CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A022600110001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 6, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 29, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Reuse 2003/06/25: CIA-RDP79T00975AO2260011
cIet
25X1
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
N2 041
29 August 1972
Approved For Release 2003/06/25 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO22600110001-8
 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/06/25 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO22600110001-8
Approved For Release 2003/06/25 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO22600110001-8
 Approved For Re se 2003/06 % ! P79T00975AO"&600110001-8
No. 0207/72
29 August 1972
Central Intelligence Bulletin
VIETNAM: The government counterattack in Quang
Nam Has slowed as enemy resistance stiffens. (Page 1)
USSR: Brezhnev displays unusual. concern over harvest
prospects. (Page 5)
SOUTH ASIA: The Chinese veto of Bangladesh's UN
bid may delay implementation of the Simla pact.
(Page 7)
NEPAL: India-based Nepali dissidents have attacked
price posts near the Indian border. (Page 8)
BENELUX-JAPAN: The Benelux countries are concerned
about sharply rising imports of Japanese electronic-,
products (Page 9)
Approved For Release 2003/06/2 GRh P79T00975A022600110001-8
 Approved For Rele a 2003/06/28f! L F flF79T00975A02W00110001-8
Hued
THIEN
QUANG TIN
SAIGON
QIJ' : AI
14
Quang NO
-H
Approved For Release 2003/06/25 : CIA-RDP79T00975A022600110001-8
SECRET
 Approved For Re1se 2003/06/9.gtaXP79T00975A1600110001-8
VIETNAM: The government advance in Quang Nam
Pro nce appears to have slowed as Communist resist-
ance has stiffened.
South Vietnamese forces reportedly now control
most of Que Son district town, but they have not
been able to push the Communists out of the mili-
tary compound near the center of the town. The
enemy seized the compound after fierce fighting on
Sunday. Intense groundfire near the town is making
it difficult for government helicopters to bring
in reinforcements. The capture of an enemy cache
containing two SA-7 missiles suggests that this
weapon, which has been used with telling effect
against helicopters in other parts of the country,
will also be used at Que Son. West of town, gov-
ernment forces moving toward Fire Support Base (FSB)
Ross claim to have killed more than 100 enemy in
small skirmishes. A Communist ground attack against
FSB Baldy--the base supporting the government opera-
tion in Quang Nam Province--caused little damage.
In other action, US helicopter gunships may
have disrupted Communist plans for attacking the
Da Nang airfield when they engaged an enemy force
carrying rockets south of the base on 27 August.
The gunships killed several of the Communist troops.
In the north, government forces in and near
Quang Tri City are still encountering stiff resist-
ance. The heaviest fighting involved the South
Vietnamese Marines, who reported a number of sharp
clashes in the northeastern and southern sectors
of the city.
The Communist forces that have recently shifted
from Kontum to Pleiku Province may be preparing to
step up the fighting there. In the past few days,
there has been a sharp increase in harassing at-
tacks against government positions near Pleiku City,
and on the night of 26-27 August the Communist 3
29 Aug 72
Central Intelligence Bulletin
SECRET
Approved For Release 2003/06/25 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO22600110001-8
 Approved For Relew6e 2003/06/2?1i"`RDP79T00975A000110001-8
NORTH VIETNAM: Areas Where Minor Flooding Has Occurred as of 13 August 1972
X05 \ 1~00~ - Primary dike
#fey
? , Secondary and smaller dike
Thai Nguyen r fh ;
Flooding
Nam Dinh
Area L
of map
105'4.39,.'_ ,
553521 8-72 CIA
Approved For Release 2003/06/2F1k79T00975A022600110001-8
 Approved For Rel se 2003/06/2811 MT'79T00975A0 00110001-8
AML_
~,rricaded Highway 14 south of the city. These at-
acks could be a prelude to heavier fighting once
supply corridors have been established.
Activity in the rest of the country remained
light.
North Vietnam's Red River Delta is expected
to receive its first tropical storm of the season
on 29 August. "Cora" is forecast to hit the Viet-
namese coast some 20 miles south of Haiphong with
45-50 knot winds and torrential rains. It then
will probably proceed inland toward Hanoi. "Cora"
is a large storm and, although its wind velocity
is not extreme, its inland course could lead to
extensive flood-producing rains that may test the
improvements recently made to the dikes in this
area. To date, flooding has not been extensive
in the delta this season.
29 Aug 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/06/218J79T00975A022600110001-8
 Approved For ReI a 2003/06/26!L k DT79T00975A02Z600110001-8
Brezhnev Visits Virgin Lands
Approved For Release 2003/06/25 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO22600110001-8
SECRET
 Approved For Re a 2003/06/253 Fp79T00975A0'9il600110001-8
USSR: In an unusual display of concern over
the harvest prospects, Party General Secretary
Brezhnev has flown out to the key Virgin Lands
grain-growing area for conferences with local farm
officials.
Brezhnev arrived in Kokchetav in northern
Kazakh. Republic on Thursday to address a meeting of
local agricultural authorities. He then flew to
Barnaul, the capital of Altay Kray, for a similar
meeting., and arrived in Krasnoyarsk on 28 August.
His speeches have not been published, but Brezhnev
is probably putting the full weight of his personal
authority behind the current campaign for a maximum
effort to bring in the harvest.
Much is riding on the Virgin Lands harvest.
Adverse weather conditions have severely damaged
the crops in the other major grain growing areas
of the Soviet Union, but the Virgin Lands have
produced an above-average stand of wheat this year.
The situation is precarious, however, because the
crop is over a week late in ripening and is in
serious danger of being hit by early frosts. In
addition, harvest efforts are being hampered by
prolonged cool and rainy weather, and losses are
expected to be much higher than average.
In another sign of concern over the harvest,
Soviet leaders have launched a nationwide campaign
to save bread. This drive, reminiscent of 1963
when the country suffered from a dismal grain crop,
began in early August in the Ukraine--one of the
areas most severely affected by this year's poor
harvest. Since then, some Moscow papers and the
regional press have begun to publish articles
urging consumers to economize on the use of bread.
(continued)
2 9 Aug 7 2 Central Intelligence Bulletin
Approved For Release 2003/06/2^;1 FIM9T00975A022600110001-8
 Approved For Re'se 2003/06,~P79T00975A0t600110001-8
Although large purchases of foreign grain this
year will partially offset domestic losses, some of
the measures taken in 1963, such as removing flour
from the market and lowering the quality of bread,
may have to be employed again, The Soviets will,
however, try to avoid the distress slaughtering of
livestock. A cutback in livestock inventories
would sharply curb the much-heralded program to
improve meat supplies and would be even more polit-
ically embarrassing to Brezhnev, who fathered the
program. F77 I
29 Aug 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin 6
Approved For Release 2003/06/25E+ 79T00975A022600110001-8
 Approved For RelWe 2003/06/?t P79T00975A& 2 00110001-8
SOUTH ASIA: Obstacles to implementation of
the Simla pact appear even higher in the wake of
China's veto of Bangladesh's application for UN
membership.
India has sought Pakistani recognition of
Bangladesh as an indication of Pakistan's sincer-
ity in working for a peaceful settlement of mutual
problems. Prime Minister Gandhi believes that
President Bhutto committed himself to early rec-
ognition of Dacca in their meetings at Simla last
month. She sees his subsequent decision to with-
hold recognition as well as the Chinese veto--for
which she believes he shares responsibility--as
violations of the "spirit of Simla." She is also
unhappy about Bhutto's insistence that he retains
the right to involve the UN in Indo-Pakistani
problems, since the Simla agreement's emphasis
on bilateralism appeared to rule this out.
Mrs. Gandhi and Bhutto agreed at Simla to with-
draw troops from all territory, except in Kashmir,
occupied in last year's war. This amounted to a
major Indian concession; India captured some 5,600
square miles of West Pakistani territory while
losing only about 125 square miles. Bhutto, in
return, agreed to respect the existing line of
control in Kashmir and to seek resolution of dis-
putes with India through peaceful bilateral means.
In response to what she sees as Pakistani back-
sliding, Mrs. Gandhi has reportedly decided to delay
the troop withdrawals. With Pakistani negotiators
now in New Delhi to discuss the apparent deadlock,
her immediate task is to establish her conditions
for proceeding with the withdrawals. Publicly, her
government is now giving priority to obtaining an
agreed delineation of the boundary in Kashmir. In
fact, however, Mars. Gandhi is probably reluctant
to sacrifice a major bargaining chip--the occupied
territory--in the absence of a major Pakistani'
concession such as recognition of Bangladesh.
29 Aug 72
Central Intelligence Bulletin
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/06f +1 I IE P79T00975A022600110001-8
 Approved For Rel a 2003/06/25: CIA-RDP79T00975AO 00110001-8
SECRET
N UAL: Nepali dissidents based in India have
initiated terrorist activity across the border, but
they are unlikely to pose a serious threat to King
Birendra's regime.
On the nights of 23, 24, and 25 August, as
many as 400 well-armed raiders attacked nine police
posts in the eastern part of the Terai--the low-
lands along the Indian border--killing about ten
policemen, The
raiders probably are supporters o issi en epali
Congress Party leader B. P. Koirala, an ex - prime
minister who has chosen exile in India for some
four years and has long urged insurrection in Nepal.
Koirala can count on some support from the in-
habitants of the Terai and the Kathmandu Valley,
where allegiance to the monarchy is traditionally
weak, but his ability to engineer a country-wide
revolution is highly questionable. Nevertheless,
the raids may inspire various student and political
groups to continue or even intensify their demon-
strations of recent weeks. In the face of these
protests, King Birendra has so far been reluctant
either to grant the sweeping reforms demanded or
to exert firm control.
India has in the past given tacit approval
to Koirala's low-level antigovernment activities.
Policy makers in New Delhi, while not plotting
the overthrow of the Nepalese monarchy, would have
preferred the "democratic" political system as es-
poused by Koirala to the late King Mahendra's au-
thoritarian and allegedly anti-Indian rule. New
Delhi appears to regard Birendra more favorably
than his father, and Nepali authorities have no
evidence that the recent; raids were actively en-
couraged by New Delhi. Security, however, is ob-
viously lax on the Indian side of the border, where
the insurgents took refuge. Kathmandu's ability
to deal with the present: situation will be signif-
icantly enhanced if the Indians agree to its re-
quest to take action against the raiders.
I I
29 Aug 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/06/C~W'RRP79T00975A022600110001-8
J
 Approved For Rel a 2003/06/ ~,QbA 9QP79T00975A0 00110001-8
BENELUX-JAPAN: The Benelux countries re-
portedly are dissatisfied with the results of
unilateral Japanese measures to limit electronics
exports taken after recent industry talks. Bel-
gium and Holland have sent notes to the Japanese
Government expressing their concern over contin-
uing sharply rising imports of Japanese electronic
products. Although they appear to have given
Japan an additional trial period of several months
to reduce such exports, the Benelux countries have
threatened to impose temporary import restrictions
if voluntary restraint does not have the desired
result. With Dutch elections scheduled for Novem-
ber, political aspirants may be responsive to
pressure from Philips, the leading Benelux elec-
tronics firm and a major employer, for protection
from Japanese penetration.
29 Aug 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin 9
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/06/29 .; (1ItWT79T00975A022600110001-8
 Approved For Relie 2003/06/25 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0Q000110001-8
Secret
Secret
Approved For Release 2003/06/25 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO22600110001-8