NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A030300010022-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 7, 2006
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: August 23, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

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Tuesday August 23, 1977 CG NIDC 77-196C
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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Tuesday, August 23, 1977.
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T e NID Cable is for t o purpose o in orming
senior US officials.
SYRIA: Countering Corruption Charges
ROMANIA-ISRAEL: Begin's Bucharest Visit
INDIA: Desai's Travel Itenerary
POLAND: Rumored Personnel Changes
CHINA: Hua's Congressional Speech
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SYRIA: Countering Corruption Charges
I Syrian President Asad has taken steps to neutralize
omen tc criticism of his regime. Asad attacked corruption and
government inefficiency Late Last week in a major televised
speech before the opening session of the newly elected Syrian
People's Assembly and assigned the ruling Baath party the job
of dealing with these problems.
To underscore his concern, Asad announced the establish-
ment 51--a special committee to investigate charges of corrup-
tion. The step follows closely the promulgation of several new
economic decrees ostensibly designed to crack down on graft
and prevent shortages in basic staples. As a personal gesture
demonstrating his own probity, Asad also donated some inherited
land and a house he owns in Damascus to the state.
Many observers expect Asad to follow soon with long-
expec.e cabinet changes. Prime Minister Khulayfawi, who has
already submitted his resignation, will probably be replaced
by Naji Jamil, deputy defense minister and a close crony of
Asad.
grievances appears to have been prompted in part by the surpris-
ingly low turnout--perhaps as few as 11 percent of eligible
voters--at the recent parliamentary election. Some members of
the President's inner circle reportedly are disturbed by the
voters' apathy and fear that it represents serious discontent
with the regime's handling of the economy.
Asad's decision to deal publicly with these popular
I INone of the President's moves appears to have much
substance. Instead, they seem designed primarily to undercut
the efforts by his opponents to capitalize on popular dissatis-
faction over economic conditions and government corruption. The
special investigative committee, for example, is to be headed
by a close associate of Rifaat Asad, the President's notoriously
corrupt brother.
The palliatives are unlikely to still public discon-
tent for long. Asad will have to demonstrate that he is pre-
pared to put his personal prestige behind the fight against
corruption and efforts to improve the government's economic
performance.
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That will be difficult for Asad to do without alienat-
g sUMU-of his most important supporters. Although Asad has
diligently sought to avoid the appearance of using his office
for self-aggrandizement, he has condoned the corrupt practices
of his brother and many of his supporters to ensure their con-
tinued loyalty.
At best, therefore, Asad may encourage some of his
senior o icials to follow his example by divesting themselves
of some of their property and attempt to put a damper on some
of Rifaat's activities. But it is doubtful that he or Naji
Jamil--should Jamil become prime minister--will undertake a
thorough house cleaning. Neither will it be easy politically
for Asad to take the necessary measures to dampen inflation
and improve government efficiency without actually increasing
popular discontent.
ROMANIA-ISRAEL: Begin's Bucharest Visit
//Israe Zi Prime Minister Begin arrives in Ro-
mania on Thursday for an official state visit marking the first
high-level contact between Romania and Israel since 1972. Ro-
mania is the only Warsaw Pact member that has diplomatic rela-
tions with Israel. President Ceausescu will view the trip as a
vindication of his efforts to maintain friendly contacts with
all sides in the Middle East dispute and of Romania's inde-
pendent policies in general.//
//The Israeli ambassador in Bucharest told US
p oma s a the visit will focus on the Middle East and on
Jewish emigration to Israel. Begin will hold extended private
talks with Ceausescu and will meet with members of Romania's
Jewish community. The Israeli leader will also attend Sabbath
services at a synagogue in Bucharest.//
]//Ceausescu will probably offer his "good of-
fices as a conciliator in Israel's dispute with the Arab states.
Romania has good relations with the Arabs--including the Pal-
estine Liberation Organization, which maintains a liaison of-
fice in Bucharest. Even if Begin declines the offer, Ceausescu
will still be able to relay the Israeli viewpoint to Romania's
Arab friends--and to the Soviets.//
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//Bucharest has a mixed record on Jewish emigra-
tion. According to the census figures of January 1977, Romania's
Jewish community numbers 25,700. This figure is presumably un-
derstated; the official Israeli estimate is 60,000. Despite
their restrictive emigration policies, the Romanians negotiated,
a "gentleman's agreement" with the Israelis early this year
to allow 3,000 Romanian Jews to leave for Israel during 1977.
From January to July, however, only 600 to 700 persons actually
departed--perhaps half the 1976 rate. The Begin visit may spur
Ceausescu to accelerate the flow.//
I uIn 1967, when the USSR and its other allies broke re-
lations with Israel following the Middle East War, Romania re-
fused to follow suit despite Soviet pressure. This caused a
number of Arab states to break relations with Romania. Rela-
tions with the Arabs were gradually restored, but Romania con-
tinued to import Iranian oil through a pipeline across Israel.
Certain Romanian enterprises were put on the Arab boycott list
in August 1975 and remained on it for about a year.
I I Romania persists in its "balanced" Middle East policy.
is a strong advocate of Israel's right to exist as a sepa-
rate nation but also supports a Palestinian "national state."
Ceausescu evidently believes that relations with Israel will
bolster his independent foreign policy, and he probably also
expects that his stand will win some points in US eyes.
Ceausescu's decision to meet with Begin is in keeping
with a somewhat more independent tone that has crept into Ro-
manian-Soviet relations since early July. For over a year, Ro-
mania had attempted to minimize public differences with the So-
viets. Last month, however, Ceausescu broke ranks with the
other Warsaw Pact countries and cautiously defended Spanish
Communist Party chief Carrillo following Moscow's unprecedented
attack on him in June. Ceausescu received Carrillo in Romania
in late July, and the two independent-minded leaders reiterated
their belief in the principles of party autonomy and noninter-
ference in internal affairs.
I IA series of articles highlighting Romania's foreign
policy as begun to appear in the Romanian press, and in mid-
August Ceausescu saw visiting Italian Communist Party official
Pajetta for "warm and friendly" talks on the communist move-
ment.
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INDIA: Desai's Travel Itenerary
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Indian Prime Minister Desai plans to travel to the
USSR and US this fall; he appears anxious to demonstrate the
even-handed, nonaligned policy of his governs nt.
Desai expects to visit Washington in October or Novem-
ber. It will be the first visit of an Indian prime minister
since November 1971--just prior to the India-Pakistan war and
the subsequent low point in Indo-US relations. The Prime Min-
ister obviously hopes the visit will give impetus to his re-
cent moves toward improved relations with the US.
I The relationship with the USSR, however, is still of
primary importance to Desai's government. To reassure the
USSR of India's continued good will, Desai plans to hold wide-
ranging discussions with Brezhnev in September before his trip
to Washington.
Defense Minister Ram will make a separate visit to the
USSR, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany in September on what is
presumably an arms-shopping mission.
POLAND: Rumored Personnel Changes
IThEe Polish rumor mill has predicted Jaroszewicz's
fall since the June 1976 riots over proposed price increases.
In fact, the longer the economic malaise continues, the greater
will be the pressure for political change. Changes in the
government lineup could be announced during one of the fall
sessions of the parliament--the first of which will be held
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late next month. Party shifts could be announced at the second
party conference--a mini-party congress scheduled for early
next year.
Of the two leaders, Gierek is the more secure. He was
not blamed personally by the public for the price proposals
and seems to be generally viewed as the most acceptable party
politician. He has no obvious rivals for his job. We believe
that the rumors about Gierek's future are overly pessimistic.
Unless there is a repetition of widespread rioting, it is un-
likely that he could be forced out of office.
//Jaroszewicz's status is less certain. He
was ame or e price proposals and is unpopular because of
his long-time association with the Soviets. More important,
there is a widespread belief that the government remains un-
able to meet consumer demands or to get a handle on severe for-
eign trade problems.
and he has been very active this spring and summer. Gierek
would have to convince Moscow that removal of the trusted Prime
Minister is required for economic and political stability.//
//Jaroszewicz's early replacement is not a
oregone conclusion. He managed to keep his job after the riots,
be the leading candidate to become prime minister. Olszowski,
a former foreign minister, became a party secretary and Gierek's
principal adviser on economic matters at a Central Committee
plenum last December.//
//If there is to be a change, most sources
assert that Central Committee Secretary Stefan Olszowski would
//Olszowski is reported to be a good manager,
brig an, aggressive, and has promoted Gierek's pragmatic po-
litical and economic policies.
e appears to nave a goo
re a ions ip wi e ovie s; is was demonstrated in March
when he was received by General Secretary Brezhnev.//
I Olszowski's nomination would probably be opposed by
some officials within the economic establishment because of
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CHINA: Hua's Congressional Speech
I Chinese party Chairman Hua Kuo-feng, in a wide-rang-
ing po icy address to the 11th Party Congress that was made
public yesterday, stressed the need for unity and increased
agricultural and industrial production. He also reiterated
China's opposition to the USSR and its interest in improved
relations with the US. The themes are familiar ones, but do-
mestic issues have not been treated in so comprehensive or
authoritative a fashion since the Cultural Revolution.
I The speech, which seemed to contain something for
almost everyone, will doubtless be well received. Its principal
importance may be as an indicator of how much the Chinese po-
litical situation has improved since the purge of the left.
At the 10th Party Congress in 1973, then Premier Chou En-lai,
who was the consumate Chinese politician, could do little more
than repeat slogans.
I lAfter lavishly praising Mao Tse-tung's contributions
to Marxism, Hua cleared Mao of all ties to the purged leftist
leaders. Hua asserted that Mao had actually led the opposition
to the "gang of four" and that he had worked closely with Hua
and recently rehabilitated party Vice Chairman Teng Hsiao-ping
to prevent the gang from seizing power. Mao, in fact, often
protected the leftists and acquiesced in Teng's fall in 1976.
Hua's fiction is vital because it enables the new
leadership to claim Mao's mantle but discard those aspects of
his legacy that run counter to the pragmatic, moderate policies
favored by the new Central Committee.
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Hua stoutly defended veteran party cadre, many of
whom had been criticized by Mao or branded enemies of the party
by the leftists. The new Central Committee and Politburo are
dominated by these old party bureaucrats and professional mili-
tary men. The Party Chairman went to great lengths to show that
they had been wrongly accused and that their return to power
does not violate Mao's wishes. The presence of so many old party
hands on the Central Committee and Politburo is likely to dis-
please younger party members who have labored at lower levels
for years and who loyally withstood the blandishments of the
gang of four.
Unity and stability were the overriding themes of the
domestic section of Hua's speech. He indicated that the new
leadership will not tolerate the disorder that characterized
the last decade. He repeatedly called for greater party disci-
pline and warned of harsh treatment for those who break the
law.
Hua announced a wide-ranging "screening" of gang of
four supporters, but seemed to subordinate this work to increas-
ing industrial and agricultural production. He also stated that
the investigations must be completed by the end of this year or
early next, and that purges should be kept to a minimum.
In conjunction with the campaign against leftist sup-
porters, a "rectification campaign" in the party will be launched
later this year. Among other things, it will apparently review
the cases of those party members who have suffered at the hands
of the leftists.
I Hua broke no real new ground when he discussed eco-
nomic policy. He did suggest that professional managers and ex-
perts will be given more leeway to run their enterprises as long
as they remain within the national economic plan. He treaded
lightly when addressing worker demands for higher wages and bet-
ter living conditions by repeating the standard line that worker
benefits would increase as production rises. Hua did not discuss
the role foreign trade will play in expanding production, but
the new Central Committee contains many advocates of increased
imports of foreign technology.
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Military themes also received standard treatment
.
Hua stressed the party's absolute control over the military,
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and at one point repeated Mao's admonition to senior military
commanders not to abuse their authority. He called for the
modernization of the army, but made it clear that defense in-
dustries would not get priority over agriculture and basic
heavy industry.
I IHua strongly endorsed a relaxation of the strict
limitations the leftists placed on education and the arts and
sciences. Hua made it clear that intellectuals had been wronged
by the leftists and indicated that China intends to draw on
the intellectuals' expertise, even if many of them lack a
thorough understanding of politics.
,
most authoritative response so far to Albania's recent public
criticism of China. While he did not mention Albania by name,
it was obvious that Hua had it in mind when, citing Mao and
Lenin, he defended China's opening to the US. Those who fail
to understand the strategic advantages of temporary alliances
with erstwhile enemies, Hua said, "fail to understand even a
particle of Marxism."
Hua's remarks on Chinese foreign policy included no
although his backhanded swipe at Albania was the
surprises
The Party Chairman reiterated Peking's interest in
improved relations with the US, and sharply criticized the
USSR's "aggression and expansion." Hua said the 1972 Shanghai
communique remains the "basis" for Sino-US relations. He
stressed that the communique states both sides' opposition to
"hegemonism," Peking's codeword for the USSR. Hua also said
ties between the two countries would continue to improve "pro-
vided the principles laid down in the communique are carried
out in earnest," a formulation that--since 1975--has implied
Peking's suspicions about the US ability to move the relation-
ship forward.
1 Hua also repeated Peking's "three conditions" for
the normalization of Sino-US relations. These requirements
were first made public officially last month by Vice Chairman
Li Hsien-nien. They state that the US must sever diplomatic
ties with Taipei, withdraw all military forces from Taiwan and
the Taiwan Strait, and abrogate its mutual defense treaty with
Taipei.
The Chinese leader placed the blame for the lack of
movement in Sino-Soviet relations squarely on Soviet shoulders.
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Referring to the Soviet leadership as a "fascist dictatorship,"
Hua said that Moscow had not shown "one iota of good faith"
about improving relations and that the Soviets were responsible
for leading relations between the two sides "'up a blind alley."
He said differences of principle between Peking and Moscow
would continue "for a long time."
Hua's extremely pessimistic characterization of the
prospects for Sino-Soviet relations strongly suggests that Pe-
king's post-Mao leaders have not softened their attitudes to-
ward the USSR. Coming on the eve of Secretary Vance's visit to
Peking, Hua's remarks serve to reinforce Peking's apparent de-
termination to follow through with "Chairman Mao's revolutionary
line in foreign policy," the most important aspect of which has
been China's opening to the US.
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