NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A030400010060-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2006
• Sequence Number: 60
• Publication Date: November 18, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

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Friday 18 November 1977 CG NIDC 77J-2..1iB
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Friday, 18 November 1977.
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The NID Cable is for the purpose o informing
senior US officials.
CONTENTS
ISRAEL: Euphoria and Suspicion
USSR-SOMALIA: Naval Options
GUINEA: US and USSR Relations
SOUTH YEMEN - SAUDI ARABIA
IRAN: Student Demonstrations
UNITED KINGDOM: Devolution Vote
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SWEDEN: No Anti-Neutron Resolution
BRIEFS:
France
Mexico
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ISRAEL: Euphoria and Suspicion
President Sadat's impending visit has generated eu-
phoria in Israel, reflecting a deep desire for both peace and
Arab acceptance. By breaking the Arab taboo to meet Israeli
leaders in Jerusalem, the Egyptian President has enhanced--
however tenuously--his credibility and has put a dent in the
deep-seated Israeli distrust of the Arabs. In Egypt, reaction
is shifting from enthusiasm to apprehension that Sadat may
have conceded too much to Israel.
Israeli satisfaction is heavily tempered by suspi-
cion of Sadat's motives and intentions, especially in official
circles, and by the fear that Sadat may make Israel appear to
be uncompromising unless Prime Minister Begin can demonstrate
more flexibility.
Begin is a shrewd, skillful politician with deep ide-
ological and religious convictions who does not compromise eas-
ily. But he is also a deeply emotional man sincerely committed
in his own way to peace, and with a flare--like Sadat--for the
bold and unexpected move.
Both men have expressed a desire to achieve a genu-
ine resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict in their lifetimes,
and the sense that their time may be growing short may have an
effect on their exchange. In this unprecedented situation,
which is developing a dynamic of its own, we cannot rule out
the possibility that the two leaders may depart dramatically
from their conventional positions.
The reaction in Egypt has begun to shift from enthu-
siasm to apprehension. Many sophisticated Egyptians believe
that Sadat has conceded too much to Israel and fear that the
trip will, in effect, endorse Israel's current borders and
Jerusalem as its capital. There apparently is also consider-
able skepticism about Sadat's justification for the visit,
with many believing that Sadat is acting more on behalf of the
US--and perhaps at its direction.
Foreign Minister Fahmi's protest resignation yester-
day--followed hours later by the resignation of his designated
successor, Minister of State Muhammad Riyad--has added to pub-
lic concern. Fahmi for some time has been critical of Sadat's
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handling of relations with the US and the USSR and has been
especially concerned that Sadat has relied too heavily on the
US in arranging peace talks.
The resignations of Fahmi and Riyad will be widely
interpreted as a sign that the Egyptian foreign policy estab-
lishment strongly opposes Sadat's decision and that his visit
will help the US but may seriously hurt Egypt. No other cabi-
net members of Fahmi's stature have shown any signs of prepar-
ing to desert Sadat, but some have previously sympathized with
Fahmi's views and may be considering their options should Sa-
dat's gambit fail.
Sadat has given no indication of being deterred ei-
ther by the resignations or by the uneasiness of his colleagues,
nor has he tried to allay fears by defending his motives.
The Egyptian President probably scheduled the visit
as soon as he did in the hope of handicapping any efforts to
organize a forceful opposition to his initiative.
President Asad indicated deep distaste for President
Sa at s actions yesterday in both a news conference and an of-
ficial government statement. Although Asad did not say directly
that he might opt out of Geneva, he did seem to be warning that
this is possible.
Asad has seen his continued participation in prepara-
tions for Geneva as the only way to prevent Sadat from moving
ahead alone. If he comes to believe that Sadat ultimately in-
tends to make a separate deal, Asad may conclude that there is
little utility for Syria in going to Geneva.
Asad's opposition to Sadat's decision is consistent
with his cautious approach to negotiations. This is based on
his perception that Israel is not prepared to make adequate
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concessions and on his concern to avoid a failure that his do-
mestic opponents could use against him. By standing for Arab
solidarity and protecting his flank with the Palestinians, Asad
has preserved a tactical flexibility that enables him to avoid
the kind of risk Sadat is now taking while retaining the ability
to respond to any major concessions Israel might make in the
future.
Should the Sadat visit somehow restore momentum toward
Geneva in a manner acceptable to Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and per-
haps even the Palestinian moderates, Asad would be under strong
pressure to endorse Sadat's achievement. Should the visit prove
a failure, however, the Syrian President would be in a position
to obtain the support of the conservative as well as the radical
Arab states.
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USSR-SOMALIA: Naval Options
//The USSR's Loss of the naval complex at
Berbera will complicate Soviet naval operations in the Indian
Ocean, but the Soviets will probably be able to maintain about
the same Level of ship operations as in the past. Soviet air
reconnaissance activity in the area will be severely curtailed,
however, unless suitable airfields are found elsewhere. Polit-
ically, the Soviets stand to suffer a Loss of face in Africa
and the Middle East but may consolidate their position in
Ethiopia, which--if it remains intact--is potentially the ma-
jor power in the Horn of Africa.//
//The loss of Berbera is unlikely to upset
the December round of US-Soviet Indian Ocean talks because that
round will probably reamin focused on restricting US strategic
options in the area. In subsequent talks addressing military
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reductions, the issue of facilities will become more important,
however, particularly if the Soviets have not found a replace-
ment for Berbera.//
I //The USSR will probably try to replace the
facilities it used at Berbera and recoup some of its political
losses. During the September round of the US-Soviet Indian ocean
talks, the Soviets reserved the option to replace Berbera should
they lose it. Their options are limited, however.//
//South Yemen as 25X1
again considering an agreement that would allow the USSR unre-
stricted use of the port facilities at Aden. The natural harbor
and fuel storage area in Aden are at least as good as those at
Berbera, and the installation of a floating drydock purchased
from Japan enables it to handle ships of destroyer size. An air-
field in Aden is capable of handling Soviet IL-38 antisubmarine
warfare aircraft, but it is not large enough to handle the
longer range TU-95 reconnaissance aircraft.//
/The Saudis would not look with favor on a
Soviet base in neighboring South Yemen. Other alternatives have
either geographic or political drawbacks for the Soviets.//
~// Djibouti, for example, is a suitable port in a
favorable location, but the lingering French presence and Somali
influence would prevent extensive Soviet use for the immediate
future.
Both
Ethiopia's best port, Massawa, and the smaller port of Assab
are in war-torn Eritrea, and Assab lacks adequate facilities
for Soviet naval operations.//
I /In some ways, Somalia's ejection of the Soviets
from Berbera has simplified Soviet policy. The USSR is now free
to support Ethiopia and back the Organization of African Unity,
which has taken a stand against Somalia. The Soviets stated in
August that they supported the Ethiopians and the OAU principle
of territorial integrity; most African nations, however, greeted
the USSR's statement with skepticism.//
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I /As the largest and most populous country in the
area, Ethiopia--if it remains intact--has the potential to be-
come the major power in the region. Moscow may also be able to
improve its relations with Kenya, which had feared the Soviet-
backed threat from Somalia.//
//We believe the Soviets were aware of the risks
involved in trying to accommodate two hostile clients but opted
to tilt in favor of Ethiopia because they believed Somalia's
military dependence on the USSR would keep President Siad in
line. The Soviets were certainly surprised by the timing and
scope of the Somali decision. They still have a diplomatic pres-
ence in Mogadiscio, however, and have probably not given up hope
that future Somali reverses will weaken President Siad and open
the way for a restoration of some Soviet influence.
GUINEA: US and USSR Relations
The USSR is making some effort to ease strains
in relations with Guinea following President Toure's decision
in June to deny Soviet TU-95 naval reconnaissance aircraft the
use of Conakry airfield.
Longstanding frictions in Guinean-Soviet relations
were a factor in Toure's decision to halt the Soviet flights
and to move at the same time to expand relations with the US
and the West generally. Guinean-US relations are now in a warm-
ing phase as Toure cautiously seeks to reduce some of Guinea's
dependence on the USSR and to project a more flexible and non-
aligned image. Problems could ensue, however, given Toure's
radical ideological tenets and his volatile temperment.
During ceremonies in Conakry marking the 60th anniver-
sary o t e Bolshevik Revolution, the Soviet Ambassador an-
nounced a gift of 3,500 tons of agricultural commodities--the
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first such grant in many years to Guinea, which is chronically
short of food. France undertook a food program last year, and
the European Community has now begun one, but the US remains
Guinea's major food supplier.
Toure's wish to improve relations with the US is moti-
vated in part by his desire to ensure continued US food supplies
and other aid. He also seems to recognize that Guinea's future
economic development depends on attracting more Western invest-
ment; Guinea is keenly interested in the development of its
large iron ore reserves by a US steel company.
/Recent militant gestures by South Yemen have
caused Saudi officials to reassess their policy of normalizing
relations with that country. South Yemen's actions suggest
that it will not significantly moderate its policies in the
short term and will continue to maintain close ties to the
USSR and other Communist countries.//
//Saudi officials in recent months have watched
with dismay as South Yemen's support for the Ethiopian Govern-
ment has become increasingly evident. The amount of Soviet
military equipment sent from South Yemen to Ethiopia has been
limited, but some 100 to 200 South Yemeni military advisers
are providing logistic support for the Ethiopian military.
This activity has put South Yemen squarely at odds with the
Saudis and other Arab moderates who have lined up with Somalia
and the Eritrean separatists.//
//While speaking to the UN General Assembly in
early October, South Yemeni President Salim Rubayya Ali took
a hard line against Oman, thereby undercutting Saudi efforts
to arrange a reconciliation between the two neighbors. In late
October, moreover,, the South Yemenis touched a sensitive Saudi
nerve when their state-controlled media replayed a Soviet news
story alleging Saudi involvement in the assassination of North
Yemeni President Hamdi.//
I /Most Saudi officials now appear convinced that
their attempts to persuade South Yemen to follow a more moder-
ate line have failed.//
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I /For the present, the Saudis are likely to hold
in abeyance aid deliveries or commitments. If further develop-
ments offer additional proof of continued South Yemeni insin-
cerity, the Saudis may again support efforts by South Yemeni
exiles to bring down the South Yemeni regime. The Saudis will
in particular watch for signs 'that the USSR is transferring
advisers previously stationed in Somalia to South Yemen.//
I //South Yemen's recent actions suggest at a mini-
mum that radicals continue to wield significant influence over
Aden's policies. They can also be interpreted as evidence that
South Yemen's professed interest in normalizing relations with
its Arab neighbors was merely a ploy designed to attract badly
needed economic assistance.//
//Whatever the rationale, South Yemen now appears
lice y to maintain its current close relationship with the
USSR, Cuba, and other Communist states and to continue to sup-
port terrorist groups such as the Popular Front for the Liber-
ation of Palestine.
Student disorders in Iran this week, apparently co-
ordinated with demonstrations in Washington against the Shah's
visit to the US, may prompt the Shah to consider tough new
measures to suppress student dissent. The clashes in Tehran,
in which two police officers were reportedly killed, may also
move the Shah to re-examine his policy of political liberaliza-
tion, which is intended, in part, to refurbish Iran's human
rights image.
The shooting of police officers during a student de-
monstration Tuesday is unprecedented and suggests possible in-
volvement of Iranian terrorists seeking to stir up further
violence. Student agitators do not normally carry weapons out
of fear of being arrested on charges of terrorism.
The incidents may trigger further disorders, partic-
ularly if police seek retaliation or resort to tougher measures
in dealing with any future student protests. Student disorders
are nothing new in Iran, particularly in November, when students
seek to commemorate the 1953 military intervention at Tehran
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University. This year, the Shah's visit to the US gave student
extremists a chance to exploit a familiar theme--the Shah's al-
alleged subservience to the US.
Student unrest could become a more serious problem
this year if conservative Muslim agitators, who staged a num-
ber of incidents last month, give support to demonstrations by
radical dissidents. Fundamentalist Muslim students, at odds
with the Shah for his secularization of national life, have
been agitating for a return to the traditional Muslim practice
of segrating women on campus.
//British Prime Minister Callaghan and his govern-
ment have benefited politically from Parliament's vote of
cloture on debate on home rule for Scotland and Wales. Belying
earlier predictions of very close contests and possible defeat
of the government, the vote produced a more than comfortable
majority to limit debate on the bills. Coming on the heels of
strong popular backing for CaZZaghan's tough stance on union
demands, support for the regional devolution bills--a major
part of the government's legislative package--greatly strength-
ens Callaghan's hand in scheduling a new election. The cloture
vote makes final passage virtually certain. Barring unforeseen
difficulties and delaying tactics in the House of Lords, devo-
lution should become reality early in 1979.//
//Home rule will come about mainly on government
terms and be limited to carefully defined areas. London will
retain control over foreign affairs, taxation, and revenues
from North Sea oil. The government's success is prompting se-
rious consideration of limited devolution for Northern Ireland
as a way to mitigate London's difficulties there.//
//Careful wooing by the government of its Liberal
allies, pressure on rebellious Labor members of Parliament, and
support from Scottish and Welsh Nationalists, Irish independents,
and a scattering of Tories, successfully produced a coalition
that reversed the rejection of similar bills in the previous
Parliamentary session.//
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I /Defeat of the measures would have greatly en-
hanced the strength of Welsh and Scottish Nationalists, whose
ultimate goal is complete independence, while seriously jeop-
ardizing Welsh and Scottish seats held by Labor.//
/Conservative inability to defeat the measures by
capita izing on back-bench Labor discontent is a further example
of how the increasingly stable and confident Labor government
is preempting and outmaneuvering the Tories on most major issues.
Conservative fortunes, which looked bright only two months ago,
have been on the decline ever since. Aside from the devolution
issue, the Tories have been forced privately to applaud the La-
bor government's stand on wage demands and seems unwilling to
take strong issue with Callaghan's increasingly pronounced
stance of only grudging cooperation within the EC.//
I // Unless the Conservative leadership is able to
turn these issues to the party's advantage during the next six
months, the government's position ma be unassailable in elec-
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Sweden has decided not to offer in the UN General
Assembly a resolution condemning the neutron warhead, despite
strong pressure from the parliamentary opposition and widespread
public antineutron sentiment.
Foreign Minister Soder said in parliament last week
that such a resolution would tend to polarize the issue in the
UN along lines of existing alliances. She noted, however, the
government's opposition to the neutron warhead and suggested
that Sweden is concerned that military strategists would not
feel the same constraints when deciding to use the neutron war-
head as they would for a decision on other nuclear weapons.
The government decided against the resolution largely
in order to avoid offending the US, and the leftist opposition
will try to make political capital out of the government's
France's governing coalition has failed to profit po-
litically from the disarray in the Left, according to a public
opinion poll published yesterday by the conservative Le Figaro.
The poll shows that 47 percent of the electorate still intends
to vote for the center-right--the same percentage of voters
that planned to do so prior to the breakdown in the Left's ne-
gotiations on 23 September.
The poll showed the Communists at 21 percent (up one
point from a poll in early September), the Socialists and Left
Radicals at 26 percent, and the ecologists at 4 percent. It is
difficult to measure losses the Socialists and Left Radicals
have sustained, because an early September poll that gave them
31 percent of the vote did not allow the voter to express a
preference for the ecologists. It is generally assumed that a
good portion of the ecologist vote will switch to the Socialists
on the second ballot of the two-round election to be held on 12
and 19 March.
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Some of the ecologist organizations, meanwhile, are
reconsidering the nonpartisan stance they have been adopting
recently. Realization is growing that by refusing to step down
in the second round or to direct their voters to vote for the
leftist candidate who is better placed, the ecologists may be
helping candidates on the right whom they perceive as the "most
dan erous" in terms of ecological issues
I Mexican President Lopez Portillo's replacement of his
two principal economic cabinet ministers Wednesday night comes
just one month before the deadline for completion of the budget.
The move is apparently designed to end a debate in the govern-
ment that has been hampering coordination of economic policy
and prompting public speculation about the President's ability
to solve national economic problems. The cabinet changes will
probably have no major impact on Mexican policy, as the Presi-
dent seems to rely more on private economic advisers Rafael
Izquierdo and Jose Antonio Ugarte than on his ministers.
The new Finance Secretary is David Ibarra, who was the
director of Mexico's national development bank and a member of
Lopez Portillo's economic cabinet. Ricardo Garcia Sainz, for-
merly a subsecretary of the National Patrimony and Industrial
Development Secretariat, is the new Secretary of Programming
and Budget.
Both men are well qualified. Both are financially con-
servative, and their appointments could create greater harmony
between the two key economic ministries. This would boost the
lagging confidence of the private sector in the government's
economic policies.
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The government of Ghana late last month abruptly
canceled t e inauguration of a political organization that was
to have mobilized support for General Acheampong's plans to
return the country to civilian rule in 1979.
/The Ghana Patriotic Movement was to have been
headed by an old-line leftist politican who had been close to
former President Nkrumah. In recent months, Acheampong has re-
habilitated Nkrumah and allied himself with the Nkrumahists,
hoping to use them to engineer his election as president of a
civilian government. The Nkrumahists are factionalized and
maneuvering against one another.//
The US Embassy in Accra believes Acheampong may well
have concluded that the Nkrumahists--despite their professions
of support--were really planning to use the organization to
advance their own political fortunes and would eventually dump
him. If Acheampong has decided to break with the Nkrumahists,
he will have to find some other political group to help him
drum up public support for his civilian government proposals,
which will be subject to a referendum next March.
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