NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A028500010016-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 22, 2006
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: January 10, 1976
• Content Type: REPORT

25X1
e '& Approved For Release 2007/03/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO2850001001 -8
National Intelligence
Bulletin
State Dept. review completed
Top Secret
25X1 January 10, 1976
9
Approved For Release 2007/03/16: CIA-RDP79T00975A028500001>
 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO28500010016-8
Approved For Release 2007/03/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO28500010016-8
 Approved For Releao
National Intelligence Bulletin
January 10, 1976
CONTENTS
PORTUGAL: Azevedo concerned
over extremist threat . . . . . . . . . . . . .
LEBANON: Heavy fighting viewed
as major test of strength . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
TURKEY: Renewed student unrest
again challenges government . . .
EC: Efforts to stimulate progress
toward European unity .. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
SOMALIA-ETHIOPIA: Relations
are likely to worsen . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
25X1
JAMAICA: Radical groups becoming
increasingly militant . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
LAOS-THAILAND: Border opening eases
Vientiane's economic problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
FOR THE RECORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Approved For Releas - 0975AO28500010016-8
 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO28500010016-8
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2007/03/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO28500010016-8
 Approved For Release
National Intelligence Bulletin January 10, 1976
Prime Minister Azevedo presented an essentially optimistic review of the
Portuguese political situation in a recent tour d'horizon with US Ambassador
Carlucci, although he expressed concern over the ever present threat from political
extremists, particularly those on the far right.
Azevedo told the ambassador that only minor jurisdictional disputes between
the Socialists and the centrist Popular Democrats over sub-cabinet posts are delaying
a final announcement on the government reorganization. Both parties are trying to
gain maximum advantage from the government negotiations, but neither is likely to
allow the talks to break down or cause a government rupture.
The Prime Minister confirmed that elections for a legislative assembly have
been set, but expressed concern that the Communists and the far right would try to
polarize the country in the period leading up to the April vote. Azevedo said the
Communists would not be allowed to engage in subversive tactics as before, but he
fears that rightist agitation may play into the Communists' hands.
Azevedo was especially worried over rightist efforts to mobilize peasants in the
north and pointed to a rally planned by disaffected farmers this Sunday in the
northern city of Braga as being ideal for exploitation by followers of former
president Spinola. The farmers are gathering to protest the agrarian reform program
and to demand higher prices for farm produce, but the rally could degenerate into
an anti-Communist forum. The government: apparently fears that this could trigger
strong Communist reaction at several leftist rallies scheduled for next week in
Lisbon.
In a more positive vein, Azevedo expressed confidence in his government's
ability to solve the Azores problem. His confidence will get an early test.
An Azorean delegation hopes to meet with Azevedo today and with the
Council of Ministers on Tuesday in an effort to achieve significant changes in the
decree law issued last month that fell far short of Azorean expectations of greater
autonomy. Both sides have some room for compromise- but should the talks fail. the
issue will likely trigger a strong protest in the Azores.
Approved For Release 2007/03/16 : 61A-RDP79T00975A028500010016-8
 25X1
Approved For Releas4
1, F ! ,;,,ff r s
Approved For Release T00975AO28500010016-8
 Approved For Release
National Intelligence Bulletin January 10, 1976
Heavy fighting continued undiminished yesterday in the Beirut suburbs around
the refugee camp of Tall Zatar and moved into the hotel district early this morning.
Both sides seem to see the battle as a major test of strength and have shown little
inclination thus far to negotiate a cease-fire.
The only hopeful sign is a report that President Franjiyah sent a special
emissary to Damascus on January 8 apparently to seek Syrian President Asad's help
in ending the fighting.
Prime Minister Karami's on-going feud with Minister of Interior Shamun has
reduced his effectiveness during the current crisis and again raised questions about
prospects for his government. Bickering between the two rivals was obvious
Thursday on Lebanese television when Shamun called on the cabinet to use the
army to restore order, or resign. Karami accused Shamun, the leader of one of the
most important Christian factions, and leftist Kamal Jumblatt of being principally
responsible for the country's continuing political problems.
Both warring factions, meanwhile, are claiming major gains, but reports from
independent sources indicate that the fighting is stalemated. The Palestinians have
thus far refrained from retaliating by attacking Christian quarters in central Beirut
and are concentrating their efforts on lifting the blockade of Tall Zatar. They are
reportedly insisting that the siege be lifted unconditionally before agreeing to a
cease-fi re.
According to an-Nahar, a reputable independent Beirut newspaper, the
Christian rightists are seeking to force the relocation of the refugee camp away from
a major highway leading to two Christian towns outside Beirut. They are also said to
be trying to reopen the whole question of Lebanese-Palestinian relations,
presumably in an effort to fend off the pressure on them to respond to the Muslim
demand for political and institutional reform.
5
Approved For Release 2 -
FU "
 Approved For Release 2
Nations
ntelligence Bulletin January 10, 1976
Renewed student unrest and associated street violence in many Turkish cities
are posing an additional challenge to Prime Minister Demirel's faction-ridden
coalition government.
Gunfire erupted between police and leftist students yesterday in front of the
US consulate general in Istanbul. There was no evidence to suggest anti-US overtones
to the incident, which seemed representative of similar outbreaks between extreme
left and right student groups reported recently in most major Turkish cities. The
disorders have forced administrators to suspend classes at several universities. More
than ten youths have died since the violence began last fall.
Press reports indicate that both President Koruturk and Prime Minister Demirel
are considering imposing martial law. Last fall, Demirel was able to avoid such firm
action-difficult because of tensions within his coalition-because of the fortuitous
intervention of the holiday season that put a temporary damper on the violence. He
may have obtained support for sterner measures during a series of highly publicized
meetings last month with educators, politicians, and military leaders.
If the current wave of disorders continues at its present level for an extended
period or increases significantly, martial law or other harsh measures may be
unavoidable. If Demirel cannot act on his own, the senior military leadership is
likely to force the government into action.
The violence has increased political tensions, already aggravated by coalition
squabbling and the tactics of the aggressive parliamentary opposition. Government
and opposition members have traded charges of responsibility for the problem.
Opposition leader Ecevit asserted earlier this week that Demirel's coalition was not
fit to govern if it could not ensure domestic security. Other members of Ecevit's
party revived charges that one of Demirel's coalition partners-National Action Party
leader Turkes-was supporting the right-wing students. One of Turkes' subordinates
countered by implicating parties of the far left.
6
Approved For Release 20 1 7/03/16 - - 5A028500010016-8
 25X6 Approved For Release 2007/03/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO28500010016-8
Approved For Release 2007/03/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO28500010016-8
 Approved For Release
National Intelligence Bulletin
January 10, 1976
The Europe of the Nine is re-examining its long-term objectives in the hope of
,reaffirming them and thus agree on new ways to stimulate progress toward European
4nity. The focal point for this review will be the analysis of the state of unification
efforts, which Belgian Prime Minister Tindemans recently submitted to his fellow EC
leaders.
The March summit session of the Nine-the European Council-will reportedly
,y largely given over to discussing the report, and the Council may direct that
;oncrete proposals be drawn up for consideration at its summer meeting. It is
unlikely that measures would be approved before the end of the year.
Adoption of key proposals will pose a serious dilemma for some of the Nine,
i!ecause Tindemans' analysis suggests that the process of unification will require
more binding coordination of foreign policy, security matters, and internal
Community problems.
Some controversy has also followed from Tindemans' observation that the Nine
ire not equally able to move toward economic and monetary union. The stronger
members should thus be allowed to go ahead with joint plans, leaving the
;est-Ireland, the UK, and Italy-to catch up when possible. Although Tindemans
marefully notes that all should participate in deciding on common goals, the proposal
,till smacks of the so-called "two-tier approach" floated last year by former
+:hancellor Brandt and opposed by the prospective "outsiders" as creating a kind of
.:cond-class EC citizenship.
Tindemans was assigned the task of drafting the report at a European Council
meeting in December 1974. During the past year he has discussed the full range of
European issues with party, government, business, and labor leaders in all of the
;iember countries; the EC institutions also contributed proposals.
At a press conference this week, Tindemans said it was his overall impression
from these talks that Europe's best course still lies in unification. He said he
$ievertheless found the public skeptical because the necessary political will on the
dart of its leaders is missing. In order to mobilize European opinion, he believes it is
essential that firm commitments be made on specific objectives and that parallel
;provision be made for a substantial strengthening of Community institutions.
In foreign affairs, Tindemans asserted that a "single decision-making center"
;hould no longer differentiate between political cooperation and subjects specifically
,;overed by the Community treaties. The foremost areas of concern he listed are:
Approved For Release 2007/03/16 CIA-RDP79T00975A028500010016-8
 Approved For Release
National Intelligence Bulletin
January 10, 1976
--A policy toward the developing world.
--Relations with the US.
--Security policy.
--Political uncertainty in Europe-specifically the Mediterranean region.
Tindemans emphasized the overriding importance of the US to Europe and said
that the necessity for Europe to speak to the US with one voice is one of the
underlying arguments for integration. He wants one of the Nine to be delegated to
reach a common understanding with the US on the "character and scope" of
US-European relations-a notion that one Luxembourg official has already called
risky because it moves away from a possibly less contentious case-by-case approach.
Tindemans said that although a common defense policy itself remains distant,
regular consultations are needed in the meantime on security matters in Europe and
on specific defense issues. Among the latter he included cooperation in armaments
manufacture. Specific consideration should be given to the possibility of establishing
a European armaments agency.
Approved For Release 2007/03/16 : bA-RDP79T00975A028500010016-8
 Approved For Releas
reYmein
(Sans)
Asmara . Sana*
of the "y,Dlibou1:i
Ethiopia
Socotra
Yemen (Aden)
/
OGADEN
P%/
* Mogadis eio
Kenya
*Nairobi
Pemba
Zanzibar
Dar es Salaam
/ AKISTAN
7 '
 Approved For Release
National Intelligence Bulletin January 10, 1976
SOMALIA-ETHIOPIA
Relations between Somalia and Ethiopia, which have steadily deteriorated
during the past year, are likely to worsen further as a result of France's plan to give
independence to the French Territory of the Afars and Issas and Somalia's backing
of Ethiopian dissidents.
The US embassy in Mogadiscio believes, however, that the Somalis are unlikely
to make a direct military move against Ethiopia, in part because the USSR, their
military supplier, has apparently indicated it would not support such a venture.
Somali President Siad has shown no desire to lessen tension between the two
countries, fearing that such a move might enhance the stability of the Ethiopian
military government. On the contrary, Mogadiscio is now giving support to insurgent
groups in Ethiopia, hoping to contribute to the downfall of the ruling military
council or to force Addis Ababa to make territorial concessions.
Somalia claims Ethiopia's Ogaden region, which is inhabited by ethnic Somalis.
In recent months, the Somalis have trained and armed several hundred Ethiopian
insurgents, some of whom have already entered southern Ethiopia, where they have
attacked security forces as well as civilians.
Events in the neighboring French territory could spark new trouble between
Mogadiscio and Addis Ababa. The Somalis believe Ethiopia has been maneuvering to
deny true self-determination to the territory by supporting France's plan to turn
over control of an independent government to Ali Aref Bourhan, a member of the
Afar tribe that straddles the border with Ethiopia, and maintain him in power by
continuing to base French troops in the territory.
The Somalis strongly oppose the plan and will surely try to block its
implementation. Mogadiscio covets the territory for itself, claiming that the Issas,
who are ethnic Somalis, form the majority of the population.
11
Approved For Release 2 - 5A028500010016-8
 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO28500010016-8
Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2007/03/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO28500010016-8
 Approved For Release
National Intelligence Bulletin
January 10, 1976
The violence in Kingston, Jamaica, over the past few days seems in part to have
been instigated by radical groups who want Prime Minister Michael Manley to
accelerate his move to the left. They particularly want him to recognize the regime
declared by the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola.
Manley has tried to mollify the left on this issue by sending a message to the
OAU blasting South Africa's "invasion" of Angola and justifying Cuba's role there.
He stopped short of recognizing the Popular Movement.
So far, Manley has refused to give security forces a free hand in halting the
violence. If the violence continues, he may be forced to take measures that could
complete the alienation of his party's left wing.
16
Approved For Release - 975AO28500010016-8
 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO28500010016-8
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2007/03/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO28500010016-8
 Approved For Release
National Intelligence Bulletin January 10, 1976
Vientiane's economic difficulties have eased somewhat, following Thailand's
partial reopening of the border on January 1. Many Lao are crossing the Mekong to
shop in the principal Thai town near Vientiane, and consumer goods are beginning
to return to Vientiane markets. Gasoline is again being imported, but the Lao
government is not yet permitting retail sales.
In order to reduce Vientiane's food requirements, the Lao communists have
initiated a modest resettlement program for residents of the capital. According to a
recent government broadcast, 66 families are being relocated to a district north of
Vientiane. Additional population relocations are likely as the Lao attempt to move
toward their goal of self-sufficiency in food production.
Approved For Release
 Approved For Release
National Intelligence Bulletin
January 10, 1976
ROMANIA: A new commercial airline, Romanian Airlines, reportedly has
Keen established primarily to serve Israel. The new airline was formed in
mid-December, apparently as a device to get around the Arab Boycott
Organization's blacklisting in August of Tarom, Romania's other commercial airline.
The boycott is believed to be based on Tarom's transporting Romanian emigrants to
Israel. The boycott is politically embarrassing to President Ceausescu whose
"balanced" Middle East policy recently has come under increased attack from the
more radical Arabs. Romania has conducted an intensive lobbying campaign to have
the sanction removed.
Approved For Release 2 - 975A028500010016-8 1 ^^17 1^114 114 25X1
 Tolp Secreted For Release 2007/03/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO28500010016-8
Top Secret
Approved For Release 2007/03/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO28500010016-8