ROAD WATCH COMPUTER PROGRAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000600470001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 18, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 1, 1968
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Road Watch Computer Program
September 1968
No Date
No Date
No Date
19 Sep 68
Automated Road Watch Data Operations Plan: 30-Day Trial,
to begin on 1 Nov 68
ANNEX L, Selected Summaries of Road Watch (Data
Compiled from CIA Messages
Table: Northwestern Laos (truck and troop movements)
(Ch/DDP Systems Group) Memo for Record re
Laos Road Watch Computer Program
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19 September 1968
SG-68/360
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT : Laos Road Watch Computer Program
1. Pursuant to the discussion with SAVA and OER on 17 September,
this is to outline for further review the circumstances regarding
Road Watch reporting/processing, and the possible equities in engaging
in a computer project related thereto. It is understood that
of SAVA will prepare the case for Mr. George
Carver's decision to commit SAVA resources. It is hoped that the
following will enable those concerned to size the problem sufficiently
to reach a decision within two weeks. .
2. RW reporting is received by cables daily from Vientiane in
the form of FOV's of varying precedence transformed into TDCS reports,
and disseminated normally to: DIA, the military services, DOD, JCS,
NMCC, NIC, NSA, SDO, CRS, NPIC/IAS, OER,,SAVA, nd various 25X1
FE division components.
3. On a suggestion from FE that this reporting be summarized by
the field in twice weekly summaries, the field has insisted that its
lateral customers (CINCPAC, MACV, etc.) insist on "real time" reporting.
At the Headquarters level, we have determined, however, that all re-
cipients, with the exception of OER are content, in fact welcome, weekly
summaries instead of the flood of daily cables reporting minutiae. OER
has to prepare weekly intelligence reports to the Watch Committee, White
House, and Paris which must, for policy reasons, be based on the Director's
assurance that the reports contain the intelligence available to Head-
quarters on Monday morning.
4. The field's need for lateral cable dissemination of this data
to military customers will continue to be honored. The CS would like
to find a more economical way of meeting users needs in Washington.
5,. A spot review by the undersigned in exploring the flow of RW
information and related activities revealed a high degree of redundant
exercise in many community offices, along with frustration by all con-
cerned with the .inabili=ty to fully cope manually with the volume of
f?n }- ~ y;~'' ~ LXCI ' v 1 n14".:112f1C{
2 3 SE ~0~ ,.v) ~~ G r ii u tii IBr nd #1
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detail reported. While I did not attempt to calculate man hours and
costs community wide, a general assessment of the current RW reporting
and data processing picture reveals, against the backdrop of a general
need for weekly summary information only: daily reading, distribution
and rereading by all the components cited in para. 2 above, plus varying
degrees of analysis, postin harting, calculation, summarizing and re-
reporting - all manual - by c OER, SAVA, OCI, Q NPIC/IAS, DIA 25X1
(including a machine program on MUSCLE SHOALS area), Defense Commo
Planning Group (DCA), and STAG (Str'ategy and Tactics Analysis Group -
Army). I would guess that another 2 dozen "war rooms" in Army, Navy, Air
and DOD units around town are massaging the same data and, worse, re-
porting it upwards without understanding the nature of the operational
collection problem.
6. Parenthetically, my visceral feel for this situation is that
data of significance to the Paris talks and the President is coming
through in such a form that is perforce being manhandled and mishandled
by so many diverse groups that figures of possible strategic and diplomatic
significance are reaching the top loaded with false, confirmation, over-
lap, and inaccuracy. Part of this may be based on "-;,handling of CIA re-
ports, part by confusion between RW team information and data collected
from PI, SI, sensor information and pilot observations.
7. Aside from the major question of accurate intelligence reporting,
insofar as the RW teams can be judged reasonably accurate given their
coveragepthere is the question of aggregate agency and community effort
in dealing with this reporting for whatever reason.
8. Just in terms of reading for distribution and redistribution,
and sheer paper flow we are talking about some degree of work in Cable
Secretariat, the IW, FE Division Reports, 1 I and all the customers. 25X1
The degree of redistribution in DOD is unknown. As a wild guess, probably
50 copies are ultimately made of every RW cable received. For every copy
made, someone's time is occupied to some extent.
9. In terms of anal sis and one or another level of posting and cal-
culation, we know that and OER put in fairly intensive effort for
different but largely overlapping purposes. SAVA does some posting and,
still within the Agency, OCI, NPIC and are believed to do some 25X1
data extraction. In the community, DIA and are processing the details,
and DCPG/DCA is reading if not processing.
10. The survey of this scene led us to postulate:
a., let's Non Dissem routine cabled RW reports
b. have one processing unit prepare weekly CS report to
community, with analytical notes
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c. have this weekly report ultimately prepared by computer
d. take advantage of many other potential but still unproven
capabilities of the computer in manipulating same data base for a variety
of field and Headquarters purposes.
e. related to all of above, take advantage of STAG's work in
developing a viable computer data base while,.(]) simplifying input
analysis, (2) adding a couple items of use to the DDP and DDI (team
identification and team reliability).
11:. The advantages of handling RW reporting in a computer system
a. Provides an economical means for eliminating one to several
daily and difficult to digest RW TDCS reports to a number of customers,
with related savings"a : message handling and reading throughout the
community.
b. Centralizes in the-hands of one or two experts the analysis
and summary of data for the entire community.
c. Capitalizes on STAG's work, allows research in the machine-
able data base back to 1966 to examine long termed trends in enemy activity
(insofar as the data is reliable) over any time period (night-day, by
route segment, by area, wet-dry season, etc,) using plotter display tech-
niques.
d. Allows for greater possibility of systematic detection of
anomolies in reporting (fabrication by or enemy control of team, new
routes, truck parks) for investigation by station.
e. Greater possibility detecting unusual activity/buildup taking
place in low increments of movement over relatively long time periods
which are not noticed normally by analysts concentrating on historically
significant infiltration routes.
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12. Component Responsibilities and Relationships:
a. DDPIthrough CS activities 25X1
response e or collection and reporting of RW info for
tactical.interdicition and OB reporting/analysis functions in the field,
(2) guidance to Cable Sec. and IW for dissem of intelligence to CIA and
community users, (3) analyzing utility of RW teams in terms of overall
Headquarters project management.
b. C/DDP Systems Group: on behalf FE Division, and the
Clandestine Services at large, responsible for developing the best
practical system to meet majority of needs (with or without computers)
with possible (but not highly probable) extension of data processing
activity to Udorn.
c. DDP/Records Integration Division (RID). Willing absorb key-
punching activity, at least on 3-4 months trial basis, without formality.
d. DDS&T/Office of Computer Services (OCS). Willing undertake
computer programing and processing to convert STAG mag tapes to CIA equip-
ment, add CIA desired features, prepare updated tape for STAG if latter
stays in business and has requirements, without formality.
e. OER. Responsible for.preparing up-to-date weekly reports on
traffic flow North to South Vietnam for Watch Committee, White House and
Paris.
f. SAVA. Selected posting most significant trend information,
overall cognizance relationship RW reporting to Vietnam war.
g. OCI. Requirements and manpower involved in RW analysis
not understood.
h. NPIC,
not known.
Degree of interest and manpower expended
i. TSD. Tangential but significant interest re: efficacy R&D
efforts sensors.
j. DIA. Much interest and manpower, little if any understanding
on our part of DIA's use of data beyond boilerplate presentations for
higher echelons.
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k. STAG. Much interest and work we can transfer directly;
no understanding STAG's role or impact in DOD or with JCS re. RW pro-
gram except informal comments to effect they think its best thing since
central heating in support air war in S. E. Asia.
13. The input analysis/coding is the key to operation of a viable
system serving in multiplicity of interests. 1/2 man year analyst ,
1/2 year typist, each with backup, essent If this commitment under-
taken, the other parties (DDP/SG, RID, FE IW, STAG, OCS) can continue
to handle and develop the system without recourse to further protocol/
red tape.
14. Some practicalities, which are the counter points to the ad-
vantages listed in,para. 10 above. The manpower figures are given
immediately above. From the time some unit agrees to test the computer
approach, probably one month will be required for analyst and typist
training, input forms design, output format design, computer programing
and processing debugging, and related procedural check&'before the system
works at a satisfactory level. Another three months will be required to
see how the system is paying off in the aggregate. At the end of this
time it could be determined that the old, sloppy, redundant method of
ad hoc dissemination is preferable to the organization, control and
patience required in developing and operating a computer system. One
thing for sure: if there is a reasonable belief that an integrated com-
puter system will pay off, it has to be paid for in development time and
manpower, with one manager clearly In charge.
15. Attached is a list of the officers concerned in each Headquarters
component.
Distribution:
C/SAVA OCS -
C/RID
C FE Reports TSD -
Chief, P Systems Group
OER EA/DDP
FE
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ANNEX L
Selected Summaries of Road Watch Q Data
Compiled from CIA Messages (U)
1. (S) GENEkL. The road watch computer routines. developed by STAG
for the last updating period, 1 March-30 September 1967, have been extensively
modified for this report. In addition, an extensive screening of all road
watch messages received by the Department of the Army disclosed that
numerous messages had not been received by STAG and therefore, the data
base was significantly incomplete. Subsequently, the missing messages were
obtained the data from the messages coded, and the data base tapes updated.
a. Two tapes are now on hand at STAG. The first tape covers
data for the period 1 September 1966 through 30 September 1967 and has
15,718 records. The second tape covers data for the period 1 October 1967
through 14 April 1968 and has 17,634 records. Data will continue to be
added to the second tape as it is coded and key punched. The basic tapes
are easily updated and added to, through an update program.
b. In addition to the basic tapes, two tapes have been
created from the basic tapes. These tapes have the same record infor-
mation as the basic tapes with a word added to each record that reflects
the numerical coordinate conversion of the UTM coordinate. These con-
verted tapes are the input for the six reports described in paragraph 2
below.
c. Since previously published information was incomplete, updated
reports for the previous report period, 1 March-30 September 1967, have
been published. These reports as well as reports for the period 1 September
1966-28 February 1967, are included in a Special Edition, Assessment of the
Air Effort in Vietnam and Laos (U), (September 1966-September 1967).
2. (S) COMPUZER ROUTINES. The following computer routines or
reports have been prepared by STAG to assist in analyzing data derived
from road watch messages.
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a. Report 1 is a chronological listing of all data by route,
river, or area.
b. Report 2 is divided into two parts. Part 1 lists all data
by route with the sequence by UTM coordinate from north to south.
Part 2 lists all data by route with the sequence by UTM coordinate from
east to west.
c. Report 3 is a monthly summation of movement activity by hour
and shows the direction of movement.
d. Report 4 is a monthly summation of movement activity by
route segment and the total movement activity for all segments of each
route or river. It shows direction and time of movement. Copies of this
report for selected routes and the Se Kong River are at appendix II.
e. Report 5 is a monthly summation of hours of observation and
hours on station for the road watch teams. It is su?med by route
segment and by route for each day of the month. Copies of this report
for, selected routes and the Se Kong River are at appendix III.
f. Report 6 is a periodic summary of movement activity and
observation effort for each route or river. Direction and time of move-
ment for each general category of movement activity as well as the amount
and percent that moved during the day or night are shown. Additionally,
the observation effort spent on each route is shown in number of hours and
percent of the total hours the teams were on station, as well as the total
hours available in the period. Copies of this report for all routes and
rivers are at appendix Zv.
3. (S) ROUTE SEGMENTS. To derive data adaptable to traffic
analysis, each reported route and river has been segmented in conformance
with the reconnaissance segments shown on the USARPAC base map, Edition 1,
May 1967, Standard Alignments, Designators, and Linear Segments. Each
segment follows the general configuration of the route or river and ex-
tends approximately 5-10 kilometers to either side. Some segments shown
on the USARPAC base map have been resegmented to provide more specific
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details of traffic activity. Computer programming limitations have
required that the segments be lettered consecutively beginning with the
letter A. To aid in specific identification of the route segment being
examined, the coordinates delineating the segment have been printed as
an extension of the segment identifier. The UTM 100,000 meter grid square
designator has been converted to a numE,rical equivalent in accordance
with the matrix at table L-1. The coordinates transmitted in road watch
messages have also been converted to numeric coordinates through a conversion
routine. The area programs then identify the message information by seg-
ment, and compile the data. Routes are readily identified by the actual
route number, except Route 19 (Cambodia) which is shown as Route 190 to
avoid confusion with Laotian Route 19. Rivers are identified by letter
designators as shown in table B-15, annex B, volume I.
4. (U) CODING. The codes used for designating types of movement
activity or lack of activity and for describing the loads carried by prime
movers and the movement activity, are those used in COACT III (see appendix
I). Additional codes that were used are shown below.
Fixed Targets
AASC AA searchlights
ARHp hospital
GE generator
CSEX construction site explosion
XP outpost
MVRS truck repair shop
EN engine
LA landslide
NONE no activity
UNTO unable to observe because of
weather
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 lettered consecutively beginning with the
identification of the route segment being
examined, the 'coordinates delineating the segment have been printed as
an extension of the segment identifier. The UTM 100,000 meter -rid square
designator has been converted to a numerical equivalent in accordance
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,with the matrixat table L-1. The coordinates transmitted in road watch
messages have also been converted't o numeric coordinates through a conversion
The area programs then identify the message information by seg-
and Compile the data. Routes are readily identified by the actual
route number, except Route 19 (Cambodia) which is shown as Route 190 to
avoid confusion with Laotian Route 19. Rivers are identified by letter
designators as shown in table B-15, annex E, volume I.
(U)' CODING. The codes used for designating types of movement
activity or lack of activity and for describing the loads carried by prime
d,' the'movement activity, are those used in COACT III (see appendix
.Additional codes that were used are shown below.
AA searchlights
hospital
generator
construction site explosion
outpost
truci repair shop
engine
landslide
no activity
unable to observe because of
weather
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Fixed 'carne
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Numerical
16
Equivalent
Table L-1--(U) UTM 100,000 Meter Grid Squire Numerical
Conversion Matrix (U)
47a 48a.
T
;>
_4
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 X25 26
z
Q R S T U V W X Y Z
E
K 24
D
j 23
C
H 22
Qa B
C 21 Qa
A
F 20
V
E 19
U
D 18
T
C 17
S
B 16
R
A 15
Q
v 14 P
a
P
P
U 13
0
T 12
J
S 11
aGrid Zone Designator
bPrefix Letters identifying the 100,000 meter grid square.
Sample: 48QVG 600 550 equates to 48Q 22600 21550. As in map read-
ing, the matrix should be read right and up.
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Movable Targets
MSIAR armored car
MVPC personnel carrier
TCHB coolies
TCAN pack animals
TCCT push or pull cart
TCBY bicycles
TCBM
TSNV
TS PL
TS CH
TOFF
motor bikes
NVN troops
PL troops
Chinese troops
officials
Cargo or Activity Describer
antiaircraft artillery
armed Chinese
armed Pathet Lao
ammunition
armed NVN
armed personnel
food
generator
hand tools
crew served weapons
POL drums
individual weapons
other supplies
empty
unarmed personnel
UU unidentified cargo
WP wounded personnel
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County
Cambodia
China
Laos
North Vietnam
South Vietnam
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COACT Codes (U)
1. (U) TARGET TYPE, FIXED TARGETS CODES
AA/AAA Site (Unidentified)
AAAW Automatic Weapons
AAFL Flak Trap
AAFC Coastal Gun Emplacements
RASA Surface to Air Missile (Unidentified)
AAS1 SA1
AAS2 SA2
AAS 3
SA3
AASP SAM Support Facility
AASM Small Arms
AA37 37mm
AA57 57mm
AA85 8 5zmun
100mm
Air Field
Anchorage
AR Area/Depot
ARAM Ammo
ARBA Barracks
ARCM Communications
ARFO Fortified
ARHQ Headquarters
ARMI Military
AROR Ordnance
ARPO POL/Tank Farm
ARSG Staging
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CODE
ARSP Supply
ARST Storage Supply
ARVL Vulnerable
ARWA
AT
BF
Base
Warehouse Area
Antenna
Bunkering Facility (POL)
BSAY Army
BSNA Navy/Naval
BSAB Air Force
BL Building
BLAM Ammo
BLBA Barracks
BLBU Bunker
BLCM Communications
BLCO Control (incl Control Number)
BLGE Generator
BLHA Hangar
BLHQ Headquarters
BLHT Hut
BLPW Power House
BLPU Pump House
BLRA Radar
BLST Storage, Warehouse, Supply
BLWA Warehouse
BR Bridge
BRAP Bridge Approach
BRHI Highway
BRBP Bridge Bypass
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CODE
BRRR Railroad
BRFT Foot Bridge
BRRH Railroad and Highway
BRSH Bridge Section/Span (Hwy)
BRUW Underwater
BRSR Bridge Section/Span (RR)
BRPN Pontoon
BROW Causeway
BV Bivouac
CG Cooling Towers
CP Command Post
Construction Site
Cave
Choke Point
DA Dam
DD Dry Dock
DR Drum (POL)
DK Dike
EC Camp
EL Launcher (Missile)
FY Ferry
FYAP Ferry Approach
FYLA Ferry Landing
FYSL Ferry Slip
FD Ford
IS Island
LK Lock
LV Levee
MP Mountain Pass
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Marine Pailway
Minefield Land
Minefield Water
Mineable Area
NF Naval Support Facility
PL Plant
PLCE Chemical
PLEX Explosives
PLCE Coal
PF Port Facility
PP Pipeline
Pier
Power (Electric)
PWHY Hydro Power Plant
PWTH Thermal Power Plant
PWTM Transformer
PWLN Lines
Station
Road
Road Intersection
Refinery (POL)
Runway
RA Radar
RAFF Flat Face
RAEW Early Warning
RAKR Knife Rest
RAFC Fire Control
RASH Skin Head
RAGC GCI
L-I-4
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CODE
RAHF Height Finding
RAED Surface Search
RAEE Fan Son;
RAEF Spoon Rest
RRYD
RRTK
RRRS
Revertment
Railroad
Yard
Track
Repair Shop
RRES Station
RRCY Classification Yard
RRSD Siding
RRSR Spur Line
RRMA Main Line
RO Radio
SC Searchlight
SI Sil.o
SP Supplies (Misc)
SY Shipyard
TW Tower
TP Truck Park/Stop
TN Tank (POL)
TU Tunnel
TH Trenches
TR Transfer/Transshipment Point
UN Unknown/Unidentified
WF Wharf
RAMC Mooncone
RABL Barlock
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CODE
RASR SRO-2
RARS Rock/Stonecake
RAOE One Eye
RACU Crossup
RAIF 660 Iff
RASN Sidenet
SF Sensor Field
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2. (U) TARGET TYPE MOVABLE TARGET CODES
CODE
AC Aircraft (Unidentified)
ACDU Dummy
ACFF Fighter
ACBM Bomber
ACTB Trainer
ACTC Transport
Helicopter
Motor Vehicle (Unidentified)
MVBZ Bus
MVCJ Car
MVMI Military (Unidentified)
MVDU Dummy
MVEQ Equipment, Construction, Bulldozers, Graders, etc.
MVTY Tank
MVTN Tank Truck (POL)
MVET Transporter
MVTX Truck
MVVA Van (Comm, Radar, Trailer w/1 Cab, etc.)
MVCK Vehicle Convoy
RV Railroad Vehicles (Unidentified)
RVBO Boxcar/Freight Car
RVCF Crane Car
RVFC Flat Car
RVLM Locomotive
RVTN Tank Car (POL)
RVTI Train (Unidentified or Mixed)
RVTJ Train Passenger
RVTQ Train Freight
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CODE
RVWC Work Cars
WV Water Vehicles (Unidentified)
WVBL Cargo Barge
WVBG Barge
WVBP POL Barge
WVBT Boat (Unidentified)
WVDG Dredge
WVFR Freighter
WVFY Ferry
WVJK Junk
WVJC Cargo Junk
WVLC Landing Craft/Landing Ship
WVCL Logistics Craft
WVLR Lighter
WVPC Patrol Craft
WVGB Gunboat
WVPN Pontoons
WVRT Raft
WVYP Patrol Boat
WVPT Torpedo Boat (PT)
WVSK Sampan
INSS Ship
WVUB Submarine
WVSZ Swatow
WVTN Tanker
WVUO Tug
TS Troops (Unknown Number)
TSDV Division (6000)
TSRG Regiment (1500)
TSBT Battalion (400)
L-I-B
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TSCO Company (100)
TSPT Platoon (33)
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C r"-RD NUM.EE R.
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 CARD NUMBER.
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05: CIA-RDP78TO2
Approved For Release 2006/10/05: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600470001-1
 Approved For Release 2006/10/05: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600470001-1
Automated Road Watch Data
Operations Plan: 30-Day Trial
I. Background.
As'a result of a preliminary analysis of the Laos road watch
data processing system currently in use within the Agency, it was decided
that the automated processing begun by the Strategic and Tactical Analysis
Group (STAG) should be adopted here, if certain feasibility and desirability
conditions were met.
A. Feasibility Conditions
more current, cheaper, more accurate, or provide
;,,Approve:dFar,R :4 es ;~OQ611OIQ l
1. That manpower inputs be sufficient to maintain a
currency for the rc2ort consistent with the currency
now achieved through the manual system. Manpower
inputs include both analytical (coding and validation) and
machine formatting (keypunch and processing).
2. That data processing (computer) priorities be assigned
so as to be compatible with Feasibility Ghndition 1.
B. Desirability Conditions
1. Exchange Optimality; that is, that no current consumer--
DDI, DDP, DOD, etc. -- be worse off as a result of the
shift to automated processing. This condition is not trivial
due to the fact that manpower inputs are to be obtained
from consumer components.
Y
2. That the automated system provide information that is
 Approved For Release 2006/10/05: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000600470001-1
Approved For Release 2006/1010 -CIA- ' (` S :C7'f 14700? -
analytical support for an intelligence problem in a
manner not previously available.
II. Manpower & Data Flows for the 30-Day. Trial
1. The 30-day trial should begin on 1 November 1968. The
information flow now supporting the production of OER's weekly traffic
report will not be altered; thus providing a dual capability -- manual and
semi-automated -- during the trial period.
2. Since the final deadline for the OER summary report is
1200 each Monday, computerized reports will be scheduled for production
on 8, 15, 22, & 29 November, the Fridays preceding the Monday due dates.
will be assigned the task of coding the raw
reports received Monday through Friday, assembling the coding sheets and
arranging for key punch and processing operations.
4. OER will be assigned the task of coding the raw reports
received on Saturday and Sunday and of reviewing the Friday report for
general (not detailed) accuracy.
 Approved For Release 2006/10/05: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000600470001-1
BEST COPY
Available
Approved For Release 2006/10/05: CIA-RDP78T02095R000600470001-1
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Approved For Release 2006/10/05 CIA-RDP78T02095R000600470001-1
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 A roved For Relew R6/10/05: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000600470001-1
^ UNCLAI~E ^ USE ONLY El CONFIDENTIAL ^ SECRET
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
FROM: DDP/
1-H-
LJ
511
3
EXTENSION
NO.
-
DATE
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE
OFFICER'S
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
INITIALS
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
OER/I/L
25X1
2. 1 Li Z14
3.
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4.
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Ccr
6.
7.
B.
10.
11.
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FORM 61 O USE PREVIOUS SECRET F1 CONFIDENTIAL INTERNAL n UNCLASSIFIED
3-62 EDITIONS 0~'
Approve or Release 200710/05: CIA-RDP78T0 5 08K4700 1