CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A021200080002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 17, 2003
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 19, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2003/05/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A021200080002-6
Top Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Top Secret
C 1. P
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19 February 1972
ooromed For Release 9003105191 m CIA-RD 79T00975A021200080002-6
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19 February
Central Intelligence Bulletin
BOLIVIA-CUBA-CHILE Bolivian exiles disappointed
with meeting with Castro. (Page 7)
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BOLIVIA-CUBA-CHILE: Chilean-based leftist
Bolivian exiles are probably disappointed with the
outcome of their recent meeting with Fidel Castro.
The would-be insurgents of the Anti-Imperialist
Revolutionary Front (FRA) reportedly returned to
Santiago from Havana on 6 February, apparently with-
out a firm Cuban pledge of significant financial aid
or a timetable for arms shipments. Castro is said
to have offered to provide paramilitary training to
the front's members, however.
Lacking even a unified command structure or an
acceptable plan of action, the three-month-old front
fails to meet Castro's current pragmatic standards
for gauging a revolutionary group's worthiness for
Cuban support. While Castro supposedly promised to
provide an "unlimited" supply of arms, he said that
they would have to be shipped to Chile and this
could be done only with the consent of President
Allende, which he did not think would be forthcoming.
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the Soviets do not want :o see
armed struggle in Bolivia. Soviet representatives
may be pushing the same cautious line with Havana.
Historical and psychological factors in the Boliv-
ian case (Che Guevara was killed therein 1967) may
yet make Castro overlook the FRA's shortcomings and
bring forth a major Cuban commitment despite the
obstacles, but the front's delegation evidently
failed to elicit such a response.
Although at least one of its components prob-
ably could carry out limited terrorist activities,
the FRA. cannot yet mount a sustained campaign in
19 Feb 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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