SOUTH AFRICA ON THE EVE OF ELECTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A005200070002-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 30, 2006
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 25, 1966
• Content Type: REPORT

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South African Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd
is expected to lead the National Party (NP) to an
increased parliamentary majority in the general
elections on 30 March. The white voters' approval
of his stand on Rhodesia and the opposition's in-
effectiveness assure a continuation of the present
government and its policies. Several current and
pending international problems will test South Af-
rica'g ability to keep at bay the African nations
calling for an end to white rule in southern Af-
rica. Verwoerd has reluctantly become involved in
the Rhodesian crisis and faces the prospect of an
adverse ruling by the International Court of Jus-
tice (ICJ) on South Africa's Mandate in South-West
Africa. The future independence of three adjoin-
ing Bantu nations may further complicate matters.
The NP held 105 of 156 seats
in the previous House of Assem-
bly, and used this majority in
gerrymandering constituencies to
improve its chances in the com-
ing election. In the process
the House has been expanded to
166 seats.
The opposition United
Party (UP), which held 50 seats,
lacks dynamic leadership and a
real alternative policy to
Verwoerd's apartheid (racial
separateness.) It is losing
ground to the NP even in many
traditional UP districts. The
dichotomy between the Afrikaner
NP and the predominantly English-
speaking UP, which formerly
served as the basis for a two-
party system in the white-ruled
state, has been reduced by the
increasing white support for
Verwoerd's efforts to preserve
the Europeans' preferential po-
sition.
Helen Suzman, the only rep-
resentative of the relatively
liberal Progress Party (PP) and
the government's only effective
critic in Parliament will prob-
ably not be re-elected.
Two recently formed racist
parties are opposing the NP from
the right. They are not likely
to win any seats this time, but
they have considerable future
potential for playing on the
whites' racial fears.
The nonwhites, who make up
81 percent of the South African
population, have no voting rights
in the national elections. In
a separate election, the mixed-
blood "Coloureds" in Cape Prov-
ince will elect four white rep-
resentatives. South Africa's
Communist Party was outlawed in
1950. The various nonwhite sub-
versive organizations, with few
current assets inside the country,
are forced to operate from weak
positions abroad.
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Verwoerd has won wide sup-
port in the white community by
his delicate handling of the
Rhodesian problem. His policy
balances several conflicting
pressures: the emotional iden-
tification of most white South
Africans with Ian Smith's rebel
regime; the need to preserve
amicable relations with Britain,
which is leading the campaign
against Smith; a fear of being
identified abroad as Rhodesia's
sole prop, a development which
could lead to increased pressure
for sanctions against South Af-
rica; and apprehension that the
successful use of sanctions
against Rhodesia might set a
dangerous precedent for those
who want to apply sanctions
against South Africa.
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Initially, Verwoerd prob-
ably thought that Smith could
survive without much help from
Pretoria. The UP, however, im-
mediately seized upon the Rho-
desian crisis as an election
issue and has been accusing
Verwoerd of coolness toward the
embattled Europeans of Rhodesia.
For the first three months
after the Rhodesian declaration
of independence, Verwoerd fol-
lowed a policy of minimal offi-
cial involvement. South Africa,
he said, would pursue a policy
of "business as usual," i.e.,it
would not participate in sanc-
tions against Rhodesia and would
trade with all comers--Zambia
as well as Rhodesia. It was not
immediately clear whether "busi-
ness as usual" implied freezing
trade at previous levels and
discouraging private efforts to
send strategic materials such
as oil to Rhodesia. Verwoerd
also presented himself as a
statesman pursuing South Afri-
ca's own national interests and
--ironically for an Afrikaner
nationalist--devoted to the pres-
ervation of its close relation-
ship with Britain.
ipation in the boycott. Indi-
vidual whites all over South
Africa took this as the green
light for an oil-for-Rhodesia
campaign. This drive has re-
sulted in the shipment of pri-
vate contributions of oil. Al-
though quantities thus sent are
small; compared with Rhodesia's
requirements, amounts have been
discreetly sent by firms which
seized the opportunity to profit
from the situation. Oil from
South African sources has not
yet been enough to meet even
the minimal needs of Rhodesia,
but it has stretched the Rho-
desian reserves and taken some
of the pressure off the Smith
government's efforts to find a
regular supply of its own.
Despite Verwoerd's evident
belief that South Africa should
help preserve white rule in
neighboring territories, he ap-
parently will try to keep his
government's official involve-
ment to a minimum. The scope
of the involvement will be gov-
erned by a desire to avoid pres-
sure for increased sanctions
against South Africa.
When by mid-February Smith
had still not broken the oil
embargo, Verwoerd, with his cus-
tomary good timing in domestic
politics, further deflated the
UP's sails by clarifying his
policy a trifle. "Business as
usual," he said, did not pre-
clude normal efforts to increase
trade, and any limitation of
goods shipped to Rhodesia would
amount to South African partic-
South Africa has been able
to stand up well against the
sanctions already imposed because
of its racial policies. The UN-
sponsored military equipment boy-
cott has been ineffectual, in
spite of participation by most
major nations, because of the ad-
vanced munitions and armament in-
dustry in South Africa and the
design and production assistance
of France and Italy, which are
not fully participating in the
boycott.
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The trade boycott imposed
three years ago by the Afro-
Asian and Communist countries
has only produced pinpricks in
the South African hide. Ver-
woerd fears only Anglo-Ameri-
can action similar to those
measures being applied against
Rhodesia as a result of Afro-
Asian pressure. The bulk of
South African trade and foreign
investment comes from Britain
and the US.
If the situation in Rho-
desia should be at a fever pitch
at the same time the ICJ promul-
gates an unfavorable decision
on South Africa's mandate in
South-West Africa, which is ex-
pected this summer, other Af-
rican nations would increase
their agitation for reform in
South Africa.
Article 2 of the League of
Nations Mandate of 1919 requires
that South Africa "shall promote
to the utmost the material and
moral well-being and social
progress of the inhabitants." of
South-West Africa. The ICJ held
in 1950 that the mandate issued
under the League of Nations re-
mained valid notwithstanding the
league's demise. It is now de-
liberating charges brought in
1962 by former league members,
Ethiopia and Liberia, that South
African administration of South-
West Africa violates the terms
of the mandate.
South Africa has made a far
abler presentation of its case
than have the lawyers represent-
ing the plaintiffs. Most observ-
ers nevertheless believe that
the decision will go against the
South Africans in view of politi-
cal influences which may affect
the judges. The court may, how-
ever, allow South Africa room to
maneuver and delay implementation
of any recommended reforms.
Other African nations are
likely to use the decision as
a battle standard in their-ef-
forts to terminate the practice
of apartheid in South Africa.
Some are likely to call for Secu-
rity Council action under Chapter
VII of the UN Charter by declar-
ing the improper administra-
tion of South-West Africa a
threat to peace demanding mili-
tary or economic sanctions, or
both.
Pressure would quickly cen-
ter on Britain and the US. As
permanent members of the Security
Council their votes would be es-
sential for approval of any sanc-
tions. As South Africa's top
trading partners and the source
of most of the country's outside
capital, their full support of
economic sanctions would be vital
to make them even partially ef-
fective. In the military sphere
the African nations are also likely
to be ineffective by themselves
against South Africa's well-
trained and well-equipped forces.
Independence of
High Commission Territories
Verwoerd's interpretation of
apartheid as a racial policy allowing
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separate but equal development
of native areas will be tested
as Bechuanaland, Basutoland,
and Swaziland approach independ-
ence.. These almost totally
African-populated states were
long ruled by London through
its high commissioner in Pretoria,
and thus have been known as the
High Commission Territories.
Bechuanaland becomes inde-
pendent as Botswana on 30 Septem-
ber. Basutoland and Swaziland
are likely to follow in a year
or two. These small nations
will, however, depend upon South
African good will to a degree
not really commensurate with in-
dependence. Most of their trade
will still be with South Africa,
and a large part of their work-
ing force will continue to cross
the border occasionally to spend
six to ten months in the South
African mines, industries, and
farms.
The independence of these
states nearly fits the theory
of apartheid, which, at least
in theory, allows for the even-
tual independence of small un-
productive native areas in South
Africa such as the Transkei
within a federation with the re-
maining white regions. The criti-
cal difference is the actuality
of complete de jure independence.
Some consider this a threat to
South Africa's domestic racial
policy. The emerging right-wing
opposition to Verwoerd in South
African politics already consid-
ers his version of apartheid a
dangerous departure from the old
."Baaskap" policy of keeping the
African in his place. If Ver-
woerd feels forced to make fur-
ther gestures to the right, he
might blatantly offend the
nominally independent neighbor-
ing states by refusing to grant
their nonwhite representatives
in South Africa the normal ameni-
ties. So far Pretoria has re-
ceived no diplomats from black-
ruled states. This would raise
a perplexing dilemma for Britain,
which would feel obliged to
stand up for its former terri-
tories without forcing a show-
down with South Africa.
In general, only a surpris-
ing reversal in next week's elec-
tions would alter the Verwoerd
government's course of entrench-
ing itself behind the barriers
of its own racial policy without
regard for foreign criticism.
Verwoerd's own efficient secu-
rity apparatus is fully capable
of quelling any manifestations
of domestic discontent by the
black masses. Despite the awk-
wardness in the approaching in-
dependence of the High Commission
Territories, Pretoria is well
able also to withstand pressure
from other African states. It
is girding itself also to sur-
vive if Western nations impose
further sanctions, and the ris-
ing prosperity of South African
whites suggests that Verwoerd
will proceed confidently along
established policy lines.
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