CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A027600010008-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 15, 2006
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: April 4, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
114
DUMBIMIN
National Intelligence
Bulletin
State Dept. review completed
Top Secret
April 4, 1975
7
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 4, 1975
President Thieu appears to be moving to thwart any
move against him. This morning, he arrested a former
adviser who has been identified with the Ky-Lam group
and several other lesser figures.
Pressure for Thieu to resign is certain to grow.
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April 4, 1975
CONTENTS
CAMBODIA: The military situation. (Page 1)
SOUTH VIETNAM: The political situation in Saigon re-
mains confused. (Page 3)
THAILAND: Impact on Bangkok of recent events in Indo-
china. (Page 5)
LAOS: Souphanouvong's acceptability as a future prime
minister enhanced. (Page 8)
JAPAN: Tokyo attempting to stabilize the yen's exchange
rate. (Page 10)
TURKEY-GREECE: The likelihood of a serious incident in
the Aegean is growing. (Page 11)
CYPRUS: Peace talks to resume on April 25. (Page 13)
PORTUGAL: Political parties are to respond today to the
Armed Forces Movement's proposals for a new constitu-
tion. (Page 14)
YUGOSLAVIA: Tito denounces Soviets for belittling Yugo-
slav role during World War II. (Page 16)
BRAZIL: Dissidence among military officers continues.
(Page 18)
ARGENTINA: President Peron to meet with key labor
spokesmen today. (Page 19)
RHODESIA: Continued detention of Sithole increases pos-
sibility that negotiations will collapse. (Page 20)
FOR THE RECORD: (Page 22)
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CAMBODIA: Phnom Penh Area
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CAMBODIA
Khmer communist attacks late on Wednesday forced
government units to abandon positions on the dike that
has formed part of Phnom Penh's northern defenses. Coun-
terattacking government troops yesterday regained some
ground in this area but not the dike itself. Inconclu-
sive fighting continued on most other battlefronts around
the capital, including the newly threatened Bassac River
front southeast of the city.
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Communist gunners fired over 20 rockets at Pochen-
tong Airport yesterday. US airlift operations were not
affected, but two Khmer air force aircraft were destroyed.
The air force's steady losses are being reflected in a
much reduced level of tactical sorties and in declining
morale.
Even if the airport remains open, funding for ammu-
nition and airlift flights themselves will be exhausted
shortly after midmonth. Ammunition stocks in Phnom
Penh will not last through the month and certain types
of ammunition will begin running out in two weeks.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 4, 1975
Maneuvering to arrange the ouster of President
Thieu, spearheaded by Senate president Tran Van Lam and
former vice president Ky, is under way, but there is no
sign yet the President is ready to step down.
Thieu earlier had requested Lam to make proposals
for reorganizing of the government. Lam, armed with a
unanimous Senate vote expressing no confidence in Thieu
and calling for a change in leadership, is moving far
ahead of what Thieu had in mind.
Lam's plan has the support of Ky and some senior
officers such as General Vien, the chairman of the Joint
General Staff. A major question, however, is whether Ky
can command support among senior troop commanders, who
would have to back a move against Thieu if it is to be
successful. Ky, himself, does not appear to be totally
confident on this score. In a conversation yesterday
with an American official, Ky maintained that Thieu is
not likely to step down voluntarily and that his re-
moval will occur only after strong pressure is brought
to bear from the South Vietnamese military or from the
There have been no further serious setbacks for the
South Vietnamese in the past 24 hours, but small-scale
communist attacks have been increasing in both the prov-
inces near Saigon and in the delta. Although action in
the delta has been low in intensity, much of it is con-
centrated on the outer defenses of Can Tho City and ad-
jacent military complexes which regional officials be-
lieve to be priority targets for the communists.
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April 4, 1975
Saigon, meanwhile, is taking some steps designed to
shore up the combat effectiveness and morale of the armed
forces. A nine-point program has been prepared by the
Joint General Staff and may soon be implemented. Among
the steps to be taken is the reorganization of all ranger
groups into three infantry divisions, the reassembling of
armor units for the general reserve, the integration of
all territorial forces into the army, and reformation of
units that have been evacuated from the northern provinces.
In Military Region 2, the North Vietnamese still
have not occupied Nha Trang in force and some remnants of
government units remained at Cam Ranh airport as of late
Wednesday. Several hundred marines, airborne troops, and
remnants of other army units have been filtering down to
Phan Rang and are assembling on the town's airstrip.
North Vietnamese helicopters have been noted flying
into Hue and Da Nang during the past few days.
It is
likely that or Vietnamese civil cadre are being rushed
in to cope with the numerous problems of organizing the
civilian administration.
The Viet Cong broadcast a statement today outlining
a ten-point policy toward newly occupied areas, which sug-
gests that the communists hope to keep much of the former
South. Vietnamese government apparatus intact until a com-
munist administration can be organized. It appeals to
former government cadre to stay in their positions and for
government troops to join the "liberation." In addition,
it said that all property of the South Vietnamese govern-
ment would be managed by the Viet Cong, but that private
enterprise would be allowed to continue.
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Recent events in Indochina are likely to have a
greater impact on Thailand than on most other countries
in Southeast Asia. Although the Thai do not believe
that a communist take-over in Cambodia and Vietnam would
pose an immediate threat to their own security, they are
concerned over the long run implications of having po-
tentially hostile neighbors along their eastern border.
This concern will be most visible in the conduct
of Thai foreign policy. Foreign Minister Chatchai has
said that Thailand will have to accommodate itself to
changes in the region. The adjustments are likely to
include sharply .accelerating Thailand's efforts to move
away from identification with US policy in Indochina,
a process that began several years ago, and exploring
alternatives to its long reliance on the US for its se-
curity.
Khukrit Pramot's government, in office less than
two weeks, has already signaled its intent to dissociate
itself from US Indochina policies. Convinced that Phnom
Penh's collapse is inevitable, Thai officials have fo-
cused publicly on their opposition to the US airlift of
arms to Cambodia from bases on Thai soil.
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The Indochina situation will probably cause the
Thai to double efforts they are already making to im-
prove relations with their communist neighbors. It
could lead them to push ahead their timetable on recog-
nition of Peking.
Even without the collapse of Indochina, US inter-
ests in Thailand will be certain to come under scrutiny
by Bangkok in the months ahead. The Khukrit government
is already on record as favoring the withdrawal of all
US forces from Thailand within one year. Here again,
Khukrit and Chatchai have indicated to US officials
that the government's private position is more flexible
than its public position, but this may not prove to be
the case when the impact of the situation in Indochina
sinks in.
Given the increased influence in Thailand's new
parliamentary system of younger, well-educated politi-
cians who resent the extraordinary influence that the US
has long exerted in Thailand, it would be difficult for
Khukrit or any elected government to defend an indefi-
nite presence of US forces in Thailand. The Thai mili-
tary, who have been the staunchest defenders of the US
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presence, have been expressing their disappointment in
recent days that Thai-based US aircraft have not been
sent into action over Indochina. Having long identified
these aircraft with the US security commitment to Thai-
land, they may now begin to question the utility of keep-
ing the US bases.
There is little reason to believe, however, that a
communist take-over in Indochina will cause the Thai to
seek a complete reversal of their long-standing close
relations with the US. The Thai continue to see even a
limited US presence and involvement with Southeast Asia
as a useful counterbalance to the interests of Moscow,
Peking, and Hanoi. While the Thai have probably passed
the point at which they would again uncritically support
US policy interests in Asia, they still harbor immense
goodwill toward the US. However much the Thai may now
discount the value of the US security commitment to
Thailand, they will still look to the US for basic sup-
port for their armed forces, especially as a supplier
of badly needed spare parts and other forms of assistance.
One of the strongest advocates of striking out for
new approaches in foreign policy is Foreign Minister
Chatchai, whose initiatives are frequently influenced
by his personal ambitions for higher political office.
Chatchai, while essentially a conservative, tends to
say or do whatever he thinks will most enhance his po-
litical stature, and he currently seems convinced that
moving away from the US is good politics. He has
strongly advocated early withdrawal of US forces pri-
marily to gain a greater following in the National As-
sembly and not simply to remove one of the obstacles
to better relations with Hanoi. Chatchai's grandstand-
ing is likely to compound US problems of dealin with
the Khukrit government in the months ahead.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 4, 1975
Two developments closely identifying Lao King Savang
with communist leader Souphanouvong could have an impor-
tant bearing on Souphanouvong's eventual acceptability
as a future prime minister.
A spokesman for the coalition cabinet recently an-
nounced that the King has accepted Souphanouvong's in-
vitation to pay an official visit to the Pathet Lao zone
this year and that His Majesty has also decided to be
formally crowned no later than the end of 1976. Souphan-
ouvong is to be in charge of arrangements for both the
King's visit to Sam Neua, which may take place soon af-
ter the Lao New Year's festivities in mid-April, and for
his coronation.
Timetables in Laos often slip but, if these deci-
sions are carried out as announced, Souphanouvong's rep-
utation as a national leader will be considerably en-
hanced and his claim to be Prime Minister Souvanna
Phouma's ultimate successor significantly strengthened.
Since his accession to the throne in 1959, King
Savang has maintained that he would be crowned only when
Laos was unified under a single administration. His de-
cision to proceed with the coronation represents a sharp
break with the past, for the country clearly is not yet
unified now and may be no more than marginally so by
late 1976.
The 67-year-old King, however, may have come to
view a coronation--with Pathet Lao involvement--as a
means of ensuring the survival of the monarchy beyond
his reign. He may also feel that a visit to Sam Neua
would be a symbolic gesture welcoming the Pathet Lao as
loyal subjects back into the national fold.
Little is known about the actual events that led
to the King's recently announced decisions, but they
probably evolved from lengthy discussions with Souphan-
ouvong and Souvanna during the Prime Minister's extended
convalescence in the royal capital of Luang Prabang.
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For his part, Souvanna probably relished the idea of in-
volving the King--who is held in awe and respect by all
Lao groups and factions--in potentially major-steps to-
ward national reconciliation.
There is no firm evidence that Souvanna is actively
promoting his half-brother Souphanouvong as a successor.
Souvanna, however, has consistently maintained that Sou-
phanouvong is more of a Lao nationalist than a communist
and that if Laos' third and possibly final coalition ex-
periment is to have any chance of success, risks must be
taken and compromises made to bring him and other so-
called Pathet Lao moderates back into the nation's politi-
cal mainstream. Moreover, recent battlefield developments
in South Vietnam and Cambodia have apparently reinforced
Souvanna's conviction that a policy of political accommo-
dation with the Pathet Lao is the only alternative to
the inevitable communist military take-overs which he
believes await Laos' Indochinese neighbors.
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JAPAN
Tokyo is taking steps to reduce the movement of for-
eign capital into Japan. Its aim is to stabilize the yen
exchange rate.
The Ministry of Finance last week ordered a 20-
percent cut in loans from the Eurodollar market. Bond
sales abroad, up sharply in the first quarter, will also
be curtailed. Additional outflows will be encouraged by
allowing more foreign lending by Japanese banks.
The yen had been relatively steady at about 300 to
the dollar for several months, but it came under strong
upward pressure in late January and peaked at 285 to the
dollar in early March. The current rate is about 290 to
one--an appreciation of more than 3 percent since January.
Tokyo's direct intervention in the market, totaling
at least $400 million in February and March, kept the
rate from rising even more. Tokyo is hoping that tighter
capital controls will make future intervention of this
magnitude unnecessary.
The yen's strength reflects a combination of a much
improved trade account and larger than expected long-
term movements of capital from abroad. The seasonly ad-
justed trade surplus last quarter alone exceeded the
$1.6 billion recorded in all of 1974. Long-term capital,
traditionally a deficit item, showed a large surplus in
February. In recent months, gains have reflected a
sharp increase in foreign buying of Japanese securities.
Net foreign purchases of Japanese stocks and bonds to-
taled $550 million from January through March.
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The likelihood of a serious incident in the Aegean
is growing as Greece and Turkey appear increasingly will-
ing to risk a confrontation to back up their "conflict-
ing" claims in the area.
The US embassy in Athens was informed by the Greek
government that two Turkish aircraft violated Greek air-
space yesterday, while another 18 Turkish planes flew
a patrol nearby. Greek aircraft on patrol in the area
were ordered by higher authorities not to engage the
Turkish planes. Antiaircraft batteries on the islands
did open fire, but apparently were not effective.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 4, 1975
Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders have apparently
agreed to resume their interrupted peace talks on April
25 in Vienna.
The initial press announcements did not state who
would participate in the talks, but Rauf Denktash and
Glafkos Clerides probably will at least open the negotia-
tions. There has been a move to replace Denktash, who
is now president of the recently proclaimed Turkish
federated state of Cyprus, with an individual of lesser
stature. This would suit Cypriot President Makarios,
who would like to be able in turn to replace Clerides,
whom he has criticized as too lenient a negotiator.
The Turks, who had previously balked at an active
role for UN Secretary General Waldheim, finally agreed
to his participation in the first week of the negotia-
tions. This is a shorter period than the Greeks or Greek
Cypriots wanted, but they probably agreed for want of a
better alternative.
Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis remains anxious to
get the Cyprus problem behind him and would probably be
prepared to adopt a more flexible position if the Turks
were willing to withdraw from some part of the area they
now hold. The Greek Cypriots continue to hope that the
cutoff of US military aid to Turkey will make the Turks
more amenable to concessions.
Although there is a consensus in Ankara that terri-
torial concessions are necessary, the US embassy in
Nicosia reports indications that the Turks continue to
move toward a de facto separation of the two communities
on the island. The Turks have now settled virtually all
of the migrants from the south in former Greek villages
in the north and are in the process of making the north
self-sufficient in such things as electrical power.
A Turkish Cypriot constitution--drafted in mainland
Turkey--was completed on March 26 and has been forwarded
to the Turkish Cypriot constituent assembly for approval.
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The draft constitution provides all the accoutrements
of an independent state; the only concession to the Greek
Cypriots is an admission that the constitution may be
amended "when the constitution of the federal Republic
of Cyprus is put into force."
PORTUGAL
Lisbon's political parties are to respond today to
the Armed Forces Movement's proposals for a new consti-
tution that will formalize military domination of the
government for at least three to five years.
The details of the proposals, termed "guidelines
for a transitional constitution," have not yet been re-
leased. The "guidelines" were drawn up by the Revolu-
tionary Council, however, and almost certainly include
a constitutional provision formalizing the Council's
role as the principal policy-making body.
Negotiations between the Movement and the politi-
cal parties on the military's future role in politics
were suspended following the coup attempt on March 11.
The Socialist and Popular Democratic parties may con-
tinue to oppose giving the military permanent political
dominance, but it is highly unlikely that their opposi-
tion will sway the military from its decision to retain
power. A military spokesman told reporters that no sanc-
tions were foreseen against those parties that failed to
ratify the pact.
In the meantime, the campaign for the election of
the assembly that is charged with writing the constitu-
tion has proceeded with only minor incidents since its
official opening on April 2. A revolutionary student
organization allied with a recently banned extreme left-
ist party charged that its headquarters had been attacked
by the Communists. The Communist Party countered by
charging that the students had besieged Communist of-
fices, sending several party members to the hospital.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 4, 1975
President Tito has denounced the Soviets for be-
littling Yugoslav resistance during World War II.
Speaking at a party meeting in Macedonia on Wednes-
day, Tito responded angrily to a recent article by the
Warsaw Pact commander in chief, Marshal Yakubovsky, who
claimed the USSR was responsible for the successful
anti-Nazi resistance in Eastern Europe. Tito emphasized
that his forces began fighting in 1941, but received no
Soviet aid until late 1944. It would be a "disgrace,"
he added, if Moscow refuses to recognize the independent
Yugoslav war effort that the West openly acknowledges.
The Yugoslav leader made very plain his annoyance
with Yakubovsky's support of Bulgarian claims that they--
with the Red Army--played the main role in liberating
Yugoslavia. Tito reminded the Soviets that he allowed
Bulgarians into Yugoslavia only at the insistence of
Moscow and that the Bulgarian troops never fought a
major battle.
For three months Belgrade has been inveighing
against Bulgaria's "irredentist" intentions toward Yugo-
slav Macedonia. Any signs that the Soviets are backing
Sofia--even such indirect support as Yakubovsky's in-
sensitive jingoism--increase Yugoslav edginess.
Belgrade has other reasons to suspect Moscow's in-
tentions.
Belgrade shares Ceausescu's view that-the viet party is becoming more rigid in its demands for
conformity in preparations for the European Communist
Conference. The two parties are jointly reviewing their
options against the harder Soviet line. Belgrade has
warned that, if pressed too hard by Moscow, it would re-
fuse to attend. Romania could decide to boycott the
conference, as it did the Karlovy Vary gathering in 1967.
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Last fall, when the Soviet-aided "Cominformist" plot
was exposed, Brezhnev was able to mollify Belgrade, and
Tito eventually tried to protect his working relation-
ship with the Soviet party secretary. Any Kremlin at-
tempt to offset the effect of the Yakubovsky article
will have to come before the celebrations in Moscow of
the "victory over fascism" on May 9, when the Yugoslavs
will be primed to correct the Soviet view of history.
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BRAZIL
Dissidence among senior military officers opposed
to President Geisel's liberalization program is continu-
ing.
Some opponents are apparently trying to rally sup-
port for their position by circulating anonymous pam-
phlets that attack Geisel's top adviser, General Golbery,
whom they view as the chief architect of liberalization.
The pamphlets--a traditional military method of gaining
support--accuse Golbery and others associated with him
of advocating policies that betray the goals of the 1964
revolution and play into the hands of the communists. A
number of leading military conservatives are security
specialists who feel that liberalization could embolden
subversives. They also fear a diminution of their con-
siderable influence in government if the program contin-
ues.
The top army commander in Sao Paulo,
Genera vi a e o, earlier this week denounced the
efforts of liberals to investigate claims of torture
and political prisoners. He denied, however, that "sec-
tors of the army" oppose Geisel.
Thus far the dissident officers do not appear nu-
merous or strong enough to wring a major concession--
such as the sacking of Golbery. Indeed, they may be
satisfied if the process is stopped where it is rather
than demanding a reversal of liberalization. The gov-
ernment's seizure last Monday of a weekly political
satire magazine, previously freed from censorship ma
have been intended to placate the conservatives. I
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ARGENTINA
President Peron is trying to soften the mood of con-
frontation that has developed between the Peronist labor
movement and her government by agreeing to meet with key
labor spokesmen today. The prospects for a successful
outcome are not bright, at this stage, but a slowdown may
be temporarily averted.
The influential Peronist newspaper May_oria has
billed the talks as possibly the last chance "to elimi-
nate men and procedures which damage the government and
distort the thought and programs of Juan Peron." Labor
leaders will probably demand a larger share of power and
changes in the cabinet, including removal of Social Wel-
fare Minister Lopez Rega. Mrs. Peron's aloofness and
reliance on Lopez Rega have angered labor, which is the
backbone of the Peronist movement. Pressure has grown
to the point where she can no longer ignore the powerful
trade union organizations without risk of losing their
support. There is no evidence, however, that Mrs. Peron
will heed an ultimatum to get rid of Lopez Rega. If she
does not at least placate labor with concessions in other
areas, her political position will. probably deteriorate
further.
Aside from the agreement to talk, labor will expect
some substantial concessions--particularly a large role
in economic policy planning. Mrs. Peron's apparent un-
willingness to sack Lopez Rega, however, could make it
very difficult to reach an accommodation. Labor's views
are widely shared by others--the military, opposition
parties, and many moderate Peronists, including cabinet
members and the influential governor of Buenos Aires
Province.
Mrs. Peron is holding meetings with representatives
of other political parties in an effort to stem the ris-
ing tide of opposition to her government. Spokesmen for
roach on
the President are promising a conciliatory app
her part.
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April 4, 1975
Prospects for a complete cancellation of settlement
negotiations between Ian Smith's white regime and black
Rhodesian nationalists have increased as a result of the
ruling on Wednesday by a court in Salisbury that the gov-
ernment can legally detain without trial. Ndabaningi Si-
thole, a major nationalist leader. The deepening impasse
poses hard choices for South African Prime Minister
Vorster and the leaders of four black states who have
been collaborating for months in a joint effort to medi-
ate a Rhodesian solution.
The Rhodesian tribunal declared that the government's
rearrest of Sithole a month ago--he had been released
from ten years confinement only last December--and his
detention without trial were "fully warranted." The
court did not rule on the accusation by Smith's aides
when Sithole was arrested that he had plotted to kill
rival leaders of the nationalists' umbrella African Na-
tional Council. Instead, Sithole's detention was upheld
on the basis on evidence--withheld from the public hear-
ing before the tribunal last week--that he had encouraged
terrorism by Rhodesian guerrillas and thus had under-
mined the truce agreement the Smith regime concluded with
the nationalists last December.
The change in the government's approach was almost
certainly dictated in part by a weak case against Sithole
on the plotting accusation. The broader charge is prob-
ably also viewed as likely to elicit fuller support
among Rhodesian whites for the action against Sithole.
Smith apparently is unconcerned--indeed he may be glad--
that the judicial decision makes more difficult a face-
saving compromise between his regime and Sithole's col-
leagues in the council who have vowed not to resume even
preliminary talks Smith until Sithole is freed or
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Vorster is surely highly displeased by Smith's ap-
parent determination to keep Sithole under detention.
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Forster must either bring
more effective pressure to ear on Salisbury.--he has
potential economic leverage in addition to the withdrawal
of South African police units from Rhodesia, which is
already well advanced--or risk seeing his policy of de-
tente with black Africa go down the drain.
The African mediators, who have similarly invested.
their prestige in the settlement attempt, had counted on
Vorster to prevail on Smith to resolve the S:ithole case
satisfactorily. Publicly, they have backed the position
of the Rhodesian nationalists on the issue and implied
that their countries--Zambia, Tanzania, Botswana, and
soon-to-be-independent Mozambique--would support full-
scale guerrilla warfare if Smith scuttled settlement ne-
gotiations./ I
Last week, Zambia's President Kaunda risked additional.
African criticism when he rounded up many Zambian-based
Rhodesian insurgent leaders who had been involved in
bloody inter-tribal feuding. If Kaunda has also effec-
tively clamped down on the insurgents' bases in Zambia,.
he may be in a position to forestall an early resurgence
of guerrilla attacks in the wake of the Sithole decision.
On the other hand, the Zambian leader may find it polit-
ically untenable to stand against the new African pres-
sures to turn up the insurgency that the decision is
sure to generate. Criticism of his policy may crystallize
at the Organization of African Unit foreign ministers'
meeting in Tanzania next week.
-21-
Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975A027600010008-7
 Approved For Release
2007/03/06: CIA-RDP 9T00975A027600010008-7
National Intelligence Bulletin
April 4, 1975
South Korea: Anti-government demonstrations by
some 5,000 university students spilled into the streets
of Seoul yesterday and were contained by riot police only
after numerous injures to both sides. In Pusan, over a
thousand members of the principal opposition party
clashed with police trying to stop their protest march.
South Korea is in another of its familiar cycles of pro-
test and repression. The Pak government does not'appear
to be considering any marked departure from past prac-
tice, and first reactions will probably focus on arrest-
ing offending politicians and closing down the most trou-
blesome campuses.
Approved For Release 2007/03/ CIA-RDP79T00975A027600010008-7
 S d et d For Release 2007/03/06: CIA-RDP79T00975AO27600010008-7
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Approved For Release 2007/03/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO27600010008-7