The 1964 Cuban Sugar Harvest

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP70T00666R000100180017-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 2, 2003
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: May 12, 1964
• Content Type: MF

25X1 Approved For Release 2003/05/28 : CIA-RDP70T00666R000100180017-8
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2003/05/28 : CIA-RDP70T00666R000100180017-8
J0666W00100180017-8
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved Fo
r Release 2003/05/28 : CIA-RUP70
1 2 MAY 1964
Director (Intelligence)
The 1964 Cuban Sugar Harvest
1. We curre
be about 3.8
estimat
ion met
tone --
r production this year
e low level as last
2. Re*emphasis by the regime on sugar production during the last
two years took the form primarily of extensive cane replanting. This
probably would have resulted in a sugar harvest of about 4.2 million
metric tons had it not been for (a) the "Second. Agrarian Reform" of
October 1963, atich extended bureaucratic government control over
Cuban cane land from about 50 percent to about 70 percent of the total
and (b) the damage done to the cane in Oriente and to a lesser extent
in Camaguey by HUrricane !lora, also in October 1963.
3. A production of 3.8 million metric tons would be insufficient
for Cuba to fulfill both its. international .::ommitments and domestic
needs. On Nay Bey Castro stated that Caen sugar export commitments
this year amounted to 3.8 million metric tons. Domestic consumption
vill almost certainly be no lower than 300 thousand metric tons and
could well be as high as ivoo thousand metric tons. This means that
sugar production this year probably will be 300 to 400 thousand metric
tons Short of Cuba 'a total requirements. However, it is very likely
that the bulk of this short-fall will be offset by reduced exports to
the USSR. Cuba has an export commitment of 1.6 million metric tons
to the Soviets and a reduction of 400 thousand metric tons would still
result in exports to the USSR equal to last year's exports.
4. It was widely reported that Cuba purchased 10,000 tons of re-
fined sugar from a British sugar company for shipment to Bulgaria and
10,000 tens of raw sugar in Faris for shipment to Ned China, ostensibly
because domestic sugar production was insufficient to meet export
commitments.
Approved F crr-Release-2003fErof26-:-C-1A-REPP-7-0T-60 6 6 6 RO 0 01 0 01 8 0 01
25
X1
Approved For
25X1
25X1
Release 2003/05/28 : CIA-RDP70T006
W0100180017-8
The speech by Carlo* Rafael Rodriguez, the chief
Ctiba, on 9 May 1964 (as reported in today's W
*ate that production this year will be less than our
e ot 3.8 million metric tons.
is standard. practice for the regime to exhort aorkers to
quickly at this stage of the harvest. In May the
togin and these rains hinder but do not necessarily
operations. Moreover, with the start of the rainy
workers becalm eager to plant their other crops. The
ouragee the sugar worker at this time to stay on
harder. Xt hae now become customary for the cane
into early July and the regime most resort to ex-
ions to keep the workers in the fields for such a long period
. Last year the harvest continued until 8 July in s bite of
set of the rainy season and Cuba was able to produce thousand
.ons after May Day. Xt is significant that nany more sugar mills
y operating in Cuba compared to last year, Indicating an
d a potenti 1 to continue the harvest perhaps beyond last
date.
T. The statement by Rodriguez that Hurricane had dramatic
percuss for Camaguey and Oriente is probably ace e. Oriente
is normally the Province with the highest sugar yields from cane. This
year the yields in Oriente are only mediocre -with the result that the
total sugar yield this year will be one of the lowest on record, to a
great extent resulting from the flooding and cane damage caused by
Hurricane ioni. However, we have taken this effect into considera-
tion in arriving at the estimate of 3.8 million metric teas.
8. We have reviewed Under Secretary of State Ball'a presentation
on Nice to the NATO Council, all the essentials of which he repeated
in his more recent speech in Roanoke, Virginia. With the exception of
certain relatively minor points whleh Under Secretary Ball obviously
ramie fox' policy emphasie, our evidence on the state of Cuban econoMY
is fundamentally in accord with the picture he presented. Most of the
quantitative data he cited were based on material we have made avail-
able to the State repartment over the last 12-18 months.
9. Although calculation* we made about 16 months ago were probably
the basis for Mr. Ball's reference to a decline of about 20 percent in
the Caen standard of living, our Judgment today is that the 20 percent
figure overstates the actual overall extent of decline. Also, we would
timate Cuba's 1963 exports at closer to $520 million than
ion figure used. by the Under Secretary. We ahead not, as
characterize Cuba e industrial plant as repidly wearing
Approve
2
000100180017-8
rApproved For elease 2003/05/28 : CIA-RDP70T0066
.R000100180017-8
outs as 'we see it, iiainerr has been deteriorating but the poceae
appears to be a gradmal one. Much of the sugar machinery was obso es-
cent before Castro took over but Cuba continues to have a grinding
capability well in excess of actual production levels of recent years.
We reiterate, however, that these points of difference are not of
sufficient veight to affect materially any of the major judgpents in
Under Secretary Ball's policy presentation.
Approved For Release 2003/05/28 : CIA-RDP70T00666R000100180017-8
lease 2003/05/28 : CIA-RDP7
Approved For Re
OT00666R000100180017-8
ate A,
graphic e
ed by ORR during the period
a Vietnam,
1 1 MAY 1964
note that the bulk of this res
the pest trig years. The requisite
is upon Vietnam have been made with
iculty and by means that have come to
u ne. Wo unique problems have been encountered.
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/05/28 : CIA-RDP70T00666R0001
00180017-8
25X1
Approved For Rel
se 2003/05/28 : CIA-RDP70T0
66R0011400180017- 41VP
a/g4t.a*,d
7 MAY 196A
MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Assistant Director, Research and Reports
SUBJECT: Geographic Intelligence Production on Indochina,
1950 to Present ?
25X1 1. produced 40 reports on Indochina during
the perioa 1 January 1950 - 31 March 1964. Twenty-seven of these
reports were undertaken/ 2 were
prepared for the Department of State; and ii were produced as basic
research support to planning, briefing, and estimates personnel. A
list of the reports, with dates of issue, is attached. It will be
noted that while one or more reports were produced in every year except
1956, almost one-half of the total output is concentrated in the two
years following January 1962.
2. During the same period, produced 407
maps, charts, and other cartograpnic items In support of CIA and ?epart-
meat of State requirements on Indochina. The bulk of the production was
undertaken in support of current intelligence analysis; geographic,
economic, and other basic research activities;
"a. These 407 cartographic items were used as follows:
Categories
(1) In support of National Intelligence Estimates
(2) In support of current intelligence requirements
25X1 (3)
(4) Briefing support
(5) Pro.duction for the National Intelligence Survey
(6) Geographic, economic, and other research-support
(7) General planning and orientation map support
25X1
initiated maps for intelligence
community use)
25X1
Items
26
123
64
37
54
00
10
(0) Other (maps, charts, sketches, etc., not covered 27
in above)
Total
Approved For Release 2003/05/28 : CIA-RDP7OTOOE
Q7
66R000100180017-8
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For
66ROO*00180017-8
25X1
Release 2003/05/28 : CIA-RDP70T006
b. The chronological distribution of the cartographic
support was as follows:
Number of Items
1950 - 1953
41
10
1954 - 1957
03
21
1958 - 1961
115
20
1962 - 1964
160
41
1950 - 1964 77i
Enclosure:
25X1 Listing of IPoduction on Indochina,
1 January 1950 - 31 March 1964
25X1
V9Aef, Geographic Research
25X1
- 2 -
Approved For Release 2003/05/28 : CIA-RDP70T00666R000100180017-8
Approved For Rel
ease 2003/05/28 : CIA-RDP70T00666R000100180017-8
Economic Research on North and South Vietnam
1950 - 1964
Economic researchon what was then Indo-China began in April
1954 when ORR Initiated a study on the transportation routes used
to supply the Viet Minh from Communist China
During the remainder
of 1954 and 1955, ORR provided considerable additional support
concerning Viet Minh logistics. After the formation of North Vietnam,
ORR began to follow the economy of that country and prepared a number
of studies on the overall economy and on specific sectors, particularly
food and agriculture. Except for several comparisons of the economies
of North and South Vietnam, ORR did not do economic research on
South Vietnam until 1962. Since then several projects were done on
South Vietnam in support of ONE
ICCOttomie intelligence support on both North and South Vietnam
increased sharply during the first quarter of 1964. Most of this
support concerned status of transportation facilities and construction
of new railroads, highways, and airfields in North Vietnam, and the
probable impact of various economic warfare measures against North
Vietnam.
Attacha4 is a list of economic research projects on Vietnam
Lug 1954 - April 1964. The following is a breakdown of the
timers of these projects:
Articles for OCI Pu ations
35
Memoranda for USIS Watch Committee
35
Contributions to National Estimates
8
MS Sections
8
Other Support
30
Self-Initiated Projects
33
App
roved For Release 2003/05/28 : CIA-RDP70T00666R0001001800
17-8
25X1
25X1
2511
25X1
25X1 Approved For Release 2003/05/28 : CIA-RDP70T00666R000100180017-8
Next 19 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2003/05/28 : CIA-RDP70T00666R000100180017-8