THE SOVIET-CUBAN MILITARY RELATIONSHIP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84B00049R001303250004-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 19, 2006
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: December 20, 1979
• Content Type: NIE

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Director of Top Secret
Central
Intelligence
2006105/25'' CIA RPP84 Of A4k 10: 3( 325
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KEY JUDGMENTS
1. The Soviet-Cuban military relationship, which has strengthened
since its inception in the early 1960s, clearly entered a new phase in
1975. The USSR embarked on a major program to upgrade Cuba's
defenses and to give it the capability to conduct military operations in
the Third World. Together the two countries entered into overt military
intervention in Africa. For four years they have worked together with
increasing confidence to promote the fortunes of Third World
governments and revolutionary groups they favor.
2. The broad decision to modernize the Cuban armed forces
apparently was made during 1975, probably before the Cuban
involvement in Angola had become a major intervention. Some of the
weapon systems delivered since 1975, however, may have been added
to the modernization program as a "reward" for Cuba's actions in
Angola and Ethiopia and as a result of a mutual desire to enhance
Cuba's capabilities in future Third World conflicts. In any event, the
weaponry supplied by the USSR since 1975 is transforming the Cuban
armed forces from a home defense force into a military power with
formidable capabilities relative to those of Cuba's Latin American
neighbors, and enables it to sustain an active interventionist role in the
Third World.
3. In general, we believe that both the Soviets and the Cubans are
satisfied with the present framework of their military relationship and
unlikely to seek a more formal agreement along the lines of the Warsaw
Pact. The military modernization effort in Cuba is designed to provide
Castro with forces sufficiently equipped and trained to cause the United
States to calculate carefully the risks of any military move against him.
At the same time, it affords the Cubans the opportunity to train on
newer equipment that they use abroad.
The Cuban Perspective
4. Havana sees its close military relationship with the USSR as
having strongly benefited Cuba. Cuba views Moscow as the critical
source of economic and military support that has been responsible for
the development of an impressive Cuban military establishment. Castro
is well aware that, without Soviet backing for Cuban forces in Angola
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and Ethiopia, Cuba could not have intervened there and hence gained
recognition as a major military actor in the Third World. The Castro
regime also perceives its action in support of Soviet objectives as a
means of ensuring continued influence with the Soviet leadership.'
5. Cuba perceives few drawbacks to this relationship with the
USSR. Havana has been characterized as a Soviet stooge by some
members of the nonaligned movement, but its relationship with
Moscow has so far not significantly detracted from Cuba's influence in-
the NAM. Indeed, Cuba emerged from the recent Havana ' NAM
summit with a considerably enhanced position in the movement.
The Soviet Perspective
6. The Soviets have been able to accomplish two major objectives
in Cuba. Cuban military forces are particularly effective additions to
Moscow's capabilities to project its power and influence in the Third
World.2 And the USSR has been able to use Cuba for its own military
purposes:
- The Soviets periodically deploy naval units in the Caribbean,
visit
Cuban ports and stage reconnaissance aircraft
7. The presence of a Soviet ground forces brigade in Cuba was
confirmed in August 1979. It has an estimated personnel strength of at
least 2,600 men and perhaps as many as 3,000. The Soviets first
established a ground forces unit presence in Cuba in 1962, and the
brigade or a precursor appears to have been present since that time,
although its size and mission may have evolved over time. We have
insufficient information to determine with confidence the brigade's
present missions. We think it likely, however, that it is now intended to
serve as a symbol of the Soviet military commitment to Castro and to
provide security for some Soviet facilities in Cuba.
8. The Soviets also maintain a military advisory mission in Cuba to
provide technical assistance and advice to the Cuban military on
' For a fuller discussion of the Cuban perspective, see SNIE 85-79, The Cuban Foreign Policy, 21 June
1979.
' For a fuller discussion of Soviet objectives, see NIE 11-10-79, Soviet Military Capabilities To Project
Power and Influence in Distant Areas, February 1979.
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planning and tactics. The size of this mission
may be in excess of 2,000 men.
9. These military forces
constitute
virtually all the Soviet military personnel identified in Cuba and may
number upwards of 6,000 men.
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10. On the basis of present projections, the fundamental underpin-
nings of the Soviet Cuban military relationship are unlikely to change
over the next few years. We expect to see continued growth of military
cooperation both in Cuba and abroad.
11. Soviet Use of Cuba. Moscow will continue to use Cuba for a
variety of military purposes and may gradually expand some of those
uses, depending on the evolution of political circumstances. We believe
the Soviets will avoid activities in Cuba that they consider likely to
worsen relations with the United States seriously, particularly if those
actions would confer only marginal military benefit. At the same time,
the Soviets are likely over time to explore the ambiguous limits of
previous US-Soviet understandings to test the political cost of further
use of Cuban facilities.
12. We believe it likely that the Soviets will continue to improve
facilities in Cuba for these purposes:
- Soviet naval reconnaissance aircraft will continue to stage
occasionally from Cuban airfields, and Soviet antisubmarine
warfare (ASW) aircraft may possibly begin to do so as well. The
Soviets may have already improved their maintenance capabili-
ties in Cuba to support such aircraft.
- Cuban ports, particularly the new site at Punta Movida in
Cienfuegos Bay, will probably be used for visits by Soviet ships,
including conventionally powered submarines and cruise-mis-
sile-armed surface combatants. The Soviets have frequently
included such ships in their Caribbean deployments. In the
future they might send larger ships on such visits to Cuba or the
vicinity-ships such as a Kiev-class aircraft carrier or a Moskva
helicopter ship.
13. Two other categories of Soviet submarines-nuclear-powered
attack and diesel-powered ballistic missile submarines-raise more
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complicated issues.
Although a 1970
understanding between Washington and Moscow prohibits Soviet
nuclear submarines from calling at Cuban ports for "servicing,"
occasional port visits are not barred. Depending in part on their
assessment of the expected US reaction, the Soviets may well include
submarines of this type in future deployments to Cuba.
14. Moscow may seek to test US reactions by staging such visits in
an ambiguous fashion designed ultimately to provide these submarines
with operational support.
15. Nuclear Basing. The Soviets no longer have an important
military requirement to establish a strategic nuclear capability in Cuba,
such as they attempted to do in 1962, or to base ballistic missile
submarines there. We believe it highly improbable that the Soviets will
attempt to base strategic weapon systems or nuclear warheads in Cuba
in the future, even under the assumption that the USSR retained control
of the weapons and denied them to the Cubans. The Soviets probably
believe that such a move would lead to a US-Soviet confrontation.
16. Soviet Modernization of Cuban Forces. The logic and
momentum of the Soviet weapons deliveries to Cuba over the past year
or so suggest that new weapons are likely to follow. Soviet arms
deliveries to Cuba since 1975 have stressed modernization, and the
Soviets probably assume that the Cuban military forces can be
improved in measured ways without incurring a strong US reaction.
- Short of introducing delivery systems that they acknowledge to
be nuclear weapons carriers, the Soviets are unlikely to be
deterred from providing modern weapons to Cuba solely
because the United States might consider such actions
inconsistent with the spirit of the 1962 understanding. If
challenged on the basis of the understanding, the Soviets would
likely reiterate their adherence to it, as they did last year in
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 To ere
denying that MIG-23s were relevant to the 1962 understanding.
The Soviets would probably resist any US effort to define more
precisely the scope of the understanding, preferring to retain
the freedom of action and flexibility provided by existing
ambiguities.
- The Soviets will further improve Cuba's Air Force with
additional shipments of MIG-21s and possibly MIG-23s. The
delivery of MIG-25 Foxbats is less probable but cannot be ruled
out. They could be regarded as a deterrent to US aerial
surveillance.
- The USSR will provide Cuba with additional conventionally
powered submarines and may also give Havana ASW aircraft as
well as additional missile boats. These arms will gradually but
not dramatically improve Cuban naval capability in the
Western Hemisphere.
- We believe it even more unlikely that the Soviets would provide
the Cubans with nuclear weapons than that they would
introduce them into Cuba under Soviet control. Such provision
of nuclear weapons to Cuba would give Havana a degree of
independence and leverage vis-a-vis the USSR that would be
unacceptable to Moscow and could entrap the USSR in an
unwanted crisis with the United States.
17. Intervention Abroad. In Africa, participation in the Angolan
and Ethiopian wars has been, on balance, sufficiently successful from
the viewpoint of Moscow and Havana to make them more inclined to
exploit new opportunities if they arise. If invited by one or more of the
so-called Frontline States,3 Cuba-with Soviet backup-would probably
send troops to help those states defend their territory against Rhodesian
or South African strikes. More direct Cuban-much less Soviet-
ground combat involvement in Rhodesia is less likely.
18. However, if an appropriate opportunity should present itself in
another area, the USSR and Cuba are likely to choose to intervene as
long as a direct Western response was unlikely, the military and
political prospects were favorable, and the action could be portrayed as
a legitimate response to a beleaguered government.
19. The prospects for large-scale Soviet-Cuban military operations
in the Middle East over the next few years will be limited-although
not precluded-by (a) the Arabs' strong nationalism and their suspicions
of Soviet intentions, (b) the Soviet-Cuban perception that the risk of
adverse Western reaction, including a potential for confrontation with
the United States, is greater in the Middle East than in Africa, and (c)
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the presence of large, well-trained, well-armed indigenous forces in the
area. Such factors would tend to make large-scale Cuban-Soviet
intervention on the Angolan-Ethiopian model appear more costly than
was the case in Africa and more uncertain of success. Nevertheless,
these inhibiting factors will not restrain additional Soviet-Cuban
support-indirect and on a smaller scale-for revolutionary groups in
the area.
20. The Grenada coup and the ouster of Somoza in Nicaragua
have heightened Cuban and Soviet interest in the eastern Caribbean
and Central America and will likely spur, Havana and Moscow to
greater activity in the region. Cuba's ties with Jamaica raise the
possibility that the government of that country might request a Cuban
military presence to guarantee survival against domestic opposition or to
provide protection against a third country. In Nicaragua, Cuban arms
shipments and tactical guidance provided by a small number of Cuban
military advisers operating out of Costa Rica played a decisive role in
helping the Sandinistas oust the Somoza regime. The Cubans were
careful, however, to coordinate their efforts with other governments in
the region in order to minimize the risk of a US and hemispheric
reaction.
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