PRINCIPAL FINDINGS ON THE CAPABILITIES OF THE UNITED STATES TO MONITOR THE SALT II TREATY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01315R000400350072-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 10, 2004
• Sequence Number: 72
• Publication Date: October 1, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

& or Release 2005/01112 ~. CIA-RDDb
98th Congress t
1st Session J
REPORT
OF TIIE
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES SENATE-,,
PRINCIPAL FINDINGS
ON THE
CAPABILITIES OF THE UNITED STATES TO
MONITOR THE SALT II TREATY
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
52-120 WASHINGTON : 1979
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SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
[Established by S. Res. 400, 04th Cong., 2d Sess.]
BIRCH BAYII, Indiana. Chairman
TIARRY GOLDWATER, Arizona, Vice Chairman
ADLAI E. STEVENSON, Illinois JAKE GARN, Utah
WALTER D. IIUDDLESTON, Kentucky CHARLES McC. MATUTAS, Ja., Maryland
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Delaware JOHN H. CHAFES, Rhode Island
DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, New York RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii MALCOLM WALLOP, Wyoming
HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington DAVID DURENBERGER,'Minnesota.
PATRICK 7. LEAKY, Vermont
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia, Ex Officio Member
HOWARD II. BAKER, JR., Tennessee, Ex Officio Member
WILLIAM G. MILLER, Staff Director
EARL D. EIaBNHO{FER, Minority Staff Director
AuonaY II, H 'rRY, Chief Clerk
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PRINCIPAL FINDINGS BY THE SENATE SELECT COM-
MITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ON THE CAPABILITIES OF
THE UNITED STATES TO MONITOR THE SALT II
TREATY
In approaching the duty given to us by the Senate to examine the
ability of the intelligence community to monitor Soviet compliance
with the SALT II Treaty, the Committee has kept in mind that our
reconnaissance system cannot provide absolute certainty. In the past
our monitoring system has, in some instances, underestimated the rate
of deployment of some strategic weapon systems of the Soviet Union.
In other instances it has overestimated the deployment of some stra-
tegic weapon systems.
Since 1970, the estimating record has improved as a direct conse-
quence of improvements in the technical capabilities of the U.S. recon-
naissance systems and in the intelligence community's analysis of that
data. These improved technical collection and analytical capabilities
have resulted in a reduction in uncertainties about the state of devel-
opment, testing, and deployment of Soviet strategic weapons. Because
we are forced by history to bear in mind the analytic error of the
"missile gap," as well as the underestimating of the rate of deploy-
ment of some strategic weapons systems, the Committee has conducted
an independent review and assessment of U.S. monitoring capabilities.
As a result of this review, the Committee has made findings with re-
spect to the following issues :
A. Implications of SALT I record for monitoring SALT II
Accords;
B. The degree to which U.S. SALT II negotiating positions
were based on monitoring capabilities;
C. Providing the necessary resources for the U.S. monitoring
system;
D. Improved analysis;
E. Congressional. oversight; and
F. Evaluation of the ability of the United States to monitor the
SALT II Treaty.
The subject of U.S. monitoring capabilities is so complex that Sen-
ators are strongly encouraged to read and study the full text of the
classified report and its accompanying attachments, in order to fully
understand these brief findings.
A. IMPLICATIONS or SALT I RECORD FOR MONITORING SALT II
Accoims
On the basis of the SALT I record, the Committee believes that the
Soviet Union will push to the greatest extent possible any advantages
which the provisions or ambiguities of the SALT II Treaty might per-
mit. Further, the Soviet Union will probably continue nearly all its
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present concealment and deception practices. and additional conceal-
ment and deception practices may be attem pted. The record also in-
dicates, however, that the Standing Consultative Commission is a
valuable forum for resolving compliance issues, and possible ambit Ii-
t ies in intelligence information and Treaty interpretation, when the
United States aggressively pursues them. For example, in the case of
the expanded pattern of Soviet concealment activities, vinorous pur-
suit by the United States of this issue in the Standing consultative
Commission halted the expansion,
Therefore, the United States must expect that unanticipated Soviet
activities may occur during the course of the SALT II Treaty and be
willing to raise and aggressively pursue questions of Soviet compliance
with the Treaty in the Standing Consultative Commission, which will
play an even more significant role during SALT IT.
L. Tim I)r:Grer:r ro WIlrcir UhnITrn STATES SALT II EGoTIATI-,io
POSITIONS WERE BASE[) ON MONITORING CAPtBILrTIES
The Committee has also reviewed in detail the substance and process
of SALT II diplomatic negotiations to see how the need for effective
monitoring was factored into the actual negotiations in Geneva and
elsewhere, l"embem of the Committee have gone to Geneva repeatedly
to observe firsthand the negotiation process paying particular atten-
tion to monitoring questions. We have also examined the di lomatic
record of these negotiations, the historical record of the SALT I and
AB 1'i Treaties, and the Proceedings of the St ending Consultative Com-
mission in order better to understand Soviet SALT behavior and the
monitoring record concerning those agreements. We have also studied
the specific verification provisions of the SALT IT Treaty and Protocol
and have made our own judgments as to the monitoring' requirements
of these provisions.
The Committee has reviewed the extent to which the provisions of
the SALT I t accords contribute to monitoring compliance. There are
provisions which enhance our monitoring capability; there are other
provisions which reduce monitoring difficulties but retain substantial
ambiguities; and there are provisions which impose very difficult
monitoring burdens.
The Committee believes that. in most cases, monitoring requirements
were given high priority during Treaty negotiations, and that mon-
itoring necessities were reflected in the Treaty provisions, In some
cases, however. Treaty provisions were not drawn precisely because. of
negotiated trade-offs and United States and Soviet interest in not
impairing the flexibility of some of their respective weapons develop-
ment programs.
C. PROVIDING THE NErr.ss.1Rr REsor-RrE5 FOP, Tlrh: UXITEI) STATES
MONITORING SrsTrnr
Although our national reconnaissance system is complex and com-
prehensive, sonic of its components are fragile. In order for the
reconnaissance srsteni to be effective, sufficient back-up and redun-
dancy must be provided during the period of SALT IT.
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In order to provide these resources a very high budget priority
must be given to the intelligence collection-systems, as well as to
processing and analysis functions.
The Committee finds that continued improvement and investment
will be required during this period to ensure that U.S. monitoring
systems keep pace with the monitoring tasks they must perform.
Arbitrary resource constraints must not curtail these needed improve-
ments and Investment.
The Committee also recommends that increased analytic attention
to SAI:T monitoring should be accompanied b?y the intelligence
community's full and careful attention to other areas of Soviet mili-
tary, political, and economic activity and to military, political, social
and economic developments in other countries. It is for this reason
that we recommend a very high budget priority for processing and
analysis, as well as for intelligence collection systems.
D. IMPROVED ANALYSTS
The Soviets unanticipated ability to emplace the much larger
SS-19 in a slightly enlarged SS-11 silo circumvented the safeguards
the United States thought it had obtained in SALT I against the
substitution of heavy for light ICBMs. Similarly, the range of the
SS-N-8 missile on the Delta class Soviet ballistic missile submarine
was greater than expected. This reduced the significance of the Soviet
"geographical disadvantage" on the basis of which we conceded to
the Soviets in SALT I the right to build a larger number of ballistic
missile submarines than were, permitted to the United States. The
Committee is of the view that the intelligence community should
make every effort to minimize intelligence surprises. Recognizing
that predicting the future is a very difficult, if not impossible task,
the Committee recommends the following :
Soviet SALT negotiating strategy and tactics should be exhnns-
tivel,y studied for hints about future developments which the Soviets
may have been trying to protect. On the basis of this analysis. "warn-
ing signs" should be formulated whose appearance would alert the
analyst to the possibility the Soviets are taking unexpected steps in
their weapons development, program.
Various possible. Soviet "cheating scenarios" should be developed,
using technical experts outside the intelligence community who have
been given briefings containing information about U.S. intelligence
sources and methods roughly comparable, to what the Soviets may be
expected to possess. On the basis of these scenarios, similar "warning
signs" should be formulated.
Competitive analysis, reflecting a full range of expert points of
view, should be conducted periodically on important topics in Soviet
strategic weapons developments. The results should be analyzed to
provide "warning signs" and to suggest collection strategies which
would minimize the differences and uncertainties.
E. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
It is clear from the SALT I record that intelligence of possible
Soviet violation of the Treaty was, in some cases, and for a time, with-
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held from Executive branch ofhwinls who had a need for such informa-
tion. Lacking an oversight committee for intelligence matters, the
Congress was not supplied the intelligence inforiation on SALT I
nionitorinir.
In the course of the hearings held by the Committee on the SALT
I monitoring record, the responsible officials in the intelligence com-
niunity were asked if then would "fully and currently" supply to the
('oitirnittee intelligence on the monitoring of SALVII Treaty pro-
visions, as required by S. Iles. 400 and by Executive Order 12036.
The Director of Central Intelligt'nre, the Director of the National Se-
eurity Agency, and the Director of DI A have said they understood
it was their duty to do so. Procedures for handling such reporting
hal-ealready been established by the Committee.
()the]- committees of the Senate with the task of SALT IT over-
sight are the Foreign Relations Committee and the Armed Services
Committee. Under S. Iles. 400. the Select Committee on Intelligence is
obliged to keep these committees informed of any intelligence infor-
mation that might he of signifi