NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A028700010048-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 24, 2006
• Sequence Number: 48
• Publication Date: March 27, 1976
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
National Intelligence
Bulletin
Top Secret
N2 699
DIA and DOS review(s) completed.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
March 27, 1976
LEBANON: Syria reconsidering
withdrawal of mediation team . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ARGENTINA: Military
consolidating control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
CUBA: Economic assistance
to developing countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
PANAMA: Cuba's intervention in
Africa threatens proposed summit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
NATO-AFRICA: Allies concerned
over Soviet role in Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
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National Intelligence Bulletin
March 27, 1976
The Syrian mediating team in Lebanon apparently returned to Damascus on
Thursday; an embassy source said that colonels Khuli and Madani briefed the Higher
Syrian Military Committee last night on their experiences in Lebanon, and the
committee then debated courses of action. The committee reportedly is composed
of both military and political leaders, and probably is a newly created task force
charged with following events in Lebanon.
Jumblatt has told US officials in Beirut that he is now willing to accept
President Franjiyah's resignation under the Syrian formula of a constitutional
amendment providing for the immediate election of a new president. Jumblatt's
only qualification is that Franjiyah step down within "a few days" after the
election. The leftist leader's acceptance of this formula could provide the basis for
renewed negotiations on a cease-fire agreement.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
March 27, 1976
Phalanges leader Pierre Jumayyil and Interior Minister Shamun-who together
hold the key to the Christians' next move-apparently are coordinating closely on
their military tactics, but neither seems sure what to do next. Jumayyil yesterday
issued a statement labeling partition the "most abhorrent" solution to the crisis. He
expressed some hope that Syrian mediation might still succeed, but raised the
possibility of putting the Christian case before the UN or the Arab League.
The Military Situation
Heavy fighting continued yesterday in Beirut and in the mountainous district
east of the city, although neither Muslim nor Christian forces appeared to be making
appreciable gains. The Phalangists reportedly repulsed several attacks against the
major Christian district in east Beirut, and Christian forces apparently are
surrounding several villages in the mountain area where Kamal Jumblatt's forces are
operating. The US defense attache in Beirut calls the situation generally static.
The Christians apparently have recovered from their initial disarray following
Franjiyah's flight from the presidential palace to Juniyah, and unconfirmed reports
state that several thousand Christian volunteers have joined the Phalangist ranks.
Despite this, the Christians probably will be able to do little more than stabilize their
defensive positions.
As of early Friday morning, the US defense attache in Syria had reported no
unusual military activity along the Damascus-Beirut road. He had not yet been able
to check out a report of unusual military activity in the area of Syria's 1st Armored
Division just south of Damascus.
After conversations with various Syrian army commanders Thursday night, the
attache concluded that the Syrians are now in a readiness posture that would enable
them to move forces into Lebanon within a few hours, should Asad take the
political decision to do so.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
austerity measures.
March 27, 1976
ARGENTINA
The military government in Argentina is extending and consolidating its
control.
The junta has named army Commander Videla as President. A committee of
senior officers will advise the President on legislative matters. Officers now occupy
the top jobs in all 22 provinces and some local jurisdictions, as well as all federal
executive posts. The intended duration of military rule is not clear. An official
communique only specified that junta members will not represent their services for
more than three years.
A ban on all political activity remains in effect, but only a handful of left-wing
splinter parties have actually been disbanded. The Moscow-oriented Communist
Party survives. The junta has taken over the administration of the General
Confederation of Workers, the principal labor organization, and banned its political
affilitate, the so-called 62 Organizations.
The junta has not yet publicly addressed its most pressing problem-the
economy. It has said, however, that civilians will be appointed to cabinet posts
requiring "unique specialties," and the Economy Ministry is almost certainly among
them. A civilian economist would provide the expertise the military acknowledges it
lacks and would act as a lightning rod for criticism of future policies. Jose Martinez
de Hoz, an economist and former government official, is the most likely candidate.
Apparently encouraged by the lack of public resistance thus far, the junta is
relaxing some of the more obvious controls. The US embassy reports, for example,
that roadblocks are now down, airports are operating normally, and censorship of
the press has been lifted. The greatest potential for opposition lies with the
terrorists, who so far have remained relatively inactive. Labor can also be expected
to protest when, as seems likely, the government announces further economic
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National Intelligence Bulletin
March 27, 1976
The Castro government has been increasing its foreign economic assistance
programs to developing countries. Initiated in the mid-1960s, these programs are an
important part of Cuba's effort to increase Cuban political influence in the third
world.
Havana has more than 2,000 civilians in at least 15 countries throughout
Africa, the Middle and Far East, and the Caribbean. Although the number in any
one country fluctuates from one year to the next, the total is considerably above the
levels of the mid-1960s.
About two thirds are located in Africa: chiefly Tanzania, Guinea, Equatorial
Guinea, Somalia, Angola, Guinea Bissau, and Zambia. In addition, several hundred
civilians are operating in Vietnam, and a 280-man construction brigade is being sent
to Jamaica, Havana's first major aid effort in the Caribbean area.
The Cubans are engaged primarily in building rural roads and water systems and
in social development programs. Specific projects include providing agricultural
advisers for the sugar industry and medical technicians and teachers for public health
and education programs-all areas in which the Cubans have expertise.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
March 27, 1976
Opposition to Cuban intervention in Africa is threatening Panama's planned
summit meeting of Latin American leaders in June. A number of Latin American
leaders have already indicated they will boycott the meeting if Cuban Prime Minister
Castro attends.
Panama had hoped the meeting would promote endorsements of Panama's
position in the Canal treaty negotiations, as well as enhance General Torrijos'
prestige as a Latin American leader.
Torrijos recently met with the presidents of Venezuela and Costa Rica in order
to resolve the dilemma. A failure to salvage the conference would be a major
di l
omatic setbacK and embarrassment for Torrijos.
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National Intelligence Bulletin March 27, 1976
The French, who have been the most prominent West European supporters of a
"low-profile" approach, appear to be reassessing their policy and now may agree
t -etc in Africa
NATO-AFRICA
The NATO allies share a growing concern over the Soviet role in southern
Africa, but are unable to agree on measures to contain Soviet influence there.
At Alliance consultations this week, the Dutch described the dilemma facing
the West as one of how to go about supporting decolonization while blocking the
extension of Soviet influence in Africa.
The allies agreed that an outbreak of hostilities between the black African
nations and the white-ruled states would increase African dependence on the Soviets
and appear to put the West on the side of white rule. In the near term, the West
should press the Rhodesians and South Africans to be more responsive to black
African demands.
The West Germans and some other allies argue that, once tensions have eased,
the attraction of Western aid and the strength of African ties to Europe will lead to a
restoration of friendly ties with Angola and Mozambique. Nationalist sentiment
would remain an important factor and would also help put an end to Soviet
intervention. The West Germans admit that a continued Cuban presence might have
to be tolerated, but agree that it would be less ominous than a Soviet presence.
In the Dutch view, the Cuban troops must be withdrawn; this can only be
achieved by the US exerting pressure on the Soviets. The Dutch acknowledge that
this entails a judgment about the importance of Africa that the US might not be
prepared to support. The Dutch believe, however, that the Soviet actions pose a
clear threat to detente.
The Dutch position may in fact reflect widespread skepticism that the white
minorities in Rhodesia and South Africa can be induced to give up their rule
voluntarily and that economic aid and traditional Western ties will be enough to
establish friendly relations with Angola and Mozambique. More visible evidence of
Western support would thus be a minimum condition for expecting the Africans
themselves to be willing or able to expel the Cubans and the Soviets.
that approach is needed to orese Western in e
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National Intelligence Bulletin March 27, 1976
The Portuguese also support practical steps to demonstrate Western firmness.
At the NATO meeting, they suggested that the West make it clear that it has drawn a
line beyond which the Soviet-backed forces would not fitted to go without
encountering Western resistance F777 I
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