CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A010300240001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 14, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 29, 1967
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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STATE review(s) completed.
Top Secret
173
C
29 September 1967
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29 September
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
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Communist China - Japan: Peking behaving more rea-
sonably toward Japan. (Page 5)
Hong Kong: Moderate Communists show some success
in keeping violence down. (Page 6)
Philippines: Huks want to use election to expand in-
fluence. (Page 7)
Arab States - Israel: Husayn will try to break dead-
lock. (Page 8
Czechoslovakia: Move to quiet intellectuals may be
ineffective. (Page 9)
Panama: Assembly will stress domestic issues
rather than canal treaties. (Page 10)
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Peru: Dissent within cabinet (Page 11)
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Communist China Japan: Recent friendly ges-
tures toward the Japanese probably reflect the devel-
oping moderate trend in Peking.
Chinese newsmen in Tokyo reportedly declared on
26 September that Peking would soon approve the re-
placements of three Japanese correspondents expelled
from China on 10 September. The Chinese newsmen
told a group of Japanese politicians and trade officials
that trade negotiations probably would begin soon. The
Chinese also encouraged their hosts to send a delega-
tion from the ruling Liberal Democratic Party to Pe-
king as soon as possible.
This marks an abrupt reversal of Peking's pre-
viously hostile attitude toward the Japanese. As re-
cently as two weeks ago, Chinese trade officials in
Tokyo met with their Japanese colleagues and denounced
the Japanese Government for allegedly manhandling Chi-
nese officials. Earlier this month, a series of inci-
dents had caused some Japanese trade officials to fear
that the semi-official trade agreement and the exchange
of newsmen would be terminated.
There have been a number of other recent indica-
tions of a shift to more reasonable behavior toward
foreigners. Since the sacking and burning of the Brit-
ish Embassy on 22 August, there have been no major
demonstrations against any foreign diplomatic missions,
and a new atmosphere pervades diplomatic exchanges.
Some dependents of British diplomats were allowed to
leave China this month and only the most carefully con-
trolled demonstrations took place against the Indian
Embassy despite the armed clashes in Sikkim. : ::]
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Hong Kong: Moderate Communist leaders apparently
are having some success in their attempts to prevent in-
discriminate violence in the colony.
Their immediate objective is to restrain the militant
elements who wish to defy police bans against fireworks
displays on 1 October at the Chinese. Communist Na-
tional Day celebrations. To meet objections of the Hong
Kong government, the local Communist committee in
charge of arrangements has submitted a revised script
for the variety shows to be staged during the celebrations.
The conflict within the local Communist leadership
over the conduct of the celebrations reflects the split
between moderates advocating a shift to long-term
political struggle and militants among labor and educa-
tion groups favoring continued violence. Although there
have been some sporadic flare-ups in the last week,
the moderates' control appears strong enough to have
kept the violence to a minimum. One indication of this
was the absence of widespread disturbances and demon-
strations when Governor Trench returned to the colony
early this week.
The workers and students appear to be attempting
to coordinate their activities and to be ignoring the ad-
monitions of the more moderate leaders. The leader-
ship, in an effort to restore unity, has emphasized that
it will continue efforts to erode British authority and
has implied its support for some limited terrorism
under the guise of "defensive counterattacks. "
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Philippines- The pro-Communist Huks expect to
use the November elections to expand their influence
in Luzon.
Although eight national senators as well as provin-
cial and municipal officials are to be chosen, the Huks
are chiefly concentrating on local contests in Central
and Western Luzon, In return for strong-arm suppo.'rt:
in the campaign, some local politicians usually promise
the Huks special privileges and government positions,
mainly on local police forces.
The Huks have made deals with a variety of in-
cumbents and candidates at the municipal and village
level during the past three months, with at least the
tacit approval of the governors of Pampanga and Tarlac
provinces. The opposition Liberal Party gubernatorial
candidate for Zambales Province, in Western Luzon,
as well as two key incumbent mayors are also said to
have Huk backing.
Over the past two years, the Huks have been im-
proving their position through selective acts of terror-
ism and intimidation, while at the same time posing as
defenders of the people against government corruption
and inefficiency. Through these tactics, the movement
in some areas exercises an influence dispro ortionate
to its still modest numerical strength.
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Arab States - Israel: King Husayn will soon un-
dertake diplomatic initiatives aimed at breaking the
deadlock in the Middle East.
Husayn is going to Cairo on 30 September to try
to get Nasir's agreement to accept the compromise
US-Soviet resolution which the Arabs opposed at the
special UN General Assembly session last summer.
If he succeeds, the King will then urge the Soviets to
support it when he visits Moscow on 2 to 5 October.
Egyptian officials already have indicated that
Cairo would favor a resolution "along the lines" of
the US-Soviet proposal, which linked Israeli with-
drawal with an end to Arab belligerency.
The Soviets will probably welcome Husayn's ef-
fort, but are unlikely to take up the issue again with-
out some assurance of broader Arab support. They
have indicated that they do not intend to take the ini-
tiative to persuade such recalcitrant Arabs as the
Syrians and Algerians, who fought the compromise
resolution last summer and who Probably still o ose
it.
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Czechoslovakia: The relatively moderate steps
taken by the Czechoslovak regime to quiet intellectual
dissidence may prove to be ineffective.
The party central committee on 27 September ex-
pelled three outspoken writers from the party, stripped
another of alternate membership on the party central
committee, and placed the weekly journal of the Czech-
oslovak writers' union under the control of the Minis-
try of Culture and Information.
These punitive measures were largely in response
to the "antiparty views" expressed at the fourth writers'
congress in June. They suggest that the party leader-
ship was unable to agree on anything more severe.
Some intellectuals, aware of the delicate balance be-
tween the liberals and the conservatives within the re-
gime, are not likely to succumb for long to such re-
latively mild censure. Both party and nonparty "lib-
erals" can be expected to continue their pressure on
the party leader-ship for more cultural freedom and
social reform.
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Panama: The National Assembly, which opens
on 1 October, is likely to focus on highly-charged
domestic political issues rather than the proposed
canal treaties.
Differences have developed within the govern-
ment coalition over selecting a presidential candi-
date for the election in May 1968. Four of the eight
coalition parties refuse to support President Robles
in his choice of Finance Minister Samudio. There
are no signs of an early resolution of the impasse.
The split in the coalition is working to the advan-
tage of opposition leader Arnulfo Arias who still plans
to enter the race. Arias' recent call for a "national
unity" candidate probably was intended to widen the
split in government ranks since he reportedly has
closed the door to any "unity" candidate other than
himrself .
Intense politicking for the election has super-
seded the treaty issue. The draft canal agreements
are still stalled in the advisory Foreign Relations
Council which is not expected to conclude its studies
until later this year. It is unlikely that Robles will
attempt ratification, or even signature, until after the
elections.
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NOTES
Peru: Minister of War; General Julio Doig_told
US Embassy officials on 25 September that he does not
believe the cabinet installed on 5 September will last
long. He also said that he and the other three military
cabinet members have made it clear they will resign
unless the government produces a balanced budget.
Doig's remarks reflect military concern over the dis-
array in the Belaunde government and their intention
to make their views known.
29 Sep 67
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
The United States Intelligence Board on 28 Sep-
tember 1967 approved the following national intel-
ligence estimate:
NIE 11-7-67, "Soviet Foreign Policy,"
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