IM 70-70: ENEMY SUPPLY LOSSES IN CAMBODIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000200070001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 12, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: REPORT

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18 May 70 Maj Caulfield, DoD, to Kissinger memo re Impact on the
Enemy of?Ammunition Losses in Cambodia (response
to Gen Haig's request for an estimate on enemy of
captured ammunition in Cambodia and related information)
19 May 70 Distribution list for IM 70-70, Enemy Supply Losses in
Cambodia
21 May 70 Moyer to Ch/D/I memo re Cambodian Losses to VC/NVA Forces
(losses by FANK to VC/NVA for period 18 March to 19 May
1970)
IM 70-70: Enemy Supply Losses
In Cambodia*
21 May 70 Major Caulfield to Commander Howe (White House Situation
Room) memo re Information on Cambodian Operations
(info in tonnages of weight of enemy materiel and
supplies captured in Cambodian operations as of.20 May)
22 May 70 D/OER to Ch/D/I memo re Appreciation (in recent study
of enemy supply losses in Cambodia)
STAT 16 Jun 70
0
to Lt. Commander Howe, NSC, re The Weapons
Component of Cambodian Stockpiles Estimates
Attachment: Blind Memo re Stockpiles of Weapons
in Cambodia
STAT 2 Jul 7 0
Attachment: DCI Briefing for Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, Cambodia,
30 Jun 70
]:M 70-70 not in file.
to DCh/Production Staff, OCI, memo re DCI
Fu bright Briefing
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2 July 1970
:OiA }DU FOR : Deputy Chief, Production Staff, I
SUBJECT DCI Fuibright briefing
1. The aattac .ed is a redo of the supply 1oss::s
mart of the iulbrig xt briefing . We have attempted
where posai%3 .e_ to comply with the DCIIS suC ge tl' on .
2. The comparisons now parallel those made by
the President. Mr. Helms should be wware, however,
that the comparison on r quipping battalions with
Weapons , while arithmetically correct, is not sound.
Tais is because about t=wo A.thirds of the weapons cap--
tured are either Free V orld weapons or old weapons of
a type neither preferred nor being used by Co munist
forcer.
3. We are unable to give locations of stockpiles
in Laos or to quantify them. 4evertleles s , our
knowledge of logi:atic activities, enemy supply require-
Laos
t ern ,
i
n or
zants, and the large stocks taken
and Cambodia convinces us that the stockpiles in
Southern Laos are large.
4. Your suggestion to use the DI.A input/
throughput figures is unwise. There. are so many
y problems with these figures that t he are Bros ly
t Iii n gene is on record
tzaer
mislead-Lag- Fur
,
that the data available will not support a juantifica_.
Lion of supply moves ezat,3 through Laos .
Deputy Director
Lcoraomic geswarch
Attach:me.at ;;
stated.
Distribution:
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2 OD/OER
1 - DD OER
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DCI BRIEFING FOR SENATE
FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE
I. The position of the Lon Nol government in the
countryside continues to deteriorate in the face
of increasing Communist military pressure.
A. The presence of the allied forces and the
Communists" own logistic and command difficul-
ties have prevented the Communists from making
even more substantial gains at the expense
of the badly outclassed Cambodian military
forces. Since late March,-for example, the
Communists have attacked 15 out of 19 pro-
vincial capitals, They now occupy five of
these key population centers, In the north-
east--Stung Treng, Kratie, Lomphat, and Sen-
monorom, and in the west, Tbeng Meanchey.
1m With the recent abandonment of two be-
leaguered outposts in Ratanakiri Province,
the government?s presence in the
northeast region has been virtually
eliminated,
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2. There are indications that the Communists
already are expanding their`control over
this zone, Elements of a North Vietnamese
regiment have been conducting supply oper-
ations on the Se Kong Rivera which runs
from the Laotian end of the Ho Chi Minh
trail into the Mekong at the town of Stung
Treng,
3. From Stung Treng, the Communists can use
Route 19 to truck supplies eastward toward
the South Vietnam border, and they can
move supplies southward? along Route 13
and the Mekongti and westward along Route
231.
B. West of the Mekong, the Vietnamese Communists
are making substantial inroads in the north-
ern provinces of Preah Vihear, Oddar Mean-
chey, Kompong Thom and Siem Reap,
1. Sizable concentrations of Communist
troops have been moving into Preah Vihear
Province since mid-May, and they have
isolated it by cutting the main road from
the Laotian border to Kompong Thom city,
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The government is pulling its forces out
of Preah Vihear and Oddar Meancheye
2s Kompong Thom city has-been surrounded
and attacked by the Communists for a
month, but South Vietnamese air support
enabled exhausted government defenders
to hang on until reinforcements could
be brought in. Elements of the Viet
Cong 272nd or 275th regiments probably
are involved in this fighting; the 275th
took part in the capture of Kratie city
in early May.
3, We have fresh evidence that-elements of
the Viet Cong 275th Regiment--which,
captured documents indicate, has now or-
ganized a companion regiment bearing the
same denomination, but composed of Cam-
bodian Communists and local Vietnamese--
are also involved in the fighting for
Siem Reap city. The presence of the
275th and the forward element of the
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Viet Cong?s 5th Division, indicates that
the Communists attach considerable impor-
tance to the Siem Reap effort. They pre-
sumably calculate-that taking Siem Reap
or the nearby Angkor Wat ruins--which
at last report were in their hands--
would deal a telling psychological blow
to Phnom Penh, and Bangkok as well.
C. In the eastern border province of Kompong
Cham, enemy activity appears to be rising
again.
1. The.province capital is defended by Khmer
Krom forces--ethnic Cambodians who had
been fighting under allied command in
South Vietnam--but the presence of a sub-
stantial proportion-of the Viet Cong 9th
Division nearby indicates-that another
major assault could come soon.
D. In the border provinces to the south and
southeast,'the Communists continue to attack
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government positions and lines of communica-
tions,
1. Svay Rieng and Prey Veng cities are
continually enemy harassed. Large con-
centrations of Communist forces roam
Kandal Province, between the Mekong and
Bassac rivers, frequently taking villages
as close as 10 miles to Phnom Penh,
E. West of Phnom Penh, the Communists have at-
tacked the capitals of Kompong Speu and Kom-
pong Chhnang provinces,
le Their continuing attack on Kompong Speu
suggests that the Communists are
determined to block Route 4, thereby
severing Phnom Penh's main overland ac-
cess to the seaport of Kompong Som--
formerly Sihanoukvillem
2? Enemy attacks in Kompong-Chhnang probably
also are directed at key lines of communi-
cations. Route 5, Phnom Penh's last re-
maining road link to the Thai border, has
been harassed and the parallel rail line
to Thailand is still cut in several places.-
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II. Communist forces have moved around Cambodia al-
most at will, but they face some important ob-
stacles.
A. Not the least of these is the lack of support
from a passive but essentially hostile popula-
tion.
1, The Communists are trying hard to build
a Cambodian Communist movement, but such
work takes time. In addition, the Commu-
nists must also contend with the anti-Viet-
namese sentiment of the average Cambodian
villager.
B. As they expand their operation areas, the
Co -auni_st"s freedom of action is likely to
be inhibited by supply problems and the
lack of well-established rear base areas.
C. Up to now, the Communists have minimized
these problems by avoiding major pitched
battles, and by limiting the number of
troops committed against the-Cambodians.
1. Less than half theirli main force in-
fantry regiments now in Cambodia have
been identified in action against targets
in the Cambodian interior.
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D. The Communists must also be concerned that--
with time--the Cambodian Army may become a
credible fighting force.
1. Despite a generally inept performance,
there have been instances--especially in
defending fixed positions--when the Cam-
bodians have fought valiantly and well.
E. The Communists have detached large segments
of territory from Phnom Penh?s control and
their actions have clearly had considerable
psychological effect. Nonetheless, most
Communist successes to date seem to have been
recorded in situations where Cambodian Govern-
ment defenders have put up only a minimal
resistance. In almost every engagement where
the Communists have had to contend with a
serious counterforce--Cambodian, Khmer Krom,
South Vietnamese or US--the Communists have
given ground.
III. The government in Phnom Penh continues to func-
tion, despite the sharp military reverses.
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A. Prime Minister Lon Nol and his deputy Sirik
Matak are shouldering much of the burden, with
Lon Nol assuming responsibility for military
affairs and Matak almost everything else.
1. Rumors of a serious rift between them
have been circulating in the capital.
Most of these are traceable to bickering
among their subordinates. But Matak could
decide at some time that Lon Nol's leader-
ship is wanting.
B. The loyalty of the army is crucial, and so
far it has remained steadfast behind Lon Nol
and the government.
1. The strains of the past several weeks
have given rise to some grumbling, but as
far as we can tell it has not reached
serious proportions.
2. Some junior officers in the air force, for
example, have criticized Lon Nol for ac-
cepting offers of South Vietnamese and
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Thai troop assistance without.. obtaining
written assurances that the new allies
will leave Cambodia when asked.
C. Opposition has cropped up in the national
assembly, one of the government's most im-
portant sources of support.
1. The assembly itself is divided, and each
faction blames the government for differ-
ent--and sometimes conflicting--deficiencies.
2. One of the most basic problems is that many
elements in the assembly and elsewhere
hoped for a thorough house cleaning after
Sihanouk's ouster. This has not been pos-
sible because Lon Nol depends on the old
guard bureaucrats in the government and the
army for his position, and because the war
has pre-empted the time and energies of
the top leadership.
D. The economy is another major trouble spot for
the Lon Nol government, as the fighting has
brought economic activity to a virtual stand-
still.
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1. Rail and road. links radiating from Phnom
Penh have been interdicted -by Communist
forces since early May. Exports of rice,
Cambodia's most important earner of foreign
exchange, have practically ceased. Rubber
production has stopped; petroleum products
are in short supply,
2. Government revenues, derived principally
from customs duties and sales taxes, have
declined while military expenditures soar.
Inflation is a serious and growing threat.
3. These problems are not yet of critical
proportions. Cambodia has a simple econ-
omy based on the farm or handicraft in-
dustries. Rice is plentiful in the coun-
tryside and in Phnom Penh.
4. Nonetheless, Cambodia lacks the material
and financial resources to fight the Com-
munists without substantial infusions of
aid, both military and economic.
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IV. Vietnamese Communist objectives in Cambodia remain
open to speculation.
A. Hanoi clearly considers South Vietnam the
main theater in Indochina, but the speed and
scope of Communist military operations in Cam-
bodia suggest that Hanoi may now wish to bring
down the Lon Nol government.
1. It is becoming increasingly clear with
each passing week that such a course would
necessitate an all-out military operation
in Cambodia, including a direct attack on
Phnom Penh itself.
2. This would involve considerable political
and military risks but Hanoi may believe
that the risks are justified by the chance
to undermine U.S. policy in Southeast
Asia, intensify the anti-war sentiment in
the United States, and increase pressures
on Washington to negotiate on terms more
acceptable to Hanoi.
3. It seems more likely, however, that the
North Vietnamese will continue to do what
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they have been doing for the past three
months:
----one, solidify their control over the
northeast, in effect turning it into an
extension of the Laotian infiltration
corridor
--two, take as much Cambodian territory
as they can with a view to building a
viable Cambodian Communist movement, but
without using all the military resources
at their disposal
--and three, keep up the pressure on Phnom
Penh itself---perhaps even by rocketing
the city or sending in a sapper battalion
to create havoc---in the hope that the Cam-
bodian generals will capitulate to Commu-
nist demands or that the.government will
collapse under the accumulated pressure.
B. Whatever the case, it appears certain that at
a minimum the Vietnamese Communists want to
maintain their position in Cambodia and keep
on using Cambodian territory to support their
war effort in South Vietnam.
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2. The South Vietnamese have already indi-
cated that they intend to be firemen in
Cambodia, bailing out the Cambodians
when they get in trouble.
3. Even under the best of circumstances,
however, Cambodia is in for a tough time,
as events appear to be pushing the country
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toward a Laos-like de facto parti-
ti on
V. In a broader sense, developments in Cambodia
since last March have presented Hanoi with a
whole new set of problems and opportunities in
Indochina.
A. The Communists have been set back in many
ways, especially by the disruptive effects
of allied operations during the past two
months.
1. They suffered large supply losses, ex-
tensive casualties, disruptions of their
supply routes, dispersal of their forces
and their command and control apparatus,
and the loss of immunity in sanctuaries
and base areas astride the Cambodian-
Vietnamese border. .
B. Between 30 April and 30 June, allied opera-
tions against Communist base areas have cap-
tured substantial stockpiles of supplies,
including:
--over 7,000 tons of rice, or enough to feed
60,000 men for about five months.
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--Over 22,900 individual weapons, 2,500
crew-served weapons, 14.8 million rounds
of ammunition, and 143,000 rounds of
rocket, mortar, and recoilless rifle am-
munition.
C. These losses probably have placed further
limits on the scale of action open to the
Communists in the southern part of South
Vietnam for some months.
1. Hanoi has long demonstrated, however,
that it possesses a highly flexible
logistics system, and has the capabil-
ity to replace these losses through
intensive effort.
2. Rice losses can be made good from the
excellent South Vietnamese harvest or
from the bumper January crop in Cambodia,
3. Over time, ammunition losses can be re-
placed from stockpiles in Laos, especially
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after the rainy season ends this fall.
4. Furthermore, the Communists are continu-
ing to move supplies southward through
Laos this rainy season, whereas last
year at this time the system was closed
down.
VI. Even before their losses in the sanctuaries, the
Communists recognized that events in Cambodia
would impose additional burdens on them.
A. The evidence suggests that sometime in
April the Politburo began to modify its
strategy to fight a wider war in Indochina.
1. A recently captured document indicates
that a new Vietnamese Communist party
resolution may have been issued in
that period.
2. A session of North Vietnam's National
assembly was convened in early June,
probably to put an official stamp on
earlier decisions of the party leader-
ship.
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3. Now Vietnamese Communist diplomats from
around the world are headed home for brief-
ing on the revised party line.
B. The full scope of what the North Vietnamese
intend to do next is not clear, but Hanoi's
actions and statements suggest that it sees
significant potential opportunities, as well
as liabilities, in the new situation in Cam-
bodia.
1. The speeches at the National Assembly ses-
sion in Hanoi in June strongly suggested
that the Communists have concluded that
more hard fighting than they had antici-
pated earlier is now in prospect, and that
this will require the use of more North
Vietnamese troops.
a. There are some signs already that ad-
ditional North Vietnamese regular com-
bat units are being committed to the
fighting in either southern Laos or
northern South Vietnam.
VII. To date we have seen no major changes in Communist
tactics in South Vietnam which can be traced
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directly to the allied moves into Cambodia.
A. The diversion of substantial portions of the
Communists' main force combat strength to the
Cambodian theater, or at least away from South
Vietnam itself, has reduced the threat to
much of III and IV Corps.
B. Their presence, however, is not essential
to the kind of smaller unit actions on which
the Communists have recently been relying.
C. The Communists are determined to maintain a
credible military stance in South Vietnam, but
they are now conserving assets in the expecta-
tion that better political and military oppor-
tunities will come along as the US withdraws.
1. In the meantime, through shellings, ter-
rorism, and small unit action, the Commu-
nists have had some success in slowing down
the progress of pacification programs and
rebuilding their own apparatus to carry
on the war over the long haul.
2. Heavier enemy action is likely in the
northern provinces of South Vietnam, where
the Communists may seek to demonstrate
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their military power and attempt to force
the South Vietnamese to divert troops to
meet the threat.
D. The lasting impact of Cambodian developments
on Communist fortunes depends heavily on what
the Communists, the US, and the South Viet-
namese do in thy future, not only in Cambodia
but in South Vietnam as well.
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CIA Control No. 6896
16 June 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR Lt. Comdr. Jonathan T. Howe
National Security Council Staff
The White House
SUBJECT The Weapons Component of Cambodian
Stockpiles Estimates
1. As you requested we have attempted to quantify
the number of weapons included in our estimates of
enemy stockpiles in Cambodia. We have found it
impractical, if not impossible, to attempt to quantify
specific weapons in the stockpiles and have settled
on two categories -?-- of individual weapons and crew--
served weapons. The available data and state of the
art simply do not permit any greater precision. In
fact the large number of variables in our data and
our considerable uncertainties about the enemy stock-
piles make it imperative that the figures presented
below be understood simply as calculations and at
this time certainly not be regarded as firm estimates.
We are continuing to explore the problem in the hope
of getting a better understanding of the impact of
the enemy's weapon losses.
2. CIA estimates of enemy stockpiles in Cambodia
of weapons and equipment (classes II and IV) include
allowances for the following supplies.
a. Estimated enemy consumption of weapons
in South Vietnam, including an allowance for
replacing weapons because of normal wear, and
re-equipping local enemy forces with more
modern weapons.
b. Reported VC/NVA losses of weapons in
South Vietnam which we assume the enemy must
replace from stockpiles.
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c. Estimated consumption of other supplies
?-- quartermaster, signal, engineer, and so forth
-- that the enemy must obtain from out of country
(external) sources.
3. The weapons and equipment components of the
total stockpile of these classes of supplies is given
below in tons;
stimate
High Estimate
Weapons and
qui meat
1600
2700
Weapons
565
950
Equipment
1035
1750
Weapons account for 35% of the estimated enemy stockpiles
of weapons and equipment; the equipment component accounts
for 65% of the total.
4. Assuming that the stockpiles in Cambodia consist
of the same mix of individual and crew-served weapons as
found in enemy units in South Vietnam, 565 tons and 950
tons of weapons are equivalent to the number of weapons
shown below:
Low Estimate
High Estimate
565
950
Individual
Weapons
70,000
117,750
Crew-served
Weapons
9,120
15,330
5. Through 14 June the Cambodian operations
have picked up a reported 17,721 individual weapons
and 2,330 crew-served weapons. These losses, when
compared with stockpile estimates of the number of
weapons in Cambodia, show that the Communists have lost
from 15% to about 25% of their reserves of both individ-
ual and crew.-nerved weapons (see tabulation below):
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Enemy Losses of Weapons Compared to Stockpiles
in Percent
Individual
Weapons
Crew--served
Weapons
25X1
Acting Director
25
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25X1
Distribution:
Orig. -
5 -
Addressee
via LDX
SAVA
O/DD/I
OD/OER
DD/OER
Ch/D/I
Ch/I/L
St/P/C
OD/OER?
(16 June 70)
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2 2 MAY 1970
FO Chief , Indochina Div
Publications S
for
recent
' i t
noy Supply Losses in C.!'odia,
was not Only the most ti m l._r comple
and balanced :study of the impact of enewy supply
losses available in the unit gut it w a
s
also
one Of t :s MOs t enthu3iastically received studio
we have done in the past year. 4a have received
;: lion of appreciation and praise from
har- d and put in many long hours in comol tiirig
2. 1 know that a great rummer of people _orked
Office of the Secretary of f nse, from. Dr.
Staff and from the. Department of State.
nt. T iey can all feel a great deal of
their official ,-,er onnel folder.
personal satisfaction for their role is j roviding
tree highest levels of t ha government s.ith- a first
rate intelligence product. I would ap reci to your
da sing t=bi commendation along to each of the irdi...
viual involved. It will also '.xe made a -art of
25X1
X1
Distribution
Orig. C=h/D/I
1 Ch/St/P
2 oD/OER
4- DD/OER
1 Et/h
1 St/P/C
DD/OE
ay 70)
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c toA
Appreciation
I 'evrant to to&e t its op ort;uiity to express
ulatione, and appreciation of this office
andid effort involved in completing= the
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief., D/I
SUBJECT : Cambodian Losses to VC/NVA Forces
21 May 1970
1. In response to a DIA/CIA request, the U. S. Defense
Attache in Phnom Penh has obtained the following report of
losses by FANK to VC/NVA forces for the period 18 March to
19 May 1970.
1105 rifles
103 sub-machine guns
15 automatic rifles
21 machine guns
19 mortars
13 field guns
3 rocket launchers
AI\MZUNITION*
10,940 individual cartridges
10 cases of cartridges
8 cases of mortar rounds
2 cases of grenades
2. FANK reported capturing from VC/NVA forces the following
material:
Specific types unidentified; total weight probably less
than 2 tons.
""V I
EaCtdde 1 ira n a I9ac;nt4r.
09~k1F,~9~lfl~ 2!?t
 Approved For Relea I1/NOC
1 mortar
4 rocket launchers
2 anti tank grenade launchers
3 U. S. carbines
23 rifles
9 automatic rifles
51 Chinese Communist sub-machine guns
1 machine gun
AMMUNITION*
100 mortar and artillery shells
111 grenades
1 mine
3. We have no way of knowing how complete the FANK
report may be. For example, no reference was made to possible
losses sustained when the VC/NVA overran the munitions storage
Chief., Logistics Branch
Specific types unidentified; total weight less than 1 ton.
SEC ET~o
SEE
25X1
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 Approved For Release 2006/01/03 : CIA-RDP78T02095R00g00070001-0
IM 70-70, Enemy Supply Losses in Cambodia 9 7 0
Unnumbered Copy to Sec. Laird
#1 - DD/OER file
#2 - Dr. Kissinger
#3 - Secretary Rogers
#4 - DepSec of Defense Packard
#5 - General Wheeler
#6 - DD/I
#7 - DDCI
#8 - DD/OER file . -l.~o~?p
#9 - John H. Holdridge, White House
#10 - OCI (f" Ri4y.Ge,n. Mikat-e.l()
#11 - r. Laurence Lynn, NSC
#12 - William H. Sullivan, State
#13 - H. Freeman Matthews, State
#14 - Ray Cline, State
#15 - William Gleysteen, State
#16 - Lt. Gen. Donald V. Bennett, Defense
#17 - MGen. Richard R. Stewart, Defense
#18 - Brig. Gen. George S. Blanchard, Defense
#19 - Brig. Gen. Jacob E. Glick, Defense
#20 - DD/OER file
#21 - ONE
#22 - D/OCI
#23 - OCI -
#24 - ch/ilu-l
#25 - SAVA
#26 - Ch/D/I
#27 - Ch/DDP/FE
#28 - I/TLC
#29-30 - I/L
#31 - I/SV
#32 - ONE
#33-5 - bt/p;;)
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 SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM
UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL X SECRET
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
TO
NAME AND ADDRESS
DATE
INITIALS
I
Chief. D/I
Z
G4
2
3
4
5
6
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL
DISPATCH
RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT
FILE
RETURN
CONCURRENCE
INFORMATION
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Remarks:
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N&AW
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
FROM. NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.
DATE
Chief, I/L, RM. 3G19, Hdqrs.
21 May '(
A rou .As$W ase 006 O't1O$IEIgD +MP7 O2
991 &20
070001-0 j
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Ap
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I6/fi-
1 RM 55 2AI REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.