NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A028200010035-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 31, 2005
• Sequence Number: 35
• Publication Date: October 11, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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National Intelligence
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October 11, 1975
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National Intelligence Bulletin
October 11, 1975
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LEBANON: Interagency Memorandum . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
PORTUGAL: Popular Democrats urge
Costa Gomes to resign as armed
forces chief of staff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
PORTUGAL: Intelligence
Alert Memorandum .
WEST GERMANY: Bonn concerned about
Soviet - East German treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
USSR: Brezhnev
has busy week . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
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ISRAEL: Tel Aviv attempts to
coax Syria into active negotiations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
LIBYA: Qadhafi discusses
dissension within regime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
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VIETNAM: Communists may refuse
to accept returning refugees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
BRAZIL: New oil policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
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National Intelligence Bulletin
October 11, 1975
The Bulletin presents the major judgments of an interagency memorandum,
"Lebanon at the Crossroads," October 10, 1975.
The spiraling cycle of violence in Lebanon has thrown the country's traditional
political system seriously out of balance and has brought Lebanon the nearest it has
been to national collapse.
The need for fundamental changes in the 1943 National Covenant, which
provides for a distribution of political posts that favors the Christians over the
country's Muslim majority, is the central issue in the crisis. Whether the country
drifts further into chaos depends primarily on some immediate concessions by the
Christian leadership to the moderate Muslims' demands for greater political power,
and a scaling down of leftist reform proposals.
The principal stumbling block to a workable compromise appears to be the
continued intrasigence of the Muslim extreme leftists and Christian Phalanges leader
Pierre Jumayyil. The extreme leftists, abetted by the more radical Palestinian
fedayeen "rejectionists," are seeking to overturn the traditional political system
through violence and see little reason to stop now. Jumayyil, on the other hand, is
seeking to preserve the status quo and is making it difficult for the traditional
Muslim and Christian leaders to cooperate by his refusal to discuss any changes in
the 1943 Covenant.
If the "Committee for a National Dialogue" fails to reconcile soon some of the
competing demands of Muslims and Christians and the extremist groups are not
curbed, the situation is likely to disintegrate into even more widespread violence
leading to all-out civil war.
Prolonged civil strife carries a high risk of military intervention by Syria and
Israel, and the possible dismemberment of the country.
Thus far, Israel has reacted with restraint, and Syria, along with Palestine
Liberation Organization leader Yasir Arafat, has attempted to play an active
mediating role. No major Lebanese Christian or Muslim leader appears deliberately
bent on provoking Syrian or Israeli intervention, and no leader is actively seeking
partition of the country.
A return to public order in the short term is dependent largely on the ability of
Syria and the less radical fedayeen organizations to curb the small but dangerous
extremist groups, restraint by Jumayyil's Phalangist militia, and a curbing of arms
supplies to both Muslim and Christian elements.
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A joint Arab military force reportedly has been proposed by moderate
Lebanese Christian and Muslim leaders to enforce a truce while a political
compromise is negotiated. Such a force will be difficult to organize and deploy very
soon, and the effectiveness of such a force, if it materialized, would be questionable.
A sense of national self-interest may overcome divisive forces, as it has in past
Lebanese crises, but Lebanon is clearly at a central crossroads. In the short term, the
Muslims probably will not curb their demands for basic modifications in the
Covenant and the Christians may not agree to compromise under the duress of
continued fighting.
Even if compromise is achieved, the prospect for any quick return to stability is
bleak. The formal government has shown no ability to exercise effective authority
during the current crisis or to utilize the army to provide basic security. The
communal tensions that have been inflamed over the past six months will not easily
subside. Over the longer term, a more ideological division may develop within the
country as moderate Christians and Muslims gravitate toward their more militant
co-religionists.
The Soviet Union has kept a wary eye on the turmoil in Lebanon, but Moscow
has not sought to aggravate tensions. The Soviets apparently hope that the Lebanese
crisis can be ended through political and social concessions that will enhance the
position of the left. If civil war were to erupt and Syrian and Israeli intervention
occurred, the Soviets could be ex ected to seek-probably in coniunction with the
US-to isolate and end the crisis.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
October 11, 1975
The Popular Democratic Party yesterday called on President Costa Gomes to
give up his post as armed forces chief of staff, claiming this would aid the
government's effort to assert its authority and restore discipline in the military.
Popular Democratic leader Francisco Sa Carneiro, whose party colleagues were
fired on earlier this week by extreme leftist soldiers in Porto, said that if it is not
ended soon, military insubordination may topple the government and lead to civil
war.
Sa Carneiro, who blamed the present situation on the Communists, made his
comments at a press conference which coincided with a marathon joint meeting of
the Revolutionary Council and the cabinet called to consider appropriate measures
to deal with the crisis.
The joint session followed a meeting of the cabinet which issued a strong
statement on the seizure earlier this week of the artillery regiment in Porto and the
incidents of violence surrounding it. The cabinet:
--strongly condemned the violence and announced that it would prosecute the
"supporters of minority political groups" responsible for it;
--refuted Communist Party charges that the Popular Democratic Party had
provoked the violence;
--criticized the biased coverage of the Porto events by the
Communist-influenced press;
--announced the replacement of the leftist leadership in the Bank of Portugal.
This is a vital step in implementing a realistic economic policy and a clear
indication that Prime Minister Azevedo is still intent on reducing Communist
influence, despite the current turmoil.
The government's determination to end the violence and indiscipline will be
greatly aided if it can assemble the military intervention force announced two weeks
ago. The Lisbon press reported yesterday that a reinforced commando regiment will
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National Intelligence Bulletin
October 11, 1975
be the backbone of the new force. The 900-man regiment will absorb an initial 400
commandos now on reserve status, but the reactivation of 1,000 has already been
approved. As many as four companies of marines might also be added, bringing the
potential strength of the force to as much as four battalions of 400 men each.
Despite the government's determination, the disorder continues. The Porto
artillery regiment remains in the hands of extreme left soldiers, and some reports
said 150 radical military police have gone to Porto to reinforce the dissidents.
Porto was the scene of further violence last night when followers of the
Reorganizing Movement of the Proletariat Party attacked the headquarters of
another far-left group. The attack was in retaliation for the murder of a party leader
in Lisbon earlier this week.
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National Intelligence Bulletin October 11, 1975
The Bulletin publishes an intelligence alert memorandum entitled "Portugal: A
New Crisis of Authority, " October 10, 1975.
The Azevedo government is caught in a crisis of authority that threatens its
continued viability. It would be premature to count out Azevedo and the moderates,
but they face some critical challenges. Growing political instability stems from
several sources:
--The subversive activities and demonstrations of the Portuguese Communist
Party and far-left groups.
--Worsening economic and social problems, which are exacerbated by the influx
of Angolan refugees.
--The most critical is the politicization and breakdown of discipline in the
armed forces on a far more serious scale than ever before.
The chance of widespread violence is enhanced by the inability of the Lisbon
ose order
,oovernmen to many o e army uni s in Lis on-wi a excep ion o
commandos-appear to sympathize with various leftist groups. North of Lisbon, the
army tends to support the government, but even there dissident far-left
organizations, such as.Soldiers' United Will Overcome, have been able to subvert the
orders of commanders in some units. The southern military region is divided and
probably would not play a major role in a conflict.
The closely knit navy generally follows a leftist line. Only the marines, whose
political sympathies are divided, have the capacity to respond to a challenge to the
government. The air force generally is considered the most conservative of the
services, but a few leftist sergeants with access to aircraft could sabotage a service
response to civil violence or a coup attempt. Neither the police nor the national
guard, even though they may support the government, can effectively maintain
order in a crisis since both groups are under armed. Government efforts to establish
a new security force to replace the radical-infiltrated continental operations
command have so far enjoyed scant success.
Despite the Portuguese Communist Party's recent setback with the ouster of its
ally, former prime minister Goncalves, and its reduced role in the new government,
it continues to be a powerful force and maintains a disproportionately strong
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influence in the media in Lisbon and within organized labor. Although the
Communists are still nominally participating in the government, they are at the same
time supporting demonstrations against it and fomenting unrest in the military. It is
the far left, however, that has been most active in staging protests and forcing
confrontations that have led in some cases to violence. An exacerbating factor is the
ample supply of arms which communists and far-left groups have at their disposal.
About 175,000 Angolan refugees have returned to Portugal. Most are
politically conservative and hostile to leftist military and civilian leaders who they
believe sold out their interests in Africa. Many have small arms. Their frustration will
deepen as the government is unable to handle their problems and they may feel they
have little to lose in challenging the government. The refugees, many of whom have
roots in the north, could, along with other conservative northerners. form an
The present volatile situation could lead in any of several directions. At present
reading, the first alternative appears more likely, at least for the near term.
--The present government, or one like it, could survive. To consolidate its
position, however, it would have to gain greater control over the armed forces.
--This poses a dilemma: if it tries harsher measures, as its recent statements
suggest, it may encounter added resistance and indiscipline. If it seeks to
conciliate by relaxing military discipline, it will legitimize dissidence in the
armed forces, making for further violence and instability in the longer term.
--There could be the return of a more radical government, either of a
pro-communist nature such as the Goncalves regime, or of the far left with
leaders such as security chief General Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho or Admiral
Antonio Rosa Coutinho. The communists would support either government
and would certainly regain considerable influence. Such a regime would
probably face renewed anti-communist violence in the north and separatism in
Atlantic island possessions. Economic aid would not be forthcoming from the
West.
--Large-scale civil disorder, involving segments of the civilian population and
opposing military units, may occur, fueled by the widespread arming of
civilians of all political persuasions and the disunity of the military. Although
this violence could eventually deteriorate into a civil war, it would be more
likely to evolve to the point where a leftist government is nominally in power
in Lisbon with a state of anarchy in other parts of the country.
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--An attempted rightist takeover by forces within Portugal and/or by
expatriates based primarily in Spain is possible. The chances that this could be
successful are extremely limited due to a lack of arms, personnel, funds, and
popular support in Portugal.
The Portuguese talent for last-minute accommodation to avoid final
showdowns may once again reassert itself and head off any decisive resolution of
these uncertainties, at least for a time. The Azevedo government and the moderate
elements in the armed forces and political parties still have assets-including a
majority of popular support. But the tendencies toward disintegration of
institutions-especially the armed forces and the government's control over
them-make the outlook more uncertain than ever.
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WEST GERMANY
October 11, 1975
West German officials are apprehensive that the Soviet - East German treaty
signed this week has ominous implications for West Berlin.
Their major concern is with Article 7, which distorts the language of the
Quadripartite Agreement of 1971 to give the impression that East German and
Soviet relations with West Berlin are on the same footing as those between West
Germany and that city.
There are no indications that the treaty presages a new Soviet - East German
pressure campaign against West Berlin. Bonn, however, believes that East Germany
and the USSR will increasingly try to bypass the Federal Republic and deal directly
with the authorities in West Berlin. Both have long attempted to reduce Bonn's
influence there, while enlarging their role in order to increase the city's dependence
on them.
The Soviet ambassador in Bonn has told the political director in the Foreign
Office that West Germany should be pleased with the new treaty because-unlike the
pact of 1964-it does not describe West Berlin as an "independent political entity."
The West Germans believe that the language used does, in fact, mean the same thing.
The allied ambassadors in Bonn, in response to a West German request, have
agreed ad referendum to issue a brief statement that the treaty does not affect
four-power rights and responsibilities for either Berlin or Germany. It is likely that
Paris and London will ioin Washington in aoarovina the statement-
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General Secretary Brezhnev had a full schedule of activities this week. He
participated in various functions for visiting East German party boss Honecker,
spoke at the celebration of the 250th anniversary of the Academy of Sciences, and
on Friday received Syrian President Asad. His activities received extensive TV
coverage, and on all occasions his image in the media was that of a vigorous and busy
leader.
According to the US embassy in Moscow, Western diplomats who saw him at
close range were impressed by his gait and demeanor, as well as by his overall
physical appearance and relative clarity of speech. His performance appeared far
superior to that noted in Helsinki at the end of July.
The embassy cautions, however, that a certain element of stage management
may have been present, since most of Brezhnev's public appearances were relatively
brief. He was absent from the East German reception for Honecker on October 7
despite the fact that Pravda reported his attendance. Brezhnev may have been
resting after his appearance at the Academy of Sciences celebration earlier that day.
He seemed to be in ebullient spirits the next morning when he saw Honecker off at
the airport.
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National Intelligence Bulletin October 11, 1975
Prime Minister Rabin and Defense Minister Peres privately indicated to a group
of visiting foreign officials this week that Tel Aviv is looking for a way to coax Syria
into active negotiations with Israel.
Rabin referred to Syrian restraint since the signature of the Golan Heights
disengagement agreement early last year. He reportedly cited Syria's refusal to allow
Palestinian guerrillas to infiltrate across the Golan into Israel as evidence that
Damascus has rejected the military option and said a way should be found to give it
another alternative option.
The Prime Minister did not say what he might have in mind, except to indicate
he thought only US-mediated negotiations could succeed. Rabin claimed Moscow
would try to prevent US-broker talks but that it was up to Washington to decide
whether or not to risk a dispute with the Soviets by proceeding with a Golan peace
initiative.
Rabin thought Damascus had not yet decided on its course of action. He
speculated that the Syrians would probably approach Washington toward the end of
the month to explore potential negotiating topics. In a speech earlier this week,
Syrian President Asad insisted that any talks on the Golan must be accompanied by
parallel talks on the Palestinian question with the PLO.
Defense Minister Peres told the group in a subsequent session that the
government would probably make some unilateral gesture on the Golan in order to
encourage the Syrians to take a more flexible negotiating posture. Peres claimed it
would be minor in nature and different from the unilateral thinning of Israeli forces
in the Sinai in June.
Rabin's statements to the group probably were made with an eye to impressing
his foreign audience with Tel Aviv's sincerity in seeking a settlement with Syria.
Rabin-like Peres-remains deeply suspicious of Syrian intentions. He seems
persuaded there is little hope for an early interim agreement.
Nevertheless, there is genuine concern among the top Israeli leadership that Tel
Aviv should explore the negotiating possibilities with Syria so as not to jeopardize
the 1974 disengagement agreement and, possibly, the durability of the Sinai
agreement with Egypt.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
October 11, 1975
President Qadhafi struck a defensive but determined posture this week in his
first major policy speech since an abortive coup in early August. He talked openly
about the attempt against him, attributing it mainly to personal vengeance.
The overall thrust of Qadhafi's remarks, however, suggests that he recognizes a
deeper problem. He revealed indirectly, for example, that tribal politics, foreign
policy differences, and conflicts over domestic priorities were behind dissension
within the regime.
Qadhafi did not blame the military for the defections of a few, emphasizing
instead that the armed forces would continue to be the guiding force in Libyan
political life. He praised the Free Officers-a loose organization of some 60 officers
who participated in the 1969 coup-and announced that they would lead a new
national congress. The congress presumably is to be made up of civilian interest
groups, such as trade unions, professional organizations, and popular committees.
Qadhafi also warned of a major shake-up in Libya's sole political party, the
Arab Socialist Union. The party's secretary general, Major Bashir Hawadi, was one of
the main leaders of the attempted coup. Qadhafi did not refer to Hawadi or the
other putschists by name, nor did he mention the fate of their membership in the
Revolutionary Command Council. Although the council has been totally discredited
as a ruling body, Qadhafi apparently feels uneasy about abolishing it publicly.
Throughout the speech, Qadhafi showed a new defensiveness. He spent
considerable time justifying his foreign aid program to many inward-looking and
racially conscious Libyans, who resent his assistance to Black Africa and far-off
Muslim causes. At one point the Libyan leader told his audience that "Libya was the
most miserly country in the world and I am ashamed ; but he did promise that
Tripoli's economic interest would come first. He also tried to allay fears of a large
Soviet presence in Libya, denying in strong terms that he had granted Moscow base
rights.
In general, Qadhafi seems to have been sobered but not shaken by the coup
attempt. He appears to be more aware of his vulnerabilities, but to be intent on
protecting himself against them. His attempt to explain his policies-an effort he has
rarely made in the past-suggests he recognizes that his arbitrariness and neglect of
parochial interests are part of the problem. But he apparently believes he can
continue both his domestic and foreign policy course as long as his major prop-the
military-is firmly behind him.
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National Intelligence Bulletin October 11, 1975
Recent statements by the Vietnamese communists suggest that they may refuse
to accept the 1,600 refugees scheduled to leave Guam next Friday to return to
Vietnam. State/INR believes that, on the contrary, Saigon's recent statements
indicate that it will accept the refugees, although with reluctance.
Communist media in recent days have attacked the plan, and broadcasts from
Hanoi and Saigon claim that authorizing the refugees' return is a "sovereign right of
Vietnam" and should not be settled simply "according to the desires" of the US. A
Saigon Foreign Ministry statement on October 4 stated that those desiring to return
would be considered on a "specific case" basis. It called on the refugees to "protect
themselves" by being "aware of the enemy plot" and to "unite in struggling against
the adventurous US act:'
Since their takeover of Saigon in. April, the communists have refused to accept
any former citizens into the country, with the exception of a few orphaned
Vietnamese children who had been evacuated to Laos and some merchant seamen
who returned on two commandeered boats. Attempts by both Red Cross and UN
refugee officials to clarify Vietnamese policy have failed to produce results. Officials
from these organizations have concluded that the matter is not high on the
communists' list of priorities.
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President Geisel announced on October 9 that foreign oil companies would be
allowed to sign exploration and production contracts with Petrobras, the state oil
monopoly. By his action, which was triggered in part by the latest OPEC price hike,
Geisel has at least temporarily resolved a nationwide debate over ending or
modifying Petrobras' 22-year monopoly in domestic oil exploration and production
activities.
Brazil depends chiefly on imports from the Middle East to meet its petroleum
needs. Substantial increases in oil prices during the past year and a half have already
made a dent in the nation's foreign exchange holdings and contributed to inflation.
The effect of the announced plan, however, will not be felt for at least several years.
Geisel, who headed Petrobras prior to becoming president, has long favored a
more aggressive exploration program aimed at self-sufficiency in petroleum
production. Early this year he asked Minister of Mines and Energy Ueki to prepare a
draft proposal permitting foreign firms to sign contracts with Petrobras, but the idea
was shelved temporarily in response to a predominantly negative reaction from
government circles. The President apparently feels that now is a propitious time to
act.
While he will probably incur some criticism from both military and civilian
nationalists, his recent decision to de-emphasize the goal of political liberalization
has improved his political standing among conservative elements. Moreover, he can
point out that the activities of foreign oil companies will be closely controlled and
Petrobras retains its legal monopoly of domestic oil operations, except for retail
sales.
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