THE SITUATION IN GUATEMALA*

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000800020008-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 12, 2005
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: May 19, 1962
• Content Type: MF

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE A G E N C Y
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
19 May 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: The Situation in Guatemala*
1. President Ydigoras has apparently weathered his worst
political crisis to date, but popular dissatisfaction with his
administration remains high and the odds on his ability to serve
out the remaining two years of his term are no better than even.
2. Ydigoras= resignation was demanded by three political
parties ranging from the non-Communist loft to he far right, but
the situation was rendered critical by rioting led by Communist--
inspired student groups. These disturbances have subsided, but
will probably recur if, as seems likely, Ydigoras takes no effective
action to reform his administration.
The substance of this
memorandum has boon discussed with 001
and DDP.
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3. The military now support Ydigoras, but without much con-
viction and mainly because no agreeable alternative is in sight.
Rather than cope with new public disorders, they might depose him
in favor of his constitutionally designated successor or of a
temporary military junta.
L. In any case, the present dissatisfaction with the Ydigoras
regime has favored the leftward political trend in Guatemala. The
Communists profit from this effect. Although their number is
small, they have shown themselves adept in seizing at least temporary
leadership of antiregime agitation and demonstrations.
DISC ITSS ION
5. The recent crisis began in March, with student demonstrations
in the capital city denouncing fraud in the December congressional
elections. Communist agitators quickly transformed these demon-
strations into serious riots. Ydigoras? security forces restored
order, but police brutality provoked widespread popular revulsion
and demands for the Presidentrs repignation. The deaths of several
students in early April, after a clash with military police, rekindled
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the crisis. Until recently, the three main non-Communist opposition
parties, along with some professional, labor, and student groups,
persisted in demands for Ydigoras to step down.
6. Since late 1961, small guerrilla groups have been operating
in the countryside. These groups are Communist-influenced and
have received some financial assistance from Cuba and from exiles
in Mexico. They do not constitute an immediate threat to Ydigoras,
but their potential for causing serious trouble will grow if dis-
affection in the cities continues to increase.
7. The present trouble is rooted in the many grievances
against Ydigoras which have accumulated since he was elected in
1958, and reflects a generally leftward trend in Guatemala. By
Latin American standards, Ydigoras has run a relatively democratic
government, but he has failed to provide vigorous and constructive
leadership and is generally held responsible for the country's lack
of momentum and progress in recent years. The President has
aroused bitter criticism by permitting extensive graft and cor-
ruption from which he and his family and, friends obviously and
abundantly benefit. His own salary and perquisites are thought
to be excessive. He has made enemies across the political spectrum,
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many of them members of groups which he has chosen to use at one
time or another and subsequently cast aside. Many politicians
no longer consider the President trustworthy.
8. The major political opposition to the President comes from
three non-Communist parties: the moderate leftist Revolutionary
Party, the small Christian Democratic Party, and the rightist
National Liberation Movement. These parties have no overall leader-
ship or program for golernment, but work together in a loose
alliance based solely on their mutual desire to remove Ydigoras
from power. Only the Revolutionary Party commands any considerable
popular support; it may be Guatemalats largest. The success of
these parties in stimulating popular disaffection owes much to the
parallel agitation carried out by the small Communist groups.
9. The Communist Guatemalan Labor Party is insignificant in
numbers -- some one thousand out of Guatemalats population of four
million. However, Ydigoras, despite, his strong stand against
international communism, has allowed the local Communists considerable
freedom of action, as competitors to the leftist Revolutionary
Party, which he regards as a more serious threat to his regime.
Nevertheless, in the recent disorders the Communists came out
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against Ydigoras and proved themselves able to seize at least
temporary leadership of agitation involving students and labor
unions.
10. The President is not without important political assets.
The two parties supporting him -- his own National Democratic
Reconciliation Party and what is left of the late Castillo Armast
political organization -- control nearly two-thirds of the seats
in the legislature. Ydigoras is a shrewd and experienced politician
who can make clever use of divide-and-rule tactics. He is aware
of the fundamental differences among the three opposition parties.
He is probably counting on playing them off against each other,
and also on their growing fear of the local Communists. Moreover,
Ydigoras continues to command considerable p_;pularity among the
peasants. Although he has not called on his machete wielding
adherents in recent months -- probably to avoid antagonizing the
security forces -- he can still do so.
11. Ydigorasi greatest asset at the moment is the continued
support of the military. They are not so much sold on the President
as fearful of what might transpire if he were to go. Like other
Latin American military establishments, they would probably act
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forcefully to prevent a Communist takeover. Although the Guatemalan
armed forces did support the Communist-infiltrated regime of
President Arbcnz, the present leaderst awareness of what Castro
did to the professional officer corps in Cuba must weigh heavily
in their thinking.
12. Ydigoras has adamantly refused to resign. For a while
he sought to placate the opposition by promising governmental
reform and by offering them a place in his administration. This
attempt failed. The President thereupon filled all but one
cabinet post with officers from the armed' forces. In order to
restore civilian government, a group of nonpartisan professional
and business leaders then offered to participate in the cabinet
in return for Ydigorast pledge to reduce graft and corruption, to
improve administrative efficiency, to undertake measures aimed
at economic and social progress, and to initiate a strong anti-
Communist campaign. Ydigoras agreed to this proposal, but it
has not been implemented, mainly because the nonpartisans have not
yet been able to agree among themselves rogarding the composition
of a cabinet. Meanwhile, the military are becoming fond of their
cabinet positions and probably reluctant to relinquish them.
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13. The recent agitation has now subsided -- probably because
the opposition parties desire to avoid outright military suppres-
sion. The opposition remains convinced that it could win a free
election and desirous of getting rid of Ydigoras before the next
election is held. If, as now seems likely, Ydigoras should fail
to reform his administration, he would also antagonize the nonpartisans
now willing to support him. Although the non-Communist opposition
is now worried by the Communistst assumption of leadership in
the recent Cisorc+ors, they would probably seize any opportunity
presented by continuing popular dissatisfaction to make another
attempt to unseat Ydigoras. The Communists, for their part, will
certainly be alert to exploit the existing situation to foment
new disorders.
14. Thus the prospect is for continued plotting, new demon-
strations, and further violence. Ydigoras may react by resorting
to more repressive measures than he has in the past, and in so
doing he may retain military backing at least for a while. However,
his chances of lasting out his term are probably no better than
even. The chances for new crisis like the recent one will be
enhanced by the political tensions likely to accompany preparations
for the national elections scheduled for late next year.
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15. Ydigoras is not likely to be directly overthrown by
violent revolution, but a renewal of serious public disorder might
lead the military to conclude that it would be more dangerous to
uphold the President than to depose him. In that case, the military
might sot up a provisional junta in which control was shared with
a few civilians. There is a good chance, however, that they would
let Ydigorast legal successor, Colonel Ernesto Molina Arreaga,*
take office, exercising control from the background. This solution,
following the Argentine example, would enable the successor govern-
ment to claim compliance with the constitution, having in mind
the importance of this consideration in relation to US aid. Leader-
ship of the non-Communist opposition would probably approve of this
solution in that -- if the law were complied with it would
provide for national elections within four months.
16. The outlook for Guatemala under a provisional government
headed by Molina would not be bright, though it would probably be
better than under a junta. Before the euphoria of change had worn
off, pulling and hauling among civilian and military leaders would
In March of each year the President calls upon the Congress to
approve of two new -"presidential designates"" from a list of four
names which he has selected. The first is Molina, the second,
Ruben Flores Avendano, a former president of the Congress.
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probably produce an extremely unstable situation such as that which
obtained in 1957 after the assassination of President Castillo Armas.
17. Former President Juan Jose Arevalo would figure prominently
in such a situation. He was elected. President following the over-
throw of the Ubieo dictatorship in 1944, served a full term, and
was succeeded by Jacobo Arbenz. Arevalo is still greatly respected
by many Guatemalans as a symbol of the Revolution of 1944 and its
promise of political and social reform. In recent years Arevalo
has disassociated himself from the Communist-ridden Arbenz regime
and has come out strongly against Fidel Castro, with whom Arbenz
is now allied. However, despite this stand against communism,
he has persisted in maintaining personal relations with individual
Communists whose reformist zeal he admires. Arevalo will again
become legally eligible to the Presidency in March 1963. If he
should be returned to power, his second administration would
certainly be strongly nationalist and socialist, but perhaps more
on guard against Communist infiltration than was the first.
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:
25X1
SFIERMAN KENT
Chairrlan
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