NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A030200010111-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 1, 2006
• Sequence Number: 111
• Publication Date: August 8, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

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CIA-RDP79T00975AO302000nQ~ Secret 219
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Access to this document will be restricted to
those approved for the following specific activities:
Monday August 8, 1977 CG NIDC 77-183C
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
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To Secret 25X1
State Dept. review completed p
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National Intelliaence Daily Cable for Monday, 8 Auaust 1977
.or e purpose or intorming
senior officials.
USSR-SOMALIA-ETHIOPIA: Report
Page 1
FRANCE: Left Common Program
UK: Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing
USSR: Energy Production Slows Down
Page 7
Page 9
Page 10
Page 12
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USSR-SOMALIA-ETHIOPIA: Report
I I Soviet Ambassador to Somalia Samsonov told a US of-
ficial late last week that the USSR, in accordance with previous
agreements, is continuing to supply Somalia with arms and had
not reduced the number of military advisers in Somalia.
The Soviet ambassador admitted that Soviet support
for Ethiopia and the undeclared war in the Ogaden are causing
problems for the USSR in its dealings with Somalia. The Somalis,
said Samsonov, see the Ethiopian revolution as more tribal than
Marxist while the Soviets think it is a victory for socialism
in an important part of Africa. The Soviet ambassador stressed
that the USSR would continue to support the regime of Chairman
Mengistu in Ethiopia for this reason.
Samsonov asserted that Somali-Soviet relations, for
the most part, are on track. He noted that social, political
and cultural exchanges and collaboration between Somalia and
the USSR are continuing without interruption. The ambassador
emphasized that Somalia is a socialist country and, in an
obvious reference to recent Saudi Arabian aid credits to the
Somalis, Arab money would not change this.
The ambassador denied knowing of any recent Soviet
attempts to mediate the Ethiopian-Somali conflict. He was
pessimistic about the chances of any such mediation efforts,
however, arguing that the Ethiopians are as determined to
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save the Ogaden as the Somalis are to take it. He further
denied that the Soviets could bring any real pressure on the
Somalis to stop their actions in the Ogaden.
In general, Samsonov's remarks betray a growing So-
viet recognition of their predicament in the Horn of Africa.
Although apparently aware that continued support for Mengistu
could lead to a rupture in Somali-Soviet relations, the Soviets
nonetheless appear to be taking comfort in Somalia's commit-
ment to socialism and, more important, its dependence on the
USSR. In the meantime, Moscow is continuing its attempts to
mediate the conflict.
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FRANCE: Left Common Program
Socialist leader Mitterrand, in two recent inter-
views, tried to strike a balance between the demands of So-
cialist ideology and responsible pragmatism. He noted that,
although the Socialists; would never go back on their decision
eventually to renounce nuclear weapons, the nuclear force should
be kept in its present state until multilateral disarmament ar-
rangements render it unnecessary. In a suggestion that many
viewed as a sign of indecisiveness, he proposed that the French
people make the final decision on the nuclear force, probably
in a referendum.
I The proposal was immediately denounced as unconstitu?-
iona y both President Giscard and Communist, leader Marchais,
who also accused Mitterrand of "weakening the left" by his pro-
posal.
In an oblique reference to NATO, he expressed doubt
about the deterrent value of a nuclear force independent of
"other arrangements." Defense autonomy based solely on the nu-
clear deterrent would result, Mitterrand said., in a "nuclear
Maginot line."
Although the Communists pay lip service to French
presence in the Atlantic alliance, many Socialists are con-
vinced that Communist demands for an independent nuclear force
and an "omnidirectional." defense posture are motivated by an
essentially neutralist attitude designed to pull France out of
the Alliance; Mitterrand and most Socialists are committed to
the Alliance.
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Despite Communist pressures, Mitterrand has evidently
decided that his party will not definitely resolve its position
on the nuclear defense issue until December 11 at a special
Socialist convention on defense. Mitterrand's views probably
will prevail at the convention, although he will be opposed by
a significant minority of Socialists who argue that the nuclear
force is immoral, ineffective, and not in the pacifist tradi-
tion of Socialism.
I IMitterrand also probably will be able to impose most
of his defense views on the Communists. Some of their demands--
such as a defense strategy not aimed only at the East and a
"collegial" responsibility for the use of the nuclear strike
force--are clearly bargaining chips and probably will be dropped.
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UK: Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing
//British authorities are conducting public hear-
?-nge on a proposed nuclear fuel reprocessing facility on. the
northwest coast of England. The matter has become a maj.:,r
test involving energy policy, civil rights, and environmental
politics, as well as foreign exchange earnings.//
//The hearings, which will last at least until
mI - c o er, will consider local, national, and international
implications of the planned construction. The final decision
on the plant, however, rests with the secretary of state for
the environment.//
//British Nuclear Fuels Ltd. submitted its appli-
cation at the end of last year. The local county council ap-
proved plans for expanding the existing plant at Windscale,
which reprocesses natural uranium fuel from British reactors,
and for developing an encapsulating technique to store nuclear
wastes. Under pressure from numerous special interest groups,
however, the council called a public inquiry into the applica-
tion to build a new oxide reprocessing plant at the site.//
//This plant is designed to handle 1,200 tons per
year o spent fuel from reactors using enriched uranium. About
half the capacity of the plant, which is scheduled for comple-
tion in he late 1980s, would be used to reprocess spent fuel
from Britain's advanced gas-cooled reactors. The other half
would reprocess fuel from other countries.//
//The nuclear firm stands to earn more than. $1
1. ion .rom reprocessing spent fuels from foreign countries
if the plant goes into operation. The company has already nego-
tiated a tentative $700-million contract to reprocess 1,640
tons of spent fuel from Japan during the 1980s. The Japanese
halve agreed to the British request for an advance payment of
$260 million, enough to cover more than a quarter of the new
facility's development costs.//
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//The broad and well-organized opposition to the
plant inc u es members of Parliament, scientists, environment-
alists, and even the British Council of Churches. The opponents
argue that:
--Reprocessing of spent fuels is not necessary.
--The plant would be uneconomic.
--Plutonium separation would encourage nuclear prolifera-
tion.
--Inadequate provision is made for disposal of highly
radioactive waste.//
//British Nuclear Fuels has cleared the first
major hurdle in its efforts to expand the Windscale facilities.
During the first seven weeks of the inquiry the firm presented
its case. The opposition was unable to make any substantial
points although it did successfully attack the company's safety
record.//
//The judge leading the inquiry has shown dis-
pleasure wi the opposition's inability to substantiate some
of its claims, which probably has damaged the opposition's
credibilit . The opposition will present its case late this
month. 25X1
USSR: Energy Production Slows Down
Soviet production of energy from major fossil fuels
rose 4.7 percent in the first six months of this year, somewhat
less than the 6.2-percent growth rate achieved during the first
halves of 1975 and 1976. Crude oil production is 5.2 percent
above the first half of 1976, but is running about 1 to 2 miZ-
Zion tons behind the rate required to meet the annual plan.
Natural gas output is rising faster than planned and is likely
to exceed its target by 4 to 6 billion cubic meters. Coal pro-
duction grew by only one half the planned rate and may fall
short of the 1977 target by as much as 10 million tons.
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I Almost all of the increase in oil production is coming
from Wes Siberia. Output in Central Asia and in some of the
older producing regions--Azerbaydzhan, Ukraine, and North Cau-
causus--is falling and is a major cause of the overall slower
growth rate. Much of this year's success depends on the con-
tinued growth in output, from the Samotlor field in West Siberia.
I The Soviet gas industry, on the other hand, achieved
a record performance during the first half of 1977, with output
rising 8 percent compared to the 6.5 percent planned rate. Bar-
ring unforeseen setbacks, production this year will reach 346
to 348 billion cubic meters, slightly above the planned goal.
If the strong performance of 1976 and 1977 continues, the USSR
could come close to reaching its production goal of 435 billion
cubic meters in 1980.
Starting in 1.978, most additions to gas production
will have to come from the giant Urengoy field and smaller
neighboring fields in northern Tyumen Oblast. Reserves in the
area are plentiful, but. recent reports indicate that serious
supply bottlenecks and construction delays are hampering Uren-
goy's development and could lead to slower-than-planned pro-
duction growth.
I ICoal production increased only 1.5 percent during the
first six months of this year. The two largest producing basins,
the Donetsk and Kuznetsk, were reported to be behind in deliv-
eries, and output at several other locations was apparently be-
low potential. This poor performance was attributed in Soviet 25X1
publications to various. managerial problems. No mention has
been made of the difficult geological conditions or shortages
of rail cars that hampered the industry last year.
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Jamshid Amouzegar, formerly Iran's minister of state
and principal international petroleum negotiator, was appointed
prime minister yesterday to succeed Amir Abass Hoveyda, who had
held the post since 1965. Hoveyda has been appointed minister
of court.
Hoveyda's departure had been widely rumored in Tehran
for years but has intensified in recent weeks. His removal was
probably intended to mute serious public complaints about
chronic electric power and commodity shortages.
The Shah, who ordered the change of prime ministers,
remains in full control. of Iran's foreign and. domestic policies.
The appointment of the US-educated Amouzegar, who has headed
the nation's only political party since last October, does not
presage basic change in Iran's national and international
policy. an
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