NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A029100010018-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 5, 2006
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: July 12, 1976
• Content Type: REPORT

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE
Monday July 12, 1976 CI NIDC 76-169C
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
State Dept. review completed
Apprquarl For Release
CIA-RDP79T00975A029100010018-9
Too Secret
(Security Classification)
Top Secret
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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Monday July 12, 1976.
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The NID Cable is for the purpose of informing
senior officials.
Syria may have introduced substantial numbers of
additional troops into eastern and northern Lebanon over the
past few days to strengthen its forces attacking Palestinian and
leftist positions.
These troops reportedly have been drawn from Syria's
Defense Companies, which ordinarily operate only in the Damascus
area. to provide security for the Asad government. This well.
trained force, made up primarily of troops drawn from minority
religious groups, probably is considered less likely than regular
units to balk at orders to attack Palestinians.
Syrian troops sharply intensified their attacks on
PaleTt-i-n-ian and leftist positions north of Tripoli over the week-
end. The Syrians apparently are working with Christian forces
south of the city to encircle and blockade the leftist and
fedayeen-controlled port. If this campaign succeeds, Tyre will be
the only port from which the leftists will have access to the in-
terior of Lebanon.
U The Christians are continuing their heavy attacks on
Palestinian and leftist forces south of the Tripoli-Zagharta
axis. The right-wing militias are making steady gains, and only
a handful of leftist strongholds in the area remain.
Several clashes have occurred between Syrian and Pales-
tinian forces east of Jazzin on the Jazzin-Sidon road. Syrian
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troops continued to shell Sidon; the port remains under fedayeen
control.
Syria's concentration on Tripoli, Balabakk, and Sidon
is due largely to the presence of two fortified Palestinian
refugee camps near each of these cities. With the exception of
four camps in extreme southern Lebanon, which pose no immediate
threat to Syria's military campaign, these are the only camps
in Lebanon outside the Beirut area.
A Christian radio broadcast yesterday announced that
the right-wing militias had captured Tall Zatar, the only remain-
ing Palestinian camp serving as a fedayeen stronghold in a pre-
dominantly Christian area of Beirut. This claim is unconfirmed.
Two smaller camps in Christian areas had fallen previously.
II The military reverses suffered by Palestinian and
leftist forces have prompted increasingly urgent calls for help
by Fatah chief Arafat and Lebanese socialist leader Jumblatt.
Arafat has appealed to Egypt and apparently Libya to assist the
Palestinians militarily, and Jumblatt has asked also for aid 25X1
from Saudi Arabia, Algeria, and Iraq.
Beirut newspapers have spoken of an Egyptian
proposal, to be tabled at today's scheduled Arab League foreign
ministers' meeting, for a joint Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi "strike
force." //The reported plan for intervention may entail nothing
more than an attempt to gain League approval for Egyptian parti-
cipation in a joint Arab force.//
Cairo may feel--undoubtedly over-optimistically--that
it can bring enough pressure to bear on Syria to force Damascus
to cease its offensive against the Palestinians and to accept
an Egyptian role in Lebanon.
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//The US embassy in Tripoli believes that Libyan
President a afi--humiliated by the Israeli success in rescuing
the hostages from the Palestinian. hijackers in Uganda last
week--will probably react by sponsoring spectacular terrorist
attacks against Israeli targets.//
//A recent editorial in a Libyan government-
controlled newspaper describes the Israeli raid as a grievous
insult to the "dignity of the Palestinian revolution" and the
Arab people. The editorial, which the embassy believes probably
had Qadhafi's personal approval, criticizes the hijackers for
believing that Israel intended to negotiate with them. It
openly suggests that the hijackers should have dealt more harsh-
ly with their hostages.//
The failure of the Uganda hijacking operation
came immediately after exposure of Libya's involvement in the
abortive coup in Sudan on July 2 and coincided with Libyan
Prime Minister Jallud's failure to show any concrete results
from his well publicized month-long mediation effort in Lebanon.
//Qadhafi's embarrassment and frustration, rather than chastening
him, is more likely in the embassy's view to motivate him to
strike out again, probably against an Israeli target.//
KENYA-UGANDA
The quarrel between Nairobi and Kampala resulting from
the sraeli raid on Entebbe is, for the moment, taking the form
of Kenyan economic harassment of the Amin regime and reported
reprisals against Kenyan citizens living in Uganda.
The Nairobi press is carrying stories of killings and
widespread reprisals against Kenyans in Uganda by Amin's secu-
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rity forces. We cannot confirm that systematic and officially
sanctioned reprisals are under way. At the very least, however,
Kenyan expatriates are probably seen as fair game by ill-disci-
plined soldiers or other Ugandans who sense an opportunity to
drive out the Kenyans and seize their property.
Radio Nairobi charges that
there has been a buildup o Ugandan forces along the border in
the last few days,
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Uganda-Somalia
Kampala radio reported on Saturday that a "high-pow-
ered Ugandan military delegation had just returned from meet-
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ings in Mogadiscio with their Somali counterparts. Kenya may
well interpret the radio report as an attempt by Amin to forge
closer military links with Somalia or at least to persuade Pres-
ident Siad to put pressure on Nairobi. Somalia has long claimed
northeastern Kenya--where many ethnic Somalis live--just as
Uganda claims western Kenya.
//Major Mengistu Hailemariam, the first vice
chairman of the ruling military council, and his supporters on
the council have begun a purge of suspected military and civi-
lian opponents.//
I General Getachew Nadew, martial law admin-
istrator an -armea forces commander for rebellious Eritrea Pro-
vince, was killed Saturday in Addis Ababa in a shootout with
troops sent to arrest him. He had been called to the capital
~~+ar~~ihly 1-n discuss the situation in Eritrea.
On several occasions over the past year, messages
sent, from the forces in Eritrea to the council have denounced
the regime's policies and authoritarian rule, and called for
a political settlement of the Eritrean guerrilla war. In.
addition, units have refused to undertake aggressive operations
against the rebels.
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We have no evidence that Getachew was
actively plotting against the government. //He was a popular
commander and an obvious potential leader of council opponents.
Mengistu probably ordered the arrest of other
military and police officers as a means of cowing potential
plotters rather than because of any firm evidence that they were
planning to oust him and his clique.
The party reportedly has received extensive Soviet
advice an financial support. Its activities so far have been
limited mainly to recruiting members and distributing anti-
government pamphlets. There are unconfirmed reports that the
party has organized a unit to carry out terrori against
the government.
//Soviet Premier Kosygin's official visit to
Iraq in late May reportedly resulted in an agreement in princi-
ple for sizable quantities of Soviet arms and economic assis-
tance. Details of the agreements will be worked out when Iraqi
leader Saddam Husayn goes to Moscow later this year.//
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//We expect Moscow to agree to most of Iraq's re-
quests for major equipment items but to refuse the large spare
parts order; the USSR usually provides no more than an 18-month
supply. Iraq has now received nearly all the arms it has ordered
from the USSR, almost $2 billion since 1958. Despite Iraq's re-
cent efforts to diversify its sources of arms, Baghdad still
relies on the USSR for most of its modern weapons systems.//
//During his visit to Iraq, Kosygin also agreed
to consider further economic assistance. New aid could finance
about $500-million of Soviet development contracts now under
study. The $550 million of aid previously extended has all been
drawn or allocated to projects under construction.//
French Territory of the Afars and Issas
Tribal fighting this weekend in the French Territory
of the Afars and Issas is a setback for French efforts to bring
about an orderly transition to independence. The rioting erupted
Saturday after Issas attacked the Afar quarter of Djibouti, the
capital. At least 13 people were killed--most of them reportedly
Afars--and 50 injured before police restored order.
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The two tribes are traditional enemies and their ani-
mosi y as frequently led to fighting, but the latest violence
clearly had political overtones as well. The Issas attacked and
burned the home of the brother of Ali Aref Bourhan, the Afar
president of the local government. Issas hold Aref responsible
for denying them full participation in the territory'.; politics
and economy.
According to some reports, the clashes began as skir-
mishes between Aref's Afar-dominated National Independence Union
and the predominantly Issa opposition party, the African People's
Independence League.
Last month the Union, the League, and Aref's parlia-
mentary opponents--meeting under French auspices--agreed in
principle to form a coalition government and to support changes
in the territory's electoral laws that would give the Issas and
other ethnic Somalis greater representation in the political
process. Union representatives signed the agreement despite
Aref's opposition. Aref, whose support within his own party has
declined sharply over the past year, seemed likely to lose his
office as soon as the legislative assembly held a vote of con-
fidence.
II The resurgence of tribal hostility may make it diffi-
cult for the Union and the League to continue their collaboration.
Aref will probably try to convince the Afars that they need his
continued leadership to protect their interests against the
Leagur,. If he succeeds, territorial politics will again become
polarized, considerably reducing France's chances of creating a
government strong enough to withstand Somali pressure to annex
the territory.
I lInsurgents of the Southwest African People's Organi-
zation based in Angola appear to be operating more aggressively
along the Angola-Namibia border and are penetrating farther
south into Namibia than before.
Last week a guerrilla band killed an Ovambo tribal
policeman and members of his family at their home near the
Angolan border, then killed a farmer in a nearby village and
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seized a school teacher whom they took back to Angola. Accord-
ing to the South African commissioner general for Namibia,
nine more Ovambos were abducted by other guerrilla bands last
week.
This is the highest toll of killings and kidnapings
within a single week. Last year, the insurgents killed at least
20 civilians and eight South African soldiers, and there were
some abductions. Most of the civilian victims have been tribal
leaders or other Ovambos who collaborated with the South African
administration. The policeman killed last week was serving as
bodyguard to the chief minister of the Ovamboland government
established by Pretoria in 1973.
South African authorities have confirmed that a ten-
man guerrilla group from Angola crossed the southern border of
Ovamboland last month and entered the copper mining area around
Tsumeb, where all but two were killed. This is the deepest known
penetration by a group of this size.
Factional rivalries within the SWAPO leadership have
evidently not curbed their ability to increase their small-scale
terrorist operations near the Angolan border. The factionalism
became apparent last April when Zambian authorities arrested
several members of the SWAPO executive in Lusaka who opposed
SWAPO president Sam Nujoma.
According to reports earlier this year, many Namibian
guerrillas favored Shipanga because they believed that Nujoma
was neglecting their interests. Nujoma and other members of the
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SWAPO executive in Lusaka may have decided to counter this by
paying more attention to guerrilla operations and adopting more
aggressive tactics as a way of reasserting their leadership.
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I1 //EC heads of government-meet in Brussels today and
tomorrow un er pressure to make decisions on basic issues facing
the Community, most notably direct elections to the European
Parliament.//
and EC inactivity since then puts the Nine on the spot to avoid
another stalemate. The prospects for some agreement this time
are better, but smaller state resentment over signs of "dicta-
tion" by the larger EC powers may cloud the occasion.//
//The disappointing summit in Luxembourg last April
//EC failure to agree on the number and allocation
of seats for 'a directly elected European Parliament was respon-
sible for much of the gloom following the April summit. Since
then, France, Germany, and the UK have apparently agreed on a
compromise, although smaller states, particularly Ireland, are
likely to object that the compromise will give them too few
seats.//
//The smaller states are expected also to protest
their exclusion from the recent Puerto Rico summit. They were
not satisfied with the briefing UK Foreign Secretary Crosland
gave the foreign ministers last week on that summit. They will
probably again seek assurances that such meetings will not be-
come routine.//
//The Dutch, who have assumed the EC presidency for
the next six months, are particularly concerned by reports that
the Puerto Rico participants are considering a follow-up summit
in Tokyo. They plan to recommend prior consultations within the
Community as well as EC representation at any future summits,
but this will run into opposition from the French, who oppose
any set procedures for handling future summit invitations.//
//The smaller states are also concerned that recent
bila era visits involving France, Germany and Britain could
signal the emergence of a three-power Community directorate. The
French, who are no longer pressing for a formal directorate,
still believe that big-power agreements are the only realistic
way to assure progress in the EC.//
//The summit was expected to name UK Home Secretary
Roy Jenkins as the president of the new EC Commission which
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takes office next January, but this may be delayed until later
this year because of French objections. Jenkins is a staunch
"Europeanist" and has already said he wants to play an active
role in selecting other commissioners who have enough political
stature to represent Community policy effectively.//
//A decision to eliminate the distinction between
regular EC meetings and high-level political consultations may
also be postponed. Integrating these meetings could greatly
facilitate member-state coordination on foreign policy matters,
especially with regard to the Mediterranean and southern Africa.
Some member states are apparently reluctant to adopt the recom-
mendations contained in Belgian Prime Minister Tindemans' report
on European unity, however, and a decision may be delayed un-
til the November summit in The Hague.//
//Consultations w:th the US may also be addressed
partly as a result of the prob.ems which arose from inadequate
consultations and coordination among the developed states at
the Nairobi UN Conference on Trade and Development. Some of the
Nine, concerned that the US may move too far ahead of them in
responding to third world demands, are pushing the increased
consultations with the US.//
//Some dissatisfaction has also become evident
recently over the alleged inadequacy of US-EC consultations on
southern Africa. Several states argue that the Nine's support
has been solicited without much US reciprocity in conve in
its own intentions. 25X1
The brief military rebellion on Friday by a dissident
army general was easily put down, but President Morales Bermudez'
position remains uncertain.
I The moderate-leftist schism in the armed
forces caused Fr.i a 's challenge. 25X1`
e is rime Minis-
ter an army comman er Fernandez Maldonado decided to remove
conservative army general Bobbio, who commanded a training cen-
ter near Lima. The move apparently had the concurrence of Morales
Bermudez.
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Bobbio resisted the order, and some brief fighting at
the center was reported, but apparently there were no casualties.
Bobbio gave up the fight late Friday. He has since been retired,
and all military commands have publicly expressed support for
the president. By Saturday morning, Lima appeared calm.
The leader of the leftist forces, Fernandez
Maldonado, is at least the short term winner, having eliminated
an important conservative voice from army ranks.
Despite the show of loyalty for him, Morales Bermudez
must still contend with mounting economic problems and basic
political divisions in the armed forces. The navy and some seg-
ments of the air force and army probably sympathized with Bobbio,
although no units overtly supported his move.
//Cuba is continiung its campaign to have the UN
Committee on Decolonization, which meets next month, list Puerto
Rico as a non-self-governing territory and recognize a Puerto
Rican national liberation movement. Puerto Rico was removed
from the list in 1953.//
//The Cubans have raised the question of Puerto
Rican independence in the UN and at nonaligned meetings since
the early 1960s. Last year Havana proposed that the General
Assembly grant the liberation movement non-voting observer
status; consideration was postponed until this year. The group
Cuba has in mind for UN observer status will probably include
members of the strongly pro-Cuban Puerto Rican Socialist
Party.//
//The Cubans are intent on avoiding a postponement
in the decolonization committee. They may get their way because
committee members are still angry about US criticism of the
committee at the General Assembly last fall and do not want to
appear subservient to the US on a "colonialism" issue.//
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//Radical members of the third world advocate
comp ete in ependence for Puerto Rico, and many of the moderates
are reluctant to side with the US against Cuba. Active third
world support for Cuba may have decreased this year, however,
as other problems have taken center stage at nonaligned con-
ferences.//
//Nevertheless, Cuban pressure on committee members
and tours by Puerto Rican Socialist delegations seeking support
for an independence movement indicate that the issue will be
hotly debated in the committee.//
//The committee vote is likely to be very close.
Australia, Chile, Fiji, Iran, and Norway are expected to support
the US and defer consideration of Puerto Rico's status. Cuba
can count on support from Bulgaria, the Congo, Czechoslovakia,
Iraq, Mali, Syria, Tanzania, and the USSR. Afghanistan,
Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Ivory Coast, Trinidad and Tobago,
Tunisia, Sierra Leone, and Yugoslaviacould abstain or vote either
way. China is not expected to participate in the debate.
Spain is concluding arrangements on a $1 billion loan
from a syndicate of international banks to help finance its cur-
rent balance-of-payment deficit. Although the loan was negotiated
under the previous government, the new cabinet is likely to
honor the agreement.
I I Spain reportedly obtained particularly good terms be-
cause o the highly liquid position of many of the participating
banks. The five-year loan calls for an interest rate of 1.375
percent over the London interbank offer rate. In addition, a
number of the banks undoubtedly were influenced by their inter-
est in establishing branches in Spain.
The loan is to be used to meet a part of Spain's for-
eign financing needs for 1976. In addition to $3.1 billion needed
to cover the current account deficit, Spain must come up with
$1.6 billion to finance external debt amortization. Approximately
$2 billion should be provided through private capital inflows,
leaving $2.7 billion to be financed. If Spanish reserves are
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drawn down by $1 billion, as now planned, a further $700 million
will still be needed beyond the $1 billion obtained through the
loan.
LJ The terms of the $1 billion bank loan reportedly pro-
hibit the Spanish government from further private borrowing for
at least a year. No restrictions have been placed, however, on
borrowing by government-owned commercial entities. Spain could
also arrange borrowings from international institutions such as
the International Monetary Fund. Spain is reported to be seeking
long-term credits--approximately $150 million--from Middle East
sources for financing oil imports.
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