CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79T00975A017700030001-2
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RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
18
Document Creation Date:
December 14, 2016
Document Release Date:
February 12, 2003
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
December 1, 1970
Content Type:
REPORT
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
40
1 December 1970
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No. 0287/70
1 December 1970
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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YUGOSLAVIA - WEST GERMANY: Scheel's visit to Yugo-
slavia made good relations even better. (Page 2)
FRANCE-POLAND: The visit of Chaban-Delmas and Schu-
mann to Poland has restored good relations. (Page 3)
ALBANIA-YUGOSLAVIA: The thawing of hostile attitudes
continues. (Page 4)
COMMUNIST CHINA: The regime is putting military of-
ficers in key central government positions. (Page 5)
PAKISTAN: Yahya Khan has moved to ease tension in
East Pakistan. (Page 7)
CHILE: The Communist Party is boasting of its role
in the Allende government. (Page 8)
NICARAGUA: The government and the opposition are
negotiating on the country's political future.
(Page 10)
USSR - EAST GERMANY: Warsaw Pact meeting (Page 11)
ARGENTINA: Anti-US terrorism (Page 11)
CAMBODIA: US Embassy explosion (Page 11)
LAOS: Military situation (Page 13)
CONGO (BRAZZAVILLE): Power struggle (Page 13)
CONGO (KINSHASA): Acting army commander (Page 14)
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SECRET
YUGOSLAVIA - WEST GERMANY: West German Foreign
Minister Sc ee s official visit to Yugoslavia from
25 to 27 November made good relations between the
two countries even better.
Against a backdrop of exceptionally warm press
coverage, Scheel and his Yugoslav counterpart, Mirko
Tepavac, signed an extradition agreement that opens
the way for West German deportation of Yugoslav
emigre terrorists currently working out of the
Federal Republic. Progress also is being made to-
ward resolving the most serious problem in bilateral
relations--German indemnification of Yugoslav World
War II victims. It was announced that negotiations
on this subject will begin soon.
In the realm of economic relations, the Yugo-
slavs urged Bonn to accept their assurances that
capital investments and profits could be repatriated
if joint ventures earned sufficient foreign exchange
to cover the amounts sought in repatriation. Bonn,
however, held out for guaranteed repatriation re-
gardless of the foreign exchange position of indi-
vidual companies. The two sides agreed to another
urgent meeting of specialists to resolve the issue,
which threatens existing joint arrangements.
I Yugoslav offi-
c s are pleased with e outcome of the talks.
For its part, Bonn appears motivated by a desire
to demonstrate to other East European states the
benefits which can flow from a normalizatif n of
relations.
1 Dec 70 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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FRANCE-POLAND: The visit to Warsaw last week
of Premier Chaban-Delmas and Foreign Minister Schu-
mann appears to have restored the good relations
existing between the two countries prior to the 1968
events in Czechoslovakia.
This was probably the intent of the French in
making the trip, and the Poles responded with a red-
carpet welcome. At the same time Paris once again
demonstrated its tendency to go its own way in pur-
suing relations with Communist countries, as it had
previously with President Pompidou's trip to Moscow
and Planning Minister Bettencourt's visit to Peking.
The Poles clearly wanted, and obtained, a French
statement of satisfaction with the German-Polish
treaty, and a reiteration of French de facto recog-
nition of the Oder-Neisse boundary as an "indisput-
able and irreversible fact." The visit also gave
Warsaw an opportunity to stress that its political
and economic policy toward Western Europe is not
wholly focused on relations with West Germany.
Despite Polish pressures, the French visitors
held to the position taken by Pompidou in Moscow
that Paris would support only a "properly prepared"
conference on European security and only following
substantial progress on the Berlin negotiations and
ratification of the West German - Soviet nonaggres-
sion pact.
In the realm of bilateral activities, the two
countries agreed to develop "political cooperation"
through regular consultations with the purpose of
eventually coordinating initiatives. They also dis-
cussed development of closer economic, cultural, and
scientific-technological ties.
The three top Polish party leaders--Gomulka,
President Spychalski, and Premier Cyrankiewicz--
acce ted an invitation to visit France.
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ICRET
ALBANIA-YUGOSLAVIA: Improvement in relations
continues despite persisting major ideological and
nationalistic differences.
The 25th anniversary of the Yugoslav republic
and the conclusion of an annual bilateral trade pro-
tocol last week provided both sides the opportunity
to demonstrate anew the gradual thawing of hostile
attitudes begun in late 1968. Commenting on the
Yugoslav holiday, Tirana glossed over outstanding
issues and, in a tone not noted in over 20 years,
stressed the unity and common experience of the two
peoples. The theme of the commentary was in line
with a milestone speech by Albanian party chief
Hoxha last May and a Tirana statement on the 29th
anniversary of the Nazi invasion of Yugoslavia in
April. Answering recent Yugoslav allegations of a
Tirana-Sofia detente at Belgrade's expense, Tirana
reassured the Yugoslavs that they continue to have
a friend in Albania, which. regards "their enemies
as enemies of the Albanian people."
The trade protocol for 1971 was signed in Bel-
grade on 26 November. For the first time both coun-
tries agreed to long-term economic consultations
running from 1971 to 1975. The Albanian delegation
was given VIP treatment by Belgrade, including a
tour of the Romanian-Yugoslav Iron Gates hydroelec-
tric project on the Danube River. The Yugoslavs
have desired closer ties with Albania, but have in-
dicated that further improvements must come at Tir-
ana's initiative; apparently Albania is cautiousl
moving in this direction.
1 Dec 70 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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COMMUNIST CHINA: The regime's intention to
place military officers in key central government
positions has recently been confirmed.
A Peking NCNA broadcast on 28 November report-
ing the departure of a government delegation for
Mauritania identified delegation head Sha Feng as
"minister of agriculture and forestry." Sha, who
previously had been identified as an officer in
the Armor Corps, is the first army man to be of-
ficially confirmed as a ministry head since the
Cultural Revolution. Another military officer was
recently named a vice minister in the same ministry.
These appointments reinforce other evidence that
military officers will play a major role in the
management of China's post - Cultural Revolution
central government hierarchy.
In most ministries the principal decision-
making authority over the past four years has in
fact rested with military commissions that assumed
control early in the Cultural Revolution. But,
there have been signs that the leadership in Peking
is divided over the precise extent of the army's
future participation in government and party af-
fairs. In all likelihood, a mixed picture will
emerge, with some ministries headed by "rehabili-
tated" civilian cadre and others by relatively in-
experienced military officers such as Sha?
Sha has been put in charge of a new ministry
that came about with the merger of the formerly
separate ministries of agriculture and forestry.
It is one of five new supra-ministries formed over
the past year or so by combining the functions of
two and sometimes three ministries. Officially,
this program is inspired by Mao Tse-tung's long-
expressed desire to consolidate and streamline the
top-heavy central government bureaucracy, which
was made up of some 40 ministries and 12 commis-
sions before the Cultural Revolution. Judging by
Central Intelligence Bulletin 5
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developments thus far, it seems likely that even
further cutbacks will be disclosed when the regime
finally convenes its long-delayed National People's
Congress--the governmental counterpart to the party
congress held last year.
Despite the streamlining at the top, however,
the regime has been less successful in reducing the
number of subordinate staff officers necessary to
keep the central government machinery working.
Since October 1960 some 15 persons have been identi-
fied as leading members of the newly amalgamated
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, including
five former civilian vice ministers. This figure
roughly approximates the number of top-level exec-
utives who were assigned to these functions prior
to the Cultural Revolution.
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PAKISTAN: President Yahya Khan, at a press
conference on 27 November, sought to defuse a poten-
tially explosive situation in East Pakistan.
Tension had been increasing there as East Pak-
istani politicians attacked the government for al-
leged mishandling of cyclone relief, threatened dire
consequences if the military government used the
cyclone as an excuse for postponing coming elections,
and continued their agitation for much greater pro-
vincial autonomy.
Although Yahya's defense of the relief effort
was somewhat weak, he probably mitigated future crit-
icism by announcing a $180-million rehabilitation
program.
Elections are to be postponed in the nine con-
stituencies most severely hit by the cyclone, but
Yahya apparently calmed leading politicians by
strongly reaffirming that contests for the remainder
of the 300 National Assembly seats will be held as
scheduled on 7 December. Nevertheless, small, left-
ist parties--some of which do not want elections
under any conditions--are continuing to call for new
antigovernment demonstrations.
Yahya supported the long-standing East Paki-
stani demand for greater provincial autonomy. He
qualified his support, however, by adding that the
constitution to be drafted by the soon-to-be-elected
National Assembly must ensure the "integrity, safety,
and securit of the country" or martial law will
continue.
1 Dec 70 Central Intelligence Bulletin 7
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SECRET
CHILE: The Communist Party is publicly boast-
ing of its major role in the Allende government.
The speech of secretary general Luis Corvalan
at a plenum of the Chilean Communist Party (PCCh)
last week attests to the strong Communist influence
in the policies adopted by Allende's Popular Unity
(UP) coalition government. Corvalan cited economic
and other measures already taken as proof that the
month-old Allende administration is "of and for the
masses." He warned that stubborn "imperialism and
oligarchy" must be eradicated from all centers of
Chilean economic power and hailed the Cuban revolu-
tion as the beginning of an historic process in
Latin America.
Corvalan emphasized that the six parties that
make up the UP must continue to cooperate and said
that Allende's election was a triumph for the UP
rather than a personal one. In welcoming the Presi-
dent to the plenum, Corvalan indicated that the
PCCh relies on him and the powers at his command to
carry out the revolution that will transform Chile
into a "popular state." In his remarks Allende an-
nounced that he will submit legislation this week
that would nationalize copper and private banks and
insurance companies, and end monopolies.
Corvalan's speech implies PCCh leaders are now
confident that anti-Communist opposition in Chile
is weak and that they no longer need to be cautious
in their exercise of political power. It also indi-
cates that the PCCh wants to assert its importance
in the UP and claim credit for the initial successes
of the Allende administration as it prepares for the
municipal elections scheduled for next April.
(continued)
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Pravda's account of Corvalan's speech portrays
the PCCh in a more militant and revolutionary light
than previous Soviet press commentary. Heretofore
the PCCh has been pictured as a reasonable partner
in a coalition having wide appeal. This suggests
that the USSR is not so worried about possible US
and internal Chilean reactions to greater Soviet
attention to the PCCh.
1. Dec 70 Central Intelligence Bulletin 9
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NICARAGUA: Negotiations between the government
and the major opposition party concerning the coun-
try's political future are now under way.
President Somoza and Fernando Aguero, the
leader of the opposition Conservative Party, agreed
last Friday that the scheduled 1972 general election
would not be held. Instead, at the end of Somoza's
term, a transitional government elected by a con-
stituent assembly would be instituted for a period
of perhaps two or three years. The details of elec-
toral and governmental reform will be worked out in
subsequent meetings.
Aguero's primary objectives are to ensure that
Somoza steps down in 1972 and to gain for his party
a more substantial role in the government. The pro-
posed plan also satisfies Somoza's political ambi-
tions because it allows him to continue as head of
the armed forces and to run for the presidency after
the transitional government.
Leaders of other political factions will un-
doubtedly criticize any accord and characterize
Aguero's action as a sellout to Somoza. Aguero, who
may aspire to head the transitional government, is
unlikely to be sidetracked, however, and chances of
an agreement are fairly good.
1 Dec 70
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NOTES
USSR - EAST GERMANY: Soviet party chief Brezh-
nev reportedly is scheduled to arrive today in East
Berlin for the impending summit meeting of Warsaw
Pact countries. Press sources in East Berlin con-
sider it likely that he will conduct private talks
with the East German leaders before the full summit
begins. The meeting is expected to deal with the
coordination of bloc policy toward Bonn, a matter
which most directly affects the interests of East
Germany and the USSR. Both countries may be anxious
to resolve any differences between them before the
arrival of other bloc leaders. TASS announced yes-
terday that the Pact meeting would take place this
week in East Berlin, but did not give a date; some
East European sources have said the meeting will
begin on 2 December.
ARGENTINA: Urban terrorists have focused their
operations on US personnel with increasing frequency
since the fire-bombing of the defense attache's home
in October. The forced entry into the homes of three
US military personnel last Friday came only a week
after bombs were placed at the homes of two other US
officials. No one was injured Friday, but the ter-
rorists made off with arms, uniforms, and identity
documents. Many US officials live in the outlying
suburbs of Buenos Aires where police protection is
minimal, increasing the likelihood of additional and
more serious incidents.
C CAMBODIA: The explosion in the US Embassy early
today was the most dramatic Communist action in Phnom
Penh to date, and the first targeted against the
American presence. It may signal the onset of an
intensified Communist terrorist campaign in the cap-
ital. No US personnel were injured in the blast,
which reportedly was caused by a large plastic charge
possibly planted by a local laborer in a section of
the embassy now being renovated.
(continued)
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LAOS: Plaine des Jarres
Na
Khan
BouafW
Long,
Souy PALE:
Govt op meet
(tnce
"ES
$Xi g Khouang
?San Tian
Ca I'atta!i
Xieng
11
ipuar pit
Ban, N Muong
Tong Hein l hang
L"`
Tie
ang Vieng
20 M i1
by "~ rnet~tr talcl , locate n
m mst-~
n'u 'did location
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LAOS: Communist forces in the vicinity of Ban
Ban have so far offered little resistance to the
seven battalions of government troops that have en-
tered the area since 27 November. The 1,000-man
irregular force which was airlifted into positions
south of Ban Ban has advanced to within two miles
of its immediate objective at San Tiau, but is moving
slowly because of poor weather. An additional 850
government troops (three battalions) from Bouam Long
have moved into positions about four miles north of
the Ban Ban valley and have had only scattered con-
tact with enemy forces. Like the government units
to the south, these battalions intend to attack Com-
munist logistic assets in the Ban Ban area, but will
be withdrawn of er their primary missions have been
accomplished.
CONGO (BRAZZAVILLE): The power struggle be-
tween President Ngouabi and his extreme leftist
partners continues and a showdown is possible before
the year's end. In October Ngouabi moved to shore
up his weak position by agreeing to cooperate closely
with Kinshasa President Mobutu. Last week he suc-
ceeded in reinstating a tribal brother as army chief
of staff. The radicals, in turn, have arranged the
demotion of Vice President Raoul--a Ngouabi sup-
porter--to the fourth position in the government
after the President and the two top party extrem-
ists. They also are taking steps to buttress the
radical component of the armed forces stationed in
the capital. The leftists may fear that the sched-
uled restoration of diplomatic and unrestricted
commercial relations with Kinshasa in mid-December
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will
greatly
strengthen Ngouabi's hand. This view
could
impel
them to move directly against the Pres-
ident soon.
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(continued)
1 Dec 70 Central Intelligence Bulletin 13
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CONGO (KINSHASA): President Mobutu has named
a senior officer to act as army commander for Com-
mander in Chief Bobozo, who suffered a severe stroke
on 13 November. The officer, Major General Bosango,
was named only the acting commander, thus averting,
at least temporarily, serious dissension among army
officers. Bosango is regarded by many younger offi-
cers as incompetent and cowardly, but they reportedly
believe that Mobutu will choose a better man as the
permanent commander in chief if Bobozo is not able
to resume active duty. Protracted delay in choosing
a permanent commander could, however, intensify long-
standing rivalries among senior officers and eventu-
ally reopen latent tribal and regional factionalism
among all ranks.
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