BRITAIN EAST OF SUEZ

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004900070004-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Sequence Number: 4
• Content Type: REPORT

0 CIA-RDP79-00927A00'4900070004-0
18 June 1665
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GROUP I ixcluded frnm awomatic
downgradi'n9;and de?1g5sification
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The British Government is critically review-
ing its defense commitments to determine which it
can continue to afford and what forces and equip-
ment are needed to meet them. Some key advisers
are urging that Britain concentrate its efforts
"East of Suez"--the area in which the remnants of
Britain's global power are concentrated and to
which ties of sentiment still are strong. Britain's
"presence" in this area requires some 100,000 troops,
and their upkeep costs the UK about a billion dol-
lars annually. London is pressing for NATO recogni-
tion of this outlay as part of Britain's contribu-
tion to the West's over-all defense. It hopes one
outcome of the defense review will be a more equit-
able sharing of the burden among its allies and
Commonwealth partners.
Commitments, Costs
And Returns
During his election cam-
paign, Prime Minister Wilson
made much of Labor's antico-
lonialist tradition and de-
nounced Conservative folly in
preserving the expensive trap-
pings of power after its sub-
stance had been lost. He prom-
ised to reassess these"entangle-
ments" in light of Britain's
limited resources and its other
national or international in-
terests. Britain's economic
difficulties--especially the
two-billion-dollar balance of
payments deficit in 1964--have
made this reassessment all the
more urgent.
Wilson accordingly has
hoped to reduce commitments
wherever possible, or to find
NATO or Commonwealth help in
fulfilling them. He has found
it difficult in practice, how-
ever, to cut Britain's outlay
without defaulting on inter-
national commitments (to NATO,
SEATO, CENTO, and the Common-
wealth) or endangering commer-
cial interests. His govern-
ment has had to accept the
necessity of maintaining some
foreign bases by force if
necessary, unpalatable though
that may be to his party's left
wing. To complicate matters,
nationalist pressures are rising
in the areas of British interest,
and the problem may be less one
of deciding whether to abandon
bases, than one of planning for
the time when they are no longer
available.
The defense review now in
progress will give special at-
tention to Britain's role in
the area between Suez and Singa-
pore. The British believe the
major threats to Western in-
terests now lie outside Europe,
and because of historic ties as
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1%W1 N11111111liV
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BRITISH MILITARY PERSONNEL
EAST OF SUEZ
3,110
-
-
3,110
Malaysia (Except
Borneo)
21,950
15,000
7,900
44,850
Borneo
9,900
-
1,400
11,300
Hong Kong
6,500
500
400
7,400
Gan (Maldive Is,)
well as current assets and obli-
gations, the "East of Suez" arc
holds special attractions for
Britain. Some labor advisers--
most notably Defense Minister
Healey and Chief of the Defense
Staff Lord Mountbatten--see this
as the natural locale for Brit-
ain's special contribution to
over-all Western defens?.
British forces in this
area are concentrated at the
Middle East Command at Aden and
the Far East Command at Singa-
pore. Britain also has commit-
ments to and some military facil-
ities in the Commonwealth states
--India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Aus-
tralia and New Zealand--as well
as miscellaneous dependencies in
the Pacific and Indian Ocean is-
lands. Troops east of Suez cost
the UK approximately a billion
directly attributable dollars
a year, of which about $200 mil-
lion is a drain on the balance
of payments. The UK also pro-
vides extensive economic and
military assistance to countries
in the area amounting to well
over $240 million entailing an
additional balance of payments
drain of $150 million. In re-
turn, Britain earns nearly a
half billion dollars annually
from its investments there. An
estimated $300 million of this
comes from Middle East oil hold-
ings.
The Malaysian Nettle
The only British troops now
openly fighting are those help-
ing to defend Malaysia against
Indonesia. The British see their
presence in Malaysia as a con-
tribution to the Western position
in Southeast Asia, and argue that
"falling dominoes" could begin
with Malaysia as well as with
Vietnam. Strategically located
at the Malacca Straits, and the
world's leading producer of rub-
ber and tin, Malaysia too is im-
portant to the UK and the West,
in London's opinion.
The Malaysian federation
was created by the British
partly as a device for combining
independence of the constitutional
territories with preservation of
the British naval base at Singa-
pore. The"forcible" inclusion
of British Borneo in the federa-
tion was deemed necessary be-
cause the prosperous, Western-
oriented Malaya would not other-
wise have accepted union with
a Singapore 85-percent ethnic-
ally Chinese and subject to
strong Communist influence. This
inclusion is Indonesia's pre-
text for "confrontation" with
Malaysia.
London believes that despite
Sukarno's frequent overtures to-
ward a peaceful settlement, he
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will be satisfied only with the
dismemberment of Malaysia and
the discrediting of Western-or-
iented elements there. Sukarno's
long-range ambition is to rid
Southeast Asia of Western influ-
ence. London accordingly tends
to resent any US aid to and trade
with Indonesia--which it con-
trasts with British support given
the US in Vietnam, in spite of
mounting public and press criti-
cism.
The entire UK Far East Com-
mand, headquartered at Singapore,
is available for Malaysia's de-
fense. This command includes
more than 56,000 British troops
and probably absorbs two thirds
of Britain's East-of-Suez mili-
tary budget. British troops
theoretically are part of the
unified Commonwealth Far East Com-
mand (UK, Australia, and New
Zealand). The comparatively
small Australian and New Zealand
contingents, however, contribute
more in the way of moral support
and a show of Commonwealth soli-
darity than in any significant
military strength.
In practice, the Common-
wealth and Malaysian forces have
been able to resist Indonesian
guerrilla operations. Indonesia
has failed to develop any degree
of support within Malaysia for
the guerrillas successfully in-
filtrated. Indonesian casual-
ties in the two and one-half
years of "confrontation" are es-
timated to be about six times
more than those of the Malaysian
and Commonwealth forces.
"Confrontation" probably
simplifies London's political
problems, both at home and in
Malaysia. Sentimental attach-
ment in Britain to the Asian
Commonwealth reduces domestic
criticism of the British en-
tanglement, at least while the
military threat is so obvious.
This attachment is at least as
strong among Laborites as among
Tories. A Labor government gave
India independence, and likes
to think the conversion of the
Empire to a great multiracial
Commonwealth is a special Labor
achievement. Labor's objection
to Britian's 1963 bid to join
the European Economic Community
was based in part on an attach-
ment to the Commonwealth idea,
and the "third force" role it
hoped that body would play in
East-West relations.
There is no significant
agitation in Malaysia against
the British, while the fighting
goes on, and the external threat
probably helps unify the fledg-
ling federation. Over the long
term, however, Britain's position
in Malaysia, as well as the very
existence of the federation it-
self, will depend on the preser-
vation of political and communal
peace between the Malays and the
Chinese. The British fear that
the Chinese People's Action Party
(PAP), led by Prime Minister Lee
Kuan Yew of Singapore, which is
beginning to challenge Malay po-
litical hegemony on the national
level, could be moving to force
a showdown that could lead to
Singapore's withdrawal from the
federation. This would jeopardize
Britain's base rights in Singa-
pore, and confront Malaysia with
a potential Chinese Communist
state on its border.
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WORLD WIDE DEPLOYMENT OF BRITISH FORCES
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? OTHER MILITARY DISPOSITIONS
COMMONWEALTH, BRITISH COLONIES & DEPENDENCIES
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Britain's difficulties in
Malaysia are the more immediate,
but the problems building up on
the Arabian peninsula are more
complex and possibly more impor-
tant.
Since World War II Britain
has looked to the Arabian area
as its main source of oil for
domestic consumption and for
sale for foreign exchange. With
the erosion of Britain's posi-
tions in the Mediterranean, Af-
rica, and Middle East--the loss
of Kenya as a military base and
the uncertain tenure of military
facilities in Malta, Libya, and
Cyprus--Arabia also has assumed
increased importance in British
strategic thinking. The Kuwait
operation of 1961 and the East
African military mutinies in
late 1963 demonstrated to the
British the inadequacy of air-
lift and the importance instead
of having acclimatized forces
near potential trouble spots.
Aden or some satisfactory alter-
native to it, since Aden is an
essential staging point on the
route to the Far East. Aden is
the largest bunkering port in
the world and the third largest
port of any kind in the Common-
wealth. It has the largest and
busiest RAF station in the
world and, after Singapore, the
largest British base complex
outside the UK itself.
The commander in chief Mid-
dle East (CINCME), headquartered
at Aden, operates through three
service commands, each with head-
quarters at Aden and subsidiary
installations in the Persian
Gulf states. The naval commander
also maintains port facilities
in East Africa and Mauritius, a
wireless station under leasehold
in Ceylon, and facilities for
repair work at Karachi, Pakistan.
The Middle East Air Force has
access to runways in the Sey-
chelles and Cocos Islands, a
transport command staging post
in Mauritius, and overflight and
staging rights in Kenya.
Aden is Britain's last re-
maining base of substantial size
between Gibraltar and Singapore.
The British depend on it to an-
swer any calls for help from Af-
rican Commonwealth states. Sup-
port of the Indian subcontinent
also might come from Aden rather
than Singapore. There is some
question whether UK forces sta-
tioned in Malaysia could be used
elsewhere without Malaysian con-
sent, therefore Aden may have
the only freely deployable Brit-
ish forces between Suez and
Singapore.
The British presence in
Malaysia may itself depend on
Britain also provides offi-
cers, trains, and substantially
equips the police and armed
forces of the Persian Gulf states,
and pays for the South Arabian
federation's army. In addition
to Aden Colony Britain has, in
the Arabian Peninsula, 19
Arabian Protectorates; a defense
agreement with independent Ku-
wait; responsibility for foreign
relations and military protection
of Bahrain, Qatar, and the seven
Trucial states; and a strong po-
litical commitment for the mili-
tary protection of the independ-
ent Sultanate of Muscat and
Oman.
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Political Problems
Aden Colony, now joined
with fourteen of the Arabian
Protectorates in the South Arab-
ian Federation (SAF), is slated
for independence by 1968. This
is in keeping with London's view
that the best way to preserve its
primary overseas interests in an
age of anticolonialism is to
create independent states willing
to negotiate treaties with the
UK. It hopes that in this case
--as Malaysia was for Singapore
--the South Arabian Federation
will become the sort of indepen-
dent state with which British
base rights in Aden can be ne-
gotiated. British efforts to
get a constitutional conference
going, however, have run up
against fundamental incompati-
bilities between the progressive-
to-leftist Adenis and the feudal
sheikdoms of the hinterland.
London still believes that
all important political parties
in Aden see the necessity of
retaining the base--as a defense
against a Nasir-backed Yemeni
take-over, and for the substan-
tial income it brings the colony.
Their inability to get agreement
on an independence formula, how-
ever, is being exploited by the
Egyptian-backed National Libera-
tion Front, which hopes through
terrorism to prevent an orderly
transition to independence.
There are signs that the local
population is beginning to blame
the British presence for the
terrorism, and repressive meas-
ures taken by the British to
deal with it may cause further
resentment.
Arab League Opposition
The Arab League recently
opened a second front in its
campaign to drive the British
from Arabia. With an offer of
a $14-million development fund,
the League seems to have won
the approval of the local rulers
for the establishment of offices
in at least two of the seven
Trucial States even though this
violates the treaty giving Lon-
don responsibility for the States'
foreign relations. The British
have made a counter offer of
$2,800,000, but the Trucial
States' leaders have not been
deterred.
Prior to this Arab League
encroachment, London had planned
to "modernize" its relations
with the sheikhdoms. None of
them is thought suited for in-
dependence, and rivalries among
them make union impossible for
the present. Nevertheless,
Britian had hoped, through tem-
porarily larger subsidies, to
shift the burden of defense and
internal security to local states
wherever possible, and by re-
linquishing certain powers, to
make the British presence less
obtrusive. London also seemed
resolved to press the rulers
for a more enlightened social
and economic policy to elim-
inate some of the grievances
on which revolution might feed.
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All these plans are in
abeyance pending the outcome of
the present test of strength
with the Arab League. The Brit-
ish feel that, unless they hold
firm, their position in the
Gulf will rapidly erode. If
London pushes too hard in oppos-
ing the Arab League offices,
however, the Trucial States'
rulers might denounce the trea-
ties with Britain and ask for
UAR protection.
Pressures at home are also
adding to Britain's problems in
maintaining its position in
Arabia. British liberals ob-
ject to London's support of the
reactionary rulers of the pro-
tectorate and the Trucial States.
Foreign policy commentators in-
creasingly question the neces-
sity of garrisons in Arabia to
protect oil supplies when the
world oil market is glutted.
These critics point out that
British oil companies operate
in Kuwait and even Iraq--and
US companies in all of Arabia
--on a purely commercial basis.
British defense planners do not
question the value of the Aden
base to the West, but wonder
whether it should be Britain's
responsibility alone.
Other British Commitments
and Resources
The British maintain at
Hong Kong a squadron of mine-
sweepers and an army garrison
for internal security. There
is considerable private British
investment in Hong Kong, and
the colony is used for jungle
training of troops destined for
Malaysia.
The British know they are
in Hong Kong on Chinese Commu-
nist sufferance and are careful
to avoid having the colony an-
tagonize Peiping. To this end
they try to avoid publicity on
US 7th Fleet visits from South
Vietnam
IThe colony is impor
tant to Peiping as a source of
foreign exchange; consequently,
the British probably can remain
there indefinitely, if they con-
tinue their present guard against
provocative action.
The British have strong
sentimental ties to and a sense
of responsibility for India,
which they regard as the supreme
test of Britain's effort to dis-
charge successfully the "white
man's burden." It is still
Britain's best hope for influ-
ence in the Afro-Asian world.
London, however, must carefully
balance its military assistance
between India and Pakistan, and
has considered withdrawing aid
from India if its border dis-
putes with Pakistan are not re-
solved. The balancing task is
complicated by the risk that
India might turn to the Soviets,
or Pakistan to the Chinese if
Britain is not generous enough.
London's immediate concern is
that a proposed Soviet naval aid
package may lead to Soviet pene-
tration of the Indian Navy. Even
more worrisome to the British
is the possibility that, should
India feel it necessary to de-
velop a nuclear capability
against the Chinese threat, Pak-
istan might seek a Chinese nu-
clear guarantee against India.
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Britain is increasing its
aid to Ceylon, now that the Dud-
ley Senanayake government has
replaced the "neutralist" and
inefficient one of Mrs. Ban-
daranaike. British banks in Cey-
lon have lent the new government
$11,200,000 to help it meet its
inherited foreign exchange dif-
ficulties. London also is tak-
ing an active part in organiz-
ing an international consortium
to aid Ceylon.
Under an agreement with
the Maldive Government, London
has an airfield and communica-
tions facilities on Gan Island
and other anchorage facilities
in the Addu Atoll.
Britain also has use of
the Woomera rocket range in
Australia, and the RAF has ac-
cess to Australian air bases.
Britain's efforts to keep
its present "East of Suez" hold-
ings are at best a delaying ac-
tion while other arrangements
are sought. London hopes to
develop with the US alternative
military facilities on various,
sparsely populated Indian Ocean
islands. These island bases--
and hopefully Australian bases--
would support seaborne "fire-
fighting" forces for the entire
'Suez to Singapore area. As an
anticipated part of these
forces, the amphibious squadron
based at Aden is being enlarged
to a joint service task force
which will include an assault
group, a carrier task group, and
a replenishment group.
London hopes these forces
will provide a nuclear guarantee
to the Asian commonwealth and
discourage India and Pakistan
from developing bases of their
own or seeking other alliances.
Lord Head, British high
commissioner in Malaysia, has
expressed the hope that the pro-
jected bases can be operated
jointly by the US, UK, Australia,
and New Zealand. Although he
thinks such joint forces could
not be expected to cope with
subversion on the mainland, they
would be "another source of
power in the area besides China."
As rumors of the US-UK
Indian Ocean plans have been
leaked by the press, outcries
against "imperialist nuclear
bases" have begun in neighbor-
ing nations. The British ex-
pect India and Ceylon, at least,
to take a hostile stand in pub-
lic while privately welcoming
the support these bases would
offer. The internal situation
in Mauritius is not reassuring.
As part of its campaign for in-
dependence,the left-wing Hindu-
dominated Mauritius Labor Party
is agitating against "nuclear
bases" on Mauritian soil. To
complicate matters, there are
racial frictions in Mauritius
between the Hindus and the
Creole, French, and Chinese
populations--numerically smaller
but economically and socially
dominant--who want the British
to stay on as protection against
Hindu domination. There is as
yet no significant Communist
sympathy in Mauritius, but the
situation is susceptible to
Communist intrigue,
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Britain is exploring the pos-
sibility of Saudi Arabia's becoming
the core of a, stable system in
the Persian Gulf. London's ef-
forts to lay the groundwork for
Saudi influence after Britain's
departure include seeking a. set-
tlement between the Saudis and
Abu Dhabi over the Durami Oasis
dispute, and encouraging Saudi
assistance to the Trucial States
Development Fund. Britain also
supports Saudi aid to the Yemeni
royalists.
Ironically, Britain's new-
found friendship with the Saudis
may stand in the way of UK-Yemeni
Republican (YAR) rapprochement.
The,British acknowledge that the
new YAR President Numan is making
a courageous stand against Egyp-
tian control, but do not feel
they can establish relations with
him while the Saudis oppose him.
These are long-term plans,
however, and London feels an im-
mediate need for relief from
some of its commitments. It
is urging its NATO partners to
consider its overseas role a
part of Britain's contribution
to the total Western effort.
The Western European Union re-
cently agreed to study the
global defense commitments of
each of its members, and the
British hope this may lead to
some sharing of those commit-
ments. London also is pressing
for increased Australian and
New Zealand contributions to
the Malaysian effort. At the
very least, London will be most
reluctant to take on any new
burdens--such as detachment
proceedings for the Indian
Ocean islands--until its defense
review is completed and a, strong
pitch is made for a. more equita-
ble sharing of the load by
Britain's allies.
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