NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A029300010002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 11, 2006
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: September 1, 1976
• Content Type: REPORT

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE
Wednesday September 1, 1976 CI NIDC 76-206C
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
0 State Dept. review completed Top Secret
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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Wednesday, September
1976 25X1
The NID Cable is for the purpose of
informing senior US officials.
CONTENTS
TURKEY: Sismik I Sails Again
Page 2
LEBANON: Situation Report
Page 2
USSR: Climate's Effects on Grain Output
Page 4
MOZAMBIQUE-RHODESIA: Nationalist Leaders Meet
Page 7
PORTUGAL: Base Negotiations with US
Page 8
KOREA: North's Propaganda Continues
Page 10
JAPAN: Miki Endorses Compromise
Page 11
CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION
Page 12
MEXICO: Peso Floated
Page 13
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TURKEY: Sismik I Sails Again
According to a broadcast yesterday by Turkish gov-
adio, the Turkish research ship Sismik I was sched-
uled to depart Izmir last night on its fourth mission.
I I The ship has been in Izmir since August 24, report-
ed, y for maintenance and the installation of new equipment. A
US official reported that the dry dock containing the Sismik
I was seen being flooded yesterday.
The Turkish governmen has not yet announced the
exact area and duration of this mission, as it has done at
least a day prior to each of the three previous voyages. This
suggests that the ship may undergo a brief shake-down cruise
before beginning exploration in earnest again.
-CIA, DIA, NSA-
LEBANON: Situation Report
I ILebanese president-elect Ilyas Sarkis traveled to
Damascus yesterday for talks wi-h Syrian President Asad on
current peace negotiations and arrangements for Sarkis' take-
over from President Franjiyah on September 23.
I I Both Sarkis and Asad have recently expressed con-
ence at the transfer of power can be carried out smoothly.
They have studiously avoided public and private comment on
how the change will affect relations between Damascus and
the Lebanese government.
I Sarkis and Asad have previously had virtually no
irec , personal contact, and both probably approached the
meeting with uncertainty. Sarkis is beholden to the Syrians
for his election last May and must now rely on them to help
engineer his assumption of power.
I ISarkis is acutely aware, however, that his effec-
tiveness as president will depend on his ability to retain
the confidence of all parties to the conflict, and his views
on steps to end the war may therefore not be in complete har-
mony with Asad's.
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Sarkis' efforts to convene roundtable peace talks
ear y in the summer were pre-empted by Syrian military moves
against the Palestinians and Lebanese leftists, and since
then he has dissociated himself from Syrian policy in Lebanon.
I ISarkis is in no position to advise changes in
Syrian policy and may, in fact, see some wisdom in continu-
ing military pressure on the Palestinians. He probably shares,
nevertheless, the concern of some Christian leaders about
Syria's ultimate intentions and their possible divergence
from Lebanon's interests.
I Sarkis probably also takes seriously recent warnings
rom traditional Muslim leaders that he alone cannot assume
responsibility for accepting Syria's military moves in Leb-
anon.
I The leftist-controlled Beirut press charged yester-
ay that Syria moved an additional 20,000 troops into the
Bekaa Valley over the weekend in order to present Sarkis with
a "fait accompli."
I Lebanese military sources have told US officials
a e.re has been no significant increase in Syrian troop
levels, and one Western diplomat who regularly travels through
Syrian-held territory observed no change in Syrian deployments
while driving along the Beirut-Daascus highway on Monday.
I _1 yria has approximately 5,000 troops stationed
just beyond the Lebanese border, and a repositioning of these
forces would be difficult to detect.
The Christians have reportedly reinforced their
positions in the southern outskirts of Beirut, presumably in
conjunction with plans for a new offensive coordinated with
the Syrians. They recently moved 30 "heavy w pons" to the
Baabda area, that are now
aimed in the ecru airport.
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I Arab League efforts to arrange a local cease-fire
in the mount Lebanon area received a major setback yesterday
from Palestinian leader Salah Khalah, who announced that the
Palestinians would not accept a truce agreement which is not
part of an overall settlement.
The Palestinians apparently have decided they cannot
afford to jeopardize their positions in Christian territory,
the loss of which would greatly reduce their bargaining power
in future negotiations. Moreover, they probably suspect--with
some justification--that Camille Shamun's forces would not
adhere to the cease-fire agreement.
-CIA, DIA, NSA-
USSR: Climate's Effects on Grain Output
I IThe severe Soviet drought of 1975 contrasted sharply
wi e unusually favorable conditions of 1969-74, suggesting
a return to the climate--that is, weather averaged for a year
or more--of the early 1960s, when good and bad years alter-
nated.
While good weather has returned to the USSR in 1976,
there is evidence to suggest that a return to harsher average
conditions is under way. Namely, the general climatic condi-
tions in the Northern Hemisphere since 1974 show definite sim-
ilarities with those of the ear-'y 1960s.
I I The well-publicized drought of 1972 was different
rom ose of the early 1960s and 1975 because its effects
were felt mainly in the winter grain areas of European Russia
rather than in the steppe regions of the New Lands.
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Assuming the same climate as in 1962-65, annual So-
viet grain output would average no more than 200 million tons
in 1976-80. An output of this size falls a staggering 25 to 30
million tons short of estimated annual requirements. If the
USSR chooses to cover the deficit by imports, these purchases
would match those following the disastrous grain harvests of
1972 and 1975. Alternatively, Moscow could cut the already
modest livestock program.
I I Grain growing in the USSR faces severe environmental
imi a ions. Because three fourths of the sown area is cli-
matically comparable with the Prairie Provinces of Canada and
the Northern Great Plains in the United States, the farmland
of the USSR is less productive on the average than that of the
United States. As in analogous areas in North America, the So-
viet Union's agricultural land is relatively lacking in ade-
quate amounts of heat, moisture, and nutrients.
I I More than 30 percent of the USSR is too cold for
agriculture, and an additional 40 percent is so cold that only
hardy, early maturing crops can be grown. Even where warmth
permits a wide range of grain crops--south of about 50 degrees
latitude--low precipitation and high temperatures limit mois-
ture so that, with few exceptions, grain can only be grown by
irrigation.
I I Because of these unfavorable natural conditions, So-
viet grain growing areas are particularly susceptible to longer
term fluctuations in hemispheric conditions. Climatic fluctua-
tions in the USSR, as well as in other regions, are related to
the size of the circumpolar vortex, a dome of cold air cover-
ing the polar regions.
As the Northern Hemisphere cools in winter, the vor-
tex expands, cooling the middle latitudes and moving the hem-
ispheric weather patterns southward. In summer, it contracts,
allowing warmer air to move north from the subtropics.
I I As important as the size of the vortex is its pat-
tern of waves that extend out from it and move with the wind
patterns of the hemsiphere. The size, shape, and number of
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these waves depend on the size of the vortex, the temperature
difference between the pole and the equator, and the topography
over which the air flows.
I I During the late 1960s, the cooling of the Northern
Hemisphere moved the wetter northern climates in the Soviet
Union southward. At the same time the changed wind pattern as-
sociated with this cooling brought increasing amounts of air
from the North Atlantic rather than from Siberia.
J This shift increased moisture, cooled summers, and
preven e the bitter cold of the Siberian winter from penetrat-
ing into the grain belt. The net effect was to move the moist
northern climate southward about 190 kilometers (120 miles),
pushing back the desert and nearly doubling rainfall in
Kazakhstan. The cooling of the Northern Hemisphere and the
subsequent shift of the desert zone south of the Soviet grain
belt apparently is also related to the Sahelian drought and
failures of the Indian monsoon during this period.
The climate changes of the 1960s modified the nor-
mally harsh conditions and had a major effect on Soviet grain
output. Between the early 1960s and 1974, total grain output
increased at an average of 6.8 million tons annually. We esti-
mate that about half of the increase since 1963 was caused by
the more favorable climate. The other half is apparently due
to a greater use of fertilizer and improved varieties of grain.
The improvement was greatest in the southern fringes of the
grain belt east of the Urals, where spring grain output is
concentrated.
In the mid-1970s the climate appears to have reversed
e southward shift of the desert, which had so bene-
fited Soviet agriculture, ended. In late summer 1974 the hot
dry winds, which were common in the early 1960s, reappeared in
the eastern steppe regions of the grain belt. The dry weather
lasted for more than a year, spreading over most of the grain
belt by summer 1975.
I Unlike previous droughts, which were concentrated in
the New Lands area east of the Urals, the 1975 drought also
hit the grain heartland in the European part of the country.
In other parts of the world, the drought in the Sahel ended
and the monsoons returned to India. All three events seem linked
to an apparent warming of the orthern Hemisphere during the
early 1970s. F7 i
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 MOZAMBIQUE-RHODESIA: Nationalist Leaders Meet
//Mozambican President Machel has summoned leaders
o the feu ing Rhodesian nationalist factions to a meeting in
//Machel wanted Joshua Nkomo to attend, but the
a ter Is in the Middle East and will be represented by a sub-
ordinate.//
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I //Although we do not know what Machel has in mind,
the hurried nature of the gathering strongly suggests that it
is keyed to the meeting this weekend between Secretary Kissinger
and South African Prime Minister Vorster.//
//The "third force" leaders, who will be attending
such a high-level meeting for the first time--and Muzorewa, who
has been barred from the guerrilla camps, are reportedly eager
to use the session with Machel to strengthen the positions of
their own factions.//
25X1 /Machel has leverage over the nationalist politi-
cians ecause of his control of their access to the guerrilla
camps in Mozambique. He may take a tough line with them in yet
another effort to coerce them into submerging their differences.//
//Machel and Tanzanian President Nyerere have been
acting e "third force" leaders as an alternative to old-line
political leaders such as Muzorewa and Nkomo but have been un-
able to prevent ethnic and personal rivalries from surfacing
among the guerrillas.//
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//Machel probably coordinated the meeting of the
nationalist leaders with Zambian President Kaunda when the two
met in Mozambique last weekend. Kaunda has clearly preferred
Nkomo, but he and Machel, together with Nyerere and Botswanan
President Khama, have cooperated in the past in several abortive
efforts to bring unity to the Rhodesian nationalist movement.//
PORTUGAL: Base Negotiations with US
//The Portuguese government reportedly plans to
iscuss wi e US embassy in L-sbon within the next three
weeks a reopening of negotiations on the Lajes air base in the
Azores. The Portuguese appear, however, to be in no hurry for
serious negotiations.//
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The base agreement expired in 1974, but its terms al--
ow e US to continue using the base until there is a new agree-
//The Portuguese ambassador to the US told Am-
bassador Carlucci in late August that the Portuguese are anx-
ious to resume a dialogue on renewing the base agreement.
The new Socialist government appears to be under some
pressure from the Azorean regional administration and wants to
show that at least some progress toward an agreement is being
made.
Soares has also promised that, for the first time,
ze zoreans will benefit from the terms of the agreement and
that officials from the regional government will participate in
the negotiations.
//Foreign Minister Medeiros Ferreira, who plans
to head the Portuguese team when negotiations take place, re-
portedly foresees no serious difficulties. Possibly in an effort
to help smooth the way, Soares appears to be taking a less dog-
matic stand on the use of the Azores for the resupply of Israel
in a renewed Middle East conflict.//
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ernment would decide on new requests for the use of the base on
a case-by-case basis, taking Portugal's "national interests"
into consideration. Soares had been quoted by an Iranian news
agency last week as saying that Portugal was studying the pos-
sibility of banning use of the base in a future US airlift to
KOREA: North's Propaganda Continues
A spokesman for Soarer said on Monday that the gov-
North Korea is continuing to warn that the threat of
a us-provoked war on the peninsula is increasing--a line that
was prominent for months before the recent killing of the two
US Army officers in Panmunjom.
A North Korean broadcast on August 29 cited reports
of the presence of the US nuclear-powered submarine Pollack in
the Sea of Japan as further evidence of US preparations for
war.
In addition, North Korean authorities re-
cent y or ered a reduction in contact with foreigners:
//--Some scheduled cultural and goodwill visits to North
Korea apparently have been canceled or delayed.//
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//--Some Japanese trade representatives have been asked
to leave Pyongyang.//
We believe these latter actions are part of a North
Korean e fort to build an air of crisis around the Korean is-
sue at this fall's UN General Assembly. North Korea hopes such
an atmosphere will increase international political pressure
for a US military withdrawal and help defeat a pro - South
Korean resolution.
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There is no evidence that such limited steps reflect
serious war preparations. Some foreign technicians and economic
specialists have been allowed to remain in North Korea; the
Japanese trade officials may well be a special case.
I INorth Korean commercial relations with Japan are
strained at present over the debt repayment problem. The North
Koreans probably are using their tension-building campai n as
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JAPAN: Miki Endorses Compromise
I Prime Minister Miki has endorsed a compromise de-
signed o resolve, at least temporarily, the political impasse
in Tokyo. Deputy Prime Minister Fukuda and Finance Minister
Ohira, leaders of the movement to oust Miki, discussed the
plan with Miki during a three-hour session on Monday but have
so far withheld public endorsement of the compromise. Anti-Miki
members of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party have publicly
opposed the plan and renewed calls for Miki's resignation.
The compromise was apparently worked out by party
leaders who are attempting to mediate the struggle in the
leadership following inconclusive talks by the three princi-
pals last week, and it involves:
--A shuffle of cabinet posts and party leadership posi-
tions. Almost certainly the most important change would
be the removal of party Secretary General Nakasone, whose
alleged involvement in the Lockheed scandal has made him
an election year liability.
--The convening of an extraordinary Diet session to pass
a number of pending fiscal bills.
--A call for efforts to "unite the party"--presumably
meaning to resolve the struggle over Miki's tenure--be-
fore the general election this fall.
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Miki apparently hopes that growing pressure to call
the Die =into session will produce a positive response from
his opponents. Fukuda and Ohira are well aware that accepting
the new proposal would postpone the question of Miki's resig-
nation, at least until after the pending legislation is passed.
Still, given Miki's adamant refusal to step down voluntarily,
they may well be willing to pay that price in exchange for the
ouster of Nakasone, who is Miki's only major ally within the
party.
I IMiki probably calculates that an interim truce with
his rivals will buy time. Any delays in passing the pending
bills in the Diet session would reduce the time available for
Fukuda and Ohira to renew their challenge before the fall
election campaign.
Implementation of the plan could begin this week if
Fukuda and Ohira agree quickly. At this point, however, ob-
jections from the anti-Miki Liberal Democratic members, com-
bined with likely wrangling over a new cabinet, will probably
delay a response from Fukuda and Ohira for at least a few days.
I //The spokesman for the 19 developing countries
participating in the Conference on International Economic Coop-
eration in Paris may be trying to get the talks between the
developed and developing states back on track. Venezuelan cabinet
minister Perez-Guerrero will meet this weekend with the other
developing countries' co-chairmen of the four CIEC commissions.//
//The talks were stalemated in July when the devel-
insisted that the detailed agendas for the next
four months of talks include language on the issues of debt and
of protecting their "purchasing power." The industrialized states
rejected this language as prejudicial to the outcome of the dis-
cussions.//
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//Another factor contributing to the impasse may
well have been pressure from the 90-odd other developing states--
whose interests the 19 theoretically represent--not to make con-
cessions until the full group had considered such actions at
the Colombo nonaligned summit in mid-August.//
1/,Perez-Guerrero apparently used the Colombo meet-
ing to lobby for continuing the CIEC. Although the language on
the Conference incorporated in the nonaligned economic declara-
tion contains a negative assessment of its results, the summit
did not specifically reject continuation of the dialogue.//
//Following Colombo, Perez-Guerrero reportedly spent
parz of a week lobbying in some Middle East states as well.
While progress at CIEC may be linked rhetorically to an OPEC
oil price increase, all indications point to a 10- to 15-percent
oil price increase in December regardless of what happens at
CIEC.//
//In any case, Perez-Guerrero's activity the past
two days in Paris indicates that he now feels confident enough
of support from both the OPEC states and the full caucus of
developing states to encourage a resumption of the Conference.
MEXICO: Peso Floated
Mexico's release yesterday of the peso from its fixed
exchange rate with the US dollar will result in a devaluation
that Mexican officials reportedly hope can be held to around 20
percent. Monetary controls and export and excess profits taxes
will be employed to prevent speculation, but no exchange con-
trols will be introduced. International banking sources in Mex-
ico City said the peso would probably stabilize at about 20 to
the dollar, down from the present 12.5.
I I The peso has come under growing pressure recently as
inflation in Mexico has continued to outpace that in the US.
This has resulted in an overvaluation of the peso by as much as
40 percent to 60 percent.
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Mexico's import bill will increase as a result of the
anticipated depreciation of the peso. Although service on the
large foreign debt--now estimated to reach $20 billion by year-
end--will also rise, Mexico should not encounter problems in
handling the payments. Because most exports are already in US
dollars, there should be no large increase in shipments abroad,
but tourist receipts--40 percent of total exports--will be
strengthened.
Capital flight, the recent increase of which provoked
the float at this time, will be reduced if the government insti-
tutes the necessary fiscal and monetary policies to complement
the devaluation. President Echeverria is expected to elaborate
on such reforms later today in his State of the Republic address.
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