NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A028100010006-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 27, 2006
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: September 4, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
National Intelligence
Bulletin
State Dept. review completed
DIA review(s) completed.
Top Secret
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September 4, 1975
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National Intelligence Bulletin
September 4, 1975
PORTUGAL: Boycott of general assembly
meeting planned by some officers . . . . . . . . . . .
LEBANON: Demonstrations
against the Sinai pact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
ISRAEL-LEBANON: Israeli
aircraft hit fedayeen targets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
CYPRUS: Greek Cypriots pessimistic
over prospects for talks in New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
ANGOLA: National Front aims to
establish military positions near capital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
ARGENTINA: Conservative Peronist
groups weakened by recent crises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
USSR: Warsaw Pact establishes new
headquarters facing NATO's southern flank . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
FOR THE RECORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
ANNEX: Factionalism Within the Chinese Leadership
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National Intelligence Bulletin
September 4, 1975
Portuguese officers supporting the Antunes faction apparently now plan to
boycott the crucial meeting of the Armed Forces General Assembly-scheduled for
tomorrow-unless former prime minister Goncalves' appointment as armed forces
chief of staff is rescinded and the composition of the pro-Goncalves assembly itself
is changed.
This strategy reportedly evolved from a meeting of the army assembly on
Tuesday. The results of the meeting were not made public but were conveyed
directly to President Costa Gomes. The US army attache in Lisbon has learned that
the vote went heavily against Goncalves in spite of his personal appearance at the
assembly. The army assembly voted not to send delegates to tomorrow's general
assembly session.
A meeting of the air force assembly yesterday was expected to follow the
army's lead. We do not yet have the results of this meeting, but if the air force does
in fact follow the army's lead in calling for changes in the membership of the general
assembly, the inter-service meeting will probably be postponed.
In the past few days, the Communist-influenced media have attempted to sow
discord and confusion in the air force by casting doubt on the support enjoyed by
its chief of staff, General Morais da Silva. Earlier this week, he said Goncalves would
serve the interests of the Communists in his new position as head of the military.
Last night, the President's office denied reports that Morais da Silva would be
replaced.
Meanwhile, according to Socialist Party sources, Mario Soares has made public
his party's conditions for joining a new government. In addition to the removal of
Goncalves, Soares' tough demands reportedly included:
--Municipal, labor union, and national assembly elections.
Support for the popularly elected constituent assembly.
--Implementation of an economic plan drawn up recently by the Socialist
Party.
The Popular Democratic Party reportedly is making the same demands for
political freedoms that were rejected in July, resulting in the party's withdrawal
from the fourth provisional government.
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September 4, 1975
The joint strategy being pursued by the Antunes faction and the democratic
parties seems to leave the next move to Costa Gomes. At the same time, the threat
of military action by one or another of the factions in the armed forces appears to
be growing daily.
There are some indications that Portuguese rightists may try to take advantage
of the present situation. According to press reports, former president Antonio de
Spinola left Brazil on Tuesday for Paris. This visit reportedly is part of a plan to
stage a political comeback.
Spinola supporters could upset the present political situation if they launched a
strike against the Communists-as some reports have suggested they might. Such a
move would be effectively exploited by Communists propagandists, who would link
it with the Antunes group, perhaps scuttling efforts to purge Goncalves and his
supporters.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
September 4, 1975
A general strike called by Palestinians and Lebanese leftists to protest the latest
Egyptian-Israeli agreement halted commercial activity in the southern port cities of
Sidon and Tyre yesterday. The strike was only partly effective in Beirut, although
roadblocks appeared in several areas of the city and the road to the airport was
closed. Demonstrations are expected to continue today.
Small arms fire was heard early yesterday morning in the Beirut suburbs where
heavy fighting occurred in late June, and two rockets were fired at the headquarters
of the right-wing Christian Phalanges Party. Government security forces moved
quickly to contain the violence, and to provide protection to the Egyptian embassy,
where Palestinians demonstrated last weekend.
There is a danger that the demonstrations against the new Sinai pact might
combine with the continued clashes between Christians and Muslims to produce a
real explosion in Beirut. Palestinian radicals organized a few demonstrations late last
week in support of Muslims and fedayeen in the Zahlah area, where violence has
already lasted ten days.
The Lebanese internal security service appears gradually to be gaining the upper
hand in Zahlah, although reliable press reports indicate that at least 36 persons have
been killed in the fighting.
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National Intelligence Bulletin September 4, 1975
ISRAEL-LEBANON
Israeli aircraft bombed fedayeen targets in southern Lebanon yesterday for the
second consecutive day.
Tel Aviv has increased attacks on fedayeen targets during the past several
weeks, partly because of stepped-up fedayeen strikes across the border, and also in
an attempt to preempt terrorist attacks against Israel. While discussing yesterday
morning's air raid, an Israeli spokesman said that Israel would hit the fedayeen
whenever it has information as to their location.
Yesterday, according to a military authority in Tel Aviv, 16 A-4 Skyhawks
struck fedayeen camp, storage, and headquarters structures in the Burghuliyah area,
some 15 miles north of the Israeli border on the Mediterranean coast. Israeli aircraft
and artillery also hit fedayeen targets in southeastern Lebanon near Mount Hermon
in separate strikes.
The Palestine guerrilla command
announced in Beirut this morning that Israeli commandos struck guerrilla positions
near the Lebanese port city of Sidon. F__ I The Israeli military command
c irm in a rie communique that its troops had clashed with Arab guerrillas
but provided few details.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
September 4, 1975
Turkish unwillingness to follow through on commitments made during the last
round of the intercommunal talks in Vienna has left Greek Cypriots frustrated and
pessimistic over prospects for the round in New York on September 8 and 9.
The mainland Turks and Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash appear caught
between a tactical need to appear reasonable and forthcoming in New York-with an
eye to the US House of Representatives' position on the arms embargo-and the
political situation in Turkey that makes concessions difficult. Denktash also has to
contend with political restraints in his own Turkish Cypriot community and is
concerned about possibly being left out on a limb by Ankara.
US embassy officials in Nicosia believe that any concessions the Turks do
finally offer in New York will be relatively minor, and only an initial bargaining
position. Combined with Denktash's failure to produce on other Vienna
commitments, such a position would further embarrass and embitter Greek Cypriot
negotiator Clerides, who may have weakened his political position by making
concessions at Vienna last month. It would also give substance to Cypriot President
Makarios' doubts about the Vienna talks and help justify a decision to submit the
Cyprus issue to the UN General Assembly.
Denktash has yet to follow through on his promise to present concrete
proposals on the various issues prior to going to New York. In addition, he has failed
to produce on other Vienna agreements in exchange for Clerides' agreement to
permit the nearly 9,000 Turkish Cypriots remaining in the south to move to the
Turkish zone in the north. Denktash did agree to the return of some 800 Greeks
expelled earlier from the north, but Turkish obstructionism has resulted in no more
that 230 being readmitted to the Turkish zone so far. Clerides has told UN officials
that he is considering blocking the movement of the remaining Turkish Cypriots to
the north if movement of Greek Cypriots is not speeded up.
In Ankara, Prime Minister Demirel is reluctant to make any concessions on
Cyprus that might leave him vulnerable in the partial Senate elections next month.
Demirel's rightist coalition partner, Necmettin Erbakan, has taken a no-concession
position on Cyprus and would be quick to turn any major conciliation gestures by
Demirel to his own political advantage.
I n a move that appears to be related to the arms embargo as much as to a
Cyprus settlement, Ankara announced on September 3 that some of the 1,000 to
1,500 army commandos stationed on Cyprus since July 1974 would return to
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National Intelligence Bulletin September 4, 1975
Turkey during the first week of September. This move, which the Turks have been
considering for some time, may have been announced at this time to help offset
their failure to make meaningful proposals on a territorial settlement. It is doubtful
that this gesture will dispel the pessimism in Greek Cypriot ranks in the few
remaining days before the opening of the talks in New York.
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National Intelligence Bulletin September 4, 1975
Claims by the National Front for the Liberation of Angola that its troops have
advanced to within ten miles of Luanda, the capital, have not been confirmed by
Portuguese military officials. The Front and the rival Popular Movement for the
Liberation of Angola are known, however, to be building up their military forces
between Luanda and the Front's stronghold at Caxito, some 40 miles to the
northeast.
The Front is anxious to establish a military perimeter around the outskirts of
Luanda.
Apparently, the Front also hopes to discredit claims by the Popular Movement
that it is the territory's only effective nationalist group. The Popular Movement has
maintained that it is the only group that has lived up to its responsibilities under the
accord concluded between Lisbon and the liberation groups last January. It says it
expects to "assume total responsibility for governing Angola" on November 11.
With slightly over two months remaining before they are scheduled to grant
independence to Angola, the Portuguese are making a last-ditch attempt to patch
together a government to which it can hand over sovereignty. Admiral Leonel
Cardoso, formerly in charge of naval operations in Portugal's African territories, was
sworn in on August 30 as the new Angolan high commissioner and should be arriving
in Luanda soon. Cardoso will have broader executive, judicial, and defense
responsibilities than those granted to his predecessor now that Lisbon has suspended
the January agreement.
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The crises that have rocked Argentina recently have seriously weakened the
unity of conservative Peronist groups that still profess loyalty to President Maria
Estela Peron.
Labor and political leaders are trying to preserve an image of cooperation and
vitality, but events of the past week demonstrate that this is only a facade. Peronist
party leaders elected during last week's convention are calling for a return to
"consensus politics"-the dialogue with all national political participants begun by
Juan Peron. The directive ordering this, however, contains no guidelines for
reconciling groups that are mutually antagonistic.
The leaders are ignoring the fact that Peronists who disapproved the party slate
have organized a rival faction called the "Peronist Affirmation." This appears to be
the first time in Peronist history that any group has formally challenged the
hierarchy without first resigning from the party.
Moreover, tensions within the Peronist labor movement-long the dominant
civilian political force in the country-were increased by the recent conflict between
President Peron and the military chiefs over the appointment of an army officer to
the interior portfolio. According to reliable press reports, the country's two major
union leaders disagreed strongly on the issue of taking sides in the dispute and are
unlikely to reconcile their differences. Both men already have been weakened
because of their past ties to the now-discredited Lopez Rega and their inability to
prevent price hikes and to curb rising unemployment. Their disagreement will
probably be papered over, but behind the scenes it appears that the union boss who
sided with President Peron in her dispute with the military high command has lost
political ground.
This latest flare-up is a further indication of the lack of organizational
cohesiveness that prevents labor, military, and political leaders from exercising the
leadership needed to cope with major political and economic problems. Although
real power passed to military and (labor leaders two months ago with the downfall of
Lopez Rega, they have been unable to work effectively with President Peron, are
unwilling to oust her, and cannot agree among themselves on a course of action.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
September 4, 1975
A significant change has been reported in the command and control structure
of Warsaw Pact forces facing the NATO Southern Region. F__ I
a new organizational structure consisting of a Theater of Military
Operations headquarters was said to have been established in Odessa with supporting
staffs in Odessa, Tbilisi, and Sofia, Bulgaria. This headquarters would probably
control and coordinate wartime operations against Greece and Turkey carried out by
Pact forces from Bulgaria and the Odessa, North Caucasus, and Transcaucasus
military districts.
It has been believed for some years that the Pact would in wartime establish a
southwestern theater headquarters. Setting up the command now would make the
transition to wartime operations that much more rapid.
Information over the past year has suggested new developments in
Soviet-Bulgarian military relations. For example, military delegations from Bulgaria
have made several trips to the Odessa Military District over the past year, while both
Soviet Minister of Defense Grechko and Warsaw Pact Commander Yakubovskiy have
visited Bulgaria recently. In addition, Soviet troops have crossed Romania to
participate in combined Soviet-Bulgarian exercises on several occasions, most
recently in March.
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 SOUTH
CHINA
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Northeast Cay
Southwest Gay ~.
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Flat
Nanshaa
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PERU: The Peruvian army is filling the last major gap in its force
modernization program by acquiring a Soviet self-propelled automatic antiaircraft
gun system-the quad 23-mm. ZSU 23-4-that will provide an effective mobile
close-support air defense weapon. Although the weapons system is now known to be
in Peru, the number delivered and their arrival date are not known.
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National Intelligence Bulletin September 4, 1975
Factionalism Within the Chinese Leadership
After a period of relative calm, factionalism within the Chinese leadership
appears to be coming to the surface again in virulent form. In September, People's
Daily carried a major article that seems to be a thinly disguised attack on Teng
Hsiao-ping, China's senior vice premier who also holds important military and party
posts and who is currently in day-to-day charge in Peking.
The attack is contained in a criticism of the famous Ming-dynasty novel "Water
Margin" (also known as "All Men Are Brothers"), which has long been known to be
a favorite of Chairman Mao. A similar article also appeared in the latest issue of the
theoretical journal Red Flag; both have been widely disseminated by the Chinese
news agency. A list of contents of Red Flag also distributed by the news agency
indicates that it contains a number of other articles on the same subject; they are
not yet available in Washington.
Both articles are highly critical of the role and character of a leading figure in
the novel. The description of this figure leaves little doubt that, in the context of the
current criticism, he is a surrogate for Teng. The figure is specifically called the head
of a "faction" who is intent on undermining and vitiating the principles of "peasant
rebellion." In a passage that unmistakably links criticism of the novel to current
politics, Red Flag claims that in this figure can be seen the "ugly features of
present-day capitulationists."
The central issue raised by the articles appears to be "revisionist
capitulationism...at home and abroad." This criticism is aimed at the policy of
"rehabilitation" of veteran party officials disgraced during the Cultural
Revolution-a policy that, despite a number of ups and downs, has generally been
pursued by Peking since the early 1970s. Teng Hsiao-ping is not only an advocate of
this policy but also its most important beneficiary. As secretary general of the party
he was disgraced early in the Cultural Revolution. He was rehabilitated in the spring
of 1973, reappointed to the Politburo in December of that year, and made a
member of the Politburo Standing Committee last January.
The rehabilitation issue has long been a bone of contention between the "left"
and "right" wings of the Chinese party, which have respectively opposed and
supported the policy. The issue involves the larger question of the efficacy and
legitimacy of the Cultural Revolution, which has been at the heart of Chinese
domestic politics for a decade. The articles define rehabilitation as accepting "royal
amnesty" while planning ultimately to betray the revolution.
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The phrase "royal amnesty" raises in direct form the question of Mao's status
and his role in the present controversy. For two years, Chinese polemics, arguing by
historical analogy, have treated the emperor-figure as a surrogate for Mao; the
Chairman has, moreover, clearly associated himself with Teng's rehabilitation.
In an extraordinary passage that seems to bear directly on this issue, People's
Daily comments: "In a feudal country, the emperor is the highest ruler, the general
representative of the landlord class and the big boss of all feudal bureaucrats. The
peasantry must oppose the emperor in order to oppose the reactionary rule of the
landlord class. If the peasantry only opposed corrupt officials, but not the emperor,
it cannot shake the rule of the landlord class." It added that the evil Teng-figure and
his friends "did not oppose the emperor and were loyal to him."
This passage seems to claim that in order to preserve the revolution it may be
necessary to oppose Mao himself; at the very least, it appears to imply that Teng has
pulled the wool over Mao's eyes by stressing his personal loyalty to the Chairman.
The Red Flag article is more ambiguous, however. While also criticizing the idea of
"royal amnesty," it refers favorably to another character as the "founder of the
revolutionary cause" chronicled in the novel. Moreover, Mao's authority is invoked
in the article.
This spate of articles-at least one more apparently was published in the Peking
newspaper Kuang Ming Daily-appears at a moment when the central theme of
Chinese propaganda has been unity and discipline and when the central authorities
appear prepared to crack down on dissident activities and strikes in factories and in
the transportation industry. In fact, both the Red Flag and People's Daily articles
appear to refer by indirection to the recent use of troops-on Teng's authority-to
restore order in Chekiang Province, claiming that "suppressing other bandits" in the
name of the "emperor" is an example of the Teng-figure's "flunkyism."
In the current environment, then, it is possible-although it is too early to be
certain-that the attack on Teng is an act of desperation on the part of his
opponents, who see in his current exercise of authority and stress on unity
indications that the vice premier is attempting to consolidate his position before the
Chairman's death so as to secure his place in the succession. Behind such tactical
maneuvering, however, is almost certainly a considerable dissatisfaction on the part
of a number of those most closely associated with the Cultural Revolution with
Teng's assertion-expressed in a speech prior to last January's National People's
Congress-that that upheaval and its divisive aftermath have tarnished the reputation
of the Chinese government.
In this context, Teng's enemies may believe they have no other choice than a
head-on attack on the vice premier-and perhaps on Mao as well. There are
indications that an attempt was made a year ago to undermine current policies by
opening a major attack on corrupt practices among party officials;
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Ian introductory note appended to
the Red Flag article on "Water Margin," stating that the criticism of the novel is
only for the purpose of discussion, indicates that the sudden new attack on
personalities and policies does not have the support of the full Chinese leadership.
The implications for Mao in the current developments are even more
ambiguous. The Chairman was almost certainly weakened to some extent by last
year's divisive anti-Confucius campaign. The conflicting treatment of Mao's role as
"founder and commander" of the Chinese army during the August 1 celebration of
Army Day suggests there is continuing controversy regarding Mao's direct control of
the military.
It is possible that the Chairman's running quarrel with the army has left him
vulnerable to criticism from other quarters, but the wily old man's political acumen
is still considerable and he still retains great reservoirs of prestige among the general
populace.
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