SOVIET SEA POWER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A004700130004-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Sequence Number: 4
• Content Type: REPORT

"r 5 February 1965
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5 February 1965
Having constructed an impressive force of com-
plex modern warships--including the largest subma-
rine force in the world--the Soviets are increasing
their ability to operate this force effectively.
Most important in this respect, they are going to
sea. in greater numbers and at greater distances
from the Soviet Union than ever before. Soviet
surface ships and submarines are operating frequently
in the Mediterranean and Norwegian seas, a.nd Soviet
submarines now are deploying out to sea. on train-
ing and probably operational patrols.
Nevertheless, the lack of an effective antisub-
marine warfare program and the absence of support
from aircraft carriers and seagoing supply ships
make the USSR vulnerable to US Polaris missile at-
tack and virtually preclude sustained Soviet sur-
face-fleet operations at great distances from the
USSR. Despite these and other disadvantages im-
posed by geography and inexperience, however, ex-
panding Soviet naval and maritime strength promises
to be of growing importance in the equation of
power between East and West.
Growth of Soviet Sea. Power
Following the unimpressive
performance of the Soviet Navy
in World War II, Soviet leaders
realized that a. strong navy would
be an important factor in their
drive to gain recognition of
their great power status. In
less than a. decade the USSR de-
veloped, the second largest fleet
in the world and continued to
mainta.i.n the largest submarine
force. By Stalin's death in
1953, the naval development pro-
gram was well advanced; nine
cruisers had been completed,
construction had begun on two of
a programed four hea.vy cruisers,
and construction of aircraft
carriers was reportedly planned.
The Soviet Navy was becoming a
force which might eventually
attempt to contest control of
the high seas as well as defend
the USSR against attack.
Shortly after Stalin's
death, however, the changes
brought about by the advent of
atomic power began to cause doubt
about fundamental assumptions
on which the naval building pro-
gram had been based. By the
end of 1955, construction of
cruisers ceased, and it became
apparent to Western observers
that no carriers were to be built.
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JAMTY VERSUS 0UANTJ
The old 16,000-ton SVERDLOV-class light cruiser with its four, triple mounted
6-inch guns is for outclassed in firepower by the new 5,000-ton KYNDA-class
guided-missile frigate with its one dual surface-to-air and two quadruple surface-
to-surface missile launchers.
Submarine construction declined
sharply in 1957 after the com-
pletion of the "W" and "Q"
classes and the construction of
a. record 83 submarines in 1956
--more than any other nation
has ever built in a, single year.
Soviet leaders apparently
recognized that earlier plans
to wage an active contest for
control of the sea. were unreal-
istic. Nuclear warfare had
created an entirely new situa-
tion in which submarines could
serve as strategic weapons; and
small, missile-equipped surface
ships could become the equal
of much larger conventionally
armed vessels. Quality could
count for as much as quantity.
Although the Soviet Navy would
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retain its traditional missions
of interdicting the enemy's sea.
communications, defending the
littoral of the USSR, and sup-
porting the seaward flanks of
the Red Army, its basic mission
was to be expanded to include
the strategic defense of the
USSR against seaborne nuclear
attack. and the launching of
missile attacks against enemy
territory.
It was not until 1958, how-
ever, that these new concepts
were reflected in the introduc-
tion of new ships, armament,
and propulsion plants. These
were eventually to include con-
ventional and nuclear-powered
submarines equipped with ballis-
tic- or cruise-type surface-to-
surface missiles, gas turbine
propulsion systems, new torpedoes
and antisubmarine weapons, and
surface ships equipped with sur-
face-to-surface and surface-to-
air missiles.
Soviet Naval Strengths
Today the Soviet Navy, in
addition to possessing the
world's largest submarine and
mine warfare forces, has the
most ships with surface -to-sur-
face missiles, the only missile-
armed patrol boats, and the
only cruise-missile-equipped
submarines capable of attacking
both shore targets and surface
ships at ranges up to 450 miles.
After a late start, and partly
as a, result of delays in the US
program, the number of Soviet
nuclear submarines now about
equals that of the US. The So-
viet fleet currently comprises
about 390 submarines; 19 cruis-
ers, two of them equipped with
guided missiles; 24 guided-mis-
sile destroyers; 140 other de-
stroyers and destroyer escorts;
and 2,700 patrol, mine warfare,
amphibious, and auxiliary ves-
sels including 140 guided-mis-
sile patrol boats.
Having begun to construct
such an impressive array of
complex modern warships, the
Soviets sought to increase their
ability to operate those forces
more effectively. Although the
Soviets missed many of the les-
sons learned by other navies
during World War II, they made
strenuous efforts to overcome
their deficiencies. Operating
areas were expanded and joint
training exercises held. So-
viet submarines began more ex-
tended operations.
Since 1963, Soviet naval
vessels of all kinds have been
going to sea. in greater numbers
and at greater distances from
the USSR than ever before. Since
June 1964, Soviet surface ship
and submarine detachments have
been operating frequently in the
Mediterranean and extensive ex-
ercises have been conducted in
the Norwegian Sea.
In addition, the navy is
being used more extensively for
diplomatic purposes. During
the past year, Soviet naval ves-
sels ma.de formal port calls to
Denmark, Norway, Yugoslavia,
Rumania., and Bulgaria; and So-
viet naval research ships visited
a. number of African countries
in addition to Canada., the UK,
and the US.
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One of 10 H -class nuclear-powered submarines capable of surface-launching
three- 350-mile ballistic missiles; a few of these subs have probably been modified
for underwater launch of a 700-mile ballistic missile,
Twenty-seven of these conventionally powered G-1 class submarines are be-
lieved to be operational; they were built to fire three 350-mile ballistic missiles
from the sail area while surfaced.
Four cruise missiles, probably with 450-mile ranges, can be surface -launched
from the hulls of the 12 conventionally powered J-class submarines in-the Soviet
Navy;
BALLISTIC MISSILE
10
35
45
CRUISE MISSILE
16
25
41
TORPEDO ATTACK
15
292
307
TOTAL
41
352
393
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Perhaps the most significant
development of all, however, has
been the tremendous expansion
of the Soviet maritime fleet.
The USSR, traditionally a, land
power and one of the world's
most self-sufficient nations,
historically has found little
need for a merchant marine. Fol-
lowing 'World War II, however,
its expanding foreign trade and
aggressive foreign policy led
to the enlargement of its almost
nonexistent merchant fleet.
Since 1952, that fleet has more
than doubled in tonnage, and
since 1962 alone the USSR has
risen from eleventh to sixth
place among the world's maritime
powers. Present construction
rates and overseas orders sug-
gest that the announced Soviet
intention to have the largest
and youngest merchant fleet in
the world by 1980 could be
achieved.
While the economic impor-
tance of this fleet is readily
apparent, there are also a num-
ber of military advantages.
Most of the new ships have suf-
ficient speed, endurance, and
capacity to contribute to mili-
tary sealift capabilities. The
delivery of Soviet military equip-
ment to non-Communist countries
is almost wholly dependent on
Soviet bottoms. The merchant
service could also supply a.uxil-
ia.ries and experienced seamen
to the na.vy in time of war, and
provide early warning informa-
tion on the movements of Western
air and naval forces during the
initial stages of hostilities.
Merchant ships can provide
logistic support to submarine
patrols and can be used to sup-
port a, variety of operations in
other countries.
In spite of the expanding
size and capabilities of Soviet
naval and maritime forces since
World War II, a. number of sig-
nificant weaknesses remain. Not
the least of these are geographic.
The USSR's four widely separated
fleets cannot provide effective
mutual support, have few points
of access to the open sea., are
frequently hampered by poor
weather, and are limited by vul-
nerable lines of communications
to their rear support areas.
The conservative tactics
and defensive strategy which
so severely limited the effec-
tiveness of the Soviet Navy in
World War II continue to influ-
ence Soviet naval operations
today. For example, Soviet
naval strategy still does not
call for naval forces sufficient
to move amphibious ground forces
overseas against enemy opposi-
tion or to protect sea communi-
cations to distant areas 1
In addition to these inher-
ent weaknesses, Soviet emphasis
on submarine warfare, the ab-
sence of carrier-based air sup-
port, and the lack of adequate
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25A1
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afloat logistic support virtually
preclude sustained wartime opera-
tions by surfa.ce forces at great
distances from the USSR. The
surface fleet ca.nnot carry the
battle to the enemy, and in
spite of some improvements in
sealift capabilities--including
the re-establishment of the Na.-
val Infantry--the Soviets do
not appear to be developing sea.
escort capabilities which might
make such long-range operations
possible.
herited from World War II as
well as by a. certain lack of
confidence in the reliability
of their vessels.
Probably the Soviet Navy's
most significant weakness, how-
ever, lies in its almost com-
plete inability to detect and
destroy enemy submarines
Despite recent So-
viet claims to the contrary, US
Polaris submarines could expect
to operate almost unopposed in
the event of hostilities, at
least in the near future.
Current Soviet submarine
operations also suggest that,
in spite of more extensive op-
erations, Soviet submariners
continue to be restricted by
the conservative traditions in-
Future of Soviet Sea Power
It is within the USSR's
industrial and technological
capabilities to overcome many
of these weaknesses should it
decide to do so. Despite this
capability, however, the indi-
cations are that the numerical
strength and, except for a.ddi-
tional guided-missile units,
the over-all composition of So-
viet surface forces will remain
fairly stable over the next few
years. The naval air arm will
probably be strengthened some-
what, however, by the introduc-
tion of additional supersonic-
da.sh Blinder medium bombers and
by the development of a new anti-
ship a.ir-to-surface missile.
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Soviet submarine capabili-
ties will probably be improved
before long by the introduction
of faster, quieter, and deeper-
diving nuclear submarines--per-
ha.ps able to achieve speeds of
more than 25 knots and depths
of 1,500 feet. The Soviets may
also be developing a. new, nu-
clear-powered ballistic-missile
submarine, and by 1970 could
probably develop an underwater-
launched ballistic missile with
a. range up to 2,000 miles--more
than enough for Soviet needs.
Soon thereafter, and perhaps
earlier, Soviet missile subma-
rines will probably be conduct-
ing patrols well into the North
Atlantic, the Pacific, and pos-
sibly the Mediterranean.
The Soviets will almost
certainly take steps to improve
their ASW capabilities in the
coining years. They may attempt
the development of a ship- or
submarine-launched antisubma-
rine missile and will probably
place increased emphasis on the
use of submarines in ASW.
In addition, the Soviets
will probably continue their
efforts to improve their amphib-
ious capabilities. With the im-
provement of their inland water-
ways and construction of better
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icebreakers, they are already
attempting to overcome some of
the disadvantages imposed by
geography.
Although improvements are
being made, the Soviets are not
likely to develop an effective
ASW capability or a significant
amphibious force in the foresee-
able future, and show no signs
of developing a.ir cover for sup-
port of long-range naval opera-
tions. However, the size and
increasing capability of the
Soviet submarine force, the
growing firepower of the USSR's
missile-equipped surface ships
and shore-based bomber aircraft,
and a. large naval shipbuilding
capacity make Soviet naval and
maritime power a, force of grow-
ing importance in the equation
of power between East and West.
In spite of the disadvantages
of geography, inexperience, and
imbalance, the Soviet Navy is
able to defend against surface-
borne attack by Western naval
nuclear strike forces--especially
carrier task forces--and, with
its expanding missile submarine
fleet, is increasing its capa-
bility to launch nuclear attacks
a.za.inst distant land targets.
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