SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS - - THE NEW GAME

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A001100010006-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 12, 2005
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: November 13, 1964
• Content Type: MF

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13 November 1964
Much of the attached memorandum is necessarily of an interim
and highly speculative nature, and we have not attempted to coordinate
it, even within CIA. We do feel that it contains enough interesting
analysis to be worth bringing to your attention.
25X1
AB330T SMITH
AcZii2g ABsistamt Director
National Estimates
CROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
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-~ ?C-R-E-T
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
.4 'ICE Or I
13 November 1964
MDICE.A?'1DUM FOR T D: CTOR
SUBJECT: Sino-Soviet Relations - The New Game
SM 'TA.RY
The Soviets and Chinese have clearly retreated from the
split Khrushchev had scheduled for Decerfoer. They have restored
high level contacts and established the basis for a new dialogue.
They now appear to have a mutual interest in quieting down their
dispute and seeking a practical working arrangement. Neither
side, however, is likely to make concession on fundamental issues.
1. Nothing dramatizes the consequences of Khrushchevts
fall from power as much as Chou En-Lai`s appearance atop the Lenin
mausoleum for the 47th anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution.
Many observers are bound to conclude that Khrushchev was removed
precisely to make such a journey to Moscow possible. Whether this
is in fact the case is far from clear, but it is evident that some
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
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new intricate Sino-Soviet manuevering has begun, less than a month
after Khrushchev's political demise.
The origins of the Chou En-Lai mission are still obscure.
The Soviets have let it be known to other parties that the Chinese
sought the invitation, and put some pressure on the Soviets by indi-
eating that other. Communist states should be informed of the request.
Naturally, the new Soviet team could not refuse without immediately
taking the blame for iutransigent perpetuation of the quarrel. On
the other hand, there is some evidence that the Soviets made known
their interest in bilateral talks with the Chinese when they con-
ferred with Gomulka.
3. Both sides have made some concessions. Direct public
polemics have been stopped, and cordial messages published. The
Chinese ignored the slight of the 1,lhr,ians and the presence of
Tito's representatives. The Soviets initially drew back from
Khrushchev's project for a 26-party drafting commission to meet in
mid-December, and have offered a new formula for a series of short
meetings and consultations. Both sides have laid the ground work
for shifting much of the blame for past differences onto Khrushchev,
much as he sluffed off the conflict with Tito onto Beria in 1955.
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4. The conduct of both powers has already changed considerably.
Contacts which were broken off in mid-1963 have been re-established.
The atmosphere of mutual recriminations has been dispelled at least
temporarily by the public display of cordiality in Moscow. The
private talks could be the basis for a continuing dialogue. in
effect, neither side has chosen to proceed toward the split which
was coming in December, but it is far from clear how they will
proceed from this new starting point.
The Main Issues
5? Khrushchev. Before the two parties can go very far in
their discussions the historical role of Khrushchev must be decided.
The Chinese have already baited the Soviets by attributing
Khrushchev's overthrow to his betrayal of "proletarian inter-
nationalism, the path of the October revolution, and the interests
of the Soviet people." They h; ,re warned that the "people" will also
"spurn" any other leaders who follow Muushchev's line. It is
impossible for the Soviet leaders to accept this interpretation
without great damage to their position inside the USSR and among
their allies in the Communist movement. The most they can do is
blame Khrushchev for damaging Soviet-Chinese state relations un-
necessarily and for exacerbating the dispute with petty polemics.
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6. Ideology. Even if the Chinese do not press for complete
de-I{hrushchevization, the two parties are faced with his general
policies. The new Soviet leaders must prove their legitimacy by
demonstrating continuity with the "general line" of the party.
There are three issues which have to be reaffirmed: (1) de-
Stalinization, (2) peaceful coexistence and the non-inevitability
of war (20th Party Congress), and (3) the Party Program (22nd Party
Congress). To repudiate this "general line" would amount to a
fundamental change of policy. At the same time, the Chinese hold
that the origin of the dispute dates back to the 20th Party Congress,
the "gross errors" of de-Stalinization, and the "distortion" of
Lenin's concept of peaceful coexistence. Moreover, the CPSU party
program was thoroughly denounced by Peiping in June 1963. It is
difficult to see how such fundaments propositions can be overturned
without paying a high price. If the issues are ignored, then before
too long they will be talking at cross purposes, and despite the
best of intentions, sliding back into polemics.
7. Authority. One way of deferring substantive resolutions
is to use old compromise language from the 1960 Conference and simply
reaffirm it. They might do this bilaterally, but the Soviets cannot
completely drop the idea of a new conference without appearing weak
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and unsure of their position. In fact, Brezhnev has made a new
conference a "necessity." Yet the Chinese will sooner or later
require the same concessions as before: unanimity and coordinated
preparations -- in other words a Chinese veto.
8. A new obstacle is the Chinese encouragement and
acceptance of a number of factions and splinter groups as the
legitimate Communist parties in various countries. Two of the
parties (India and Brazil) represented on the 26-party drafting
commission are split in this way. The Soviets cannot accept such
renegadee without losing much of the confidence they still hold among
pro-Soviet parties. Yet the Chinese will find it difficult to
abandon the parties they have sponsored over the past few years.
Even if the two Communist powers reached some working agreement,
it is by no means certain that they could impose their views on
the various national parties, particularly those which have been
split into warring factions. In addition, of course, there is the
Chinese refusal to accept Tito into the ranks of Communist powers.
In other words, the question of authority and discipline is not
solved by Khrushchev's departure and cannot be resolved, if at
sU, without important concessions throughout the Communist world.
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9. The Soviet Position. The above discussion, together with
the well kn wra nationalistic aspects of the Sino-Soviet dispute,
suggest that no fundamental reconciliation is possible, unless the
Soviets are prepared to overturn the Khrushchev era and develop a
completely new internal aM external policy. As of now, it seems
highly unlikely that this would be attempted. The incentive for
the new leaders to do so is lacking. On the other hand, there may
be considerable incentive for the Soviets to put a much better face
on their relations with China. Khrushchev's tactics had reached a
dead end. Not only were the Chinese gaining direct support, but
Soviet allies were dropping by the wayside. The Soviets need time
to try to repair this disarray, particularly in Eastern Europe.
By refusing to be taunted into a final break, the Soviets may gain
little, but at least they do not court the deliberate defiance of
their allies. Finally, the Soviets have been greatly weakened in
their diplomacy and international policies by the growing acceptance
throughout the world of Sirao-Soviet split. if they can not create
a semblance of unity they may gain a stronger hand in dealing with
the West, and cause considerable concern in anti-Communist ranks.
10. The Chinese Position. One incentive for China to play
along with this notion of improving state relations is to relieve
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the pressures on their northern borders. Another incentive is the
prospect of economic and military assistance. Kosygin has already
indicated that some economic aid may be resumed. Some years ago
the Chinese might have been sorely tempted to make concessions for
resumption of full scale assistance. Their survival of adversity
and their new prestige have made them much readier to resist
temptation, and their demands are higher: the Chinese must be
granted a co-chairmanship of the international movement; the
Soviets must reorient their foreign policy to support Chinese
ambitions, and thereby confront the US with a solid front.*
11. It is likely that the Chinese are shrewder than to present
this bill to the Soviets immediately. The Chinese have much to
gain by playing down the conflict for the short term and letting
the Soviets make the moves either toward a more cordial relationship
or back to the brink. As long as there remains doubt as to the
future direction of Sino-Soviet relations, the Chinese gain a
stronger hand in such matters as the Indian situation, the struggle
Chinese insistence on implacable hostility toward the US was made
evident in a speech at a Soviet Embassy reception on 6 November.
Peng Chen, who has conducted some of the polemical debates with
the Soviets, said: "In the present international situation the
demarcation line between those who want revolution and those who
do not is whether or not they oppose US imperialism ... those
(like Khrushchev) who attempt to obscure this demarcation line
have been repudiated."
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for Southeast Asia, and throughout the Communist movement, where
divided leadership must even now be casting a wary eye at the
pro-Chinese factions.
12. In sum, both sides have an interest in quieting down the
dispute. The Chinese will capitalize on the fall of Khrushchev and
the disarray this has already produced among various Communist parties.
They will also wait for further changes, if any, in the Soviet leader-
ship. They need not make any concessions, other than dropping their
pointed polemics and simply reaffirming their positions. They are
probably confident that the Soviet position will weaken and that
Soviet authority will be further damaged. Any concessions from
:Brezhnev & Co. of course will be pocketed, with an awareness that
this too weakens the Soviets in the eyes of their hitherto loyal
followers.
13. The mere fact of starting talks may have put the Soviets
at a tactical disadvantage. While the Chinese are under no pressure
to make major concessions, the new Soviet team is under pressure to
show that they can handle things better than Khrushchev. Unless they
call a quick halt to the Chinese dialogue and insist on the correctness
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of their positions, they may fall into a trap. The closer they
come to an agreement the greater the pressure not to take the blame
for upsetting it and the greater the temptation to bring the Chinese
problem under control with concessions. Perhaps Chinese arrogance
will save the Soviets in the end, as in 1963 when the Chinese
deliberately challenged Khrushchev on the eve of the bilateral
talks in Moscow. But if the Chinese string out the discussions
the good faith of the Soviets can be badly damaged among those
Communists and non-Communist powers who have accepted the Sino-Soviet
dispute as a profound conflict of principles. Brezhnev and his
cohorts will look more and more unprincipled and devious.
14+. The Chinese issue must be a matter of serious debate and
conflict within the new Soviet leadership. There are already signs
that the maneuvering for position is intensifying, and a new upheaval
at the top seems inevitable. Brezhnev is emerging as the champion
of Communist unity. But there are other signs that a new approach
to China is being resisted. For example, someone sponsored the
publication of anti-Chinese statements in Pravda several days after
Khrushchev' s fall. The first Secretary of the Ukraine, a protege
of Podgorny's spoke out against the Chinese, but his remarks were
suppressed by Pravda. Podgorny is on record, two days before the
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anti-Khrushchev coup, with a vicious indictment of the Chinese.
If Brezhnev is vulnerable to eventual charges of bungling or
weakening the Soviet position, he could just as easily attack
others for softness in the face of the common enemy. It is possible
that there are Soviet leaders who believe a reconciliation with
China goes hand in hand with the revival of a more orthodox ideology
inside the USSR. Until this internal power play is resolved it is
doubtful that we can estimate the course of Sino-Soviet relations
with much confidence.
15. The present pause cannot go on indefinitely, however.
Even if a conference is set aside the new Soviet leaders must
convene a party congress by next fall at the latest. By this first
post-Khrushchevian congress, they probably need to know the future
direction of their relations with China.
25X1
ABBOT SMITH
Acting Chairman
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