CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A013700010001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 15, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 7, 1969
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
d51_
DIA and DOS review(s) completed.
7 May 1969
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No. 0109/69
7 May 1969
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
South Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 1)
Korea: The South Koreans have uncovered a North
Korean espionage net. (Page 2)
Chile: Pressure for action against US-based copper
companies is increasing. (Page 3)
United Kingdom: More Labor Party losses are expected
in :Local elections this week. (Page 4)
Tur rkey: Ankara is trying to mediate a strike that
is hampering certain US activities. (Page 5)
Iran: The Shah is attempting to strengthen and par-
tially restructure the armed forces. (Page 6)
Portuguese Africa - Zambia: The Portuguese have
agreed to restrict counterinsurgency operations.
(Page 7)
Bolivia: New cabinet (Page 8)
West Germany - Berlin: Bundestag committee meetings
Page 8)
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NORTH
nVIETNAM
AVERAGE STRENGTH
OF ENEMY UNITS
Battalion: VC 200 400
NVA 300 500
Demilitarized Zone
Regiment: VC 1,000 1,500
NVA 1,2002,000
CAM B06] A
Division: VC 5,000 7,000
NVA 5,0008,000
CAM
''RANH
SOUTH VIETNAM
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MILES
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I South Vietnam: Fighting has flared up in the
provinces north and west of Saigon.
The Communists unleashed 15 mortar and rocket
barrages against allied positions in the region and
a number of sharp ground clashes were reported on
5-6 May. Well dug in allied forces suffered gen-
erally light casualties, but four US troops were
killed and 25 wounded by mortar fire at one base in
Binh Long and South Vietnamese irregulars lost three
killed and 18 wounded in a fight in War Zone "D."
In Tay Ninh Province the enemy unit which
mounted a heavy ground assault against a US company
during the night of 5-6 May has been identified as
an element of the North Vietnamese lst Division.
In addition to 133 enemy killed in the battle, 33
prisoners were taken--an unusually high number of
main force troops. Many of the prisoners are prob-
ably inexperienced troops from newly arrived in-
filtration groups, which the enemy has been relying
on to maintain sporadic military pressure in north-
west III Corps.
The North Vietnamese are clearly continuing
these costly assaults in hopes of inflicting signif-
icant US casualties, which they consider a key
factor in raising US domestic pressure for a set-
tlement.
The Communists may also harass Saigon with
rockets as part of their May campaign plan. A
recently captured prisoner claims that 100 civilian
laborers have been ordered to move heavy rockets
toward the capital during the night of 7-8 May.
7 May 69
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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Korea: South Korean security authorities may
have uncovered an important North Korean espionage
net
(national assemblyman belonging to the govern-
ment party was arrested on 1 May on charges of "trav-
eling to North Korea" a few years ago, reportedly
during his student days in London. According to
a National Assembly official, the case could take
on :bigger proportions than the arrests in 1967 of
the members of an East Berlin - based North Korean
spy ring which involved several prominent South
Korean intellectuals at home and abroad. The ar-
rest--as yet unannounced--was made on the basis of
There are already signs that this development
will produce serious political repercussions. A
leading opposition legislator has informed the US
Embassy that once the case is made public his party
intends to charge the government party with recruit-
ing Communist sympathizers. It is also likely that
factional elements within the regime will try to
exploit the incident. The arrested legislator may
have had political ties that could aggravate in-
fighting within the regime over th u ion of a
third term for President Pak in 1971.
7 May 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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Chile: Pressure for some form of action
against US-based copper companies is increasing
in President Frei's Christian Democratic Party.
The left-wing "rebel" sector of the party has
long advocated nationalization of the companies,
although the Frei administration has stood firmly
behind the "Chileanization" agreements signed in
1967 that give the Chilean Government participation
in the ownership and management of the companies.
Several weeks ago, however, a deputy from the sec-
tion of the party that usually supports Frei called
for nationalization of Anaconda on the ground that
it had been buying up mineral lands in the north,
thus putting more resources into foreign hands.
The position officially adopted at a meeting
of the Christian Democratic Party last week goes
beyond Frei's policy and calls for "recovery of na-
tural resources through a policy of Chileanization
or nationalization in accord with the national in-
terest."
Action against the copper companies appears
to be a subject on which much of the party, other-
wise badly divided, can agree. It is certain to
be an important issue in the campaign for the res-
idential election in 1970.
7 May 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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Turkey: (7Th(
ILLEGIB
(Minister of
Tel's rsonal representative on the case, has called
together union and company officials in an effort
to end the labor dispute. There has been little
indication thus far of a willingness to compromise,
however.\
~an s ips carrying military cargo
the time being, at least, all the strike
sites appear to be quiet, but there have been sev-
eral instances of violence and harassment of US
personnel. The most serious of these arose at a
US Army water terminal and a cold storage facility
near Istanbul, where strikers cut phone lines and
interfered with mail deliveries. Some trouble also
occurred in the key ports of Istanbul, Izmir, and
Iskenderun when US ships arrived carrying troop
supplies and military aid cargo. The USNS O'Brien,
which reached Izmir a week ago, left port without
unloading when dock strikers threatened to board
it. The ship's master reportedly was jostled b
the mob when he refused to hand over the manifest.
(Turkish officials have instructed union lead-
ers to take all necessary precautions to prevent
any further interference with the unloading of
Ame r l ~^ h ?
The main issues in the strike, which could
spreato nearly all US military installations in
Turkey, are wage increases, severance pay, demands
for managerial positions, and annual bonuses. The
strike is actually targeted against the American
firm hiring Turkish labor rather than against the
US installations themselves. The strikers, how-
ever, are picketing the installations where the
contract labor works in o r t in pressure
against the hiring firm
7 May 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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Iran: The Shah has taken a series of steps
designed to strengthen and partially restructure
the Iranian armed forces
a surprise move, the Shah replaced the chief
of the Supreme Commander's Staff, General Bahram
Ariana, with Lt. General Feridun Jam. He has also
replaced the commanding general of the Iranian
ground forces.
The changes result from differences in philos-
ophy on the organization of the Iranian armed forces
and could also reflect a desire to replace incum-
bents with younger, more aggressive, and highly
professional officers. Ariana, who was not in sym-
pathy with the Shah on key development issues, has
not been generally receptive to modern military
techniques and doctrine. Jam, a close personal
friend of the Shah is considered an intelligent
and forceful leade
General Jam has already planned two changes in
the military structure. The Iranian Military Intel-
ligence Department (MID) will be abolished and its
functions merged with the intelligence group in the
Supreme Commander's Staff. Troop commanders had
criticized the MID for inadequate reporting on Iraqi
dispositions, especially during the early days of
the Shatt al-Arab crisis. Jam has also said that
the army will give increased emphasis to the devel-
opment of a smaller, more mobile ground force. A
key element in the new plan will be a buildup of
"militia" forces among the tribes, staffed and com-
manded by armyficers and organized Qr guerrilla-
type warfare.' 1
7 May 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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Portuguese Africa -- Zambia: The Portuguese
apparently have agreed to restrict all air force
and army counterinsurgency units from areas at least
ten miles from the Mozambique-Zambian frontie
is esigne to
numerous incidents that have occurred on
the Zambian side of the border between Portuguese
forces and Zambia-based insurgents. The agreement
also lessens the chance of another direct encounter
between Portuguese and Zambian troops such as the
one that occurred last November
Portugal's willingness to implement the agreement
will probably be predicated on Zambia's continuing
to restrict the activities of guerrillas on its
territory.
Zambia's dependence on transport routes through
Portuguese Africa and a mutual desire by Lisbon and
Lusaka to prevent the spread of fighting to Zambia
have opened the way for considerable unofficial
contact and a surprising degree of accommodation.
Border problems related to insurgent activity and
Zambia's expanded use of rail routes through Portu-
guese Angola have been the most notable examples of
agreement
7 May 69 Central Intelligence Bz lIeti:i
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Bolivia: The cabinet sworn in on 5 May re-
flects a compromise between President Siles and
l
i
udes
nc
armed forces commander in chief Ovando. It
two relatives of Ovando and members of all the par-
ties that supported the Barrientos administration
but none of the young technicians Barrientos had
favored. In general, the cabinet seems competent
and perhaps somewhat more conservative than the one
it replaced.
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West Germany - Berlin: The decision of the
Bundestag leadership to hold committee meetings in
West Berlin early next month will probably arouse
some opposition in West Germany and draw protests
from East Berlin and Moscow. West German tradition-
alists have long argued that such meetings are nec-
essary to emphasize Bonn-Berlin ties. Opponents
have claimed that the sessions unnecessarily harm
chances for easing tensions with East Germany and
the Soviet Union. Leaders of the Kiesinger govern-
ment, including the chancellor, showed a willingness
prior to the 5 March presidential election in Berlin
to de-emphasize the federal presence in the city, if
the price were right. They may be receptive to pri-
vate negotiations with the East concerning the meet-
ings.
7 May 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin 8
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