NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A030300010034-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 7, 2006
• Sequence Number: 34
• Publication Date: August 30, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE
Tuesday August 30,, 197.7- G NIDC._77-2020
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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Tuesda 30 August 1977
The NID Cable is or a purpose of informing
senior U o icials.
CONTENTS
SOMALIA-USSR-ETHIOPIA: Diplomacy
RHODESIA: Election Preview
EAST GERMANY: Dissident Charged
Political Activity
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Page 8
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UAE: Pushing Oil Exploration
BRAZIL: Anti-US Policies
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SOMALIA-USSR-ETHIOPIA: Diplomacy
//Somali President Siad's flight to Moscow on
Sunday was 2n response to a request from Soviet President
Brezhnev to visit the USSR for talks on the Ethiopian-Somali
conflict. Siad is unlikely to engage in meaningful negotia-
tions, but he and the Soviets will probably consider the pos-
sibility of a future settlement allowing Somalia to keep the
Ethiopian territory it has already seized. Ethiopia, by raising
possible UN involvement in the dispute, may be prodding the
USSR to press Siad harder for a negotiated settlement. Siad has
responded to the US refusal to supply arms to Somalia while the
conflict is in progress by suggesting other ways in which the
US could aid Somalia.//
I I Brezhnev on Saturday had again requested a meeting
ana sen a special plane to bring Siad to Moscow. Siad had re-
fused previous invitations from Brezhnev for face-to-face talks.
The meeting is part of the continuing but so far
rui ess Soviet effort to mediate between Ethiopia and Soma-
lia. Siad's presence in Moscow is unlikely to result in a quick
settlement of the conflict. He probably views the visit as a
chance to state personally his unwillingness to compromise with
Ethiopia. He shows no sign of abandoning his insistence that
Ethiopia either agree to a political solution giving self-de-
termination to the ethnic Somali inhabitants of the Ogaden re-
gion or risk losing the territory by force of arms.
Siad will probably also reiterate his publicly and
privately stated warning against a Soviet attempt to tilt the
military balance in Ethiopia's favor by undertaking a major
arms lift. He may even urge the Soviets to reduce their support
for Ethiopian leader Mengistu or risk losing their position in
Somalia.
While continuing to adhere to a hard line, Siad may
be concerned about his forces' ability to take the remaining
Ethiopian garrisons. He will probably sound out the Soviets
about the type of settlement they would be willing to support.
In particular, he may try to discern Soviet willingness to ac-
cept a solution allowing Somalia to keep control of the parts
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of the Ogaden region its forces have already seized, while
permitting Ethiopia to keep Harar, Jijiga, and Dire Dawa--the
major towns still under Ethiopian control.
I I Siad would propose such a solution, reluctantly and
only if he became convinced Somali forces would be unable to
take the towns. The Somalis are continuing probing operations
against the garrisons and will almost certainly mount another
major offensive against them soon.
Moscow's repeated invitations to Siad and its dis-
patch of an aircraft to pick him up are signs of continued So-
viet concern, if not growing anxiety, over the recent events
in the Horn of Africa. During Siad's visit, the Soviets will
Probably re-emphasize their dissatisfaction with the Somali
role in the Ogaden conflict and their dedication to the suc-
cess of the Ethiopian revolution.
I I Although Moscow may threaten--either explicitly or
implicitly--to reduce its aid to Somalia if Mogadiscio persists
in its present course, the Soviets would probably not actually
cut Somalia off for fear that this would push Siad toward the
West and the conservative Arabs. Moscow is more likely to press
for negotiations between Ethiopia and Somalia in hopes of pre-
serving its position in both countries.
I I The Soviets have continued their criticism of Soma-
a s ro e in the conflict. The Soviet weekly Za Rubezhan car-
ried a sharp criticism of Somali actions last Friday. The So-
viets are also placing greater blame, however, on "imperialist
and reactionary forces" bent on the destruction of both Somalia
and Ethiopia. In recent commentaries in New Times and Pravda,
the US and Saudi Arabia were singled out for criticism.
J Given the inconclusive military situation, the So-
viets may believe that the time is ripe for new emphasis on
mediation efforts. Moscow has continued to call for some sort
of political settlement of the Ogaden problem under the aus-
pices of the organization of African Unity. In return for a
cease-fire and an opening of negotiations, the Soviets in the
near term may be willing to recognize Somali gains as an ac-
complished. fact. This would surely meet with Ethiopian opposi-
tion, but Moscow may be willing to risk it. Ethiopia's dissat-
isfaction could be allayed by promises of more aid and some
future and more acceptable settlement.
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I I In the long term, Moscow may hope that appeals to in-
erna ional socialist solidarity will yet win out over Ethio-
pian and Somali nationalism. The Soviets may still envisage
some sort of socialist confederation in the Horn. An end to
the current conflict would at least delay Moscow's having to
choose between Somalia and Ethiopia.
I IThe Ethiopians have raised the possibility of taking
tneir ca to the UN. They have not made a formal request, but
Addis Ababa radio broadcasts said yesterday that the members
of the Security Council must assume their responsibility and
maintain international peace and security.
Ethiopia will probably raise the Ogaden fighting at
the General Assembly session next month but will probably
hold off taking the issue to the Security Council. The Soviets
have argued against such a move out of concern that a Security
Council debate would put them in an embarrassing position by
drawing attention to their provision of military assistance to
both sides. Ethiopia's hint of asking for UN involvement may
be a subtle warning to Moscow to press Siad harder for a settle-
ment.
//Siad, after being informed of the US refusal
to provide arms to Somalia during its conflict with Ethiopia,
has requested other forms of US support. The request was de-
livered to Ambassador Loughran on Friday by Somali Ambassador
to the US Abdullahi Addou, who is currently in Mogadiscio. Addou
said Siad had "swallowed his dissappointment" with the US arms
decision and was ready to discuss alternative ways the US could
assist Somalia.//
//Siad asked that the US encourage third coun-
tries--especially Egypt and Morocco--to provide Somalia with
arms and spare parts. He requested a US statement that it would
not view with indifference the introduction of foreign troops
into Ethiopia. According to Addou, Siad believes such a state-
ment would be especially useful in warning Moscow and Havana
to keep their advisers or forces out of Ethiopia.//
needed some tangible evidence of the US commitment to provide
/Addou further stated that Siad had said he
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Somalia with defensive arms. Siad said that he understood why
the US could not provide arms now but that he hoped arms would
be delivered as soon as circumstances in Ethiopia permitted.//
//Saudi Foreign Minister Saud, in a meeting
with the US A assador on Sunday, took strong exception to the
US decision to delay supplying arms to Somalia. He said that
for the US to announce publicly a decision to provide arms to
Somalia and then to appear to reverse this decision would have
a negative symbolic effect and would be contrary to both US and
Saudi interests in counteracting Soviet influence in the region.//
RHODESIA: Election Preview
Rhodesian Prime Minister Smith is likely to win a
mandate in the national election tomorrow to proceed with his
plan for an internal peace settlement. He has pledged to ar-
range a settlement by the end of the year and has indicated
that he feels he must go ahead with his own plan because the
proposals made by the UK and the US are unacceptable. Smith's
chief opposition comes from a new conservative party that
wants to maintain a dominant position for whites in the gov-
ernment and argues that black majority rule is unnecessary.
In the last election, in 1974, Smith's Rhodesian
Front won more than 75 percent of the vote and all 50 seats
reserved for whites in Rhodesia's 66-seat parliament. Last
spring, however, 12 right-wing legislators defected from the
front and subsequently formed the Rhodesian Action Party.
I I Smith hopes the front can win at least the 44 seats
needed or a two-thirds majority, to ensure passage of the
constitutional amendments his settlement plan would require.
Even if his party falls short of two-thirds, however, Smith
can probably obtain the necessary votes from black members of
parliament.
The Prime Minister's emphasis on South African sup-
port or nis settlement plan may be a telling point in the
election. He has been informing voters that vital aid from
Pretoria would end if the Rhodesian Action Party won the elec-
tion.
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Smith himself is unopposed for re-election, but the
new party is contesting 46 of 50 white seats. The 12 legisla-
tors who formed the party are its only candidates with any na-
tional stature, and some of them apparently are in trouble.
The party is charging Smith with lacking leadership and sell-
ing out white interests. Its program for a federal approach
similar to South Africa's and for a more vigorous military ef-
fort against the guerrillas does not appear popular with the
war-weary white population.
A coalition of small liberal parties, the National
Unifying Force, is also contesting some of the white seats,
but it is unlikely to do well. Voters who might otherwise sup-
port the coalition may fear that this would only take votes
away from Smith and help elect Rhodesian Action Party candi-
dates. The liberals have been campaigning in support of the
US-British settlement proposals. Of the 16 black seats, eight
are appointed by a group of tribal chiefs basically loyal to
Smith.
I Most observers expect Smith's party to win a large
majority. One poll taken by a Rhodesian magazine last week
showed it with more than 57 percent, compared to 3.9 percent
for the Rhodesian Action Party and 2.2 percent for the liberals.
More than 36 percent were undecided or unwilling to disclose
their sentiments.
I I Although the Rhodesian guerrillas had reportedly
ope to increase military activity to disrupt the election
campaign, the overall level of fighting has not increased sig-
nificantly in recent weeks. There could be isolated incidents
on election day, but the guerrillas do not appear capable of
interfering seriously with the voting.
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EAST GERMANY: Dissident Charged
I ast week, East Germany for the first time charged
a dissident with espionage for the West. This action does not
necessarily indicate that the East Germans intend to crack
down on dissidents. At about the same time, authorities also
released five prominent activists and allowed them to emigrate
to West Germany.
On 23 August, the regime arrested :Rudolph Bahro, an
economist and long-time party member, and charged him with
"intelligence activities" on behalf of West Germany. Several
days earlier, West German television broadcast an interview
with Bahro that was harshly critical of the :East German regime,
and a magazine carried excerpts of his book, which will be pub-
lished in West Germany in September.
Bahro says the USSR and the East European regimes
have become "industrial despotisms." He urges the formation of
a "Marxist opposition" within East Germany to revamp the overly
bureaucratic party structure, and he advocates reforms patterned
after the short-lived system in Czechoslovakia in 1968.
Last spring, Bahro circulated some 200 unsigned manu-
scripts of his book and also sent copies to numerous officials
within the party hierarchy. When the regime did not move against
him, he submitted the manuscript to the state publishing house,
which rejected it.
I IBahro's criticism may not strike a responsive chord
within East German society. The 41-year-old critic is not a
member of the dissident cultural intelligentsia, and he was un-
known outside the country until his arrest. He joined the party
in 1952 and was earlier considered a hard-line Marxist.
The regime's treatment of Bahro does not necessarily
presage a stricter line in dealing with dissidents. East Ger-
many has been encouraging dissidents to emigrate and has been
allowing them to travel more freely to the West.
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I Last Friday, in fact, the East Germans released five
o eir most prominent political detainees. Earlier, there were
rumors that three of them--Gerulf Pannach, Christian Kunert, and
Juergen Fuchs--would stand trial. They were arrested when they
protested the expulsion last November of singer Wolf Biermann.
The others--Professor Hellmuth Nitsche and Dr. Karl-Heinz
Nitschke--were apparently detained last spring when they com-
plained about violations of human rights in East Germany.
I IThe regime may plan to free even more of its better-
known critics. About two weeks ago, the East Germans told the
West Germans that they might release some 50 imprisoned dissi-
dents in return for financial compensation "in the usual way."
The West Germans have long paid substantial amounts of money to
East Germany in return for the release of specific prisoners.
The two countries are currently engaged in prepara-
tory soundings for another round of inter-German talks, and
humanitarian issues may be a sensitive point in the discussions.
The East Germans may also hope that the recent releases
will help avoid incidents with remaining dissidents before the
Belgrade talks on European security open in early October. Since
July, East German dissidents have been more active, and a number
of them have carried their case to Western media.
WEST BANK: Political Activity
//Political activity among competing Arab
groups on the Israeli-occupied West Bank has increased in re-
cent weeks in an apparent effort to respond to initiatives
undertaken by the new Israeli Government, particularly its
establishment of additional Jewish settlements there. Jordan
and the Palestine Liberation Organization are also trying to
increase their own influence in the area and curb independent
initiatives by the West Bank mayors, who are attempting to es-
tablish a new poZiticaZ organization of their own. The Israelis
are likely to move quickly to disrupt any poZiticaZ activity
that appears to be gaining wide support.//
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I In the past, the. mayors have argued that their man-
date did not extend beyond municipal affairs and that the PLO
represented them in regional and international matters. The
mayors continue to insist that they have no intention of under-
mining the PLO, but the formation of the policy group would
give them a forum to express their views on Middle East issues
independently of the PLO.
A pro-Jordanian, anti-PLO effort led by Hebron lawyer
usayn a Shuyuki has received predictably heavy play in the
Israeli press because of Shuyuki's outspoken attacks on the
PLO. He claims to have substantial support in Amman and other
Arab capitals and in more conservative Palestinian circles.
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I Despite Israeli press claims and Shuyuki's own
boasts, Jowever, he appears to have little support beyond
Hebron and few prospects for widening the support he does
have.
In fact, Jordanian influence on the West Bank appears
to be at a low ebb. Several mayors-refused to attend King Hu-
sayn's silver jubilee celebrations in Amman, and the influence
of pro-Jordanian West Bankers has declined notably in recent
months.
growing realization among some West Bank leaders that they
need a political organization of their own to combat increas-
ingly aggressive Israeli policies in the area. Some West Bankers
may also be seeking to establish an alternative to the PLO that
they hope will be more acceptable to the Israelis and thus fa-
cilitate a resumption of the Geneva peace talks.
The cooling of old ties with Amman may reflect a
I I Barriers against any one organization encompassing
the entire West Bank, however, are formidable. Regional dif-
ferences remain strong, and there are significant personal
animosities between many of the area's leading politicians.
I I More importantly, the Israeli authorities are un-
likely to permit the development of any broadly based politi-
cal organization that they cannot control. In the past, Israeli
security services have moved rapidly to arrest or deport West
Bank political activists who appeared to be gaining wide sup-
port.
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UAE: Pushing Oil Exploration
I The chief oil spokesman for the United Arab Emirates,
Abu Dhabi Oil Minister Utayba, said Saturday that foreign oil
companies would Lose some of their concession areas if they did
not begin to search for more oil. The minister told an inter-
viewer that companies henceforth would be expected to find
new reserves equivalent to the oil they extract.
Utayba's statement is aimed at contending with the
recent abrupt halt in the discovery of new oil reserves in Abu
Dhabi--by far the largest oil producer among the seven emirates
in the federation. No new reserves have been proved in Abu Dhabi
since 1974. Proved reserves nearly tripled during the period
1970-74, reaching a peak of 30 billion barrels. By the end of
1976, they had dropped to 29 billion barrels, as companies
extracted about 1 billion barrels without adding appreciably
to reserves.
JThe Oil Minister has a strong hand in setting oil
policy roughout the federation,. and his insistence on stepped-
up company exploration will weigh heavily with the other emir-
ates. Under the directions outlined by Utayba, producing com-
panies that do not find sufficient oil could lose portions of
their concessions where no exploration is taking place. These
areas could be transferred to other companies for exploration.
Ir Abu Dhabi currently produces about 1.7 million bar-
rels pe day of crude oil. Collectively, the emirates produce
2.1 million barrels daily--sixth highest among OPEC producers.
I Development of additional capacity will be expensive,
especia y since most oilfields are small and present difficult
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operating conditions; many are offshore. Government oil offi-
cials recognize this and have given foreign companies consider-
able leeway in their operations, never threatening full nation-
alization.
The companies have responded with heavy investment
in primary and secondary recovery projects. A $400-million off-
shore waterflood complex--the world's largest--was put into
operation this spring by a consortium led by British Petroleum.
The complex is designed to boost declining reservoir pressure
at Abu Dhabi's Umm Shaif offshore field. The UAE apparently is
now concerned that oil-producing projects are being overempha-
sized at the expense of exploration. Continued production from
existing fields without development of new areas would further
damage reservior pressures and could reduce ultimate recover-
able reserves.
Brazil has been seeking to loosen its trade and invest-
ment ties with the US for a wide variety of economic reasons:
--Concern over Brazil's substantial trade deficit with the
US.
--The search for new export markets.
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--The strong and growing presence of West European, espe-
cially West German, and Japanese multinational firms in
Brazil.
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--Continuing irritation over the countervailing duty provi-
sions of the US Trade Reform Act.
human rights issues.
US products seems to be a widespread fear that the US may exert
economic pressure to try to force Brazilian leaders to abandon
their plans to acquire uranium enrichment and nuclear reprocess-
ing facilities from West Germany and to be more sensitive to
The most plausible explanation for any shift away from
of import purchases away from the US.
policy of discrimination against US firms is being implemented,
but if Brazilian leaders believe the US is becoming more dis-
criminatory, the current climate of strong competition among
US, West European, and Japanese economic interests in Brazil
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The growing importance of state enterprises in the economy pro-
vides policymakers with the opportunity to direct sizable amounts
There has been no firm evidence to date that a general
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