SALT II BOTH CARTER AND BREZHNEV ARE RISKING MUCH IN THE UPCOMING BATTLE OVER RATIFICATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01315R000400370028-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 16, 2004
• Sequence Number: 28
• Publication Date: June 17, 1979
• Content Type: NSPR

Approved For Release 2005/01/12: CIA-RDP88-01315R0004P03T9Q2A8 ," , (AJ, (I, ,a w-
Article appeared
on page C-1, 3
TI-IE BOSTON GLOBE
17 June 1979
Both Carter and Bre'zhnev *are 1 much
in the upcoming battle over ratification
This is the first of a five part series by The Globe's diplo-
matic correspondent analyzing the issues and implications
of the Senate debate on the ratification of S.-1LF 11L
By William Beecher
Globe Washington Bureau
EXCERPT:
L?t7 ;:des agree the pivotal Senate battles probably will
ioliowitig issues:
Encryption. The CIA wanted the White House to push toori
a ban on encryption, the encoding of test data radioed
i:o.,m Russian missiles. Instead the parties agreed only nn, r.o
pt that information necessary to monitor compliance '.vith
!rea.: c::nstramts.
Critics want an amendment calling fora total'
ban on encryption, insisting that otherwise the
burden is on the United States to prove to the
Soviets that information being denied is vital toy
monitoring compliance. The Administration willi
argue that it has sufficient data on what radio
channels the Russians have customarily used on
previous missile tests for various kinds of data,
and if key channels aro suddenly encrypted, the
United States would know it and insist that. it
"top. , . .
o Loss of CIA Iritt'iiansites. Two electronic
bases in Iran provided important intelligence on
the critical launch phase of missile firings from
Tyuratam, one of-the two most important Soviet
ICBM test centers. Sen. John Glenn (D-Ohio)
wants Russia either to permit US spy flights
through Soviet air space near test complexes, oi?
to allow the emplacement of unmanned "black
boxes," which would allow the US to monitor
tests remotely. -
The Administration hopes that U2 flights on
the Turkish side of the border will suffice, as-
suming the Russians don't object to them.
o MX Mobilebasing. When the United
States was considering shuttling the MX ran-
domly among several silo-like holes, the Rus-
sians insisted this w91~t9tl~rt~
devise an effective monitoring scheme. The Rus-!
.cam,,: hnuan'tewn ackPd about the trench bas-
guagge stating that the treaty is being ratified
only with the'understanding that the trench sys-
tem is permitted.
But since the first IVIX isn't due to become
operational until a year after the treaty expires,,
the argument has more to do with nailing down
the issue so it doesn't turn into a big hassle in
SALT III.
Protocol. A protocol to the treaty, to expire
in 1981, would ban the deployment of mobile
ICBMs and of ground-or sea-based cruise mis-
siles. Sen. Gary Hart (D-Colo.) wants a resolu-
tion making clear that the protocol cannot be ex-
tended beyond that time without the approval of
two-thirds of the Senate. The Administration
will not oppose this reservation, but will fight an
attempt to kill the protocol outright and ex-
punge it from the treaty: `
a Backfire bomber. The Administration will
strenuously, resist an attempt to get Backfire
counted as a strategic weapon, arguing that the
lRussians would never agree, and that this would
amount to killing the treaty. Further, officials
will point'out that there are more than 500
American planes --- based in the United States;
in Western Europe and on-aircraft carriers in the
Mediterranean - all of which have contigency
assignments to drop nuclear weapons on Sovieti
territory. And the United States successfully re- i
sisted any of those being counted as strategid,4
weapons. -
In addition to wrangling over treaty lan- I
guage; the Senate also will doubtless debate-
what has been happening to the balance of pow-
er during the 10 years of SALT, as. well as
whether the United States should try to insist
that passage of the treaty and extension of Most-
Favored-Nation tariffs to the Soviet Union%
should be linked to Soviet cooperation, rather
than confrontation in the Mideast and elsewhere-
around the world. SALT I was sold partly on the,
premise of linkage. j
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