THE ZHDANOV- MALENKOV RELATIONSHIP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T01172R000200190001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 29, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 29, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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29 July 1953
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THE ZHDANOV - MALENKOV RELATIONSHIP
Office of Current Intelligence
DIA review(s) completed. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DOS review(s) completed.
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THE ZANOV-MALENKOV RELATIONSHIP
The hypothesis is frequently advanced that Zhdanov and Malenkov
engaged in a bitter political conflict for Stalin's favor and for
control over the Soviet Communist Party. This is a matter of some
importance, since many observers profess to see in this conflict and
its outcome an explanation for many of the problems of Soviet policy
in the post-war years. The hypothesis set forth below is a compos-
ite of various versions of the alleged Zhdanov-Malenkov controversy.
Under this hypothesis, a rise in the influence of one was accom-
panied by a partial eclipse of the other. Zhdanov, who was pre-emi-
nent in the Party and generally accorded to be Stalin's favorite
prior to the war, was sent to Leningrad at the time of the Nazi at-
tack. Malenkov, a rising young man who had become prominent only in
February 191+1, was made a member of the Supreme Defense Council, a
five-man streamlined Politburo for the conduct of the war./ In the
Supreme Defense Council Malenkov was Stalin's immediate subordinate
for Party affairs, with additional responsibility for aircraft pro-
duction and for the relocation of Soviet industry from western USSR
to the east.
After the tide of the war turned and the Soviet armies began to
retake occupied areas, Malenkov was made Chairman of a new State Com-
mittee for the Rehabilitation of Devastated Territories. This com-
mittee, with Beria, Mikoyan, Voznesensky and Andreev as members, was
responsible for industrial, agricultural and political reconstruction
in the Soviet territories recovered from the Germans. Since the
German-occupied areas had held a large portion of Soviet industry,
agriculture and population, the magnitude of the responsibilities of
this committee was great.
i/ Proponents of this hypothesis, such as Ruth Fischer, Franz
Borkenau and Boris Nicolaevsky, have their own variants, and each
has drawn attention to facts overlooked by others. Nicolaevsky,
for example, was the only outside observer to discover that
Malenkov appeared in Soviet agricultural affairs in 1917.
The original five members of the Supreme Defense Council were
Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, Malenkov and Beria. Later additions
were Kaganovich, Voznesensky and Mikoyan. Voroshilov was later
replaced by Bulganin.
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Zhdanov, meanwhile, whatever the reason for his original assign-
ment to Leningrad in 1941, may have been in some sort of disfavor in
January 1945. After the successful defense of Leningrad, he was re-
lieved of his-duties as First Secretary of the Leningrad City and
Province Committees. In January 1945, when the city of Leningrad was
presented with the Order of Lenin, Zhdanov?s'name was mentioned, but
only as one of the Politburo members. Zhdanov moved to Helsinki as
Chairman of the Allied Control Commission in Finland and remained
there until December 1945, at which time he returned to Moscow.
Thereafter, Zhdanov again managed to secure Stalin's favor and
to eclipse Malenkov. Zhdanov sold Stalin on the necessity for an
ideological cleansing of the Communist Party and for a tightening up
of Soviet society generally. Zhdanov himself spearheaded the ideo-
logical purge. He then began undercutting Malenkov: he successfully
unseated him from several key positions, and then attacked such as-
sociates of his as Varga and Aleksandrov. As for Malenkov, he ap-
peared to be concerned, from late 1946 on, with agricultural problems
and suffered a great loss of prominence.
Zhdanov is said to have been a fanatic Communist, and to have
believed that it was possible to make striking advances internation-
ally through foreign Communist Parties, particularly in France and
Italy. Specifically, he is said to have been responsible for the
organization of the Cominform in September 1947, a foreign policy
move which at the minimum was intended to sabotage the Marshall Plan
but which was also intended to launch the French and Italian Parties
into revolutionary action to seize power.
The French .Communlst Party undertook violent action in November
of 1947 and, until broken by the French army, almost succeeded in
paralyzing the government and the economy. The Italian Party under-
took similar action, but with much less seccess. In February 1948,
the Czechoslovak Communist Party succeeded in seizing power; the im-
petus for this was attributed to Zhdanov.
At the founding conference of the Cominform in September 1947,
Zhdanov supported the Yugoslav delegates in their criticism of the
backward policies of other Communist Parties, especially the French
and Italian, and in general indicated his approval of the policies
of the Yugoslav Communists. Tito, however, was proving to be less
than completely obedient, and in 1948 Stalin decided that it was nec-
essary to take disciplinary action. After negotiations lasting four
months, characterized by efforts of Stalin and Molotov to intimidate
and split the Yugoslav Politburo, it became necessary to apply the
extreme sanction against Tito. excommunication from the Communist
fold.
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During this period, the turn of events in Western Europe had
led the United States to take the initiative in attempting unilateral
solution of the West German economic situation. The British and the
French joined in this effort in the winter of 19+7-4+8. Russian re-
action entailed an attempt to capitalize on the most exposed position
of the West, the Allied sectors of Berlin, an effort that culminated
in the full blockade of Berlin in June 1948.
According to the hypothesis being set forth, Stalin held Zhdanov
responsible for the vari us reverses in Soviet policy, in particular
the Yugoslav defection.l/ Zhdanov's death on 31 August 19+8 signalled
the end of the so-called Zhdanov period. After his Death, Malenkov
rapidly achieved a high position in official listings of the Polit-
buro, which was generally taken to indicate that he had returned to
grace. Malenkov then allegedly initiated a purge of various persons
who owed their positions to Zhdanov's influence. Meanwhile, the
Berlin blockade was liquidated and the Greek Civil,War was permitted
to come to an end, and the emphasis in Soviet foreign policy visibly
began to shift to the Far East, where the Chinese Communists were
rapidly gaining complete control of mainland China.
What now can be said with regard to this hypothesis? There are
several very critical questions involved in it. These questions are:
Was there in fact political enmity between Zhdanov and Malenkov? Did
Malenkov truly lose out in the period from, say, August 1946 up to
some time early in 198? For example, did Malenkov find himself in
At the time, many observers attributed the Yugoslav break to
Zhdanov's purportedly hard line toward the Yugoslavs, i.e., to an
attempt on his part to set the same standards of ideological and
political conformity for the Satellite countries as had been ap-
plied in the USSR. Others believed, on the contrary, that Tito
was Zhdanov's principal ally in the international Communist sphere,
and that Tito's defection was not so much a result of Zhdanov's
effort, to bully the Yugoslavs as. it was the cause of his being
irrevocably discredited.
There were numerous rumors and much speculation that Zhdanov was
murdered. This speculation was revived and given added impetus
by the so-called Doctors' Plot of January 1953.
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agriculture as a top-ranking trouble shooter or was he relegated to
this field in disgrace? Was Zhdanov in fact responsible for the in-
ternational communist expansionism of this period? Was there in fact
a purge conducted by Malenkov after Zhdanov's death and after Malen-
kov was back in Stalin's good graces? Was there in fact a shift in
emphasis in Soviet policy to the Far East following Zhdanov's death
and during the period of Malenkov's rise?
THE POLITICAL ECLIPSE OF MALENKOV
The question of whether Zhdanov and Malenkov were political
enemies depends a great deal on the answer to the question whether
Malenkov really lost both responsibilities and prestige in the fall
of 1946. The evidence for Malenkov's political eclipse is as fol-
lows:
1. In early October 1946, a source of the US Military At-
tache in Moscow reported that Malenkov had suffered some meas-
ure of disgrace, although he was unable to give the reasons for
the alleged trouble. Although on 18 October it was announced
that Malenkov had been "confirmed" as Deputy Chairman of the
Council of Ministers, there was a rumor in Moscow that this con-
stituted a demotion. This was given added credence on 24 Oc-
tober when received from the
Chief of the Soviet Information Bureau an official biography of
Malenkov. This biography omitted reference to Malenkov's "re-
sponsible work in the Central Committee," which is believed to
have been done in his position on Stalin's personal secretariat;
it omitted reference to the fact that Malenkov had been a Sec-
retary of 'the Party for many years; and finally, it omitted ref-,
erence to the fact that Malenkov had been an alternate member
of the Politburo since 1939 and a full member since only the
preceding March. the biography
had been initialed by a superior of the Chief of the Soviet In-
formation Bureau, such initialing was
usually an indication that the item had been cleared with higher
authority.
2. Apparently, Male.nkov was removed from the Secretariat
of the Central Committee and lost control over Party personnel.
matters during this period. He was given these responsibilities
in 1939 and he retained them-through the war; he was last iden-
tified in the Party Secretariat in the spring of 1946. There-
after he was not listed among the Party Secretaries, nor.was
the designation "Secretary" given after his name on Soviet cal-
endars, election listings, and so forth, until 20 July 1948.
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On this date he signed a telegram of condolence to the leader
of the Japanese Communist Party, Tokuda, as a Secretary of the
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In 19+7 and 1948, Zhdanov was clearly the leading Secretary
of the Part ; he signed decrees on behalf of the Central Commit-
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tion that Malenkov was still a figure of some power and still
concerned with Party organizational questions was his appearance
with Zhdanov at the founding conference of the Cominform in Sep-
tember 1947. At this conference, Malenkov gave the report on
behalf of the Soviet Communist Party. It was a recital of the
program of the Party since the war, the problems it faced, its
educational, ideological and economic tasks, its problems of re-
construction, and so forth. It may be noted, however, that
Malenkov very definitely was the junior partner at the Cominform
Conference: Zhdanov gave a far-reaching analysis of the entire
international situation and of Soviet policy as well, whereas
Malenkov served simply as rapporteur for the Soviet Party.
As noted above, there is no evidence associating Malenkov
with the Central Committee apparatus, nor with Party personnel
matters, during this period. The supposition that Malenkov lost
these responsibilities would be strengthened if some other per-
son could be reliably identified as responsible for them. Ten-
tative evidence suggests that A. A. Kuznetsov may have received
these responsibilities. A. A. Kuznetsov was a former deputy to 25X1
Zhdanov in the Leningrad Party organization, and became a mem-
ber of the Secretariat and Orgburo in March 1946.
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agricultural work.
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3. Malenkov, following his apparent eclipse, was subse-
quently identified by the Soviet press as "directly" engaged in
This requires a certain explanation of the agriculture
problem existing at that time. During the war the Communist
Party had relaxed a number of its harsher measures with regard
to the peasantry and, as a result, the peasants had concentrated
their efforts on private holdings at the expense of communal
land and had disposed of the produce from these private holdings
on the free market at high prices. Due to the destruction re-
sulting from the war, the disruption of the kolkhoz system, and
a severe drought and a poor harvest in 1946, the Government and
Party found it necessary to restrict severely bread rations and
the release of grains. However, because an unduly large propor-
tion of agricultural produce was grown on private holdings and
disposed of by the peasantry on the free market, the Government
found it difficult to control the flow of grains and to effect
a cut in bread rations. Due to the same factors, furthermore,
there had been a disproportionate flow of money from the city
to the countryside, and peasant savings had risen sharply.
This served to strengthen the bargaining position of the peas-
antry vis-a-vis the Soviet Government and Party. (It may be
noted that it was this situation which led to the extreme deval-
uation of the ruble in December 1947, which practically wiped
out peasant savings.) Agriculture was thus the most critical
problem facing the Soviet Government in the fall and winter of
1946-47. The possibility exists that Malenkov was moved into
agriculture as a top-flight trouble shooter.
This possibility, however, does not appear to be supported
by available evidence. Beginning in September 1946, the Gov-
ernment and Party began to issue a series of joint decrees de-
signed to correct abuses of the kolkhoz charter and to meet the
agriculture crisis. These decrees were signed by Stalin on be-
half of the Government and by Zhdanov on behalf of the Central
Committee of the Party. On 8 October 1946 a Council for Col-
lective Farms Affairs of almost forty members was established.
A. A. Andreev, a Politburo member, was designated Chairman of
this council. Malenkov was not a member. In March 1947, a
plenary session of the Central Committee was held to discuss
the agricultural crisis and it was Andreev who presented the
report.
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4. There is, finally, the question of Malenkov's prestige
throughout this period. In March 1946, the US Embassy reported
that Malenkov was acknowledged to be Stalin's principal adviser
on-internal political problems." Yet, by 7 November 1946,
Malenkov's position had dropped in the Politburo listing and
Zhdanov appeared to have taken his place in Stalin's favor. It
is important to note that Malenkov was the only Politburo mem-
ber whose status dropped significantly in the period from 1946
to 1948 and whose position rose measurably after Zhdanov's
death. In the 1947 elections, Malenkov was not widely propagan-
dized, and he was not one of the five principal "candidates".
This relative obscurity prevailed through 1947 and the first
half of 1948.
The evidence adduced above almost conclusively establishes that
Malenkov's career suffered a very sharp set-back in 1946, involving
a severe reduction in the scope of his duties and responsibilities
and, therefore, in his power. What his personal relations with
Stalin were cannot be said; it must be remembered that Malenkov did
survive this critical period, and we can be sure that if Stalin had
developed real dislike or distrust of Malenkov, the latter would
have disappeared completely.
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FURTHER INFORMATION RELATING TO MALENKOV'S POSITION IN THE HIERARCHY
In 1945 Malenkov was involved in many activities other than
those relating to the Communist Party. These activities undoubtedly
brought him into conflict with other Soviet leaders. There is at-
tempted below a'summary of information relating to these activities,
in an effort to throw some light on Malenkov's fortunes during this 25X1
period.
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Soviet Policy on Germany. Malenkov became involved in foreign
policy in connection with his chairmanship of the State Committee for
Rehabilitation of Devastated Areas, to which he was appointed in Aug-
ust 1943. This body, called the Special Committee, later became the
authority responsible for the policy of industrial dismantling in Soviet-
occupied areas in Eastern Europe and possibly in the Far East. I I
The Special
ee was represented in the Soviet Military Admi-nistration in
Germany by M. Z. Saburov, who had also been one of the Soviet economic
advisors at the Potsdam Conference in July 1945. There does indeed
seem to have been some sort of. policy difference in Moscow on the
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problem of Germany, and it seems probable that this was in some way
associated with the dismantling program.
The whole dismantling operation was very badly handled and a
great deal of valuable property was destroyed or lost. The program
also created hostility toward the Soviet Government among the peo-
ple of Eastern Europe and Germany. In a 10 July 19+6 foreign policy
speech, Molotov announced that dismantling was to be discontinued
and that Soviet policy in the future would support German industrial-
ization.. The actual dismantling of German industry appears to have
dropped off in 1946. In 1946 and early 1947, a new form of economic
control was developed, which involved Soviet ownership of control-
ling shares in industrial and commercial firms 9.n Germany and in, other
non-Soviet areas. This new program appears first to have been placed
under the jurisdiction of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade under
Mikoyan. In mid-191+7 the program was identified under a newly es-
tablished Chief Administration for Soviet Properties Abroad (GUSIMZ),
which is believed to have belonged nominally to the Ministry of For-
eign Trade. This administration was under the direction of Merkulov,
who had been replaced in June 191+6 as Minister of State Security.j/
It is noteworthy that Evgenii Varga, the ranking economic analyst
for the Communist Party and Director of the Institute of World Politics
and World Economics, had written a series of articles, beginning in
191+3, regarding the necessity of rebuilding Soviet industry and eco-
nomy with equipment and plants expropriated from the enemy powers.
Varga himself was not on the Special Committee which handled dismant-
ling; yet it seems,likely that he had been, if not the moving spirit,
at least the man who was providing theoretical propaganda.justifica-
tion for this policy. This series of articles is one of the indica-
tions that Varga was in some way closely associated with Malenkov in
this period. The dismantling policy was terminated some time in 191+6;
it was in the summer of 191+6 that Malenkov lost influence; and it was
in May 1947 that Varga was brought up for criticism because of his
theoretical analyses of the impact of the war on the capitalistic
economic system.
It is interesting to note, in this connection, that many of the
Soviet-owned plants in Austria, Germany and Manchuria were turned
back to the respective Satellite Governments in 1951 and 1952,
which suggests not the dissolution but at least the reduction in
scope of activities and influence of this Chief Administration.
Merkulov himself moved from this administration to the Ministry of
State Control in 1950, replacing the incumbent minister, Mekhlis.
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there was conflict between
the various o uro figures over Soviet economic policy in Germany.
the dismantling and removal of German in-
,.us r a p s was intended both to prevent future German resurgence
and to assist in. Soviet reconstruction. This initial post-war policy
was said to have been predicated on the estimate that the Soviet for-
ces would not remain in occupation for a long period of time.
IMalenkov had been the leading proponent of this
poicy, but that he had met opposition from Mikoyan and the Soviet
Military Administration, under Marshal Zhukov until early 192+6.1
Mikoyan allegedly favored the retention of German plant capacity in
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It seems reasonable to suppose that Malenkov may also have met
opposition from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, i.e., Molotov. This
supposition cannot be supported by available evidence.
The Varga Case. Under instructions from the Central Committee,
in 1944 and 1945 Varga Fs institute produced an analysis of the impact
of the war on the Western capitalist economy. The book was completed
2f Saburov was reported to be a strong supporter of Malenkov. He
succeeded Voznesensky as Chairman of Gosplan in 191+9, presented
the Fifth Five Year Plan of the Party Congress in October 1952,
and became a full member of the Party Presidium in March 1953.
Germany, in the interests of efficient production and a balanced
East Germany economy capable of supporting the Soviet economy.
political objectives in Germany
sky then sided with Mikoyan and Zhdanov, in the interests of rational
planning and accounting. Malenkov clashed
with the Soviet Military Administration in Germany, which was aware
of the profound antagonism the removal program was creating among the
German populace and believed it was prejudicing Soviet occupation and
Zhdanov became involved in the controversy,
seeing it as a useful political weapon against Malenkov. Voznesen-
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We have already noted Varga 's role In espousing e
dismantling policy, the apparent association between Varga and Malen
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Saburov as plenipotentiary of the Special Committee in the Soviet
Military Administration./ There is, further, the actual shift in
Soviet economic policy in 1946 and early 19+7, and the establishment
of the nominal jurisdiction of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade,
under Mikoyan, over this economic policy.
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about December 1945 and received fairly wide circulation, as indi-
cated by several remarks made during the debate on the book to the
effect that a number of Communist and progressive public figures of
both the USSR and the Satellites had been "disoriented" by Varga's po-
sition. Sometime in very late 1946 or early 1947, it was decided to
convoke a conference of economists to discuss the book. The debate was
held in May 1947.
One of Varga's statements during this debate seems to present
almost positive evidence that it was Zhdanov who inspired the debate
and the criticism of Varga's position. Varga's statement is worth
quoting in full: "The difference between the author and the critic
among us in the scientific field is different than in the field of
art. In the field of art a division of labor is to be observed; the
artist paints a picture, the sculptor creates a statue, but the critic
writes a criticism. We cannot have such a situation, in which one
works and another only criticizes---I deny such---a 'division' between
those writing books and those criticizing them--but if such a 'divi-
sion of labor' exists, then, although I am no longer a young person,
and not very healthy, I want to remain, to the end of my life, in the
camp of those who work and not in the camps of those who merely criti-
cize." This statement, made barely ten months after Zhdanov's furious
criticism of Soviet literary figures, and during the Party's new at-
tack against "Art for Art sake" cannot but be considered to have been
a very courageous statement. It also clearly indicates the quarters
from'which the criticism'of Varga''s bbOk was emanating. Elsewhere dur-
ing the debate, Varga's statements imply that the attack originated
from doctrinaire members of the Party hierarchy.
Subsequent to this debate, Varga has had a career of ups and downs.
Suffice it to say that he was not completely disgraced, and, while his
Institute was subsequently broken up, he seemed to remain an important
economist in the USSR. The Party decision on Varga and assessment of
his position was revealed in Pravda in January 1948; it is interesting
to review the conclusions: Firstly, Varga was adjudged to have as-
cribed too much independent power to the bourgeois states in economic
planning, whether in war or in peace, and in particular to have misun-
derstood the nature of the Labor Government in the United Kingdom.
(The debates of May 1947 indicated that this was apparently causing
considerable controversy among Soviet economists and political analysts.)
Secondly, he was accused of having separated political from economic
problems; he had taken up only economic problems in his first book,
and it was adjudged that this was not only erroneous but also harmful,
since the two are inseparable. Thirdly, Varga was condemned for fail-
ing to permit the Party to point out the errors in his thinking, that
is, for refusing to recant. It may be noted in passing that only one
of these three criticisms was a substantive question which would have
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a bearing on Soviet estimates of the situation in the Western world
and on forecasts of future trends.
More interesting is the fact that there was a wide variety of
views expressed by the various professional economists during the
debate on the various theses that Varga had propounded. This may be
taken to indicate that there was considerable uncertainty in the
Soviet Union at that time regarding these questions. Moreover,
since these questions were so intimately associated with policy, it
may be inferred that there was, correspondingly, some degree of un-
certainty in policy formulation. It is further interesting to note
that several of the points discussed in the Varga debates were
treated in Stalin's Economic Problems of Socialism, published in
1952, and some of the formulations in Stalin's Economic Problems
would appear to have been taken almost verbatim from several of the
speeches made in these early debates.
The Varga debates were interpreted in the Western world as in-
dications and, so to speak, as indices of the Soviet estimate regard-
ing future economic trends in the West and the prospects of the
Western powers. This is probably correct. However, the information
given herein leads to the supposition that Varga's fate was also
something of an index of the degree of predominance which Zhdanov
had managed to obtain. It should again be noted in this connection
that Zhdanov never did succeed in completely submerging Malenkov,
and that, as is indicated by Varga's career, Zhdanov's influence was
probably not so great that he could effect the complete disgrace of
this man associated with Malenkov.
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ZHDANOV AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM
Zhdanov's role in the formulation of Soviet policy during this
period, with regard to the outside world in general and international
Communism in particular, is a very complex and controversial problem.
We are on unsure grounds because, since the 30's, international Com-
munism has been closely intertwined with the foreign intelligence ap-
paratus of the USSR, and this apparatus is of course largely in secrecy.
Available data, how-
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Ever -- primarily that contained in published books and articles in-
cluding,
for example, Dedi er' ography of Tito,
permits some tentative suppositions
uncL n us ons regarding this problem.
L control of the Czechoslovak
Commun s arty had been exercised by men working out of Malenkov's
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Malen ov was chief of the Foreign Sector of the
Soviet ommun s arty in 1945. However, the exact responsibilities 25X1
of this position, as well as the nature of its relations with the
international Communist movement, are unknown.
I rumors in the top echelon of the Czecho-
slovak Communist Party that Zhdanov had been responsible for the
appointment of Rudolph Slansky as Secretary General of the Czechoslo-
vak Party. Zhdanov had been associated with the Comintern since at
least 1935 and, with Kuusinen, was one of the two Soviet signatories
of the decision dissolving the Comintern in 1943. In 1947, accord-
ing to Dedijer's biography of Tito, the Yugoslav Ambassador in Moscow
dealt with Zhdanov on questions concerning Yugoslav relations with the
Albanian Communist Party. At the founding conference of the Comin-
form, it was Zhdanov who laid out the broad lines ofpolicy for the
foreign Communist Parties. It has been reported that Rudolph Slansky
cleared the proposed Czech Communist coup in February 19+8 with Zhdanov
nally, in the fall of 1952 when Andre Marty was defending his position
in the French Communist Party, he reportedly cited the authority of
Zhdanov as justification for his actions in the early post-war period.
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According to some sources, the Greek Civil War was espoused by
Zhdanov. This would be of considerable interest, if true. The Yugo-
slavs claim that the Yugoslav Communist Party was the principal pro- 25X1
tagonist of the Greek Communists and, in fact, provided the bulk of
the materiel support for the Greek Civil War.
The Yugoslavs also claim that tali .n imse was skeptical regar ng
the Greek revolution and did not believe that it had any prospects of
success. Furthermore, according to the Yugoslavs, the second Greek 25X1
insurrection of 1947 was undertaken by agreement between Markos and
Tito without previous policy coordination in Moscow.
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1. After the dissolution of the Comintern,. Zhdanov
advocated the establishment of a new international Communist
organization. In 1946, there was, reportedly, a divergence
of views in the Politburo regarding the character of the new
organization. Zhdanov advocated an organizational concept that
would allow for specific differences in the methods to be ap-
plied in different foreign countries.
Comment: Dedijer, in the biography of Tito, noted that
Tito advanced the proposal of a new international Communist or-
ganization in 1945, and that Tito and Stalin discussed the
question in June 1946.
2. Zhdanov illustrated his position by the Yugoslav ex-
ample. He publicly labelled Yugoslavia as the most advanced
People's Democracy. Dimitrov, the world-known Comintern func-
tionary, supported Zhdanov's views.
Comment: Zhdanov publicly supported the Yugoslav criti-
cism of the other Communist Parties at the Cominform meeting in
September 1947. With regard to Dimitrov, circumstantial evi-
dence supports the contention that he supported Tito*s position
during Yugoslavia's conflict with Moscow.
ov sagree with the tone o the resolution
condemning ugoslavia, and insisted tbat an "escape" clause
giving the Yugoslavs an opportunity to recant be included. The
"other wing" was for an immediate and complete break with Yugo-
slavia.
Comment: In Tito's biography it is claimed that Stalin
and Molotov signed the original letter denouncing Yugoslavia.
According to the Yugoslav-Soviet letters, Molotov bad levelled
at least one accusation against the Yugoslavs.
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Zh ov wrote an article n
January 1948 denouncing a speech of Dimitrov's favoring Balkan
federation. Balkan federation was a project especially fa- 25X1
vored by Tito, and Tito and Dimitrov had bad several discos
sions on the subject. hdanov forced
the break with Yugoslavia.
5. Zhdanov was considered an "aristocrat of the Party" and
one of the best brains in the Soviet hierarchy. However, he was
said to be reckless. 25X1
Comment: Zhdanov was brilliant,
arrogant and dynamic . have
reported rumors in Soviet circles that Zhdanov had a mp ed to
pursue "an independent line."
6. Yugoslavia played the chief role in support of the
Greek Civil War. Greek General Markos
had been "greatly influenced by the _ugos v role and support."
Comment: Yugoslav support of the Greek Civil War is well
know.. Circumstantial evidence strongly supports the contention
that Markos was associated with Tito.
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The evidence clearly demonstrates that Zhdanov was responsible
for international Communist affairs. This conclusion,
strongly supports the hypothesis that the m' n international
ommun st policy of 19+7 was indeed an "individual" policy advocated
by Zhdanov.
Circumstantial evidence of another nature tends to give further
weight to this hypothesis. Stalin, it is known, had little or no
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respect for foreign Communists and foreign Communist Parties. He
had long been mistrustful and suspicious of foreign Communists Thus,
if a broad, militant Communist policy was adopted, then the presumption
must be that Stalin's mistrust and'skepticism had been overcome by some
advocate of such a policy. Zhdanov evidently was this advocate.
A militant and aggressive policy was in fact adopted. The West-
ern.Communist Parties were given the task of sabotaging the Marshall
Plan: Zhdanov bluntly stated this in his September 19+7 speech. In
19+7 the Finnish Communist Party, for no apparent reason, adopted a
disruptive strike program. The Greek Communists, given the challenge
of the Truman Doctrine in March 191+7, revolted in the summer and fall
of 1947 and proclaimed a Government in December of that year. The
Czech Communists seized the Government in February 194$. It is easy
to believe that Zhdanov's political fortunes depended upon the success
of the militant policy. It succeeded only in Czechoslovakia, and this
was a minor victory when compared with the reverses suffered.
CONCLUSIONS
The conclusions of this analysis can be summarized as follows:
1. The broad hypothesis set forth is not refuted by
available information. Certain sub-hypotheses are strongly sup-
ported by the weight of evidence. These specific points are:
2. It appears well established that Malenkov lost impor-
tant positions and suffered a reduction in status from mid-1946
to early 1948.
3. Available evidence supports the contention that Malen-
kov's eclipse was directly related to Zhdanov's return to Moscow.
Malenkov's most important position was lost to a longtime asso-
ciate of Zhdanov. The hypothesis that Zhdanov and Malenkov
clashed over control of the Soviet Communist Party appears plaus-
ible. Available evidence indicates that Malenkov probably
clashed with other Politburo members'also, and that he probably
received little if any support from them in his difficulties.
4+. It is highly probable that Zhdanov was responsible for
the policy line of the foreign Communist Parties in this period,
and that he was an advocate of a militant revolutionary policy.
It is probable that Zhdanov's career was compromised by the
failure of the French and Italian Communist Parties in 1917 and
19+8, and by the intransigence and defection of Yugoslavia.
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