CURRENT SITUATION AND OPTIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP68R00530A000100130014-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 27, 2005
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: June 16, 1965
• Content Type: REPORT

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WORKING AID FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SUBJECT Current Situation and Options
in South Vietnam
This working aid presents, in tabular form, some of
the vital elements of the situation in South Vietnam and
postulates certain US options for dealing with that
situation.
The vertical column lists the major participants in
the situation; the horizontal bar lists elements of the
situation or US options. At each intersection, therefore,
will be found statements relating one of the participants
to an element of the situation or stating that participant's
estimated response to a US option.
Where published Special National Intelligence Esti-
mates or ONE memoranda are applicable to a given option,
these are cited in a source reference; otherwise the
statements represent the judgment of the CIA Vietnam
Working Group. Statements are numbered by combining
the Roman numeral in the vertical column with the Arabic
numeral on the horizontal bar; e.g. IB5 refers to the
South Vietnamese reaction to the US option postulated
in column 5 of the table.
A Top Secret table approved by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff in November 1964 is attached as an annex; it
postulates certain Communist military actions and suggests
US/GVN responses as foreseen at that time. Use of the
JCS table in this context has not been auauthorized by the
Department of Defense.
PREPARED BY THE CIA VIETNAM WORKING GROUP
JCS review(s) completed.
TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET
tw~w d`' "t ' -- /-,
c.-
r~/V ~/IrWMMVY"`~t
CURRENT SITUATION
and
OPTIONS
SOUTH VIETNAM
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1
Minimum Objectives & Interests
2
Current Tactics
3 Stated Conditions for Negotiations
US
1.
Containment of Chicom expansionism in SEA
1.
Limited bombing of north to hamper infiltra-
None, other than unwillingness to deal with
r
2.
.
Establishment of a stable, independent, non-
tion, hearten SVN, and eventually hurt DRV
h to cause it to call off war
enou
Liberation Front.
- - 0
Communist government in Saigon.
2.
.
g
Improvement of balance of forces through in-
3.
Cessation of hostile armed activity in SVN.
tensified local recruitment and deployment
SVN
1.
Physical & economic _ security
of US and other forces.
3.
Compete with Viet Cong for popular support
i-B
2.
3
Survival as an independent entity
Preservation of traditional social &
through wide variety of civic and military
l
b
tt
l
f
.
er
oca
or
e
measures including pressure
cultural patterns
and national government.
NVN
1
Force US out of South Vietnam
1.
Supply of men and arms to Viet Cong
"
"
Insists it has no "preconditions", only "working
.
2.
volunteers
Threaten overt introduction of
principles", which center around cessation of
2.
2
Set up government under Communist
p g
from the north,
bombings against DRV, recognition of Front, US
influence.
3.
Generate international pressures on US to
withdrawal.
----
withdraw.
Same
----
VIET CONG
"---'"
3
1.
2.
Destruction of ARVN units and will to resist.
Terrorism, agitation and subversion aimed at
Essentially the same as DRV, but often stated as
"preconditions".
disrupting SVN political and social order.
1
Elimination of US influence from SVN
1.
Supply of military aid to DRV and VC.
No stated conditions of its own but Peiping has
T
.
2
Propaganda and diplomatic support for DRV
strongly endorsed the position taken by DRV and
2.
Set up Communist-dominated, pro-Chinese gov-
.
NFLSV.
ernment in Saigon.
and VC.
COMMUNIST
3.
Take credit for any Communist victory in SVN
3.
Psychological warfare, including threats of
CHINA
to prove Chicom methods are better than Soviet
intervention.
in fighting US.
4.
Preservation of a Communist regime in NVN.
1.
Avoidance of general war.
1.
Supply of military equipment to DRV.
None stated on its own.
Y
2
Take as much credit as possible from any Commu.
Has voiced support for DRV and NFLSV positions.
.
nist victory in South Vietnam and deny credit
2.
Political pressures on US to negotiate on
Has stated belief that the first step toward
DRV/VC terms,
negotiations must be cessation of bombings.
to Peiping.
USSR
3.
Preservation of a Communist regime in NVN.
4.
Limit spread of Chinese influence in SE Asia.
I
GENERAL
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 VIET CONG
COMMUNIST'
CHINA
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Current Prospects
US Option #1
Bombing thus far had little impact either on
ability or willingness of DRV to support war
in south.
Government forces hard pressed as Viet Cong
intensify offensive operations.
Political instability in Saigon weakening
war effort and bringing pacification ac-
tivities to virtual standstill.
Presently favorable for the destruction of
ARVN fighting ability and morale.
The closer the ARVN comes to defeat, the
better the Chinese Communist position.
Dim for arranging a negotiated settlement.
Only fair for countering Chicom boasts that
Vietnam war proves its thesis on revolution
correct.
3. Placed in increasingly difficult position as
war escalates.
Terminate commitments in SVN and withdraw under
conditions which impair US standing elsewhere as
little as possible.
Political and military collapse,
Triumphant propaganda boasting about success of
Vietnamese people in throwing out foreign "aggres
sor". Early moves to establish at least de facto
political control over all of Vietnam.
Early moves to smash remaining vestiges of anti-
Communist authority and to absorb South Vietnamese
government under VC banner.
Vindication of theses on "US paper tiger" and
national liberation strategy.
Employment of Communist victory in Vietnam to
improve China's standing in world Communist move-
ment to detriment of USSR.
Increase in pressure on Laos, Cambodia, and
Northern Thailand.
Increased problems with Peiping in World Commu-
nist Movement.
Re-examination of estimates of US staying power
in face of "liberation wars" and, perhaps, in-
creased support of "liberation movements" in
Africa and Latin America.
Initial relief at cessation of hostility and
diminished risk of general war.
Widespread belief that US had failed in test
case of its ability to cope with insurgency.
Asian countries would review their relations
with US and Peiping and would downgrade import-
ance and value of US backing and support.
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US Option #2
Continue according to present plans, using only
those forces currently programmed and avoiding
major escalation in NVN.
GVN will probably be unable to cope with mount-
ing VC military pressure and ARVN may be defeated
or virtually destroyed on field of battle.
Steady increase of support to VC, continued dis-
interest in neogitations and hardening of DRV at-
titude.
Constant increase in military pressure on GVN
and in political agitation and terrorism, es-
pecially in urban areas.
Continued encouragement to Hanoi to perservere
and not be seduced by negotiation offers.
Additional promises of support to NVN, par-
ticularly if it appears that such support will
not be needed.
Will probably not even try to urge early nego-
tiations on Hanoi. Will probably continue to pro-
vide support, at least in terms of material as-
sistence to improve DRV's air defense capability,
including radar and, perhaps, additional SAMs.
Continued criticism of US involvement in Viet-
nam and increasing disbelief in possibility of
US/GVN success.
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US Option #3
VIET CONG
COMMUNIST
CHINA
Major augmentation and commitment of US Forces
to offensive action (per Westmoreland suggestion)
but avoiding major escalation in NVN.
Ambivalent reaction: encouragement but some
tendency to "let US do it".
Probably improvement in military situation,but
actual result would depend on how US Forces used
and key determinant would be effectiveness of
total effort, political as well as military.
No lessening of determination to win but would
recognize task had become harder.
Combat results would be real test.
DRV would step up its support, including addi-
tional NVN line units. If tide of battle ran
heavily against VC, might consider negotiations.
Would urge VC and DRV to continue struggle.
Would promise more aid should US invade NVN.
Might make some troop movements in Southern
China to underscore commitment but would prob-
ably not intervene at this stage.
Problems would grow more acute.
Would see no alternative to continued support
for DRV. In time might have to face awkward
choice of moving toward withdrawal or accepting
risks of deepening Soviet commitment.
Those who doubt US ability to avoid defeat
would think agony being prolonged and escalation
risks increased.
Governments which support US would come under
GENERAL I increasing criticism.
Approv
US Option #4
Combine option #2 with unrestricted aerial war-
fare in NVN.
Morale would be heartened by punishment of
north, but situation on ground in SVN would be
about as described in option #2.
So long as Communist progress was being made on
the ground in SVN, Hanoi would probably perservere.
VC would press on as described above in option
#2. Reduced DRV resupply capabilies might even-
tually be felt but not for some time and issue
might be decided by then.
So long as Communists think they are winning
in SVN, Peiping unlikely to intervene with ground
forces.
Commitment of Chinese aircraft and pilots based
in NVN, likely; Chicom air operations from bases
in China less likely unless Chinese territory ac-
tually attacked.
Chicom attacks elsewhere in Asia (off shores,
Taiwan, Korea) unlikely.
So long as Communists think they are winning in
SVN, USSR most unlikely to intervene with ground
forces.
New pressures and threats against US.
Further military aid if feasible.
Criticism (including domestic) of US action
would mount sharply as would pressure on -- and
from -- allied governments.
Condemnation from UN likely.
9
US Option #5
Combining option #3 with unrestricted aerial
warfare in NVN.
Improvement of morale and capability for coping
with VC pressure but ultimate test would still be
that of combat and effectiveness of total program
(See #3)
Unless VC decisively checked on ground 4A SVN,
DRV would probably perservere. If VC so checked
would probably seek negotiations.
Would perservere as in #3 above unless or until
ordered to desist by Hanoi.
Ash #4, but would make obvious troop move-
ments as if to intervene.
As in #4
Appearance "volunteers" possible.
As in #4 but more so.
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SENSITIVE,
JCS Postulation of Possible Communist Actions and Possible US/GVN Countermoves
Communist Action
1. Stepped up VC operations.
VC might attack US/GVN bases, terrorize US
citizens, try to disrupt SVN govt and economy with
increased terror, sabotage, attacks in Saigon, pro-
vincial capitals, and rural areas.
2. DRV or Chicom air attacks on SVN or US carriers.
The DRV Air Force (if not crippled by US strikes)
can conduct fighter-bomber attacks against northern
SVN and close-in carriers. From Hainan, Chicom
fighter-bombers can reach northern half of SVN, and
bombers can reach all of SVN and carriers in So.
China Sea.
3. DRV ground attack against SVN or Laos.
The DRV, for reasons of rear area security and
coast defense, has only 5 deployable divisions.
It can, depending on weather, put and support 2
(in 48 hrs) to 5 divisions across the DMZ and/or
up to 3 into Laos.
4. Chicom/DRV ground attack into SE Asia.
If not interdicted, the Chicom/DRV, depending
on weather, can put and support 7-24 divisions into
SEA. First Chicom forces could enter South Vietnam
in 10 days.
Possible US/Allied Countermoves
a. Take additional security measures, including
dispersal outside SVN of some US air and adding
US/GVN ground forces for base security and for
protection of key cities or installations.
b. Step up attack on infiltration targets.
c. Evacuate unessential non-combatants.
d. Carry out reprisals in dramatic cases.
a. If Communist attack small, consider a limited
reprisal.
b. If large and only DRV involved: (1) US/GVN
airstrike DRV airfields, POL and support facil-
ities to kill the DRV Air Force; (2) reinforce
air defenses in SVN as insurance against Chicom
air strikes; (3) alert US ground forces for de-
ployment to SEA.
c. If large and Chicoms involved: (1) US air
intercept, engage in "hot pursue" Chicom air-
craft; (2) US air strike air bases and related
facilities in South China; (3) to forestall Chi-
com ground action, US air strike interdiction-
type targets in South China; (4) consider hitting
Chicom nuclear production facilities; (5) begin
major deployments to SEA and West Pac to provide
against the contingency of Chicom ground inter-
vention.
a. Defense: GVN ground defense, augmented
quickly by US ground forces.
b. Offense: (1) US/GVN interdiction, attrition
and punitive air attacks on NVN; (2) US harbor
mining and naval blockade; (3) early US/GVN
ground offensive (consider seizing and occupying
some or all of NVN).
c. Major deployments: Begin major US deployments
to SEA and West Pac to provide against the contin-
gency of Chicom intervention.
In addition to actions in para 3 above:
d. Extend air strikes and blockade to So. China,
increase US ground forces in SEA to 5-2/3 divi-
sions, and employ US naval and air forces on a
large scale against China.
e. Consider attacking Chicom nuclear production
facilities.
f. Stress either a ground offensive to seize
North Vietnam (per OPLAN 32-64) or air and naval
action designed to drive Red China out of the war
A gvg 0061( l (01 11-~ ~ ~5 A~@~ a,"4-8
We cannot prevent stepped up VC operations,
but, unless the SVN Government topples, the VC
could harass but not stop US/GVN strike programs
(which could be conducted entirely from outside
SVN).
Air superiority over DRV should be achiev-
able in 2 days, over South China in 5 days. If
Chicoms openly intervene and US conducts strikes
on the Chinese homeland, the risk of further es-
calation would be great.
SVN's army would be outnumbered 2 or more
to 1. It can resist initially with 1 div, plus
an airborne brigade as lift became available.
The ARVN's counter-VC role would slow further
reinforcement.
US air countermoves could be brought to bear
on short notice. US ground forces, if not de-
ployed in advance, would be arriving in the area
slower than Chinese forces, unless the latter
were successfully interdicted.
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I-B-5 through V-5:
11-6 through V-6:
I-B-7 through V-7:
I-B-8:
11-8 through IV-8:
V-8:
OPTION #5
11-9 through V-9:
SOURCE SHEET
(Options)
Working Group judgment; this option
has not previously been considered
by CIA or the USIB.
Working Group judgment; MACV
(Westmoreland cable) is even more
gloomy.
Working Group judgment; in accord
with tenor of recent estimates though
latter have not been specifically
addressed to this option.
ONE 10 June 65 coordinated memoran-
dum "Reactions to a Further US
Buildup in South Vietnam".
Working Group judgment; not specifi-
cally addressed in earlier estimates.
Covered by statement or implication
in 11 June 65 ONE Briefing Paper.
Working Group judgment; not really
covered in earlier estimates.
Working Group judgment.
Covered in part in ONE Briefing
Paper, 11 June 65.
7'OP SECRET
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THE SITUATION
lb
IIb
COMMUNIST
CHINA
IV
1. Containment of ChiCom expansionism in SEA.
2. Establishment of a stable, independent, non-
Communist government in Saigon.
3. Cessation of hostile armed activity in SVN.
1. Physical & economic security
2. Survival as an independent entity.
3. Preservation of traditional social &
cultural patterns.
1. Force US out of South Vietnam.
2. Set up coalition government under Communist
influence.
1. Elimination of US influence from SVN.
2. Set up Communist-dominated, pro-Chinese
government in Saigon.
3. Take credit for any Communist victory in SVN
to prove ChiCom methods are better than
Soviet in fighting US.
4. Preservation of a Communist regime in NVN.
1. Avoidance of general war.
2. Take as much credit as possible from any
Communist victory in South Vietnam and deny
credit to Peiping.
3. Preservation of a Communist regime in NVN.
4. Limit spread of Chinese influence in SE Asia.
1. Limited bombing of north to hamper infiltra-
tion, hearten SVN, and eventually hurt DRV
enough to cause it to call off war.
2. Improvement of balance of forces through
intensified local recruitment and deployment
of US and other forces.
3. Compete with Viet Cong for popular support
through wide variety of civic and military
measures including pressure for better local
and national government.
1. Supply of men and arms to Viet Cong.
2. Threaten overt introduction of "volunteers"
from the north.
3. Generate international pressures on US to
withdraw.
1. Destruction of ARVN units and will to resist.
2. Terrorism, agitation and subversion aimed at
disrupting SVN political and social order.
1. Supply of military aid to DRV and VC.
2. Propaganda and diplomatic support for DRV
and VC.
3. Psychological warfare, including threats of
intervention.
1. Supply of military equipment to DRV.
2. Political pressures on US to negotiate on
DRV/VC terms.
None, other than unwillingness to deal with
Liberation Front.
1. Bombing thus far has had little impact either
on ability or willingness of DRV to support
war in south.
2. Government forces hard pressed as Viet Cong
intensify offensive operations.
3. Political instability in Saigon weakening
war effort and bringing pacification
activities to virtual standstill.
Presently favorable for the destruction of
ARVN fighting ability and morale.
Insists it has no "preconditions", only "working
principles", which center around cessation of
bombings against DRY, recognition of Front, US
withdrawal.
Essentially the same as DRY, but often stated as
"preconditions".
No stated conditions of its own but Peiping has
strongly endorsed the position taken by DRV and
NFLSV.
None stated on its own.
Has voiced support for DRV and NFLSV positions.
Has stated belief that the first step toward
negotiations must be cessation of bombings.
The closer the ARVN comes to defeat, the
better the Chinese Communist position.
1. Dim for arranging a negotiated settlement.
2. Only fair for countering ChiCom boasts that
Vietnam war proves its thesis on revolution
correct.
3. Placed in increasingly difficult position as
war escalates.
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E US OPTION #1
F U$ OPTION #2
(
G US OPTION #3
H US OPTION #4
H
US OPTION #5
US OPTION #6
I
J
US
Terminate commitments in SVN and withdraw under
Continue according to present plans, using only
Yajor augmentation and commitment of US farces to
u
t
i
conditions which impair US standing elsewhere
those forces currently programmed and avoiding
offensive action in SVN but avoiding major
Unrestricted aerial warfare in
with no
t
ti
nres
r
cted aerial warfare in NVN with major
au
t
ti
d
Invade North Vietnam in farce in effort to
as little as possible.
major escalation on NVN
escalation in NYN.
t
major augmen
a
on of -S effort in SVN.
gmen
a
on an
commitment of US forces in SVN.
bring it capitulation by Hanoi
la
,
---
_ - _ _
_ _ _ _
Ambivalent reaction: encouragement but some
- - - -
- - - -
1, GVN
though enthusiastic
would be able to
NN
tendency to "let US do it",
Morale would be heartened by punishment of north
Improvement of morale and capability for ct
i
,
,
contribute only token force5.
Political and military collapse. e.
y ps
GVN will proba
probably be unable to cope with mount-
,
p
19
2, Some backlash resentment at colonialist
probabl imp r yement in military situation, but
as describ
d i
ti
#2
be that of
o
b
t
d
ff
ti
ieplications of US effort.
or virtually destroyed on field of battle.
actual result would depend on how US forces used
e
n op
on
.
m
c
a
an
e
ec
veness of total
(
I b
and key determinant would be effectiveness of
program
See #3)
IF
IF
total effort, political as well as military.
o
NUN
Triumphant propaganda boasting about success of
Steady increase of support to VC
continued
I
No lessening of determination to win but would
i IT
So long as Communist p
rogress w
as be
ing made
Vietnamese people in throwing out foreign
"
,
disinterest in negotiations and hardening of
recognize task had become Larder
H
on the ground in $VN, anoi would Probably
l
o
peebeiveyly checked on ground in
c
e
1. Pierce
ce
n
dance, in both conventional and
aggressor". Early move s to establish at least
pgy attitude .
.
persevere.
e
k
URV
wou d
probably persevere
VC so checked
I
il Is m
odes
guerr, by all wed forces
II a
de facto political control over all of Vietnam.
Combat results would be real test
s.
would probably seek negotiations.
2. If press
ed, fighting withdrawal to hinterlands
_ _ _ _
,
_ _ _
or M. into China, and appeal for comitment
VI ET CONG
- - - -
DRV would step up its support, includin
g
- - - -
-
of ChiCom farces.
Constant increase in military pressure on GVN
additional NVN Iine units. Overt i vas on
VC would press on as described above in option
W
I. Almost no likelihood of negotiation or
Early moves to smash remaining vestiges of anti-
and in.political agitation and terrorism
Possible, but covert infiltration more
#2. Reduced DRV resupply capabilities might
DRV r
esu
ould persevere s
a in #3 above unless or until
surrender.
II b
Co
mmunistauthority and to absorb South Viet .
,
especially in urban areas
likely. If tide of battle ran heavily
eventually be felt but not for some time and
ordered to desist by Hanoi.
1
All
t V
mesa government under VC banner.
against VC, might consider negotiations.
issue might be
by then,
.
-ou
C effort t
o harass US/OVN rear areas.
11F
IT G
IT H
nI
Vindication of theses on "US paper tiger" and
Continued encouragement to Hanoi to persevere
Would urge VC and DRV to continue struggle
So long as Communists think they are winning i
s
A
i
#4
b
national liberation strategy.
and not be seduced by negotiation offers.
.
S
Peiping unlikely to intervene with ground
s
n
,
ut would make obvious troop movements
1. Neald intervne massively, with or without
i
Would promise more aid should US invade NtR7
S
o Ce
as if to intervene
invitation,
ftheyconsidered NYN resistance
COMMUNIST
Exploitation of Communist victory in Vietnam to
Additional promises of support to M, portico-
,
g or 9
crumbling thought US/GVN forces likely to
amprove China's standing in world communist move-
larly if it appears that such support will not
Yi ht make some trop
mo
ements in Southern
E
Commitment of Chinese aircraft and pilots based
approach border.
CHINA
mast to detriment of USSR,
be needed.
v
ter
e
oth
c
Chin' to
but would
rub-
iu NVN, likely; CbiCom air operations from bases
troops into Laos and might
2, Probably move
in
v
ne
n stn
d
ably not terene at th iis stage
in China less likely unless Chinese territory
ai
threaten Thailand.
Increase in pressure on Laos, Cambodia, and
.
actually attacked.
3, With would generate intensive propaganda/
III
Northern Thailand,
to "stop US S aggression".
diplomatic pressure
in E
m I
Inc
iw attacks
an elsewhere in Asia (off shores,
T TaaiwanKorea) unlikely.
s
.I~7
Increased problems with Peiping in world
Will probably not even try to urge early
Problems would grow more acute.
So long as Communists think they are winning in
A. in 4
1. Would mount intensive diplomatic effort in
communist movement.
negotiations on Hanoi. Will probably continue
SVN, USSR most unlikely to intervene with
.
UN and elsewhere to preserve Communist regime
to provide support, at least in terms of
would see no alternative to continued support
ground forces.
Further military aid, possibly including
in Hanoi.
Re-examination of estimates of US staying power
"
material assistance, to improve DRV's air
for ISV. In time might have to face awkward
pilots and technicians, if feasible.
2. Would take internal military alert and
USSR
in face of liberation wars
and, perhaps,
"
defense capability, including radar and, perhaps,
choice of moving toward withdrawal or accepting
New pressures and threats against US,
deployment measures.
increased support of
liberation movements" in
additional SAYS,
risks of deepening Soviet commitment.
3. Emergency military aid
short of intervention
Africa and Latin America,
Further military aid, possibly including
,
with ground units
to NVN and perhaps China
pilots and technicians, if feasible.
,
.
IV
IV I
IV G
IV
IVI
IYI
Initial relief at cessation of hostility and
Continued criticism of US involvement in
Th
h
d
bt US
bilit
As in #4 b
t
diminished risk of general war.
Vietnam and increasing disbelief to possibility
ose w
o
ou
a
y to avoid defeat mould
thi
k
Criticism (including domestic) of Us action
u
more so.
1. Criticism of US further intensified,
of US/GVN success.
n
agony being prolonged and escalation risks
would mount sharply as would pressure on -- and
includin
ost certain UN condemnation.
g a
widespread belief that US had failed in test
increased.
from -- allied governments.
,
2. from orlfor e.g. ^n, forced
dissociate
GENERAL
case of its ability to cope with insur
gency.
ct
from or formally censure p6 ac till.
Governments which support US would come udder
Condemnation from UN likely.
S. Strong possibility of dispatch by Afro-
Asian countries would review their relations
increasing criticism.
Asians of volunteers.
with US and Peiping and would downgrade impor-
4. Worldwide demonstrations against US
v
tones and value of US backing and support.
installations and ersonnel.
P
VE
VG
V _LT
ci
Approved For Release 2006/03/10 : CIA-RDP68R00530A000100130014-8
 lb
IIb
COMMUNIST
CHINA
K checking Viet Cone
Would provide opportunity for intensive civic
action/political consolidation effort to extend
GVN authority and win popular support.
Would improve morale, possibly generating
additional support for GVN and perhaps inspire
greater efforts in political/civic action
programs.
1. Attempt to counter US/GVN success by intro-
ducing substantial numbers-of NVN troops,
covertly at first, overtly if necessary.
2. Would probably intensify subversion and
terrorism to offset military defeats.
3. Lowered VC morale and rise in defections.
1. Try to keep NVN and VC in the war with
increased political and material support.
2. More threats to send volunteers, but actual
dispatch unlikely.
3. Might move troops to NVN and Laos borders as
a threatening gesture.
4. General propaganda effort to convince US that
China will enter the war.
1. Probe for signs that either side wants to
negotiate.
2. Harder general public line toward US.
3. Increased military aid to NVN, but no troops.
1. Some relief at apparently improved prospects.
2. More pressure on US for negotiations.
Approved For Release 2006/03/10 : CIA-RDP68R00530A000100130014-8
EVENTUALITIES
EVENTUALITY #2
Imminent Viet Cong Collapse
1. Heightened requirement for major emphasis on
political and economic development programs.
1. Government in power would gain popular
prestige from success, though Saigon
politicking may increase.
2. Government's ability to translate initial
auccess into permanent popular, especially
rural, support essential to prevent renewed
insurgency.
M
EVENTUALITY #3
Imminent NVN Collapse
Refusal to surrender, fierce delaying action
awaiting Chinese rescue.
1, Substantial introduction of NVN troops
having failed, would probably seek ceasefire,
attempting to preserve clandestine organi-
zation and intending to resume at more
favorable time.
If not already subdued or at least under control,
would make all-out effort to harass rear areas
and lines of communication.
1. Back up DRV/VC efforts to preserve Viet Cong
assets in place through negotiated ceasefire
by escalated threats of "volunteer" inter-
vention plus show of strength in South China.
2. Make greater effort to preserve DRV as
sanctuary by warnings of Chinese intention
to defend DRY.
1. Will use imminent VC collapse to press thesis
that Chinese Communist policies lead to
disaster.
2. Might urge negotiated settlement on DRV.
Salutory second thoughts in Afro-Asian world
about US ability to counter subversion,
insurgency and Chinese expansionism.
Massive Chinese intervention, with or without
NVN invitation.
1. Continue with substantial military aid to
China and NVN, but no direct intervention.
2. Would probably not precipitate crisis
elsewhere in the world.
N
EVENTUALITY #4
Massive ChiCom Intervention
1. Chinese intention would be to drive US forces
out of SEA, including Thailand.
2. Within one week at least 6 of 21 infantry
divisions in NVN border regions could be
moving into NVN. Without interdiction,
probably 600,000 troops could be deployed in
NVN within 60 days.
3. Although defenses opposite Taiwan would be
strengthened, a second front against Taiwan,
Korea or India would be avoided.
1. Considerable emergency effort to sustain
ChiCom war fighting capabilities.
2. No direct engagement with US forces so long
as Soviets saw no direct threat to USSR or
to existence of Communist regime in China.
3. Loud sabre-rattling and pressures on both
sides for ceasefire.
Approved For Release 2006/03/10 : CIA-RDP68R00530A000100130014-8