NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A030600010026-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 15, 2006
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: March 15, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

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Wednesday 15 March 1978 CG NIDC 78/061C
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CIA-RDP79T00975AO30600P
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National Intelligence Daily Cap lp for Wednesday, 15 March 1978.
25X1
The N a e is for the purpose o in orming
senior US o icials.
CONTENTS
USSR-ETHIOPIA: Soviet Reaction
NAMIBIA: Political Decisions
CHAD: Situation Report
WEST GERMANY: Labor Problems
SPAIN-UK: Gibraltar Talks
CHINA: New Defense Minister
Ar ina
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//In a conversation with Ambassador Toon on
Monday, Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko refused
to discuss reducing the Soviet and Cuban presence in Ethiopia
or stationing UN observers in the Ogaden. Korniyenko's unyield-
ing comments were the most authoritative defense in recent
weeks of Soviet policy on the Ethiopian-Somali conflict.//
//Korniyenko, whose demeanor was described as
"tough" and "brusque" by the Ambassador, argued that any dis-
cussion of the Cuban presence in Ethiopia or of a UN presence
there would have to be with the parties directly involved. He
implied that a US request for a reduction of Soviet and Cuban
forces in Ethiopia was improper and rhetorically asked what
the US response would be to a Soviet demand that the US reduce
its personnel in Iran.//
//The official also accused the US of distorting
the USSR's position in leaks to Western media, particularly the
notion that Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin had "reacted positively"
to the idea of reducing the Soviet and Cuban presence in Ethi-
opia. Korniyenko said this is not a matter for Soviet-US dis-
cussion and implied that there would be no reduction in force
levels as long as Somalia refuses to renounce its claim to the
Ogaden.
//South African Leaders seem to be weighing do-
mestic political considerations and what they believe are changes
in US attitudes about current developments in Africa before
deciding whether to proceed unilaterally with a program for
Namibian independence. The US Embassy in Cape Town estimates
the odds as Less than even that South Africa will accept the
Western .settlement proposal as it is now drafted.//
//Recent informal discussions between South Afri-
can diplomats and Western envoys indicate that South Africa
is determined to maintain a military presence strong enough
to cope either with truce violations by the South-West Africa
People's Organization or with actions by the proposed UN peace-
keeping force that the South Africans judge to be contrary to
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their interests. The South Africans are adamant that their
residual force remain until an independent government is es-
tablished, instead of leaving shortly after an election as the
Western plan prescribes. They have shown some flexibility, how-
ever, on other parts of the complex proposal.//
//Foreign Minister Roelof B th
that, if a settlement is achieved, his leadingproleninytheplong,
hard bargaining will put him in line for eventual top leadership
in South Africa. As a newcomer to the cabinet, however, Botha
must solicit backing for a settlement not only from Prime Minis-
ter Vorster but also from several veteran cabinet ministers who
have far greater influence than Botha does in the ruling National
Party. The strongest of these are Minister of Defense Pieter
Botha and Minister of Information and Plural Relations Mulder.
Mulder, regarded as the most likely successor to Vorster, is
among the more conservative members of the cabinet.//
//The Minister of Defense n
d
b
o
ou
t will insist
that the settlement terms preserve South Africa's capability
for effective military action in Namibia until there is a re-
liable new government. The conservatives in the cabinet and in
Parliament are very likely to be sympathetic to appeals from
white hard-liners in Namibia, who advocate breaking off settle-
ment talks and proceeding with a unilateral program that gives
priority to white interests in the territory.//
//The Embassy reports that South Af
i
r
cans also are
speculating whether recent developments in the Horn of Africa
and Rhodesia may modify Western policy toward Namibia.//
//Many South Africans believe that the US is
a opting a tougher policy toward Soviet and Cuban involvement
in Africa, but they draw various inferences. Some South Afri-
cans apparently think the US and other Western sponsors of the
Namibian settlement talks may now tolerate a South African uni-
lateral solution in Namibia. Others believe that heightened
Western wariness of the Communist threat may make it safer for
South Africa to accept the Western settlement package, arguing
.that the West can now be trusted not to condone truce violations
by SWAPO.//
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(C NF) //The Embassy has learned from sources in the South
African Parliament that a debate on Namibia is not likely until
after the Easter recess, scheduled for 16 to 28 March. The
debate on the government's budget immediately after the recess
will afford opposition leaders an opportunity to demand a
policy statement on Namibia.
CHAD: Situation Report
I The French Embassy in Chad believes that French re-
inforcements now posted in the north will stabilize the miZi-
tary situation there. Tensions in the Chadian yulinqcouncil
continue, however, and there are rumors of coup plotting against
President MaZZoum.
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France has sent airborne troo
s and l
i
p
eg
onnaires, in-
cluding some veterans of earlier service in Chad, directly to
outposts at Moussoro, Mongo, and Abeche along with helicopters.
The primary mission of the French force at Abeche is to protect
the airfield and to ensure the security of French citizens there.
France has also stationed four transport aircraft at Ndjamena to
support the Chadian Army.
The French Ambassador told the US Ambassad
th
or
at
France would send more forces if those already there were not
sufficient. He said the outcome of the French election would
not affect his government's support for Chad and noted that
French Socialist leader Mitterrand has no use for Libyan
President Qadhafi, who is supporting the insurgents. He remarked
it is important that the Chadian Government receive some real
sign of US support.
Qadhafi's real intentions are unclear
and his
li
,
pre
m-
inary talks last week with the Chadian Vice President produced
nothing of significance. Peace negotiations between Chad, Libya,
and the rebels will begin next Tuesday, but there is no assurance
that the rebels will participate. Rebel radio broadcasts point
out that they did not participate in the cease-fire talks in
Libya last month and assert that they are not bound by the de-
cisions reached there.
25X1 Tensions within Chad's ruling Supreme Military Council
have fueled rumors of an impending coup. The group within the
council that favors negotiations with Libya and the rebels is
now on top, but Foreign Minister Kamougue, now on the defensive,
might attempt to oust Malloum if he himself were threatened
with removal. The French reinforcements have strengthened Mal-
loum's position, but his ultimate fate could rest on the outcome
of the negotiations.
25X1 Q If the rebels continue their insurgency, both the US
and French Embassies in Ndjamena believe they may launch a cam-
paign of terror against the central government and Europeans
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WEST GERMANY: Labor Problems
West Germany's labor problems worsened Zast weekend
wit the breakdown of talks aimed at averting a strike today
by metal workers in Baden-Wuerttemberg. Union officials rejected
management's offer of a pay raise of just over 4 percent and
decided to strike for 8 percent. The strike is certain to heighten
the already growing concern within the government over the pos-
ible negative impact of labor unrest on the economy and, in
the longer run, on the unity of the governing coalition.
The metal workers' unions in the northern states of
Baden-Wuerttemberg and North Rhine - Westphalia last week over-
whelmingly authorized their leaders to call a strike follow-
ing unsuccessful attempts to narrow the gap between the unions'
demand and management's original offer. No strike date has been
set for North Rhine - Westphalia, but the metal workers there
will probably follow the lead of the unions in Baden-Wuerttem-
berg. Management in North Rhine - Westphalia is considering
lockouts of employees even if there is no formal strike.
I Metal workers in Baden-Wuerttemberg would like to
win a wage hike above the government's suggested 5 percent,
a settlement that could then be used as a model for other re-
gions. Management, however, seems reluctant to offer more than
4 percent. Both management and the union rejected a compromise
proposal of 4.8 percent late last month.
I Elsewhere, labor and management in the newspaper in-
dustry have been sparring with spot strikes and lockouts in
major West German cities for about two weeks. Newspaper pub-
lishers have vowed to lock out workers in about 230 of the
country's 250 dailies today unless the printers return to work
in several large cities. Negotiations will resume or open with
workers in public services, the construction industry, and
private banking--all of whom are demanding wage increases in
excess of 5 percent.
The government is continuing its hands-off ap-
proach, but there are indications that the prolonged labor un-
rest is causing concern. An official of the Economics Ministry
told the US Embassy that he was worried about the possible im-
pact of excessive wage settlements on the economy. A strike in
the steel and metal industry, he said, would almost certainly
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result in a wage increase exceeding the government's informal
guideline. This could slow investment and jeopardize government
hopes that present fiscal programs would be sufficient to at-
tain the 3.5-percent growth target set for this year. 0 25X1
SPAIN-UK: Gibraltar Talks
//Another round of Spanish-British talks on Gi-
ra tar is scheduled to get under way today in Paris. No quick
solution is likely on the basic problem of sovereignty, but
some progress toward easing tension over the issue seems possi-
ble.//
Neither Spain nor the UK expects the im asse t b
k, %J
resolved soon. The authorities in Gibraltar refuse
to open e
substantive negotiations on sovereignty until the Spanish
blockade, imposed by General Franco in 1969, is lifted. Spain,
under intense domestic pressure, believes it cannot lift
the blockade until negotiations have shown significant progress.
Spain, according to Foreign Minister Oreja is w411-
11
ing to offer Gibraltar enhanced autonomy, including i
ts own
administration, courts, and public order force; Madrid would
be responsible only for foreign and defense policy. The people
of Gibraltar overwhelmingly favor remaining British, but it is
clear that Gibraltar's colonial status cannot be maintained in-
definitely. British officials, moreover, have ruled out full
integration with Britain.
The first round of the current talks took
lace l
t
p
as
November. Although it accomplished little of substance, it did
seem to improve the atmosphere. Subsequently, Spain extended
indefinitely the customary Christmas opening of telephone com-
munications with Gibraltar. More significant for the long run,
the Spanish seem to have been making a greater effort since No-
vember to understand Gibraltar's point of view. Representatives
of Spain's principal political parties have visited Gibraltar,
and a correspondent of the official Spanish news agency has
been posted there.
These contacts appear to have fostered
reater a
-
g
p
preciation by Madrid that Gibraltarian acceptance of Spanish
sovereignty is likely to take a long time. On his return from
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a visit to Gibraltar in January, the international secretary
of Prime Minister Suarez' Union of the Democratic Center spoke
to newsmen of a transition period of 10 to 25 years.
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tary matters than his predecessors. He has no apparent strong
ties to Teng or to Party Chairman Hua Kuo-feng, the principal
contenders for power, nor does he appear to have an independent
power base in the People's Liberation Army. He is professionally
competent, however, and as one of China's "old marshals" is
widely respected within the armed forces.//
//The issue is charged with emotion, and the Spanish,
British, and Gibraltarian Governments all will have serious
trouble with domestic lobbies in justifying any concessions.
Nonetheless, if the Gibraltarians now respond to the Spanish
concession on telephone links by satisfying Madrid that there
is some movement on their part toward meeting Spanish goals,
Spain is likely to reciprocate, perhaps by reopening ferr
service from Algeciras to Gibraltar.// 25X1
CHINA: New Defense Minister
//The selection of Chinese Politburo member Hsu
Hsiang-chien as defense minister at the National People's
Congress last week is probably only a temporary solution to
the political infighting over the defense portfolio. Hsu is
76 years old and in poor health, and the circumstances of his
selection suggest that he was a compromise candidate chosen
for his political neutrality. The Chinese leadership apparently
could not agree on a stronger personality to replace Party Vice
Chairman Yeh Chien-ying, who became the de facto head of state.//
//Before the congress, there were numerous reports
that Canton Military Region Commander Hsu Shih-yu, thought to
be an ally of Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping, would replace Yeh
as defense minister. Chen Hsi-lien, commander of the Peking
Military Region and an opponent of Teng's, was also a candidate
for the job. A stalemate may have developed between pro- and
anti-Teng forces on the Politburo over who should receive the
defense portfolio, and Hsu Hsiang-chien probably was selected
to break the deadlock.//
//Hsu will probably have less influence on mili-
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//The defense minister is usually the de facto
a rman o the Military Commission, the party body that over-
sees the armed forces, but there is no indication that Hsu has
yet replaced Yeh in this critical post. At least two other
members of the Military Commission, Teng and former Chief of
Staff Lo Jui-ching, seem to have greater influence than Hsu.//
//China's military establishment is re bl
as
ona y
stable
politically, but it faces several important questions
that require effective leadership. The trend of military dis-
engagement from civilian political activity is continuing.//
//The issues of military modernization and wa
r
preparedness could cause considerable controversy, especially
over budgetary allocations. The recently adopted program of
screening and "purifying" the military leadership has already
resulted in some shuffling and restructuring of command groups,
mostly at middle levels, and instability could result if it is
not carried out carefully.//
//Hsu has consistently advocated "professionalism"
and de-politicization of the armed forces, but his positions on
these important military issues are not entirely clear. Hsu
appears to rank behind Yeh, Teng, and Lo Jui-ching in the
military hierarchy and can be expected to follow their lead
i
n carrying out these and other policies.
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Argentina
II A riot yesterday in one of Argentina's largest prisons
is likely to increase international and domestic criticism of
the military regime. US Embassy sources say 70 persons were
killed and 30 injured in one of the worst prison riots on record.
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According to press reports, both guards and inmates
were casualties; no cause has been given for the rioting. The
prison houses hundreds of political prisoners, but the Embassy
sources describe those taking part in the riot as mostly "common
criminals." Civilian groups, which are becoming bolder in criti-
cizing the military government, may try to exploit the incident
i
n an attempt to undermine the regime's authority.
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