PROBABLE REACTIONS TO THE POSITIONING OF US COMBAT FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND THAILAND

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000700020003-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 11, 2005
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: April 28, 1961
• Content Type: MF

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TS#312298
C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
28 April 1961
DRAFT
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: Probable Reactions to the Positioning of US Combat
Forces in South Vietnam and Thailand
10 Bloc leaders would probably be initially' uncertain as
to the ultimate US intent in positioning its combat forces in
Thailand and South Vietnam, but if these forces did not very
soon thereafter intervene in Laos, they would probably consider
that the US was prepared to accept the loss of much or-all of
Laos, and that the mission of the US forces was limited to
denying the Communists further gains in the Thailand-Indochina
area, In any event, they would probably anticipate that these
US actions would not necessitate a halt to the further Communist
absorption of much of Laos, and would probably remain confident
that Viet Cong subversion of South Vietnam could continue even
in the presence of US troc;ps there. Moreover, they would probably
expect, we believe correctly, that there would be a generally
adverse world reaction to those US moves, especially with respect
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to South Vietnam, and that the Bloc could derive considerable
advantages from exploiting these reactions through largely
political and propaganda means, We do not believe that the
Bloc would respond to the US actions by major military action,
at least initially,
20 We continue to believe that the Bloc effort in Laos
has not been motivated as much by regard for the outcome in
Laos itself., as by confidence that events in Laos would ulti-
mately result in a sharp prestige defeat of the US, world-wide)
and a reduction of Free World confidence in its leaderships
Bloc leaders would probably consider that the US could be
humiliated if it did not quickly intervene in Laos and in the
final analysis acquiesced in the collapse of Laos by PL pressures
and Bloc diplomatic flim-f lam. Communist leaders would probably
consider that a general continuance of present PL tactics in
Laos would carry relatively little risk of greatly expanded
hostilities, and would almost certainly order such pressures
to continue, confident that the FAL-RLG, without major US
intervention in Laos, would soon collapsed Bloc leaders would
probably also be confident that, if the US ultimately did
intervene in Laos, there would be not much left to save except
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a few towns along the Mekongj, and that the Bloc could fall back
on a cease-fire and an international conference -- with most of
Laos in hand,, and with the US at odds with much of the world?
3. Communist concern and response would be much sharper
concerning the US forces in South Vietnam than in the case of
Thailand. There would be heavy political and propaganda play
in both cases. Concerning South Vietnam, the Bloc would charge
that the US had contravened the 1954 Geneva Accords by introducing
its forces., and would seek UN and international condemnation of
this "lawlessness." Communist China and the DRV would be
especially concerned about the presence of US combat forces in
neighboring South Vietnam., and would almost certainly make a
strong response. We believe., however, that this response would
be limited, at least initially, to dire threats., political action,,
and heightened support of Viet Cong terrorist activities. Bloc
leaders would probably consider that the subversion of South
Vietnam had boon made more difficult by the US action, and that
DRV stiffening of the Viet Cong must not become so extreme as
to risk US military retaliation against Hanoi. Nevertheless..
Moscow,, Peiping, and Hanio would probably not be convinced that
the US action threatened the Viet Cong, and would probably direct
it to continue and if possible accelerate its activities, testing
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whether US forces would prove more formidable enemies than were
the French.
I, Non-Communist reactions to the positioning of US
troops in Thailand and South Vietnam would vary greatly, The
neutralist nations of the Afro-Asian group would be highly
critical of the moves even though the leaders of some of them
might see some advantage to their nationas security in such a
specific US commit ma~,' to hold the line against further
Communist advances in Southeast Asiao The SEATO countries would
probably welcome the moves and some of them might be willing
to contribute token forces to a standing SEATO garrison. There
would be many world leaders,, however, who would criticize the
positioning of US troops in Thailand and South Vietnam as pro-
vocative and as a gesture of little significance in helping
those two countries to meet the primary Communist throats of
subversion and infiltration,
59 Prime Minister Sarit would probably welcome US troops
as evidence of serious US intentions to defend Thailand against
Communist aggression, However, there would probably be strong
adverse reactions from some elements of the Thai public and
governmento US troops stationed in Thailand would make more
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In Thai policy toward the
difficult any future adjustments
Bloc, a situation many Thai loaders would fool inopportune in
the aftermath of a Communist take--over in Laos-
6o Vietnamese leaders would probably be relieved, on the
one handy that forceful us assistance was at hand,, but concerned
on the other that this action might complicate the GVNia efforts
to gain greater political support of the country-side over the
might
long run, and, in time,/lead either to further Communist gains
or to a virtual US protectorate. The GRC would consider the
US actions to be too little and too late, would be concerned
for future US ttretroatstt at its expense) and would increase its
calls on the US to escape calamity by sharply increased support
of the GRC and its Policies-
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