A THOUSAND DAYS, PART 5 CUBA: TO THE EDGE OF THE NUCLEAR ABYSS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01350R000200640023-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 22, 2004
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: November 12, 1965
• Content Type: MAGAZINE

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A THOUSAND DAYS, PART 5
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Kennedy was grave but unequivocal
on television (Oct. 22, 1962) when he
told the country about Soviet nuclear
missiles in Cuba and denounced the
Russians for a "deliberate deception."
by ARTHUR M.
SCHLESINGER JR.
On July 2, 1962 Ratil Castro,
Cuba's minister of the armed
forces, arrived in Moscow. Either
before his arrival or very soon
thereafter the Soviet and Cuban
governments arrived at a startling
decision: Soviet nuclear missiles
were to be installed secretly in
Cuba in the fall.
In a general sense, this decision
.. obviously represented the supreme
Soviet probe of American inten-
. tions. No doubt a "total victory"
Zontinued
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he Soviet missile buildup in
Cuba, which three Years ago
? brought the L.S. close to
war, was confirmed by this
picture, one of those dramat-
ically displayed at the
two days after it was taken by
a low-flying U.S. reconnais-
sance plane. Annotations on
the photograph are by experts
kont the Defense Depart-
ment. This vtas the Sagua Ia
Grande missile site, 218 miles
from Havana. Two launch ty`
pads were in business, capa-
ble of launching ballistic mis 7.
-
sites with a range up to 1,200 t
miles?enough to hit dozens
of U.S. targets, including
Washington. Vehicle tracks
indicated that one or more
missiles were inside the ready
buildings and all set to go.
The oxidizer vehicles carry
oxygen or possibly a more
exotic substance like fluorine
to combine in rocket fuel.
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NOV 12 1965
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faction in Moscow had long been
arguing that the Soviet Union could
safely use.the utmost nuclear pres-
sure against the U.S. because the
Americans were too rich or too
soft or too liberal to fight.
By late July the Soviet shipments
began to arrive. Three weeks later
the CIA sent an urgent report to
the President?"something new
and different" was taking place in
Soviet aid operations to Cuba.
There were perhaps 5,000 Soviet
"specialists" now in Cuba; military
construction of some sort was go-
Then, a week later, Moscow said the ground in San Crist?bal.
flatly that the "armaments and About 8:30 that evening the.
military equipment sent to Cuba CIA informed McGeorge Bundy
are designed exclusively for defen- of the incredible discovery. Bundy
sive purposes." ' knew that Kennedy would want
The President in the meantime the photographs and supporting
asked Congress for stand-by au- interpretation in order to be sure
thority to call up the reserves, and the report was right and knew also
also took the precaution of dou- it would take all night to pre-
bling the frequency of the U-2 pare the evidence in proper form.
I
overflights on Cuba. The evidencet was better, Bundy thought, to
from flights on Sept. 5, 17, 26 and let the President have a night's
29, and Oct. 5 and 7, as well as sleep in preparation for his ordeal.
from other sources, indicated a
The President was having break-
continuing military build-up, large fast in his dressing gown at 8:45
on Tuesday morning, Oct. 16,
--ing on; more ships were on their in its proportions but still defen-
when Bundy brought the news.
way with more specialists and more sive in its character.
Kennedy asked at once about the
electronic equipment. Across the world, ships were
nature of the evidence. Convinced
The U.S. intelligence communi- sliding out of Black Sea harbors
that it was conclusive, he said that
ty concluded that Moscow, having with nuclear technicians in their
the U.S. must bring the threat to
resolved after a time of indecision cabins and nuclear missiles in their an end: one way or another the
hatches. Khrushchev, having done ; missiles would have to be removed.
his best to lull Kennedy by pub- He then directed Bundy to insti-
lic statements and private nnes- tute further intelligence checks
sages, now began the stealthy ship-
ment of offensive weapons. And
and to set up a meeting of top offi-
cials. Privately he was furious: If
he had an advantage unknown to
Khrushchev would pull this after
us: Soviet engineering had enor all -
his protestations and denials,
mously reduced the time required
how could he ever be trusted on
for the erection of missile sites.
Nonetheless, when a U-2 flight Meanwhile Washington had anything?
'
The meeting, beginning at 11:45
on Aug. 29 showed clear evidence ' been receiving through the refu-
that morning, went on with inter-
of SAM [Surface-to-Air-Missile] gee channels a flow of tales about
missions for the rest of the week.
sites under construction, the Pres- nuclear installations. Lacking pho-
The group soon became known
ident decided to put Moscow on tographic verification, the intelli-
as the Executive Committee, pre-
notice. On Sept. 4, the Secretary gence community treated this in-
sumably of the National Security
of State brought over a draft of formation with reserve. In the in-
Council; the press later familiarly
the warning. The draft as revised terim, it recommended on Oct. 4 a
dubbed it ExCom, though one nev-
read that, while we had no evi- U-2 flight over western Cuba. The
er heard that phrase at the time. It
dence of "significant offensive ca- recommendation was approved ori '
carried on its work with the most
,
pability either in Cuban hands or 'Oct. 10 and from the 11th to exacting secrecy. For this reason
? under Soviet direction," should it the 13th the pilot waited for the., its members?the president, the
be otherwise, "the gravest issues weather to break. Sunday, Oct. 14, Vice President, Secretary Rusk,
Secretary McNamara, Secretary
Dillon, Robert Kennedy, Gener-
al Maxwell Taylor, McCone, Ad-
lai Stevenson, Bundy, Ted Soren-
sen, George Ball, Roswell Gil-
for the President. The Soviet lead- scure and intricate markings, spe- patric, Ambassador Llewellyn
er pledged in effect that he would , cialists identified a launching pad,. Thompson and U. Alexis Johnson,
stir up no incidents before the con- ? a series of buildings for ballistic Assistant Secretary
gressional elections in November. missiles and even one missile on with. others brought in on occa-
EcdowninuMnauretidn,
that it had a large stake in Castro's
survival, had decided to insure
the regime against external attack.
No one (with one exception; for
- the thought flickered through the
mind of CIA Director John Mc-
Cone) supposed that the Soviet
Union would conceivably go be-
yond defensive weapons.
would arise." dawned beautiful and cloudless.
On the same day the Soviet am- When the U-2 returned from its
bassador in Washington gave the mission, the film went swiftly to
Attorney General an unusual per- the processing laboratories. Late
sonal message from Khrushchev Monday afternoon, reading ob-
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NOV 12 1965
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sion, among them Dean Acheson for the build-up of an amphibious go ahead on the bases and that it '
and Robert Lovett--had to attend task force, soon including 40,000 would mean another Munich. Dc-:
their regular meetings, keep as Marines. The Army gathered more spite such arguments, however, the
many appointments as possible than 100,000 troops in Florida. majority of the Executive Commit-
and preserve the normalities of life. Meanwhile, the Pentagon under- tee by the end of the day was tend-
The President himself went off took a technical analysis of the re- lag toward a blockade.
that Tuesday night to dinner at quirements for a successful strike. That afternoon, in the interests
Joseph Alsop's. Following dinner The conclusion, as it evolved dui._ of norma lity, the President received
the talk turned to the contingen- ing the week, was that a "surgical" Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei '
cies of history, the odds for or strike confined to the nuclear mis- GromYko. Kennedy knew thatthere
against any particular event tak- sile bases alone would leave the air_ were Soviet nuclear missiles in
ing place. The President was silent ports and the IL-28 military jets Cuba. Gromyko unquestionably
for a time. Then he said, "Of. untouched; moreover, we could knew this too, but he did not know
course, if you simply consider not be sure in advance that we had that Kennedy knew it. His empha-
mathematical chances, the odds identified or could destroy all the sis was rather grimly on Berlin, al-
are even on an HA:6mb war with- missile sites. Military prudence most as if to prepare the ground
in 10 years." Perhaps he added to: called for a much larger strike to for demands later in the autumn.
himself, "... or within the next, eliminate all sources of danger? When the talk turned to Cuba,
10 days." i perhaps 500 sorties. Gromyko heavily stressed Cuban
The U.S. had, it. was estimated, But the Soviet experts pointed fears of an American invasion and
about. 10 days before tht-misSiles out that even a limited strike would said with due solemnity that the
would be on pads ready for firing. kill the Russians at the sites and Soviet aid had "solely the purpose
This meant that the American re-; might well provoke the Soviet Un_ of contributing to the defense capa-
sponse could not be confided to the ion into drastic and unpredictable bility of Cuba"; "if it were other-
United Nations, where the Soviet ' response, perhaps even a nuclear wise," the Russian continued, "the
delegate would have ample oppor- ' war. The Latin American experts ! Soviet government would never be-
tunny to stall action until the nu- ' pointed out that a massive strike ' come involved in rendering such
clear weapons were in place. We ' would, in addition, kill thousands assistance." To dispel any illusion
. could not even risk the delay in-? of innocent Cubans. The Europe_ about possible American reactions,
volved in consulting our allies. The anists said the world would re_ the President read the foreign mm-
total responsibility had to fall on gard a surprise strike as an exces_ ister the key sentences from his
the United States and its President. sive response against the U.S. , earlier public statement. He went
When the Executive Committee no further because he did not wish
0 met on Wednesday, Oct. 17, Secre_ to indicate his knowledge until he
n Tuesday morning, the U.S. tary McNamara advanced an idea had decided on his course.
choice for a moment seemed to lie which had been briefly mentioned Thursday evening the President
'between an air strike or acquies- ,the day before and from which he met with the Executive Committee.
cence?and the President had did not thereafter deviate?the Listening again to the alternatives
made clear that acquiescence was. conception of a naval blockade de- over which he had been brooding
impossible. Listening to the dis- signed to stop the further entry of all week, he said crisply, "What-
cussion, the Attorney Generall offensive weapons into Cuba and ever you fellows aresrecornmending
scribbled a wry note: "I now know I hopefully to force the removal of today you will be sorry about a
how Tojo felt when he was plan- the missiles already there. Here was week from now." He was evidently
mug Pearl Harbor. Then he said a middle course, which exploited attracted by the idea of the block-
aloud that the group needed more our superiority in local conven- - ade. If it worked, the Russians
alternatives: surely there mias.sOme' tional power and would permit could retreat with dignity. If it did
course in between bombing and subsequent movement either to-
not work, the Americans retained
'
doing nothing; suppose, for ex- ward war or toward peace. the option of military action. Ken-
ample, we were to bring counter- , As the discussion proceeded nedy accordingly directed that
vailing pressure by placing nuclear : through Thursday, Oct. 18, the preparations be made to put the
missiles in West Berlin? Finally supporters of the air strike mar-
,.?weapons blockade into effect on
the group dispersed for further shaled their arguments against the Monday morning.
reflection.The next day. Friday, Oct. 19,
blockade. They said that it would'
The next step was military prep- not neutralize the weapons already the President left Washington for
aration for Caribbean contingen- within Cuba, that it could not pos- a weekend of political barnstorm-
cies. A Navy-Marine exercise insibly bring enough pressure on ing. He left behind a curiously rest-
the1area, long scheduled for this Khrushchev to remove thoseweap-
less group of advisers. This beca me
week, provided a convenient cover ,
ons, that it would permit work to I evident when they met at the State
.... ._
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Continued
NOV n 1965
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Department at 11 in the morning..
Over Ted Sorensen's protest, sev-
eral began to reargue the inade-
quacy of the blockade. Someone
said: Why not confront the world
with a fait accompli by taking out
the Cuban bases in a clean, swift
operation?
Secretary McNamara, however,
firmly reaffirmed his opposition to
a strike and his support for the
blockade. Then Robert Kennedy,
speaking with quiet intensity, said
that he did not believe that, with
all the memory of Pearl Harbor
and all the responsibility we would
have to bear afterwards, the Presi-
dent of the United States could
possibly order such an operation.
For 175 years we had not been
that kind of country. Sunday-
morning surprise blows on small
nations were not in our tradition.
It was now proposed that the
committee break up into working
groups to write up the alternative
courses for the President?one to
analyze the quarantine policy, the
other to analyze the strike. Then
everyone dispersed to meet again
at 4 o'clock.
At the 4 o'clock meeting the bal-
ance of opinion clearly swung back
to the blockade (though, since a
blockade was technically an act of
war, it was thought better to refer
to it as a quarantine). In retrospect
most participants regarded Robert
Kennedy's speech as the turning
point. The case was strengthened,
too, when the military conceded
that a quarantine now would not
exclude a strike later.
Then they turned to the problem
of the missiles already in Cuba.
Someone observed that the United
States would have to pay a price to
get them out; perhaps we should
throw in our now obsolescent and
vulnerable Jupiter missile bases in
Italy and Turkey. After a couple
of hours, Adlai Stevenson arrived
from New York. He expressed his
preference for the quarantine over
the strike but wondered whether it
might not be better to try the dip-
lomatic route also. We must, he
said, start thinking about our ne-
gotiating position. He also echoed
the suggestion that we might want
to consider giving up the Italian
and Turkish bases now, since we
were planning to do so eventually.
The President, still campaign-
ing, was receiving reports from his
brother in Washington. The sched-
ule now called for a speech to the
nation on Sunday night, Oct. 21.
By Saturday morning, however, it
was evident that the preparations
would not be complete in time, so
it was decided to hold things for
another 24 hours. Meanwhile, the
President, pleading a cold as a
pretext, canceled the rest of his
political trip and returned to
Washington.
Saturday afternoon he presided
, over the Executive Committee and
, its final debate. McNamara im-
pressively presented the case for
the quarantine. The military, with
some civilian support, argued for
the strike. Stevenson argued with
force about the importance of a
political program, the President
agreeing in principle but disagree-
ing with his specific proposals. A
straw vote indicated 11 for the
quarantine, six for the strike. The
President observed that every one
should hope that his plan was not
adopted; there just was no clear-
cut answer. Then he issued orders
to get everything ready for the
quarantine. On Sunday morning a
final conference with the military
leaders satisfied him that the strike
would be a mistake. His course was
?
now firmly set.
had known nothing about any
of this. Late Friday, Oct. 19, Ad-
lai Stevenson phoned me, saying
casually that he was in Washing-
ton and wondered when we could
get together. He was staying at the
house of his friend Dr. Paul Mag-
nuson across the street from my
own house in Georgetown, and we
agreed to ride down to the State
Department together the next day.
When we met after breakfast on
Saturday morning, he beckoned
me into the Magnuson house. "I
don't want to talk in front of the
chauffeur," he said; and then, in a
moment, "Do you know what the
secret discussions this week have
been about?" I said I knew of no
discussions. Observing gravely that
there was trouble and he had the
President's permission to tell me
about it, Stevenson described the
seesaw during the week between
the diplomatic and military solu-
tions. The quarantine, he now felt,
was sure to win. He would have to
make a speech early in the week at
the Security Council, and he want-
ed me to help on it. He outlined the
Secretary of Defense'McNamara
pushed the idea of naval blockade
?"a middle course" which after
two days of argument in commit-
tee was adopted by the President.
argument and, with due discretion,
I set to work.
The secret had been sucerbly
kept. But later that day. when the
President returned from the cam-
paign and Rusk canceled a speech
that night, a sense of premoni-
tory excitement began to engulf
Washington. By Saturday night
the town was alive with specula-
tion and anticipation.
On Sunday, Stevenson wrote
down his thoughts about our U.N.
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.1965
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strategy. He saw no hope of mus- in the Communist world, by show-
tering enough votes in the U.N. to Mg that Moscow was capable of
authorize action against Cuba in bold action in support of a Com-
advance; but the OAS offered an munist revolution; second, it also
opportunity for multila,teral sup- would radically redefine the set-
port. As for the U.N., he said, we
must seize the initiative, bringing
our case to the Security Council at
the same time we imposed the quar-
antine. His political program cen-
tered on the.removal, under U.N.
observation, of Soviet military
equipment and personnel, leading
to the neutralism of Cuba. He
ting in which the Berlin problem
could be reopened after the elec-
tion; third, it would deal the U.S.
a tremendous political blow. When
I remarked that the Russians must
have supposed that we would not
respond, Kennedy said, "They
thought they had us either way.
If we did nothing, we would be
would throw into the bargain a dead. If we reacted, they hoped
noninvasion guarantee to evidence to put us in an exposed position,
our restraint and good faith. Exer- :whether with regard to Berlin or
cising the prerogative of changing ,Turkey or the U.N."
one's mind, freely employed that i met with him again at 11 to go
week by nearly all his colleagues, over the draft of the U.N. speech
he now wrote that Turkey and It-
aly should not be included; this
would only divert attention from
the Cuban threat to the general is-
sue of foreign bases.
The President, however, rightly
regarded any political program as
premature. Stevenson, when I saw
him that weekend, took this realis-
tically; he felt he had done his job
in making the recommendation,
and the decision was the Presi-
dent's. However, some of his col-
leagues on the Executive Commit-
tee worried considerably over the
weekend (and some of them vocal-
ly thereafter) whether, denied his
political program, the ambassador
would make the American argu-
ment with sufficient force in the
U.N. debate.
At 10 o'clock on Monday morn-
ing, Oct. 22, the President called
me in to instruct me to go to New
York and work with Stevenson.
He was in a calm and reflective
mood. It was strange, he said, how
no one in the intelligence commu-
nity had anticipated the Soviet at-
tempt to transform Cuba into a
nuclear base; everyone had as-
sumed that the Russians would not
be so stupid as to offer us this pre-
text for intervention. I asked why
he thought Khrushchev had done
such an amazing thing. He said
that, first, it might draw Russia
and China closer together, or at
least strengthen the Soviet position
with Rusk, Robert Kennedy and
others. The President suggested a
few omissions, including a passage
threatening an American strike if
the Soviet build-up in Cuba con-
tinued; he preferred to leave that
to Moscow's imagination. The At-
torney General drew me aside to
say, "We're counting on you to
watch things in New York. ... We
will have to make a deal at the end,
but we must stand absolutely firm
now. Concessions must come at
ihe end of negotiation, not at the
beginning." Then, clutching the
speech, I caught the first plane to
New York. dent returned to the Mansion,
In Washington everything await- sought out Caroline and told her
cd the President's television broad- stories until it was time for dinner.
cast to the nation that night. Sor- He dined alone with Jacqueline.
ensen had been laboring over the We listened to the speech clus-
draft since Friday. tered around a television set in
Stevenson's office in New York. I
had found Adlai unperturbed in
ennedy himself was never the midst of pandemonium. He
more composed. At 5 o'clock he had to talk so much to U.N. dele-
saw the congressional leaders, gates from other nations that he
many of whom had flown in from had little time left over for his own
their home states in Air Force speeches and strategy. Through
planes. He showed them the U-2 Monday evening and Tuesday
photographs and' told them what morning, Oct. 23, he snatched
he proposed to do. Senator Rus- moments to revise and edit his
sell disagreed; the blockade, he ar- remarks for the Security Coun-
gued, would be too slow and too cil. The last part of Stevenson's
risky?the only solution was inva- address was still in the typewriter
sion. To the President's surprise, at the U.S. mission on Tuesday
Senator Fulbright, who had op- afternoon when he had already
posed invasion so eloquently at the begun to speak across the street
time of the Bay of Pigs, now sup- at the U.N.
The speech, extraordinarily elo-
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ported Russell. The President lis-
tened courteously but was in nc
way shaken in his decision. (Ken-
nedy told me later, "The trouble is
that, when you get a group of sen-
ators together, they are always
dominated by the man who takes
the boldest and strongest line. That
is what happened the other day.
After Russell spoke, no one want-
ed to take issue with him. When
you can ,talk to them individually,
they are quite reasonable.")
Then, sat 7 o'clock, the Presi-
dent's speech: his expression grave,
his voice firm and calm, the evi-
dence set forth without emotion,
the conclusion unequivocal. He re-
cited the Soviet assurances, now
revealed as "deliberate deception,"
and called the Soviet action "a de-
liberately provocative and unjusti-
fied change in the status quo which
cannot be accepted by this coun-
try. . ." Our "unswerving objeC-;
tive," he continued, was to end
this nuclear threat. He concluded
with quiet solemnity: "Our goal
is not the victory of might, but the
vindication of right; not peace at
the expense of freedom, but both
peace and freedom here in this
hemisphere and, we hope, around
the world. God willing, that goal
will be achieved."
After the broadcast the Presi-
NOV 12 1965
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quent, was delivered to a hushed . the picture and unaware of any in-, low an interlude for negotiations.
chamber. He concluded: "Let [this structions. This meant that the lin- K hrushchev accepted this thought
day] be remembered, not as the day position of the quarantine the next at once and with evident pleasure;
when the world came to the edge of
day might well bring a clash, but, from our viewpoint, it equat-
nuclear war, but as the day when The three old friends talked on. ed aggression and response, said
men resolved to let nothing there- Ormsby Gore recalled a conversa-, nothing about the missiles already
stop them in their quest for tion with Defense Department of-1 in Cuba, permitted work to go for-
ficials who had declared it impor-! ward on the sites and contained no
tant to stop the Soviet ships as far provisions for verification. New
out of the reach of the jets in Cuba York and Washington agreed in
as possible. The British ambassa- rejecting U Thant's proposal, but
dor now suggested that Khru- Stevenson and John J. McCloy,
shchev had hard decisions to make who was now with him, recom-
. and that every additional hour mended a response which would
might make it easier for him to keep the diplomatic option alive.
climb down gracefully; why not, On Wednesday night, at the
therefore, make the interceptions U.S. mission in New York, I re-
much closer to Cuba and thereby; ceived a telephone call from Aver-
give the Russians a, little more ell Harriman. Speaking with un-
time? If Cuban aircraft tried to in- usual urgency, he said that K hru-
terfere, they could be shot down. shchev was desperately signaling a
I Kennedy, agreeing immediately, desire to cooperate in moving to-
I called McNamara and, over emo- ward a peaceful solution. Harri-
tional Navy protests, issued the, man pa rtc.ufr!rized the evidence;
'appropriate instructions. This' Khrushchey's suggstion of a sum-
..;been of vi-. mit meeting his reply to a mes-
tal importance.
.ws:11 have
sage from the 'iiritish pacifist Ber-
Around the world emotions rose trand Russell: his well-publicized
?fear, doubt, incertitude, appre-
call on the American singer Jerome
hension. In the White House the
Hines the night befc -e, after a
President went coolly about his af- Moscow performance; his amiable
fairs, watching the charts with the if menacing talk with an Amen-
Soviet ships steadily advancing to- can businessman, William Knox
ward Cuba, scrutinizing every item of Westinghouse Electric; the in-
of intelligence for indications of dications that afternoon that the
Soviet purpose, reviewing the de- nearest Soviet ships were slowing
ployment of American forces. He down ;and changing course. This
said to someone, "I guess this is was not the behavior of a man who
the week I earn iny salary." wanted war, A'verell said; it was
It was a strange week; the flow the behavior of a man who was
of decision was continuous; there begging our help to get off the
was no day and no night. In the hook. Khrushchev had sent up
intervals between meetings the similar signals after the U-2 affair
President sought out his wife and in 1960, Harriman continued, and
children as if the imminence of ca- Eisenhower had made the mistake
tastrophe had turned his mind of ignoring him; we must not re-
more than ever to his family and, peat that error now:, "If we do
through them, to children every- ,nothing but get tougher and
where in the world. One noon, tougher, we will force him into
swimming' in the pool, he said to countermeasures. The first incident
his friend and aide Dave Powers, I on the high seas will engage Soviet
"if it weren't for these people that 'prestige and infinitely reduce the
haven't lived yet, it would be easy,, chance of a peaceful solution."
after
peace." The President, who had
been watching on television, im-
mediately dictated a telegram:
"DEAR ADLAI: I WATCHED YOUR
SPEECH TIIIS AFTERNOON WITH
GREAT SATISFACTION. IT HAS GIV-
EN OUR CAUSE A GREAT START.
. . . THE UNITED STATES IS FOR-
TUNATE TO HAVE YOUR ADVOCA-
CY. YOU HAVE MY WARM AND
PERSONAL THANKS."
And now the tension was rising.
In Cuba workmen were laboring
day and night to complete the
bases. On the Atlantic at least 25
Soviet merchant ships were steam-
ing toward Cuba. Ninety ships of
the American fleet, backed up by
68 aircraft squadrons and eight air-
craft carriers, were moving into
position to intercept and search the
onrushing ships. In Florida and
neighboring states the largest in-
vasion force since the Second
World War was gathering.
On Tuesday night the Presi-
dent dined at the White House
with English friends. Cuba was not
mentioned at the table, but after
dinner he beckoned David Orms-
by Gore out into the long central
hall, where they talked quietly
while the gaiety continued in the
dining room. The British ambas-
sador, mentioning that the reac-
tion in his own country had been
dubious, suggested the need for
evidence: could not the aerial pho-
tographs be released? The Presi-
dent sent for a file, and together
they went through them, picking
out the ones that might have the
greatest impact on skeptics. In a
while Robert Kennedy walked in,
bleak, tired and disheveled. He
had just been to see Ambassador
Dobrynin in an effort- to find out
whether the Soviet ships had in-
structions to turn back ifchallenged
on the high seas. The Soviet am-
bassador, the Attorney General
said, seemed very shaken, out of
to make decisions of this sort."
In New York on Wednesday,
Oct. 24, U.N. Secretary General U
Thant made an unexpected inter-
vention, proposing that the Soviet
Union suspend its arms shipments
and the U.S. its quarantine to al-
These words seemed utterly con-
vincing to me. I asked him wheth-
er he had made these points at the
State Department. He said, "1
haven't been in on this at all." Ac-
cordingly I sent Harriman's views
along to the President. Kennedy
Continued
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S
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called him the next morning, and I Zorin then muttered something
imagine that Harriman's counsel about not being in an American
may have strengthened his own in- courtroom. Stevenson, cold and
clination to go further along the controlled: "You are in the court-
diplomatic road. At any rate, his room of world opinion. . . . You
reply to U Thant authorized Stev- have denied they exist, and I want
enson to continue discussions. This to know if I understood you cor-
was a second vital decision. ' rectly. . . I am prepared to wait
for my answer until hell freezes
over. And I am also prepared to
present the evidence in this room!"
It was a moment of tremendous
excitement. At Stevenson's order,
aerial photographs were spread
? on easels in the council chamber,
showing the transformation .of San
Crist?bal from a peaceful country
spot into a grim nuclear installa-
tion. Other pictures added further
evidence. Zorin wanly denied the
authenticity of the display. Ste-
?venson wondered savagely why the
Soviet Union did not test its de-
nial by permitting a United Na-
tions team to visit the sites.
Then, in a moment, Stevenson
concluded: .,"We know the facts
and so do you, Mr. Zorin, and we
are ready to talk about them. . . .
Our job, Mr. Zorin, is to save
the peace. If you are ready to try,
we are."
lurther encouraging signs came
on Thursday, Oct. 25. Half the
Soviet ships, it appeared, had put
about and were heading home.
Others were evidently waiting for
further orders. Only one had en-
tered the blockade zone?a tank-
er, obviously not carrying nuclear
weapons. The President decided
to give Khrushchev more time and
said that the tanker, once it had
itself, should be permit-
ted to proceed without boarding
and search?a third vital decision.
There were other portents. For
the first time all week Soviet, dip-
lomat' behavior across the world
was to conform to .a
this indicated that Mos-
cow h.?1it lasr sent out some in-
strlcrv
? ?c ;ging pat-
tern d-) eo fo: a
pcacehfl :ettleilerit. Th. - was what
t1 ,o'iet ambassadoi n Lon.-
den and Bonn were sayifilgi to the
British and West German govern-
ments. But despite these gestures
the situation was .still loaded with
danger. On Thursday afternoon at
the U.N., Stevenson returned to
the debate in the Security Council.
He crisply dismissed the Commu-
nist argument. that the U.S. had
created the threat to the peace:
"This is the first time that I have
ever heard it said that the crime is
not the burglary, hut the discovery
of the burglar."
Russia's Valerian Zorin made
a cocky but evasive reply. Now
Stevenson turned on him with
his magnificent scorn: "Do you,
Ambassador Zorin. deny that the
U.S.S.R. has placed and is placing
medium- and intermediate-range
missiles and sites in Cuba? Yes or
no? Don't wait for the translation.
NOV 12 1965 Yes or no?" ?
On Friday, Oct. 26, work in
Cuba still continued on the sites.
Some of the men around Khru-
shchev?perhaps the Soviet mili-
tary?were apparently determined
to make the missiles operational as
speedily as possible. But Khru-
shchev himself, having abandoned
the effort to bring in more nuclear
weapons, now evidently wanted to
call the whole thing off.
At 1:30 p.m. on Friday, John
Scali, the State Department corre-
spondent for the American Broad-
casting Co., received a message
, from Aleksandr Fomin, a coun-
selor at the Soviet embassy,
requesting an immediate meeting.
Scali, who had lunched occasional- .
ly with Fomin in the past, joined
him at once in the Occidental Res-
taurant. The usually phlegmatic
Stevenson was magnificent at
the U.N. His famous "until hell
freezes over" speech shattered the
Russian case and put world opin-
. ion firmly on the side of the U.S.
Russian, now haggard an d a larmed,
said, "War seems about to break
out. Something must be done to
save the situation." Scali replied
that they should have thought of
that before they put the missiles in
Cuba. The Russian sat in silence
fora moment. Then he said, "There
might be a way out. What would
you think of a proposition where-
by we would promise to remove
our missiles under United Nations
inspection, where Mr. Khrushchev
would promise never to introduce
such offensive weapons into Cuba
again? Would the President of the
United States be willing to.prom-
ise publicly not to invade Cuba?"
When Scali said he did not know,
Fomin begged him to find out im-
mediately from his State Depart-
ment friends. Then, reaching for a
pencil, he wrote down his home'
telephone number: "If I am not at
the embassy, call me here. This is
of vital importance."
Scali carried the proposal to
Roger Hilsman at State, and Hils-
man carried it to Rusk. After dis-
cussion with the Executive Com-
mittee, Rusk asked Scali to tell
the Russian that we saw "real pos-
sibilities" for negotiation but they
must understand that time was
short- ?no more than 48 hours. At
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Continued
9
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nonaggresnon plecige to urKey -icaogrr
the U.S. would remove its missiles
from Turkey and offer a nonag-
gression pledge to Cuba. Kennedy
regarded the idea as unacceptable,
and the swap was rejected.
Then came word that a U-2
plane was missing over Cuba, pre-
sumably shot down. Did this sig-
nify that the confrontation was en-
tering its military phase? Should
the U.S. now retaliate by knock-
ing out a SAM site? And, if it be-
gan military counteraction, could
it stop short of an invasion? The
Presiden t declined to be stampeded.
Again he insisted that the Russians
be given time to consider what they
were doing before action and coun-
teraction became irreversible.
7:30 Friday evening Scali passed
this word along. They met this
time in the coffee shop of the Stat-
ler Hilton. Fomin, after a brief
attempt to introduce the idea of
U.N. inspection of Florida as well
as Cuba, rose and, in his haste to
get the word back, tossed down a
55 bill for a 300 check and sped
off without waiting for the change.
Two hours later a long letter
from Khrushchev began to come
in to the President by cable. The
Soviet leader started by insisting
that the weapons shipments were
complete and that their purpose
was defensive. Then he declared his
profound longing for peace; let us,
he said with evident emotion, not
permit this situation to get out of
hand. If the U.S. would give as-
surances that it would not invade
Cuba and would recall its fleet
from the blockade, this would im-
mediately change everything. Th ;n
the necessity for a Soviet presence
in Cuba would disappear. The cri-
sis, Khrushchev said, was like a
rope with a knot in the .middle:
the more each side pulled, the more
the knot would tighten, until final-
ly it could be severed only by a
sword. But if each side slackened
the rope, the knot could be untied.
Khrushchev's letter was not, as
subsequently described, hysterical.
Though it pulsated with a passion
to avoid nuclear war and gave the
impression of having been written
in deep emotion, why not, with the
world on the brink of nuclear holo-
caust? In general, it displayed an
entirely rational understanding of
the implications of the crisis. To-
gether with the Scali proposal, it
promised light at the end of the
cave. And in New York on Friday
we heard that Zorin had advanced
the same proposal to U Thant. The
President probably had his first
good night's sleep for 10 days; cer-
tainly the rest of us did.
But when the Executive Com?
-
mittee assembled on Saturday{
morning, Oct. 27, prospects had
suddenly darkened. The Moscow
radio began to broadcast a new
Khrushchev letter containing, to
everyone's consternation, an en-
tirely different proposition from
the one transmitted through Scali
and embodied in Khrushchev's let-
NOV 1 2 1965 ter of the night before: that the
Soviet Union would remove its
missiles from Cuba and offer a
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fr-741
here remained the two Khru-
shchev letters, and the Executive
Committee turned to them with
bafflement and something close to
despair. It was noted that Defense
Minister Malinovsky had men-
tioned Cuba and Turkey together
as early as Tuesday, Oct. 23, and
that Red Star, the army paper, had
coupled them again on Friday,
Oct. 26. Could the military have
taken charge in Moscow? Rusk
called in Scali and asked him to
find out anything he could from
his Soviet contact. Scali, fearful
that he had been used to deceive
his own country, upbraided Fo-
min, accusing him of a double-
cross. The Russian said miserably
that there must have been a cable
delay, that the embassy was wait-
?
ing word from Khrushchev at any
moment. Scali brought this report '
immediately to the President and
the Executive Committee at the
White House (where Pierre Salin-
ger nearly had heart failure when,
in the midst of the rigorous securi-
ty precautions of the week, he sud-
denly saw the ABC reporter sit-
ting at the door of the President's
inner office).
Meanwhile, a new crisis: anoth-
er U-2, on a routine air sampling
:mission from Alaska to the North
Pole, had gone off course and was
over. the Soviet Union; it had al-
ready attracted the attention of
Soviet fighters and was radioing
Alaska for help. Would the Rus-
sians view this as a final reconnais-
sance in preparation for nuclear
attack? What if they decided to
Hilsman took
the frightening news to the Presi-
dent. There was a moment of abso-
lute grimness. Then Kennedy, with
a brief laugh, said, "There is al-
ways some so-and-so .who doesn't .
get the word."
Later Saturday afternoon the
Executive Committee met again.
Robert Kennedy now came up
with a thought of breathtaking ?
simplicity and ingenuity: why not
ignore the second Khrushchev
message and reply to the first? For-
get Saturday and concentrate on
Friday? This suggestion was prob-
ably more relevant than anyone
could have known. For the so-
called second letter may well have
been, in fact, the first letter. Its in-
stitutional style suggested that it
was written in the foreign office,
and it read as the immediate fol-
low-on of Khrushchev's Thursday
reply to U Thant. It was very like-
ly drafted in Moscow on Thursday
and Friday for Saturday morning
release in New York. The so-called
"first letter," which reflected the
movement of events far beyond the
U Thant proposal and which was
clearly written by Khrushchev him-
self, may well have been composed
late Friday night (Moscow time)
and transmitted immediately to
Kennedy while the "second" letter
was in the bureaucratic pipeline.
At any rate, on Saturday, Oct.
! 27, Kennedy wrote Khrushchev,
! "I have read your __Letter of Oct.
26th with great care and welcomed
the statement of your desire to seek
a prompt solution." As soon as
work stopped on the missile bases
and the offensive weapons were
rendered inoperable under U.N.
supervision, Kennedy continued,
he would be ready to negotiate a
settlement along the lines Khru-
shchev had proposed. The message
shot inscrutably into the night.
Robert Kennedy carried a copy to
the Soviet ambassador, saying
grimly that, unless we received
assurances in 24 hours, the U.S.
would take action by Tuesday.
Saturday night was almost the
blackest of all.
...)unday, Oct. 28, was a shining
autumn day. At 9 in the morning
Khrushchev's answer started to
come in. By the fifth sentence it
Continued
NOV 12 1965
'U
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was clear that he had thrown in his
hand. It was all over, and just
barely in time.
If word had not come that Sun-
day, if work had continued on the
bases, the U.S. would have had no
real choice but to take some action
against Cuba the next week. No
one could .discern what lay darkly
beyond an air strike or invasion,
what measures and countermeas-
ures, actions and reactions might
have driven the hapless world to
the ghastly consummation. The
President saw more penetratingly
into the mists and terrors of the fu-
ture than anyone else. A few weeks
later he said, "If we had invaded
Cuba . . . I am sure the Soviets
would have acted. They would
have to, just as we would have to.
I think there are certain compul-
sions on any major power." The
compulsions opened up the appall-
ing world of inexorability. The
trick was to cut the chain in time.
When Kennedy received Khru-
shchev's reply that golden Octo-
ber morning, he showed profound
relief. Later he said, "This is the
night to go to the theater, like
Abraham Lincoln."
Homeward bound with shroud-
ed objects believed to be missile
launchers, a Soviet merchant ship
sailed from Havana on Nov. 9,
1962?the same day Khrushchev
appeared in Moscow, shaken.
Some Russian military men op-
posed his decision but Aleksei Ko-
. sygin, now premier, supported it.
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