let a chance slip by. And
we, as one says, took them to task for it. On May 1 the reconnaissance
plane was shot down. The military splendidly coped with the task
when the opponent grew bold. For the American military thought
like this : If the April 9 flight passed off with impunity, hat means
they cannot hit it at such an altitude, and the aggressive military
wanted to demonstrate their strength once again fifteen days before
the summit meeting.
Well,. Khrushchev, what are you boasting of? We fly over your
country and you can do nothing about it. They expected to fly over
over Soviet territory this time, too, to fly over Sverdlovsk and to show
that we can do nothing about it. Indeed, an unpleasant situation 1
And now when he hit the air pirate with a rocket, as the saying has
it, it is time to dismount from the horse I
S. M. Budenny : One must slash down to the saddle, and everything
will ggo to pieces.
Niki.ta Khrushchev : I believe that this cavalry rule is quite appro-
priate!
Attempts are still made to frighten us because in the West bombers
are flying on round-the-clock vigil * * *.
I should like to tell those people : Listen, gentlemen, we also have
bombers, but they are not on vigil, in our country rockets are on vigil 1
It is common knowledme that V bombers, as a rule, fly at an altitude
ranging from 12,000 to 17,000 meters, they cannot rise higher because
designers still cannot overcome technical difficulties. The plane which
committed the diversion on May 1 flew at an altitude of 20,000 meters.
They say it was an unarmed V plane. It was because it was unarmed
that it could fly at such an altitude. They expected that such a plane
will be invulnerable for a long time to go. They even expected that
this will be almost for all time.
I shall say further, when Twining, the then Chief of Staff of the
United States Air Force, arrived here we welcomed him as guest and
entertained him. He left. our country by air and next day sent a
plane flying at great altitude to our country. This plane flew as far as
Kiev. The question arose: Should we protest? I proposed that no
protest should be lodged. Only an animal might act like Twining
which, eating at one place, might do its unpleasant business there.
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From such behavior we drew the conclusion : To improve rockets, to
improve fighters. Our fighters can fly as high as 28,000 meters. But
the difficulties of a fighter are that though it can rise high, it is not
so easy and simple to find the target in the air; a plane in the air is
like a needle in the ocean.
But the rocket finds its targets itself. This is the advantage of the
rocket and we use of it. W eiave both fighters and rockets. That is
why I say: If there are still politicians who would like to rely on
bombers, they are doomed to failure. With the up-to-date military
techniques bombers will be shot down even before they approach the
target. We also have good aviation. I flew to America in a TU-114.
This plane is a modification of a bomber with a flying range of 17,000
kilometers. I mentioned this to the President of the United States.
However, the ceiling of the bomber is within the sphere of operation
of fighters. It is now not so difficult to bring down a bomber.
The Americans can do this, but we can do it even better.
That is why one should abandon this exchange of threats. It would
be better to speak of peace and friendship, how mutually advantageous
it is to trade, how good relations can be established between peoples
how cultural contacts and tourist travel can be developed. This would
be a far more useful and lofty job and all the peoples of the world
would welcome this. This is precisely what our stand is, comrades!
The peoples demand tranquillity, they are against wars and military
conflicts. Let us try and meet these just demands of the people.
SOVIET GO.tLS CITED
When we were preparing the recent session of the Supreme Soviet
we did not envisage the discussion of any military questions. We
drafted a law on the abolition of taxes paid by factory and office
workers and a law on the completion of the transition to a, seven and
six-Hour working day. We prepared for discussion at the session
the question of Increasing by 25,000,000,000 to 30,000,000,000 rubles
expenditures for the expansion of industry manufacturing consumer
goods so as to emerge to first place in Europe during this seven-year-
lan period and to catch up with the United States five years later.
What lofty aims from the attainment of which not a single people, not
a single individual in the world, would suffer!
And here, as one says, to "cheer us up " they timed such an ag-
gressive act for the great proletarian May bay holiday ! But the ag-
gressors themselves did not expect that they would indeed cheer
us up. When Marshal Malinovsl y mounted the mausoleum on May
Day to make his speech, I could already congratulate him on the shoot-
ing down of the plane. Ile replied that ho had learned this just be-
fore motoring to Red Square. This was good news before the min-
ister's speech at the May Day parade.
Comrades, today we are celebrating the day of victory in the war
in which we lost more people and wealth than any other country.
We mourn over the dead but at the same time we celebrate and rejoice
in our victory.
We rejoice because our people not only rehabilitated the devastated
economy but far surpassed the pro-war level of development. This
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victory is also being celebrated in countries that were our allies
in the last war. The Ambassadors of those countries are also here.
We have just clinked glasses with the American Ambassador, Mr.
n the air are already not ringing proper
Thompson. gla.ssess in the u Czechoslovak "clinking"
ringing.
I respect the Ambassador of the United States and I am convinced
that he had nothing to do with this incursion, that he could not have
anything to do even if he wished to.
I am convinced of the ethical qualities of this man. Since I know
him I think that he is not capable of such a thing. Evidently lie
feels this incident as a big annoyance for his country and for himself
as the representative of the United States in the Soviet Union. This
must be taken into consideration.
Comrades ! I propose a toast to the victory, to the nations and peo-
ples who fought against Nazi Germany and with us won a great
victory !
I propose a toast to friendly Czechoslovakia, to the remarkable
people of Czechoslovakia, to the hosts of this house, the Ambassador
of the Czechoslovak Republic, Comrade Dvorak, and his wife, to all
who represent the fraternal Czechoslovak Republic in the Soviet
Union !
I raise my glass to the end of wars, to the end of provocations, to
peace and friendship between the peoples.
9. STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE
MAY 9, 1960
[Department of State press release No. 254]
On May 7 the Department of State spokesman made a statement
with respect to the alleged shooting down of an unarmed American
civilian aircraft of the U-2 type over the Soviet Union. The follow.
ing supplements and clarifies this statement as respects the position
of the United States Government.
Ever since Marshal Stalin shifted the policy of the Soviet Union
from wartime cooperation to postwar conflict in 1946 and particularly
since the Berlin blockade, the forceful takeover of Czechoslovakia
and the Communist aggressions in Korea and Vietnam the world has
lived in a state of apprehension with respect to Soviet intentions. The
Soviet leaders have almost complete access to the, open societies of
the free world and supplement this with vast espionage networks.
However, they keep their own society tightly closed and rigorously
controlled. With the development of modern weapons carrying tre-
mendously destructive nuclear warheads, the threat of, urprise attack
and aggression presents a constant danger. This menace is enhanced
by the threats of mass destruction frequently voiced by the Soviet
leadership.
For many years the United States in company with its allies has
sought to lessen or even to eliminate this threat from the life of man so
that he can go about his peaceful business without fear. Many pro-
posals to this end have been put up to the Soviet Union. The Presi-
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dent's "open skies" proposal of 1955 was followed in 1957 by the
offer of an exchange of ground observers between agreed military
installations in the U.S., the U.S.S.R. and other nations that might
wish to participate. For several years we have been seeking the
mutual abolition of the restrictions on travel imposed by the Soviet
Union and those which the United States felt obliged to institute on
a reciprocal basis. More recently at the Geneva disarmament con-
ference the United States has proposed far-reaching new measures of
controlled disarmament.. It is possible that the Soviet leaders have
a different version and that, however unjustifiedly, they fear attack
from the West. But this is hard to reconcile with their continual
rejection of our repeated proposals for effective measures against
surprise attack and for effective inspection of disarmament measures.
I will say frankly that it is unacceptable that the Soviet political
system should be given an opportunity to make secret preparations to
face the free world with the choice of abject surrender or nuclear
destruction. The Government of the United States would be derelict
to its responsibility not only to the American people but to free peoples
everywhere if it chid not, in the absence of Soviet cooperation, take
such measures as are possible unilaterally to lessen and to overcome this
danger of surprise attack. In fact the United States has not and
does not shirk this responsibility.
In accordance with the National Security Act of 1947, the President
has put into effect since the beginning of his Administration directives
to gather by every possible means the information required to protect
the United States and the Free World against surprise attack and to
enable them to make effective preparations for their defense. Under
these directives programs have been developed and put into operation
which have included extensive aerial surveilance by unarmed civilian
aircraft, normally of a peripheral character but on occasion by pene-
tration. Specific missions of these unarmed civilian aircraft have not
been subject to Presidential authorization. The fact that such sur-
veillance was taking place has apparently not been a secret to the
Soviet leadership and the question indeed arises as to why at this
particular juncture they should seek to exploit the present incident
as a propaganda battle in the cold war.
This government had sincerely hoped and continues to hope that in
the coming meeting of the Heads of Government in Paris Chairman
Ihrushchev would be prepared to cooperate in agrteeing to effective
measures which would remove this fear of sudden mass destruction
from the minds of peoples everywhere. Far from being damaging to
the forthcoming meeting in Paris, this incident should serve to under-
line the importance to the world of an earnest attempt there to achieve
agreed and effective safeguards against surprise attack and aggression.
At my request and with the authority of the President, the Director
of the Central Intel] igence Agency, the Honorable Allen W. Dulles, is
today briefing Memgers of the Congress fully along the foregoing
lines.
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10. TEXT OF SOVIET UNION NOTE TO THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT, MAY 10, 1960
[From the New York Times, May 11, 1960]
Moscow, May 10 (AP)-Following is the text of a Soviet note to-
day to the United States on the downing of an American plane, as
translated by the United States Embassy.
The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics con-
siders it necessary to state the following to the Government of the
United States of America :
On May 1 of this year at 5 hours 36 minutes (5:36 A.M.), Moscow
time, a military aircraft violated the boundaries of the U.S.S.R. and
intruded across the borders of the Soviet Union for a distance of
more than 2,000 kilometers (1,240 miles). The Government of the
U.S.S.R. naturally could not leave unpunished such a flagrant viola-
tion of the Soviet state boundaries. When the intentions of the violat-
ing aircraft became apparent, it was shot down by Soviet rocket
troops in the area of Sverdlovsk.
Upon examination by experts of all data at the disposal of the
Soviet side, it was incontrovertibly established that the intruder air-
craft belonged to the United States of America, was permanently
based in Turkey and was sent through Pakistan into the Soviet Union
with hostile purposes.
SOVIET CITES EVIDENCE
As the Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, N. S.
Khrushchev, made public on May 7 at the final session of the U.S.S.R.
Supreme Soviet, data from the investigation leave no doubt with
respect to the purposes of the flight of the American aircraft which
violated the U.S.S.R.'s border on May 1. This aircraft was especially
equipped for a reconnaissance and diversionary flight over the ter-
ritory of the Soviet Union. It had on board apparatus for aerial
photography, for detecting the Soviet radar network and other spe-
cial radio-technical equipment which formed part of the U.S.S.R.
anti-aircraft defenses. At the disposal of the Soviet expert commis-
sion, which carried out the investigation, there is undisputable proof
of the espionage reconnaissance mission of the American aircraft;
films of Soviet defense and industrial establishments, a tape recording
of the signals of Soviet radar stations and other data.
The pilot [Francis G.] Powers, about whose fate the Embassy of
the U.S.A. inquired in its note of May 6, is alive and, as indicated in
the afore-mentioned speech of the Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council
of Ministers, N. S. Khrushchev, will be brought to account under the
laws of the Soviet state. The pilot has indicated that he did every-
thing in full accordance with the assignment given him. On the
flight map taken from him there was clearly and accurately marked
the entire route he was assigned after take-off from Adana [Turkey] ;
Peshawar [Pakistan]-Aral-Sverdlovsk-Archangel-Murmansk, fol-
lowed by a landing at the Norwegian airfield at Bodo.
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
PILOT}S UNIT IDENTIFIED
The pilot has also stated that he served in sub-unit No. 10-10.
which under cover of the 'National Aeronautics and Space Adminis-
tration is engaged in high-altitude military reconnaissance.
This and othier information revealed in the speeches of the head
of the Soviet Government completely refuted the-United States State
Dopartnient "s concocted and hurriedly fabricated version, released
May 5 in an official announcement for the press, to the effect that the
aircraft was allegedly carryin g__ out. meteorological observations in
the upper strata of the atmosphere along the Turkish-Soviet border.
After the complete absurdity of the afore mentioned version had
been shown and it had been incontrovertibly proved that the Ameri-
can aircraft intruded across the borders of the Soviet Union for ag-
gressive reconnaissance purposes, a new announcement was made by
the United States State Department oil May 8 [Moscow time] which
contained the forced admission that the- aircraft was sent into the
Soviet Union for military reconnaissance purposes and, by that very
fact, it was admitted that the flight was pursuing aggressive pur-
poses.
In this way after three days the State Department already had
denied the version which obviously had been intended to mislead
world public opinion as well as the public opinion of America itself.
"OPEN SKIES`} ISSUE NOTED
The State Department considered it appropriate to refer in this
announcement to the "open skies" proposal made by the Government
of the U. S. A. in 19.5E and to the refusal of the Soviet Government
to accept this proposal. Yet, the Soviet Government,, like the govern-
ments of many other states, refused to accept this proposal which
was intended to throw open the doors of other nations to American
reconnaissance. The activities of American aviation only confirm the
correctness of the evaluation given to this proposal at the time by the
Soviet Government..
Does all this mean that, with the refusal of a number of states to
accept this proposal for "open skies" the U. S. A. is attempting arbi-
trarily to take upon itself the right to "open" a foreign sky?
It is enough to put the question this way, for the complete ground-
lessness of t le afore-mentioned reference to the U. S. A. "open sky"
proposal to become clear.
It follows from the aforementioned May 8 announcement from the
United States State Department that hostile acts by American avia-
tion, which have taken place numerous times in relation to the Soviet
Union, are not simply it result of the activity of the military com-
mands of the U. S. A. in various areas but are an expression of a
calculated U. S. A. policy. What the Scriet Government has re-
peatedly declared in its representations to the Government of the
U. S. A. in connection with the violations of the U. S. S. B. national
boundaries by American airplanes has been confirmed, namely, that
these violations are premeditated.
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U. S. POLICY DISCUSSED
All this testifies that the Government of the U. S. A., instead of
taking measures to stop such action by American aviation, the danger
of which has more than once been pointed out by the Soviet Govern-
ment, officially announces such actions as its national policy.
Thus, the 0overnment of the, U.S.A., in the first place testifies to
dovernment
the fact that its answers to representations of the Soviet
t
s ue,and that l all v olt ons by alAmeri o n
to were avoid ?ubstance of tl form, behind
aircraft arcrcraft of national boundaries of the U.S.S.R. represented actions
conforming to U.S.A. policy.
In the second place, and this is the main point, by sanctioning such
? actions of American aviation, the Government of the U.S.A. aggTa;
vies the situation even more.
One must ask, how is it possible to reconcile this with declarations
tStriving for prove
the of leading oviet Government, U.S.A. s also
thU. .A like the S
ment of relations between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., for a relaxa-
tion of international tension, and the strengthening of trust between
states.
Military intelligence activities by one nation by means of intrusion
of its aircraft into the area of another country can hardly be called
a method for improving relations and strengthening trust.
It is self-evident that the Soviet Government is compelled under
such circumstances to give strict instructions to its armed forces to
take all necessary measures against the violation of Soviet boundaries
by foreign aviation.
VIEWS SAID TO DIFFER
The Government of the U.S.S.R. regretfully states that , while it
undertakes everything possible for the normalization and improve-
ment of the international situation, the Government of the U.S.A.
follows a different path.
It is impossible to exclude the thought that, apparently, the two
governments view differently the necessity of improving relations be-
tween our countries and for the creation of favorable ground for the
forthcoming summit meeting.
The Soviet Government, as well as all the Soviet peoples, considers
that personal meeting and discussions of the President of the U.S.A.
a good be-
and other U.S.S.R. during his visit in the U.S.A. Council
ginning Minis-
tors of f the .S.R. during
ginning in the cause of normalizing Soviet-American relations and
therefore an improvement of the entire international situation as well.
however, the latest actions of the American authorities apparently
seek to return the state of American-Soviet relations to the worst time
of the "cold war" and to poison the international situation before the
summit meeting.
The Government of the U.S.S.R. cannot avoid pointing out, that
the State Department's statement which is unprecedented in its cyni-
cism, not only justifies provocative flights of the armed forces of the
U.S.X. but also acknowledges that such actions are a "normal phe-
nomenon" and this in fact states that in future the United States
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intends to continue provocative invasions into the confines of the air
space of the Soviet Union for the purpose of intelligence.
U.B. CONTRADICTION SEEN
Thus the Government of the U.S.S.R. concludes that the announce-
ment that the flight was carried out without the knowledge and per-
mission of the Governnment of the U.S.A. does not correspond to
reality because in the very same announcement the necessity for
carrying on intelligence activities against the Soviet Union is justi-
fied. This means that espionage activities of American aircraft are
carried on with the sanction of the Government of the U.S.A.
The Government of the Soviet I'nion makes an emphatic protest
to the Government of the U.S.A. in connection with the aggressive
acts of American aviation and warns that, if similar provocations
are re eated, it will be obliged to take retaliatory measures, the re-
sponsibility for the consequences of which will rest on the Government
of the state committing aggression against other countries.
TheSoviet Government would sincerely like to hope that the Gov-
ernment of the U.S.A. recognized in the final analysis that the inter-
ests of preserving and strengthening peace among people, including
the interest of the American people itself, whose starving far eace
was well demonstrated during the visit of the head of the Soviet
Government, N, S. Khrushchev, to the U.S.A., will be served by the
cessation of the aforementioned dangerous provocative activities
against the U.S.S.R., by cessation of the "cold war," and by research
through joint efforts with the Soviet Union and other interested
states for a solution of unsettled international problems on a mutually
acceptable basis, which is awaited by all people.
11. TRANSCRIPT OF PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S NEWS
CONFERENCE, MAY 11, 1964 [EXCERPTS]
[From the tiew York Times, May 12, 10GO]
Washington, May 11 (UPI)-Following is the transcript of Presi-
dent Eisenhower's news conference today:
PRESIDENT EISENnowER. Good morning. Please sit dov-n.
I have made some notes from which f want to talk to you about
this U-2 incident.
A full statement, about this matter has been made by the State Do-
partnient and there have been several statesmanlike remarks by lead-
ers of both parties.
For my part, I supplement what the Secretary of State has had
to say, with the following four main points. After that I shall have
nothing further to say-for the simple reason I can think of nothing
to add that might be useful at this time.
The first point is this: The need for intelligence-gathering activities.
No one wants another Pearl Harbor. This means that we must have
knowledge of military forces and preparations around the world, es-
pecially those capable of massive surprise attack.
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Secrecy in the Soviet Union makes this essential. In most of the
world no large-scale attack could be prepared in secret, but in the
Soviet Union there is a fetish of secrecy and concealment. This is a
major cause of international tension and uneasiness today. Our de-
terrent must never be placed in jeopardy. The safety of the whole
free world demands this.
As the Secretary of State pointed out in his recent statement, ever
since the beginning.of my Administration I have issued directives to
gather, in every feasible way, the information required to protect the
United' States and the free world against surprise attack and to enable
them to make effective preparations for defense.
My second point : The nature of intelligence-gathering activities.
"BELOW THE SURFACE"
These have a special and secret character. They are, so to speak,
"below the surface" activities. They are secret because they must cir-
cumvent measures designed by other countries to protect secrecy of
military preparations.
They are divorced from the regular visible agencies of movernment
which stay clear of operational involvement in specific detailed
activities. gather
These elements operate under broad directives to seek and mo g.
intelligence short of the use of force-with operations supervised by
responsible officials within this area of secret activities.
We do not use our Army, Navy or Air Force for this purpose, first
to avoid any possibility of the use of force in connection with these
activities, and second, because our military forces, for obvious reasons,
cannot be given latitude under broad directives, but must be kept under
strict control in every detail.
These activities have their own rules and methods of concealment
which seek to mislead and obscure-just as-in the Soviet allegations
there are many discrepancies. For example, there is some reason to
believe that the plane in question was not shot down at high altitude.
The normal agencies of our Government are unaware of these specific
activities or of the special efforts to conceal them.
Third point : How should we view all of this activity?
DISTASTEFUL BUT VITAL
It is a distasteful but vital necessity.
We prefer and work for a different kind of world-and a different
way of obtaining the information essential to confidence and effective
deterrents. Open societies, in the day of present weapons, are the only
answer.
This was the reason for my "open skies" proposal in 1955, which
I was ready instantly to put into effect-to permit aerial observation
over the United States and the Soviet Union which would assure that
no surprise attack was being prepared against anyone. I sliall bring
up the "open skies" proposal again at Paris-since it is a means of
ending concealment and suspicion.
My final point is that we must not be distracted from the real issues
of the day by what is an incident or a symptom of the world situation
today.
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200 EVENTS LNCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
This incident has been given great propaganda exploitation. The
emphasis given to a flight of an unarmed nonmilitary plane can on]
reflect a fetish of secrecy. y
The real issues are the ones we will be working on at the summit-
disarmarnent, search for solutions affecting Germany and Berlin and
the whole range of East-West relations, including the reduction of
secrecy and suspicion.
Frankly, I am hopeful that we may make progress on these great
issues. This is what we mean when we Speak of "working for peace."
And as I remind you, I will have nothing further to say about this
matter.
1. Rosuirr J. DONOVAN of The New York Herald Tribune. Mr.
President, since our last visit, or conference, Prime Minister Khru-
shchev has made some pretty vigorous statements about your plans
for bringing Mr. \ixoii to the summit in case you had to come home.
Do his comments in any way change your intention?
A. No, indeed. And, I should clarify somethin , there seems to be
some misunderstanding; because a friend from Congress, a friend
indeed of the other party, told me the other day that he had never
heard of the latter part of my press conference on this point where I
said if my-if my absence from the conference had to be more than
two or three days, I would be right back there, and I believe I re-
marked, I am not sure, that the jet plane made this kind of a trip
possible.
Now, as far as Mr. Khrushchev's statement this, I can just say this:
He has never asked me my opinion of some of his people. [Laughter.]
2. CuAiu.Es H. Mona of Time magazine. Mr. President, in case, Mr.
President, that the Soviet Union should reject your proposal for sur-
prise attack conference, or open skies arrangements, do you think that
the development of satellites like Samos and Midas will possibly in
the next few years erase our worries on the score of surveillance and
also are you doing anything now to speed up those scientific projects?
A. Well I know of nothing-no, I keep in touch with my Scientific
Advisory committee and operators, and I know of nothing we could
do to speed these up. The are research items and as such no one can
predict exactly what would be their degree of efficiency. So I couldn't
make a real prediction of what is going-how useful they are going
to be.
Q. Sir, do you think that their development will ease our worries
on the question of secrecy?
A. Well, I say, I just can't predict what the final results will be.
Now. we do know this, right now. I believe, it's either Tiros that is
sndmg back constantly pictures on the cloud cover all around the
earth, and that is admittedly a rather rough example of what might
be done in photography. But this is being done constantly, and I
don't know ow many thousands of photographs have been taken, and
they send them back on command.
3. LAURENCE Ii. Buav of The Chicago Tribune. Mr. President, last
week you used the word "if" in connection with your trip to Russia.
Have you changed any plans about that, or think you mi ht?
A. No, not at all. I have no idea, but you can never tell from one
day to the other what is happening in this world, it seems, so I just
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said-"if"-and I put it in the positive sense, I think. I expect to go;
put it that way.
5. EDWARD T. FOLLIARD of the Washington Post and Times Herald.
Mr. President, do you think the outlook for the summit conference
has changed, or has been changed in the last week or so?
A. Not decisively at all, no.
* * * *
11. MERRIMAN SMITH of United Press International. Mr. President,
quite aside from your comment about the U-2 plane episode, sir, I
wonder if you could give us your reaction to a rather denunciatory
speech made this morning, right ahead of the summit meeting, by the
Russian Foreign Minister. Mr. Gromyko attributes to this country
deeds and efforts which he said amount to dangerous ways of bal-
ancing on the brink of war. He says that the United States has de-
liberately engaged in provocative acts in conjunction with some of our
Allies.
Now, with statements like this, do you still maintain a hopeful
attitude toward the summit?
A. Well, I'd say yes. I have some hope, because these things have
been said for many years, ever since World War II, and there is no
real change in this matter.
Now, if we-I wonder how many of you people have read the full
text of the Abel trial, the record of the trial of Mr. Abel [Rudolph
Abel, convicted Soviet spy.] Well, I think he was sentenced to thirty
years. Now, this business of saying that you're, doing things that are
provocative, why, they had better look at their own record. And I'll
tell you this : the United States and none of its Allies that I know of
has engaged in nothing that would be considered honestly as provoca-
tive. We are looking to our own security and our defense and we
have no idea of promoting any kind of conflict or war. This is just,
it's absolutely ridiculous and they know it is.
12. HENRY N. TAYLOR of the Scripps-Howard Newspapers. Mr.
President, sir, would it be trespassing on your request about the U-2
to ask if you could tell us something about any possible Soviet recon-
naissance flights over the Western part of the world, and our response
to them, if any?
A. Well, I could just say this: as far as I know, there has never
been any over the United States.
15. CHARLES W. ROBERTS of Newsweek. Sir, in connection with the
Abel trial which you mentioned-the Soviet Government in that case
made no effort to defend Colonel Abel. I wonder if an American
citizen were arrested by a foreign government and brought to trial
as a spy, what the policy of this Government would be so far as his
defense was concerned?
A. Well, we would certainly offer the good offices of our embassy,
and see whether there was anything we could do. Of course, we
would have to do it, it would be an internal matter there and we
would have to do it with the permission of the other country. So
far as I-I think that if there is anything wrong diplomatically with
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my answer, you had better ask the State Department, but I think that
would be the result.
*
17. M u viN L. ARRoWSMITU of the Associated Press. Mr. President.,
you have said many times that you wouldn't go to the summit under'
any threats or ultimatums. Yesterday, as you know, the Soviets in
their note threatened retaliation against us if we continued to fly these
planes over their territory. Do you regard that kind of threat as
within the category you were speaking of? A. No. I think that you
have to set that aside in a special category. I don't believe it's the
kind of thing that you call an ultimatum at all.
18. EDWARD P. MOIWAN of American Broadcasting Co. Mr. Presi-
dent, a point of clarification, Mr. President: Do we infer correctly that
your prepared statement this morning is the final, complete and ulti-
mate answer to your critics, friendly and hostile, on the subject?
A. I said that at this time I could see nothing useful more that I
could say, so that's where I stand at this moment.
20. JOHN SCALI of the Associated Press. Mr. President, you said
in your initial statement that the Soviet account of the downing of
this plane contained many discrepancies, and that there was reason
to doubt that the plane was downed at a high altitude, as Afr. Khru-
shchev claims.
Can you tell us, sir, wlhetlier the Administration at some future time
intends to expose these discrepancies, and can you at this time without
violating what you have said, give us any more details about how we
believe t1iis plane actually came down in the Soviet Union?
A. Well, .1 don't think I am-you raise a question that is really an
auxiliary to the main issue, and so I don't mind saying this: That,
take the pictures themselves, we know that they were not, or we believe
we know that they are not pictures of the plane that was downed,
and there are other things in their statements.
Now, I don't know what's going to happen in the future, but these
things you can be sure will be carefully looked into. And, as again
I say, I do not foreclose any kind of statement that in the future may
be necessary. I am saying that now I can see nothing more useful:
to say.
23. RAYMOND P. BRAT DT of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch. In view
of your emphasis on the---you might go back to the summit if you had
to come back here, have you any idea how long the Paris meeting will
go on, how lone do you think it will take you to get to some agreement t
A. Well, I c(ron't know. But I just want to point this out : I hear
that some, and I don't know whether this is all of the others or not,
but they do not like the simultaneous translations. Now, let us assume
you have called an hour's conference, and one of you, for example,
wants to make a, let's say, a ten-minute eg osition. When you take
seriatum translations, here is already a half hour of an hour's con-
ference gone, and you have had only ten minutes.
Now, these are very slow and laborious things, and consequently
the possibility of prophesying how long this thing is going to be is
really remote. Now, for my part, I am perfectly ready to work as
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many hours as an individual human can to get this thing along the
line, but I am prepared to go to this thing as long as there is any
usefulness whatsoever promised, and even if I am called back, and I
know I have one date for one twenty-four hours, I am still ready and
prepared to go back. And that is what I have been trying to insist,
that I am not making my own convenience and my own duties here the
decisive thing as to how long this conference will last.
24. LILLIAN LEVY of the National Jewish Post and Opinion.-Mr.
President, are any changes in the present borders of West Germany
part of the German question to be discussed at the summit? I ask
this, sir, because this issue has been raised by a responsible West Ger-
man leader and member of Adenauer's Cabinet who recently suggested
that Germans be allowed to return to Sudetenland.
A. I didn't get the very first clause of your question.
Q. Well, what I asked-were boundaries going to be part of the
German question to be raised?
A. Well, at this time we wouldn't raise it. As a matter of fact,
they've been living with these boundaries for a long time, and I would
see at this moment no possibility of changing them except in methods
that would be unacceptable, so, it might be raised by someone but
I have no plan to do it.
Mr. AitmiowsMITII. Thank you, Mr. President.
12. ACCOUNT OF PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV'S INFORMAL
NEWS CONFERENCE, MAY 11, 1960
[From the New York Times, May 13, 1960]
London, May 12 (Reuters).-Followin is an account, issued today
by Tass, Soviet press agency, of the in f ormal news conference held
yesterday in Moscow by Premier Khrushchev, incorporating a tran-
script of the questions and his replies:
Following the press conference given by Foreign Minister Andrei
Gromyko, Soviet and foreign correspondents were invited to examine
the exhibition of the fragments of the downed American plane.
During their visit to the exhibition, the correspondents met Nikita
Khrushchev, who, having examined the wreckage of the plane and
talked to experts, was preparing to leave. The correspondents sur-
rounded Nikita Khrushchev and a conversation ensued.
The correspondents expressed satisfaction with having been given
an opportunity of examining the fragments of the plane and the
equipment and special apparatuses it carried.
I see that you are satisfied with the press conference, Nikita Khru-
shchev said. You must have got the answers to all your questions.
I have already said that we intend to take to the Security Council the
question of the aggressive intrusion of an American plane within the
confines of our country.
If the Security Council-on which, apparently, pressure will be
exerted by the United States-does not take the right decision, we
shall raise the matter in the United Nations General Assembly.
Such aggressive actions by the United States of America are highly
dangerous things.
56412-6Q-14
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This danger is enhanced by the fact that in his statement of May
9, the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Herter, not only sought to
justify this act of aggression, but said also that the U.S. vcrnment
mtencIed to continue such flights.
"OPEN TII1{EAT TO PEACE"
This is an open threat. to peace. We will shoot down such planes,
and we will strike at the bases from which these planes will be sent to
our country. You understand that if such aggressive actions con-
tinue, this might lead to war.
Question. K fay I ask you a question? one of the correspondents
asked Nikita Khrushchev.
Mr. IKIRusircnEV. Even two if you like.
Q. You have probably noticed a placard among the fragments of
the plane urging assistance to the pilot. What do you think its
authors meant.?
A, We assisted the pilot when he flew into our territory and gave
him due welcome. If there are other such invited guests, we shall
receive them just as hospitably as this one. We shall try him, try
him severely as a s y.
Q. How could all this affect the summit meeting?
A. Let those who sent this spy plane think over this question.
Though they should have thought about the consequences beforehand.
After all, an aggression has been committed against our country.
And we shall continue annihilating all the aggressors who dare raise
a hand against us. You see how accurately our rocketeers shot down
the plane without setting it on fire'. The pilot is alive, the instru-
mentation intact, in other words the material evidence is here for
everyone to see. These are very skillful actions of our rocketeers.
We are very grateful to them for this.
Q. Will this plane incident influence Soviet public opinion when
Mr. Eisenhower comes to Moscow?
A. I would not like to be in Mr. Eisenhower's place. I would not
like to be asked the questions which might be put to him when be comes
to the Soviet Union. I can only say : The Soviet people and our public
are very polite, so there will be no excesses, but questions will be asked
of course.
I would put it this way : one person, namely, NIr. Herter, has helped
the President particularly in this respect.
At his press conferenceHerter made an outrageous statement! Far
from feeling guilty and ashamed of aggressive actions, he justifies
them and says that this will continue in the future. Only countries
which are in a state of war can act in this way.
We are not in a state of war with America. These aggressive actions
and Herter's statement are impudence, sheer impudence!
Herter's statement has made us doubt the correctness of our earlier
conclusions that the President, the American Government, did not
know about the flights. Herter's statement says that this intelligence
plan was endorsed by the Government.
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The Americans, obviously, were compelled to say this because other-
wise they would have had to bring Allen Dulles to account. Dulles, in
turn, would have exposed the Government by saying that he carried the head of
stater ntrtatwas made by
the Government VeI proceed from consequently,
Herter. days-when many
There was a time-I remember it from my young
criminals and other suspicious elements roamed the world. These peo-
ple resorted to a followinm trick :
A bandit with a small boy would hide under a bridge and wait for
someone to cross it. Then the bandit would send the boy to the passer-
by and the boy would say : Hello, Mister, give me back my watch.
The natural answer would be: "What's that? Now run along!" Then
the boy would insist : But look, Mister, this watch is mine. Why don't
you give me back my watch? Then the armed bandit would appear, as
do yttracted ou bully the, bonoise of the im back his watch and pass passer-by:
Why over
Why y Y Y? Give h
your coat, too !
The United States wants to live according to this law. But we are
not defenseless passers-by. Our country is a strong and mighty state
which can try its strength with it. If the United States has not experi-
enced yet a real war on its territory, has not experienced air raids,
and if it wishes to unleash a war, we shall be compelled to fire rockets
which will explode on the aggressor's territory in the very first
minutes of war.
I say this because I have read Herter's statement saying : "We are
compelled to fly ; it is the fault of the Soviet Union itself, because it
does not give us access to its secrets, which we simply must know.
This is why, if you please, we undertake such flights. After all, the
President has said that the skies should be open-this is why we fly
and shall go on flying, shall go on opening the skies."
How can an official representative of a state speak in this way about
another nation !
We do not live according to the laws of the United States. We have
our own laws and this is why we shall make everyone on our territory
respect these laws-and the violators will be thrashed !
I liked the article in the British newspaper Daily Worker, whose
meaning was as follows : If we accept the philosophy which some
people in the United States want to instill in the public, it will be, some-
thing like this-it is not the burglar that is guilty, but the owner of
the house he broke into, because he locked it, thereby compelling the
burglar to break in.
But this is a philosophy of thieves anal. bandits !
I think that if world; public opinion correctly realizes all the gravity
of the situation and approaches this aggressive act of the United States
policy with due responsibility, if everyone unanimously condemns this
act; and if the United States Government no longer uses such methods
with regard to other states, this will be a good refreshing, so to say
ozonizing, tendency in international relations.
Reading American press reports these days, I see that excepting a
few gangsters of the pen who are whitewashing this action, the abso-
Inte majority of people writing in the American press, including those
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who are notorious for their past unobjectiveness, are indignant about
this incident, regard it as perfidy with regard to the Soviet Union.
It is a good sign. If you, newsmen, inform the public correctly, this
incident, as very other incident, will finally be digested. After all,
gentlemen, we must live in peace, and not only in peace but also in
friendship.
"INCORRIGIar. , OI'TIUIBT"
~. Can one remain optimistic about the United States policy?
A. I hold myself to be an incorrigible optimist. I regard the
provocative flight of the American intelligence plane over our country
not as a preparation for war, but as probing. They have now probed
us and we boxed the nose of the "probers."
Sonic United States officials are makingg a big noise now. Let them!
The Soviet Union is not Guatemala. Tlrey cannot send troops hero.
We Ilave means to cool down bandits, should they wish to use their
brazen rnetlrods against us. If they behave in this way, they will
get thiscalmative.
Q. Mr. Khrushchev, has your estimate of President Eisenhower,
which you gave upon your return from the United States, changed?
A. Well, the statement issued by the United States Department
of State in connection with the intelligence plane naturally alters
my belief that the United States President had nothing to do with
this affair. I did not know that such an intelligence plan existed in
the United States and that it included a program of reconnoitering
flights over the Soviet territory.
It follows from the statement of the Department of State, which
was approved by the President, that flights of American intelligence
PPlanes over our country are not a whim of some irresponsible officer,
but realization of a plan, prepared by Allen Dulles leader of the
Central Intelligence Agency, a department within tine jurisdiction
of the united Atates President.
Air. Herter admitted that the United States President had issued
directives to collect various intelligence information by all possible
means. On the basis of these directives, programs have been worked
out and implemented, which, as Herter said, included large-scale
observations from the air with the aid of aircraft and by means of
penetrations.
I want you to pay attention to this-by means of penetrations
that is by paeans of reconnoitering, spying flights over the territory
of it state with whom normal relations exist.
And this plan was approved by the President. An unheard of
action. And after all this I am expected to say: "What nice people,
you are." That would mean lacking in self-respect.
I would say that Mr. Herter has removed all wrappers. Ile has
removed all tlae paint with which, as it were, they camouflaged, made
up and applied cosmetical treatment to the policy of the imperialists
of the United States.
Now, through his statement, he has revealed the bestial, fear-inspir-
ing face of imperialism.
So what ? It turns out that this face inspires no fear any longer.
Such actions of the U.S.A. militarists are not inspired by the heroism
of these masterminds, but by cowardice,
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Danger comes not from one who has command of one's nerves and
counts on one's powers and possibilities, but from a coward who fears
everything.
I often read something like this: "Khrushchev claims that capi-
talisin will die. Isn't this the reason why reconnaissance flights over
the Soviet Union are made?" But it was not I who said it. It is
Marx who explained this a hundred years ago. If Messrs. Capitalists
consider that Marx is wrong, then this should console them, then
there is nothing to lose one's head over or show the white feather?
Q. Did the Turkish, Pakistani and Norwegian authorities know
about the provocative flight of the American plane?
A. It is difficult for me to speak in the name of these countries,
but I do grant that they did not know-the Americans are not ac-
countable to them. I do not think that even the Prime Ministers
of the countries on whose territory American military bases are situ-
ated are let inside those bases.
The fault of such nations as Turkey or Pakistan is that they have
joined aggressive blocs. The peoples saying on this score is "one sells
one's soul to the devil ; before one has done so, one can be one's own
master, but after it is the devil that is the master." That is how mat-
ters are at present with Turkey, Pakistan and Norway.
I warn you, Messrs. Foreign Journalists, don't sell your souls to
the devil, keep them to yourselves. You would do better by applying
your energies to promoting the progress of society. The Communist
ideas shape the most progressive and the most correct trend in the
development of society.
The best of Americans, such as John Reed, the author of "Ten Days
That Shook the World," grasped the great meaning of these ideas.
John Reed was a very clever man. Yet he was not born Communist,
but came to accept it during the October Revolution, and he died
Communist.
Some of you scribble stories against communism out of lack of wis-
dom and understanding. May God forgive you for this.
When I read the bourgeois journalists' stories slandering Soviet
realities and communism I get angry sometimes, but, on second
thought, I say to myself : Not all the journalists are John Reeds. In-
deed, they are ordinary men, hired by such publishers as Hearst, who,
like spiders, seize a man and enmesh him in their web.
And if such a journalist fails to supply slanders against commu-
nism, what then, will Hearst, or any other publishing concern, need
for him? Hearst will not keep such a correspondent for a single day.
HEARST ARTICLE CRITICIZED
I talked with Hearst twice. During our second conversation I told
him : "How is it that you told me one thing and wrote another?" And
he replied : "Did I sum up the interview wrongly ?
I must do him justice : He summed up the essence of the talk more
or less accurately, but his commentary to it misrepresented the whole
meaning of it.
I told him this, but he replied : But I am a capitalist, it is my own
commentary that I give. Indeed, he is a capitalist, but most of you are
not capitalists, nor will you ever be. So why have you got to serve
capitalism?
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TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
My conviction is that all the roads lead to communism. Where else
can they lead to?
This is just what the American imperialists fear. This is why they
they get nervous, and fling themselves into reckless adventures. This shows
are not sure of their own system,
The State Department of the United States says that all countries
engage in spying. But the Soviet Union never sent its planes into the
United States or any other countries for reconnaissance purposes, nor
does it do so. If there have been any individual instances of our planes
inadvertently violating the airspace of other countries--this has hap-
pened on our frontier with Turkey and Iran-we have apologized to
those countries and punished those responsible for such violations.
We want to warn those who may try to send their spies into this
country to think carefully of the consequences.
Q. Do you still want President Eisenhower to cone to the Soviet
Union?
A. What shall I say ? Take my. dace and say it for me.
You see for yourselves what difficulties are cropping up. I ani
frank with you. You know my attitude to the President of the United
States. I have often spoken about. it. But my hopes have been some-
what disappointed. I am a man and have human feelings. I am re-
sponsible for the direction of the Soviet Government.
You must understand that we Russians, we Soviet people, always
go the whole hog: When we play, we play, and when we fight, we
fight. So how can I now call on our people to turn out and welcome
the dea~r~ gguest that is coming to us. The people will say: Are you
nuts? What kind of a clear guest is lie who allows a plane to fly to us
to spy ? The American militarists who sent the aircraft on a spying
mission over this country have put inc, as one responsible for the ar-
rangements for the United States President's arrival in the U.S.S.R.,
in a very difficult position.
Frankly speaking, I think the United States President understands
this himself.
Supposing, before my visit to the United States, we had sent such
a plane over there and they had shot. it. down. one can imagine the
kind of welcome I would have got. from Americans. They would have
met me according to my desserts. I think everybody understands
that.
One can guarantee, however, that during the President's visit there
will be no excesses. Out- people are courteous; they let off steam in
words, and will leave it to the Government to act. They will not
indulge in any insulting actions.
I think that. American journalists and tourists feel now the con-
straint, and discipline of Soviet people.
I have not heard of a single case of one of our people insulting an
American. This is commendable. This speaks of the strong spirit of
our people.
Q. Will the flight of this plane come up at the summit?
A. It already is the subject of discussion all over the world. That
is why I do not regard it at present as necessary to put this matter on
the agenda of the summit conference.
We are allowing for the fact that I alone will represent the Socialist
countries at the conference while the Western powers will have three
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE T
representatives there. But I do not think that two of these three
approve of this aggressive, dangerous act of American brass hats.
Apparently you would like to know when I intend to fly to Paris.
I intend to arrive in Paris, on May 14, a day or even two before the
conference starts in order to get acclimatized a little. I like Paris, it s
a nice city. Well, and if others do not come-I mention this because
some are threatening that the conference may not take place-then it
will be clear that it is not our fault that the conference did not take
place. So we shall go to Paris? And if the conference does not take
place? Well, we have lived without it for many years and will live
for another hundred.
It is not our country alone that is interested in the conference. All
the world is interested in it. The peoples of all the world want inter-
national tensions to relax, want a normalization of international rela-
tions. I believe our partners in the negotiations are as interested
in the conference as the Soviet Union. Therefore the conference will
depend upon our partners.
We are ready. I intend to emplane for Paris on Saturday, May 14.
Some diplomats take offense and say that Khrushchev,'if you please,
is indulging in too harsh expressions. I should like to have heard their
reactions had a similar aggressive invasion been committed against
their country.
What do you expect of me, after all, that I should take off my hat
and welcome this invasion? No, we shall meet gangsters the way they
deserve. And this was a gangster, bandit raid.
Have you seen here the "air sampling instruments?" How can
the authors of the fib look into our eyes after it was exposed? True,
we know the kind of eyes imperialists have. As the saying goes :
"Spit in their eyes and they would keep saying : God's dew."
Now you see that I did not tell the whole story deliberately at the
Supreme Soviet session because we knew whom we were dealing with.
We did not say at first that the pilot was alive, that the instruments
were intact, that the plane did not explode.
They believed that the pilot committed suicide, and now that he is
alive the American press seriously reprimands the pilot for a breach
of his instructions, for failure to commit suicide and surrendering
instead.
Some in the United States say that the pilot must be brought to
trial for breaking the instructions and failing to destroy himself.
Well, this is bestial talk. This is the ideology of imperialism. You,
gentlemen, American journalists, you read newspapers, don't you?
This is a horrible thing.
NOTE RECEIVED FROM U.S.
Q. Did not the American Charge d'Affaires ask for an interview
with Powers?
A. The Americans have sent us a note on this question and asked
to be allowed to have an interview with him. But they themselves
understand that this is too much. The pilot is now under investigation,
he is a spy, isn't he? So how can one speak about an interview with
him? He must answer before our Soviet court.
Q. Does this mean that neither the Ambassador nor the Charge
d'Affaires will be allowed to see Powers?
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II4CIDENr To THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
A. I did not say that.. Maybe they will, maybe they will not. We
shall see later. Y cannot reply to this question now because the in-
vestigation is in progress.
Q. WW' ill you regard as aggressive actions flights of aircraft. of West-
ern powers to Berlin after t1ie signing of a peace treaty with Eastern
Germany ?
A. We have already made a statement in this connection. I re-
peat:After the signing~, of a peace treaty with the German Democratic
Republic, the status determined by the terms flowing from the mili-
tary surrender for this territory will change.
Since that moment the occupation of 31'st Berlin will be over, all
access to Berlin which was based upon the surrender of Germany will
cease from that moment.. Then file German Democratic Republic
will exercise full control of its territory and will also control access to
West Berlin, which is situated on its territory.
If the German Democratic Republic comes to terms with the coun-
tries concerned and will allow them to use the airspace, the waterways,
the rail and highways, this will no longer be our business. That will
be the business of the German Democratic Republic. That's her
sovereign right.
Some say that the Vestern powers will force their way into West
Berlin.
I want to make it clear. If anyone tries to force his way, our mili-
tary units stationed in the G. D. R. to safeguard peace will counter the
force of violators of peaca with their own force, and let some hotheads
in the West ponder what would come of that for them.
DELAY IN VISIT SrGOESTED
Q. Considering this aircraft incident and your attitude toward
President Eisenhower, wouldn't you prefer Eisenhower's visit to be
put off ?
A. We shall exchange views with the President on this question
when we meet in Paris. We still want to find ways to improve re-
lations with America, we want to have normal relations with the
United States. And we believe that with time Soviet-American re-
lations must grow into friendly relations between the peoples of our
countries.
That would be normal and that is what. all normal people are striv-
ing and will continue to strive for.
Any more questions? In conclusion I have this to say, we deal
Harshly with those who invade the borders of our homeland, who vio-
late our sovereignty. But we want to live in peace and friendship
with all nations. I hope you will understand our attitude when we
angrily condemn such aggressive actions. But we take a sober view of
things and realize that even the sharpest polemics are better than war.
This is why we shall do everything to have this strain relieved, shall
do everything to normalize the international situation and to restore
good relations with the United States if, of course, the United States
also contributes to this.
I should ask you to take this into account and not to write any-
thing that. could increase tension still further. What do you need it
for? After all, you will be in for trouble if a war breaks out. A war
does not bring happiness to anyone.
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During the past few days I have read many statements by Ameri-
can Senators, Congressmen, businessmen, and I believe it is a good
sigIn that many of them deplore this action of their Government.
believe it is a goo the sign
matter as Herter has done. heads, that
not everyone explains
TO FRANCE HAILED
Q. What would you like to wish the French people in connection
with your trip to Paris?
A. The French people have given me a good welcome, just as the
American people, but, of course, I do not want to set one people off
against the other. However, my visit to France was undertaken later
and the impressions are therefore fresher.
I am very much pleased not only with the welcome given to me by the
French people but also with the talks I had with President de Gaulle.
As to the people, well, all the peoples want peace. Wars are started by
the governments, while the people's lot is to spill their blood. This is
why they all want peace.
The French people also want peace. We fought against militarist
Germany together with France. If war breaks out, and it can be
unleashed by West Germany, Frenchmen will remember that they had
a good ally in the past-the Soviet Union. This ally may come in
handy again. But it is best we prevent war and be allies in the strug-
gle for peace.
I think it is time to end this impromptu press conference.
Let me thank you, dear comrades and gentlemen, let me wish you
success.
Unfold the truth, the noble cause of peace, and you will earn the
respect of your people.
13. TEXT OF UNITED STATES NOTE TO THE SOVIET
GOVERNMENT, MAY 12, 1,960
[Department of State press release No. 2G2]
There follows the text of the note delivered on May 12, 1960, to the
Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in reply to
the Soviet note of May 10, :
The Embassy of the United States of America refers to the Soviet
Government's note of May 10 concerning the shooting down of an
American unarmed civilian aircraft on May 1, and under instruction
from its Government, has the honor to state the following.
The United States Government, in the statement issued by the
Department of State on May 9, has fully stated its position with
respect to this incident.
In its note the Soviet Government has stated that the collection of
intelligence about the Soviet Union by American aircraft is a "cal-
culated policy" of the United States. The United States Govern-
ment does not deny that it has pursued such a policy for purely de-
fensive purposes. What it emphatically does deny is that this policy
has any aggressive intent, or that the unarmed U-2 flight of May 1
was undertaken in an effort to prejudice the success of the forthcoming
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meetin of the Heads of Government. in Paris or to "return the
state of American-Soviet relations to the worst times of the cold war."
Indeed, it is the Soviet Government's treatment of this case which, if
anything, may raise questions about its intentions in respect to these
matters.
For its part., the United States Government will participate in the
Paris meeting on May 16 prepared to cooperate to the fullest extent
in seeking agreements designed to reduce tensions, including ef-
fective safeguards against surprise attack which would make unneces-
sary issues of this kind.
14. TRANSCRIPT OF "ARC'S COLLEGE NEWS CONFER-
ENCE," WITH GEORGE V. ALLEN, DIRECTOR, UNITED
STATES INFORMATION AGENCY, MAY 15, 1960
The ANiwuNCER. Here comes the future. From WW'ashington, D.C.,
we present the Peabody Award-sw?inning College News Conference,
where the leaders of tomorrow meet the leaders of today.
Here today to meet our panel of university reporters is the IIon-
orable George V. Allen, Director of the United States Information
Agency. Now here is our founder and moderator, Ruth Ha
Miss IIAoY. Good afternoon and welcome to aother weekly edi-
tion of College News Conference.
Mr. Allen, it is a great pleasure as always to have you back in
our campus newsroom.
Mr. ALLEN. Thank you.
Miss Haar. I would like you to meet the students who are going
to interview you at this I itne.- From George Washington Law School,
Chuck Manati, who is the president of the National Federation of
Young Democrats. From Trinity College, Martha Dodd, who is the
daughter of the distinguished Senator from Connecticut, Senator
Dodd. From Ilosvard University, Timothy Jenkins, the president of
the Student Council. From the university of Maryland, Sybil Rap
l oport:, the secretary of the student body. From Tufts University,
David Jackson, who is a Sears, Roebuck Scholar who comes to us
under the National Merit Scholarship program. Ile enjoys one of
the fine scholarships given by many corporations in this country to
enable many of our talented young people to continue with their
education.
Now, students, as you know Mr. Allen is a very distinguished diplo-
mat and it is a good thing for us that he is because he is in a very
hot seat today. This is the day before the beginning of the summit
conference and Russia ~*oes into this international poker game with a
full house of cards. Tlto advantage that they have gained from the
downing of the U-2 plane a.nd our subsequent admission that the plane
was on a spying mission, and then the launching of a four-and-a half-
ton space satellite, today, five times larger than anything we have
put into the air and more than three times larger than any of their
previous launchings, rartrying a dummy-not a man-and inciden-
tally, this feat was predicted on this very program two weeks ago by
Senator IIenr ? .Jackson who anticipated that on the eve of the sum-
mit there would be another great space achievement by the Russians.
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And so you see, Mr. Allen, as our Number One public relations offi-
cer and his agency who have the job of interpreting us to the rest of
the world, find that on the eve of the summit they have indeed-
they find us in a very precarious and a very delicate position with the
Russians having scored these two coups. However, he has had a great
deal of experience in handling all sorts of matters. He has been our
Ambassador to Iran, to India and Nepal, to Yugoslavia and to Greece.
hand e
H has for Near eEasterntAftai s. Ia of that ohewill e able to Affairs
this one.
Who has the first question for him?
Mr. JENKINS. Mr. Allen, given that your agency has the unique
responsibility of interpreting our foreign policy in its most favorable
light abroad, I wonder how you intend to vindicate the U.S. position
on this spy incident?
Mr. ALLEN. Let me say right off, that the responsibility of my
agency is to try to represent the United States as honestly and as
fairly as we can. Your implication that we try to put as favorable
an aspect on the United States carries more of the connotation that
we are merely trying to present the good side and hide the bad side.
That is not the philosophy of the U.S. Information Agency. I must
emphasize and say in all genuineness that we try to present the United
States as honestly and as fairly as we can.
Insofar as the recent events are concerned, we have played them
right straight down the middle just as straight as we know how to
play them.
Miss RArroroRT. Well, Mr. Allen, what have the reactions been
abroad? How has our explanation been accepted by the foreign
peoples?
Mr. ALLEN. You refer to the U-2 incident, of course?
Miss R ArroroRT. Yes.
Mr. ALLEN. Reactions abroad-again I am going to be just as
honest and frank as I possibly can-have mainly centered around
three things: One of them is somewhat favorable; two of them are
somewhat unfavorable. The rather favorable side has been a very
considerable amount of comment abroad, of understanding of the
necessity of the United States and the free world in general., to try
its best to find out what is going on behind the Iron Curtain.
There is a very general concern about getting more information
and an understanding of efforts on the part of the United States to
try to do it. Furthermore in that same line there has been a rather
considerable amount of appreciation for the fact that the United
States was capable of carrying out activities of this kind.
The two unfavorable aspects : First, the confusion, shall I say,
of the announcements that came out of Washington on the subject
and not only the original announcement saying that the plane was
on a weather mission, but subsequent announcements which need some
clarification here today, I think, concerning our right to carry out
activities of this kind which have caused dismay in various foreign
circles.
But the other unfavorable aspect is the wide concern on the part of
people in many countries abroad lest this affect adversely the chances
of the success of the summit. Most of them around the world are
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6UMMaT CONFERENCE
hoping, very much that the summit will find some measure of success,
and this has caused dismay.
Mr. MANATr. Mr. Allen, who is the person in authority who au-
thorized the original statement that this was a weather plane?
Mr. A I.LN. That was a spontaneous reply, as a matter of fact,
It was already prepared, according to circumstances which were fore-
seen and it was just almost a, I think, a pushbutton reply. As far
as the actual reply made, it was made by the spokesman for the
State Department, Mr. Lincoln White. I spoke to Lincoln White
yesterday and he said he gave out exactly the honest information he
had in his hand front his reports from the field.
Mr. MINATF. Don't you believe, sir, this will prove very unfortunate
to involve NASA in something like this when our complete intentions
were to divorce it from the military area and to bring the civilian areas
into space much more?
Mr. ALLEN, That is an unfortunate aspect of it, yes.
Miss ILeor. May I clarify one point that I think has people con-
fused. The officials of NAA who ave out this information were
acting in good faith, were they not? They were under the impression
that this was a weather plane, that this was a weather mission, this
reconnaisance mission ? Or were they in on the deception?
Mr. ALLEN. That is getting into more details with regard to inside
operations than I think I ought to try to comment on in all frankness.
At the same time I will say this, that I know that the spokesman of the
State Department who gave out the information was acting in entirely
good faith when he said that it was a weather plane.
Now your immediate question is, Doesn't this embarrass us by
getting NASA involved in military operations? It does, I think. On
the other hand let me remind you that the United States has been in the
forefront from the beginning on the whole question of space, of trying
our level best in every international conference that we have had, in
the United Nations and in our talks with the Russians, and so forth, to
make outer space an international operat.ioin, with cooperation-we
have hone very far in offering to have internal space supervised-outer
space supervised by multilateral operation. We are perfectly ready
to go in with the Russians and anybody else in an international opera-
tion on space, just as we have been ready to go in with the Russians on
an open-skies proposal for over-flights by airplanes. We have been
pressing for this kind of agreement since--well, since the United
Nations started.
Miss Dow). .11r. Allen. as a propaganda specialist, what do you think
Mr. Iihrushehev will do with the pilot of the plane?
Mr. ALLEN. That is hard to predict. I have seen some suggestion
that lie may present him at the summit meeting as a sort of a gesture.
I don't know. I would doubt that. Judgnig by the background, I
would guess that lie would probably hold hire as a card close to his
chest fora while.
Miss Pone. '4~Tell, if he does put him up for trial, how far do you
think the United States should back the pilot?
Mr. ALLEN. We should do everything possible to see that lie gets a
fair and honest trial. That means, of course, through diplomatic pro-
cedures. I want to emphasize this: A lot has been said about the fact
that this man was a spy and caught spying and so forth. There are a
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lot of different definitions of "spying" and I don't want to try to
quibble, but I do think I ought to point this out and that more people
ought to recall it : When he went down he told exactly what his mis-
sion was and exactly what he was expected to do, and he was under
instruction to do that. He wasn't wearing a false mustache and a
cloak and dagger and that sort of business that you usually think of
as a spy pretending that he is somebody that he isn't. He gave an
honest rport of what his mission is and I think that ought to be re-
called by everybody concerned.
Mr. JACKSON. Premier Khrushchev last week sent formal protests
to the countries that based the U-2's in Europe and in Asia. Presi-
dent Eisenhower also stated that in event of Russian intervention
we would go to the aid of our allies. Already Norway has lodged
a formal protest with the United States for using Norwegian bases
for these flights. How can our allies give much credence to such a
pronouncement from the President when they see our continual back-
ing off in the Israeli-Egypt dispute over the use of the Suez Canal
when we stated that we would go to Israel's aid to get free use of
the Suez Canal and we have continually backed oft on that?
Mr. ALLEN. We never said we would use Marines or the Navy or the
Army to help Israel get through the Suez Canal. We have every
time the question has come up in the United Nations or anywhere
else, we have expressed our views very forcibly and very strongly
that the Suez Canal ought to be open to the peaceful shipping of all
nations.
Mr. JACKSON. But don't we have a moral commitment to Israel to
make sure that it is?
Mr. ALLEN. When you say "make sure" does that mean go to war?
That is the usual point of what you are talking about. When you
are saying : "You can't believe in us because we say that we have a
moral commitment to see that Israel gets through the Suez Canal,"
we have never said that we would go to war to assure that Israel would
get through the Suez Canal.
Miss RAPPOPORT. I would like to get back to the unfavorable re-
action of which you spoke before about the U.S. right.
The United States has maintained that this s ying was sort of a
necessary evil. Yet Mr. Allen, as a member per aps of the younger
generation I would like to know your opinion of the example of
morality that is being set by the United States Government in justi-
fying this breaking of international law.
Mr. ALLEN. The international law being the encouragement of an
airplane over the Soviet territory or the spying?
Miss RAPPOPORT. Espionage.
Mr. ALLEN. The espionage part of it.
Are you suggesting for reasons of morality that the United States
ought to get completely out of any espionage business?
Miss RAPPOPORT. I would like to know your opinion on the morality
of it.
Mr. ALLEN. That is a very fair question. I wish very much, Sybil,
that we could. Nothing would please me better. If we had a world
which would permit that. I think, as a matter of fact, that we have
gone a far way towards an open society in proposals which we have
made, such as those which President Eisenhower made in 1955 in
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which he not only offered to the Soviet Union but urged the Soviet
Union to get rid 'of this closed society, this suspicion and these Iron
Curtains that are goin * to prevent people from finding out L th
planes fly opening. 7hie United States has been in the for.froetnt ine
urging that kind of a result.
Miss Riuroror.T. If you say therefore because of this tightness of
the iron curtain there is a need for these reconnaissance flights in or-
der to penetrate it, then why did the Government admit it, thus jeop-
ardizing future security of the United States?
Mr. ALLEN. That is a very important question and I have been very
much interested and I may say quizzical about a great many com-
ments that I have seen on that very subject. Damning the United
States for having admitted that the plane was flying over Soviet ter-
ritory for the purpose of obtaining information about the Soviet
Union. I must say right here that think that that was one of the
most important things that has been done in this whole field oft rying
to build an open society. The frank admission on the part of the
United States that we did it.
Now a lot of people will say : "You didn't do it until your hand was
forced," and all that kind of matter, but I must emphasize that I think
this admission-yes, we were trying to get information to guard this
nation against surprise attack. We have gone through Pearl Harbor,
we have submitted to surprise attack and where there is a great area
of the world where there is no other means of finding out what is
going on, the United States has said : "Yes-, we are going to try-we
have a right. to try to get information as best we can.
Let me say just one more thing-I know you want to ask questions;
I don't want to take too much time on my own, but there has been a
great misunderstanding that I would like to correct, today: Mr. Her-
ter, the SIle has said that there is an obligation and a ecretary of State, has not said that we are going to continue
th ep part of the government of the United States and of the free world
to try to obtain information to guard against surprise attack. But he
has not said that we are going to continue to fly. Ile hasn't said one
way or another.
Mr. JEN EI ti s. Mr. Allen, you seem to express confidence in the vir-
tue of our admission, on moral grounds, but now the consideration
of this admission in terms of jeopardizing the position of our allies.
Given that the Russian statement is that there is a possibility of mis-
silo retaliation, do you recognize that this is a thing which might com-
promise the virtue of our open admission ?
Mr. ALLEN. Timothy, I didn't justify our admission on moral
grounds, no. I said that in my opinion, this is one step towards the
general concept of an open society-open skies. I am not saying
whether it is moral or immoral. I am just saying that in my opinion
is a step in that general direction.
Mr..JENKI13. But considering the practicality of our allies being
very much involved in our making such an admission, namely that
the planes took off probably from their territories, doesn't this seri-
ously jeopardize their position, in juxtaposition to the Soviet Union?
Dir. ALLEN. Yes, that is one of the very difficult problems of this
whole situation of the U-2, is this situation of our allies. There again
I am quite frank to say here that it is perfectly obvious-I am not
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFER N +
telling any secrets when I say that our allies are naturally going to
be much more concerned from now on. It is quite natural that they
would be, about the actions taken from airbases in their territory.
On the other hand, in keeping with the same idea of trying to
develop open skies, I believe that we will have the support of the
general free world in the direction, in the trend in which the United
States is trying to go.
Miss HAGY. Mr. Allen, you have used the term "open societies"
now, twice. I wonder if you would perhaps elaborate on this. We
have heard about President Eisenhower's open skies plan which he
presented before the United Nations and which presumably he is
taking to the summit conference in a revised form. Could you tell
us something about how the open society differs from open skies?
Mr. ALLEN. Well, the open society is a new and enlarged phrase
but it grows out of the idea that we are going to get away from the
seclusion and secrecy of every military action and allow-when we
offer opportunity for Soviet planes to fly over the United States, take
photographs, see anything they want to, that is open skies. All we
ask is that we be able to do the same.
If you can take that step, then perhaps you might get towards
the idea of societies being open. That is laboratories, combined tests
for atomic explosions, things of that sort. We are trying to build.
We want to encourage the Russians to come in with us, to investigate
the explosion of atomic energy underground, in tests to see how the
seismographic implements can detect it. All those sorts of things.
Mr. MANATT. Mr. Allen, in preparation for the summit meeting
we have had in a few short weeks the announcement that Vice Presi-
dent Nixon may go to the summit, we have had the announcement
of the reconvening of underground nuclear testing and also the U-2
plane incident.
I am wondering, do any members of our government in reference to
the people in preparing for the summit consult with you in relation
to, for example, the nuclear testing statement, and what effect this
will have on the rest of the world and what effect it will have on the
summit meeting?
Mr. ALLEN. I must say that I was not consulted with regard to the
nuclear testing statement, but I want to emphasize here again that
oftentimes these statements are-the impression in the public mind is
what they see in a headline. We haven't said we are going to start
resuming nuclear weapons testing at all. We have offered to the
Russians an opportunity to participate with us in examining how
nuclear testing, nuclear explosions underground, can be detected
through improved seismographic instrumentation.
Now that is quite a different thing from the general idea that we
have suddenly said we are going to start resuming
Miss HAGY. That is perfectly true, Mr. Allen. It took a whole week
for the true picture of this resumption of tests to become clear.
Now isn't it a part of the obligation to make sure that the original
statements are presented with such accuracy that there is not a chance
of this harm being done to us in a propaganda and public opinion
way? Shouldn't they consult with you in the method of presentation
so that it doesn't take a whole week for a refutation to penetrate?
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Mr. ALLEN. I think perhaps I will have to agree with you although
I must say no amount of consulting with me will determine how
American newspapers are going to write their headlines.
Mr. JACKSON. I would like to get back to the "open society" for a
moment. Don't you agree that before any meaningful open society
may be attained there must be a government by law and not of force
implemented by men?
Mr. T.LEN. In each nation, do you mean, or in the world?
Mr. JACKSON. In the world.
Air. ALLEN. In the world.
Yes. That opens up a very much larger question. We have to
achieve a government of laws in the world, a rule of law in the world;
yes, very definitely.
Mr. JACKSON. Then don't you think that we are slightly hypocritical
in our outlook towards international law? We will take the decisions
of the World Court when they are favorable to us or we will accept
their decisions. If we don't accept their decisions, we won't abide by
them. We will break international law when it can be justified for our
mutual security.
Dir. ALLEN, You have it almost. right, What our position is under
the Connally Amendment, we will not accept the jurisdiction of the
World Court if we consider that it is a part of our internal matters
and therefore we kee the decision as to whether we will allow a case
to go to the World Court or not. I couldn't agree with you more. I
think that we ought to build up the international court in every way
we possibly can. That is the smallest little step we can take. Wic
ought, in my opinion-I don't have any hesitation in stating it right
here as strongly as I can-that the first and smallest step is to accept
the jurisdiction of the international court.
Air. JENxINS. Don't we in effect, then, by positing such a rule of
expediency undercut the real significance of any such meeting" at the
summit, where four men are going to sit down in the center of urope
and decide the world's problems with absolute criteria by which they
shall operate in making their decisions? We have no common accept-
ance on a Iegal theory,, which should be operative between nations.
at the And last summit conference it was the policy of the USIA to
present this as a very favorable meeting which had accomplished
many significant gains.
Now when we view this in the light of the summit conference coming
on, haven't we actually by the mere admission that this is not the real
means for arriving at settlements, undercut the significance of such
a meeting?
Dir. ALLEN. I am not quite certain, Timothy-let me try to say
what I think you mean.
Air. JENKINS. Or will there be any attempt of USIA to bring out
of this meeting things which are significant? Would those things
which are significant really be pertinent to the solutions of peace
for our society ?
Mr. ALLEN. Well, I think the summit meeting has possibilities of
finding things that would add towards the peace of the world; yes.
Miss HAOY. Are you optimistic about it?
Air. ALLEN. Unfortunately-I wish I were. I think it is possible
that the summit meeting-t am just guessing, now, but it seems to
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chance of accomplishment in field of
me it has the most
new instructions to the disarmame t negotiators. I wish Ithecould be
optimistic.
Your point, I think, Timothy, is why do we have summit meetings
if we agree that a rule of law in the world is what is needed. The
rule of law in the world is what we are heading towards, but we
have to take an awful lot of steps in between time in every direction
possible in order to achieve that rules of law.
Mr. MANATT. Mr. Alien., you have said, I believe, in the past that
executive,initiative and positive programs make the best propaganda
What new prograin3 or 11VVV
the summit with him other than the warmed-over version of the open
skies announcement of five years ago?,
Mr. ALLEN. President Eisenhower will announce that tomorrow at
the meeting. It certainly wouldn't be proper for me to tell you today
what he is going to say tomorrow.
Miss RAPPOPORT. I would like to ask something about this morning's
news story about the satellite being launched yesterday by the Soviets.
You recently said that we had caught up with the propaganda gains
of the Russians in space. Doesn't this now put them out once more
ahead of us in propaganda, and how does your agency counteract this?
Mr. ALLEN. Putting earth satellites up is always going to be a kind
of a seesaw thing. The Russians have a big jump today in putting up
a four-ton satellite. It is by far the largest that has ever been put up
and it is an important step towards evenually putting a man in space.
I am the first to recognize that. Although I will remind you, and
our listeners, that until this morning the only earth satellites going
around the earth were American. There were five of them. The only
ones today that are sending back information from outer space are
American. Five of them are still radioing back. The amount of in-
formation we have given to the world on space, on the dimensions of
space and what goes on out there has been, I'd say, almost ten to one
American against Russian.
Miss IIAOY. Nevertheless, if they succeed in putting a man into space
before we do-and it looks now as though they might with this trial
test that they have just launched this morning Will that not give them
a great propaganda advantage?
Mr. ALLEN. Yes, it will. It will certainly give them a great propa-
ganda advantage, but I wouldn't-as a propagandist I wouldn't pro-
pose that we put up a man there until we are pretty sure that we can
get him back-absolutely sure.
Mr. JENTKINS. Mr. Allen, it is a conceded fact that we are now fourth
with respect to overseas broadcasting.
Mr. ALLEN. In factor of time on the air, yes.
Mr. JENKINS. Yes. It is also a surprising fact that many of the
major auto manufacturers invest more in public relations than we do
as a whole country. I wonder then what you have to say about the
probabilities of an increase in the budget out of this year's Congress?
Mr. ALLEN. We are asking for a small increase this year. I hope
and believe we will get it.
56412-60-15
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
Miss IIaoy. Thank you very much. We are going to have to con-
clude on that note, sir, because our time has just run out. It is all too
short when we have so many interesting things to talk about with you.
Thank you, students, for your interesting questions. We would like
to invite all of you at home to join us again next week when our guest
will be Governor G. Mennen Williams, of Michigan, and until then,
goodby and a good week from Ruth Ilagy and the college news
correspondents of College News Conference.
The ANNOUNCER. College News Conference is created and produced
by Ruth IIagy. Assistant producer, Johanne Curran. This program
was directed by Richard Armstrong and originated in Washington,
D.C.
This has been a presentation of ABC Public Affairs.
15. TEXT OF PREMIER KIIRUSHCHEV'S STATEMENT AT
PARIS SUMMIT CONFERENCE, MAY 16,1960
[From the New York limes, may 17, 136,0]
Paris, May 16 (Rcutcrs)-Follouring are the text, in unofficial
translation, of a statement made by PremierKhrushchev of today's
session of the summit conference and made public by the Soviet
Union.
President de Gaulle.
Prime Minister Macmillan.
President Eisenhower.
Permit me to address you with the following statement:
A provocative act is known to have been committed recently with
regard to the Soviet Union by the American Air Force. It consisted
in the fact that on May 1 a United States military reconnaissance air-
craft invaded the Soviet Union while executing a specific espionage
mission to obtain information on military and industrial installations
on the territory of the It;S.S.R. After the aggressive purpose of its
flight became known, the aircraft was shot down by units of the Soviet
rocket troops. Unfortunately, this was not the only case of aggressive
and espionage actions by the United States Air Force against the
Soviet Union.
Naturally the Soviet. Government was compelled to give appro-
priate qualification to these acts and show up their treacherous nature,
which is incompatible with the elementary requirements of the main-
tenance of normal relations between states in time of peace, not to
speak of its being in gross contradiction to the task of lessening inter-
national tension and creating the necessary conditions for the fruitful
work of the summit conference. This was done both in my speeches at
the session of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. and in a special note
of protest sent to the United States Government.
At first the United States State Department launched the ridiculous
version tciat the American lane had violated the borders of the
U.S.S.R. by accident and had no espionage or sabotage assignments.
When irrefutable farts clearly proved the falsity of this version, the
United States State Department on May 7, and then the Secretary of
State on Map 9, stated on behalf of the United States Government that
American aircraft made incursions into the Soviet Union with mili-
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE 221
tary espionage aims in accordance with a program endorsed by the
United States Government and by the President personally.
Two days later, President Eisenhower himself confirmed that exe-
cution of flights of American aircraft over the territory of the Soviet
Union had been and remained the calculated policy of the United
States. The same was declared by the United States Government in
a note to the Soviet Government on May 12. Thereby the United
States Government is crudely flouting the universally accepted stand-
ards of international law and the lofty principles of the United Nations
Charter, under which stands the signature of the United States of
America also.
INDIGNATION WAS VOICED
The Soviet Government and the entire people of the Soviet Union
met these declarations of leading statesmen of the U.S.A. with indig-
nation, as did every honest man and woman in the world who displays
concern for the destinies of peace.
Now, at a time when the leaders of the Governments of the four
powers are arriving in Paris to take part in the conference, the ques-
tion arises of how is it possible productively to negotiate and examine
the questions confronting the conference when the United States Gov-
ernment and the President himself have not only failed to condemn
this provocative act-the intrusion of the American military aircraft
into the Soviet Union-but, on the contrary, have declared that, such
actions will continue to be state policy of the U.S.A. with regard to
the Soviet Union.
How can agreement be sought on the various issues that require
a settlement with the purpose of easing tension and removing sus-
picion and mistrust among states when the Government of one of the
great powers declares bluntly that its policy is intrusion into the
territory of another great power with espionage and sabotage pur-
poses and, consequently, the heightening of tension in relations among
states?
It is clear that the declaration of such a policy, which can be pur-
sued only when states are in a state of war, dooms the summit confer-
ence to complete failure in advance.
We, naturally, take note of the declaration by the United States
Government of such a policy and state that in the event of a. repeated
intrusion by American aircraft into the Soviet Union we shall. shoot
these planes down.
The Soviet Government reserves the right in all such cases to take
the appropriate retaliatory measures against those who violate the
state sovereignty of the U.S.S.R. and engage in such espionage and
sabotage regarding the Soviet Union. The U.S.S.R. Government re-
iterates that, with regard to those states that, by making their territory
available for American military bases, become accomplices in aggres-
sive actions against the U.S.S.R., the appropriate measures will also
be taken, not excluding a blow against these bases.
In this connection it is impossible to ignore the statement by Presi-
dent Eisenhower to the effect that under the threat of a peace treaty
with the German Democratic Republic he could not take part in the
summit conference, though what he called a threat was merely a decla-
ration by the Soviet Government of its firm resolve to do away with
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222 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUIT CONFERENCE
the vestiges of war in Europe and conclude a peace, and thus to bring
the situation-particularly in West Berlin-in line with the require-
ments of life and the interests of insuring the peace and security of
the European nations.
How then can the Soviet Government take part in negotiations
under conditions of an actual threat emanating from the United
States Government, which declared that it would continue to violate
the U.S.S.R. borders and that American aircraft had flown and
would continue to fly over the Soviet Union's territory? The United
States Government has thereby declared its intention to continue
unheard of and unprecedented actions directed against the sovereignty
of the Soviet state, which constitutes a sacred and immutable prin-
ciple in international relations.
(COVERT AND HONEST POLICY"
From all this it follows that for the success of the conference it is
necessary that the Governments of all the powers represented at it
pursue an overt and honest policy and solemnly declare that they will
not undertake any actions against one another which amount to viola-
tion of the state sovereignty of the powers.
This means that if the United States Government is really ready to
cooperate with the Governments of the other powers in the interests
of maintaining peace and strengthening confidence between states it
must, firstly, condemn the inadmissible provocative actions of the
United States Air Force with regard to the Soviet Union and, sec-
ondly, refrain from continuing such actions and such a policy against
the U.S.S.R. in the future.
It goes without saying that in this case the United States Govern-
ment cannot fail to call to strict account those who are directly guilty
of the deliberate violation by American aircraft of the state borders
of the U.S.S.R.
Until this is done by the United States Government, the Soviet
Government sees no possibility for productive negotiations with the
United States Government at the summit conference. It cannot be
among the participants in negotiations where one of them has made
treachery the basis of his policy with regard to the Soviet Union.
If, under the obtaining conditions, the Soviet Government were to
participate in negotiations clearly doomed to failure, it would thereby
become a part to the deception of the nations, which it has no intention
of becoming.
It stands to reason that if the United States Government were to
declare that in the future the United States will not violate the
state borders of the U.S.S.R. with its aircraft, that it deplores the
provocative actions undertaken in the past and will punish those
directly guilty of such actions, which would assure the Soviet Union
equal conditions with other powers, I, as head of the Soviet Govern-
ment, would be ready to participate in the conference and exert all
efforts to contribute to its success.
As a result of the provocative flights of American military aircraft
and, above all, as a result of such provocative flights being declared
national policy of the United States of America for the future regard
to the Socialist countries, new conditions have appeared in interna-
tional relationships.
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Naturally, under such conditions, we cannot work at the conference;
we cannot because we see the positions from which it is intended to
talk with us : under the threat of aggressive reconnaissance flights.
Espionage flights are known to be undertaken with reconnaissance
purposes with the object of starting a war. We, therefore, reject the
conditions the United States of America is creating for us. We can-
not participate in any negotiations and in the solution of even those
questions which have already matured; we cannot because we see
that the United States has no desire to reach a settlement.
"DECEPTION" IS RULED OUT
It is considered to be a leader in the Western countries. Therefore,
the conference would at present be a useless waste of time and a decep-
tion of the public opinion of all countries. I repeat, we cannot under
the obtaining situation take part in the negotiations.
We want to participate in the talks only on an equal footing, with
equal opportunities for both one and the other side.
We consider it necessary for the peoples of all the countries of the
world to understand us correctly. The Soviet Union is not renouncing
efforts to achieve agreement. And we are sure that reasonable agree-
ments are possible, but, evidently, not at this but at another time.
For this, however, it is necessary first of all that the United States
admits that the provocative policy it has declared by a policy of "un-
restricted" flights over our country is to be condemned and that it
rejects it and admits that it has committed aggression and admits that
it regrets it.
The Soviet Government is deeply convinced that if not this Govern-
ment of the United States then another, if not another then the next
one would understand that there is no other way out but peaceful
coexistence of two systems, capitalist and Socialist. Either peaceful
coexistence or war, which will result in a disaster for those who are
pursuing aggressive policy.
PEACEFUL LINKS STRESSED
Therefore, we think that some time should be allowed to elapse
so that the questions that have arisen should settle and so that those
responsible for the determining of the policies of a country would
analyze what kind of responsibility they placed upon themselves,
having declared an aggressive course in their relations with the Soviet
Union and other Socialist countries. Therefore, we would think that
there is no better way out than to postpone the conference of the heads
of government for approximately six to eight months.
The Soviet Union on its part, will not lessen its effort to reach an
agreement. I think that public opinion will correctly understand our
position, will understand that we were deprived of the possibility to
participate in these negotiations.
However, we firmly believe in the necessity of peaceful coexistence
because to lose faith in peaceful coexistence would mean to doom man-
kind to war, would mean to agree with the inevitability of wars, and
under the circumstances it is known what disasters would be brought
by a war to all nations on our planet.
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I wish to address the people of the United States of America. I was
in the U.S.A. and met there with various sections of the American
people and I am deeply convinced that all the strata of the American
people do 'lot want war. An exception constitutes but a small frantic
group in the Pentagon and, supporting it, militarist quarters that
benefit from the armaments race, gaining huge profits, which disre-
gard the interests of the American people and in general the interests
of the peoples of all countries, and which pursue an adventurous
policy.
We express gratitude to President de Gaulle for the hospitality and
rendering us the possibility to meet in Paris, the capital of France.
We also appreciate the efforts of the Government of Great Britain and
Prime Alin ister Macmillan personally.
We regret that this meeting has been for pedoed by the reactionary
circles of the United States of America by provocative flights of
American military planes over the Soviet Union.
We regret that. this meeting has not. brought about the results
ex ected by all nations of the world.
Let. the disgrace and responsibility for this rest with those who have
proclaimed a bandit policy toward the Soviet Union.
ISSUE OF EISEti1IVIwEL VISIT
As is known, President Eisenhower and I have agreed to exchange
visits. Lest September, I made such visit to the U.S.A. We were
greatly -ratified by that visit, the meetings and talks we had in the
United Mates, and for all this we expressed our appreciation.
The ]'resident of the U.S.A. was to make a return visit to our coun-
try. Our agreement was that he would come to us on June 10. And
we were being prepared to accord a good welcome to the high guest.
Unfortunately, as a result of provocative and aggressive actions
aganst the U.S.S.R., there have been created now such conditions
awein we have been deprived of a possibility to receive the President
with the proper cordiality with which the soviet people receive wel-
come guests. At present, we cannot express such cordiality to the
President of the U.S.A. since, as the result of provocative flights of
American military planes with reconnaissance purposes, there are
created conditions clearly unfavorable for this visit.
The Soviet people cannot and do not want to be sly. That is why
we believe that at present the visit of the President of the U.S.A. to
the Soviet Union should be postponed and agreement should be
reached as to the time of the visit when the conditions for the visit
would mature. Then the Soviet people will be able to express proper
cordiality and hospitality toward the high truest representing the
great power with which we sincerely want to live in peace and friend-
ship.
I believe that both President Eisenhower and the American people
will understand me correctly.
The Soviet Government states that on its part it will continue to do
its utmost to facilitate the relaxation of international tension, to facili-
tate the solution of problems that still divide us today. In that we
shall be guided by the interests of strengthening the great cause of
peace on the basis of peaceful coexistence of states with different social
systems.
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16. TEXT OF EISENHOWER MEETING ON MAY 6v1G
THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE 960
[Department of State press release No. 271, May 17, 1960]
Following is the text of the statement by President Eisenhower,
following the May 16 meeting of the Four Heads of Government:
Having been informed yesterday by General de Gaulle and Prime
Minister Macmillan of the position which Mr. Khrushchev has taken
in regard to this Conference during his calls yesterday morning on
them, I gave most careful thought as to how this matter should best be
handled. Having in mind the great importance of this Conference
and the hopes that the peoples of all the world have reposed in this
meeting, I concluded that in the circumstances it was best to see if at
today's private meeting any possibility existed through the exercise
of reason and restraint to dispose of this matter of the overflights,
which would have permitted the Conference to go forward.
I was under no illusion as to the probability of success of any such
approach but I felt that in view of the great responsibility resting on
me as President of the United States, this effort should be made.
In this I received the strongest support of my colleagues, President
de Gaulle and Prime Minister Macmillan. Accordingly, at this morn-
ing's private session, despite the violence and inaccuracy of Mr. Khru-
shchev's statements, I replied to him on the following terms :
I had previously been informed of the sense of the statement just
read by Premier Khrushchev.
In my statement of May 11 and in the statement of Secretary Her-
ter of May 9 the position of the United States was made clear with
respect to the distasteful necessity of espionage activities in a world
where nations distrust each other's intentions. We pointed out that
these activities had no aggressive intent but rather were to assure the
safety of the United States and the free world against surprise attack
by a power which boasts of its ability to devastate the United States
and other countries by missiles armed with atomic warheads. As is
well known, not only the United States but most other countries are
constantly the targets of elaborate and persistent espionage of the
Soviet Union.
There is in the Soviet statement an evident misapprehension on one
key point. It alleges that the United States has, through official
statements, threatened continued overflights. The importance of this
alleged threat was emphasized and repeated by Mr. Khrushchev. The
United States has made no such threat. Neither I nor my Govern-
ment has intended any. The actual statements go no further than to
say that the United States will not shirk its responsibility to saf e-
guard against surprise attack.
In point of fact, these flights were suspended after the recent in-
cident and are not to be resumed. Accordingly, this cannot be the
issue.
I have come to Paris to seek agreements with the Soviet Union
which would eliminate the necessity for all forms of espionage, in-
cluding overflights. I see no reason to use this incident to disrupt
the conference.
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NFERENCE
Should it prove impossible, because of the Soviet attitude, to come
to grips here in Paris with this problem and the other vital issues
threatening world peace, I am planning in the near future to submit
to the United Nations a proposal for the creation of a United Na-
tions aerial surveillance to detect preparations for attack. This
plan I had intended to place before this conference. This surveillance
system would operate in the territories of all nations prepared to ac-
cept such inspection. For its part, the United States is prepared not
only to accept United Nations aerial surveillance, but to do every-
thing in its power to contribute to the rapid organization and suc-
cessful operation of such international surveillance.
We of the United States are here to consider in good faith the
important problems before this Conference. We are prepared either
to carry this point . no further, or to undertake bilateral conversations
between the United States and the U.S.S.R. while the main Confer-
ence proceeds.
My words were seconded and supported by my Western colleagues,
who also urged Mr. Khrushchev to pursue the path of reason and
commonsense, and to forget propaganda. Such an attitude would
have permitted the Conference to proceed. Mr. Khrushchev was left
in no doubt by me that, his ultimatum would never be acceptable to
the United States.
Mr. Khrushchev brushed aside all arguments of reason, and not
only insisted upon this ultimatum, but also insisted that he was going
to publish his statement in full at the time of his own choosin It
was thus made apparent that he was determined to wreck the Paris
Conference.
In fact, the only conclusion that can be drawn from his behavior
this morning was that he came all the way from Moscow to Paris
with the sole intention of sabotaging this meeting on which so much
of the hopes of the world have rested.
In spite of this serious and adverse development, I have no inten-
tion w hatsoever to diminish my continuing efforts to promote progress
toward a peace with justice. This applies to the remainder of my
stay in Paris as well as thereafter.
17. TRANSCRIPT OF NEWS BRIEFING WITH JAMES C.
HAGERTY, ANDREW H. BERDING, AND CHARLES E.
BOHLEN, PARIS, MAY 16, 1960
[The White House press release]
Mr. IIAGERTY. I will try to speak as loud as I can, Can the people
in the back of the room hear me? I have a statement from President
Eisenhower, which I shall read. The statement is presently being
stenciled and will be distributed as soon as it is mechanically possible,
by my office.
.Air. I3erding and I are here. Also with us is Ambassador Bohlen,
who was present at the meeting this morning and who will be
available for questions and a report on the meeting, after I finish read-
ing the statement.
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO r
I will read it through, not at dictation speed, but I will read it
through so that you can get the sense of it, and by the time I am
finished reading, the stencil should be available outside.
This is a statement by President Eisenhower. (Mr. Hagerty then
read the statement down to the words, "on the following terms. )7)
What I will now read is what the President read at the meeting
[see document No. 14] (and Mr. Hagerty continued reading down to
"the main conference proceeds"). This is the end of the statement
the President read this morning, but his full statement continues.
(Mr. Hagerty read through the final paragraphs.)
That is the conclusion of the President's statement. (Most of the
questions that follow, due to very poor hearing in the room, were re-
peated by Mr. Hagerty for the benefit of those present, but are as
accurately as possible the actual words of the questioner.)
Q. How long will the President stay in Paris, Mr. Hagerty ?
Mr. HAGERTY. I think that that would depend on what would
happen tomorrow.
Q. Mr. Hagerty, did Mr. Khrushchev reply to Mr. Eisenhower's
statement?
Mr. BOHLEN. Mr. Khrushchev made a partial reply to the Presi-
dent's statement, by reiterating the three points of his ultimatum. He
indicated that the statement of the President that flights would not be
resumed; he inquired whether this meant for the duration of the Con-
ference, and the President said, "No." It was indefinite. He then
repeated, however, that unless the United States would publicly
renounce its past act and punish those which he said were immediately
responsible for it, the Soviet Union still could not attend this Con-
ference.
Q. Well, Jim, is the Conference over?
Mr. HAGERTY. I think that I could say-wait a minute-I think it
was left wide open when the meeting broke up. If I may have a
suggestion which I think would save our time and yours, it would be
that if you have any questions on the statement as such, if we could
get this out of the way now and then ask Ambassador Bohlen to give
you a rundown on the meeting, and during the rundown I am sure
quite a few of these questions that you are asking me would be
answered. Would that be agreeable?
Q. Did the President have anything to say about the attack that
Mr. Khrushchev had been making on Pakistan and other countries
where United States bases are, located?
Mr. Bom EN. At the meeting this morning, he did not touch on
that part of Khrushchev's statement. He did not go into the details
of Khrushchev's statement other than those contained in his own state-
ment.
However, in answer to the question, I think prior to this Conference,
that the United States had made it plain that it would fulfill its obli-
gations to any of its allies in the event of any attack or threatened
attack.
Q. Did the British and French delegations take a stand on the
American position?
Mr. HAGERTY. Did the-you mean the statement that I just read?
Q. And your statement of position
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Mr. IIAGERTY. I think Yes, but I would prefer to have that come
from the British and French spokesmen, who are now giving their
special briefings.
Q. Did Khrushchev make clear that he won't attend any bilateral
meetings such as the, President mentioned, that he won't be back to-
morrow morn ing at. Elysee Palace?
Mr. BOHLEN. I think the first answer to that question is an impor-
tant one. At today's meeting, Mr. Khrushchev said he did not consider
this a meeting of the Paris conference, this was a preliminary meeting
to determine, in their eyes, whether the Conference could take place or
not. He said the same thing in regard to any possible meeting to-
morrow or in the nest days.
Mr. HAGERTY. Again, if I can make a suggestion, I think it would
be helpful if you would let Ambassador Bohlen, who was at the meet-
ing as a Member of our Delegation, just run down through it. All
right.
Q. The Russians are saying that they will have a press conference
after the President replies. Now, what you just said here and what
you said at the closed meeting earlier, may we consider this the Presi-
dent's final reply to Russia?
Mr. IIAOERTY. How can you consider anything as final? The answer
would be "No" to yyour direct question. Now do you mean if I am
gtigDon't to have another press conference today? Who can tell?
you think t rat Mr. Khrushchev wants to prevent a meet-
ing of President Eisenhower and the Soviet people because he is afraid
that the Russian people. would welcome the President?
Mr. II1aERTr. Yes, I would agree with that, but that was not the
point. Mr, Bohlen might want to answer that question directly on
what happened on the invitation.
Mr. BOHLEN. In further elaboration of his statement canceling the
invitation, Khrushchev said that the circumstances had changed as a
result of this matter of the plane, that it would be hypocrisy for the
President to come to the Soviet Union, the Soviet people were not
hypocrites and that they would not be able to understand how you
could invite the representative of a state whose planes had flown over
the Soviet territory and one of which had been shot down by Soviet
rockets.
He even said that he didn't know what he would say to his little
grandson, if his grandson asked him that question.
In regard to your answer, this is your question, of course Khru-
shchev did not go into that angle of the thing, but I think it's a
reasonable supposition.
Q. Thank you very much.
Mr. IInoERTY. And as far as the invitation or withdrawal of the
invitation was concerned, in Mr. Khrushchev's statement this morn-
ing, the President did not answer it, but the fact that Mr. Khrushchev
withdrew it I think-the fact that Mr. Khrushchev withdrew it, pre-
vented the President from refusing to accept. [Laughter].
Q. Will you repeat that., please?
Mr. IIAOERTY. I said the fact that Mr. Khrushchev withdrew the
invitation prevented
Mr. BonLEN. (to Mr. Hagerty) : No objection of the President.
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE 229
Mr. I-IAG}ERTY. There was no objection on the President's part and
it just meant that he did not have to refuse to accept the invitation.
Mr. BOHLEN. The President did not refer at all to that part of
Mr. Khrushchev's statement, dealing with the cancellation of the
invitation.
Mr. HAGERTY. I would still like to have Mr. Bohlen, who is present
[laughter]
Mr. BOHLEN. I will try and hit, gentlemen, the highlights of this
meeting, since it went on for quite a while, as you know. 1 nd I think
the first point I have already made, that Mr. Khrushchev made it per-
fectly plain that he did not regard this as his attendance at the Con-
ference, this was a preliminary meeting to see whether or not, as he
put it, conditions could be established which would permit them to
stay. He read his statement which lasted at least a half hour, and
more with the translations-close on to an hour with the translation-
was followed by the President's statement.
Mr. Macmillan, and while I think Mr. Hagerty is right, that he
would wish to brief it, but I think this was important because both
General de Gaulle and Macmillan urged Khrushchev to adopt an
attitude which would make this Conference possible. Mr. Macmillan
pointed out that their reference to any threat had been completely
removed by the present statement that these flights had been sus-
pended and would not be resumed. Mr. Macmillan also made the
point that all espionage is in effect violation of sovereignty, and that
unfortunately espionage was an unpleasant fact of life, but that he
did not see how you could make too much distinction between one
form of espionage and another since the great majority of any form
of espionage constitutes a violation of national sovereignty.
General de Gaulle, as I say, was trying to counsel moderation on
Mr. Khrushchev. He proposed there should be at least a day's recess
while there might be an opportunity to see what could be done. He,
urged upon Mr. Khrushchev not to make any final decision.
In reply to Mr. Khrushchev's question, as I had already said, the
President made it clear that this suspension of flights was not just
for the duration of the Conference. Mr. Khrushchev ignored this and
put out his statement, as you all know, publicly, which contains no
reference to the fact that the President had made this important
statement.
General do Gaulle pointed out that incidents like this of the plane
were in effect the result of the tensions that this Conference had been
called upon to deal with. He thought that its very happening, which
was in the past, had highlighted the importance of addressing them-
selves to the subject on which they had come to Paris for. He pointed
out that as a matter of commonsense, the time was not far distant when
the satellites in orbit would open the skies over all countries, and even
mentioned that there was a Soviet satellite launched yesterday, which
was crossing France eighteen times a day.
None of this seemed to shake Mr. Khrushchev in his fundamental
position, and he announced that he intended to publish this state-
ment at a time of his own choice, and that he could not do otherwise.
He made one interesting reference-interesting to me-when he said
that this was a matter that involved deeply the internal politics of'
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230 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
the Soviet Union, a matter which he said was of great importance to
them. Ile stressed the fact that, as he termed it, the United States
policy had been made public on this, ignoring the President's state-
ment about the suspension of the plane flights, and that consequently
a public statement would have to be issued by the United States
and this statement included not only the question of suspension o
the flight-, but also a denunciation of what had already happened
and an expression of regret that this had occurred. The President's
statement makes plain this was not acceptable to the United States.
And also the third point was the punishment of those directly re-
sponsible, as stated in his own statement this morning.
The matter was left in some obscurity. Up to the time of Khru-
shchev's announcement of his determination to publish this thing and
publish it in full, there had been some consideration along the lines
of General de Gaulle's statement of providing-suggestion as Presid-
ing Officer that they should take a recess should see what might be
done through bilateral or other forms of discussion, that he would
stay in contact with the delegations and then later on would determine
whether to call a session of the Conference.
It was again at this point that Iihrushchev pointed out that he did
not consider this the Conference, that these were preliminary meetings
and not the Conference itself. After he insisted upon publishing
this, both Mr. Macmillan and General de Gaulle I think questioned
what was going to happen, whether or not a meeting would take place
tomorrow, or when, and I would say the matter was left in complete
abeyance.
Both General de Gaulle and Macmillan pointed out that if this
statement was made public, it would be the taking of a -decision of
the type which General de Gaulle had urged should not be taken,
except after mature and due consideration during the recess.
Q. What is your view? Are you ready for questions?
Mr.IlAOERTY. Yes.
Q. Can you tell us why
Q. What. is your view of the significance of Mr. Khruslichev s
comments about the internal politics of the Soviet Union?
Mr. BoIILI:N. It struck me only that I never, at any previous con-
ferences, heard any reference of this kind made. I 'think anybody
can draw their own conclusions from it.. I don't propose to speculate
on what might. be in Mr. Khrushchev's mind, but only say this is
the first time I have heard a reference in exactly those terms made
in any conference with the Soviets.
Mr. Khruslichev provided a few liighliglets which I might mention
to you, one of which during discussion he raised both his liands-
on the subject of innocence in regard to espionage and the friendly
feelings towards all countries-he raised his arms above his head
and said: "As God is my witness, my hands are clean and my soul is
pure." [Laughter.]
Q. Mr. Ambassador, is there going to be a Summit Conference?
Mr. BoIrt.EN. Well, it depends on whom you are talking to. As
far as Mr. Khrushcliev is concerned there hasn't been any. I think-
and I don't want to speak for our Western colleagues, but we would
consider this was a meeting of the Summit this morning. As to what
happens in the future, I just don't know.
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Q. Mr. Bohlen, is it your feeling that Mr. Khrushchev intends to
call off the nuclear discussion, the test ban, and the disarmament
discussions, as well as the Summit Meeting?
Mr. Bori.LEw. I don't think we can answer that yet. There have
been two conferences going on at Geneva, the ten-nation disarma-
ment conference and the nuclear testing thing which has been going
on for over a year and a half. We have not yet heard whether the
Soviets are going to pull out of those yet.
Q. Can you tell us anything about any further meetings the Presi-
dent will have this afternoon or this evening?
Mr. HAGERTY. Well, first, of course, when he returned to the Ameri-
can residence, after the conclusion of the Summit Meeting, he had
a meeting with all of the members of the American Delegation.
And he and they, with Ambassador Bohlen and Mr. Berding and
myself, were working-and he was working-on this statement that
I have just read to you. There is a meeting, and I think it started
at four or shortly thereafter, of the Western Foreign Ministers at
the Quai D'Orsay, which is probably presently in progress, and that
is all the meetings I know of at the present time.
The President is at the residence, and intends to stay there, but
I do not know of any meetings scheduled for him other than those
with his own people at this time.
Q. Jim, did Mr. Khrushchev make any other references to political
conditions in the United States beyond the remark in his prepared
statement, which we have?
Mr. HAGrRTY. Well, I will ask Mr. Bohlen to answer that. He
was at the meeting.
Mr. Boi[LzN. I don't think he did. I just haven't seen-I heard
him make it, but I can't quite recall whether the reference to his visit
to the United States is included in his published statement or not
Mr. HAGERTY. Yes it is-Yes.
Mr. BoTTLEN. He did-it was, yes-about how much he enjoyed it.
Then he didn't add anything about the United States except what is
in his statement.
Q. Mr. Bohlen, did we offer to make the statement public that the
flights would not be resumed during this period of discussion, when it
still wasn't clear whether he was going to publish his own statement?
Mr. BOHLEN. This statement actually did not come up, but I would
say it is a fair inference that the statement at the Conference could
have been made public. But I would like to emphasize in this, in
commenting on it, Mr. Khrushchev said that they had heard this with
some satisfaction. However, they noted that there was no denuncia-
tion of the past act, no expression of regret, and no indication of will-
ingness to punish, as he put it, those immediately responsible for
these overflights.
Q. Mr. Bohlen, did Mr. Khrushchev in any way indicate what is
going to happen to Captain Powers?
Mr. BoiiLEN. No, he did not. Captain Powers' name was not men-
tioned this morning at all.
Q. Was there any reference, Mr. Ambassador, to the German prob-
lem and the possibility of a German peace treaty now ?
Mr. BoiILEN. No, the only one is the one contained in his statement.
Q. Mr. Ambassador, what was the attitude of Mr. Khrushchev i
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Was he fiery angry or was he nonconunittal, or what was the atmos-
phere of the meeting?
Mr. BOHLEN.. I think he certainly wasn't noncominital, if you read
his statement, [Laughter.]
not Ile seemed to me to be rather ill at ease,
articularly in his manner of expression or excited. But I would
say Ea was under some feeling of tension. Ile seemed to pay a great
deal of attention to Mr. Groniyko on one side and to Marshal llali-
novsky on the other. The atmosphere of the meeting was very-cer-
tainly wasn't cordial. It was not excited. but it was cold and busi-
nesslike.
Q. How did President Eisenhower take to Khrushchev's statement,
Mr. Ambassador?
Mr. Born i;x. I think the President's statement in response gives
you the answer to that.
Q. I mean, physically ?
Mr. BOHLEN. Oli, there were no signs. The President has been
around a great deal and he didn't show any signs one way or other
on his face when he heard this.
Q. Will the President go to the Palais de Chaillot tomorrow at
11 o'clock?
Mr. I [AGM nTY, The Palais de Chaillot?
Q. To the President's Palace?
Mr. IIAGEiiry. I think the only thing I can say on that is what we
have said two or three times, we will have to wait and see.
Q. Jim, will the President still go to Portugal as scheduled?
Mr. IIncE8rrY. Gee- you know, we haven't talked about that at all
today. [Laughter.] I just don't know, Sinitty.
Q. Mr. Anibassador, has the recent expulsion of the two Soviet
spies from Switzerland been mentioned?
Mr. BOHLEN. No, the only reference to espionage was the one in
the President's statement, and the one I mentioned in Mr. Macmil-
lan's statement, who staid it was an unpleasant fact of life that all-
mos
Q. Does the t forms of espionage involved violation of national sovereignty.
change of attitude eon~the part of ethdee United morning g toewaide flighty
over the Soviet Union?
Mr. IIAGEPTY. I think his statement pointed out that there had been
misunderstanding on this and that both on May 11 and on May 9 I
believe the date is, referred to in the statement, these statements we
thought were made clear, but there had been misapprehension on one
key point.
Q. Then the right to such flights is maintained?
Q. Can I ask a question? Was it not previously denied in Wash-
ington that the President had ordered a cessation of overflights, as
reported by Mr. Reston in the New York Times?
Mr. IIAOEirrY. The story that you are referring to, I made the
remarks, the story as written was not correct.
Q. But the right to make the flights is maintained?
Mr. ILwnwrY. The right to make flights is maintained? I don't
know what you mean by the right to make flights?
Q. The right of espionage? (Laughter.]
Mr. IIAGERTY (indicating). That's my answer.
Q. Mr. Bohlen, could you possibly say in what order the statements
were made?
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SU
Mr. BOLiLEN. Yes. Khrushchev spoke first. De Gaulle opened up
as host and said that yesterday he had received the information con-
cerning the Soviet position from one of the participants, Mr. Khru-
shchev, and he had made this known to his other two colleagues, and
he wondered if anyone had anything to say.
Mr. Khrushchev jumped in and said, "I have something to say,"
and said it.
Q. Was there any informal exchange between the two men-between
Eisenhower and Khrushchev ?
Mr. BoHLEN. No, there was not.
Q. Did they shake hands when they came in?
Mr. BOHLEN. No, they did not. When the President came in, Khru-
shchev was already seated at the table, and the President just took his
place at the tame.
Q. How did the scene end up, Mr. Ambassador? Did they say
goodby to each other informally, or did they just walk out without
speaking?
Mr. BOULEN. They just walked out.
Q. Has the machinery been set up, or is it being set up now to
arrange a bilateral meeting, between Mr. Khrushchev and Mr. Eisen-
hower, and if so, who is operating that machinery?
Mr. HAGERTY. No, I don't know of any at the present time. The
statement that has been made by the President at the meeting-let
me see where it is-on the last page: "We are prepared either to
carry this point no further, or to undertake bilateral conversations
between the United States and the U.S.S.R. while the main confer-
ence proceeds." The President made the offer. We have heard noth-
ing from the Soviets.
Q. May I ask
Q. Did Mr. Khrushchev propose to adjourn the Conference for 6
to 8 months with some kind of pledge at this time not to change the
situation in Berlin?
Mr. BoULEN. There was no such pledge.
Mr. IIAGERTY. The question was did Mr. Khrushchev make any
pledge, was it?
Q. No, is the Ambassador considering a proposal of some kind of
pledge
Mr. HAGERTY. Is the Ambassador considering-what proposal, sir?
Q. To adjourn the conference.
Mr. HAGERTY. The proposal to adjourn the Conference, does this
change the situation on Berlin? Is that
Q. Not to change?
Mr. HAGERTY. Not to change the situation-I am sorry-it is diffi-
cult to hear here.
Q. Yes. I beg your pardon for my bad English.
Mr. HAGERTY. No, no, I understand. (?) is considering
Q. The question was whether President de Gaulle
recent proposals to adjourn the Conference for 6 or 8 months with
some kind of pledge that he during this time will not change the actual
situation in Berlin?
Mr. HAGERTY. In proposing to end this Conference here and have
another one at some time in the future, 6 to 8 months, as Mr. Khru-
shchev says, does this mean that Mr. Khrushchev will change his posi-
tion
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L TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
Q. Will not?
Mr. IIAGEWrY. Will not change his position-I am sorry-on
Berlin?
Mr. BOZILEA-, I don't think it's possible to draw any inference from
that statement. lie made no reference to Berlin at all, except tlie one
in his published statement. Therefore, I don't think that you can
read into this one way or other, it`s merely what he said, let's have an-
other-the conference, maybe in 6 to 8 months. IIe did say-you asked
if there was any reference to the internal thing-1 think this is in his
statement when there would be a new American government.
Q. Ambassador Bohlen, did eit her Khruslichev or de Gaulle or .Mac-
millan comment in any -,vay on the President's suggestion on United
Nations surveillance?
Mr. BOIILEN. The only one who did was Khrushchev, who said that
the Soviet Union is sovereign over its own airspace and no one-and
he repeated no one-will be permitted to infringe on it. If you ever
got, lie said, complete disarmament when there were no arms whatso-
ever, then you could have open skies, open earth, and open water.
But until that happens, no one--and he repeated no one-would be
permitted to fly over the Soviet Union.
Q. Mr. Hagerty
Q. Jim
Q. Jim, can you tell us why it was, or give us the background, the
fact that these flights were suspended and were not to be resunied-
why that was not announced, in view of the misunderstanding you
mentioned ?
Mr. II.tn rcra. WW'ell, 1 thought that it was, by some of our people in
our Government, in some conversations that they have been having,
but that's the only answer I can give.
Q. Mr. Ambassador, is it correct that prior to Mr. Tihrushchev's
clean hands and pure soul statement, there had been no detailing of
any kind as to Soviet espionage in the West or the United States?
Mr. BoiinEN. There was no detailing of it. but the President's state-
ment, which has just been read by Mr. IIagerty, said: "As is well
known, not only the United States but most, other countries are con-
stantly the targets of elaborate and persistent espionage of (lie Soviet
Union."
Q. Mr. Hagerty, do you know whether-if the United States dele-
gation is prepared to counterattack arrainst (lie Soviet Union on a
propaganda basis on the matter, or rater try to calm down the situ-
ation?
Mr. ILAGERTY. We11, in the first place, I think that propaganda
speaks for itself, and I refer you to the President's statement as far
as propaganda is concerned here--at this meeting. I think what we
tried to do is--on the second part of your qui,stion, I think that this is
also handled in the statement, where the President says that "In spite
of this serious and adverse development, I have no intention whatso-
ever to diminish my continuing efforts to promote progress toward a
peace with justice. This applies to the remainder of my stay in Paris
as well as thereafter."
I think those words speak clearly in answer to your statement.
Q. Mr. Hagerty
Mr. IIAGERTY. Yes, sir.
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Q. Will you tell us when the three Western chiefs of government
will get together and decide their next move?
Mr. HAGERTY. I can't tell you now. I would think that this is one
of the reasons the Foreign Ministers are meeting this afternoon.
Q. With the Russian Foreign Minister present, or only the three
Western
Mr. IIAGERTY. No, I said the three Western Foreign Ministers are
meeting this afternoon.
Q. Did Mr. Khrushchev acknowledge in any way Mr. Eisenhower's
statement that overflights will be discontinued'?
Mr. IIAGERTY. I thought Mr. Bohlen had answered that.
Mr. BOHLEN. Yes, lie did, and he said they had some satisfaction
on this, but pointed out that the other points of their demands still
remained unanswered or unaccepted.
Q. Thank you.
Mr. HAGERTY. Okay?
Q. Thank you.
Mr. HAGERTY. That statement is mimeographed and on the tables
outside the hall.
18. COMMUNIQUE, MAY 17, 1960
[White House press release]
The President of the United States, the President of the French
Republic and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom take note
of the fact that because of the attitude adopted by the Chairman of
the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union it has not been possible
to begin, at the Summit Conference, the examination of the problems
which it had been agreed would be discussed between the four Chiefs
of State or Government.
They regret that these discussions, so important for world peace,
could not take place. For their part, they remain unshaken in their
conviction that all outstanding international questions should be
settled not by the use or threat of force but by peaceful means through
negotiation. They themselves remain ready to take part in such
negotiations at any suitable time in the future.
19. TRANSCRIPT OF PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV'S NEWS
CONFERENCE, PARIS, MAY 18, 1960
[From the New York Times, May 19,1960]
Paris, May 18 (Reuters).-Following is the o7lcial English trans-
lation of the text of Premier Khrushchev's prepared statement at his
news conference here today:
Ladies and Gentlemen.
You obviously know the statement which I made on May 16 to Presi-
dent de Gaulle of France, Prime Minister Macmillan of Great Britain
and President Eisenhower of the United States.
The circumstances under which the Soviet Government deemed it
necessary to make this statement are generally known. I have in view
56412-60-16
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
the aggressive flights of American warplanes over the Soviet Union,
undertaken on the eve of the summit conference, and the public decla-
ration of the United States Government that such flights are its official
policy.
Now attempts are being made to lay the blame on us for the alleged
refusal of the Soviet Union to take part in the meeting and for making
some sort of ultimatums to the United States.
But we have declared and we declare that we are ready to take part
in the conference if the United States Government makes up publicly
for the insult inflicted upon our country by its a essive actions.
However, we are still not sure that the es pionage fligghts, which are
undertaken by the United States, will not be repeated
Just recall the behavior of the United States leader, after they were
caught redhanded. I shall refer to documents, and documents alone.
On May 5, when all the world learned that an American warplane
was brought down over Soviet territory the Department of State
declared that it was an aircraft which few over Turkey to collect
meteorological information. It. was claimed also that the pilot radioed
back that he had trouble with his oxygen equipment. Asa result of
this, the pilot allegedly lost consciousness and the plane, steered for
quite a time by its automatic pilot, could have accidentally intruded
into the Soviet airspace.
It was reported that a search was carried on for this plane in
Turkish territory around Lake Van, where the terrain is very moun-
tainous.
When we announced that the American plane had been shot down
in the area of Sverdlovsk and that the captured pilot had owned up to
being a spy, the United States Secretary of State Herter said on
May 9 that it was indeed a spy plane.
More, he said that such flights were being made on the President's
instruction and in accordance with a program which provided for
extensive aerial surveillance, including "by penetration" of the Soviet
airspace. It was a brazen statement on the part of Mr. Herter.
On May 11, President Eisenhower himself confirmed Herter's state-
ment.
On May 12, the United States Embassy in Moscow, in its note to the
Soviet Government, again said that aggressive espionage flights were a
calculated policy of the United States.
And now, in Paris, the President of the United States issues a state-
ment to the effect that the United States has "suspended" its flight--
and will not resume them.
Some people ask, referring to this statement: What else does the
Soviet union need? It would seem that the threat of flights by
American military planes over the Soviet Union is thus removed.
"SERVITORS OF I3fFERIAI.ISM
Such a statement may have satisfied the servitors of imperialism.
The imperialists have grown accustomed to behaving like Russian
merchants did of old : they painted the lackeys' lips with mustard, and
the latter said, "thank you" and bowed low.
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We will not tolerate insults, we have our pride and our dignity. We
represent a mighty Socialist state.
But then Eisenhower said at the preliminary meeting on May 16
that what he had meant by his statement about the suspension of
overflights by American military planes was that they would not be
resumed for the remainder of his tenure as President.
He said he did not know, naturally, what decision the next Presi-
dent would take. Thus, what the President of the United States
promises is not renunciation of aggressive policy, but merely a tem-
porary "suspension" of flights till January, 1961.
It is not for a long period that Mr. President promises us to dis-
continue the provocative policy of espionage flights. But interna-
tional relations cannot be built on the term. of office of this or that
'official, for what would then be the worth of any international
agreement.
If we followed the American President's logic, it would be impos-
sible to negotiate on, say, disarmament. An agreement may, con-
ceivably, be signed today, but lose force tomorrow and be thrown
into the wastepaper basket because the person who signed it would
leave his post.
To hear President Eisenhower, it would seem that the question
of whether American military planes will or will not overfly the
U.S.S.R. depends on him and him alone.
Just think, what presumption ! He now says they will not overfly.
What magnanimity !
Of course, it is for President Eisenhower to decide whether to send
or not to send his planes. But it is another question whether they
will be able to overfly our territory. This is decided by us, and very
definitely for that matter-we shall shoot these planes down, we shall
administer shattering blows at the bases whence they come and at
those who have set up these bases and actually dispose of them.
The point in question, therefore, is not some sort of "favor" to
the Soviet Union on the part of President Eisenhower. We do not
ask "favors" of the United States Government, but honest condem-
nation of the bandit flights of American intelligence planes.
However, President Eisenhower did not utter a single word of
condemnation with regard to the provocative policy against the Soviet
Union, on the strength of which the spy flights were undertaken.
Can such a statement by the President satisfy anyone but the
aggressor himself ?
Eisenhower's statement that he has suspended these provocative
flights for the term he remains in the White House is not a confes-
sion, not even a semi-confession, but an attempt to dodge confession
and consequently responsibility for his aggressive actions. But sub-
terfuges and even semi-confessions of political leaders have never
helped them to avoid historical responsibility. Even the children
are told : If you do something bad-own up and say you "won't do
it again." In government affairs, it is even more important to make
complete confessions and draw all the necessary conclusions.
PREMIER VOICES SURPRISE
The Soviet people, public opinion in our and all other peaceful
countries, would not understand us if we contented ourselves with the
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
American President's dodges and the "favor" he "graciously" did us
by stopping flights over the Soviet Union till January, 1961.
Nor could we fail to be surprised by Eisenhower's statement., which
looked like a threat that he planned to submit to the United Nations
a new "open skies" plan.
After the Pentagon had realized that the Soviet skies were closed
to American spy planes, the people there apparently decided to send
planes with the sumo aims but under the United Nations flag. It is
to be hoped that the United Nations is not an American state, not
a branch of the Pentagon, and will decline this humiliating role.
Some of you say in~your dispatches that flights by American air
pirates over the Soviet Union are only a "small incident." You repre-
sent here the press of various states, and I would like to ask you
what would you think of your government if it treated with indiffer-
ence, with unconcern, the overflights of your cities by military planes
of countries of which you yourselves sometimes write as potential
opponents?
Would you respect such a government? Would your families and
you yourselves feel safe listening to the drone of an alien military
plane over your heads?
But the Soviet people have as much right to think in this way, the
more so since the peoples of our country have vivid memories of two
murderous wars imposed on us from without, two wars which took
a toll of tens of millions of lives.
It is indicative that the governments of the countries that have
rashly lent their territories for the preparation and carrying out of
aggressive spy flights over Soviet territory, are now compelled to
righit themselves in this or other measure before public opinion and
disavow the actions of the American military. They, a parently,
have begun to realize--and we are sure that this will soon be realized
by everybody who opened their land for the establishment of Ameri-
can war bases-that such things are not to be trifled with.
The Soviet Government. regrets that it. was impossible to hold the
conference now, but, as I have already said, it could not act otherwise.
We have done everything to prepare well the heads-of-government
meeting, but some hotheads in the United States of America have
torpedoed it even before it could be opened.
I rep. eat, gentlemen. the Soviet Union is firmly for peaceful coexist-
ence, for talks, for the reaching of reasonable, mutually acceptable
agreements.
We shall work in this direction, confident that our peace-lovin
policy meets with the sympathy and understanding of all nations, an
we should like to believe that the Western leaders will also strive
toward this end, that within six or eight months we shall again meet
with our partners in a new, more favorable atmosphere, if they show
interest and agreement. to have this meeting, if they create the neces-
sary political atmosphere for it, for the discussion and settlement of
urgent international problems-that is, if they do not undertake prov-
ocations against the Socialist states.
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WE CANNOT BE BENT
This can happen even sooner, but only if everybody realizes that
no one will be able to intimidate the Soviet Union, the Socialist states,
by any provocative actions whatsoever ! We cannot be bent !
Negotiations and agreements with us are possible only on the basis
of equality, without threats or blackmail.
I should like to thank the President of France, General de Gaulle
for enabling the heads of government to meet in Paris, for the ef-
forts he made so that the summit should take place, so that our meet-
ings should be held as agreed upon and conform to the aims for which
we have come here.
Today I paid a farewell call on the President of France. We ex-
changed our views, and I am happy to say that a common striving
was revealed to continue to exert efforts for the development and
strengthening of our relations in every way. I welcome this and I
express my satisfaction that the President 'and I agree on this most
important question.
I should also like to express my gratitude to the Prime Minister of
Great Britain, Mr. Macmillan, for his understanding and the efforts
he made so that the summit meeting takes place.
And yet, I cannot fail to express some regret as well. If the
President of France and the Prime Minister of Neat Britain assumed
the position of the objective appraisal of facts instead of yielding to
their Allied ties, if they displayed more will, the leaders of the United
States might perhaps have been obliged to condemn their aggressive
actions, and conditions would thereby have been created enabling the
summit conference to take place and yield the beneficent results
hopefully awaited by all the peoples of the world.
I thank you for your attention, gentlemen, and I am now ready to
reply to your questions.
PARIS, May 18 (Reuters)-Following is the transcript of Premier
Khrushchev's news conference here today, held after he made his pre-
pared statement, with the Premier's remarks and those of non-English-
speaking correspondents in unofficial translation:
Ladies and gentlemen, I want to ask your pardon but I want to
address myself to that little group in the hall that is booing.
I have already been informed that Chancellor Adenauer has sent
some of his riffraff that escaped the beating at Stalin~Tad and it is
they that are indulging in this booing, they that we did not at that
time send three meters underground.
Look to it, if you were not beaten at Stalingrad and in the Ukraine,
we will give you such a boo that you will lose any desire to come into
the hail and boo again.
Ladies and gentlemen, I want to draw your attention to the fact
that they are reacting to my words without even listening to the trans-
lation.
They understand. These are the plunderers who came to the Soviet
Union to plunder and pillage and they carried away their hands-
they carried themselves away from the Soviet Union. They escaped
a beating.
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240 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
The most important thing here is that you are all wise people, and
you must certainly understand who is standing before you. I repre-
sent the great Soviet people, a people that has won victor ? in the
Great October Revolution under the leadership. of the great Lenin, a
people that is now successfully building a Communist society, that is
confidently marching forward'to communism.
And you, this little group, represent those people of whom the
Germans themselves will in time be ashamed. Ipam speaking of this
German riffraff and not of the great German people.
Their booing heartens me, heartens and gratifies me because in the
words of a great representative of the German people, August Bebel,
"If your enemies are attacking you, then know it. Bebel, you are on
the right track."
And if you boo me then this adds confidence to me and I understand
that. I, too, am on the right. track.
I shall not conceal my pleasure. I like coming to grips with the
enemies of the working class and it is gratifying for me to hear
frenzy of these lackeys of imperialism. Nothing they attempt to do
will gaint.hem any good. The Soviet Union, firm as a rock, is march-
ing forward to build communism and will continue to march forward
till the complete triumph of communism in the Soviet Union.
Now thank you for your attention, Ladies and Gentlemen, I shall
do my best to answer to the full any questions that you may have to
ask me.
DAILY SSETCII, London. Can Chairman Khrushchev say if the
Soviet Union will continue the talks on disarmament and on the
suspension of nuclear testsl
A. We shall continue our negotiations in Geneva. The American
imperialists have received some clarification of late. They received
an eye opener in Sverdlovsk. And if they understand that, then there
is a possibility to reach agreement on the discontinuance of tests.
But if Eisenhower threatens that he will continue testing, then we, too,
will follow suit until the whole world learns who are the true guilty
parties and who is resisting agreement. We at any time are ready to
sign such an agreement.
The disarmament negotiations are another matter altogether. We
are almost convinced that our partners in these disarmament negotia-
tions do not want disarmament but want simply control over arma-
ments, which is in other words the collection of espionage information.
We will not agree to this. We are for true disarmament, for true
control measures, so that no one should threaten any one else.
What is going on now at Geneva is merely procrastination. But if
this procrastination goes on, we will be compelled to approach the
United Nations and to say that our partners do not want to reach
agreement and that we are asking the United Nations General Assem-
bly to consider the matter.
INSISTS ON ASSURANCES
BRIDGEPORT HERALD (Connecticut). If your allegations regarding
the U-2 incident are true or even worse, don't you think that as the
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFEREN
great leader of a great state and knowing that truth is on your side
it would be better to have the summit conference now than in six or
eight months' time, considering the state of tension?
A. Yes, we are in favor of holding a summit conference. That is
why we came to Paris. But the United States must admit its aggres-
sive intrusion, must condemn its act, give assurances that such acts
would not be repeated and must punish the guilty party. Then, if
it had done so, we would be satisfied and we would have taken part
in the summit conference, to seek correct solutions for the questions
confronting it. But the United States refused to do this.
How then are we to negotiate with an aggressor, with a state that
has committed aggression, and on the contrary is saying that these
flights are United States policy ?
Ladies and Gentlemen, we all have mothers. You all do, too, other-
wise you couldn't have come into this world.
I remember during my youth I was born in a very poor family and
it was only very rarely that my mother could buy us some cream. But
sometimes when she did our cat would creep up and eat some of the
cream, would steal some of the cream. Then my mother usually took
the cat by the scruff of the neck and gave it a good shaking and in
the end would poke its nose into the cream to make it understand
that such stealing was not allowed.
Wouldn't it be better, Ladies and Gentlemen, to take the American
aggressors by the scruff of the neck also and give them a little shaking
and make them understand they must not commit such acts of aggres-
sion against the Soviet Union?
DIE WELT Hamburg.-Do you still consider that international is-
sues should ~e resolved by peaceful means?
A. Yes, I reaffirm that our policy has always been to solve disputed
issues not by means of war but by peaceful negotiations. That is the
policy we have always adhered to and continue to adhere to now.
Q. Do you still adhere to your former proposal regarding the trans-
formation of West Berlin into a free city
A. Yes, I still adhere to this policy and we see no other reasonable
way out. West Berlin is situated in the center of the German Demo-
cratic Republic, which is a Socialist republic, whereas the system in
West Berlin is a capitalist one.
These two systems are antagonistic and this is always fraught with
a conflict. Why should we have such a situation? Wouldn't it be bet-
ter to take a better decision, that is to insure West Berlin a free city
status, withdraw all foreign troops and make it possible for the in-
habitants of West Berlin to choose the social system under which they
want to live, the one which satisfies them the most, and, of course, on
the condition that they are assured freedom of external ties with
the world.
This recent conflict with the United States aircraft convinces us
all the more that these questions must be solved as we are approaching
the mnatter with ever greater resolve and urgency. By the way, tomor-
row I am flying to Berlin. We will talk with our comrades, Ulbricht
and Grotewohl, and in general with our friends in the German Dem-
ocratic Republic.
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44 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
DER TAG, Berlin.-Do you intend to conclude a separate peace treaty
in Berlin? (There were additional shouts of "and when?")
A. Yes we do intend to sign not a separate peace, but a peace treaty
with the German Democratic republic and thus to put. an end finally
to World War IL In that case, the Western powers will be deprived
of their occupation rights, the right to maintain their troops in West
Berlin. When? That is our business. When we consider the time
to be right, we will take our fountain pens from our pockets-the
necessary drafts have already been prepared and the drafts will be-
we will sit down and sign the peace treaty and announce it to the world.
I would like to add we are simply intending to do what the United
States did with regard to Japan.
We fought in the war together with the United States against. Japan.
But the United States signed a peace. treaty with Japan. But we
didn't. We are. exerting all efforts to prove the necessity to sign a
peace treaty together, but. we have now almost reached the limits of
our patience and of our effort to have a peace treaty signed together
and when we do reach the Iimit we will sign such a treaty by ourselves
just as, I repeat, the United States did with regard to fapan.
NATIONAL BROADCASTING Co.-Why, since you knew about these
flights, did you not tell President Eisenhower about them and ask
him to stop them when you visited the United States?
A. I will answer that question with pleasure. When we were talking
in Camp David with President Eisenhower I almost opened my mouth
to make that statement.
I was on the oint of making it because the atmosphere there was
so convivial wit i President Eisenhower telling me to call him "My
friend" in English and using the same words with regard to myself
in Russian. And then, thought I, why not raise the matter with this
friend of mine.
But when I became apprehensive and I thought there was something
fishy about this friend of mine and I didn't }broach the subject and
it turned out that I was right, because when we caught them red-
handed they say they are not thieves, it's just their thief-like policy.
That is all.
This recalls to my mind what we used to do in the Donbas when I was
the young boy. ''henever we. caught a cat in the pigeon's loft, we
would catch the cat by its tail and bang its head against the wall and
that was the only way it Could be taught some sense.
COLUD1BTA BRo.%ne.%sTING SYs'rEa1.-Since, because by desire or not
you have become a factor in the American political campaign, would
you care to say which President you would prefer to deal with?
A. I thank you for that question. It is a good question, although
rather a difficult one to reply to. Nevertheless, I will try to reply.
When I was in the United States, I talked with very, many Ameri-
cans, ordinary people, with people who are wealthy, with representa-
tives of the capitalist world, the statesmen, the farmers. And I re-
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tamed very good and, I may even say, pleasant memories of my con-
versations with most of these peoples.
People everywhere are just like people and they all want peace.
Perhaps they understand it in their own way, but that should certainly
not be the ground for any conflict. Perhaps they don't agree with
my understanding and I don't agree with their belief that the capital-
ism system is better. But that certainly should not be the object of
any conflict and, all the more so, of a war.
I am sure that the majority of Americans regret the act perpetrated
by the American Air Force.
It is true there are some Americans who have been kidded into,
indignation against the acts of the Soviet Union but to this I can
but reply, how would they themselves feel if we were to fly our aircraft
over their country.
But they would certainly come to the conclusion that such flights
are absolutely inadmissible, that this can only end in aggression, can
only bring about a war.
Regarding the question of who, in my opinion, will become the
United States President, there certainly was a person to my liking, a.
person with whom I am sure we could have reached agreement.
He was a great American, his name was Roosevelt and he was a
worthy representative of the capitalist society, but we cooperated
with him very well indeed during World War II. When he died
his policy died with him.
But we are convinced that persons will come to power in the United
States who will pronounce themselves in favor of reaching mutually
acceptable agreements.
We have nothing to quarrel about with the American people. They
are in favor of capitalism, that is their business and even then it is.
not all the American people who are in favor of capitalism because
many of them are simply under the oppression of the capitalistic
system.
But let them come, why doesn't everyone come to the Soviet Union
and see for themselves what kind of a life we are now leading.
Let even those who have been booing here come. We'll give them.
visas, too, and perhaps even they will see the light if they come.
Our country is now second in the world in its industrial produc-
tion, in science and in culture. If I don't perhaps modestly say that.
we are first in the world, we certainly do occupy a worthy place in!
human society.
But I do not want to interfere in the American political scene..
We should maintain an attitude of patience and not try to forecast
who will come to the fore in the United States elections. The Ameri-
can people will themselves elect their worthy representative as Presi-
dent elect someone who would not understand the necessity of reach-
ing agreement we can wait we have waited and we wait and, if the next
President doesn't understand that, we can wait some more. We don't
need to hurry, we have long ago chosen the correct path. We have long
ago determined the correct line of our development and we are con-
vinced that our choice was made correctly and we are marching con-
fidently ahead to the building of a Communist society.
You, perhaps, in time will also understand that this is the only true
road and perhaps you, too, will join this road but even then you will
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not even be parallel with us, you will be lagging behind and trailing in
our wake. But we don't hold that against you, we'll help you to catch
up and share our experience with you.
COMBAT, Paris. Mr. Chairman, you agreed to come to France,
despite the facts of the U-2 incident and knowing of the categoric po-
sition taken by America. Were you convinced that France night pos-
sibly take up a position of appeasement? Why in this case have rela-
tions not relaxed despite the intentions and the actions of General de
Gaulle? Do you think, nonetheless, that these actions have served the
cause of peace?
A. Naturally we knew of the lane incident, in fact, I reported on
it in my speech at the Supreme Soviet. 'WhN then did we come here?
Because we thought that perhaps the United States might be stricken
by some honesty and apologize for its actions.
All the more so that in the recent past the United States apologized
to Cuba when an American plane was shot down over that country.
Then why shouldn't they apologize to the Soviet Union? Well, that
is what we thought, evidently we were mistaken. It was evidently one
thing to apologize to Cuba and another thing to apologize to a Socialist
country.
Well, that is their business. It's simply a matter of upbringing,
a matter of manners and honor. Regarding the position taken by
General de Gaulle. Yes, he did do all he could but nothing came of his
efforts.
Why? Well, I can only refer the correspondent who asked that
question to General de Gaulle because it was the general who talked
the matter over with President Eisenhower and so he knows his reac-
tion. I don't.
As to the results, well, my opinion is that even after a war when the
enemy has been routed the people once again live in peace and friend-
ship.
We had no war. What happened was only that someone tried to
poke his nose into our affairs and we punched that nose so that now
he certainly knows where the border is. If he comes again, he will
receive another blow as will the bases from which he takes off and
where he intends to land.
Actually, all this should be digested and the world should once again
revert to peace and even more than that. to friendship. I am convinced
that that is the opinion entertained by President do Gaulle. But he,
President do Gaulle, found himself in a very awkward situation. That
is my opinion, I don't know, he may not agree with me. On the one
hand, there was nothing he could do but cor_demn the action because
he is a man of lofty moral principles and there can be no two opinions
on this matter. This was a thief-like sally.
But on the other hand, the obstacle to this was that the thief turned
out to be France's ally and not simply an ally but a leader in Western
quarters.
But, I don't want to go into the details of this matter. It concerns
the relationships between the allies. But speaking honestly, if it were
an ally of ours that. bad acted in this way, we would say that that was a
bad way to act and that the necessary apologies should be tendered.
Well, there you are, those are the moral principles of communism.
I cannot answer for the moral principles of a capitalist society. I am
a representative of a Socialist society.
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I would like to add to that, if I understand the question to have
meant how relations between the Soviet Union and France would
develop after this, then my opinion is that all this will have no impact
on the good relations that exist between France and the Soviet Union
and from the talk I had today with General do Gaulle I gained this
same impression also, because I feel President de Gaulle also wants to
continue a policy of improving relations with the Soviet Union.
We are certainly in favor of such a policy also, because we hold
Franco in very high esteem as we do President do Gaulle, we esteem
the French nation, the French culture, so we certainly hope that our
relations with France, far from deteriorating, will improve.
BERLIN RADIO. It follows from American press reports that the
American delegate Gates, has from here declared an emergency alarm
to the American forces. How do you evaluate that act?
A.-I have heard nothing of that report yet, but I certainly have no
reason to disbelieve what the correspondent said.
If this is really so it can be qualified as nothing short of a provoca-
tion designed to trick the Americans and impose more taxes on them.
Perhaps also it can be explained by ordinary cowardice. Sometimes a
coward is even more dangerous than a provocation-monger.
A provocation-monger is trying to provoke war while a coward can
unleash war out of pure cowardice. I don't know this Gates. It's not
for me to judge him. Let the Americans themselves see what sort of
a person he is.
The person I can vouch for is Marshal Malinovsky, here, a hero of
World Wars I and II, a man who fought valiantly against the German
militarists and against Japan during the war, a person who has been
often decorated for his outstanding services. There is a true son of
a Socialist motherland. And, as he says, he has not been calling any
alert nor does he intend to.
SOVIET POWER CITED
But if this action was designed to somehow prevail upon us, then
some other country should be chosen as the target for such acts, be-
cause we certainly have every possibility of acting with regard to such
provocations in the same way as we used to act with regard to that
thieving cat which used to creep into the pigeons' loft. We can cer-
tainly teach it a lesson.
[A few minutes were lost here due to a power failure.]
I presume that the United States will attempt to raise the taxes in
the country over this incident to try to increase their orders for military
equipment-first to take more money from the pockets of the taxpayers
and thus to gain greater profits out of armaments production.
Our policy is a completely different one. We have adopted, we have
taken, the decision to abolish all. taxation of the population by 1965.
By that time no one in the Soviet Union will pay any taxes at all.
This year, we are completing the conversion of all the workers of
the Soviet Union to a seven-hour working day. By 1964, we will have
a six-hour working day for all the workers and employees of the Soviet
Union and by that time the coal miner will have but a five-hour work-
ing day.
That is our policy, and no provocation will make us turn aside or
make us swerve from that correct time that we have chosen. That is
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the true, the convinced, policy of the Soviet Union, a Socialist policy,
the policy of our Communist party.
NEvEES DEUTscuLAND, East Berlin.-Mr. Chairman, what in your
opinion is the reason for the change in the posit ion of President Eisen-
hower since your talks in Camp David? Can you explain the reasons
for the, difference in the position of the United States in Camp David
and now in Paris?
A. I believe the best reply to that question was contained in the
preceding one, the one referring to the alarm, to the emergency alarm-
in the alarm of American troops.
This shows that in the United States the most reactionary forces
in the Pentagon are coming to the fore, and it is they who sent their
planes on a sortie into the Soviet Union, naturally with the knowledge
of the United States President. And this explains this piratical policy
pursued by the United States.
JORNAL DO BR.%sir. Three questions. Mr. Chairman :Do you intend
to no to pay a visit. to the Latin American countries in the near future I
;jecond, liow do you, what. is your appraisal of the Latin-American
countries in the the present world situation? and third, can the Latin-
American countries participate in the solution of outstanding world
problems ?
A. The reply to the first question is easy regarding any possible in-
tention that I might have of visiting Brazil. Nobody has invited me
to come.
LATIN VISITS POSSIBLE
But I am not losing hope of being invited to visit the countries
of Latin America. If I am. I shall gladly avail myself of that
invitation.
As for Latin America, we are happy to Bear the pulse of Latin
America's struggle for independence against American Imperialism.
The welcome accorded to Nixon in Latin American countries was cer-
tainly an omen, a signal. And I can but welcome the events in Cuba,
where the people proudly and courageously rose up under the banner
for the struggle for their independence. I am convinced that the
other Latin American countries will also rise up in the struggle for
and ap-
their independence. We will sympathize with their struary _'
plaud their successes in this fight.
I am convinced that the peoples of Latin America are accumulating
their forces and that they will play an ever growing role in inter-
national relations. Unfortunately there still exist in Latin America
today countries whose governments are taking money from their Tut but are. serving the interests of the American imperialists. But
the Latin American people are awakening, and we welcome this
process and sympathize with it.
It is only when the Latin American peoples have their own govern-
ments, governments that will express the will of these peoples, that
these nations will be able to truly raise their independent voices in the
international arena, including tie United Nations. and this will cer-
tainly be to the benefit of all the countries of the world, to the benefit
of the cause of peace.
Ladies and gentlemen, I could certainly be ready and willing to go
on with this press conference longer, but the interpreters have inti-
mated that their working day is over and that I should respect the
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE GL4(
labor code. Otherwise they say, "Chairman-Chairman." They say,
"You better end your conference, or else we will end it without you."
I want to thank the Government of France, President de Gaulle,
the entire French people and the citizens of Paris. And not only
Paris. For yesterday, for example, we paid a visit to a village out-
side Paris that Marshall Malinovsky visited during World War I,
when he was in the army.
I want to end by saying that the Soviet Union will continue to ad-
here to the policy of peaceful coexistence between two systems, the
systems, that we will continue to pursue a policy of peace aimed at
solving all questions at issue by negotiations. But at the same time,
we will firmly stand, we will firmly defend, our sovereignty. This
policy will, I am sure, be understood by all the nations, for this is the
only correct policy, a policy of defending one's sovereignty without
threats to any one. Good-by. I want to wish you all the best.
But at the same time, I want to voice the hope that you will work
for peace, that your pen will serve the cause of peace and friendship
among the nations. Thank you.
20. COMMUNIQUE OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL,
PARIS, MAY 19, 19,60
[Department of State press release No. 274]
The Permanent Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
met in Paris on May 19, 1960, and heard statements from the Foreign
Ministers of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States on
the events which prevented the holding of the summit conference.
In the communique published at the end of its meeting in Istanbul,
the North Atlantic Council welcomed the prospects of negotiations
with the Soviet Union and expressed the hope that the negotiations
would lead to an improvement in international relations.
It regrets that Mr. Khrushchev's position has made negotiations
in Paris impossible.
Reaffirming complete solidarity of the countries of the Alliance, it
fully approves the statement of the three Heads of State or Govern-
ment that "all outstanding international questions should be settled
not by the use or threat of force but by peaceful means through nego-
tiations" and "remains ready to take part in such negotiations at any
suitable time in the future".
21. REMARKS OF PRESIDENT EISENHOWER ON HIS
ARRIVAL AT ANDREWS FIELD, MAY 20, 1960
[White House Press Release]
My good friends and fellow citizens :
After a trip of this kind you can well understand what it means
to me to have this kind of a welcome. I am deeply appreciative of
the trouble that each of you took to come out to this spot. It truly
means a lot to me.
As we planned for the Summit, the hopes of the world were not
too high. The experience of the past years had denied us any right
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248 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE StJMMJT CONFERENCE
to believe that great advances toward the purpose we seek-peace
with 'ustice--could be achieved in any great measure. Yet, it seems
that time identity of interest between ourselves and the Soviets in cer-
tain features was so obvious that logically we should have made some
progress.
Certainly the subjects on which we wanted to talk were those that
seemed so important to them-for example, disarmament; the widen-
ing of contacts so that we would have open societies, or slightly more
open societies dealing with each other; then the matter of Berlin and
a divided Germany; and finally, as between Russia, the U.K. and our-
selves some agreement on a plan for control of nuclear testing.
Therefore, it was a mystery, and remains a mystery, as to why at
this articular moment the Soviets chose so to distort and overplay
the 0-2 incident that they obviously wanted no talks of any kind,
and, in fact, made it impossible to begin them. I am not going to
speculate today as to the future, but it is quite clear that since they
wanted no talks whatsoever at this time that we can be watchful for
more irritations, possibly other incidents that can be more than annoy-
ing, sometimes creating real problems.
For example, just today a half hour before I landed, it was reported
to me that there is a C--47 missing in Western Germany. This is an
unarmed, slow plane-no possibility of being used for military pur-
poses-and, in fact., I believe it had nine passengers aboard. There
was some bad weather and its route took it near the Eastern German
border. We do not know at this moment that any deliberate act de-
layed it, but at least it is overdue. And so, in the atmosphere in
which we now have to think and Iive we cannot. be sure that t e worst
has not happened.
Now, I may want to talk soon to the nation about these matters, and
for that part of it, I now stop. But I do want to tell all of you people
about three or four encouraging features that I encountered. First of
all, was the assurance of the support of the home folks-from friends,
and from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, from the political leaders of both
parties, from newspaper comments and editorial comment of every
kind-I was assured of the essential solidarity of the United States,
and the sincerity of our peaceful purposes.
Secondly, was the conduct of my two principal colleagues of the
West. Mr. Macmillan and General do Gaulle were superb. They
spoke with one voice with our Delegation in support of those things
which we thought. right and decent and logical.
Thirdly, was an action on the part of the NATO Council yester-
day when Secretary Herter reported to them while I was in Portugal.
The NATO Resolution unanimously supported the three Western
powers in what we were trying to do.
And finally, the Portuguese reception. In a way I think they
wanted to provide the United States and the West-and even me per-
sonally-with something of an antidote for some of the disappoint-
ments we have felt.. Government and citizens alike tried to outdo
themselves in the warmth and cordiality of their reception, and on
top of that, in their assurances from every side-newspapers, the offi-
cials, common people coming in who were serving us in the Palace-
everywhere they said-the West in effect is right., and we want you
to know it.. And they used every possible way to do it. And for that
day in Portugal yesterday I am grateful.
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE 249
Finally, since most of you will understand that by our time here it
was one o'clock when I arose this morning I am sure you expected
nothing of eloquence. But I did want sincerely to give you some of
my reactions, convictions as of this moment, and to say again to each
of you : Thank you very much indeed.
22. ADDRESS OF PRESIDENT EISENHOWER, MAY 25, 1960
[White House press release]
(As actually delivered)
My Fellow Americans :
Tonight I want to talk with you about the remarkable events last
week in Paris, and their meaning to our future.
First, I am deeply grateful to the many thousands of you, and to
representatives in Congress, who sent me messages of encouragement
and support while I was in Paris, and later upon my return to
Washington. Your messages clearly revealed your abiding loyalty
to America's great purpose-that of pursuing, from a position of
spiritual, moral, and material strength-a lasting peace with justice.
You recall, of course why I went to Paris ten days ago.
Last summer and fall I had many conversations with world leaders;
some of these were with Chairman Khrushchev, here in America.
Over those months a small improvement in relations between the
Soviet Union and the West seemed discernible. A possibility devel-
oped that the Soviet leaders might at last be ready for serious talks
about our most persistent problems-those of disarmament, mutual
inspection, atomic control, and Germany, including Berlin.
To explore that possibility, our own and the British and French
leaders met together, and later we agreed, with the Soviet leaders, to
gather in Paris on May 16.
Of course we had no indication or thought that basic Soviet policies
had turned about. But when there is even the slightest chance of
strengthening peace, there can be no higher obligation than to pursue
it.
Nor had our own policies changed. We did hope to make some
progress in a Summit meeting, unpromising though previous experi-
ences had been. But as we made preparations for this meeting, we
did not drop our guard nor relax our vigilance.
Our safety, and that of the free world, demand, of course, effective
systems for gathering information about the military capabilities of
other powerful nations, especially those that make a fetish of secrecy.
This involves many techniques and methods. In these times of vast
military machines and nuclear-tipped missiles, the ferreting out of
this information is indispensable to free world security.
This has long been one of my most serious preoccupations. It is
part of my grave responsibility, within the overall problem of pro-
tecting the American people, to guard ourselves and our allies against
surprise attack.
During the period leading up to World War II we learned from
bitter experience the imperative necessity of a continuous gathering
of intelligence information, the maintenance of military communica-
tions and contact, and alertness of command.
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250 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
An additional word seems appropriate about this matter of com-
munications and command. While the Secretary of Defense and I
were in Paris, we were, of course, away from our normal command
posts. Ile recommended that under the circumstances we test the
continuing readiness of our military communications. I personally
approved. Such tests are valuable and will be frequently repeated in
the future.
Moreover, as President., charged by the, Constitution with the con-
duct of America's foreign relations, and as Commander in Chief,
charged with the direction of the operations and activities of our
Armed Forces and their supporting services, I take full responsibility
for approving all the various programs undertaken by our govern-
ment to secure and evaluate military intelligence.
It was in the prosecution of one of these intelligence programs that
the widely publicized U-2 incident occurred.
Aerial photography has been one of many methods we have used
to keep ourselves and the free world abreast of major Soviet military
developpments. The, usefulness of this work has been well established
through four years of effort. The Soviets were well aware of it.
Chairman Khrushchev has stated that he became aware of these
flights several years ago. Only last week, in his Paris press confer-
ence, Chairman Khrushchev confirmed that he knew of these flights
when he visited the United States last September.
Incidentally, this raises the natural c uestion : ~W'hy all the furor
concerning one particular flight? Ile did not, when in American last
September charge that these flights were any threat to Soviet safety.
Ile did not then see any reason to refuse to confer with American
representatives.
This he did only about. the flight that unfortunately failed, on May
1, 1,o.! nside Russia.
Now, two questions have been raised about this Particular flight;
first, as to its timing, considering the imminence of tlhe Summit meet-
ing; second, our initial statements when we learned the flight had
failed.
As to the timing, the question was really whether to halt the pro-
gram and thus forego the gathering of important information that
was essential and that was likely to be unavailable at a later date.
The decision was that the program should not be Halted.
The plain truth is this: when a nation needs intelligence activity,
there is no time when vigilance can be relaxed. Incidentally, from
Pearl Harbor we learned that even negotiation itself can be used to
conceal preparations for a surprise attack.
Next, as to our government's initial statement about the flight,
this was issued to protect the pilot, his mission, and our intelligence
processes, at a time when the true facts were still undetermined.
Our first information about the failure of this mission did not
disclose whether the. pilot was still alive, was trying to escape, was
avoiding interrogation, or whether both plane and pilot had been
destroyed. Protection of our intelligence system and the pilot, and
concealment of the plane's mission, seemed im erative. It must be
remembered that over a long period, these flights had given us in-
formation of the greatest importance to the Nation's security. In
fact, their success has been nothing short of remarkable.
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For these reasons, what is known in intelligence circles as a "cover-
ing statement" was issued. It was issued on assumptions that.were
later proved incorrect. Consequently, when later the status of the
pilot was definitely established, and there was no further possibility
of avoiding exposure of the project, the factual details were set forth.
I then made two facts clear to the public : first, our program of
aerial reconnaissance had been undertaken with my approval; second,
this government is compelled to keep abreast, by one means or an-
other, of military activities of the Soviets, just as their government
has for years engaged in espionage activities in our country and
throughout the world. Our necessity to proceed with such activities
was also asserted by our Secretary of State who however, had been
careful-as was I-not to say that these particular flights would be
continued.
In fact, before leaving Washington, I had directed that these U-2
flights be stopped. Clearly their usefulness was impaired. Moreover,
continuing this particular activity in these new circumstances could
not but complicate the relations of certain of our allies with the
Soviets. And, of course,. new techniques, other than aircraft, are
constantly being developed.
Now I wanted no public announcement of this decision until I
could personally disclose it at the Summit meeting in conjunction
with certain proposals I had prepared for the conference.
At my first Paris meeting with Mr. Khrushchev, and .before his
tirade was made public, I informed him of this discontinuance and
the character of the constructive proposals I planned to make. These
contemplated the establishment of . a system of aerial surveillance
operated by the United Nations.
The day before the first scheduled meeting, Mr. Khrushchev had
advised President de Gaulle and Prime Minister Macmillan that he
would make certain demands upon the United States as a precondition
for beginning a Summit conference. .
Although. the United States was the only power against which he
expressed his displeasure, he did. not communicate this information
tome. I was, of course, informed by our allies.
At the four power meeting on Monday morning, he demanded of
the United States four things: First, condemnation of U-2 flights
as a method of espionage; second, assurance that they would not be
continued; third, a public apology on behalf of the United States;
and, fourth, punishment of all those who had any responsibility
respecting this particular mission.
I replied by advising the Soviet leader that I had, during the
previous week, stopped these flights and that they would not be
resumed. I offered also to, discuss the matter with him in, personal
meetings, while the regular business of the Summit might proceed.
Obviously, I would not respond to his extreme demands. He knew,
of course, by holding to those demands the Soviet Union was scuttling
the?Snmmit Conference.
In torpedoing the conference, Mr. Khrushchev claimed that he "acted
as the result of his own high moral indignation over alleged American
acts of aggression. As I said earlier, he had known of these flights
for a long time. It is. apparent that the Soviets had. decided even
before the Soviet delegation left Moscow that my trip to the Soviet
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Union should be canceled and that nothing constructive from their
viewpoint would come out of the Summit Conference.
.In evaluating the results, however, I think we must not write the
record all in red ink. There are several things to be written in the
black. Perhaps the Soviet action has turned the clock back in some
measure, but it should be noted that Mr. Khrushchev did not go
beyond invective--a time-worn Soviet device to achieve an immediate
objective. In this case, the wrecking of the Conference.
On our side, at Paris, we demonstrated once again America's
willingness, and that of her allies, always too to the extra mile in
behalf of peace. Once again, Soviet intransigence reminded us all
of the unpredictability
work of despotic rule, and the need for those who
for freedom to stand together in determination and in strength.
The conduct of our allies was magnificent. My colleagues and
fr iends-President de Gaulle and Prime Minister Macmillan-stood
sturdily with the American delegation in spite of persistent Soviet
attempts to split the Western group~ss, The NATO meeting after the
Paris Conference showed unprecedented unity and support for the
alliance and for the position taken at the Summit meeting. I salute
our allies for us all.
* * * * * *
Arid now, most importantly, what about the future?
All of us know that, whether started deliberately or accidentally,
global war would leave civilization in a shambles. This is as true
of the Soviet system as of all others. In a nuclear war there can be
no victors--only losers. Even despots understand this. Mr. Klrru-
shchev stated last week that he well realizes that general nuclear
war would bring catastrophe for both sides. Recognition of this
mutual destructive capability is the basic reality of our present rela-
tions. Most assuredly, however, this does not mean that we shall ever
give up trying to build a more sane and hopeful reality-a better
foundation for our common relations.
To do this, here are the policies we must follow and to these I am
confident the great majority of our people, regardless of party, give
their support:
First. We must keep up our strength, and hold it steady for the
long pull-a strength not neglected in complacency nor overbuilt in
hysteria. So doing, we can make it clear to everyone that there can
be no gain in the use of pressure tactics or aggression against us
and our Allies.
Second. We must continue businesslike dealings with the Soviet
leaders on outstanding issues, and improve the contacts between our
own and Soviet peoples, making clear that the path of reason and
commonsense is still open if the Soviets will but use it,
Third. To improve world conditions in which human freedom can
flourish, we must continue to move ahead with positive programs at
home and abroad, in collaboration with free nations everywhere. In
doing-so, we shall continue to give our strong support to the United
Nations and the great principles for which it stands.
Now as to the First of these purposes--our defenses are sound. They
are tailored to the situation confronting us. -
?Theic ade uacy has been my primary concern for these past I
years-indeed throughout my adult life.
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In no respect have the composition and size of our forces been
based on or affected by any Soviet blandishment. Nor will they be.
We will continue to carry forward the great improvements already
planned in these forces. They will be kept ready-and under con-
stant review.
Any changes made necessary by technological advances or world
events will be recommended at once.
This strength-by far the most potent on earth-is, I emphasize,
for deterrent, defensive and retaliatory purposes only, without threat
or aggressive intent toward anyone.
Concerning the second part of our policy-relations with the
Soviets-we and all the world realize, despite our recent disappoint-
ment, that progress toward the goal of mutual understanding, easing
the causes of tensions, and reduction of armaments is as necessary
as ever.
We shall continue these peaceful efforts, including participation in
the existing negotiations with the Soviet Union. In these negotiations
we have made some progress. We are prepared to preserve and build
on it. The Allied Paris communique and my own statement on re-
turning to the United States should have made this abundantly clear
to the Soviet Government.
We conduct these negotiations not on the basis of surface harmony
nor are we deterred by any bad deportment we meet. Rather we
approach them as a careful search for common interests between the
Western allies and the Soviet Union on specific problems.
I have in mind, particularly, the nuclear test and disarmament
negotiations. We shall not back away, on account of recent events,
from the efforts or commitments that we have undertaken.
Nor shall we relax our search for new means of reducing the risk
of war by miscalculation, and of achieving verifiable arms control.
* * * * m
A major American goal is a world of open societies.
Here in our country anyone can buy maps and aerial photographs
showing our cities, our dams, our plants, our highways-indeed, our
whole industrial and economic complex. We know that Soviet at-
taches regularly collect this information. Last fall Chairman Khru-
shchev's train passed no more than a few hundred feet from an opera-
tional ICBM, in plain view from his window. Our thousands of
books and scientific journals, our magazines, newspapers and official
publications, our radio and television, all openly describe to all the
world every aspect of our society.
This is as it should be. We are proud of our freedom.
Soviet distrust, however, does still remain. To allay these misgiv-
ings I offered five years ago to open our skies to Soviet reconnaissance
aircraft on a reciprocal basis. The Soviets refused. That offer is still
open. At an appropriate time America will submit such a program
to the United Nations, together with the recommendation that the
United Nations itself conduct this reconnaissance. Should the United
N;h ons accept this proposal, I am prepared to propose that America
duly part of the aircraft and equipment required.
is is a photograph of ;the North Island Naval Station in San
Diego, Calif. It was taken from an altitude of more than 70,000 feet.
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254 EVENTS INCIDENT TO TILE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
You may not perhaps be able to see them on your television screens,
but thee, :white lines in the parking strips around the field are clearly
discernible from 13 miles up. Those lines are just 6 inches wide.
Obviously most of the details necessary for a military evaluation of
the airfield and its aircraft are clearly distinguishable.
I show you t=his Photagraph as an example of what could be accom-
plished through United Nations aerial surveillance.
Indeed, if the United Nations should undertake this policy, this
program, and the great nations of the world should accept it, I am
convinced that not only can all humanity be assured that they are safe
from any surprise attack from any quarter, but indeed the greatest
tensions of all, the fear of war, would be removed from the world. I
sincerely hope that the United Nations may adopt such a program.
As far as we in America are concerned, our programs for increased
contacts between all peoples will continue. Despite the suddenly ex-
pressed hostility of the men in the Kremlin, I remain convinced that
the basic longings of the Soviet people are much like our own. I be-
lieve that Soviet citizens have a sincere friendship for the people of
America. I deeply believe that above all else they want a lasting peace
and a chance for a more abundant life in place of more and more in-
struments of war.
Finally turning to the third part of America's policy-the strength-
ening of ttreedom-we must do far more than concern ourselves with
military defense against, and our relations with, the Communist bloc.
Beyond this, we must advance constructive programs throughout the
world for the betterment of peoples in the newly developing nations.
The zigs and zaa of the Kremlin cannot be allowed to disturb our
worldwide rograms and >urposes. In the period ahead, these pro-
grams coup well be the decisive factor in our persistent search for
peace in freedom.
To the peoples in the newly developing nations urgently needed
help will surely come. If it. does not come from us and our friends,
these peoples will be driven to seek it from the enemies of freedom.
Moreover, those joined with us in defense partnerships look to us for
proof of our steadfastness. We must not relax our common security
efforts.
As to this, there is something specific all of us can do, and right now.
It is imperative that crippling cuts not be made in the appropriations
recommended for Mutual Security, whether economic or military.
We must support this program with all of our wisdom and all of our
strength. We are proud to call this a nation of the people. With the
peop a knowing the importance of this program, and making their
voices heard in its behalf throughout the land, there can be no doubt
of its continued success.
Fellow Americans, long ago I pledged to you that I would journey
anywhere in the world to promote the cause of peace. I remain
pledged to pursue a peace of dignity, of friendship, of honor, of
justice.
Operating from the firm base of our spiritual and physical strength,
and seeking wisdom from the Almighty, we and our allies together
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will continue to work for the survival of mankind in freedom-and
for the goal of mutual respect, mutual understanding, and openness
among all nations.
Thank you, and good night.
APPENDIX 2
1. QUESTIONS RAISED BY SENATOR LAUSCIIE AND ANSWERS PREPARED
BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Question One : To what extent has the Soviet Union been spying
in the United States, West Germany, and other nations?
In recent years there has been continued evidence of the exten-
sive nature of Soviet espionage in the United States, West
Germany and other nations. The manner in which the Soviet
espionage system functions abroad has been clearly set forth in
the findings of the Royal Commissions in Canada and Australia
which were set up as a result of the Guzenko and Petrov defec-
tions. These commissions established that there was not one but
at least three parallel Soviet intelligence networks operating in
Soviet missions abroad : military, state security and party. To
these may also be added naval and commercial intelligence net-
works. The activities of eleven Soviet officials expelled from the
United States since 1953 are described in the attached document,
which was presented to the United Nations by Ambassador
Henry Cabot Lodge on May 24,1960.
So far as the espionage activities of non-official Soviet person-
nel in the United States are concerned, the case of Colonel Ru-
dolph Ivanovich Abel provides a good example of this type of
activity. Colonel Abel was convicted by a federal jury in New
York on October 25, 1957 for conspiring to steal United States
defense secrets for the Soviet Union. Abel, a veteran of the
Soviet intelligence service, had entered the United States in 1948
under false documents as a United States citizen Andrew Kay-
otis. While here he also used the name Emil Goldfus for which
he had false documents and also documents for a mythical Martin
Collins. During his years in the United States and before his
exposure Abel used a photographer's studio on Fulton Street in
Brooklyn as a front from which he operated.
Methods used by Abel and an accomplice, Reino Hayhanen,
= were ingenious. In order to contact his superiors, Hayhanen
would place chalk marks at various predesignated points. To
minimize personal contacts and subsequent danger of compromise
by surveillances, a system of widely separated "dead drops" and
"banks" was established throughout the metropolitan area of
New York. Abel was also a specialist in artifacts. In his
"photographic studio" at the time of his arrest were found both
the tools and the devices he fashioned for passing messages:
hollowed-out coins, bolts, jewelry, magnetic containers, and other
objects in which could be inserted film containing code or plain
text messages and other material for transmittal.
American citizens recruited by Soviet espionage agents include
Julius Rosenberg, Ethel Rosenberg, David Greenglass, Abraham
56412 0-60-18
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T TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
Brotlunan, Miriam Moskowitz, _Morton Sobell, Harry Gold, Kurt
Ponder, Otto Verber, Jack Soble, Myra Soble, Jacob Albam, and
others.
So far as Soviet espionage in West. Germany is concerned, a
spokesman of the Federal German Republic issued it statement, on
May 13, 1060, briefly describing the scale on which the Soviet
Union and other Communist countries practice espionage within
the territory of the Federal Republic and West, Berlin. The bul-
letin of the German Federal Government of May 17, 1960, de-
scribes this announcement as follows:
"The spokesman announced that between August 30, 1951, and
December 31, 1959) more than 18,000 agents of the Soviet. Bloc
were apprehended in the Federal Republic and Wrest Berlin. Of
these, 1,700 were given prison sentences; about 16,500 were ac-
Suitted because of duress, genuine repentance, or voluntary and
timely confession. All these agents confessed to having had
orders to carry out espionage in the Federal Republic or in West
Berlin.
"Exact information was given about the authority from which
these agents received their orders. Of the agents apprehended
in 1959, fully 2,315 admitted hiving worked for the espionage
service of the Soviet-occupied zone of Germany, 264 named the
Soviet Union as the country from which they had received their
orders and 462 admitted having received orders front other East-
Bloc countries. * * * The corresponding figures for 1958 are:
Soviet zone, 366; Soviet union. 204; of her Communist countries,
236.
"In the first quarter of 1960 alone, 588 self-confessed agents of
the Communist bloc have been apprehended.
"The extent of Communist espionage activities in the Federal
Republic and West Berlin alone, and the increase in these activi-
ties of late, is evident from these figures. To this must, be added
that these agents, according to their own confessions, had in each
case fulfilled more than one es )ion age mission. The '?64 agents
of the Soviet Union apprehended in 19.59 had carried out a total
of 790 single missions; the 2,325 Soviet zone agents of the same
year had completed it total of 8,234 missions.
"According to painstaking analysis by the German authorities,
the Communist countries maintain about 16,000 agents on the soil
of the Federal Republic and West Berlin, in spite of an annual
loss of 2,400 to 2,800 such agents. These figures include agents
who have carried out only preparatory missions and agents who
have been hired but not put into service."
Soviet esj)ionage operatives have also been very active in other
nations. '1 he recent testimony of Aleksander Y. Kaznacheev be-
fore the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee on I)eceruber
14, 1959, provides extensive evidence concerning Soviet espionage
activities in Asia. Similarly, the testimony of Peter S. Deryabin
before the House Committee on I'n-American Activities released
March 17, 1959, provides evidence of Soviet espionage activities
in Austria. The testimony of Yuri A. P-astvorov also before the
Senate Internal Security Subcommittee on February 8, 1956,
April 12, 1956, October 24, 1956 and October 30, 1956, provide
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMM IWR1
evidence of Soviet espionage activities in Japan. Other cases
could be given; but it is abundantly clear from the instances al-
ready cited that Soviet directed espionage activities are worldwide
and extremely extensive in scope.
Question Two : How many times it has breached its commitments
to other nations in the, world-especially the captive nations?
With regard to the number of times the Soviet Government has
breached its commitments to other countries, the Department of
State is not aware of the existence of any statistical compilation.
A mere count of Soviet violations, whereby, for example, a vio-
lation leading directly to the subjugation and absorption of an
entire country by the U.S.S.R. would be given the same numeri-
cal weight as Soviet infringement of a trade agreement appears,
in the Department's view, to lack real meaning. Of course, the
Department has closely followed over the years the question of
Soviet treaty violations, which has additionally been the subject
of close congressional scrutiny as in the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee's 1956 Staff Study "Soviet Political Agreements and Re-
sults" and in the 1950 report of the House Foreign Affairs Com-
mittee "Background Information on the Soviet Union in
International Relations."
"Soviet Treaty Violations," Number 233 (August 10, 1959) in
the series "Soviet Affairs Notes," describes the principal Soviet
violations. Violations occurring before and after the beginning
of World War II are listed separately and appear under country-
by-country breakdowns within each of these two main categories.
A copy of "Soviet Treaty Violations" is enclosed.
Question Three : Is there a difference between spying by foot on
land on the one hand, and by plane in the air on the other?
Considered in the light of the' end purpose of espionage activi-
ties, which may be summarized as the acquisition of information
which the state, against which the activities are directed, wishes
to conceal from the knowledge of one or more foreign powers,
there would appear to be no fundamental distinction between the
various means which might be employed in securing such
information.
Question Four: Is it in the interest of our country that we abandon
the general and traditional methods of acquiring intelligence?
As indicated by the President in his report to the American
people on May 25, 1960, the security of the United States and of
the free world "demand, of course, effective systems for gather-
ing information about the military capabilities of other powerful
nations, especially those that make a fetish of secrecy. This in-
volves many techniques and methods. In these times of vast
military machines and nuclear-tipped missiles, the ferreting out
of this information is indispensable to free world security. This
has long been one of my most serious preoccupations. It is part
of my grave responsibility, to guard ourselves and our allies
against surprise attack."
In the same speech the President reiterated his "open skies"
offer as a means of guarding against surprise attack. The Presi-
dent indicated that the United States would at an appropriate
time submit a program to the United Nations with a recommen-
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
dation that the United Nations itself conduct aerial reconnais-
sance. The program outlined by the President offers the best
hope for guarding the peoples of the world against surprise
attack. Unfortunately, the Soviet Government rejected the
President's earlier "open skies" proposal. It remains to be seen
whether the Soviets will reject his more recent suggestion.
Question Five: If we do so, what are the probabilities of the Soviet
Union following a similar course?
In the Department's o inion, even if the United States were to
abandon the general and traditional methods of acquiring intel-
ligence, there is little likelihood that the Soviet Union would
follow a similar course.
Question Six: WW`h did the Communists break their treaty with
the Poles in World WIar 11 and stab the Poles in the back while the
latter were fighting the Nazis?
The olotov-Ribbentrop agreements of August. 23, 1939, pro-
viding a ten year non-aggression guarantee, furnished a basis for
coordinated German Auld .Soviet aggression in Eastern Europe.
Poland was an early victim, falling under Nazi attack only eight
days after the agreements were signed. On September 16, 1939
the U.S.S.R. sent a note to the Polish Government stating that
the Polish State was insolvent and that the Polish Government.
had "virtually ceased to operate." The note claimed that this
situation might "create it menace to the U.S.S.R." Using this
pretext., the U.S.S.R. occupied major parts of Poland on Sep-
tember 177, 1939. Less than two months later, Molotov boasted :
"* .* * one swift blow to Poland, first by the German and then by
the Red Army, and nothing was left of this ugly offspring of the
Versailles Treaty * * *.11
Question Seven : hat are the details concerning the brutal mas-
sacre of Polish soldiers by the Communists in the hat.yn forests?
A Select Committee of the House of Representatives made an
exhaustive study of the Kat yn Forest massacre in 1952, The re-
ports of this Committee, The Select Committee To Conduct an
Investigation and Study of the Facts, Evidence, and Circum-
stances of the Katyn Forest Massacre, contain more detail on this
subject than is available elsewhere in the Department's files. The
facts developed by the Committee were brought to the attention
of the United Nations by the U.S. Delegation, and were given
wide circulation abroad through the facilities of the United States
Information Service.
Question Eight.: Why, in World War II, did the Reds, while ad-
vancing westward and nearing Poland, induce the Polish people of
Warsaw to heroically rebel a nrinst the Nazi occupiers and then aban-
don them to slatghter by the Nazis?
In various wartime agreements, the allied nations pledged
themselves to conduct the war against the enemy unrelentinely,
and to cooperate after the war in plans for recovery. The
U.S.S.R., however, had its own plans for postwar Communist
expansion in Eastern Europe, as evidenced by subsequent devel-
opments there. This political motive was an important factor
influencing Soviet military inaction during the Warsaw uprising.
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Question Nine : Why did the Soviet break its pledged word that
the people of the satellite nations, under free and open elections, would
be permitted to choose the type of government they wanted?
Soviet refusal to grant self-determination to the peoples of the
satellite nations of Eastern Europe stems from the Soviet cam-
paign during and after World War II to gain and maintain
Communist control over these nations. The United States does
not regard Soviet domination over the nations of Eastern Europe
as an acceptable permanent condition of affairs. Regimes in these
countries have been forcibly imposed and maintained, as in the
case of Hungary, by repeated Soviet political and military inter-
vention. The peoples of these countries are denied basic freedoms
and real national independence.
Satisfactory solution of the Eastern European problem must
be based, in keeping with the solemn pledges by the United
States Soviet, and other Allied Governments during and after
World War II, upon the right of the Eastern European peoples
freely (a) to choose the governments and institutions under
which they will live and (b) to enjoy full national independence
free from all foreign interference in their internal affairs.
Question Ten : Why did the Soviet aid and induce the Red Chinese
to use their military power against South Korea, resulting in death
and injury to thousands of American boys?
The Soviet Union supported Communist China in the Korean
War in order to secure the Soviet satellite government of North
Korea for the Communist Bloc and, if possible, to expand Com-
munist power to South Korea and in Asia without instigating
a world war which would have resulted from the Soviet Union's
co-belligerency with North Korea.
Question Eleven : Why did the Soviet encourage the Red Chinese
in the bombardment and killing of innocent people at the Quemoy
and Matsu Islands?
The Soviet Union has consistently supported the, claims of
Communist China .to Quemoy and Matsu. During the offshore
islands crisis, in mid-1954, however, the Soviet leaders spoke of
"popular" but not Soviet "government" support of the Chinese
Communists "liberation aspirations" toward the offshore islands.
At that time they did not threaten to evoke the 1950 Sino-Soviet
"Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance". In the
1958 offshore island crisis Khrushchev did issue the warning that
"an attack on the People's Republic of China, which is a great
friend, ally, and neighbor of our country, is an attack on the So-
viet Union" and that if Communist China fell victim to an atomic
attack the aggressor would get a rebuff by the same means. The
Chinese Communists, who have consistently followed aggressive
policies, probably needed no encouragement to initiate the bom-
bardment of Quemoy, but it is likely that, prior to the 1958 attack,
the Red Chinese received some expression of support from the
Soviet Union.
Question Twelve : What is the explanation for the mass and merci-
less murder of the freedom fighters of Hungary, Poland, and East
Germany, who were fighting for liberation in those respective
countries?
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The Communist regime in Hungary was forcibly imposed by
the Soviet Union upon the Huai arnan people at the end of World
War II. Since that time, the Hungarian regime has been and
remains, in all essential matters, Soviet-dominated. Because of
its origin and nature, it is dependent in the final analysis upon
Soviet power for its continued ability to exist and to rule. The
Hungarian uprising was so general and sweeping that it unseated
this Soviet-dominated regime, attracted large numbers of the
Hungarian armed forces to either active or passive support of
the revolutionary movement, and placed temporary control of
the country in the hands of the Freedom Fighters and of a new
coalition government headed by Imre - agg y, which supported the
aims of the revolution. Confronted by these interna develop-
ments which clearly pointed to the realization by the Hungarian
people of their aspiration to live in freedom and independence,
and fearing the disintegrative effect which a successful Hungarian
revolt would have on the Soviet Bloc structure, the Soviet T pion
intervened ruthlessly with massive armed force to crush the re-
volt and reimpose a Soviet-dominated regime upon the Hun-
garian people. Following the Soviet intervention, the new
Hungariaregime, regime, supported b ? the continued presence of So-
viet troops within I-Iungary, unfe.rtook a campaign of systematic
and harsh reprisals against. the leaders and participants in the
revolt aimed at the suppression of all remaining overt dissent and
opposition, the re-establishment. and consolidation of its power
and authority, and the discouragement of any future attempts at
rebellion.
In East Germany in 1953 and in Poland in 1956 unrest, occurred
as a result of popular dissastisfaction with the situation in those
countries. In contrast to the 1956 events in Hungary, however,
these disturbances were short-lived and resulted in relatively
little bloodshed.
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LETTER DATED 24 MAY 1960 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL1
Enclosed herewith is a memorandum giving detailed information on the
illustrative list of Soviet espionage agents apprehended in the United States
since the death of Marshal Stalin to which I referred in my statement in the
Security Council on 23 May.
I request that this memorandum be circulated as a Security Council document.
(Signed) H.C. Lodge
lUnited Nations Security Council Documents )1325, May 21G, 1960.
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ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON THE ACTIVITIES )F THE INDIVIDUALS
NAMED BY AMBASSADOR LODGE IN HIS STATEMENT IN THE SECURITY
COUNCIL ON 23 MAY 1960 FOLLOWS:
1. Commander Igor Alekeandrovich Amosov
Amosov entered the United States 17 February 1952 as Assistant Soviet Naval
Attache. Amosov was the Soviet principal in an intelligence operation directed
by the Soviets from their Naval attache's office. He served in this capacity
from 7 June 1952 until his departure in February 1954. Targets assigned by
Amosov to the recruited agent included radar developments, details of the latest
cargo ships, manuals reflecting details of the latest electronic developments
and bombsight data. He paid this agent a total of $2,000 for his services.
Amosov was declared persona non grata for these activities on 3 February 1954
and left the United States on 7 February 1954.
2. Colonel Ivan Aleksandrovich Bubchikov
Bubcbikov entered the United States 1 December 1954 as an Assistant Soviet
Military Attache. From July 1955 through may 1956, 3ubchikov maintained contact
with a naturalized American citizen of Russian origin who was employed as a sales
engineer. In July 1955 he appeared at the sales eng'ineer's residence late in the
evening and sought his co-operation in securing data concerning jet fuel, atomic
sutmarinea, and aeronautical developments, Bubchikov offered the engineer large
sums of money. In view of these activities the Department of State on 14 June 1956
declared Bubchikov persona non grata for engaging in espionage activities
incompatible with uis continued presence in this country". He departed the
United States 24 June 1956.
3. Major Yuri Pavlovich Krylov
Krylov entered the United States 4 May 1955 as Assistant Soviet Military
Attache, Washington, D.C. In August of 1955, Krylov contacted an employee of
the Atomic Energy Commission and attempted to obtain from him information
concerning the technical aspects of nuclear power. in 1957, Krylov was declared
persona non grata for having improperly purchased quantities of electronic
equipment through American intermediaries and having attempted to purchase
classified military information. He departed the United States 26 January 1957.
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4. Nikolay Ivanovich Kurochkin
Kurochkin entered the United States 4 April 1956 as a Third Secretary of the
Soviet Embassy, Washington, D.C. In the fall of 1956 a professional writer
contacted the Soviet Embassy seeking statistics as to hosiery production in the
Soviet Union. He met Kurochkin, who supplied the desired statistical data and,
after a series of meetings, informed the writer that if he would obtain military
information - including training and field manuals of the United States Army - to
be incorporated in articles Kurochkin was writing for Russian military journals,
he would share with him his proceeds from the articles. The writer obtained
unclassified training and field manuals of the United States Army which he turned
over to Kurochkin, but did not deliver the classified manuals which Kurochkin had
requested. He was paid approximately $450. On 6 June 1958, Kurochkin was declared
persona non grata for engaging in activities incompatible with his diplomatic
status. He departed from the United States on 11 June 1958-
5- Vasiliy Mikhailovich Molev
From August 1944 through January 1957, Molev served several tours of duty in
the United States, occupying positions of chauffeur and property custodian to the
Soviet Consulate General in New York and property custodian at the Soviet Embassy,
Washington, D.C. Boris Morros, an admitted Soviet agent co-operating with the FBI,
was instructed by his Soviet superiors to appear in the vicinity of 58 West
58th Street, New York City, at 3 p.m. on the first Tuesday of each month for
contact by his Soviet principal. If the contact was not made, Morros was
instructed by the Soviets to return the following Wednesday and Thursday. On
Wednesday, 7 January 1953, Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
observed Molev in the vicinity of 58 West 58th Street, New York City. Morros was
later instructed by his Soviet principal to meet his Soviet contact on Tuesday,
3 March 1953, on the corner of Central Park South and Avenue of the Americas, New
York City. On 3 March 1953, Molev was observed by Special Agents of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation meeting with Morros at Central Park South and Avenue of the
Americas. On this occasion Morros passed to Molev a report previously obtained
from Jack Soble, Morros' immediate superior, who was-subsequently convicted of
espionage. On 25 January 1957, Jack Soble, Myra Soble, and Jacob Albam were
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44 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
arrested on charges of espionage and conspiracy. Simultaneously, Molev was
declared persona non grata because of his implication in the conspiracy. He
departed the United States 28 January 1957-
6. Aleksandr Petrovich Kovalev
Kovalev arrived in the United States 8 October 1950as a Second Secretary of
the Soviet Delegation to the United Nations. In the course of his stay in the
United States Kovalev arranged to receive undeveloped microfilms of materials of
intelligence significance at a drop area in New York City. The recruited agent
was told to park his car in a designated area in Nev York City at a designated
time and to place a package wrapped in red paper therein so that it could be seer
through the rear window in the event material was to be passed. An additional
signal by way of marking a telephone directory in a New York restaurant was
perfected to indicate to the agent that the material delivered to the dead drop
was picked up. Material of intelligence significance was left by the recruited
agent in the New York dead drop area and it was retrieved by Kovalev. The agent
was given $500 to purchase an electronic device for delivery to the Soviets an
additional $500 in payment for delivery of a microfilm reproduction of portions cf
a manual dealing with an automatic steering device for ships. Kovalev was declared
persona non grata by the Department of State for his actions in this case on
3 February 1954 and he departed the United States 10 February 1954.
7. Colonel IYleksim Grigorievich Martynov
Martynov entered the United States on 3 November 1954 as a member of the
Soviet representation to the United Nations Military Staff Co?ittee. In
August 1954, a Soviet national met a United Stater Army officer in Germany. The
Soviet national, aware of the officer's plan to retire from the Army, asked him to
be of assistance in obtaining Military Manuals from the Army Command and General
Staff School at Leavenworth, Kansas when the Soviet national came to the United
States. Meetings in New York City were arranged and a code phrase was established
for recognition purposes.
On 15 November 1954, a Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
made up to resemble the Army officer, was contacted at the agreed time and place
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in New York City by Martynov. Prearranged signals were exchanged and they talked
for approximately thirty minutes. Martynov indicated he was a friend of the
Soviet National who contacted the officer in Germany and he asked for the proposed
assistance, paying him $250. A subsequent meeting was scheduled for
15 January 1955? On that date, Martynov kept the appointment and the FBI agents
accosted him. Martynov identified himself and claimed diplomatic immunity. on
21 February 1955, the Department of State expelled Martynov for the above activity
and he departed the United States 26 February 1955.
8. Viktor Ivanovich Petrov
Petrov arrived in the United States 17 February 1953 as a transistor employed
at the United Nations Secretariat, New York City. Petrov responded to an
advertisement placed in a New York newspaper by an aviation draftsman for part-
time work. The draftsman was an employee of one of our largest aircraft factories.
At the outset, Petrov gave the draftsman insignificant drafting work, later asking
him to send for various brochures on aviation. Petrov requested the draftsman to
obtain information concerning United States Military Aircraft. The information
sought was classified, it concerned the status-of United States aircraft
development. On 20 August 1956, information concerning Petrov's activities was
brought to the attention of the Secretary-General of the United Nations as a
result of which Petrov's employment at the United Nations was terminated. Petrov
departed the United States on 23 August 1956.
Gladkov entered the United States 15 December 1953 as Naval Advisor to the
Soviet Representation in the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations.
Gladkov met a sales engineer for a New York City Marine Engineering firm at a
cocktail party. He cultivated the sales engineer and held a number of clandestine
meetings with him. Through the engineer, Gladkov attempted to obtain information
relating to United States developments and progress in the field of marine engine
design and operation and informed the American citizen that he, Gladkov, had
access to fund of money for the purchase of sensitive and classified information
on new developments in the field of design and operation of power plants on
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266 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUM UT CONFERENCE
various types of naval crafts. Gladkov also sought tc obtain, and offered to pay
a large sum of money for, publications dealing with fleet training. During his
meetings with the sales engineer which continued on a regular basis Gladkov
furnished the engineer $1,550. on 22 June 1956, the Department of State expelled
Gladkov for engaging in activities which were incompatible with his status as a
member of the Soviet Delegation to the United Nations. He departed 12 July 1956.
10. Lieutenant Colonel Leonid Yegorovich Pivnev
Pivnev entered the United States on 17 March 1950 as Assistant Soviet Air
Attache. Pivnev endeavoured to utilize a Washington businessman's address as a
mail drop. He explained to the businessman that he would have mail delivered to
him at the businessman's address, which mail was to be addressed to a fictitious
person and which, upon receipt, was to be delivered by the businessman to him.
On 24 March 1954, he inquired at a Virginia aerial photographic concern as
to the possibility of purchasing aerial maps of Chicago, Illinois. He instructed
the firm to seek such maps and agreed to pay approximately $8,000 for them. On
that date he purchased thirty-three aerial photographs of Washington, D.C. and
vicinity. Pivnev, in contacting this firm, identified himself as one "George".
On 3 May 1954, he contacted a Washington, D.C. photographer, introducing himself
as a Mr. George Tinney, a representative of a private firm desirous of purchasing
aerial photographs of the New York City area at a sca..e of 1:20,000 to
1:40,000 feet. Photographs of this type were not commercially available. On
13 May 1954, he agreed to pay the photographer $700 to obtain the photographs.
He advanced on that date the sum of $400 as partial payment. On 20 May 1954,
when meeting with the photographer for the purpose of obtaining the photographs,
he was accosted by special agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation on which
occasion he identified himself. On 29 May 1954, the Department of State declared
Pivnev persona non grata and he departed 6 June 1954.
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EVENTS INCIDENT
11. Vadim Aleksandrovich Kirilyuk
Kirilyuk arrived in the United States 11 September 1958 as a political
affairs officer employed by the Department of Trusteeship and Information for
Non-Self-Governing Territories, United Nations Secretariat. In April 1959, an
American citizen contacted a Soviet official in Mexico City concerning the
possibility of obtaining a Soviet university scholarship. The Soviet official
obtained complete background information from the American, including the facts
concerning his previous assignment in cryptographic machines and systems while
serving in the United States Army. Following his return to the United States,
the American was contacted by Kirilyuk, who identified himself as one "George".
During the period from June through September 1959, Kirilyuk met with the American
in a clandestine manner on five occasions. On these occasions he requested data
concerning cryptographic machines and instructed the American to seek employment
with a vital United States Government agency. Information concerning Kirilyuk's
activities was brought to the attention of the Secretary-General of the
United Nations whereupon Kirilyuk's employment at the United Nations was
terminated. Kirilyuk and his family left the United States on 10 January 1960.
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CONFERENCE
1. -RiTRODUCTION
The Soviet
and oya observed thefeIn International obligattiowhich~it has assumed. The
scrupulous observance by the Soviet Union of the treaties and agreements which
Its representatives have signed is recognized even by those who are unfavorably
disposed toward It.
--S. Krylov, Professor of International Law, Moscow State University,
(Izvestiya, may 26, 1957.)
Few nations can match the UWR In vociferous protestations of loyalty to international
obligations. However, such declarations -which are typical of Soviet
scholars alike - diverge widely from actual Soviet practice. In the yearrs siicee t Hoek
Revolution the Soviet Government, while consistently accusing others of bad faith in inter-
national dealings, has not hesitated to violate its own treaty obligations when such action
appeared to be in its interest.
Like most totalitarian states, the Soviet Union recognizes the respect in which legal
principles are held by the vast majority of countries of the world. Soviet textbooks in
international law profess the standard principle of 21 q t
observed), though (treaties must be
stressing at the same time that cap talist sta s violate treaties as a
normal rule. The latter claim in turn paves the way for any necessary justification of
treaty violations by the Soviet Union, since the Soviet Government habitually accuses the
other party of violation as an excuse for Its own nonobservance of a given convention. A
1951 text in International law, for example, describes the "nullification" by the Soviet
Government of its 1932 nonaggression pact with Finland as "Unquestionably correct and
fully justified, " since this act was "the result of systematic and provocatory breaches of
the obligations of the stated pact by the Finnish aide. "i The facts of the case were quite
the reverse.
While Soviet writers tend to be circumspect In discussing treaty obligations their
approach to international law in general may be somewhat more revealing of the soviet
attitude. International law, as seen by Soviet theorists, is essentially an Instrument of
policy, and Its institutions and practices are employed to the extent that they are useful.
The matter is put succinctly in one Soviet textbook by Professor Kozhevnikov: p1
men of the stated tasks are erecgniizzed law and which can facilitate the d In the USSR- those which
contradict these aims In any way are rejected by it Lthe USSR/,'2
Soviet &tfaire Rotes, 'to. 233, August 10, 1959,
emvi o111, C1 1A o ences o o w,
Pravo (International La%/, Moscow, 1951, p. 421.
2. F. I. Kozhevnikov, Sgygtskoe C~+s , nre-yp i Mezydunarod_ Drano [The Soviet
State and Internattonai Iaw,Moscow p-25.
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Although the Soviet Union does not specifically extend this principle to the observance
of treaties, in practice the mental transition is not a difficult one. The peace treaty of
Brest Litovsk, the first treaty concluded by the Soviet regime, was signed In order to
gain whatever protection it might afford, but without any intention on the Soviet side of
abiding by the treaty's provisions. "Yes, of course we are violating the treaty, " de-
clared Lenin in March 1918, we have already violated it 30 or 40 times." 1
Later Soviet leaders have hesitated to speak so bluntly, but the history of the last
40 years provides numerous examples of deliberate treaty violations by the Soviet regime.
A cursory examination of the public conventions entered into by the Soviet Union during
this period reveals well over 50 violations. The USSR has disregarded treaty provisions
inconvenient to itself, has unilaterally denounced conventions to which it was a party,
has threatened abrogation as a means of intimidation, and has on several occasions
attacked fellow signatories to treaties of friendship and non-aggression. The cases in
this study are some of the more outstanding instances of these practices.
II. PREWAR AGREEMENTS
Treaties of the Soviet Union are based on principles of equality,
sovereignty and mutual benefits of states, while treaties of bourgeois
countries are based on the principle of the strong over the weak.
--V.I. Lisovskil, Mezhdunarodnoe Pravo [International LaW/,
Kiev University Press, 1956, p. 228.
Violation of the Ke iogg-Briand Pact 1929
The Soviet Union adhered to the Kellogg-Briand Pact in September 1928 upon
invitation of the original signatory powers, thereby renouncing war as an instrument of
national policy. Adherence to the pact, however, failed to deter the USSR from employ-
ing force against its eastern neighbor, China, in the following year.
Notwithstanding its self-proclaimed policy of "anti-imperialism, " the Soviet
Union had retained ownership and control of the Chinese Eastern Railroad, inherited
from the Tsarist regime. Chinese resentment at this survival of Russian domination
in Manchuria, coupled with irritation at subversive activities directed from Soviet
diplomatic establishments in China, resulted, in 1929, in confiscation of the railroad
by the Chinese and the arrest of a number of Soviet employees. The Soviet Government
rebuffed attempts to settle the dispute by diplomatic means, preferring to employ its
clearly superior military power to force a return to the statusguo ante. In October
and November 1929 Soviet troops, supported by aircraft and gunboats, invaded
Manchuria and secured the capitulation of the Chinese after the latter had lost some
6,000 men in a brief and futile resistance. Efforts by the United States and other
Western powers to invoke the Kellogg-Briand Pact and to encourage a settlement
by peaceful means were brusquely rejected by the Soviet Government.
The Litvinov Acrreements
In 1933 the United States recognized the Government of the USSR following
negotiations and an exchange of letters between Soviet Foreign Minister Litvinov and
President Roosevelt in regard to various outstanding differences between the two
countries. In his letter of November 16, 1933, Litvinov stated:
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it will be the fixed policy of the Government of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics...not to permit the formation or residence on its
territory of any organization or group -- and to prevent the activity on
Its territory of any group or organization -- which has as an aim the
overthrow or the preparation for the overthrow of, or the bringing about
by force of a change in the political or social order of the whole or
any part of the United Sitates, its territories or possessions.
The Foreign Minister's avowal produced no effect whatever upon the activities of
the Third International, or Comintern, which continued to carry out its role as the
organizer and directing center of the world communist movement from its Moscow head-
5uarters. The purpose of the Comintern clearly defined in Its statutes and theses, was
the struggle by all available means, tncfuding armed forces, for the overthrow of the
international bourgeoisie and the creation of an international Soviet Republic."
Although the Comintern was formally dissolved in 1943, Soviet-inspired communist
activity In the United States continued unabated. Evidence of systematic violation of the
Litvinov agreements after 1945 was brought to light by convictions under the US Alien
Registration Act of 1940, which made it a criminal offense "to organize or help to organize
any society, group or assembly of persons who teach, advocate or encourage the over-
throw or destruction of any Government in the United States by force or violence." The
trial and conviction in 1949 In a US Federal Court in New York of 11 communist leaders
revealed that the American Communist Party, acting upon orders of the Soviet Union
Issued by Dmitri Manullsky, Comintern leader and in 1949 Foreign Minister of the
Ukrainian SSR, had returned to a policy of violent revolution.
The Litvinov agreements also contained the following provision, as stated by
Litvinov in another letter to President Roosevelt on November 16, 1933:
.the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
while reserving to itself the right of refusing visas to Americans de-
siring to enter the Union of Soviet Socialist Republicson personal
grounds, does not intend to base such refusals on the fact of such
persons having ecclesiastical status.
In March 1955 the Soviet Government expelled the Reverend Georges Bissonette,
the most recent in a succession of clergymen of the Assumptloalst Order who had resided
in Moscow and ministered to the spiritual needs of American nationals of the Roman
Catholic faith in Moscow. The Soviet Government refused entry to the Reverend Louis
Dion as successor to Father Bissonette on the grounds that the Litvinov-Roosevelt
agreement provided for reciprocity in the admission of clergymen to the respective
countries. Although the 1933 agreement contained no provision to this effect -- of
which the Soviet Union's failure to make any such claims in the intervening years was
itself tacit admission -- the Soviet Government continued to bar Father Dion for nearly
four years. He was finally admitted in January 1959, after repeated representations by
the United States to the Soviet Government.
Invasion of Poland . 1939
On July 25, 1932, the Soviet Union and Poland signed a treaty of non-aggression.
The treaty was extended by the protocol of May 5 1934 and was reaffirmed by the
statements of November 28, 1938. Article 1 of tie 199 non-aggression pact stated:
The two Contracting Parties, recording the fact that they have
renounced war as an instrument of national policy in their mutual
relations, reciprocally undertake t6refrain from any aggressive
action against or Invading the territory of the other Party, separately
or together with other powers. _
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE 27t
In September 1939, less than 12 months after having reaffirmed this treaty, the
Soviet Union invaded Poland. The territory of the Polish state was divided with Nazi
Germane. The Soviet Government coolly explained its act of aggression in these words:
"The Polish State and its government have virtually ceased to exist. Treaties con-
cluded between the USSR and Poland have thereby lost their validity. "
Foreign Minister Molotov, speaking to an extraordinary session of the USSR
Supreme Soviet on October 31, 1939, gloated over the easy conquest of Poland. "The
ruling circles of Poland he said, "were very proud of the 'durability' of their govern-
ment and the 'might' of their army. Nevertheless, it turned out that a quick blow
against Poland, first by the German Army and then by the Red Army, sufficed to leave
nothing remaining of the ugly offspring of the Versailles Treaty. "
The Attack on Finland
By the Treaty of Peace between the Soviet Union and Finland, concluded in October
1920, the Soviet Government recognized the independence and sovereignty of Finland,
and both parties agreed "to maintain for the future an attitude of peace and goodwill
towards one another." On January 21, 1932, the Soviet Union and Finland signed a
treaty of nonaggression, which, on April 7, 1934, was renewed for 10 years. Finland,
seemingly, could also take comfort from the fact that the Soviet Union, by adherence
to the Kellogg-Briand Pact, had renounced war as an instrument of national policy
and had joined the League of Nations in September 1934. Article 12 of the League
Covenant required that disputes be submitted to the League for arbitration and enquiry,
and that neither party should resort to war until three months after the award of the
arbiters or the report of the Council.
In October 1939 the Soviet Government, summoning a Finnish representative
to Moscow, presented to Finland a series of demands, including cession of territory
and disarming of zones along the Finnish-Soviet border. The Finns were disinclined
to accede to the Soviet "proposals, " and negotiations reached a deadlock. On November
28, 1939, the Soviet Union announced the abrogation of its nonaggression pact with
Finland after a "frontier incident" and rejected a Finnish proposal for a commission
of enquiry. On November 29, the Soviet Union attacked Finland without a declaration
of war. Thirty Red Army divisions crossed the frontier, towing in their wake a
"Finnish People's Government, " headed by former Comintern secretary Otto Kuusinen.
The puppet regime, which established itself at Terijoki near the Soviet border, was
recognized by the USSR on December 7. as the legitimate government of Finland. On
December 4 Molotov, responding to a communication from the League of Nations, stated:
The Soviet Union is not at war with Finland and does not threaten
the Finnish people. The Soviet Union maintains peaceful relations with
the Democratic Republic of Finland.
Under the terms exacted from Finland by the Treaty of Peace of March 12, 1940,
the Soviet Union annexed the Karelian Isthmus and other Finnish territory. By the later
peace treaty of February 10, 1947, the Soviet Union secured additional Finnish territory
as a prize for its re-invasion of Finland in 1941.
The Fate of the Baltic States
Like Finland, the three Baltic republics. had been officially assured of Soviet
friendship and peaceful intentions. As stated in the nearly identical language of the 1920
peace treaties:
Russia unreservedly recognizes the independence and autonomy
of the State of Estonia [Latvia, Lithuania], and renounces voluntarily
and forever all rights of sovereignty formerly held by Russia...
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72 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
These professions of good faith were reinforced by treaties of nonaggression and
peaceful settlement signed by the Soviet Union with each of the three countries. The
text of the treaty with Estonia stated:
Article 1. Both High Contracting Parties mutually guarantee the
inviolability of the frontiers existing between them... and undertake
to refrain from any act of aression or any violent measures directed
against the Integrity and invggiolability of the territory or against the
political independence of the Other Contracting Party, whether such
act of aggression or such violent measures are undertaken separately
or together with other powers, with or without a declaration of war...
This treaty, virtually Identical to those signed with Latvia and Lithuania, was by
1939 a doubtful indicator of true Soviet intentions toward these countries. A secret
protocol to the Nazi-Soviet Pact, signed August 23; 1939. placed Estonia and Latvia
within the Soviet sphere of Interest. A second treaty, with secret protocols, on
September 28 transferred Lithuania to the Soviet sphere in exchange for additional
Polish territory for Germany.
On September 29 1939, the Soviet Union compelled Estonia to sign a pact of mutual
assistance. Latvia ana Lithuania signed similar treaties on October 5 and 10, respective-
ly. The USSR received leases on military bases and port installations and the right to
maintain armed forces on the territories of the states concerned.
Its immediate object achieved, the Soviet Union once again gave guarantees to
its small neighbors. Clause V of the Estonian and Latvian treaties stated:
The entry into force of this pact shall in no way infringe upon the
sovereign rights of the Contracting Parties, particularly their economic
system and social structure.
Clause VII of the Lithuanian treaty stated in more specific terms:
Entry Into force of this pact shall not affect to any extent the
sovereign rights of the Contracting Parties, in particular their state
organization, economic and social systems, military measures and,
in general, the principle of noninterference in internal affairs.
Further assurances were provided by Foreign Minister Molotov in a speech to the
USSR Supreme Soviet on October 31, 1939:
We stand for the scrupulous and punctilious observance of the
pacts on the basis of complete reciprocity and we declare that all
the nonsensical talk about the Sovietization of tits Baltic countries
is only to the interest of our common enemies.?
On June 15 and 16, 1940, Estonia Latvia and Lithuania were occupied by Soviet
troops. On July 21 the three states, following the forced resignation of their governments,
were incorporated into the USSR.
1. rea with a, May 4, 1932, extended by the protocol o April 4, 1934; w
Latvia, February 5 1932, extended by the protocol of April 4 1934; with Lithuania
on September 28, 1628, extended by the protocol of April 4, 1634.
2. Pravda, November 1, 1939.
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT
III. WARTIME AND POSTWAR AGREEMENTS
Unilateral, arbitrary abrogation of treaties contradicts international
law. However, despite this, arbitrary annulment of treaties Is a common
occurrence in the practice of capitalist states.
--F.I. Kozhevnikov in Academy of Sciences of USSR, Institute of
Law, Mezhdunarodnoe Pravo /International Law1 Moscow, 1951, p. 421.
Soviet Treaty Violations in Iran
Soviet obligations toward Iran were governed by wartime agreements as well as
by the Soviet-Iranian Treaty of Friendship, still in force, concluded on February 26, 1921.
Included in the Treaty of Friendship was a mutual undertaking by each party "to abstain
from any Intervention in the internal affairs of the other." The stationing of British
and Soviet forces in Iran during the Second World War was regulated by the Tripartite
Treaty of Alliance concluded by the two powers with Iran on January 29, 1942. Article
V of this treaty stated:
The forces of the Allied Powers shall be withdrawn from Iranian
territory not later than six months after all hostilities between the
Allied Powers and Germany and her associates have been suspended
by the conclusion of an armistice or armistices or on the conclusion
of a peace treaty between them, whichever date is the earlier...
In Article IV of the same treaty, Britain and the Soviet Union agreed "to disturb as
little as possible the administration and the security forces of Iran the economic life
of the country, and the application of Iranian laws and regulations. i'
On December 1, 1943, during the Tehran Conference, the Big Three issued a
communique stating: "The Governments of the United States, the USSR, and the United
Kingdom are at one with the Government of Iran In their desire for the maintenance of
the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Iran." Later, in a letter of
September 20, 1945, Foreign Minister Molotov reaffirmed Soviet obligations under the
Tripartite Treaty:
As regards the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran,
the Soviet Government, as you are aware, takes the view that this
withdrawal of troops should be effected within the period laid down
in the Anglo-Soviet-Iranian Treaty.
Notwithstanding these various commitments, the Soviet Union began to promote
rebellion in the northern area of Iran occupied by Soviet troops. Disturbances broke out
in the fall of 1945 in the Soviet-controlled Iranian province of Azerbaijan. Rebels,
equipped with Soviet arms and led by the Iranian Communist Pishevari, were aided by
Soviet agents who crossed into Iran. On December 12, 1945, the rebels proclaimed the
Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan. Red Army troops provided full protection and pre-
vented Iranian troops from reaching the scene. Shortly afterwards rebels in the neighboring
Kurdish province, carrying Soviet arms and wearing Soviet uniforms, proclaimed an
independent Kurdish republic. In Azerbaijan, Pishevari broadcast his thanks to the Red
Army for its assistance. Although the Iranian Government appealed to the United Nations,
the rebels remained in control and Soviet troops failed to leave by the agreed date of March
2, 1946.
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
In April 1945 Iranian Premier 4avam, who had gone to Moscow to attempt a
the nit dt'Naagreed ions, Wale admission of three Communists to his cabinet and before
to the
establishment of a joint Soviet -Iranian oil company (Russia holding 61 percent of the
stock) for exploitation of oil In northern Iran. On May 9, 1948, Red Army forces were
withdrawn from Iran, more than two months after the deadline. Subsequently the
Iranian Premier under strong pressure at home, dismit;sed the Communists from
the cabinet. In November 1946 the Iranian Government sent troops into the northern
provinces and the rebel regimes in Azerbaijan collapsed on December 15, 1948. On
October 2L, 1947, the Iranian Majlls refused to ratify the Soviet-Iranian oil agreement. I
Abrogation of Treaties with Great Britain and France United On M
and Postwa1942 r Collaboration at Londdoon, In which thegsii n tors ed a Treaty of
efforts during the wartime period and concluded an alliance against Germany a ends
d
g
into the postwar period. Part U of the Treaty, a military alliance directed explicittly
against German attack. The dalliance w s give the
a
endure for years and to continue thereafter in
the event that neither party gave 12 months' notice of a desire to terminate the contract.
The Soviet Union concluded an essentially similar treaty of alliance and mutual aid with
France on December 10, 1944.
The Soviet Union unilaterally abrogated both these treaties in early 1955. The
action was one aspect of a Soviet campaign to prevent the ratification of the Paris agree-
ments, which terminated the occupation of Western Germany and brought the newly
formed Federal Republic into NATO. Soviet notes to France and Britain in December
1954 contained warnings that their respe,;tive alliances would be annulled if the Paris
agreements were ratified. On May 7, 1955, having failed to prevent ratification, the
Soviet Union officially annulled its wartime alliances.
The Countries of East rn Eurore
In February 1945 the heads of government of the United States, the United Kingdom,
and the Soviet Union, meeting at Yalta, Issued a Declaration on Liberated Europe in which
they agreed to assist the liberated peoples to set up "democratic Institutions of their own
choice, in furtherance of the principles of the Atlantic Charter. Specifically, the three
governments agreed to assist the liberated people
to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of
all democratic elements in the population and pledge I to the earliest
possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive
to the will of the people.. .
These provisions were rendered meaningless by Soviet policies in those territories
liberated by the Red Army. Ignoring the Yalta commitments, the Soviet Union, in a now
familiar pattern, installed communist-dominated regimes in Hungary, Bulgaria, and
Rumania. In Rumania acting through Its own authorities and through the Rumanian
communist Party, the USSR deliberately prevented the exercise of democratic rights by
the people. In February 1945 Deputy Foreign Minister Vyshinsky arrived in Bucharest to
dictate the dismissal of the Radescu Government and the Imposition of the communist-
dominated Groza regime. Direct interference by Soviet authorities -- including the use
of troops -- In the elections of November 1948 was only one of the many further Instances
of Soviet violation of the declaration.
Geor Lenczowski, The )&ddWTa-st in World Affairs, Ithaca, New York, 1 ,
pp. 173-175.
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Similar Soviet actions occurred in Hungary and Bulgaria. In Hungary, for example,
General Sviridov, Deputy Chairman of the Allied Control Commission, unilaterally dis-
solved Catholic youth organizations in June 1946 and in the following year forced the
resignation of Prime Minister Ferenc Nagy. Contrary to commitments made at Potsdam
on August 2, 1945 that directives of the Allied Control Commissions would be issued by
the Soviet Chairmen "after agreement on these directives with the English and American
representatives,"1 Soviet representatives on the Commissions in Rumania; Hungary,
and Bulgaria consistently issued unilateral instructions in the name of the Commission
and thwarted the activities of the British and American representatives even to the point
of restricting their freedom of movement.
In regard to Poland, the Big Three at Yalta agreed as follows:
The Provisional Government which is now. functioning in Poland should
therefore be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion
of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad....
This Polish Provisional Government of National Unity shall be pledged
to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the
basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all
democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to
put forward candidates.
That the Soviet Union had little intention of observing this agreement became evident
almost immediately, when, on April 21. 1945, it concluded a formal treaty of alliance
with the so-called "Lublin Government, "2 Which had been organized in the Soviet Union
and moved into Poland behind Soviet troops.
Nevertheless, at Potsdam the Soviet Union once again voiced its adherence to the
principles of democracy. The Potsdam Protocol stated:
The three powers note that the Polish Provisional Government, in
accordance with the decisions of the Crimea Conference, has agreed
to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on
the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot In which all democratic
and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward
candidates.
The Polish Provisional Government was nominally a coalition, but in fact its key
positions were occupied by Communists, who had established themselves in the period
of "liberation" by the Red Army. Electiops were postponed until January 1947 in order
to terrorize and eliminate the opposition. Representations by the United States and
United Kingdom to the Polish Provisional Government calling attention to the obligations
of Yalta and Potsdam were rejected. The Soviet Union refused to join the two Western
powers in their approach on this matter to the Polish Government.
1. Potsdam rotoco ,, M. Revised Allied Control Commission Procedure in Rumania,
Bulgaria, and Hungary, and Annex I regarding the Allied Control Commission in
Hungary.
2. Hugh Seton-Watson, The East European Revolution, p. 157..
3. Seton-Watson, op. cit., pp. 171-179; Oscar Halecki in Stephen D. Kertasz (ed.),
The Fate of East Central Europe, pp. 134-139.
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Germany
In Germany the USSR has distorted and violated numerous provisions of wartime
and postwar agreements with the Western powers. The subject is too complex for
detailed discussion here, but two major sets of agreements may be noted: the agree-
ments reached at Potsdam and embodied in the-Potsdam Protocol, and the agreements
on the occupation and control of Germany
1. The Potsdam Protocol of Au g= 1 1945
The Protocol contained a statement of common Allied objectives
looking towar a velopment of democracy in postwar Germany. Among the political
principles agreed upon were the following:
The judicial system will be reorganized in accordance with
the principles of democracy, of justice under law, and of equal rights
for all citizens...
...local self-government shall be restored throughout Germany
on democratic prir.clples...
all democratic political parties with rights of assembly and
of public discussion shall be allowed and encouraged throughout Germany...
..Subject to the necessity for maintaining military security,
freedom of speech, press and religion shall be permitted, and re-
ligious institutions shall be respected. Subject likewise to the
maintenance of military security, the formation of free trade unions
shall be permitted.
The Soviet Union, in its administration of East Germany, has violated these
principles both in spirit and in letter. In 1948 the Soviet authorities forced the merger
of the Socialist Party of Germany with the Communist Party of Germany, forming the
SED or Socialist Unity Party, with the aim of 'capturing" the Socialist voters of Berlin
and the East Zone. Although they did not succeed in taking control of the SPD of Berlin,
they were able to veto the election of the SPD leader Ernst Reuter as Governing Mayor
of Berlin in June 1947. In the Eastern Zone of Germany the so-called German
Democratic Republic was set up in October 1949 by Soviet order, without prior dis-
cussion or free elections. The regime's first elections, held in the following year,
were of the single-list variety carried on under the "bloc-party" system and the National
Front, a communist cover organization.
Individual liberties, though ostentatiously displayed in the East German Consti-
tution, have never been protected. Soviet military forces cooperated with the East
German regime in putting down the uprisings and strikes which occurred in June 1953.
The free flow of information and free expression essential to democratic life has not
been permitted in the East Zone, and Western radio transmissions have been extensively
jammed.
Fc, Policies. The Potsdam Protocol provided both for reparations from
Germany an o measures of essential economic reconstruction. It was understood and
agreed at Potsdam that successful implementation of these measures required coopera-
tion and "common policies" in regard to basic economic functions. The Protocol
stated specifically.
..During the period of occupation Germany shall be treated as
a single economic unit.
Almost from the beginning the Soviet authorities obstructed efforts to Implement
this principle. In their own zone they pursued a unilateral economic policy and raised
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barriers to the flow of trade across zonal borders. Western suggestions, such as that
to place manufactures from East Germany in a common pool in order to cover the cost
of essential imports, were defeated by Soviet delaying tactics. Depending traditionally
upon food from Eastern Germany, the area under United States control was able to
survive by means of extensive American subsidy.
An essential aspect of the over-all economic problem was the question of
reparations. The Potsdam Protocol stated:
.In addition to the reparations to be taken by the USSR from Its
own zone of occupation, the USSR shall receive additionally from the
Western Zones:
(a) 15 percent of such usable and complete industrial capital equipment...
as Is unnecessary for the German peace economy and should be removed
from the Western Zones of Germany, in exchange for an equivalent value
of food, coal, potash, zinc, timber, clay products, petroleum products,
and such other commodities as may be agreed upon.
(b) 10 percent of such industrial capital equipment as is unnecessary for
the German peace economy and should be removed from the Western
Zones, to be transferred to the Soviet Government on reparations
account without payment or exchange of any kind in return.
Also,
.Payment of reparations should leave enough resources to
enable the German people to subsist without external assistance.
In working out the economic balance of Germany the necessary means
must be provided to pay for imports approved by the Control
Council in Germany. The proceeds of exports from current pro-
duction and stocks shall be available in the first place for payment
for such imports. [,This was not to apply to equipment and products,
noted above, received as additional reparations by the USSR from
the Western zones.
No effort was made by the Soviet Union to abide by these provisions. In their
own zone Soviet authorities not only refused to account for reparations exacted but also
removed large quantities from current production, thus preventing the use of these
commodities for payment for necessary imports. Moreover, the Soviet Union failed
to make deliveries of food, coal, potash, zinc, timber and other raw materials from
its own zone in exchange for shipments of industrial equipment from the Western zones.
By contrast, the United States, between March 31 and August 1, 1946, had made ship-
ments from Its zone to the USSR of 11, 100 tons of reparation equipment. After con-
tinued Soviet failure to meet these obligations, the United States suspended reparations
deliveries until such time as the USSR would be willing to implement fully the provisions
of the Protocol.
Demilitarization. The Potsdam Protocol provided for the "complete dis-
armament and demilitarization" of Germany. Provisions to this end Included the following:
All German land, naval and air forces-and all other military
and quasi-military organizations, together with all clubs and
associations which serve to keep alive the military traditions in
Germany, shall be completely and finally abolished in such manner
as permanently to prevent the revival or reorganization of German
militarism and Nazism.
In 1948 Soviet authorities began building up a sizeable "police force" in the Soviet
Zone. In May 1950 the United States protested this process of remilitarization, pointing
out that some 40,000 to 50,000 members of the so-called "Police Alert Units," equipped
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with Soviet weapons, were receiving infantry, armored and artillery training. At the
end of 1953 the Soviet Zone's "police force numbered 100,000 men (for a population
of 17 millloi, with an additional 140 200 military personnel, including 3 mechanized
divisions and air units. By June 1959 East German military and paramilitary forces
totalled more than 700,000 mn.1
E The conference at Potsdam also considered the question
of the future German - ish boundary, and included the following statement in the
Protocol.
The three Heads of Government reaffirm their opinion that the
final delimitation of the Western frontier of Poland should await the
peace settlement.
On July 6, 1950, an agreement was signed between the Soviet-controlled regimes
of Poland and East Germany fixing the Oder-Netsse as the fefinitive frontier between
Poland and Germany.
2. Occupation andControl of Germany
and the United Kingdom On September 12, 1944, representatives of the Soviet Union, the United States
was amended subsequently signed include Protocol The Protocol In its final form established
the four zones of occupation and the special joint occupation for the Berlin area, Para
graph 5 of the Protocol provides:
An Inter -Allied Governing authority (Komendatura) consisting
of four Commandants, appointed by their respective Commanders-in-Chief,
will be established to direct jointly the administration of the "Greater
Berlin" Area.
The Soviet Union was also signatory to the Agreement of May 1, 1945, which stated:
Supreme authority in Germany will be exercised on instructions from
their respective governments, by the Commanders-in-Chief of the armed
forces of the United States of America, the United Kngdom and the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics, Lang/ the Provisional Government of the
French Republic each in his own zone of occupation, and also jointly, In
matters affecting Germany as a whole, in their capacity as members of
the supreme organ of control constituted under the present Agreement.
With regard to Berlin, the Agreement stated:
An Inter-Allied Governing Authority (Komendatura) consisting of
four Commandants, one fromeach Power, appointed by their respective
Commanders-in-Chief, will be established to direct jointly the adminis-
tration of the "Greater Berlin" area. Each of the Commandants will
serve in rotation, In the position of Chief Commandant, as head of the
Inter-Allied Authority.
Almost from the beginning the Soviet representatives on the Allied Control Council
and the Komendatura carried out obstructionist tactics, as descrEbed above, and in Berlin
the communist controlled police of the Soviet sector refused to be bound by the legal
0FUW_s_a-m-eM1_e the Federal Republic, near y three times larger in pop tion,
had 235,000 men under arms, together with 14,000 police and 12,000 frontier
guards. - -Statement by Secretary of State Herter at the Foreign Ministers'
Conference, Geneva, May 25, 1959; Was_tiinoton Pos+ and Times
Heald, May
26, 1959. r
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controls authorized by the Allied Komendatura. On March 20, 1948, the Soviet repre-
sentatives walked out of the Allied Control Council and on April 1 imposed rail and
road restrictions on Allied traffic to Berlin. On June 16, 1948, the Soviet represen-
tatives left the Komendatura and 10 days later imposed a total blockade of Berlin. On
July 1, 1948, the chief Soviet representative in the Komendatura announced that the
four power administration of Berlin was terminated. On November 30, 1948, the
German Communists set up their own city. government in the Soviet sector of Berlin,
thus completing the division of Berlin into East and West zones.
On May 4, 1949, after the Western powers had demonstrated their determination
to retain their legal rights in Berlin by supplying the city by air, the Governments of
the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France reached an agree-
ment at New York, which was confirmed subsequently at the Council of Foreign Ministers
at Paris. Among other provisions, the New York agreement stated:
All the restrictions imposed since March 1, 1948, by the Govern-
ment of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on communications,
transportation, and trade between Berlin and the Western zones of
Germany and between the Eastern zone and the Western zones will be
removed on May 12, 1949.
In addition, the agreement reached at Paris specified:
... in order to improve and supplement this and other arrangements
and agreements as regards the movement of persons and goods and
communications between the Eastern zone and the Western zones and
between the zones and Berlin and also in regard to transit, the
occupation authorities, each in his own zone, will have an obligation
to take the measures necessary to insure the normal functioning and
utilization of rail, water, and road transport for such movement of
persons and goods and such communications by post, telephone, and
telegraph.
On July 23, 1955, the heads of government of the United States, the USSR, France,
and the United Kingdom issued the following statement at Geneva:
The Heads of Government, recognizing their common responsi-
bility for the settlement of the German question and the reunification
of Germany, have agreed that the settlement of the German question
and the reunification of Germany by free elections shall be carried
out in conformity with the national interests of the German people
and in the interests of European security.
That the Soviet Union had no intention of carrying out this promise was made clear
less than four months later at the meeting of Foreign Ministers in Geneva. On November
8, 1955, Molotov stated:
. such a mechanical merger of the two parts of Germany be means
of so -called "free elections".. could lead to the violation of the vital
interests of the working masses of the German Democratic Republic,
to which one cannot agree.
Since that time, the Soviet Union has consistently rejected all attempts to solve
the German problem except on its own terms, and in recent months has sought to impose
its "solution" on the Western powers, by unilateral action in total disregard of its treaty
commitments. On November 27, 1958, the Soviet Government notified the Government
of the United States that it regarded the agreements on Germany of September 12, 1944
and May 1, 1945 as "null and void," and announced its intention of turning over. its
functions within Berlin and in regard to access to the city to the so-called German
Democratic Republic. The Western powers have refused to accept any such unilateral
action on the part of the USSR.
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Agreements On Prisoners of War
The terms for the surrender of Japan were defined in the Proclamation of July
26, 1945, issued by the United States, Britain, and China. The Soviet Union, in declar-
ing war upon Japan on August 8, 1945 announced that it had joined in the Allied
Proclamation of July 28. Point 9 of the Proclamation stated
The Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed,
shall be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to
lead peaceful and productive lives.
In May 1949, following a Japanese statement that $78,929 Japanese prisoners
were still being hel, the official Soviet news agency admitted that 95,000 Japanese
prisoners were still in the Soviet Union. In 1957 the Japanese stated that 8,069 Japanese
citizens continued to be detained in the Soviet Union and Outer Mongolia, 2,829 in North
Korea, and 1, 392 in Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands.
The release of German prisoners of war was discussed in 1947 at the Council
of Foreign Ministers, which reached agreement that
German prisoners of war located in the territory of the Allied
Powers and in all other territories will be returned to Germany on
December 31, 1948.
The Soviet Union reaffirmed this obligation in submitting Its plan for repatriation
on June 30, 1947.
On January 3,1949, the United States protested to the Soviet Union for its failure
to furnish information on its repatriation of war prisoners. The United States note stated:
.on the basis of the Soviet Government's statement at the Council
of Foreign Ministers in Moscow that 890, 532 war prisoners were still
held by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at that time, only some
447,387 are officially known to have been repatriated to Germany.
In its note of January 24, 1949 to the United States, the Soviet Government
promised that "...repatriation of war prisoners will be completed during 1949."
In 1957 the United Nations Ad Hoc Commission on Prisoners of War received a
memorandum from the Federal Republic of Germany which stated:
In the course of German-Soviet negotiations in Moscow in September
1955, the Soviet Government declared itself willing to release 9, 826
prisoners of war. However, the assurance was also given that any
additional persons would be released who might be traced in the Soviet
Union on the basis of relevant German lists, provided such persons
had German nationality..
According to the memorandum, only 1,772 prisoners had been returned since
September 1958. The Soviet Government bad refused to repatirate more than 100,000
German war and civilian prisoners who had been forced to settle in the USSR following
the elimination of certain forced labor camps on the giounds that they had acquired
Soviet nationality. The Soviet Union had supplied no Information on the whereabouts of
87,353 prisoners of war and 16,480 German civilians known to have been in Soviet
captivity at one time or another; 75 German scientists, whose work contracts had ex-
pired long previously, were being detained at Sukhmi.
The Ad Hoc Commission on repatriation of war prisoners reported in September
1957 that the Soviet Government had not even replied to a request to discuss the matter
at Geneva.
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The Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, concluded on August 14, 1945, between
the Soviet Union and the Republic of China contained, among others, the following pro-
visions.
Article V. The High Contracting Parties, having regard to the
interests and security and economic development of each of them,
agree to work together in close and friendly collaboration after
the coming of peace and to act according to the principles of
mutual respect for their sovereignty and territorial Integrity
and of non-intervention in the internal affairs of the other Con-
tracting Party.
Article VI. The High Contracting Parties agree to afford one
another all possible economic assistance in the postwar period
in order to facilitate and expedite the rehabilitation of both
countries and to make their contribution to the prosperity of the
world.
Article VIII. The Treaty... shall remain in force for a term of
thirty years.
In the exchange of notes accompanying the treaty, Foreign Minister Molotov stated:
....The Government of the USSR agrees to render to China moral
support and aid in military supplies and other material resources,
such support and aid to be entirely given to the National Govern-
ment as the Central Government of China.
The Soviet Union began to disregard these provisions almost immediately.
(1) In its occupation of Manchuria, commencing in 1945, the Soviet. authorities
removed from Manchuria assets valued at $858,000,000 in the form of mining equipment,
rolling stock, steel mills, electric power generators, and other equipment.
(2) The Soviet Government made available to the Chinese Communists extensive
stocks of Japanese arms and other equipment to be employed against the National Government.
The Unification of Korea
At the Conference of Foreign Ministers in Moscow in December 1945, the Soviet
Union, together with the United States and the United Kingdom, agreed to the establishment
of a free and independent Korea. The Report of the Conference, dated December 27, 1945,
stated that, with a view to the re-establishment of Korea as an Independent state, " there
should be established a "provisional democratic Korean government." Further:
In order to assist the formation of a provisional government and
with a view to the preliminary elaboration of the appropriate measures,
there shall be established a Joint Commission consisting of represen-
tatives of the United States command In southern Korea and the Soviet
command in northern Korea. In preparing their proposals the
Commission shall consult with the Korean democratic parties and
social organization...
It shall be the task of the Joint Commission, with the participation
of the provisional Korean democratic government and of the Korean
democratic organization, to work out measures also for helping and
assisting (trusteeship) the political, economic and social progress of
the Korean people, the development of democratic self-government
and the establishment of the national Independence of Korea.
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2wr
The Soviet Union from the start thwarted the implementation of this agreement.
Its representative on the Joint Commission refused to recognize as "democratic" any
parties and organizations not under Soviet control. R prevented UN-sponsored elections
in northern Korea, and established there Its own regime, the so-called Democratic
People's Republic of Korea which-claimed jurisdiction over the entire country. On June
25, 1950, this regime, armed and encouraged by the Soviet Union, attacked the Republic
of Korea.
Soviet Pledges In Hunaarv
On October 30 1958t~th~~e~~ 'Government of the USSR made a public declaration,
printed the following lay In YI~yyY4, which stated:
Having in mind that the further presence of Soviet ?mlitary units in
Hungary could serve as an excuse for further aggravation of the situation,
the Soviet Government has given its military command instructions to
withdraw the Soviet military units from the city of Budapest as soon as
this is considered necessary by the Hungarian Government.
At the same time the Soviet Government is prepared to enter into
the appropriate negotiations with the Government of the Hungarian
People's Republic and other members of the Warsaw Treaty on the
question of the presence of Soviet troops on the territory of Hungary.
The Soviet Union not only broke the pledge, but deliberately used It as a cover In
order to crush the revolt in Hungary.
(1) On October 31, 1956, the Soviet Army began strengthening its forces in
Hungary.
(2) On November 3, 1956, under pretext of negotiating the withdrawal of Soviet
troops, Soviet authorities arrested the Hungarian representatives, led by Colonel Pal
Maleter, who had been sent to carry on the negotiations.
(3) On November 4, 1956, Hungarian Premier Imre Nagy broadcast the following
statement:
In the early hours of this morning the Soviet troops launched an
attack against our capital city with the obvious Intention of aerthrow-
ing the lawful, democratic, Hungarian Government. Our troops are
fighting. The government is in its place. I inform the people of the
country and world opinion of this.
(4) On June 16, 1958, the Hungarian Communist regime of Janos Kadar, who had
personally pledged the safety of Imre Nagy after the suppression of the revolt, announced
the execution of Nagy and of his associates, Pal Maleter, Jozsef Sztlagyl, and Miklos Gimes.
Credit Agreement with Yugoslavia
On January 12, 1958, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia concluded an agreement under
which Yugoslavia was to receive Soviet credits for economic construction and expansion.
By the agreement of August 3 1958, Yugoslavia recieved a tether credit of $175 million,
to be provided jointly by the USSR and Its East German satellite, for construction of an
aluminum combine.
In the spring of 1958 the Soviet Union, which had become Increasingly disgruntled
with Yugoslavia's ideological Independence, endeavored to employ Its credit agreement
as a political weapon. Pravda on May 9, 1958, noting that ideological differences" lead
to differences on political sues " threatened in a thinly veiled fashion that economic assis-
tance might be terminated if the 1lugoslav ideological line were not changed. On May 27,
1958, Foreign Minister Gromyko handed to the Yugoslav Ambassador a note announcing the
unilateral suspension for "five years" of Soviet and East German deliveries under the 1958
credit agreements.
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SOVIET MANPOWER'
1960 - 70
This report shows the changes in the population and labor force of
the USSR that are expected to take place between 1960 and 1970. For
purposes of comparison, data also are presented for earlier years.
The USSR has already taken steps to cope with the two most impor-
tant manpower problems that will be encountered during the 1960's --
the small increments to the population of working age during 1960-65 and
the effective use of the huge labor force living on farms. By reducing
the armed forces and by controlling the rate of school enrollment among
youths during 1956-60, the USSR has succeeded in providing enough ad-
ditional labor to overfulfill its manpower and production plans in spite
of a continuous decline in the increments to the population of working
age resulting from the low birth rates of World War II. The number of
persons on farms is expected to be almost as large in 1970 as in 1960.
By promoting industrial and construction activities in rural areas, the
USSR has attempted to employ surplus agricultural workers on the farms,
thus keeping rural-to-urban migration at a minimum and avoiding the
necessity for providing more housing and public utilities in the already
overcrowded cities.
The estimates for the 1950's are based on statistics that have ap-
peared in official Soviet publications. The outlook for the 1960's is based
on the following assumptions:
1. That birthrates (by age of mother)will remain
at present levels but that death rates will de-
cline slowly,
2. That the goals announced for the Seven Year
Plan (1959-65) relating to manpower and ed-
ucation will be achieved and that the trends
established in the first half of the decade will
continue until 1970,
3. That the planned reduction in the armed forces
by 1. 2 million during 1960-61 will take place,
4. That no major war or other cataclysmic event
will occur.
'Central Intelligence Agency, May 1960.
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284 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
THE POPULATION WILL INCREASE FROM 214 MILLION
TO 247 MILLION DURING THE 1960's
World War II hada catastrophic effect on the populationof the USSR.
The population (within the present boundaries of the country) fell from
195 million in 1940 to about 175 million in 1947. * The 1940 level was
not regained until 1954.
In addition to the enormous military and civilian losses attributable
to the war, birth rates fell to less than half their prewar level and did
not recover that level until about 1950. The small number of children
born during the war years has already posed periodic problems for
* All population estimates in this report are midyear figures.
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERE
Soviet leaders as the groups reached elementary school, high school,
and working age. These small groups will be marrying and having chil-
dren during the 1960's. As they replace the larger, prewar groups, the
rate of growth of the population will temporarily decline.
For the decade of the 1960's as a whole, the population will increase
atanaverage annual rate of 1. 5 percent -- a little more slowly than dur-
ing the 1950's.
THE CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE WILL GROW BY ABOUT
17 MILLION, OR 16 PERCENT, DURING THE 1960's
The civilian labor force of the USSR will increase by about 17 mil-
lion during the 1960's, only 1 million more than the increase during the
1950's. Growth will be slower in the first half of the decade than in the
second because the age groups starting to work during 1960-65 will be
the unusually small groups born during the war and the early postwar
period. The increase will be enough, however, to permit the achieve-
ment of the manpower goals set by the Seven Year Plan (1959-65).
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 A
296 oved For Release 2005/08/22 : CIA-RDP66B00403R000500120001-1
EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
THE NUMBER OF PERSONS REACHING WORKING AGE
WILL BEGIN TO RISE IN 1962, FOLLOWING A SHARP
DECLINE DURING THE 1950's
The total number of persons reaching the normal working age of 15
inthe USSR will more thandouble betwcenl960and 1970 -- from 2. 3 mil-
lion to 4. 7 million. This increase follows a rapid decline during the
1950's, particularly in the latter half of the decade. These fluctuations
result from the sharp decline in the birth rate during 1940-45 and its
subsequent rise.
The decline in the number of 15-year-olds would have resulted in a
much slower growth in the labor force than actually occurred if the USSR
had not taken steps to increase the labor supply. By controlling school
enrollment and by reducing the armed forces, however, the USSR has
been able to keep its civilian labor force growing at a fairly even pace.
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE 287
DECLINING SCHOOL ENROLLMENT AND REDUCTIONS
IN THE ARMED FORCES ARE ALLOWING THE CIVILIAN.
LABOR FORCE TO INCREASE STEADILY DURING THE
PERIOD OF "POPULATION SHORTAGE"
_._& 4 d ,. ,&.1 11. 4
Jil4N .. : , QQ~~ uWORKING If
' $ THE i- Ali La90~. FORCE, 195565
Between 1955 and 1960 the civilian labor force of the USSR increased
by 10 million, but the population of working age (15 to 69) increased by
only 7.4 million. At the same time, the number of persons of working
age in day schools and colleges declined, and the armed forces were re-
duced.
56412 0-60-20
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288 EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
The decrease in day school enrollment resulted both from a decline
in the number of persons of high school age and from a decline in the
proportion enrolled. More young people thus became available for work.
This downward trend in school enrollment is expected to be reversed in
the early 1960's, when the number of 15-year-olds begins to rise and
when the current reorganization of education is completed.
Between 1955 and 1960 the armed forces decreased by more than
2 million persons, and the Soviet government has announced plans to cut
the armed forces by an additional 1. 2 million during 1960-61 -- years
when the additions to the population of working age will be the lowest
(fewer than 1 million each year).
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
WOMEN FAR OUTNUMBER MEN IN THE POPULATION
AND IN THE KEY WORKING AGES
Women constitute 55 percent of the total population of the USSR --
one of the highest percentages in the world. In the age group 25 to 59,
there are 139 women for each 100 men. The heavy preponderance of
women in these ages is a consequence of the disproportionate losses of
men during World War II andalso during the collectivization drive of the
1930's. By 1970, women will constitute 53 percent of the population.
The age structure of the population will not change greatly during
the 1960's. About the same proportion will be in the working ages 15 to
69 in 1970 as now, but women will be a smaller part of the total.
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~V NEWTS INCIDENT TO THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
MORE THAN HALF OF ALL SOVIET WORKERS ARE
WOMEN
Women now makeup more than half of the civilian labor force of the
USSR, but their predominance is gradually diminishing. By 1970 the
labor force will be about equally divided between men and women.
Nearly two-thirds of the number of Soviet women 14 years of age
and over currently participate in the labor force. Women probably will
continue ?toparticipate at this high rate during the 1960's. The percent-
age could rise even higher, for Soviet leaders have established as an ul-
timate goal the almost universal participation of women in employment
outside the home. Soviet plans call for more kindergartens, nurseries,
boarding schools, and public dining facilities to make it possible for
more women to work.
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 Approved Forle~()j~/~ :-~B~Q~3001201-1
WOMEN ARE EMPLOYED EXTENSIVELY IN ALL
BRANCHES OF THE ECONOMY
ECONOMIC SECTOR
HEALTH
:;TRADE,
EDUCATION
COMMUNICATIONS,
AGRICULTURE
GOVERNMENT
ADMIISTRATIO~1 _
INDUSTRY
=CONSTRUCTION 30%
TRANSPORTATION 28%
Some sectors of the Soviet economy, such as trade, education, and
health, are staffed largely by women. In 1959, about three-fourths of
all doctors and about 70 percent of all teachers were women. Although
women accounted for about 57 percent of total agricultural employment
in 1959, the proportion has been declining steadily and will continue to
decline during the 1960's. Even in those sectors where women do not
predominate, such as construction and transportation, they nevertheless
constitute more than one-fourth of the total.
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 A-ovece$ ?Pc~&R000500120001-1
NEARLY HALF OF THE CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE IS
EMPLOYED IN AGRICULTURE
More than 50 million people in the USSR -- nearly half of the total
labor force -- are engaged in agriculture. This figure represents the
numtberof persons 14 years old andoverwho live on collective and state
farms and who participate in normal farm activities at some time dur-
ing the year. It also includes unpaid family workers who live on those
farms and who work exclusively on private plots -- still an important
source of agricultural production in the USSR.
A little more than one-fourth of the labor force is employed in in-
dustry and construction, and somewhat less than one-fourth is employed
in the service sector. Slightly more than half of all workers in the ser-
vices are employed in education, health, and trade, and about one-fourth
are employed in transportation and communications.
Agricultural employment is expected to resume its historic downward
trend during the 1960's after a temporary interruption during the mid-
1950's, when Khrushchev's "new lands" program added several million
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 Approved FoEflo@gslka f@8iZ2 TAXAsRORB6BO6r48B 5001 01-1
people to Soviet farms. In 1970, agricultural employment will still be
high, constituting 40 percent of the civilian labor force.
Employment in the services, which increased by 32 percent in the
1950's, will increase by 40 percent during the 1960's. By 1970, 28 per-
cent of the labor force will be working in service activities compared
with 21 percent in 1950. Nevertheless, more people will still be em-
ployed in the nonagricultural productive industries (manufacturing, min-
ing, and construction) than in the services.
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 A oved ftl9i H 5V08T": &Il ?R8&B8&40 000500120001-1
THE RURAL POPULATION WILL CONTINUE TO
DECLINE AS A PROPORTION OF THE TOTAL
The rural population of the USSR is expected to drop from 51 per-
cent of the total in 1960 to 43 percent in 1970. Early in the decade the
urban population for the first time will exceed the rural population.
Post-Stalin agricultural policies reduced the rate of rural-to-urban
migration, resulting in the same rural population in 1950 and 1960. The
'rural population is expected to drop slowly to about 105 million by 1970.
Although Soviet agriculture probably will achieve sizable gains in
productivity during the 1960's, the integration of surplus unskilled farm
labor into the urban labor force will present difficult problems. Khru-
shchev has talked about urbanizing the countryside by developing "farm-
cities" at existing farm sites, thus avoiding the necessity for providing
additional housing and public utilities in already crowded urban areas.
These farm-cities would provide training for jobs in industry and ser-
vices for farm workers who become surplus through mechanization..
Some such scheme maybe necessary to cope with the anomaly of a huge
farm labor force and a huge rural population in a country undergoing
rapid industrialization.
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 Approved For *ip?e1]RQ$/$$: - 61BO0 8R 001M61 -1
THE EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF THE POPULATION
AND LABOR FORCE IS STILL LOW
Elementary School
Not Completed-60.5%
m,,
a sec anze secon ary school rmnurses den s
x sc oo Fea"' cfiers.and``varTo "s m s of lechmclans reTua s
qg~ T? efe~~ o years o s oo(irig and die liiiBfi schoo7le'vel.
Some idea of the educational level of the Soviet labor force may be
obtained from the data on educational attainment of the entire adult pop-
ulation given in the 1959 census. In 1959, only 2. 6 percent -of the pop-
ulation 15 years old and over had graduated from college, and 60.5 per-
cent had not even completed elementary school (7 years). Considerable
educational progress was achievedby the USSR during the decade of the
1950's, after the 7-year elementary school was made compulsory in
1949. Even greater progress probably will be made during the 1960's,.
when an 8-year elementary education is scheduled to become compul-
sory.
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 /2P0roveQrRe4MQJ)0N0$9&RDL?&A9RR000500120001-1
THE PACE OF EDUCATIONAL PROGRESS WILL BE
STEPPED UP SHARPLY DURING THE 1960's-EVENING
SCHOOL ATTENDANCE IN HIGH SCHOOLS AND COLLEGES
WILL PLAY A MAJOR ROLE
High school and college enrollment in the USSR will rise rapidly
during the 1960's. The USSR is currently reorganizing its school Sys-
tem to place more emphasis on vocational education in high schools and
on evening enrollment in both high schools and colleges. The 7-year
elementary schools are to become 8-year schools, and attendance will
be compulsory. The projected rise in day school enrollment during the
early 1960's will resultfrom the increased attendance in theeighth grade
of the reorganized elementary schools as well as from the larger pro-
portion of persons of high school age in the population. During the 1960's,
3. 5 million to 4 million persons will be graduating from college com-
pared with Z. 5 million during the 1950's.
High school education is to be made "universally available" but not
compulsory. The USSR also is tightening the controls over school en-
rollment to provide a more effective means of manipulating school en-
rollment in accordance with the need for labor. State authorities will
decide whether graduates from the eighth grade are to go to work, to
high school, or to a trade school. Those who go directly to work will be
encouraged to attend evening classes. Enrollment in evening schools
will expand almost as rapidly as that in day schools.
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 Approved For I se f3/22 :i-3L WB66MH 001 1-1
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT AND PRODUCTIVITY
WILL CONTINUE TO RISE RAPIDLY
The continued rise in the level of education and skill of the Soviet
labor force, along with progress in technology, should permit produc-
tivity to rise rapidly. Gross national product (GNP) is expected to in-
crease about 6 percent annually during the 1960's, a little more slowly
than during the 1950's. GNP per capita and GNP per worker (which is
a rough measure of productivity) will each increase about 4. 5 percent
annually.
The high rate of increase in GNP should permit consumption per
capita to increase substantially. By 1970 the standard of living of the
average Soviet worker probably will be about 40 percent higher than the
present level.
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SUMMARY INDEX
(List of witnesses appears alphabetically in contents)
Actions of Soviet Union : Page
Contradictory--------------------------------------------------- 70, 198
71 192
Objectives------------------------------------------------------
Prediction on---------------------------------------------------- 71
Advance planning in event U-2 plane, downed, question of_______________ 137
Aiken, Senator George D.:
Examination of witnesses :
Gates, Hon. Thomas S., Jr------------------------------ ---- 138
Herter, Hon. Christian A------------------------------- 40-43, 72, 73
Authorization for U-2 flights ---------------------------------------- 102, 194
Bringing instances of espionage before U.N----------------------------- 45
Capehart, Senator Homer E.: Examination of witnesses : Gates, Hon. 141
Thomas S., Jr--------- -----------------
Carlson, Senator Frank : Examination of witnesses : Herter, Hon. Chris-
tian A------------------------------------------------------- 46,47,77-79
Central Intelligence Agency : 94
Duties of--------------------------------------------------------- 84
Powers of-------------------------------------------------------
Cessation of aircraft espionage, need for assurance of------------------- 158
Chronology of U-2 incident, from Washington Post, May 27, 1960 ------ 163-168
Communist China's influence on Soviet action------------------------- 40, 161
Comunist infiltration in the nuclear test ban movement (from Congres-
sional Record) --------------------------------------------------- 169-174
Communist propaganda on U-2 overflights----------------------------- 34,39
Consideration of U-2 incident, possible General Assembly_______________ 39
Cover story-------------------------------- 28, 115, 128, 129, 134, 178
Decision to suspend overflights ---------------------------------------- 24
Authority for suspension----------------------------------------- 66
Duration of order to suspend------------------------------------- 66
Defensive value to U.S. of U-2 overflights----------------------------- 37, 136
Department of Defense in overflight program, role of------------------- 124
Department of Defense news release, May 5--------------------------- 178
Department of State statements : 104
Background of---------------------------------------------------- 187
May 7 statement------------------------------------------------
Press and radio briefing, May 5----------------------------------- 178
Press release, May 6--------------------------------------------- 1181
93
Secretary of State, May 9----------------------------------------- 93
Devices carried by pilot----------------------------------------------
Disarmament and suspension of nuclear tests, continued efforts toward--47, 1145
38
Discontinuance of U-2 flights, effect of--------------------------------
Effect of 11-2 incident on K's summit action____________________________ 148
Effect of pleading guilty of espionage----------------------------------45
Effect of summit failure on U.S. military program______________________ 154
Efforts to interview 1J-2 pilot---------------------------------------- 37' 440
3
Espionage and international law -----------------------------------------
in Paris :
Final proceedings:
Khrushchev's press conference________________________________ 11
Tripartite communique------------------------------------- 11, 235
Tripartite meeting,; ----------------------------------------- 11
Fixed Soviet governmental position--------------------------9, 10, 12, 522
Khrushchev's arrival ---------------------------------------------
calls on De Gaulle and Macmillan_____________________ 8, 522
President's position at first conference-----------------------------
Suspension of U-2 flights, announcement of-------------------- 9, 24, 25
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SUNUM-IT
Executive branch coordination on U-2 incident ------------------- 28-31 34, ~4
Corer Story on overflight, issuance of---------------------------- - 28
Events leading to State Department May 5 statement________29, 34
Events leading to State Department May 7 31
Guidelines on missing plane, preparation of_____________
NASA statement of May 5-------------------- --------- 30
Foreign 'Ministers deadlock-------------- -
----------------------------- ------------------- 30
Fulbright, Senator J. W.: :5
Examination of witnesses:
Bohlen, lion. Charles E---------------------------------------56, 57
Dillon, Sion. Douglas ------------------------------- 50 51, 103, 104
Dryden, Dr. Hugh I------------------------------------ 112-114, 121
Gates, lion. Thomas S.. Jr------------------ 12+5-128, 145-148, 153-1>5
Herter, lion. Christian A------------------------- 24--52855). 56,57-M.
8-86, 96, 97, 102, 104-106, 107
Opening statement ----------------------------------------------- I
Future U.S. Intelligence gathering activities, influence of Khrnshchev
actions on---------------- --------------------------------------- 46
Gore, Senator Albert :
Examination of witnesses:
Bohlen. Hon. Charles E-------------------------------------- 93, 94
Dillon, lion. Douglas ------------------------- 30, 48-50, 80, 81. 90, 91
Dryden, Dr. Hugh I------------------------------------ 117-120, 121
Gates, lion. Thomas S., Jr---------------------- 128-131, 14-53,159,162
Herter, lion. Christian A-------------------- 79. 80, 90, 91, 93, 97-102
Green. Senator Theodore Francis :
Examination of witnesses:
Dillon, lion. Dougiax-------------------------------------- 28--30, 31
Herter, lion. Christian A------------ _ 28
----------------------
ealth of C-2' pilot---------------------------- ------------------ 37, 40, 182
Hlckenlcxrls?r, Senator Bourke II :
Examination of witnesses:
Dryden, Dr. Hugh L-------------------------------------- 120, 121
Gates, Hon. Thomas S., Jr-------------------------- 134-137, 152, 153
Herter, Hon. Christian A______________ --_ ------ 36-38
--------------
gh-level trips------------------------------------------------------
)
HumI hrey, Senator Hutrert li.
Examination of witnesses:
Dillon, lion. Douglas------------------------------------- 30, 34, 35
Gates, Hon. Thomas S., Jr---------------------------------- 155, 156
Herter, Hon. Christian A_______________ __ 33, 35, 36, 68-72
Information gathering opitortunities in United States and U.S.S.R-_-_-_ 83
Internal conditions in Russia------------------------------------------ 61,78
Jurisdiction over airspace and high seas------------------------------ SO
Khrushchev :
Attitude on Berlin and Germany________________________________ 159,190
Changing views on summit---------__ 153
---------------------------- Decision to wreck summit, timing of------------------------------- 147
Extent of Ixrwer of------------------------------
100
Khrttslu?hev'x stateuterats incident to sutumit, text 44
Informal new's conference, May 11--------------------------------
Remarks on U.S. plane, May .S------------------------------------ 17;7
Remarks on U.S. plane, Mar 7----------------------------------- Speec?h warning nations with U.S. bases, May 9-------------------- 188
Statement at Paris summit, May 16________________ ------------------------------- 220
Text of May 10 note-------------------------------------------- 195
Transcript of Paris news conference. May 18_______________________ 235
Khrushchev statements since visit tp United State+:
Berlin. German'------------------------------------------- 17-19, 41. 87
United States and Western Ixtlivy------------------------------- 13-21
summit---------------------------------------------------------- 21,22
Comments on West during Asian tour----------------------------- 22, 23
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EVENTS INCIDENT TO THE
Lausche, Senator Frank J.: Pave
Examination of witnesses : - _- 121
------------
Dryden, Dr. Hugh L-------------------------- 141-144,159-161
---
Gates, Hon. Thomas S., Jr------------------- -- 51-54, 81-84, 94-96
Herter, Hon. Christian A----------------------- ____ 255-26
Questions raised and answers by State Department
Long, Senator Russell B.: 137,138
Examination of witnesses : ------------
Gates, Hon. Thomas S., Jr--------------------- ___ 43-46
------------------------
Herter, Hon. Christian A_______---
Mansfield, Senator Mike:
Examination of witnesses: ______________ 67, 68 63
Bohlen, Hon. Charles E---------------------------------------
Dillon, Hon. Douglas------------------------- - - _ 114,115
Dryden, 1)r. Hugh L---------------------------
------------- _
Gates _____ 132-134
Hon. Thomas S., Jr------------- ---------------------
62, 63-67, 89, 90
-------- -
Herter, Hon. Christian A----------------
Morse, Senator Wayne :
75
Examination of witnesses: _ -----74,75
Dillon, Hon. Douglas------------------------
Gates, Ilon. Thomas S., Jr------------------ 138, 141, 149-352,73177
Herter, lion. Christian A-----------------
National Aeronautics and Space Administration : 73
Function of------------------------------------------------------ 114
Grounding of il-2's--------------- ------------------------------- 114
Incident in Japan------------------------------------------------
Line of command to President -------------------- -------------- 112,115
May 5 statement, background and clearance--___ 103, 107, 113, 116, 117,180
Research with U-2:
Information produced----------------------
109
-----------
Study of air -----------
-- U ttnce------------- ------------------------ ill
-------------------------- ____
-2 operation ------------------------------
Rolein U-2 iucident---------------------------- _____-_ 128,130
National Security Council, meeting of, May 5________________ - 4
Negotiation, engaging the Soviet Union in-------------------------76
Nuclear armament race---------------------------------------- 76
Passport legislation--------------------------------------------------
Personal diplomacy versus summit conferences ------------------------- 101
President's assumption of responsibility for espionage-------- 26, 27, 6 ,19a 129
President's commitment not to continue flights----------------- - - 157
President's dignity and character at Paris------------------------
President's statements incident to summit : 249
Address, May 25------------------------------------------------ 198
Informal news conference, May 11-------------------------------
Remarks on arrival at Andrews Air Force Base--------------------- 247
Statement following summit, May 16------------------------------- 225
Public releases on U-2 weather flights------------------------------
Questions raised by Senator Lausche and answers prepared by Depart-
260
ment of Statt ---------------------- ----------------------
Responsibility for U-2 flights, who has------------------------------- 35, 127
---------
Soviet misdeeds---------------------------------------- ----53
--- 142
---------------- ----------- 42
Soviet motivation for attending summit--------------------------------
Soviet policy, signs of radical alteration------------------------------
Soviet threat against oversea bases, implications of-- 138, 176, 187, 188, 190, 202
Soviet Union: ______________ 11
Action, analysis of-----------------------------
12, 27, 60, 224
Decision to cancel Eisenhower invitation---------------- 12, 31, 87
Decision to wreck conference--------------------------- _ 13
Factors resulting in conference disruption--------------------
Significance of Gromyko and Malinvosky accompanying Khru- 12
shchev------------------------------------------------ 134
Air maneuvers over East Germany ------------- ------------------- 134
--
Aircraft activities----------------------- ---------------- 146
Bases, question of relocation---------------------------------
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THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE
Soviet Union-_Continueei
Currency, devaluation ofPagc
Espionage---------- - - - -- ---- 77
Agents apprehended in I'.S_ ------- 25a,
Goals 261-267
--------------------------------------
Hierarchy - -- ---------- -- - 1
Knowl ge of -------------------- --------------92
Knoll ledge of I'-2
73, 140
overnights -------------- 37, - 38, --- 60, -- 81, -- 126, 13, 141, 149
Leadership, Possibility of changes in_----____- 32, -
Manlonver, 1960-70--____-- - - --------- 67
Military preparedneyti - - - --- --- ------3-297
-----------------------------
reaty violations-------------- ------- 105,282
Prewar----------- -
---------------------__ 268-282
Wartime and pcratvar______--__-- ---
269
Spy systems, U.S. and ['.S.S.R -----------4'
State Dents wade b knc>vleclge of U-2 flights ---------------------------
2
______________________ 68,90
Statements wade by president and Secretary of State. Comparison of___ 98
Status quo in Berlin, question of tualtltaining___--______ _
Statutory authority for Rights, excerpt from Naltionfll security act of 1947_
cYntntries' reactlonK to 64-66
Smuwit collapse, other Swuutit dlplotuacy, Ilnpac?t on --__--
........................................
--------------- 72
Sutumit meeting: 633
Preparation for------____
Prosi>ecG+ dimpled ----- - ---- -- -- --- - 6,33 6
Suspension of flights, no presumntit disc'usxion regarding 6
____-- 123
Test of military c?cnnmunielttlonx1.2.1 126. 132, 133, 136, 136, 138,
Threat to Berlin --------- -_
______
United States as peaceful nation. record of :"i
and Soviet intelligence gathering opportunities 1
1
U.S, intelligemIev gathering: ----------- 142
Effectiveness of
Imlx,rtwu?e of --- - - ----- 43
I'.S. ls,licy, impiic'atiotts for futarP__--------- - -- , 33 51
I'-2 flights, hnportnnee of 14
I'-2 Incident : --------- 143
--------------
C'hr'onology of
----------
;ffect oil suntntit - - 103- 168
Lesson of - ---- --- - -- ---- - 154
President's ac?connt of 106
Vice President's knowiecige of flights 7
- - --- - --
------- -
Views of France and Great Britain ova 69,
2
White, Lincoln. statement of 475
Basis fur--------------- --- - --------- 49, 50, 178
--------------------------
uestion of coordination regarding-------------- -------------- 4)?:,0
---------------
'Wiley, Seuatur Alexitnder: --- 50
Examitmtiou of tivituessvs:
Bohlen, lion. Charles I?:__------_ _
i)ryti'n, I>r. hIugh I,____------ 61.62
Gates. Fiotr. Thoumx S.. Jr__---_-. _ - Ili-). 116
Fierier. lion. C'thristiaa A ------- 31 _.i , . 132, 148. 14f) 161
World court, rc?c?orct of 4. ; 15 . o, 61, 87
106
World opinion on I'-2 overflights____________________ 76
151
O
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FRANCIS GARY POWERS
HEARING
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
EIGHTY-SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
FRANCIS GARY POWERS
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICH
80923 WASFIPNGTO4N : 1962
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
RICHARD
HARRY FLOOD BYRD, Virginia
JOHN STENNIS, Mississippi
STUART SYMINGTON. Missouri
HENRY Si. JACKSON, Washington
SAM J. ERVIN, Ja., North Carolina
STROM THURMOND, South Carolina
CLAIR ENOLE, California
E. L. BARTLETT, Alaska
HOWARD W. CANNON, Nevada
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
B. RUSSELL, Georgia, Chairman
LEVERETT SALTONSTALL, Massachuselts
MARGARET CHASE SMITH, Nialne
FRANCIS CASE, South Dakota
I'RESCOTT BUSH, Connecticut
J. GLENN DEAI t,, Maryland
BARRY GOLDWATER, Arizona
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FRANCIS GARY POWERS
U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 2 p.m., in room 318, Old
Senate Office Building.
Present: Senators Russell (chairman), presiding; Byrd of Virginia,
Stennis, Symington, Jackson, Ervin, Thurmond, Byrd of West Vir-
ginia, Saltonstall, Smith of Maine, Case of South. Dakota, Bush, Beall,
and Goldwater.
Also present: William H. Darden, T. Edward Braswell, Jr., Gordon
A. Nease, professional staff; Harry L. Wingate, Jr., chief clerk; and
Herbert S. Atkinson, assistant chief clerk.
Chairman RUSSELL. I have been requested by Senator Cannon, a
member of this committee, who is always most diligent in attending
the sessions, to announce that, due to his attendance at the War
College at Maxwell Field on national security matters, he will be
unable to be here this afternoon.
That will be all for these cameras.
I will ask the officers to see that that rule is enforced and that no
further pictures are taken.
If you need any additional policemen for that purpose, we will
summon them.
The Armed Services Committee, through the Central Intelligence
Agency, has extended to Mr.-Francis Gary Powers an invitation to
appear here in open session this afternoon.
Before we hear from Mr. Powers, the Chair would like to make a
very short statement concerning the circumstances of this hearing.
The Chair believes it can be fairly stated that this committee and
its subcommittees have attempted to deal with subjects involving the
Central Intelligence Agency and, indeed, all matters affecting the
national security, in an unspectacular manner.
Accordingly, to some, it may appear that this hearing in the caucus
room, under these circumstances, is somewhat uncharacteristic of the
proceedings of this committee.
In this instance, however, the correction of some erroneous im-
pressions and an opportunity for Mr. Powers to reveal as much of his
experience as is consistent with security requirements make it appar-
ent that a hearing of this type at this time is not only in the national
interest, but is in the interest of fair play for Mr. Powers.
And if this committee needs any defense, the Chair will state that
in scheduling this hearing, this committee has not been motivated
by any spirit of self-aggrandizement.
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Mr. Powers, after having been subjected to a public trial in Moscow,
you should feel no trepidation whatever in appearing before a group
of your fellow citizens and elected representatives.
I hope that you feel just as much at case as you possibly can.
I understand from Senator Byrd that you are a Virginia boy.
What part of Virginia are you from?
STATEMENT OF FRANCIS GARY POWERS, ACCOMPANIED BY
LAWRENCE HOUSTON, GENERAL COUNSEL, CENTRAL INTELLI-
GENCE AGENCY
Mr. POWERS. I spent most of my life in the southwest part of
Virginia, around Pound and Grundy, Vu.
Chairman RUSSELL. Were you educated in Vir iota.?
Mr. POWERS. Through grammar school and high school in Virginia
and college in Tennessee.
Chairman RUSSELL. What did you do after you left college?
Mr. PowERS. I worked for one summer as a lifeguard at the
swimming pool near my home in Virginia, joined the Air Force in
October of that year,
Chairman RUSSELL, When were you first employed by the CIA?
Mr. PowEns. In May of 1956.
Chairman RUSSELL. You were an experienced pilot at the time you
were employed by the CIA; were you not?
Mr. POWERS. 'es, sir. I don't remember the exact number of
hours, but. I have had well over a thousand hours of flying time.
Chairman RUSSELL. How much experience did you have with the
U-2?
Mr. POWERS. A little better than 500 hours flyin time.
Chairman RUSSELL. Now, Mr. Powers, we would like to have you
go ahead and tell us in your own words of your mission on the 1st of
May 1960.
It you could pull up the microphone a little closer I think some of
the members of the committee perhaps will hear you a little better.
Mr. PowERS. I was awakened on te morning of May 1, sometime
between 2 and 3 o'clock in the morning. I knew before that I might
have to fly the next day but I wasn't certain at the time.
I had breakfast. The doctor looked me over. I was feeling fine.
The navigator gave me a briefing either before or during the time that
I was rebreat.hing for this flight. Ile showed me the maps, the
route that I would take, the turning points, the different headings,
and where the equipment was to be turned off and on. Later I
talked to the weather forecaster who gave me the probable weather
conditions along the route, the weather at destination, how high to
expect condensation trails.
Then, after that, I talked to the detachment commander who told
me what I was to do in case of an emergency, in case of engine trouble,
or a forced landing over enemy territory. This was both before I put
on my pressure suit and while I was prebreathing the o_x gen.
Somewhere, I suppose about 5:30 in the morning, I finished dressing
and was taken to the aircraft. I climbed into the aircraft and waited-
I had to wait for signal before starting the engine and before taking
off. The signal came a little late. I don't remember exactly how
late, but it was later than scheduled.
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FRANCIS GARY POWERS
I took off, climbed on course. I remember that the condensation
trails were a little higher than I had been told they would be, but not
much. I climbed above this layer and reached my altitude and con-
tinued on course. The weather was cloudy underneath. I couldn't
see the ground for over an hour, and I drifted right off course. There
course I got over the
was but never did get exactly back o ecour eobefored
clouds again.
It was in this area that I saw two condensation
to be paralleling my
aircraft, so I knew at this time-they appeared
course. The first one headed in exactly the opposite direction as
myself, and a few minutes later, I assume it was the same aircraft
passed me going on the same heading that I was going on. He made
no maneuvers that I could tell and I never did see the aircraft itself,
just the condensation trail.
Chairman RUSSELL. Did you estimate his altitude?at the time.
Mr. POWERS. He was well below me. I felt fairly good I was well above the condensation trail layer and I don't think he
ever saw me if he was looking forme. I got back over the clouds there,
made a correction for the wind, but I still drifted to the right of course.
I would say approximately 200 miles south of Sverdlovsk the clouds
ended, and I corrected back to course and was on course the rest of
the :flight. Just about the time that the clouds ended, I began having
a little autopilot trouble. It wasn't very bad at the time so I just
disengaged the autopilot, a few minutes later reengaged it and it
worked for about 10 minutes and I had the same trouble again.
I went through this procedure two or three times and finally de-
cided not to use it any more, and I'd say the last 15, 20, or 30 minutes
was flown by hand without the autopilot.
Weather in this area was perfectly clear, visability was excellent.
I saw no other condensation trails from other aircraft. 30 on
very close to course all the way. I got to, I would say,
40 miles of Sverdlovsk probably as well as I can remember southeast
of the city, made a turn to the left of approximately 00", rolled out
on course, lined up on my next flight line. I was to go over the
southern edge of the city-the southwestern edge of the city.
I can remember seeing an airfield there that was not on my map.
After making this turn, I had to record the time that I reached this
particular point, the engine instrument readings, the exhaust gas
temperature, the altitude, several things, I don't remember exactly
what they all were, and I was doing this at the time that I heard and
felt this explosion.
It was approximately a minute after I had rolled out of this turn.
I can't be sure of the times there. It is hard to recall just exactly
what sensation I had at this time. I can remember feeling, hearing,
and just sensing an explosion, but there was no-just a slight accelera-
tion was all that I felt in the aircraft immedi-
ately looked up from the instruments and everywherelI looked was
orange.
I don't know whether the whole sky was orange, or just the reflection
of an orange light in the canopy, but I had never seen anything like
this before, and I am sure there was an explosion. I feel that the
explodion was external to the aircraft and behind me, but I really
don't know. I have never been in an aircraft in which the engine
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CIS GARY PoWERS
exploded or which has had an explosion on board, so I don't know
exactly what that would feel like, but I am sure You could feel that
through the controls or through the seat way, and so I ant
almost positive it ~t- :ts external to some way
the aircraft.
For a short Lillie there--I don't know
how long-th11C had no mean-
111g at this particular time -I thought evervtbing was all right. The
right wing started to drop, whirls is normal in an aircraft, it wanders
around it little, and I turned the wheel, brought the right wing back to
level position, and either after it reached the level position or just
before it reached that, the nose started dropping
I could probably demonstrate this better with the model here. It
was going along like this. The right wing dropped slightly, not very
much. I used the controls. The wing carne back upp level and just,
before or after it got level, the nose started going do-tin, and very
slowly. So I applied back pressure to the control column and felt no
resistance to the movement of the control column. and this kept going
faster and faster. So I immediately assumed at the time that the
tail section of fit(, aircraft lied come off, because it-it very violent
maneuver happened in here. I think I reached a position about like
this and I feel sure flint. bout wings came ofl'.
This was where the very violent maneuver took place.
Chairman RussFLI.. You were not where you could see the wings
to determine whether? they had eerie off.
Mr. Pownns. I didn't have much tinic to look, and I was being
thrown around in the cockpit very much at this time. It had come
down in this position. I had pulled the control column all the way
back into my lap, and it did no good. As it, came down, it kept going
faster and it. got like this and I feel that the wings came off (lien, but
I really don't know. And a very violent maneuver during this time,
and it ended up in n- spin about- this position. I know the nose was
high, and I know it was turning very fast around, it seemed like
around something heavy like in the fuselage. I don't knocc hots much
of tire. aircraft was left- at the time. But all I could see by looking
out of the cockpit wits sky. The g. forces were very strong' I have
no way of estimating hots" much.
I know that. when I tried to get in the ejection position, it took
both hands on my legs to pull nty- feet back into the stirrups of the
ejection seat.
It was spinning very violently. I was thrown forward and up,
and I was hanging onto the seat belt, not sitting in the seat.
My first reaction was to reach for the destruct switches, and I
reached up. I don't know whether I touched them or not, but I
thought that I had bet ter see if I can get out of here before using this.
I knew that there was a 70-second time delay between the time of
the actuation of the switches and the time that the explosion would
occur.
So, after deciding fliint-I had better check and see if I could get
out before actuating the switches, I tried to get- into position in the
ejection seat- so that I could use it. In this particular aircraft there
isn't much clearance between the pilot's knees and the top of the
windshield, the rail, steel rail across the top of Elie windshield, and I
was being thrown forward, and if I had used the ejection seat at that
time, I would have probably lost both legs just above Lite knees.
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I don't know how long I tried getting back in position, but at the
time I could think of no other way to get out, just the ejection seat.
My mind was fixed on that one idea.
I kept glancing at the altimeter as the aircraft was falling and it
was going around very fast. I remembered somewhere during this
time above the altitude of 34,000 feet that a friend of mine who had
had an accident in an aircraft was having trouble getting out of the
aircraft, and I remembered him. telling me of his experience.
He said that he told himself that he just had to stop and think, and
this entered my mind at the time, so I just stopped struggling and tried
to think, and this was the first time that I realized that maybe I
could just open the canopy, loosen the seat belt, and climb out.
And, along in here, I saw 34,000 feet on the altimeter, and it was
still moving very fast.
I immediately reached up, opened the canopy. One side came loose
first-I think it was the right side. The other handle loosened the
left side and it floated off-I believe it was to the left. I really don't
know, but it just disappeared.
I had pulled my emergency belt out, however-I think that was one
of the first things I did after this real violent maneuver-so that when
I separated from the aircraft, I would have an oxygen supply while
descending, but I had forgotten to unfasten my oxygen hoses--the
can on my left.
I opened the seat belt, and I was immediately thrown forward and
halfway out of the aircraft.
I can probably demonstrate this better than I can tell. The top of
the canopy was, say, the top of this table, and I was hanging out over
the front of the aircraft about like this [indicating], and I think the
only thing that was keeping me in the aircraft was the oxygen hose.
If that had not have been fastened, I would probably have gone out
right away, I don't know.
Well, then, I tried to got back into the aircraft so that I could
actuate these destructor switches. I couldn't-the g. forces were too
great and I could not pull myself back over the top of the windshield.
I tried to reach around underneath the windshield. I knew where
the switches were. And I couldn't get my hand back underneath.
Also, somewhere about this time my faceplate of my flying suit
frosted up completely. That is when it got into the cold air, and all I
could see was just the eyes on the faceplate about an inch or so in
front of my face. I knew that I was well below 34,000 feet.
I had no idea of what my altitude was. I couldn't get back in the
airplane. I didn't know whether I could get those oxygen. hoses
loose or not. I couldn't actuate the destruct switches.
So then I decided just to try to get out. I gave several lunges and
something snapped and I was floating free. It was almost immediately
that the parachute opened, and this surprised me because I hadn't
pulled the ripcord.
The parachute was equipped with an automatic opening device,
but it has to be actuated by pulling another cord, and apparently that
cord got hung on something in the airplane and pulled, because it was
well less than a minute, I am sure, after leaving the aircraft that the
chute opened.
A short while after that-I don't remember how long-I got to
thinking that this chute was set to open at 15,000 feet or lower; that
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the maxinium altitude it, would open would be 15,000 feet; so I knew
that I could take my faceplate off, and not be in danger from the thin
air.
So I removed the faceplate, just left it hanging on the hoses that
were connected to the suit, and started looking around, and I was still
very Icigh----I estimate above 10,000 feet, but I have no idea of the
exact altitude.
There were a lot, of thoughts running through my mind at this time.
It is impossible to recall them all, but I remembered I had a map in
my pocket. I took this reap out, looked at it, tore it into small pieces,
and scattered it in the air.
I also thought of the coin with the poison pin in it. This had been
given to me just prior to the flight, and it was my option whether to
take this or not, and I chose to take it. I got to thinking that when I
got on the ground if I were captured they would surely find this coin
but maybe with just the pin Iving loose in the pocket it would be
overlooked, so I opened up the coin, got the pin out, and just dropped
it in my= pocket.
I had several other things in my pockets, but they were more or less
necessary to survival if I could evade capture, so I decided not to get
rid of those things. I don't remember exactly what they were. It
was ust. some of the. things that I couldn't get into my survival pack
itself . I couldn't. tell where I was going to land. There were a lot of
wooded areas there, and there was one fairly large one that I would
drift toward and then drift back away front. 1 was trying to guide
the parachute over to this wooded area, but 1 had no success in that.
The winds were variable as I was coming down in the parachute.
and first I would go toward the Woods, later away from therm.
When I got down fairly close to the ground, there was a car I could
see on a dirt road. I didn't know what he was doing, but lie wasn't
going too fast and he seemed to be just kee. Wing up with me, and the
closer I got the closer lie would get to me. 11e came to a little village
there, turned left out to the outskirts, of the village and stopped, and
I guess I was maybe 200 feet in the air at this time, and I think it
was two men got out of the car.
I was descending what. appeared to be very rapidly at the time, and
I landed in an open field about 25 feet from a tractor with one driver
on the tractor and one man standing beside the tractor.
When I hit the ground I fell down. When I looked up, one of the
risen, I don't know which it was, was out grabbing a-hold of the para-
chute to Ley to collapse it. I remember releasing a strap on one side
so that the' air would spill out of the chute. A couple of these men
helped me to my feet. I don't remember whether they tried to say
anything to me at the time or not. I think they did, and I just shook
my- head. They helped me remove my parachute harness and the
helmet of the flying suit. They took away the pistol and a knife
that I had on nmy parachute.. After I got my helmet off and could
look around, there was a large crowd of people there, a lot of children,
so apparently there was a school in this area. I don't know how many
grownups but 1 would say there were at least 50 people. This is
just a guess.
These men tried to talk to me and I would just shake my head and
indicate that I couldn't understand theta. One of them pointed at
me and held up two fingers, and I got the impression that he was
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asking if there were two of us, and I told him "No, just shook my
head "No," and pointed to myself and held up one finger telling him
that I was alone. And then he pointed up in the air and I looked up
and saw what I think was a parachute, but I knew that I had no
other parachute on board the aircraft.
I knew that it was no one that I knew, so I wasn't very interested
at the time. They didn't pay too much attention to this. They just.
talked among themselves, one on each side of me caught my arm and
led me to this car that f had seen earlier. They put me in the car
in the front seat next to the driver and with a man on my right and
there were three, I believe, in the back seat. They had loaded up
the parachute, and I think my survival pack, in the trunk of the car.
They started driving through the village and -I indicated to them
that I would like to have something to drink, so he stopped in front
of a house there in this small village. One of the men went inside,
brought out a glass of water which I drank and they gave the glass
to some of the people standing around and we left this village. It
was on a very bad dirt road, a lot of ruts, a very rough ride. The
car was small, and T estimate that it took about 30 minutes to got
to this next village which was a larger place.
There was a paved street running through this second village.
They stopped on the side of the street that we approached the
village from, got me out of the car, and there was what I took to be
a policeman there.
They talked to him and he went through my pockets, not very
thoroughly, led me across the street into some sort of an office, and
I estimate that I stayed there about 2 hours. There were both civilian
and military there. I don't know whether the military was there
when I arrived or not but I know they were there during the time and
before I left. One of the military men tried to speak to me in German,
and I told him I didn't understand him. There was no one there
that could speak English, so they didn't ask mne any questions at the
time.
People kept bringing in small pieces of wreckage from the aircraft.
I saw several pieces of metal, some with English written on it, there
was a small roll of film. They had my parachute there, the survival
pack. Oh, they searched me here at this building also. They stripped
me down to my underwear, went through my pockets, felt along the
seams, but they didn't find. the needle at this time.
They called in a doctor. She was a young woman, I would say
about 30 years old. I had some scratches on my right leg which she
painted and bandaged. They tried to talk to me several times, but
I couldn't understand them and they couldn't understand me, and
I estimate it was around 2 hours, maybe a little more, but I have no
way of knowing how long I was there. They loaded inc up.in a mili-
tary vehicle, a, little larger than our jeep. There was an officer on my
left, myself in the middle, and an enlisted man on my right in the
back seat. The enlisted man had a carbine of some, kind.
In the front seat there was a military driver and a civilian. They
took inc into a fairly large city which I assumed.was Sverdlovsk.
It was in the downtown area, into a fairly large office building, I
would say about three stories high, and they took me to the. second
floor:
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ANCIS GARY POWERS
There they performed a thorough search and found the needle at
this place. I tried to invent. a story there that I didn't know where
I was, I was off course, but they brought. out the packages that I lied
in my survival pack or on my person with maps of the Soviet Union,
Russian rubles, and several other items that indicated the nature of
the mission. It was then that I decided to follow the instructions
that I had received earlier and tell them that 1 was a member of the
CIA and the nature of the mission.
It was quite obvious that they knew it anyway. I think I stayed
there approximately 30 minutes. They made a lot of telephone calls.
There was a man there who spoke English also and asked me several
questions, and that is how I found out lay story wouldn't hold up.
They seemed to be in a. hurry. They made several telephone calls,
talked a lot among themselves, and they gave me back my underwear
and the outer flying suit but kept the pressure suit. They also gave
me something similar to our poncho with two slits on each side made
out of canvas. The slits were for the anus to go through. They
put this on me.
One man got out a pair of handcuffs. They talked among them-
selves and he put them bark in his pocket and they never did put
them on me. We went back outside.
They loaded me in a fairly large car, limousine type, drove to an
airfield, and when we got there, we stopped at. the gate on one side of
the terminal building, I suppose it was, and we waited there maybe 5
nmintltes, and there was a jet passenger aircraft in front of this build-
in . Someone opened the gate. 11 c drove to the front entrance of
this aircraft. They made me run up the steps and led me into the
front compartment. which contained 10 seats, There were four men
with nie. I remember at least one was in uniform and one was a
civilian, but I don't remember what the other two were wearing.
They asked inc no questions on this flight.
I am getting ahead of myself. It seemed to me that the aircraft
was waiting there for us because as soon as we got in they moved the
loading ramp away and started up initnediately, and through the
curtains to the back, when the stewardess walked through, I could
see that there were other passengers in the back, so I suppose it was a
regular the flight. they asked no questions, Some of the--a
couple of the men played chess. They ate, offered me food but I
couldn't cat, and it was during this time that 1 made up my mind
exactly what course I would follow during the forthcoming weeks.
I knew that if these people released the news that I was there ---1
didn't know that they would at the time, but I knew that if they did -
that there would be~a lot of stuff in the papers in the States, and I
also knew that they probably subscribed to every paper we have, and
I wanted to make my story as close to what I thought would be re-
leased in the papers as possible,
I think the flight. took about 3 hours.
We arrived at the airport in Moscow. They had me. sit there for
about 5 minutes, brought me out, ran me down the steps to a waiting
car, and we immediately left. The car had curtains inside that they
kept pulled.
You could see outside through the curtains, but I don't suppose
anyone could see inside.
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FRANCIS GARY POWERS
They took me downtown to the building that I stayed in until
September 9.
There was another search performed immediately upon my arrival
at this building. They took all my clothing and gave me other cloth-
ing there. There was an interrogation, I would say, within 30 min-
utes after my arrival there, and there were quite a few high-ranking
people, many of them in uniforms, many of them in civilian clothes.
I don't remember exactly the questions they asked during this
time, but I think it was mostly concerned with establishing that I was
a member of the CIA, or worked for the CIA, and the purpose of the
flight.
I don't know how long this lasted. I do know that Rudenko, who
was the prosecutor during the trial, was more or less in charge of this
interrogation session.
He offered me it Chesterfield cigarette. They asked me, I think
at this time, what I knew about Moscow; what I knew about Russia;
and I told them I knew very little about it.
They asked me if I would like to see Moscow, and I said :"Yes."
And they said, "Well, that might be arranged." Then I don't know
whether I said anything or not, but, after this session was over, they
took me to the prison section of this building. There I received a
physical examination, not a very thorough one.
There was a lot of time spent just locked up in a room with nothing
but a bench built against the wall and just waiting. The doctor came
into this room and examined me there. I waited again..
They took me to it doctor's office, and it was either a different
doctor or it nurse, I don't know which, gave me a shot. This was
after dark; I don't know. what time it was.
They immediately took me to a cell and put me in it, brought in
some food which I couldn't eat, and I lay down and tried to sleep.
The next morning there was an interrogation, and, for some reason
or the other, this was left out of the books that they had compiled of
the investigation.
I don't know why this one was left out, but it was.
Chairman RUSSELL. How do you know it was left out?
Mr. PowERS. They told me that according to the Russian law, I
could review the evidence in the case before the trial.
Going through this. evidence a. week or so prior to the trial, I saw
that one was missing, and I told this to my Soviet-appointed defense
counsel, and he just shrugged his shoulders. That morning they
said that in the afternoon we would take a tour of Moscow, and I
was all for this because I know as long as I was riding around in a
car they would not be asking questions, and I would have been
willing to take a trip every day.
The real. interrogation started on the morning of the 3d, and it
varied, the sessions varied in length, but there were times as much
as 10 to 12 hours in a single day, several times at,night, but, as the
time went on, they got shorter and a longer period between the
interrogations.
It was somewhere in the latter part of May that I had a very bad
cold, could hardly talk, that they gave me the first day off that I
did not have an interrogation. .
I don't remember the exact date, but it was after the 20th of May.
Through June the sessions became shorter and sometimes they
would skip the whole weekend, Saturday and Sunday.
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10 FRANCIS GARY POWERS
I suppose you probably have a lot of questions on this that I have
gone over. Any time You want.
Chairman RUSSELL. I do have a number.
I was interested that you said a number of times that you had no
way of knowing the time. I think the first time you said your
parachute was coming down. Did you not have a' timepiece of
some kind with you?
Mr. POWErts. No.
I had the clocks in the airplane itself. I had no wristwatch. I
think there was one in my pocket, but 1 had forgotten about it, and
it probably was not wound, anyway.
From that, time I do not remember seeing a clock or anything that
I could tell the tune by.
Chairman RUSSELL. It is rather unusual for any American not to
have a wristwatch or some kind of timepiece with hint after passing
14 or 15 years of age.
I was somewhat surprised that You didn't have a wristwatch or
some watch with which you could tell the time.
Mr. POWERS. Well, it is very hard to wear a wristwatch over this
pressure suit. It can he done, but I usually went. by the watches we
had in the aircraft, itself.
Chairman RrSSELL. About what tines of day was it when this
unexplained explosion struck your pplane?
Mr. PowEns. I don't remember the exact time, but I do remember it
was close to the hour, I think just before the bow-, but which hour I
don't know. It was in the morning. I was using Greenwich time.
I have no idea what the local time was. It could be very easy to find
out by going back over the flight plan and following the route because
I was very close to schedule,
Chairman RussFLL. Unfortunately the Russians have all that;
haven't, they?
Mr. POWERS. They have all that I had with nie.
Chairman RUSSELL. If you were compelled to make an estimate of
the time that elapsed after you lost control of your plane until the
time that you were on the ground, what would you estimate that
time to be?
Mr. POWERS. I have thought about this a lot and I really don't
know. I don't know bow fast the aircraft was falling. I know it was
going pretty fast, but time didn't seem to mean anything. A second
could Have been a minute or a minute could have been a second. IL
seems like -
Chairman RUSSELL. I am including the time that you were in your
parachute coming down. Would you estimate 1 minute, 2 minutes,
3 minutes, 4 minutes?
Mr. POWERS. It was more than that. The parachute itself, I
would say, was better than 10 minutes, but I really don't know. I am
just guessing this.
Chairman RUSSELL. Better than 10 minutes in the parachute'?
Mr. POWERS. Yes.
Chairman RUSSELL. Do you think it, would have been longer or
shorter than that after you lost control before the parachute opened?
Mr. I owERs. I would say much shorter.
Chairman RUSSELL. Much shorter,. Now, these men that were
it, that automobile that were pursuing you or following you on this
dirt road, were they civilians or in military uniform?
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FRANCIS. GARY POWERS
Mr. PowERS. They all had civilian clothing.
Chairman RUSSELL. When was the first time you saw anyone in
uniform?
Mr. POWERS. At the second village where these men took me.
Chairman RUSSELL. Apparently they thought you were a Russian
when they first came up to you?
Mr. POWERS. Probably so. I really don't know. It didn't take
them long to take my pistol away, and the knife.
Chairman RUSSELL. They had spoken to you prior to that .time;
hadn't they?
Mr. POWERS. Yes, but I just shook my head, didn't say a word,
so I don't know what they thought.
Chairman RUSSELL. Did you ever have a jetplane flame out on
you, Mr. Powers, while you were piloting?
Mr. POWERS. Yes, I have.
Chairman RUSSELL. Does it make any unusual noise or give any
unusual impetus to the plane?
Mr. PowERS. Different aircraft react differently. In this particu-
lar airplane I had had -flameouts before. Sometimes there is a
chugging of the engine, but you know what that is. There was no
kind of an explosion accompayning that, and nothing that would give
an orange light.
Chairman RUSSELL. The orange light was something that was
really unusual?
Mr. POWERS. Yes, and it was apparently persistent. It wasn't
a flash, but all the time that I was looking out it was there, but I don't
remember ever seeing it again.
Chairman RUSSELL. Has there ever been any other occasion when
you were in an airplane and. were the target of a ground-to-air missile
or explosive or shell of any kind?
Mr. POWERS. Not that I know of.
Chairman RUSSELL. You have never seen any ground-to-air
missile explode?
Mr. POWERS. No, I haven't.
Chairman RUSSELL. Is that right?
Mr. POWERS. I have seen photographs or moving pictures of
some of our missiles shooting an aircraft down, but the ones I have
seen, the missile hits the aircraft.
Well, I am sure that nothing hit this aircraft. If something did
hit it, I am sure I would have felt it.
Chairman RUSSELL. You did say that the plane had an impetus
forward when it was hit?
Mr. POWERS. Yes, sir.
Chairman RUSSELL. When this explosion occurred evidently it oc-
curred behind the plane?
Mr. POWERS. That was my thinking There was definitely a
slight acceleration-not much, but a push.
Chairman RUSSELL. Could you see the plane to which, you re-
ferred or did you only see the markings of the jet plane in the atmos-
phere?
Mr. POWERS. This was at least an hour earlier, and I only saw the
condensation trails themselves. I tried to see the aircraft and.
couldn't. They were quite a way below and I estimated 20 miles to
the right, but it is hard to estimate distances in the air.
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12 FRANCIS GARY POWERS
Chairman RUSSELL. That is not much range for a jet airplane
though, is it., 20 miles? The main difference was the
Mr. PowEits. The altitude.
Chairman RUSSELL. The altitude, not the distance fronw it?
Mr. POWERS. Yas.
Chairman RUSSELL. Did you see any other airplanes on that -nis-
sion?
Mr. POWERS. I saw no other condensation trails or airplanes.
Chairman RUSSELL. Have ou ever had reason to believe that air-
planes on any other mission' were undertaking to reach you or to
find you"
Mr. POWERS. Pardon?
Chairman RUSSELL. Have you ever had any occasion to believe
on this or any Mission that an airplane was attempting to attack the
plan(, which you were piloting'
Mr. Powwrats. No. Ott this mission I can't be sure that these two
planes that I did see or the condensation trails that I did see, I can't
be sure that they were looking for ttte, but it Seemed odd that they
would first. parallel my course exactly in the opposite direction and
then a few minutes later parallel alt- course in the same direction I
was heading. I assume that they were looking for inc but they made
no turns to trv to intercept or anything.
Chairman I .ussm.L. You said several times that you drifted to the
right of Course?
Mr. PoweEas. Yes.
Chairman RUSSELL. To the right of course. Not being it pilot,
why is that- wvlnit, is that of course, is that the prevailing wind pushing
to the right?
Mr. 1POWEas. We usually have is forecast wind for different alti-
tudes, and the flight plan is drawn up to take into consideration the
strength of the wind, and apparently the wind information we had
was it little wrong and the wind was stronger than the navigator
thought. it, would be, and he had computed the course fora slower
wind.
Chairman RUSSELL. You are not it navigator yourself, Mr. Powers?
Mr. POWERS. Yes, it pilot- has to be a navigator, but I sin not it
rated navigator. I never was a rated navigator in the Air Force.
Chairman RUSSELL. Had you ever itiade it parachute descent be-
fore?
Mr. Puwl;ltS. No, sir.
Chairman RUSSELL. YOU Sac they didn't find this needle until
about the third time they examined you, I believe. Where was the
needle hidden'
Mr. PowwERS. I had just dropped it loose in the pocket.
Chairman RUSSELL. Loose in your pocket?
Mr. PowvElcs. Yes.
('ha-irman RUSSELL. I Wish you Would clear up the matter of the
needle, %Ir. Powers.
Were you under any obligation to destroy yourself if you were
captured:'
Mr. PowERs. Oh, no. I don't remember exactly who gave me, the
needle that morning, but they told tile, "You can take it if you want
to." They said, "If something does happen you may be tortured.
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FRANCIS GARY POWERS 13
Maybe you could conceal this on your person in. some way, and if you
see that you cannot withstand the torture, you might want to use it."
And that is the reason f took the needle. But I could have left it.
I wasn't told to take it.
Chairman RUSSELL. Do you have the instructions that you re-
ceived that morning and that you usually received there before you-
-Mr. POWERS. Do T have them.?
Chairman RUSSELL. Yes, sir; the instructions as to your course of
conduct in the event you fell into the hands of any enemy, potential
enemy.
Mr. POWERS. Well, it is hard to remember this long exactly what
they were.
Chairman RUSSELL. I think they are there. You can read them.
I think they ought to go into this record.
Mr. POWERS. Listed here are three paragraphs:
(a) If evasion is not feasible and capture appears imminent, pilots should
surrender without resistance and adopt a cooperative attitude toward their
captors.
(b) At all times while in the custody of their captors, pilots will conduct them-
selves with dignity and maintain a respectful attitude toward their superiors.
(c) Pilots will be instructed that they are perfectly free to tell the full truth
about their mission with the exception of certain specifications of the aircraft.
They will be advised to represent themselves as civilians, to admit previous Air
Force affiliation, to admit current CIA employment, and to make no attempt
.to deny the nature of their mission.
That is all.
Chairman RUSSELL. Those instructions had been given you before
you took off on this flight?
Mr. POWERS. Yes.
Chairman RUSSELL. You were thoroughly familiar with them?
Mr. POWERS. Yes.
Chairman RUSSELL. They were a part of your agreement with the
CIA?
Mr. POWERS. Yes.
Chairman RUSSELL. Mr. Powers, were you close enough to this
other parachute to tell whether it was occupied by a man or whether
it just had some object in it?
Mr. PowERS. No. It was very high. I don't know how high.
I couldn't see what it was.
I thought at the time that-well, where were a lot of thoughts run-
fling through my mind, and I thought at the time that maybe this ex-
plosion was caused by a rocket, and, if so, maybe this parachute was
used to recover, say, the first stage or something.
Actually, I have no idea what was in the parachute, but I am sure
it was a parachute, very similar to mine. It was a different color.
I think it had red and white markings.
Chairman RUSSELL. Were these people concerned about it? Was
there any possibility that this was a Russian in that parachute and
that they had shot down one of their own planes in their efforts to reach
you at your high altitude?
Mr. POWERS. I really don't know..
The people just asked me if there were two of us, two Americans.
I mean he just pointed at myself and asked if there were two, and I
told him by sign language that there was only one, and we got in the
car and left.
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11 FRANCIS GAILY PO ER.%
Tlic+y didn't seem concerned at. all.
Chaii'nian RcssELL. So they didn't even look for the other i in?
Mr. POWEits, No, the ones who were with ntc did not.
('huirinam Russm,i,. You do not know whether anyone else out
there looked for him or not.?
Mr. POWER . No; I have no idea.
Chairman RUSSELL, They did not ever bring him in to where they
took you?
Mr. POWERRS. No.
I do know that this was not part of my aircraft or equipment.
Chairman RUSSELL. I was very much interested in that one day's
interrogation that. was left out of your evidence and how you knew
it was left. out.
You cannot read Russian, can you, Mr. Powers?
Mr. POWERS.. No.
They translated the interrogations into English for me to read and
to correct.
Chairman RUSSELL. And there was no evidence of that day at all
in this record"?
Mr. POWERS. There was definitely an interrogation on that morn-
ing, and it was definitely not in theibooks they gave me to review.
Cha.irmtan RUSSELL. That is what I mean: `here was nothing in
the book that transpired that day?
Mr. PoivLrts. Right.
Chairman RUSSELL. Did they threaten you at any time when
they were examining you?
\Ir. PoWEitS. There were no definite threats, but they didn't let
me forget that this crime was punishable by death. Anytime they
would mention that it. was 7 to 15 years and death, and they wouldn't
let me forget that.
Chairman RUSSELL. Did you ever manifest any reluctance in
answering the questions that they asked you or did you answer them
immediately?
Mr. PowEits. I refused to answer several of their questions. I
showed reluctance on many.
Chairman RUSSELL. Pardon?
Ir. PowERs. I showed reluctance on many, some that I couldn't
see how they could be of any interest to them at all, but I was just
reluctant in answering all questions.
Chairman RUSSELL. That was not exactly in conformity with your
instructions there to cooperate with your captors; was it?
Mr. POWERS. Well, you shouldn't go overboard with this coopera-
tion, I don't think.
Chairman RUSSELL. You were quoted in the preys as having stated
at your trial that you had made a terrible mistake in flying over Russia
anti apologized to the Russian people and would never do it again
Was that a misquotation or did you make that statement at your trial.
?
Mr. Powuits. No, that wasn't a misquotation. I made this
statement, on the advice of my defense counsel, and also because it
was easy to say I was sorry because what I meant by saying that and
what I wanted them to think I meant was quite different. My main
sorrow was that the mission failed, and I was sorry that I was there,
and it was causing a lot of adverse publicity to the States. But, of
course, some of these things I couldn't say in that statement.
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FRANCIS GARY POWERS . 15
Chairman RUSSELL. Was the room in which you were confined a
cell, a jail cell, or was it just an ordinary office room?
Mr. PowERS. No, it was part of a prison. It had a solid door
with a peephole in it, one window with opaque glass, and bars on
the outside of the glass itself. The only way I could see out was
through a small crack at the top, and I could see part of the wall of
the wing of the building opposite this cell, but it was definitely a
prison.
Chairman RUSSELL. Was it kept reasonably clean?
Mr. POWERS. Yes, it was kept clean.
Chairman RUSSELL. How was your food that you had there at
the prison?
Mr. POWERS. The food was better at the first place in Moscow
there than it was at Vladimir at the prison there. I couldn't eat for
a long time, and apparently they got quite worried about it and kept
asking me if they could get me any special foods or anything, and I
told them "No."
Later on I did start eating, but I never had. much of an appetite
the whole time I was there. There seemed to be plenty of the food
but it is quite different from what we have here. It consisted pre-
dominantly of potatoes and cabbage.
Chairman RUSSELL. Borsch and different kinds of soups?
Mr. PowERS. Yes, at the prison in Vladimir the best part of the
meal at lunch was a bowl of soup.
Chairman RUSSELL. Did you ever have a roommate or did you
occupy that cell by yourself?
Mr. POWERS. From May 1 to September 9 I was in solitary con-
finement. When I moved to the other prison I had a roommate.
Chairman RUSSELL. What had lie been charged with?
Mr. POWERS. He was-they called it an article 58, which I think
means crimes against the state, and he said treason. He spoke Eng-
lish. He spoke four languages. He was a Latvian. He spoke Lat-
vian, German, English, and Russian.
Chairman RUSSELL. Do you have any reason to believe he was
planted there to spy on you or do you think lie was a bona fide prisoner?
Mr. PowERS. This was always in the back of my mind, but I do not
think he was a plant. He had a lot of stuff that he had accumulated
over the few years that he had been there, notes that lie had taken
while he was studying Russian written on scraps of newspaper and a
lot of other things. It took him a long time to accumulate what he
had. I feel sure that he wasn't a plant.
Chairman RUSSELL. How long had he been in prison?
Mr. POWERS. He was there, I think, in April of this year will be
7 years. This is what he told me. His sentence was 15 years.
Chairman RUSSELL. Did they not periodically examine your posses-
sions? You say he had accumulated this file of material about Russian.
They didn't go through your belongings to see whether you had any-
thing you shouldn't have?
Mr. POWERS. Not while we were there, anyway. Not while we were
in the cell.
Chairman RUSSELL. Not in any instance?
Mr. POWERS. There were several inspection teams who came around
the prison. They would just come in and ask through an interpreter
if there were any questions, any complaints, stuff like this, but they
didn't bother us very much at all.
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16 FRANCIS GARY POWERS
Chairman RUSSELL. I can't refrain from saying that the Russians
were much more gentle with you than I would ever have expected
they would have been to one who was taken under those circumstances.
\1r. PowEtts, It. surprised tile, also. I expected much worse treat-
ment than I received.
Chairman RUSSELL, 1 rather think you got off somewhat, better
than a Russian spy would in this country under the same circum-
stances.
Mr. Pownits. I really don't know.
Chairman RUSSELL. It might depend on where he happened to
land. Undoubtedly he would have a rough time in the section of the
country from which I come.
Senator Saltonstall?
Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Chsirtuan-Mr. Powers, I think I only
have one or two questions. I have listened with interest to what
you have said. 1 have listened to what \lr. \IcCone has told us,
what lie has given out in unclassified information, and I have listened
to the chairman.
My question would be this: Did I understand you correctly that
when you were coming down in the parachute you thew away your
instructions and threw away the snap"
Mr. PoWEns. No, I had no written instructious with me, but I did
have it map, and I tore that up in very small pieces and scattered it
out in the air its I was coining down.
Senator SALTONSTAtd,. SO that your instructions Were in your head,
so to speak?
Mr. POWERS. Yes.
Senator SALTONSTALL. Now, did you have ai briefcase or something
else in which these other things, your special food, and these other
things, were that they looked through afterward'
Mr. POwElty. Yes. I had what we call it seat pack. In this seat
pack was a collapsible rubberlifertaft, some food, some water, matches,
several other items necessary to, soy, live off [lie land or survival in an
unpopulated area.
Senator SAUrONSTALL. I it other words, nothing except survival kit''
Mr. POWERS. Yes. There were also some cloth maps for escape
and evasion.
Senator SAUCONSTALL. Mr. Powers, I will just say this: After
listening to Mr. McCone and after listening to you, I commend you
as it courageous, fine young American citizen who lived un to
your instructions and who did the best you could under very difficult
circumstaaaces.
\Er. PowEns. Thank you very much.
Chairman Russet.,i,. Senator Byrd?
Senator BIRD of Virginia. Thechairman has very ably covered the
ground, and I will not ask any questions.
I do want to say I join with Senator Saaltonstall in expressing my
opinion that the witness. Mr. Powers, has made an excellent presenta-
tion. Ile has been frank, and I aln also very much gratified that \Ir.
McCone has testified before the committee that so far as he knows no
net ion has been taken by you which was contraary to your instructions
or contrary to the interests of this country.
Chairman RUSSELL. `'senator Smith.
Senator SMITH of Maine. AIt-. Chairman, my questions have been
covered, thank you.
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Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Stennis.
Senator STENNIS. Mr. Chairman, I think you. have covered this
matter fully. I want to ask one question.
Mr. Powers, I understand you had an attorney appointed for your
trail.
Mr. PowERs. Yes, that is right.
Senator STENNIS. Did he work with you and freely advise you and
counsel with you, give you advice?
Mr. POWERS. Yes. We had several meetings before the trial.
But I didn't get to see him until, I would say, about 2 weeks before
the trial.
Senator STENNIS. Be rendered you a valuable service, did he?
Mr. PowERS. Well, I really don't know. I never did trust him
any more than the rest of them.
Senator STENNIS. I mean by that that lie gave you information
and talked to you and you think you were better off at the trial than
you would have been without his aid. What about that?
Mr. PowERs. I really don't know.
Senator STENNIS. You have understood, I suppose, that at the
time this occurred there was some publicity here, not a great deal, but
some that was not altogether favorable to you.
Did you know about that?
Mr. PowERS. I have heard about this since I
Senator STENNIS. That is just a prelude for my saying this-that it
is with satisfaction to me that I learn that you have been fully exon-
erated by the men who most know how to judge what you did, what
the facts were, by your superiors and those who employed you. Not
only that, but they found that you have discharged all of your obliga-
tions to your country, and it is with satisfaction to us here and I think
to the American people to learn that, to know it is true.
I know it makes you feel mighty good.
Me. PowERs. There was one thing that I always remembered
while I was there and that was that I am an American.
Senator STE, NNIS. You are an American.
Mr. PowERS. Right.
Senator STENNIS. And proud of it?
Mr. PowERs. Right.
Senator STENNIS. That is fine. [Applause.] You felt that the
American flag would finally find you and follow through and do what
was good for you?
Mr. POWERS. Yes, I did.
Senator STENNIS. That is all, Mr. Chairmani.
Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Case.
Senator CASE of South Dakota. 's'hank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Powers, did you have any opportunity to see the plane or any
part of it on the ground after you landed?
Mr. POWERS. Yes, I did. They took me out somewhere around
the middle of May to a building in a park in Moscow. The plane
was on display there.
Senator CASE of. South Dakota. Was there any evidence visible
or evident to you that the plane had been tampered with or changed
in any way after it had been brought there?
Mr. PowERS. Well, there was quite a bit of damage. Some parts
were missing completely. There were a few things that I was very
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interested in looking at myself. I was particularly interested in the
tail section, because I though it might be possible that [lie tail of the
aircraft came off and this caused the incident., but on looking at that
there- were no scorch marks. 'I'll(, paint was still intact. So I could
only asswne that While the engine was running the tit 11 was on the
aircraft. But as far as anytliiiig else, there was no way that I could
tell whether it head been tampered with or not. There was at lot of
damage to every thing I saw.
Senator CASE of Soutli Dakota. Was the tail on the plane when you
saw it?
Mr. PowEits. No. It was sittin in one place by itself.
.Senator CASE of South Dakota, You have referred to the incident
as tin explosion. Was there anything visibly noticeable about time
plane that helped to form that opinion Ihaat it was an explosion, or
was that limnp ly the filet that at time bane you felt t-he incident you
were impelled forward?
Mr. PowERs. Well, I beard and felt something, and it sounded like
it very dull explosion, like something "whoomp," not at real sharp
sound, but dull. Then the light after this. Looking at the aircraft
I noticed on one of the wings (halt there were holes on one side of the
wings, but I don't know whether this wits caused by at fragmentation
or maybe when it hit (be ground.
Senator CASE of Soutli Dakota. Ilow long were you in the Air
Force.?
Mr. PowwEas. A little more [barn 5 years.
Senator CASE of South Dakota. During tint time did you receive
any indoctrination, so to speak, with regard to communism?
Mfr. Powi'ERS. This was really at long time ago. I have seen sonic
films while I was in the Air Force. I think I had attended if lecture
where a list of Communist organizations was pointed out. There
might have been others, but I can't remember.
Senator CASE of South Dakota. Was your service in the Air Force
during wartime?
\Ir. PoivEnas. No. Well, I entered the .fir Force during the Korean
war, but never did get to Korea.
Senator CASE of South Dakota. With respect. to this particular
flight, did you have anything to do with the selection of the date for
the flight?
Mr. PotiwEits. No.
Senator CASE of South Dakota. Do you know whether or not the
timing of the flight was primarily a matter of the selection of weather
and favorable atmospheric conditions or anything else?
Mr. PowEits. I would assume that it depended primarily on
weather. I really don't know.
Senator CASE of South Dakota. You really don't know, but that
was your assumption?
Mr.
PowEits. Yes.
Senator CASE of South Dakota. There was nothing in your experi-
ence that would indicate anytliiiiF other than that it was a timely
fight because of the weather conditions?
Mr. POWERS. That is what I would think, yes.
Senator CASE of South Dakota. Did you learn from your celhrrate
anything about the economic or political conditions in Russia?
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FRANCIS GARY POWERS 19
Mr. POWERS. We discussed quite a few things there. He seemed to
be more interested in the West than I was in Russia. and we primarily
talked about that.
Senator CASE of South Dakota. What was his original nationality?
Mr. POWERS. Latvian.
Senator CASE of South Dakota. Latvian.
Are you still in the employ of the Central Intelligence Agency?
Mr. POWERS. Yes, I am.
Senator CASE of South Dakota. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman RussELL. What was your rank when you separated
yourself from the Air Force, Mr. Powers?
Mr. POWERS. First lieutenant.
Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Symington.
Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Powers, what do you think hit you, or
nearly hit you?
Mr. POWERS. I really don't know. I just know that there was an
explosion, but how it got there-I feel sure that it was external to the
aircraft, but how it got there or what it was, I have no idea.
Senator SYMINGTON. Has anybody given you an opinion as to what
that orange glow was?
Mr. POWERS. Well, they stressed many, many times that they got
me on the very first shot of a rocket, but they stressed it so much that
I tend to disbelieve it.
Senator SYMINGTON. Is there any possibility that you were hit
twice, once at a higher altitude, say, a near miss, and again at a lower
altitude?
Mr. POWERS. No:
There was only one explosion that I know of, and they would have
had to have been excellent shots to hit that thing as it fell.
Senator SYMINGTON. In the Red Star it said that-
Major Varanoff ran out and saw in the rays of the day's sun fragments of the
foreign plane falling down and not far from it the pilot himself.
That could not be true if you were hit at anything like 67,000 or
68,000 feet; could it? You would be behind the pieces of the plane;
would you not?
Mr. POWERS. Well, while I was descending in the parachute, I saw
one piece of the plane fall. It was a flat piece. It may have been a
wing or it may have been something smaller. But it was falling like
a leaf falls, flipping and turning, and fairly slow, but it passed me.
I have no idea of how far away it was.
Senator SYMINGTON. Could it have been another plane that had
been hit?
Mr. POWERS. No, I assumed at the time that it was part of my
aircraft. If it was a wing, it was a long distance off. If it was a
smaller piece, it was closer. That is all I can say about it.
Senator SYMINGTON. You did your best to destroy the plane, but,
because of the g.'s on you at the time, you were just unable to reach
the controls; is that correct?
Mr. POWERS. Yes, that is right.
Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to join you and
other members of the committee in commending Mr. Powers for the
way he handled himself in this unfortunate episode. I have no
further questions.
Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Bush.
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Senator Bcsiz. Mr. Chairman, I have no questions, but I also
would like to say, having heard 11r. McCone's report today and
having listened to Mr. Powers' remarkable story, that I am satisfied
he has conducted himself in exemplary fashion and in accordance
with the highest traditions of service to one's country, and I con-
gratulate him upon his conduct in captivity and his safe return to
the United States.
Mr. POWERS. Thank you.
Chairman RUSSELL. I think I should say to the members of the
committee that Mr. Powers has not yet completed his entire state-
ment.
He stopped for a period of questions, as I understood, and then
you will tell us more about your trial before you conclude, will you
not, Mr. Powers?
Mr. Powt.Rs. Yes, T will go right on until I got back, if you want
to listen to it.
(.Iaairnaan RUSSELL. Senator Jackson.
Senator JACKSON. Did they indicate to you whether the plane,
your plane, carne down near where you landed?
Mr. Powxus. No.
At one time (luring the investigation they showed me some kind
of a anal) that had indicated on it where different, parts of the aircraft
fell, but I didn't recognize any of the landmarks that, I could see on
this map.
Senator JACKSON. And while you were in this particular village and
litter in Sverdlovsk, did they indicate at that time. that they had
located the phine?
Mr. Po-,vl s. Well, people kept bringing in small pieces, pieces
that could be carried, but, as far its indicating to me that they had
located the. main parts of it, no.
Senator JACKSON. Did they indicate later that Mr. Khrushcbev
had personally ordered the shooting down of your aircraft by a rocket'.'
Mr. PowERs. I don't think so. I don't remember that his naive
entered into it.
Senator JACKSON. 1 asked that because the story was carried, I
believe, in the American press, based on, of course, a story out of
Moscow from one of the official Soviet nee=s agencies.
But they did not indicate that to y-ou?
Mr. Pow ass. av o, sir.
Senator J:ACKSO1. Do I understand after the trial you were removed
to Adeuma? That is out about 100 miles; is it not?
Mr. POWERS. I would say about 100 or 150 miles.
Senator JACKSON. East of Moscow?
Mr. PowERs. Yes.
Senator JACKSON. Did they attempt, while you were there, to in-
doctrinate you at all into communism?
Mr. POWERS. No.
Senator JecKSo . Did they attempt to indoctrinate you into the
Soviet system?
Mr. POWERS. No.
There were no lectures, no political sessions that I had to attend,
but the only news source I had was communistic. There was a. loud-
speaker in the cell that was tuned to one of the :Moscow radio stations.
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FRANCIS GARY POWERS
I didn't understand very much of what went on, on this. But there
was no direct attempt for someone to come in and talk to me about
any of this.
Senator JACKSON. Did they indicate that you might be let out
earlier than your sentence provided for?
Mr. POWERS. No.
Sometime-I think right after the trial-someone mentioned that
there might be such things as exchanges, and I said, "Is that right?"
And he said, "Yes, but we don't have any Soviet spies in the
United States."
But that is the only indication I had.
Senator JACKSON. When did you first get an idea that they had
changed their mind about that?
Mr. POWERS. The first I knew about it was about 7:30 at night on
the 7th of February.
Senator JACKSON. This year?
Mr. POWERS. This year, yes.
I didn't know what was going on, but I knew that something was
going on. Some men came in with an interpreter and asked me if I
would like to accompany them to Moscow tomorrow, and added,
"Without any guards," so I immediately assumed something was
going on. I didn't know what.
We got to Moscow, spent the night there, and they told me that
night that we would go to Berlin the next morning. I still didn't
know what was happening.
Senator JACKSON. At least you were moving west, though?
Mr. POWERS. Yes, and I was very glad to take this trip. Actually,
they never did tell me that Colonel Abel was involved in this.
I am sure they knew that I would find out the minute I stepped
across the line, but, up until that time, it was just the goodness of
their h.carts and not anything else.
Senator JACKSON. Just a voluntary act on their part?
Mr. POWERS. Yes.
Senator JACKSON. They did not indicate that anyone else was
being exchanged?
Mr. POWERS. No.
Senator JACKSON. Mr. Chairman, I want to conclude by saying
that I associate myself with the remarks previously made here. I
think it is quite clear from what we have heard this morning and now
that Mr. Powers has lived up to his contract.
Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Beall.
Senator BEALL. Mr. Chairman, I have no questions. I do want to
associate myself with you and the balance of the committee in com-
mending Mr. Powers for the very intelligent way the has handled
himself.
I was at the hearings this morning, and I am convinced that he
has been very frank with us and. I congratulate him.
Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Thurmond.
Senator TnuRMOND. No questions, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Goldwater.
Senator GOLDWATER. I have no questions.
Chairman RUSSELL. Mr. Powers, you might give us a brief resume
of your trial now. Senator Jackson has already covered the exchange,
but you might give us a brief resume of the trial.
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Mr. PoWEIts. I don't remember the exact date that they told me
when the trial would take place, but when they did tell me I was
very curious to know why the first day of the trial fell on my birthday,
and I asked them about this. They said that it was just a coincidence.
Somewhere around the lst of August, I met the. Soviet-appointed
defense counsel for the first time. I had three or four sessions with
him, not very long ones.
Ile made a lot, of suggestions of things I should do. Actually it
didn't seem that he did too much work or didn't seem to be extremely
interested in the case, or this was my impression.
I guess most everyone here knows about the trial.
[ think that has been fairly highly publicized. It was a very tense
time. for me.
The only good part about the whole thing was the last day, when
I was allowed to see my relatives for the first time.
Chairman RUSSELL. Do you feel that you were treated harshly by
the Russians, Mr. Powers?
Mr. PowmRs. No, I was treated much better than I expected to be
treated.
Chairman RUSSELL. Ilow about the sentence that was imposed
on you at the conclusion, after you pled guilty?
Mr. POWERS. 1 expected much worse.
Chairman RUSSELL. You expected it more severe sentence than you
received?
Mr. POWERS. Up until the time of the prosecutor's speech where he
only asked for 15 years, I expected death, but after he had asked for
that I thought it would be 15 years or just a little under, maybe 12
to 15 years.
Chairman RUSSELL. 1 believe they don't have a jury in Russia.
Mr. PowLns. No. it was three judges and that is it.
Chairman RUSSELL. 'I'hev have three judges who sat on the case?
MIr. Po-,A-i its. Yes.
Chairman RUSSELL. Did your lawyer make any argument to the
judges;?
Mr. Powuas. I don't think lie argued with anyone, Ile asked a
few questions, but I brought up fumy background.
Chan-1111111 RUSSELL. Did the prosecutor make any argument to
the judges?
Mr. Powrns. It seemed to be that his case was against the United
States and not against me. That is the impression I got there. He
timid a long speech at the end, but I don't recall what all lie said.
(.''ha.irman RUSSELL. Ile denounced the imperialists and things of
that kind snore than he did you?
Mr. Powmts. Yes.
Chairman RUSSELL. You were rather fortunate in being put in the
place of an unwitting pawn of these imperialists rather than being
responsible for all of it yourself?
Mr. Powrnts. Well, that might have helped; I don't. know.
('hairman RUSSELL. After your conviction, was there any difference
in the treatment that you received prior to your trial?
M[r. PowERts. Not until I changed prisons, and then the food was
worse. The bed was much better, though.
Chairman RUSSELL. That was in Moscow?
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FRANCIS GARY POWERS 23
Mr. POWERS. In Moscow this bed wasn't fit to sleep on. It was
iron straps welded together with a very thin mattress on it, and it
was almost impossible to sleep on it.
Chairman RUSSELL. I hope I never visit Russia under the circum-
stances you did, Mr. Powers. At the time I was there I found Moscow
to be exactly different. I got a good bed and very poor food, and out
in the country the bed was terrible but the food was edible, so my
experience was exactly the reverse of yours. I don't think I would
try to visit your way, though.
Any further questions by any member of the committee?
If not, I will ask all the policemen to please see that Mr. Powers
and his CIA escort are able to get out before the rush.
Will all of you please keep your seats.
(Whereupon, at 3:30 p.m., the committee recessed, subject to the
call of the Chair.)
(The following is an unclassified summary of the results of the in-
terrogation by the Central Intelligence Agency of Francis Gary
Powers since his release by the Soviet Union:)
STATEMENT CONCERNING FRANCIS GARY POWERS
Since his return from imprisonment by Soviet Russia, Francis Gary Powers
has undergone a most intensive debriefing by CIA and other intelligence specialists,
aeronautical technicians, and other experts concerned with various aspects of his
mission and subsequent capture by the Soviets. This was followed by a complete
review by a board of inquiry presided over by Judge E. Barrett Prettyman to
determine if Powers complied with the terms of his employment and his obliga-
tions as an American. The board has submitted its report to the Director of
Central Intelligence.
Certain basic points should be kept in mind in connection with this case. The
pilots involved in the U-2 program were selected on the basis of aviation pro-
ficiency, physical stamina, emotional stability, and, of course, personal security.
They were not selected or trained as espionage agents, and the whole nature of the
mission was far removed from the traditional espionage scene. Their job was to
fly the plane, and it was so demanding an assignment that on completion of a
mission physical fatigue was a hazard on landing.
The pilots' contracts provided that they perform such services as might be
required and follow such instructions and briefings in connection therewith as were
given to them by their superiors. The guidance was as follows:
"(a) If evasion is not feasible and capture appears imminent, pilots should
surrender without resistance and adopt a cooperative attitude toward their
captors.
`(b) At all times while in the custody of their captors, pilots will conduct
themselves with dignity and maintain a respectful attitude toward their superiors.
(c) Pilots will be instructed that they are perfectly free to toll the full truth
about their mission with the exception of certain specifications of the aircraft.
They will be advised to represent themselves as civilians, to admit previous Air
Force affiliation, to admit current CIA employment, and to make no attempt to
deThey the nature of their mission."
were instructed, therefore, to be cooperative with their captors within
limitations, to use their own judgment of what they should attempt to withhold,
and not to subject themselves to strenuous hostile interrogation. It has been
established that Mr. Powers had been briefed in accordance with this policy and
so understood his guidance. In regard to the poison needle which was prominently
mentioned at the trial in Moscow, it should be emphasized that this was intended
for use primarily if the pilot were subjected to torture or other circumstances
which in his discretion warranted the taking of his own life. There were no
instructions that he should commit suicide and no expectation that he would do
so except in those situations just described, and I emphasize that even taking the
needle with him in the plane was not mandatory; it was his option.
Mr. Powers' performance on prior missions has been reviewed, and it is clear
that he was one of the outstanding pilots in the whole U-2 program. He was
proficient both as a flyer and as a navigator and showed himself calm in emergency
situations. His security background has been exhaustively reviewed, and any
circumstances which might conceivably have led to pressure from or defection to
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24 FRANCIS GARY POWERS
the Russians have also been exhaustively reviewed, and no evidence has been
found to support any theory that failure of his flight might be laid to Soviet
espionage activities. The same is true of the possibilities of sabotage.
Accordingly, Mr. Powers was assigned to the mission that eventually occurred
on May 1, 1960, and accepted the assignment willingly. It was a particularly
grueling assignment across the heart of Soviet Russia and ending on the north-
west coast of -Norway. It was necessary to maintain extreme altitude at heights
at which no other plane but the U-2 had steadily flown. So far as can be ascer-
tained Mr. Powers followed the scheduled flight plan, making a prescribed turn
to the northwest when nearing the city of Sverdlovsk where he was directly on
course. According to his statement, he had settled on his new course and had
Sverdlovsk in sight, perhaps 20 or 30 miles away, when he felt and heard some-
thing he describes as a push or feeling of acceleration on the plane accompanied
by a dull noise unlike the sharp sound of a high explosive. This caused Win to
look up from his instruments, and he saw surrounding him, or perhaps reflected
in his canopy, he is not sure, an orange or reddish glare which seemed to persist.
He felt this phenomenon to be external to the plane but says he cannot be sure.
For a moment the plane continued to fly normally, then it dipped to the right
but he found he was able to control this dip and level the plane with his normal
controls. Shortly thereafter, however, the plane began to nose forward, and
Mr. Powers states that as he drew back on the stick he felt no control as if the
control lines had been severed. The plane nosed sharply over and went into
violent maneuver, at which point he believes the wings came off. The hull of
the plane then turned completely over and he found himself in an inverted spin
with the nose high revolving around the center of the fuselage so that all he could
see through the canopy looking ahead was the sky revolving around the nose of
the plane. This motion exerted g. forces on him which threw him forward and
up in the cockpit. At this point he states he could have reached the destruct
switches which would have set off an explosive charge in the bottom of the plane.
However, he realized that this charge would go off in 70 seconds and he did not
vet know if he could leave the plane. He stated that he tried to draw himself
back into the seat to see if he could activate the ejection mechanism, but the g.
forces prevented him from recovering his position. Being forward and out of the
seat, even if he could have used the ejection mechanism, which was below and
behind him, it would have seriously injured him if activated. He recalled that
it was possible to open the canopy manually, and shortly thereafter he was able
to do so and the canopy disappeared. His last recollection of the altimeter was
that he was at about 34,000 feet and descending rapidly. To see if he could get
out of the cockpit, he released his seat belt and was immediately thrown forward
out over the cowling of the cockpit to a position where lie was held only by his
oxygen tube. lie tried to pull himself back in the cockpit to the destruct switches
which take four separate manipulations to set and found himself unable to do so
because of the g. forces, the inflation of his pressure suit, and the fogging up of
his face mask which totally obscured his view. By pushing he tore loose the
oxygen tube and fell free, whereupon his parachute opened almost immediately,
indicating that he was probably at 15,000 feet or below at this time since the
automatic mechanism was set for this height. In connection with Powers' efforts
to operate the destruct switches, it should be noted that the basic weight limita-
tions kept the explosive charge to 2% pounds and the purpose of the destruct
inechanisni was to render inoperable the precision camera and other equipment,
not to destroy them and the film. After he landed he was taken by commercial
plane to Moscow the same day.
In the processing into the prison he was given a hypodermic injection which
may well have been a general immunization, and there is no evidence of the use
of truth serums or other drugs. From then until the time of the trial, about 100
days, he was kept in solitary confinement and subjected to constant interrogation,
sometimes as long as 10 or 12 hours a day, but on the average considerably less
than this. lie had no access to anyone but his Itussian guards and interrogators
despite repeated requests for contact with the U.S. Embassy or his family and
friends. He states that the interrogation was not intense in the sense of physical
violence or severe hostile methods, and that in some respects he was able to resist
answering specific questions. As an example, his interrogators were interested
in the names of people participating in the project, and he states that he tried to,
anticipate what names would become known and gave those, such as the names
of his commanding officer and certain other personnel at his home base in Adana,
Turkey, who would probably be known in any case to the Russians. However,
they asked him for names of other pilots and lie states that he refused to give
these on tlie grounds that they were his friends and comrades and if lie gave their
names the would lose their jobs and, therefore, he could not do so. He states
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FRANCIS GARY POWERS 25
they accepted this position. It is his stated belief, therefore, that the information
he gave was that which in all probability would be known in any case to his
captors.
At his trial he had only the advice of his Russian defense counsel to go by,
and he advised that unless Powers pleaded guilty to what the Russians considered
a clear violation of domestic law and expressed penitence, matters would go hard
for him, including a possible death sentence. These actions were consistent with
his instructions from CIA. After the trial and sentencing, Mr. Powers states
that there was only intermittent interrogation of little importance and that on
the whole he was well treated, adequately fed, and given medical attention when
required.
All the facts concerning Mr. Powers' mission, the descent of his plane, his
capture, and his subsequent actions have been subjected to intensive study. In
the first place, Powers was interrogated for many days consecutively by a debrief-
ing team of experienced interrogators, one of whose duties was to evaluate Powers'
credibility. They expressed the unanimous view that Powers was truthful in his
account. Secondly, an intensive inquiry was made by Government officials into
the background, life history, education, conduct, and character of Powers. This
team included doctors, specialists in psychiatry and psychology, personnel officers,
his former colleagues in the Air Force and on the U-2 project. All these persons
were of the view that Powers is inherently and by practice a truthful man.
Thirdly, Powers appeared before a board of inquiry and testified at length, both
directly and under cross-examination. The board agreed that in his appearance
he appeared to be truthful, frank, straightforward, and without any indicated
attempt to evade questions or color what he was saying. In the board's judgment
he reflected an attitude of complete candor. In the fourth place, when during
his examination before the board a question was raised as to the accuracy of one
of his statements, he volunteered with some vehemence that, although he disliked
the process of the polygraph, he would like to undergo a polygraph test. That
test was subsequently duly administered by an expert and in it he was examined
on all of the factual phases which the board considered critical in this inquiry.
The report by the polygraph operator is that he displayed no indications of devia-
tion from the truth in the course of that examination. In the fifth place, a study
of the photograph of the debris of the plane and other information concerning
the plane revealed in the opinion of experts making the study no condition which
suggested an inconsistency with Powers' account of what had transpired. The
board noted the testimony of Russian witnesses at the trial in Moscow which
dealt with the descent and capture of Powers and with technical features of the
plane and the incident.
The testimony was consistent with the account given by Powers. Powers was
able to identify a spot near a small village where he thought he had landed.
This location checked with prior testimony given by Powers as to physical
features, directions, and distances and also corresponded with earlier independent
information not known to Powers that certain of the persons who captured him
lived in this same small village. Some information from confidential sources was
available. Some of it corroborated Powers and some of it was inconsistent in
parts with Powers' story, but that which was inconsistent was in part contra-
dictory with itself and subject to various interpretations. Some of this infor-
mation was the basis for considerable speculation shortly after the May 1 episode
and subsequent stories in the press that Powers' plane had descended gradually
from its extreme altitude and had been shot down by a Russian fighter at medium
altitude. On careful analysis, it appears that the information on which these
stories were based was erroneous or was susceptible of varying interpretations.
The board came to the conclusion that it could not accept a doubtful interpreta-
tion in this regard which was inconsistent with all the other known facts and
consequently rejected these newspaper stories as not founded in fact.
On all the information available, therefore, it is the conclusion of the board
of inquiry which reviewed Mr. Powers' case and of the Director of Central
Intelligence, who has carefully studied the board's report and has discussed it
with the board, that Mr. Powers lived up to the terms of his employment and
instructions in connection with his mission and in his obligations as an American
under the circumstances in which he found himself. It should be noted that
competent aerodynamicists and aeronautical engineers have carefully studied
Powers' description of his experience and have concluded on the basis of scientific
analysis that a U-2 plane damaged as he described would perform in its descent
in about the manner he stated. Accordingly, the amount due Mr. Powers under
the terms of his contract will be paid to him.
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