(Sanitized)/TRANSMITTAL OF DOCUMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP70B00441A000100070054-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 10, 2002
• Sequence Number: 54
• Publication Date: January 17, 1967
• Content Type: DISP

25X1
25X1
25X1
Ref:
ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING
As requested in reference, we are forwarding a copy
of the briefing on the Soviet computers. A more detailed
technical report is in process and should be completed durini
the next mouth. When it is available, it will be forwarded to
you also.
25
25X1
Distribution
closure: "Computers in the Soviet Economy"
17 January 1967 25X
25X1
OFFICE
O/ DDS& T
- ILS/DDS&T
1 - DD/S&T Registry
b 1.; JAN 1963,
EO/DD/S&'$
FORM 53
1-63
(40)
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MFO: 1 -66
25X
01004S3PATCH
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Available
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S-2055 (DCI :Lricfir.S)
25 November 1966
CO.'f?UI RS IN Ti SOVIET ECONOMY
For a number of years Soviet economists have been saying that
cybernetics and computers can be used. together to solve ...any of their
economic problems. In some ways it might seem that the centrally-
controlled economy and the computer were tailor-made for one another.
Slit in fact) the Soviet economy to ay depends more on the abacus and
the hand calculator than it does on the modern, computer. Tr,e USSR
bac.ly -L_--hind. most industrial nations in the use of computers.
".,., how.. Chap t .L, the US man installed its first thousand computers
L,oout e-'--_ ,; years ahead of the USSR and now has ten tics as many
use . Even Western Europehas twice as many computers
:.. open _ ~~ G._ as the Soviet Union.
Co:._ -ters have revolution .zed the procecsin5 of economic and
in the US during the past ten years, and have than
or themselves oy reduction in costs. The potential for a,plyin
computers in the Soviet economy is equally Great, but the USSR is
years away from the pay-off that the American economy has already
realized. The major reason for the Soviet laF, is that the USSR has
.sed most of its computers in military and scientific work and r,as
barely scratched the surface in economic applications.
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i
Cru_ 11 shows how the US and. USSR have allocated their computers .
:ereas the US employs nearly 50% of its Tar Te inventory in the economy
and only about -Too in military and. scientific work, the USSR now uses
less than I % of its computers in the economy. I-.e Soviet Union is
u,;- nct a system of process:n.S economic data t' at hardly been
Changcd. in the last -O years. Acout 3 million people are engaged in
paperwork system in which hand operations predominate; fewer than
500 outdated co:puters are used in the economic data system. By
contrast, the US has automated lame chunks of its economic data
,c-ye wit ,- the aid of about 20, 000 computers.
Soviet planners and writers are well aware of the defects in
heir economic data system. This was dramatized by Soviet acedemician
&Ius kov, who said that by 1980, under the present syste u, e volume
of paperwork will have increased by 3,600% and the entire population
of the USSR will then be needed to compile and am yze economic data.
Soviet plarners hope to replace their present cumbersome methods
with a national network of computers, which would enable them to
process data and solve problems more rapidly and efficiently at a
great saving in labor. They face major problems in Working toward
this goal. The tasks before them are summarized. in Chart III.
1. Install Several Thousand Modern Computers
Existing Soviet computers for economic data processing are
crude by US standards. Most Soviet machines are des~;ned for military
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~ ~ . w -CC , e to
scion c work and # re not as useful
occs iri'7. what the Soviets nc :r_ for tar e-sCaie economic work +.s
Cum at 1~ ne of American machines capable of over 1 miilio n
tructior.s vier second and with storage capaci ,, .in excess cf 10
l on Y GrdS.' Z,' hat t hey ave for data p riocC.:_,. fICd bar
a machine capable of E0,000 instructions per second
and wi th stor al e capac 1ty of 130 000 words . Their very best and
newest :lac ine, the sM-6, 1s capable of 1' million instructions per
second, but was aesig nod for scicr :,ific gather than econoruic uses.
The Soviets are even further behind in the equipment that
accompanies the basic computer and makes it more useful. They use
;unchca cacao ao djrcct input to computers, a process conoJ crcd
. uch too slow in the CS today. They use outdated methods to store
weir data, and their page and Tina printers are relatively slow.
_uch of their equipment is of low reliability. Because of these
;GGrtcc an S they often cannot use their computers as efficiently
as we do.
2. Train Thousands of Computer Specialists
Computer manufactures in the US have been highly successful
because they service what they sell. In addition to installing the
machine, -they often keep full-time representatives on the premises
to :rk intain it. By contrast, Soviet computer manufactures have badly
neglected their customers. They usually Just hook up the mac,--e and
n Such as the ZBM 360/65.
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identify its parts, and than are never hear from again. The User
is ".porcc- to exile Lmerit, to do his Owl repairs, TO rTake riffs owl
p:re parts -- and in the process he may changc the operating
characteristics of v'_C computer so that he cannot share pro:ra~.s with
other users of the sa e model. ns an ox-_ ple of these C _p: is ties,
the Soviets reported that in 1965 ::ere were LO delivered but
unassembled computers in the Ukraine and the computers that were in
operation were idle one-third of the time .
The supply of prograT iers, operators, repairmen, and. other computer
specialists in the USSR is far below demand. Production of computers
annwally, and t~^air1n5 of personnel must
is increasing about }0
10
enmand even faster if the deficit is to be overcome.
The tremendous growth 'of 'computers the US and Western Europe
is due in part to the widespread use of prograrr."ng languages. These
ar.ges resemble a form of pidgin English and are used to tell the
computer what to do. rlt'hough the languages are developed by skilled
:;mathematicians, they can be taught quite easily to bright high school
graduates. The use of languages results in great savings in time and
:coney.
However, program:.ing languages are in their infancy in the
USSR and have been used with only a few machines. Before the Soviets
can employ computers on a mass scale in economic data processing,
they swill be forced to develop prograr::ming languages and to train
thousands of programers.
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develop an Llaoorate Co.;~:,uricatior~s System
order to use .~. nationwide ne tworh of Computers that carn
data a :(:~ assist plan ..i, the Soviets m ,tag:.
..anna aoc economic m 'n3 '~~ -
~..
UU ila a con uricatlOns rie tWO:": now
existence. Evert uaiiy t .ey trope to have each pant or C_":C r ri
conneetc. with a regional computer center, which in turn will be
coZrected. with other regional center,. and. with a national com uter
center in Moscow. Ideally, a person O~'ier ling a remote conso_c
an yWiiere Nac n be as e to ostaan data directly and.
almost _ .~:.ediately fro 1 any of the regional centers in the nation.
T, -As Will reCiuire a vast, flexibie communications system that the
Soviets Ipro'oaoly coma not develop for more than a decade.se the cono is ~:eportir.; System
The Soviets must revise their methods of economic reporting
it ^e ? ~ 1
i:~ ~in planning and statist--'cal S f^a,;cl:S.
they expect to automate
Today there are several parallel info"r: :lion systems that impose
separate burdens on the plant manager. There is redundant reportlnr,
of data into each system with little effort at standardization.
or e.:emple, different reporting systems use different stock nuxsoers
for identical items, Which rakes it difficult for them to exchange
data with one another.
Soviet writers recognize that the economy faces a major
irfor .ation crisis and that they must make sweeping chances before
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"_ey c ar, l e CO . 1 " ers on a scale. T :e Soviet econo :.is
~ ' 'The eco no .ic
IO' GWS:
CCCrC .G ^U fa:^iZCC the Cu it 1I11 pro"v~C :c as
/ ,. 1 '. C a.~
te `Consists) ca~a ccl-cd by tr.C StaT-
sJs l.G ~:
y ~:pG~' l,lnv
Y -, ., tclep. one conversations and.
agency and b ccns of a Zroat r.ur,:se~ of
0 rase data, COllcc'i.ed with a grcat dcl r, no m i re than
II:@etl:
Q. or pur7GSes Gf plannir.~. Relying on such see ,
are use
f
form' ate scientif ica.:_ ..y based
the or ans of i,_urm. rr oft a Ca"Inot
lJ
rie tlaoas.
1 -r.odern scientific
_Jla,n ever, wII@A usln~; CO.nLl~e~ and
5. Educate Enterprise Yanagers
Fir_ally, many enterprise managers are dragging their heels
in the ~GVer~L.:er/t' s effort to introduce new techno10', ...n eluuin
computers. They often have no incentive to change old ideas, and
they find ways of postponing new ones. The USSR is now begirniny to
use computers in a variety of actlvit es. for example, to route
trains and aircraft, to fins. t'no most profitable location for new
r.s
cement giants, to control cc.1J?~'ucticn p.ro'ects, and to help solve
problems in agriculture. But most of this work is still in t.e
exper L-::ental stage, and widespread applications cannot be expected
for a Owhen enterprise managers have beer. of years. Only
educated in the benefits of the computer will they be enthusiastic
about its use.
The directives of the new Soviet Five Year Plan- for 1966-70
givera,;or emphasis to increasing production of computers that are
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agile -,~o handle Iar;e a:~ou:.s o= eco': c:iic data. A ire ssr;:c ~..~,
Soviet- Qconcr..-Ls~s are ~jushin their .:escarch to ".eveio
models of the economy. plwnrcrc realize that chore i3 an
1r yl~:l~ .Y
cnorr.".o'uc of \'ork to be done and 'a,.- only a .t.L ~ rt
be accc.:,~lis::ed in the next give years. i~ Wiil be ti,eL is to e
1970's fore tae rl&iio 1 rework O CO: .p ut can bei:l -o :-C' eve
1-he burden of y anerwor it and to iael , solve y r o i i cr.S for the part
r',aana e r.
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35,C-3
..0, Cu
25, COD
20, C-00
15,CCO
10, Coo
5,000
1,000
1955 1960 1965
WESTERN
I
EUROPE
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NA! , RY A` D
SC'E TIF!C USES
60%G
ECONOMM C US
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ti . .~. r sr ''I L
!NSdALr a y``I/.'v''D/ a ^' ~ . r..
t.. /'..r. ~ ~ t.! i.Y ~ / ~. ' nc u V
? D_VEL O' AIN E A3O?AT CO :. :' C L 1 ~.~S.7_.
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